Creativity syndrome: Integration, application, and innovation

Bulletin103, No. 1,27-43

Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-2909/88/«00.75

Creativity Syndrome: Integration, Application, and Innovation

Michael D. MumfordGeorgia Institute of Technology

Sigrid B. GustafsonUniversity of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden

The present article is concerned with certain conceptual issues embodied in the description and

understanding of creative behavior. Initially, we argue that although creativity has been denned in

many ways, the ultimate concern in studies of creativity is the production of novel, socially valued

products. Subsequently, we review the literature pertaining to the development of innovative occupa-

tional achievement. We suggest that the integration and reorganization of cognitive structures is

likely to underlie major creative contributions and that the application of existing cognitive struc-

tures is Hkely to underlie minor contributions. We then extend this interpretation to the processes

traditionally held to underlie individual differences in creativity and note that both the major and

minor forms of creativity will require a number of different knowledges, skills, and abilities. Further,

we suggest that the effective translation of ideas into action will depend on a variety of individual

and situational attributes. On the basis of these observations, we concluded that enhanced under-standing and prediction will require a more sophisticated multivariate approach.

The quality of human life is greatly influenced by the creativecontributions of certain individuals (Albert, 1983). Thus, fromthe time of Galton (1883), psychology has evidenced an abidinginterest in the creative act. Much of this research has been car-ried out in the hope that a sound understanding of the phenome-non would lead to more effective use of this precious social re-source (Taylor, 1964). In recent years, this mission has becomesubstantially more important because of the high premiumplaced on creative talent in a world of rapid social and techno-logical change (Deva, 1984). As a result, the description, predic-tion, and understanding of creative behavior has become a pri-mary concern of applied psychologists, capable of generatinghundreds of articles each year (Barren & Harrington, 1981).

Unfortunately, one might legitimately wonder just where allthis activity has taken psychology. A review of the extant litera-ture leaves one feeling like Alice, who, upon reading "Jabber-wocky," commented, "Somehow it seems to fill my head withideas—only I don't exactly know what they are" (Carroll, 1872/1974, p. 177). Although the field now possesses a far more de-tailed knowledge of the correlates of creativity than has pre-viously been available, it still lacks a consensual understandingof the creative act. In view of this situation, our intent in thepresent article is to review the available literature and to pro-pose a tentative framework for the description and understand-ing of creative behavior.

Definitional Issues

Creative Behavior

The question rising at this juncture is just why a consensualunderstanding of creativity has been slow to emerge. In part,

We thank Bill Owens, Jack Feldman, Larry James, Tim Salthouse,

Don Grant, and Frank Harding for their comments and support.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mi-

chael D. Mumford, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technol-

ogy, Atlanta, Georgia 30332.

this lack of integration may be attributed to the fact that, likeintelligence, creativity represents a highly complex and diffuseconstruct (Sternberg, 1985). Of somewhat greater import, how-ever, is the lack of a sound general definition of creative behav-ior. Some investigators, such as Guilford (1950, 1967) and Kris(1952), have defined creative behavior in terms of the produc-tion of ideas. Along similar lines, Tyler (1978) argued that cre-ativity involves the recognition of possibilities. In the work ofMacKinnon (1962), it appears that creativity is considered anattribute of personality or a particular kind of response style.On the other hand, Cattell (1971) seemed to conceive of creativ-ity as a form of problem-solving ability.

The fact that the luminaries of differential psychology haveemployed such markedly different definitions might lead oneto wonder whether it is really possible to construct a generaldefinition of this complex construct. Fortunately, however, itappears that these differences may be traced to the tendency ofinvestigators to focus on different, albeit legitimate, aspects ofthe creative process rather than on creative behavior per se(Nicholls, 1972). Thus, it might be possible to formulate an op-erational definition of creativity by considering the kinds of cri-teria commonly used to define it (Albert, 1975).

In nearly all studies of creativity, researchers use criterionmeasures drawn from one of three basic categories. The firstcategory consists of overt production criteria, such as publica-tion counts or patent awards. These measures assess creativityin terms of the frequency with which individuals generate inno-vative products having acknowledged social worth or the qual-ity of these products (Cole, 1979; Lehman, 1966; Terman,1954). Second, professional recognition criteria assess creativ-ity in terms of the awards given individuals for the productionof new ideas or products held to be of some value in an occupa-tional field (Roe, 1953; Zuckerman, 1974). Third, when socialrecognition criteria are used, the judgments of knowledgeableothers, such as peers or supervisors, afford a basis for assessingthe value of an individual's novel contribution in some area(Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; MacKinnon, 1962). Al-

27

28 MICHAEL D. MUMFORD AND SIGRID B. GUSTAFSON

though these criteria differ in many ways, they seem bound to-

gether by their common concern with the production of novel,

socially valued products (Taylor, Smith, & Ghiselin, 1963).

The idea that creativity should be denned in terms of novel,

socially valued products, instead of in terms of processes, has

received increasingly wide support over the years (Amabile,

1983; Ghiselin, 1963; Harmon, 1963). Busse and Mansfield

(1980) argued that significant progress can be made in elucidat-

ing creative processes only by studying creative accomplish-

ments within particular occupational fields. Similar arguments

have been presented by Hausman (1979), Besemer and

Treffinger (1981), Bailin (1984), Hocevar (1981), and Briskman

(1980), who have noted that it is only by reference to the innova-

tive solution of significant problems that one can obtain an op-

erational referent for studying creative processes and determin-

ing the meaning of creative potential.

Definitional Implications

If the appropriateness of defining creative behavior as the

production of novel solutions to significant social problems is

granted, then creativity is essentially being defined in terms of

outstanding occupational achievement (Kogan, 1973; Lehman,

1953). Given such a definition, certain broader implications be-

come apparent. First, because the requirements for producing

these products may vary, depending on the type of problems

confronted in a particular occupational area, a great deal of

variability in the nature of creative behavior can be expected.

In fact, the existence of these cross-field differences has been

demonstrated in a number of studies of creativity (Ban-on &

Harrington, 1981;Roe, 1953;Torrance, 1972),includinginves-

tigations concerned with implicit theories of creativity (Stern-

berg, 1985). The existence of this behavioral variability in turn

suggests that attempts to understand and predict creative behav-

ior in a more general sense must necessarily focus on those pro-

cesses likely to be common to all creative endeavors.

Nevertheless, the definition of these common processes re-

quires that a distinction be maintained with respect to the level

of the creative undertaking. Ghiselin (1963) noted that the psy-

chological processes underlying the production of major contri-

butions, in which the individual generates ideas or understand-

ings used in solving a variety of problems, may not be equiva-

lent to the processes underlying the production of minor

contributions, in which the individual extends existing under-

standings to solve a more limited but still significant problem.

Briskman (1980), too, emphasized that creative products vary

in degree of significance. Although each creation reflects a rec-

ognized novel and useful solution, only those that meet the ad-

ditional criterion of altering the very background of the solu-

tions from which they originated can be labeled "transcendent

products" (Briskman, 1980, p. 97). This distinction is also ap-

parent in Besemer and Treffinger's (1981) comment that some

but not all creative products transform the manner in which

their audience perceives the world.

The foregoing discussion leads to the final major implication

of this definition. Specifically, it is unlikely that creativity, in the

sense defined above, represents a homogeneous psychological

attribute. Rather, creative behavior is likely to be determined

by a complex interaction between the attributes of the individ-

ual and the attributes of the environment. Therefore, creativity

appears to be best conceptualized as a syndrome involving a

number of elements: (a) the processes underlying the individu-

al's capacity to generate new ideas or understandings, (b) the

characteristics of the individual facilitating process operation,

(c) the characteristics of the individual facilitating the transla-

tion of these ideas into action, (d) the attributes of the situation

conditioning the individual's willingness to engage in creative

behavior, and (e) the attributes of the situation influencing eval-

uation of the individual's productive efforts.

As might be expected, previous studies have examined poten-

tial influences on creative behavior with respect to each of these

domains. Hence, in the ensuing discussion, we examine the

progress made in each area and the manner in which the associ-

ated variables interact to determine the likelihood of creative

contributions. We begin this review by considering the ontog-

eny of innovative achievement in an attempt to draw some con-

clusions concerning the cognitive strategies influencing major

and minor contributions. Subsequently, we discuss the pro-

cesses and differential attributes contributing to the effective ap-

plication of these strategies. Finally, we consider certain devel-

opmental and situational influences conditioning the likelihood

of innovation, along with the broader practical and theoretical

implications of this effort.

