Copper Futures and Cabul: On 'Reconstructing' the Monarchic Narratives

Copper futures and Cabul:

On ‘Reconstructing’ the Monarchic Narratives.

Graham Hagens

ABSTRACTThe challenges associated with biblical historiography are such that some despair that a

history of Israel can ever be written. In this paper it is suggested that a viable approach

to solving this problem may be to collate all biblical and extra-biblical material related to

one specific layer of the multilayered biblical structure. It is here suggested that a

reasonable balance of the probabilities of competing models can be achieved by a close

comparison of all the arguments for and against each model. This approach is illustrated

by an analysis of the biblical description of the trade relationship between Hiram I of Tyre

and King Solomon. The conclusion is that although many of the details remain beyond

the historical horizon, a trade agreement between these rulers probably did exist.

BIBLICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY: DECONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

The challenges associated with biblical historiography are such

that some despair that a history of Israel can ever be written.

(Grabbe 1997a). Since the final form of the text reveals the last

adjustments to a narrative that had been conceived centuries

earlier, many scholars consider the historical books of the Hebrew

Bible to be no more than a type of historical fiction as found in

the Homeric poems (Edelman 1991, 12-13; Grabbe 1997b, 22, 24-26).

This opinion is supported by the fact that significant differences

may be observed in the few cases where direct comparison of

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biblical and extra-biblical accounts of historical events is

possible (Grabbe 1997b, 25). For these reasons many earlier

treatments of the history of ‘ancient Israel’ are now considered

to be of questionable value, relying as they do on secondary

information found in the biblical text rather than on direct

evidence. Such studies may also suffer from circular reasoning in

that the information provided is either obtained directly from the

Hebrew Bible, or on scholarly consensus which derives from the

same source (Miller 1991). The biblical accounts of the United

Hebrew Monarchy in particular elicit increasing scepticism,

drawing as they do a picture of a golden age which appears to be

based upon very little original material (Finkelstein 1999, 36).

For all these reasons the biblical history has been so thoroughly

deconstructed that there is some doubt that any recoverable

history exists (Lemche 1997, 148). Although various efforts to

clarify the narrative in order to distinguish history-as-story and

history-as-fact have been made, reconstruction of the biblical

historiographical narrative remains in a primitive and precarious

state (Davies 1997, 104-7, 120). It is also recognised that

while achieving such a goal may be possible if adequate

independent data exist, an agreement of what might be considered

‘adequate’ has not yet been established. In Kuhnian terminology,

the old approach to biblical historiography has been found

wanting, and if any authentic historicity is to be recovered a

new paradigm is required.

2

This paper will attempt to establish a methodology by which

extra-biblical and biblical material may be prepared [compared] in

order to reach a conclusion between competing historiological

models. If successful this protocol might provide a better

understanding of how much material may be ‘adequate’ for such an

exercise. I will do this by examining direct and indirect extra-

biblical evidence relating to the Hebrew Bible text with reference

to one period, that of the United Hebrew Monarchy. Within that

period I will focus on one specific aspect, the international

commercial activities of King Solomon, these being described in

some detail in the Books of Kings. The question to be addressed

here is whether it can be established within a reasonable degree

of certainty whether [that] a ‘Trade Agreement’ between Solomon

and Hiram I of Tyre existed.

Although there is agreement that historical reconstruction

must involve utilisation of independent non-biblical data,

precisely how these might be interpreted is not clear. Dever

suggested that it might be possible to obtain a satisfactory

solution by using an adversarial approach with ‘adequate respect’

for all the data. Such a ‘common-sense’ comparison of all

available information from texts and artefacts might reveal a

reasonable ‘balance of probability’ between competing models

(Dever 1995, 75; 2001, 105-108). Similarly Miller suggested that

the historian should strive to minimize the ‘inevitable

circularity’ of the arguments by analysing each type of evidence

separately (Miller 1991, 93, 102). Others argue that progress may

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be realised by utilising the evidence that the author(s) of the