Age and Achievement

Basic Findings

The preceding arguments suggest that the study of creativity

should begin with an attempt to understand exactly how indi-

viduals come to produce novel, socially valued products. One

approach to this problem has been proposed by Fiske (1979)

and Sontag (1971), who suggested that the antecedent-conse-

quent information generated by developmental studies might

provide a useful vehicle for attaining a preliminary understand-

ing of such complex differential attributes as creativity. Sim-

ilarly, Nicholls (1972) and Howe (1982) have argued that at-

tempts to understand creativity should begin with a careful ex-

amination of the developmental history of individuals who have

made recognized creative contributions. Taken as a whole, these

observations suggest that a careful examination of the data con-

cerning the ontogeny of outstanding occupational achievement

might prove of substantial value in attaining a more complete

understanding of the creativity syndrome.

Perhaps the most comprehensive developmental study of in-

novative achievement may be found in Lehman's (1953, 1954,

1958, 1960, 1966) attempt to determine the age at which indi-

viduals are most likely to make notable contributions. Lehman

(1953, 1966) addressed this issue by using standard reference

sources to identify those individuals who had made significant

contributions in various occupational fields. He then deter-

mined the number of such citations, the age at which the work

was completed, and, in certain instances, its judged impor-

tance. In accordance with Ghiselin's (1963) comments, major

contributions typically reflected new ideas or products applica-

ble to a variety of significant problems, whereas minor contri-

butions were likely to reflect viable, albeit limited, extensions

of known facts and principles.

INNOVATION 29

Application of this relatively straightforward technique

yielded four important findings. First, Lehman (1953, 1954,

1958, 1960, 1966) found that major contributions were most

likely to occur in young adulthood, whereas minor contribu-

tions and net productivity were most likely to peak in middle

age. Second, the curve for major contributions tended to fall off

sharply at the end of young adulthood, although the curve for

minor contributions was relatively flat, falling off only as indi-

viduals reached their middle 60s and even then falling off rather

slowly. Third, the peak of these age curves tended to shift down-

ward in fields highly dependent on native ability and upward in

fields requiring substantial training and life experience. Fourth,

the preceding observations appeared to be stable across at least

a limited range of cultural groups and historic periods.

Although these observations are generally recognized to have

important implications for understanding creativity, it has not

been clear exactly how they should be interpreted. Attempts

have been made to attribute Lehman's (1953, 1966) findings

to the various biases inherent in archival research, such as the

selective survival of either individuals or documents (Dennis,

1956,1958,1966). However, careful follow-up research by Leh-

man (1966) and Simonton (1984b), using appropriate statistical

controls, shows that, although there was some bias in Lehman's

(1953) initial findings, it is not sufficient to change the basic

conclusions outlined above.

Previous Explanations

If Lehman's (1953, 1966) findings cannot be attributed to

methodological artifacts, one must ask just what substantive

hypotheses might account for these findings. Over the years, five

hypotheses have been proposed to account for the timing of ma-

jor and minor contributions: (a) age decrements, (b) social com-

mitments, (c) declining creativity, (d) cumulative advantage,

and (e) experience/enthusiasm.

According to the age-decrements hypothesis, occupational

investment following young adulthood is limited by physical

decrements and ill health (Lehman, 1953). Although this hy-

pothesis may explain the decline in minor contributions occur-

ring around age 60, because minor contributions and net pro-

ductivity peak in middle age and because a strong correlation

is not found between physical demands and the timing of peak

achievement, its general utility is open to question. Simonton

(1983a) and Baldwin, Colangelo, and Dettman (1984) have pro-

vided some support for this conclusion in arguing that the rele-

vant explanatory variable here is more likely to be psychological

than physical age. Yet, even if physical decrements are assumed

to include declines in intellectual ability, it seems unlikely that

these declines can account for the differences between young

adults and middle-aged people when one considers the slow de-

cline of general intellectual ability beginning in later middle age

(Schaie & Hertzog, 1986) and the substantial intellectual de-

mands made by even minor contributions of the sort described

by Lehman (1953, 1966).

A number of authors have proposed a version of the social

commitments hypothesis by suggesting that the declining fre-

quency of major contributions in middle age might be attrib-

uted to competing administrative and child-rearing responsibil-

ities (Adams, 1946; Taylor, 1963). Yet, because young adults

also face a number of competing tasks, such as establishing a

family (Havinghurst, 1954), and even minor contributions of

the type examined by Lehman (1953,1966) require substantial

time investment, this hypothesis is open to question. It has also

been suggested that the joint influence of increasing experience

and decreasing enthusiasm might account for these age curves

(Simonton, 1984a). Unfortunately, Bray, Campbell, and

Grant's (1974) finding that middle-aged people display greater

work involvement casts some doubt on the overall value of this

explanation, as do the motivational demands made by minor

contributions.

According to the cumulative-advantage hypothesis, the indi-

vidual's experience, social connections, and knowledge of pro-

fessional expectations increase with age and experience and

thereby increase the likelihood of professional recognition and

productivity (Cole, 1979). Although this explanation has value

for understanding the frequency of minor contributions in mid-

dle age, it cannot explain the tendency of major contributions to

occur in young adulthood, when individuals are in the earliest

phases of their career (Roe, 1972).

The declining creativity hypothesis suggests that the decreas-

ing likelihood of major contributions in middle age is due to

age-related decrements in divergent-thinking abilities. Al-

though age-related decreases in divergent thinking have been

observed (Alpaugh & Birren, 1977), they appear to be format

specific (Kogan, 1973; Vernon, 1971). Moreover, when creativ-

ity is evaluated in terms of the number of workable problem

solutions produced, an index of creativity highly relevant to oc-

cupational achievement, significant differences are not ob-

served (Owens, 1969). Therefore, it appears that changes in di-

vergent-thinking abilities may not provide a fully adequate ex-

planation for Lehman's (1953, 1966) findings.

An Alternative Explanation

The foregoing discussion suggests that although these five

hypotheses might account for certain findings obtained by Leh-

man (1953, 1966), they do not provide an adequate explanation

for the tendency of major contributions to occur in young adult-

hood and minor contributions to occur in middle age. Recently,

Mumford (1984) noted that a problem apparent in all these

explanations may be found in the attempt to account for Leh-

man's (1953, 1966) findings in terms of what one age group

has that the other might lack. Consequently, by focusing on the

unique developmental tasks facing individuals in young adult-

hood and middle age, it might be possible to construct a more

appropriate explanation.

Given the arguments presented earlier, it seems that some im-

portant clues in this regard might be obtained from historical

studies of individuals who have produced major contributions.

Perhaps the most well-known investigation of this sort may be

found in Kuhn's (1970) study of scientific revolutions. Follow-

ing a careful examination of the conditions underlying a num-

ber of scientific breakthroughs, Kuhn concluded that major

achievement in the sciences appears to be linked to a young

person's redefinition and reorganization of the concepts used

in past attempts to understand some phenomenon based on an

effort to incorporate certain anomalous findings that were not

readily understood within the existing paradigm. In a somewhat


more wide-ranging study, examining artists, writers, social sci-

entists, and physical scientists, Koestler (1964) arrived at a sim-

ilar conclusion. Koestler's (1964) review of the conditions re-

lated to innovative achievement led him to argue that it is im-

possible to create something out of nothing; rather, major

achievements appeared to depend on the reorganization of ex-

isting facts and understandings brought about by the sudden

fusion of two or more schemata. Rothenberg (1976, 1979) has

also documented a variety of historic evidence suggesting that

major contributions may be related to the superimposition, or

fusion, of images.

Taken as a whole, the foregoing studies provide a reasonably

cohesive description of the conditions underlying the generation

of major contributions. More specifically, they suggest that the

integration and reorganization of distinct cognitive structures

in a manner that leads to new and more effective understandings

for addressing significant problems emerging in an occupa-

tional field result in major contributions of the type described

by Lehman (1953, 1966). Of course, these historic studies do

not and perhaps cannot provide unambiguous evidence with

regard to the substantive import of this event. However, some-

what less ambiguous evidence in this regard may be found in

the broader literature.

Rothenberg (1986) and his colleagues, in studies of homospa-

tial thinking, have obtained experimental evidence providing

some support for this proposition. Rothenberg (1986), Ro-

thenberg and Sobel (1980), and Sobel and Rothenberg (1980)

have defined homospatial thinking as deliberately and con-

sciously superimposing onto one another two or more images,

resulting in emergence of the new forms held to be critical inno-

vation. Studies in which the role of homospatial thinking in cre-

ative production has been examined have involved obtaining

judgments of the creativity of literary or artistic products gener-

ated under a control condition, in which two slides were dis-

played side by side, and an experimental condition, in which

the same slides were superimposed on one another (Rothenberg

& Sobel, 1980; Sobel & Rothenberg, 1980). Although con-

strained by interrater reliabilities on the order of .40, a difficulty

in the evaluation of artistic products that Rothenberg and col-

leagues have discussed at some length, the results obtained in

these investigations support the notion that stimulus conditions

leading to the merger of two or more categories facilitate the

production of creative products even under conditions in which

gestalt effects have been controlled for (Rothenberg, 1986;

Rothenberg & Sobel, 1980; Sobel & Rothenberg, 1980). In a

different set of investigations, examining the use of multiple

cognitive categories defined on the basis of verbal protocols,

Barsalou (1982, 1983) has also obtained evidence indicating

that cross-classification, or the use of information drawn from

multiple categories, may be related to creative production.