biblical passages had access to primary records. Thus Dever and

Halpern independently emphasized the importance of what appears to

be an authentic core of factual material related to the Hebrew

Monarchy in spite of several centuries of redaction (Dever 1995,

61-62, 64; 2001, 100-101; Halpern 1996, 44-75; 2001, 57-72). One

drawback of such an approach, which accommodates untested material,

however, [remove ‘however?] is that it can result in unjustified

interpretation of the authors’ intentions. Nevertheless, it may be

hoped that the utilisation of all these available tools might

result in a probabilistic conclusion, which if not perfect is at

least functional (Grabbe, 1997b, 21, 31, 34 n.31; 1997c). Thus

if the question is well defined, and if sufficient extra-biblical

material is available, it should be possible to determine whether

the probability of a particular historical model is significantly

greater or less than 50%.

MULTI-LAYERED NARRATIVE AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Halpern (1988, 29-31) has discussed the development of tradition

history in terms of a progressive layered development of the

narrative around some original ‘kernel.’ This suggests that a

viable approach might be to attempt the reconstruction of just one

or two layers of the complex literary structure of the United

Monarchic passages. I will here attempt to explore this

approach with a limited analysis of just one such layer of the

narrative dealing with the United Monarchy. According to the

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biblical text, Hiram I of Tyre and Solomon in Jerusalem engaged in

extensive joint commercial activities during their reigns. The

objective here will be to determine whether sufficient direct or

circumstantial extra-biblical material exists to conclude with a

reasonable degree of probability whether [that] the biblical claim

that such an agreement existed is factually correct. One

advantage of restricting the question to such a narrow depth of

field is that the historicity of many ancillary ‘embellishments’

not directly related to the trade agreement can be downplayed or

ignored. Thus ‘Trade Agreement’ as defined here will exclude more

casual interactions between Tyre and Jerusalem during that

timeframe such as participation in common regional interests, or

contractual involvement in construction projects. Finally in

performing this analysis certain assumptions will be retained.

Thus the existence of these kings and the generally accepted 10th

century chronology of their reigns will not be challenged. Both

topics have been extensively debated in recent literature and

although serious doubts about the size and structure of the United

Monarchy remain, the existence of David, Solomon and Hiram I

during the 10th century is not questioned by mainstream scholars

today (Whitelam 1996, 40; Finkelstein, 1999, 40, 42; Dever 2001,

128, 132, n. 47; Kitchen 2001).

COMMERCE AND STRATEGIC SUPPLIES DURING THE DARK AGE

The United Monarchy existed in a milieu of considerable historical

interest. During the 10th century southern Europe and the Near

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East were in the depth of a prolonged recession known as the Dark

Age which was to affect the entire region for over three

centuries. The first signs of recovery may be detected in a

revival of maritime trade between Cyprus and the Levant near the

end of the 11th century (all dates given are B.C.E.). Elsewhere

in the region international commerce remained at a very low ebb

due to the disruption of many of the traditional trade routes as a

result of social unrest, regional conflict and piracy. The

problems had started during the 12th century, when the prosperous

Late Bronze Age (LBA) cultures of the eastern Mediterranean and

western Asia suffered a sudden and precipitous decline.1 In

Greece the first destruction of Mycenaean palaces occurred very

close to the time of growing social unrest in Anatolia and

concerted assaults on the Egyptian New Kingdom by waves of Libyan

and maritime invaders. These disturbances were followed by

widespread societal disorder across the region in the course of

which numerous communities ceased to exist, while those that

survived entered a long period of diminished prosperity.

Thousands of new settlers had arrived in the Canaanite highlands

late in the 12th century, at about the same time that new

population groups of ‘Aegean’ provenance appeared on the Levantine

coast. Shortly thereafter Egypt abandoned her holdings in Syro-

Palestine and the Sinai, and around the middle of the 11th century

the Philistines advanced from their coastal bases into the

Canaanite highlands. Mesopotamia was invaded by large numbers of

Aramaeans, and at one stage the disruptions were of such severity

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that both Assyria and Babylonia almost ceased to exist as

independent entities.