Some caution is required, however, in approaching these find-

ings because of the lack of external criteria appraising the cre-

ative value of resultant products.

Support for the foregoing proposition is not limited to experi-

mental studies. A number of field studies have also provided

evidence arguing for the validity of this proposition. The most

direct implementation of this theoretical perspective in an at-

tempt to measure creative potential may be found in Owens's

(1969) study of mechanical ingenuity. Owens's effort was based

on the assumption that the production of new mechanical prod-

ucts is necessarily derived from a reorganization of an existing

and finite supply of tools and concepts. After developing perfor-

mance items intended to assess the individual's facility in rear-

ranging these basic elements, Owens found that the resulting

test scores were powerful predictors of real-world production

criteria. Somewhat less direct but nonetheless significant sup-

port for the foregoing proposition may be obtained by noting

that it implies that both a search for and the use of multiple

alternative categories will be related to creative production.

Thus, MacKinnon's (1962) and Gough's (1976) observations

indicating that the use of moderately remote associations is re-

lated to creative achievement among architects, scientists, and

engineers provide some confirmatory evidence in this regard.

Further evidence along these lines may be found in Alissa's

(1972) work indicating that creativity is related to overinclu-

sion, or the tendency to attend to information that is seemingly

irrelevant to solution of the problem at hand. Studies conducted

by Arlin (1977), Csikszentmihalyi and Beattie (1979), Getzels

and Csikzentmihalyi (1976), Glover (1979), and Kasperson

(1978) also provide evidence for the importance of category

search and problem definition in creative endeavors.

Although further research is required, this confluence of his-

toric, experimental, and field research suggests that the individ-

ual's ability to integrate, reorganize, or restructure existing un-

derstandings may play an important role in generating major

contributions or new schemata of use in solving a variety of

problems. If it is granted that this hypothesis is at least tenable,

then the question rises of just what factors might predispose

young adults to successfully engage in such integrative activi-

ties. Haan (1981) argued that young adulthood may be thought

of as a time of accommodation. Following Erikson's (1959) line

of reasoning, she noted that young adults must complete a num-

ber of developmental tasks of substantial importance to future

well-being, including selecting and advancing a career, marry-

ing, obtaining an adequate income, ensuring adequate housing,

and starting a family. To accomplish these tasks, young adults

must be sensitive to objective information concerning the exter-

nal environment and must be willing to align desires and capa-

bilities with the potentialities and expectations apparent in their

environment (Haan, 198 l;Mumford, Wesley, & Shaffer, 1987),

attending especially to the occupational environment, which

constitutes a major locus of task completion (Levenson, 1978;

Vaillant&McArthur, 1972).

The need to align desires and capabilities with the potentiali-

ties and expectations associated with movement into the adult

social world requires young adults to restructure categories and

category interrelations on the basis of objective information

concerning their external environment (LaBouvie-Vief &

Chandler, 1978;Piaget, 1967). When this frequent integration

and reorganization of cognitions is based on accurate informa-

tion that was not used or was not structured in a similar fashion

in past attempts to address a problem situation, it may result

in the creation of a unique and perhaps more effective under-

standing. If this new understanding provides an effective solu-

tion to certain significant problems emerging in an occupa-

tional field, a major contribution may result. Thus, the need for

young adults to integrate and reorganize cognitive categories

with some frequency as part of their movement into the adult

INNOVATION 31

social arena may, in part, account for their unusual propensity

for major contributions.

The effectiveness of these integrative efforts with regard to

occupational achievement is likely to be reinforced by at least

three other characteristics of young adults and their lives. First,

because the occupational world constitutes a major locus of task

completion, young adults are likely to focus information

search, integration of structures, and problem solving in this

area. When combined with their manifest commitment to andconcern with occupational achievement (Vaillant & McArthur,

1972) as well as a somewhat unrealistic belief in themselves and

their abilities (Levenson, 1978), this focus should channel such

integrative efforts along occupational avenues under conditions

in which individuals would be willing to pursue new under-

standings. Second, the tendency of young adults to be con-cerned with effectiveness in the broader social world should re-

sult in a search for objective information relevant to the solu-

tion of occupational problems (Levenson, 1978; Mumford,

1984), thus facilitating integrative efforts that do in fact lead

to problem solutions. Finally, early in an individual's career,

occupationally relevant categories are likely to include rela-

tively few elements, because of limited experience, and so may

be especially amenable to reintegration or restructuring with

the inclusion of new information (Schien, 1980).

Although these forces facilitating integration among young

adults may explain their propensity for major contributions,

they do not necessarily suggest why minor contributions and

net productivity would peak in middle age. Neugarten (1968)

and Gould (1978) have argued that it is in middle age that peo-

ple are best able to handle a highly complex environment and

a well-differentiated self. Yet, along with these well-developed

social and intellectual skills, middle age brings an awareness of

oncoming death and the knowledge that certain goals set forth

earlier in life may not be achieved (Levenson, 1978; Neugarten,

1968). This reevaluation leads middle-aged people to focus oncontrol over the remaining portion of their lives within a frame-

work provided by more realistic and attainable objectives. This

general outlook seems well suited to the tasks facing members

of this age group because they must fulfill positions of responsi-

bility in the occupational world, provide an interface between

generations, and determine the course of their remaining years

(Roadheaver & Datan, 1981).

A variety of studies document the concern of middle-aged

people with realizable pragmatic achievement (Bray et al.,

1974; Levenson, 1978; Lowenthal et al., 1976; Vaillant, 1977).

When this emphasis on practical achievement within the frame-

work of more limited time and goals is considered from a career-

development perspective, it suggests a potential explanation for

the tendency of minor achievements to peak in middle age.

More specifically, prior career development should have pro-

vided these individuals with a firm grasp of a field's existing

understandings as well as with the ability to identify significantproblems apparent within this framework (Chi, Feltovich, &

Glaser, 1981; Zuckerman, 1974). These attributes, in conjunc-

tion with the motivational dispositions of middle-aged people,

their greater command of available tools, and well-developed

tacit knowledge structures, should lead them to seek out prob-

lems that can be identified and solved within the extant para-

digm, simultaneously providing them with the resources re-

quired for implementing this solution. Although these charac-

teristics are likely to facilitate minor contributions of the sort

described by Lehman (1953, 1966), it is also possible that these

well-developed cognitive structures may inhibit reintegration

by virtue of their stability, prior use, and automaticity (Barsa-

lou, 1983).

Evidence consistent with the foregoing hypotheses may be

found in studies of creativity conducted by Taylor (1963), Ma-

con (1987), and Owens (1969). Taylor (1963) used a divergent-

thinking measure to appraise idea production. This measure

was found to yield a correlation of .62 with supervisors' ratings

of creative performance during the initial phases of research

scientists' careers, but the correlation declined to .41 and. 17 in

progressively more advanced stages. These findings suggest that

idea generation may become less important to creative achieve-

ment as individuals begin to focus on and apply existing under-

standings in middle age. Macon also obtained evidence indicat-

ing that the antecedents of creative production are moderatedby age, such that idea generation is more important to younger

scientists, whereas career identification is more important to

older scientists. Finally, Owens noted that although young

adults produce a larger number of highly creative solutions to

mechanical ingenuity problems, middle-aged people produce

workable solutions at a higher rate than do young adults.

The foregoing discussion has shown how the developmental

tasks facing young adults and middle-aged people might ac-

count for their propensities toward major and minor contribu-

tions, but we have given little attention to Lehman's (1953,

1966) remaining findings. In this regard, it should be noted that

the slower onset of the developmental tasks associated with

young adulthood in fields requiring substantial training and life

experience may shift the relevant age curves upward. Further,

the high stability of occupational structures across cultures

(Deeg & Paterson, 1947; Hall & Jones, 1950), along with the

fundamental nature of these influences, might account for the

apparent stability of these findings across cultures and historic

periods. The relatively flat shape of the curve for minor contri-

butions may reflect the potential for some integrations of sche-

mata to result in minor contributions, as well as the capability

of young adults to use existing structures in the pursuit of more

limited goals. Finally, the observed declines in the frequency

of major and minor contributions might be attributed to the

performance decrements brought about by retirement and old

age, along with consistency in the timing of major developmen-tal transitions among individuals having similar life experiences

(Mumford, Wesley, & Shaffer, 1987).

Differential Processes

Production Processes

Of course, much of the preceding discussion was carried out

on an aggregate level; therefore, it may not reflect the realities

of a particular creator's productive efforts (Simonton, 1984b).

Nevertheless, this discussion does suggest that the integration

and reorganization of cognitive structures might underlie major

contributions, whereas the extension of existing structures to

significant but more limited problems might underlie minor

contributions. Yet the effective application of these cognitive


strategies in generating innovative problem solutions is likely to

depend on the effective application of an extensive set of knowl-

edges, skills, and abilities. For instance, the effectiveness of an

individual's integrative efforts might be influenced by a variety

of attributes, including individual differences in the capacity to

(a) develop and use alternative understandings, (b) identify facts

that are inconsistent with a given understanding, (c) apply mul-

tiple understandings in solving a problem, and (d) reorganize

elements within an understanding. Similarly, effective applica-

tion of existing structures might vary with individual differ-

ences in (a) the richness or comprehensiveness of the relevant

understandings, (b) the capacity to identify relevant under-

standings, (c) the identification of problems that can and cannot

be addressed within a given understanding, and (d) the identifi-

cation of problems implied by a certain understanding.

Although the foregoing attributes represent purely hypothet-

ical constructs capable of determining individuals' potential for

major and minor contributions, the extant literature does pro-

vide support for the relevance of at least some of these attri-

butes. For instance, a number of studies underscore the import

of problem-finding activities in a variety of creative efforts (Ar-

lin, 1977; Getzels & Csikzentmihalyi, 1976; Glover, 1979;

Kasperson, 1978). Recently, Dillion (1982) argued that prob-

lem finding represents a multifaceted construct involving three

progressively more complex activities: identifying an obvious

problem (Level 1), discovering a problem through data investi-

gation (Level 2), and inventing a problem through rearrange-

ment of its central elements (Level 3). In the present scheme,

Level 1 and Level 2 activities—involving the application of ex-

isting structures—appear to facilitate minor contributions,

whereas Level 3—provided that it involves multiple and hith-

erto uncombined structures—might contribute to major con-

tributions. Of course, the ability to identify a problem does not

ensure that the individual possesses the capacity to solve it.

Thus, one might expect that a variety of other attributes will

condition the individual's capacity for both major and minor

contributions.

One implication of this statement is that knowledge and com-

prehension of a given problem area are likely to represent pre-

requisites for creative activity and idea generation. As such, it

is not surprising that work by Simonton (1984b), Snow (1986),

Bradshaw, Langley, and Simon (1983), and Langley, Simon,

Bradshaw, and Zytkow (1986) underscores the importance of

knowledge of a subject-matter area in determining the likeli-

hood of innovative achievement. Although substantially greater

attention should be given to defining the role of acquired exper-

tise in determining the likelihood of both major and minor cre-

ative contributions across occupational fields, the theory out-

lined above leads to the expectation that knowledge and experi-

ence would be directly related to minor contributions, while

yielding a curvilinear relation with the likelihood of major con-

tributions due to the channeling and cuing effects brought

about by high levels of expertise.

The second major implication of this perspective concerns

the role of intelligence in idea generation. For some time, a vari-

ety of evidence indicating that intelligence measures yield mod-

erate positive relations with indexes of innovative achievement

has been available (Cattell, 1971; Cox, 1926; Terman & Oden

1959). Although many ambiguities exist with respect to the

definition of intelligence (Resnick, 1976), if it is granted that

general intelligence represents an individual's ability to formu-

late and use abstract concepts (Humphreys, 1979; Tyler, 1965),

then its significance becomes apparent. More specifically, in ar-

eas in which the relevant understandings required for both ma-

jor and minor contributions are difficult to grasp, intelligence

could be expected to condition the likelihood of major and mi-

nor contributions. This observation finds substantial support in

the many studies reporting moderate positive relations between

indexes of intelligence and creative production among artists,

scientists, and professionals (Cattell, 1971; Gough, 1976; Hel-

son & Crutchfield, 1970) but weak or insignificant relations in

lower level occupations (Friedricksen & Ward, 1978; Hocevar,

1980; Kogan & Pankove, 1974). Further, to the extent that all

areas of endeavor require the development and application of at

least some abstract understandings, it can be expected that a

certain degree of intelligence would set a minimal precondition

for creativity as it is reflected in major and minor contributions.

Therefore, it is not surprising that at least some evidence has

been obtained for Guilford's (1967) triangularity hypothesis

(Guilford & Christensen, 1973; Schubert, 1973), according to

which creativity and intelligence are most highly correlated in

the lower two thirds of the population.

Historically, studies of individual differences in the capacity

for idea generation have focused on Guilford's (1950) divergent-

thinking construct. As originally defined, divergent thinking re-

fers to an individual's ability to generate multiple potential solu-

tions to a problem. Divergent-thinking ability is typically mea-

sured by presenting individuals with an open-ended stimulus

problem to which they are required to generate as many solu-

tions as possible. The individual's performance may then be

evaluated with respect to frequency or number of solutions pro-

duced, flexibility as evidenced by the number of shifts in re-

sponse categories, or originality as evidenced in the uniqueness

of the proposed solutions. However, because of certain ambigu-

ities in the relevant scoring procedures, most investigations

have relied on frequency measures (Kogan, 1973), and such

measures have been found to yield moderate positive relations

with indexes of creative achievement (Horn, 1976; Richards,

1976).

Whereas the multivariate nature of creative production sug-

gests an obvious explanation for the strength of these validity

coefficients, the literature delineates a number of other prob-

lems associated with the rote application of divergent-thinking

measures. For instance, performance on such measures is in-

fluenced by instructional set (Evans & Forbach, 1983; Lissitz &

Willhoft, 1985; Owen & Baum, 1985), a finding that led Owen

and Baum to conclude that divergent thinking may be a situa-

tionally contingent construct rather than an enduring trait.

Other investigators have noted that scores on divergent-think-

ing measures may be unduly influenced by test anxiety, re-

sponse sets, and the limited reliability of scoring procedures

(Romaniuk & Romaniuk, 1981). Finally, in actual creative pro-

duction, individuals are confronted with a problem to solve,

not with a solution (e.g., "brick") to which they must attach

a problem (e.g., "uses"; Owen & Baum, 1985). Consequently,

current divergent-thinking tests may not fully capture the in-

tended construct (Owen & Baum, 1985), nor should they be

relied on to the exclusion of other crucial cognitive abilities,

INNOVATION 33

such as convergent thinking and evaluation (Bailin, 1984; Pearl-

man, 1983;Sternberg, 1982).

Nevertheless, some form of divergent thinking may still

represent a key cognitive component underlying creative pro-

duction. Runco and Albert (1985) discovered that the frequen-

cy-controlled originality scores of intellectually gifted middle-

school children were substantially more reliable and conver-

gently valid than alternative measures. Also concentrating on

the quality or originality of responses, Harrington, Block, and

Block (1983) found that high-quality divergent-thinking scores

in 4- and 5-year-olds correlated .45 with construct-valid teacher

evaluations of creativity 6 and 7 years later and accounted for

14% of the variance in teacher judgments beyond that attribut-

able to sex, conventional intelligence measures, and simple fre-

quency scores (Harrington et al., 1983). These results suggest

that although frequency, originality, and flexibility scores are

not independent (Lissitz & Willhoft, 1985), they may not be

fully interchangeable (Harrington et al., 1983).

Certainly, an individual's ability to generate multiple, high-

quality solutions to a problem might provide a substantive basis

for integration and thereby enhance the likelihood of major

contributions. In addition, it might be argued that such tests

reflect the individual's ability to use multiple understandings or

concepts in addressing problems and, therefore, might repre-

sent a process fundamental to integration. Although it is possi-

ble that the generation of alternative solutions also provides a

substantive base for minor contributions (Einhorn & Hogarth,

1981; Hogarth, 1980), minor contributions may not always re-

quire divergent thinking if the available understandings, or sche-

mata, provide an adequate framework for solving the problem

at hand (Cronbach, 1968). Therefore, as suggested earlier, the

efficacy of these cognitive abilities in predicting creative behav-

ior may vary with the cognitive strategy in use and career age,

thus providing an explanation for the findings of Taylor (1963),

Macon (1987), and Owens (1969).