It seems probable that an interruption in the supply of

strategic materials such as copper and tin to the metallurgical

workshops in the Aegean and Cyprus contributed to the collapse of

the Late Bronze economies (Muhly 1980, 40-45). During the 11th

century the foremost copper producer of the time, Cyprus, became

increasingly isolated while the supply of this strategic metal was

further compromised by the abandonment of the mines at Timna in

Sinai from which Ramesses III had earlier exported large

quantities of copper. Although the invention of carburised,

annealed steel did provide a viable alternative to bronze for use

in tools and weapons, the Iron Age was also a time of extreme

poverty in many regions (Snodgrass 1980a, 49-50). An important

consequence of these developments is that during the 11th century

the demand for copper and bronze would have been acute throughout

the region, and prior to the widespread utilization of carburised

iron, both would have highly been prized commodities. Snodgrass

has also noted that adoption of iron metallurgy occurred more

slowly in Palestine than elsewhere in the region, an observation

that might be related to the evidence that the Levant appears to

have suffered no strong constraint in the acquisition of copper

and tin in comparison to some other regions of the Aegean and

western Asia (Snodgrass 1980b, 355-357). It therefore seems very

likely that copper and bronze would still have been of primary

importance as a functional material for warfare and industry and

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as a corollary would have held significant interest for the

trading nations on the Levantine coast during that period. This

picture of conditions during the early Iron Age which derives from

archaeology and extra-biblical literary sources provides the

background to the emergence of both the Hebrew monarchy and the

Phoenician trading empire onto the world stage.

DARK AGE TYRE

Not all Near Eastern economies suffered from the post-Mycenaean

recession to the same extent, for the power vacuum provided new

opportunities for small city states. Thus a number of coastal

communities in the Levant that survived the chaos were able to

benefit from the loss of Ugarit, the former entrepôt which had

been destroyed during the collapse of the Late Bronze economies

(Joffe 2002). Tyre appears to have been the first and most

successful of these potential beneficiaries at seizing the moment.

A limited archaeological exploration of Tyre has revealed that the

last LBA occupation (Stratum XV), was succeeded by a poorly

represented level XIV, but that the next phase, Stratum XIII was

characterized by evidence of a strong economic revival (Bikai

1978, 66-67). The sudden appearance of Cypro-Geometric Type I

painted ware in the pottery assemblage from Tyre XIII not only

provides the first indication of a significant resumption of

maritime trade in the eastern Mediterranean, but also allows the

relative dating of early Iron Age mercantile activity to be

established. This chronology has been the topic of some debate in

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recent years. Although Cypriote archaeologists would date CG-1

painted ware found in Tyre XIII to the late 11th century, Syro-

Palestinian scholars until recently placed this development

earlier in that century, primarily on the basis of the presence of

artifacts from the Egyptian Ramesside period in Megiddo VIA.

Recent developments suggest however that the dating of

Megiddo VIA, and thus that of Tyre XIII should be lowered from the

middle to the very end of the 11th century (Hagens 1999). This

lower dating of Tyre XIII is supported by radiocarbon dating of

Iron Age strata from Dor, the coastal city a little to the south

which appears to have experienced Tyrian influence at about the

same Iron IB timeframe. Excavation of Dor has revealed Phoenician

bichrome potsherds in the stratum immediately above a burnt level

associated with the contemporary Iron Age phases G/9, B1/12. Some

of the excavators of Dor have linked the destruction of G/9 and

B1/12 with the termination of the occupation of that city by a

group of Aegean settlers known as the Šikils, and with the

beginning of Phoenician involvement at that site (Stern 1993,

357-358; Stern et al. 1997, 42 n.25; 52-55). When the similarity of

the Phoenician pottery and imported white-painted Cypriote ware in

the following stratum, B1/9, with that found in Tyre XIII is

1 The literature on the Late Bronze - Iron Age transition in the

Ancient Near East is extensive. Although the absolute dating of

these events remains a topic of debate (Hagens 1999, 2006), most

recently a compromise appears to have been reached on the dating

of the Iron I/II transition (Mazar 2005, 23).