Associational Processes

Along with divergent-thinking abilities, associational abilities

have also been considered of some import in understanding the

creative act and have produced moderate positive relations with

indexes of creative achievement (Mednick & Mednick, 1967;

Mendelsohn, 1976; Sobel, 1978). It seems likely, however, that

analogical or associational abilities will prove useful in idea gen-

eration only to the extent that they provide information rele-

vant to solution of the problem at hand. Therefore, it is not

surprising that both MacKinnon (1962) and Gough (1976) have

found that the use of moderately rather than highly remote as-

sociations is related to creative achievement in professional oc-

cupations.

Unfortunately, the definition of what constitutes a more or

less remote association as well as the significance of such associ-

ations has caused concern. Perkins (1983) contended that an

association is remote only if it comes from a domain different

from that of the problem at hand. Further, analysis of both ex-

perimental and archival data led Perkins to conclude that re-

mote associations or analogies rarely mediate discovery and

that even close analogies are not commonly used, at least

overtly. Instead, they serve as a vehicle for explaining and de-

fending solutions mediated by another process. In reply, Poze

(1983) argued that to evaluate an analogy or association, one

must concentrate on the connection between the subject and

the analogue and on the context within which it was forged,

while noting that such connections are likely to be essential only

in solving problems requiring information that cannot be

gleaned from an analysis of the problem's own elements (Poze,

1983).

Given the strategic approaches underlying major and minor

contributions, both positions are tenable. Perkins (1983) sug-

gested that remote analogies rarely mediate creative production

because they may distract from the real constraints of a prob-

lem and because truly powerful ones are difficult to engender,

given that separate domains tend to be more different than sim-

ilar at any but a superficial level. When such analogies do occur,

however, they may well connote the integration of cognitions

presaging a major contribution, as exemplified by Kekule's us-

ing the analogy of a snake's swallowing its tail to envision the

ring structure of the benzene molecule (Poze, 1983). Poze's less

stringent requirement that the connection must be new only

to the individual, regardless of the category closeness between

subject and analogue, may be more characteristic of the limited

problem-solving efforts associated with minor contributions.

The foregoing discussion leads to the issue of imagery and

metaphorical abilities in the production of major and minor

contributions. Over the past decade, researchers have evidenced

substantially more interest in the ability of creative individuals

to use images and metaphors as a basis for solving complex

problems (Harrington, 1981; Kogan, Connor, Gross, & Fava,

1980). Although clear-cut evidence bearing on the predictive

significance of these abilities is lacking, they do seem to have

some relevance to idea generation in the sense that they provide

alternative ways for attaining or applying understandings.

Ainsworth-Land (1982), for instance, suggested four orders

or stages of imaging, the boundaries of which are flexible and

through which one may move back and forth with respect to a

single problem. From Stage 1, involving spontaneous, sensory-

based imaging leading to concrete creative products, the pro-

cess moves to Stage 2's analogical, goal-directed, controlled

imagery. In Stage 3, images are metaphorical, symbolic, super-

imposed, and both controlled and spontaneous, facilitating the

integration of old and new conceptual domains (Ainsworth-

Land, 1982). Ainsworth-Land's Stage 4, which incorporates

mystical visions, the creation of a new world order through dis-

integration, and relinquishing ego control, is beyond the scope

of the present perspective. Nevertheless, the requirements for

minor contributions are not inconsistent with the concrete and

goal-directed imagery described in Stages 1 and 2, just as the

less bounded imagery in Stage 3 is consistent with the integra-

tion and reorganization of understandings held to characterize

major creative efforts.

Unconscious Processes

In recent years, access to more primitive modes of thought

has also been held to play an important role in the creative pro-

cess (Arieti, 1976;Barron, 1972; Schaefer, 1972; Suler, 1980).

Essentially, this research holds that creativity represents the

adaptive use of the unconscious by permitting unconscious


ideas and associations to flow into consciousness, thereby pro-

viding a basis for integration and redirection of thought. Strong

evidence bearing on the predictive power of scales measuring

primary-process use is not available (Suler, 1980). Nevertheless,

effective use of unconscious, repressed materials might provide

more diverse and complex information for the redefinition and

reorganization of conscious understandings and so contribute

to idea generation. Kaha (1983), for example, posited that a

creator uses primary processes, which are unconscious or pre-

conscious, in such a way that the material itself becomes con-

scious, whereas the manner in which it has reached awareness

remains hidden. Although the secondary processes of rational

thought and the primary processes that are unbounded by logic

do not recognize one another, the mind operates synchronisti-

cally at both levels to create a new conscious perspective by

merging both processes. It is this new perspective that the con-

scious mind then labels insight or intuition (Kaha, 1983).

Some evidence for the melding of primary and secondary

processes may be found in recent empirical research concern-

ing the relation between dreams and creativity. In a study of

high school students nominated as creative by their teachers,

Domino (1982) found that the creative students were more

likely than others to view dreams as commonplace and believe

in their psychological significance. In subsequent work with

professional architects, writers, musicians, sculptors, and re-

search scientists, all nominated by peers as creative, Sladeczek

and Domino (1985) compared dream-content protocols ob-

tained from these individuals in presumably creative profes-

sions with those gathered from a control group of police officers

and accountants. The dreams of the professionals engaged in

creative endeavors were significantly more regressive (implausi-

ble and unrealistic), distorted (unlike waking experience), and

visual than were the dreams of incumbents in less creative occu-

pations (Sladeczek & Domino, 1985). Sladeczek and Domino's

argument, which was similar to Kaha's (1983), was that the pri-

mary process exemplified by dreaming is a crucial aspect of

creative thinking because it facilitates restructuring one's wak-

ing world and synthesizing disparate elements. If such is the

case, dreaming and other unconscious processes may well be

associated with the major creative contributions when the re-

structuring and synthesis involves multiple domains or under-

standings and with the minor contributions when the new per-

spective applies to elements within a given understanding.

It might be wise at this point, however, to consider Guilford's

(1982) caution that to invoke, in the scientific study of creativ-

ity, processes and concepts that are not easily communicable or

operationally definable is to abandon the belief that all human

behavior is rational and that it is psychology's task "to discover

the nature of that rationality" (p. 151). Considering psycholo-

gy's abiding concern with processes that are not fully conscious,

however, perhaps we may suggest that whereas human behavior

is lawful, in the sense that dreams, images, and spontaneous

metaphors derive from a human process that can perhaps be

better elucidated, it is not always cognitively rational or logical.

Differential Attributes

Even if one assumes that individuals possess all those abilities

relevant to idea generation in a certain field, whether they will

be capable of either formulating or implementing these ideas is

open to question. Many reasons exist for an individual's failure

to develop ideas or to translate ideas into action, but one of the

more important influences appears to be the individual's

unique personality. Over the years, a number of studies examin-

ing the personality attributes related to innovative achievement

in various occupational fields have been conducted. Studies ex-

amining the personality characteristics related to creative

achievement have been conducted in the sciences (Albaum,

1976; Albaum & Baker, 1977; Chambers, 1964; Gough, 1979;

Owens, 1969; Roe, 1953), engineering (MacKinnon, 1962;

Morrison, Owens, Glennon, & Albright, 1962), architecture

(Gough, 1976; Hall & MacKinnon, 1969), and art (Barren,

1972;Gotz&Gotz, 1979).

Early investigations into the personality characteristics re-

lated to creative achievement in various occupational fields

(MacKinnon, 1962; Roe, 1953) indicated at least some differ-

ences in the attributes relevant to innovation. This finding is

understandable because the requirements for effective problem

solving vary with the tasks at hand (Fleishman, 1975; Guion,

1965). In recent years, it has become apparent, however, that

certain core characteristics are consistently related to creative

accomplishments across fields. In a comprehensive review of

the relevant literature, Barren and Harrington (1981) con-

cluded that the set of personality characteristics related to cre-

ative achievement across fields includes intellectual and artistic

values, breadth of interests, attraction to complexity, high en-

ergy, a concern with work and achievement, independence of

judgment, autonomy, intuition, self-confidence, ability to toler-

ate and resolve conflict, and a creative self-image, though the

last may, in some instances, be confounded with rejection of

convention (Ridley, 1979). Weiss (1981) also found empathy

and the capacity for status to be positively related to creativity

in architects, mathematicians, and research scientists, whereas

sociability, communality, and the desire to make a good impres-

sion were negatively related.

One potential explanation for the consistent emergence of

these core characteristics is that in some manner, they facilitate

the creation of new understandings through the integration and

reorganization of knowledge structures or facilitate the develop-

ment of more comprehensive understandings. In both cases,

these second-order cognitive outcomes should facilitate major

and minor contributions in almost any field of endeavor. In the

case of broad interests, intellectual and artistic values, a prefer-

ence for complexity, and a tolerance for ambiguity, this conclu-

sion does indeed appear true. Attributes of this sort tend to in-

crease the probability that the individual will (a) have multiple

understandings available, (b) be willing to use multiple under-

standings in problem-solving efforts, (c) be sensitive to informa-

tion that is inconsistent with a given understanding, and (d) be

willing to resolve conflicting facts or understandings. Thus,

differential characteristics of this sort might be conceived of as

attributes contributing to development and use of complex

schemata.

The second potential explanation for the emergence of these

core characteristics derives from the fact that identifying a

problem solution is not synonymous with creative achieve-

ment. At some point, a new understanding or a potential solu-

tion to a problem must be translated into action. In translating

INNOVATION 35

any idea into action, the individual must be capable of making a

public commitment to a new idea and of subsequently foregoing

other activities to ensure that this idea will become a viable

product (Motamedi, 1982). Moreover, because by definition

this idea will be new and untried, the individual will often lack

strong social approval for the value of this endeavor. Under these

conditions, it is not surprising that autonomy, independence,

self-confidence, high energy, and a willingness to work would be

found to be related to creative accomplishment across occupa-

tional fields. As a result, this second set of core characteristics

might be conceived of as general personality attributes required

for implementing both major and minor contributions within

the broader context of the creator's personal and social world.

Developmental Considerations

Early Influences

It has long been recognized that differential characteristics

develop over time as a result of the individual's interaction with

a particular sequence of environmental influences (Howe,

1982; Mumford & Owens, 1984). Therefore, a variety of situa-

tional influences might be expected to contribute to develop-

ment of the core characteristics and differential processes facili-

tating the production of major and minor contributions. Over

the years, a variety of studies have been conducted to examine

the developmental influences related to creative achievement in

various occupational fields. A variety of cross-field differences

have appeared in these investigations (Roe, 1951, 1953), but

certain consistencies have also emerged.

Perhaps the most clear-cut finding obtained in these studies is

that individuals who make creative contributions tend to come

from homes in which a favorable background for the develop-

ment of intellectual abilities is provided and intellectual values

are instilled. For instance, studies by Roe (1951, 1953), Mac-

Curdy (1956), MacKinnon (1962), Schaefer (1969), and Eidu-

son (1962) indicate that a family environment fostering intel-

lectual values and providing intellectual stimulation may con-

tribute to later creative achievement. In a related vein, Albert

(1980) argued that the tendency of creative achievers to be

firstborns may be attributed to the richer stimulus environment

provided by enhanced parental contact and the impact of this

enriched environment on intellectual development. Although

Clark and Rice's (1982) study of Nobel laureates provides some

support for this position, it also suggests that the impact of this

effect has declined with increasing educational opportunities in

later cohorts. When one considers the fundamental role that

intelligence and intellectual values play in the development of

cognitive structures, it is not especially surprising that these

early developmental influences would be found to be of substan-

tial importance to later creative contributions.

However, the educational system, even at the graduate level,

may not fully substitute for this early environment: Simonton

(1983b) reported a curvilinear relation between scientific emi-

nence and formal education, with a point that represented

more than a bachelor's degree but less than a master's constitut-

ing the optimal level. Treffinger, Isaksen, and Firestein (1983)

underscored a similar point in their argument that the educa-

tional system tends to concentrate on what they termed Level

1 and Level 2 learning, composed of convergent thinking and

complex thinking, respectively. Level 3 learning, the involve-

ment in challenging tasks that require self-direction, resource

management, product design, and professional practice, re-

ceived far less attention (Treffinger et al., 1983). Even training

programs developed specifically to enhance creativity may not

adequately compensate for the lack of an intellectually enriched

and supportive early environment; Rose and Lin's (1984) meta-

analysis of long-term creativity programs, using Glass's (1978)

magnitude of effect statistic, found that, overall, training ac-

counted for no more than 22% of the variance in creative be-

havior.

A second set of early influences consistently related to cre-

ative achievement is that pertaining to the development of inde-

pendence or autonomy. For example, Stein (1968) and Datta

(1967) have reported that creative scientists were subject to less

discipline and were raised in a less structured environment than

were noncreative scientists. Further, Getzels and Jackson (1962)

and Hudson (1968) have found that the parents of individuals

obtaining high scores on divergent-thinking tests tend to be less

vigilant and controlling of their children's behavior while en-

couraging independence and personal expression. Kennett

(1978, 1984) has added that this especially nutrient ground for

fostering the guided independence associated with later creativ-

ity is particularly evident in large families from the upper socio-

economic stratum. Interestingly enough, however, high imagi-

nativeness in play has also been found to be related to pre-

schoolers' membership in a middle-income, single-parent

family, suggesting that when economic deprivation is not a

problem, the increased independence of single-parent children

may not be detrimental to creative development (Cornelius &

Yawkey, 1985). Despite the support provided by these studies

for the general importance of developmental influences foster-

ing autonomy, Rejskind (1982) provided a compelling argu-

ment indicating that the relation between children's creativity

and independence from parents and teachers is curvilinear, with

the optimal degree of freedom depending on the task and the

type of creativity required.

Early experiences capable of facilitating intelligence, intellec-

tual values, and independence are consistently emphasized in

the literature, but other trends also come to the fore. For exam-

ple, Roe (1953) reported evidence indicating that life-history

experiences that support the Protestant work ethic appear to

be associated with later creative accomplishment. In a related

demographic study of Nobel laureates, Berry (1981) found that

Protestant and Jewish communities in the United States con-

tributed a disproportionate number of eminent scientists. Ac-

cording to Berry, these data point to the importance of the reli-

gious core values shared by Protestantism and Judaism, includ-

ing an emphasis on the inherent value of knowledge and

personal achievement, as well as the precedence of seculariza-

tion, over belief in religious observance per se.

Berry's (1981) data also demonstrate that although over 30%

of the literature laureates' childhood experiences involved the

loss of a parent or a severe economic crisis within the family, a

finding consistent with Roe's (1953) analysis, science winners

rarely experienced such emotional upheaval. Perhaps, then, the

consistency of an intellectually stimulating environment, chan-

neling curiosity and intellectual exploration along occupation-


ally appropriate avenues (Eiduson, 1962) is also an important

component in the development of creativity. This trend is again

apparent in the Getzels and Jackson (1962) study in which par-

ents of individuals obtaining high scores on a divergent-think-

ing test tended to emphasize openness to experience and to sup-

port a certain degree of role taking. Finally, evidence may be

found in Getzels and Jackson's (1962) and Trollinger's (1979)

studies indicating that a family environment encouraging cre-

ative activity and inculcating a firm sense of the self as a creative

entity may play an important role in the development of creative

individuals.

For the most part, the preceding discussion was focused on

early developmental influences. Although this focus reflects the

trends apparent in the broader literature, it should be recog-

nized that individual development does not cease at 15 years of

age; rather, it is an ongoing process continuing into adolescence

and adulthood (Baldwin et al., 1984; Jaquish & Ripple, 1981;

Lesner & Hillman, 1983; Romaniuk & Romaniuk, 1981;

Schaie & Hertzog, 1986; Taylor & Sacks, 1981). Some evidence

for the continuing nature of creativity development was pro-

vided by Trollinger (1983), who found that although highly cre-

ative female musicians were more likely to choose solitary hob-

bies and to engage in individualistic creative activities than were

their less creative counterparts, these differences manifested

themselves gradually, appearing as significant effects only years

after their initial appearance during early adolescence and

childhood.

Some research even questions the extent to which the behav-

ior of individuals can properly be labeled creative before adoles-

cence. In his theory of cognitive development, Piaget (1972)

posited that the formal-thought processes, emerging in adoles-

cence, are characterized by an ability to form hypotheses re-

garding objects and events that exist within the realm of possi-

bility but are not part of current reality. Although this ability

to hypothesize alternative possibilities seems to be tied to both

the generation and application of understandings (Wolf & Lar-

son, 1981), Ross (1973, 1976) has noted that whereas formal

thinking increases from early to middle adolescence, creative

performance on divergent-thinking tests declines, because of

peer identification and increased stress. Wolf and Larson, how-

ever, suggested that the early creativity supposedly exhibited by

children may be an artifact. They argued that preadolescent

children do not efficiently incorporate facts and tend to be in-

transigent in their views even when presented with contradic-

tory evidence. Hence, adults' judgments of children's diver-

gent-thinking responses may be based on omissions in their

responses, not on the elements actually considered (Wolf & Lar-

son, 1981).