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taken into account, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the

two phases co-existed near the end of the 11th century (Gilboa and

Sharon 2001; 2003, 55; Gilboa et al. 2004, 40-42). To this may be

added the literary suggestion that Abibaal established a colony in

Cypriote Kition, and the archaeological evidence of cultural

links between Kition and the Levant as far back as the 12th century

LC IIC period (Albright 1975; Karageorghis 1976, 95-6; Bikai 1987,

48-70; Negbi 2005, 7, 11, 23, 28). The more recent archaeological

data which appears to associate Tyre XIII with the destruction of

Dor G/9-B1/12 would support the earlier speculation of Albright

that Abibaal may have sought friendly relations with David in

order to eliminate the Aegean threat and establish secure trade

routes in the eastern Mediterranean (Ahlström 1993, 515 n.2).2 As

the tale of Wen Amun reveals, piracy appears to have been a very

real hazard to maritime activities in that region during the late

11th century, the control of which would have been essential for

‘normal’ commerce to revive. The synchronicity between these

activities suggests that Tyre XIII may have been the city of

Abibaal, father of Hiram I, and that these historical kings were

instrumental in overpowering the Šikil occupants of Dor (Gilboa

2005, 51-52).

ON THE TRADE AGREEMENT: ARGUING THE HYPOTHESIS ‘THERE WAS NO TREATY’.

The phraseology in 1 Kgs 5:1 that Hiram ‘loved’ David always,

suggests the existence of a commercial treaty of which the primary

objective was the generation of profit (Ahlström 1993, 516, n.1).

10

The essential elements of the ‘Agreement as presented in the text

appear to be that Hiram initially contributed to David’s

construction projects, and that his involvement with Jerusalem

continued into the next reign when Solomon was allowed to

participate in various lucrative trading activities for a

considerable period of time. In exchange Jerusalem supplied Tyre

with a relatively modest quantity of agricultural produce (2 Sam

5:11; 1 Kgs 5:18-24; 1 Kgs 9: 10-14). In spite of the apparent

commercial success of these activities, the arrangement came to a

less than satisfactory conclusion after two decades, at which time

Solomon transferred 20 cities in Galilee to Tyrian control, and

received a quantity of gold. Hiram was disappointed with this

transaction and described the towns as ‘Cabul,’ a word of some

2 Although the question of Tyrian militancy during the 11th century

remains controversial, the arguments against Phoenician

destruction of the Šikil occupation remain weak. The present

excavators rule out a natural cause for the widespread destruction

of that phase and concede that it was the result of human

activity. The only objection to direct Phoenician intervention

involves the nature of the reoccupation during the ‘Phoenician’

phase during which reconstruction followed the original urban

design (A. Gilboa, unpublished lecture, U. of Toronto, Nov. 2006).

This observation does no more than suggest that the Šikil

population of Dor was not completely displaced, an event which

would have been unlikely if the primary objective of the Tyrian

attack was to obtain control the maritime trade routes.

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uncertainty indicating displeasure (Gal 1993, 39). Thereafter no

more is heard of the alliance.

Since little extra-biblical information exists to support the

biblical passages describing the Agreement, a decision on their

authenticity or otherwise must derive from circumstantial evidence.

I will explore this question by adopting a variation of the

‘adversarial’ approach suggested by Dever by considering seven

arguments addressing the hypothesis that no such commercial

agreement did exist (Dever 2001, 104, 106-8). These will then be

answered with an equal number of counter-arguments. By comparing

the available biblical and extra-biblical evidence relating to

this specific question it may be possible to determine whether the

probability of the hypothesis being true is significantly above or

below 50%.