Smith and Carlsson's (1983, 1985) investigations of Swedish

youth provide a useful extension of Wolf and Larson's (1981)

arguments. Denning creativity as the ability to transcend the

boundaries of a stimulus context (Smith & Carlsson, 1985),

Smith and Carlsson (1983) argued that ordinary 4- or 5-year-

olds cannot be creative because they are unable to differentiate

outer stimuli from the internal experience of the stimuli. There-

fore, young children are incapable of the dual, inward-outward

focus that is the hallmark of creative endeavor. Using this

framework, Smith and Carlsson (1985) demonstrated that cre-

ativity begins around 5 or 6 years of age and decreases substan-

tially at the age of 7 or 8 with the imposition of schooling de-

mands. As cognitive skills develop to meet these combined de-

mands, creativity reemerges, in spite of increased anxiety, and

peaks at age 10 or 11, then beginning a decline associated with

the onset of puberty (Smith & Carlsson, 1985). While the recov-

ery of creativity is slow from ages 14 to 15, due to the confor-

mity pressures induced by peer groups, compulsiveness recedes

during this period (Smith & Carlsson, 1985). With a decline

in the compulsiveness that otherwise might continue to inhibit

creative expression, along with the enhanced cognitive abilities

that have developed throughout the years, creative behavior in-

creases markedly at about age 16 (Smith & Carlsson, 1985).

Later Influences

Given the value of a life-span approach to creativity implied

by the foregoing discussion, we believe that evidence pertaining

to later influences on the development of creative capacity is

also germane. Regarding the importance of an intellectually

nurturing environment, Levenson (1978) found that the avail-

ability of mentors during the early phase of career development

is related to creative achievement in a variety of occupational

fields. Zuckerman's (1974) study of Nobel laureates casts some

light on the mentoring process. Broadly speaking, her findings

indicate that highly creative individuals actively seek out and

are selected by other highly creative individuals for further oc-

cupational training. As part of this process, novices internalize

exacting professional standards, along with a sense of excel-

lence, achievement, and self-confidence with regard to occupa-

tional pursuits. Additionally, they appear to develop a better

than average grasp of the significant problems emerging in a

field, as well as knowledge of and concern with the basic under-

standings that might be used in solving these problems.

In a related study, Torrance (1983) described the mentor as

one who is a recognized influence in a given occupational

sphere and provides the novice with continued support and en-

couragement during the period of idea generation. Using avail-

able longitudinal data, Torrance (1983) found significant corre-

lations, for both men and women, between experiencing a men-

toring relationship and the number of recognized creative

contributions made, although what men sought in a mentor—

encouragement and prodding—differed somewhat from the

need for encouragement and praise expressed by women (Tor-

rance, 1983). These more recent observations concerning men-

toring are in line with the earlier findings of Knapp (1963) and

Knapp and Greenbaum (1952) concerning the kinds of teachers

and schools likely to produce creative scientists, as well as Bray

et al.'s (1974) findings indicating that individuals who are ini-

tially exposed to a challenging work environment display better

long-term performance. However, Simonton's (1984a) investi-

gation of the social relationships of 722 eminent artists born

between 1042 and 1912 indicated that the nonpersonal, para-

gon-emulator relationship was more crucial to artistic success

than was the mentoring relationship between master and ap-

prentice typical of the sciences.

Nevertheless, these studies of both childhood and adult devel-

opmental influences seem consistent with the general perspec-

tive presented earlier. Specifically, early experiences likely to en-

courage the emergence of the core characteristics related to the

INNOVATION 37

development and implementation of new ideas, such as inde-

pendence or an emphasis on personal achievement, are likely to

be associated with creative accomplishment across occupa-

tional fields. Further, those experiences that influence develop-

ment of the cognitive processes underlying effective construc-

tion and application of understandings also appear to be rele-

vant, as in the case of influences that facilitate intellectual

development. However, as indicated by Simonton's (1984a)

mentoring findings, these developmental effects may be moder-

ated by certain field-specific influences.

Cultural Influences

As part of their development, individuals are exposed to a

variety of circumstances that constitute the broader culture to

which they belong, and these experiences may also influence

the development of creative potential. For instance, Simonton

(1984b) found that formal education in a society is a spur to

intellectual development and is related to creative achievement

until education begins to force an adherence to traditional per-

spectives. Creative role models, on the other hand, continue to

facilitate creative development as long as these role models en-

courage an open, questioning approach to new ideas. In a sepa-

rate investigation, Simonton (1975) found that such social con-

ditions as political fragmentation, perhaps encouraging a toler-

ance for ambiguity and diverse intellectual exposure, facilitate

the emergence of creative individuals, although war and politi-

cal instability, perhaps limiting feelings of self-efficacy, inhibit

later innovation.

Berry's (1981) finding that science laureates tend to emerge

from stable, upwardly mobile, academic, or technical back-

grounds prompted Silver's (1983) comments concerning the

cultural conditions relevant to scientific innovation. Silver

(1983) contended that within the current cultural context, risk

is the hallmark of the scientific environment. If risk is regarded

as the ability to define the probability of success and the price

of failure, then an upwardly mobile family in which risks have

constantly been assessed provides relatively easy transition into

the social context of modern science (Silver, 1983). Again, these

findings and those of Simonton (1975, 1984b) indicate the im-

port of cultural influences that contribute to the development

and application of understandings in a manner consistent with

a field's problem-solving demands.

Environmental Considerations

Climatic Conditions

Even when individuals have developed the capacity for inno-

vation, their willingness to undertake productive efforts may be

conditioned by beliefs concerning the consequences of such ac-

tions in a given environment (Berlyne, I960; Derenberg & Bell,

1960). In a number of educational and industrial studies, re-

searchers have attempted to identify the climatic conditions

that facilitate creative endeavors. On a rather prosaic level, they

have shown that environments providing rewards for or explic-

itly stating the need for creativity engender higher levels of cre-

ative activity. For example, Torrance (1965) showed that the

availability of monetary incentives enhances performance on

divergent-thinking measures, whereas Harrington (1981)

showed that instructions to be creative also increase scores on

these measures.

On the other hand, Amabile (1983) argued that extrinsic mo-

tivators may limit exploration, set breaking, and risk taking. In

studies of children and adults, Amabile, Hennessey, and Gross-

man (1986) found that predefined reward contracts resulted in

decreased creativity, whereas unexpected performance rewards

did not effect creativity. Thus, it appears that simply providing

rewards may not be fully sufficient for defining a creative cli-

mate. Some further support for the importance of exploration

and risk taking has been provided by Torrance (1965, 1972),

who has found that a nonpunitive classroom environment that

focuses on the development and evaluation of understandings

while nurturing independent thought and exploration tends to

enhance idea generation. Through studies of collegiate environ-

ments contributing to scientific productivity, Thistlewaite

(1963) and Knapp (1963) have obtained collaborative evidence

in their findings that a warm, supportive, and flexible but intel-

lectually demanding environment seems related to scientific

productivity.

Studies of organizational climate and productivity by Taylor

(1963, 1972) and Andrews (1975) indicate that an organiza-

tional climate that provides physical support for creative efforts

and encourages independent action tends to facilitate scientific

productivity. In another study of scientists, Pelz (1956) found

that climates encouraging interaction, individual autonomy,

and production of knowledge generated creative achievement,

whereas climates characterized by distrust, lack of communica-

tion, limited individual autonomy, and ambiguous goals inhib-

ited scientific innovation.

Although these climate variables do not fully determine cre-

ativity, studies by Ellison, James, McDonald, Fox, and Taylor

(1968) and Ellison, James, and Carron (1970) show that indi-

viduals' perceptions of environmental support, trust, commu-

nication, freedom, and goal clarity may yield multiple corre-

lations on the order of .50 for the prediction of scientific

achievement. Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that a cli-

mate that facilitates innovation is one that provides a cognitive

basis for idea generation and encourages the actions required

for implementing these ideas while it demonstrates acceptance

and recognition for the individual's creative efforts. Thus, it is

not surprising that in studies of work climate in research and

development organizations, Abbey and Dickson (1983) and

Lind and Mumford (1987) have found that innovative research-

and-design systems are characterized by the recognition and re-

ward of superior performance, particularly with respect to the

initial exploratory stages of creative endeavors in which the in-

dividual's need for acceptance and support plays an important

role in motivating further efforts.

Evaluative Conditions

This issue of recognition and acceptance has also received

some attention as it relates to the evaluation of creators' efforts.

Perhaps the most obvious precondition for recognition and ac-

ceptance of new understandings or potential problem solutions

is that they must be communicated to potential users. In fact,

studies by Darley (1978) and Pelz (1983) suggest that effective


use of appropriate communication channels constitutes an im-

portant determinant of dissemination and recognition. The

work of Bandura (1986) and Rodgers and Adhikarya (1979) in-

dicates that acceptance of new understandings or problem solu-

tions is most likely to occur if the communication is tailored to

the existing beliefs, cognitions, and needs of the targeted group.