Argument 1: The treaty passages were invented to glorify the House of David

A considerable body of evidence suggests that the portrayal of the

United Monarchy cannot be taken as ‘straight-forward’ historical

writing (Finkelstein 1999, 36). Archaeological and extra-

biblical evidence reveals a systemic distortion of the events

making it probable that the authors manipulated authentic material

in order to promote various polemical agendas, such as

glorification of the Judahite state. The purported joint trading

venture with Hiram with its many associated embellishments was in

all probability invented to promote the mythical image of Solomon

as an exceptionally wise ruler and international statesman. Such

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a depiction of the monarch as an enlightened and revered natural

philosopher and importer of exotic woods and animals as found in

these passages is a genre typical of contemporary Middle Assyrian

literature (Halpern 1996, 51). The tales of imported apes,

peacocks and large quantities of gold associated with the Tyrian

trade ventures, in all probability fall into the same category as

the hyperbolic description of Solomon’s numerous construction

projects, marriage to the Pharaoh’s daughter, visit of the Queen

of Sheba, and seven hundred wives, all of which material is

unattested in external sources. Introduction of Hiram into the

Solomonic narrative script would also have drawn upon the high

international status in which Tyre was held during the probable

6th-5th centuries timeframe of the composition of these passages.

A possible historical core or background to this narrative, could

be that David and Solomon hired Phoenician contractors for their

building projects, and this simple contractual arrangement was

later expanded into the myth of a trading partnership.

.

2: The economics of the arrangement are irrational:

The commercial aspects of the treaty as described do not make any

sense. We are told that Hiram supplied large quantities of

materials and labour for the construction of David’s palace and

that this practice continued into the reign of Solomon. This king

was not only offered all the building supplies, workers and such

specialist cult and decorative items he desired, but was also

allowed to participate in extremely profitable trading activities

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for an extended period of time. Apparently the only payment Hiram

ever requested was food for his household, and the only delivery

received was a quantity of wheat and oil, the value of which

appears to have been significantly less than that of the services

rendered (Ahlström 1993, 517). Since Tyrian, and later

Phoenician, interests were firmly directed towards Cyprus and the

southern Mediterranean littoral, there is no obvious reason why

Tyre would have offered such financial support for a weak and

insignificant chiefdom in the hills.

3: The pattern of David’s wars does not suggest an alliance:

The pattern of David’s wars is not what might be expected if

Jerusalem had been involved in a strategic alliance with Tyre.

The text informs us that as soon as that the Philistine threat was

contained David turned his attention eastward and attacked Moab,

Ammon, Edom and Syria.3 If indeed Hiram and David had been allies

one might expect them to have shared a common approach to Tyre’s

western opportunities, for which reason the coastal and maritime

security required for their later expansion into the Mediterranean

sea lanes would have been of primary concern. Consequently one

would expect David to have completed the conquest of Philistia in

order to secure the whole coastline once the Šikil threat had been

neutralized.

3 2 Sam 8: 1-14; 1 Chron 18: 3-8. For an alternate relative

chronology see Bartlett 1989, 104.

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The remarkable string of David’s successes presented in the

text also has the appearance of fiction. We are even told that

David ventured as far afield as Syria, and managed to gain control

of Damascus by taking advantage of the absence of the Syrian king

who was then engaged in a military campaign at the Euphrates. The

information that David’s triumphs included conquest of the

northern Israelite territory, a region now estimated to have had a

population ten times greater than that of Judah further strains

the credulity of this narrative. The low probability of these

scenarios is enough to cast doubt on the entire historicity of

David’s military exploits, and by extension with his alliance with

Hiram. The biblical description of David’s campaigns should

more probably be read as anachronistic reflecting realities and

goals of the time of the compilation of the relevant texts

(Na’aman 2002, 214).