The effectiveness of this communication is further enhanced if

target groups contain individuals who are themselves likely to

be successful communicators of the innovation (Granovetter,

1983; Rodgers &Kincaid, 1981).

Of course, not all the new understandings or potential prob-

lem solutions communicated to society are adopted. As Zalt-

man and Wallendorf (1979) pointed out, not all innovations are

useful when looked at from the broader perspective of ongoing

patterns of social interchange. Tornatzky and Klein (1982) and

Rodgers and Shoemaker (1971) have summarized a variety of

evidence that indicates that the acceptance of an innovation is

determined by (a) the relative costs and benefits associated with

its application, (b) its compatibility with the existing sociotech-

nical system, and (c) its complexity. Typically, innovations that

are easily understood within existing frameworks, provide large

benefits relatively rapidly in relation to their cost, can be sup-

ported within current resource constraints, and do not disrupt

vested social interests are most rapidly accepted (Bandura,

1986; Downs & Mohr, 1979; Havens & Flinn, 1975; Roling,

Ashcroft, & Chege, 1976).

Aside from these rather pragmatic considerations, it has been

suggested that evaluation is influenced by the Zeitgeist, defined

as the spirit of the times or a common intellectual arena (Feld-

man, 1982). Gruber (1983) noted, however, that whereas com-

mon intellectual frameworks may play a role in evaluation of

creative products, the Zeitgeist represents only one of a number

of potential evaluative and predictive considerations. Simon-

ton's (1979) investigation of multiple discoveries and inven-

tions underscores this perspective. In analyzing whether,

throughout history, multiple discoveries of the same principle

by different individuals are best explained by chance, Zeitgeist,

or the genius that transcends the Zeitgeist, Simonton (1979) con-

cluded that all three explanations have merit. A small group of

highly gifted and prolific contributors who are both lucky and

consummately attuned to their fields is most likely to be in-

volved in multiple creations per se, including rediscoveries and

reinventions (Simonton, 1979).

Conclusions

These comments concerning the Zeitgeist point to an impor-

tant practical and theoretical implication of the foregoing dis-

cussion. Nearly all studies of creativity are concerned with the

prediction and understanding of creative potential. Tradition-

ally, creative potential has been assessed through one or two

trait-oriented measures, and creativity studies have tended to

examine only a limited number of simple linear relations. How-

ever, the perspective presented earlier, like the background-data

literature (Barren & Harrington, 1981) or Cattell's (1971) cre-

ativity equation, suggests that creative potential is an inherently

multivariate phenomenon that involves a variety of cognitive

attributes and personality characteristics. Accordingly, more

complex predictive systems seem called for if validity coeffi-

cients above .30 are to be obtained. Not only will such efforts

enhance prediction, by virtue of their ability to examine the

simultaneous interactive influences of variables drawn from

multiple domains, but they may also provide a more sophisti-

cated understanding of the phenomenon.

However, in determining creative potential, it also seems de-

sirable to consider certain conceptual issues brought to light in

the course of this review. First, because the nature of creative

processes may differ markedly, depending on whether creative

production involves the generation of new understandings or

the application of existing understandings, it seems necessary

to carefully distinguish the level at which creativity is being de-

fined. Second, both kinds of creative production are likely to

depend on a variety of field-specific knowledge structures and

understandings. Hence, a fully adequate description of creative

potential seems to require greater attention to the competencies

that the individual has or is capable of developing in a specific

occupational field. Third, it appears that future attempts to un-

derstand and predict creative potential should carefully con-

sider the importance of cognition, information, and informa-

tion processing to creative endeavors (Barron & Harrington,

1981), although in addressing these issues one should recognize

that there is no one absolute creative process but, rather, a set

of creative processes differentially related to alternative types of

creative endeavors.

Another concern commonly found in creativity studies is the

construction of environments capable of facilitating innovative

achievement. In this regard, innovation appears likely to be en-

gendered by an environment capable of providing creators with

personally meaningful rewards for their efforts while it ensures

that individuals possess the requisite tools for attaining these

rewards. Innovative achievement might also be facilitated by an

environment that provides a cognitive basis for creative efforts

through structures encouraging the creation of systematic un-

derstandings and ongoing exploration of alternative points of

view. Finally, an environment providing a framework for action

consistent with the core characteristics associated with creative

undertakings, such as independence or self-confidence, seems

likely to contribute to innovative achievement. Thus, organiza-

tional and educational systems that support autonomy or build

self-esteem might increase the likelihood of innovative achieve-

ment.

With regard to climatic considerations, however, somewhat

different contingencies might be called for, depending on the

style of creativity that one wishes to encourage. For instance,

when minor contributions are of concern, a climate character-

ized by well-defined goals and challenging but not impossible

expectations seems desirable. Moreover, one might hypothesize

that ensuring a firm grasp of relevant understandings and acqui-

sition-pertinent information would also facilitate application of

existing knowledge structures. On the other hand, when the

generation of new understandings is of concern, the availability

of well-defined goals and knowledge structures will probably

prove of limited value. Instead, a climate that encourages risk

taking and open questioning while it emphasizes diverse experi-

ences, the acquisition of multiple understandings, and the value

of new understandings seems more useful.

Given the differential affinity of young adults and middle-

aged people for major and minor contributions, this discussion

INNOVATION 39

of climatic influences suggests that somewhat different environ-

ments may be required for maximizing the creative achieve-

ment of younger and older adults (Macon, 1987). Further, the

nature of creative contributions and the requisite climate for

creativity might be expected to change as the proportion of the

population in young adulthood and middle age changes. These

differences in optimal climate, when coupled with the graying

of the American work force (Stewman, 1986), indicate the ne-

cessity of attending to potential age differences in establishing

a climate for creativity.

In addition, substantially greater investments should be made

in developing young adults who appear capable of making ma-

jor contributions. Because the proportion of young adults is

rapidly declining in America, the likelihood of major break-

throughs might also be expected to decline (Mumford, Olsen,

& James, 1987). When these observations are coupled with the

fundamental social import of major innovations, scientific and

economic progress might well be facilitated by systematic

efforts to identify high-potential young adults and subsequently

place these individuals in occupations and occupational envi-

ronments in which their talents are most likely to flower.

Without negating the above discussion, one must consider an

important constraint on this general conclusion. The age

differences that we speak of represent general curves of aggre-

gate data around which substantial variability exists. Therefore,

by no means are we implying that many young adults are not

more comfortable applying existing structures or that middle-

aged adults are incapable of generating the new understandings.

In fact, McLeish (1976) and Taylor and Sacks (1981) have sug-

gested that creativity may indeed be evidenced in old age if intel-

lectual capacity and openness to change are maintained, and

Lesner and Hillman (1983) suggested that the self-evaluation

characteristic of old age may act as a spur to renewed creative

efforts. In accordance with Simonton's (1983a) comments

about the centrality of psychological age, it should also be

pointed out that the conditions spurring creativity in young

adulthood might be recreated through the adaptive demands of

mid-life career change. To the extent that career changes do oc-

cur in middle age, their relative rarity notwithstanding, they

may well trigger the same integration of knowledge structures

that characterizes young adults' major contributions. Given

their potential to engender major creative contributions, failure

to encourage such career redirections might constitute a costly

error, particularly when these redirections represent extensions

of past activities into related, albeit different, domains of en-

deavor. In sum, we completely concur with Taylor and Sacks's

contention that American society can ill afford to neglect the

creative resources of any age group. Rather, it behooves Ameri-

cans to systematically develop creative potential wherever it

may be found.

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Received November 24,1986

Revision received April 1, 1987

Accepted April 6,1987 •

Call for Nominations for Editor ofJEP: General

The Publications and Communications Board has opened nominations for the editorship of the

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General for the years 1990-1995. Sam Glucksberg is the

incumbent editor. Candidates must be members of APA and should be available to start receiv-

ing manuscripts in early 1989 to prepare for issues published in 1990. Please note that the

P&C Board encourages more participation by women and ethnic minority men and women in

the publication process and would particularly welcome such nominees. To nominate candi-

dates, prepare a statement of one page or less in support of each candidate. Submit nominations

no later than February 15,1988, to

Donald J. Foss

Department of Psychology

University of Texas

Austin, Texas 78712

Other members of the search committee are James J. Jenkins, Jean Mandler, J. E. R. Staddon,

and Saul Sternberg.

Creativity syndrome: Integration, application, and innovation

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