4: The Edomite and Egyptian stories were fictional

The description of David’s invasion of Edom and the purported

genocidal slaughter of its population (1 Kgs 11: 14-22) has every

appearance of being a fictional account. The relatively small

number of Iron I sites in the highlands of southern Jordan, which

most scholars identify with the biblical Edom, indicate that

intensive settlement of that territory did not commence until the

8th century. It is therefore improbable that the population was

significant enough during the 10th century to justify the attention

described (Bartlett 1989, 71-73; Na’aman 1992, 73). A more likely

15

explanation is that this passage was inspired by anti-Edomite

sentiment in Judah which followed that territory’s rebellion

during the 9th century (Bartlett 1992, 17). The purported slaughter

of the population also suffers from internal inconsistency, for we

are told that the Edomite prince Hadad, who had escaped David by

fleeing to Egypt, was able to return to the territory after that

king’s death, and raise a force of sufficient strength to be of

significant concern for the duration of Solomon’s reign.

The references to the relations with Egypt during this period

are also inconsistent. For example the information that Hadad

grew to maturity in Egypt, married into the Pharaoh's family and

raised a son, seems unlikely in light of the rarity of Pharaonic

marriage to foreigners (Schulman 1979; Malamat 1982, 200, n. 30;

Na’aman 1992, 76). Moreover the verse relating that the

Pharaoh was sad to learn of Hadad’s desire to leave contrasts with

information that follows shortly thereafter that a close entente

with Egypt developed early in Solomon’s reign. The strength of

this relationship was apparently such that an unnamed Pharaoh

captured the city of Gezer and gave it to the Hebrew king as dowry

for his daughter (1 Kgs 9:16; Malamat 1982, 198). The narrative is

further complicated by the information that Solomon’s top

lieutenant, Jeroboam later fled to Shishak ‘king’ of Egypt where

he was warmly received. These actions which would seem to

indicate duplicity on the part of Egypt in turn affect our

confidence in those sections dealing with the agreement with

Hiram. As a result of the various difficulties with these

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passages a number of scholars have suggested that they be read as

political allegory, with possible parallels with the Exodus

narratives (Malamat 1982, 200, n.30; Edelman 1995).

5: It is unlikely that Tarshish was home to apes and peacocks:

According to the text Solomon’s mariners were engaged in

expeditions with Tyrian fleet (יייי) of Tarshish, from which they

returned every three years with such riches as apes, peacocks and

gold of Ophir (1 Kgs 10:22; 2 Chron 9: 21). A number of biblical

references such as Jonah 1:3, Genesis 10:4 and Ezek 27: 12 which

associates Tarshish with minerals, suggest however that Tarshish

was located not in south Asia or Africa where such species were to

be found, but somewhere in the Mediterranean. Although the precise

location of Tarshish remains uncertain, speculation usually

involves making a choice between Tartessus in Spain and somewhere

in Asia Minor, such as Tarsus in Cilicia (Muhly 1973, 268). Also

of relevance is the fact that exhaustive searches in the area of

Eliat as well as the island in the Gulf of Aqaba, Jezirat Faroun,

believed to have been used by the Pharaohs of the 19-20th dynasties

in their export of copper, have failed to provide evidence of

trade activity during the Israelite Iron II period (Flinder 1989).

This lack of evidence that Solomon participated in long distance

maritime trade to exotic locations beyond Aqaba weakens the

argument that any trade agreement existed.

6: Hiram’s disappointment lacks reasonable explanation:

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After two decades the relationship between Tyre and Jerusalem

appears to have ended on a sour note. At the conclusion we are

informed that Hiram was ceded 20 towns in Galilee in exchange for

a quantity of gold, but that the Tyrian king accepted these with

an expression of contempt, describing them as ‘Cabul.’ This

negative reaction lacks obvious explanation and runs counter to

the positive description of wealth portrayed in the other

sections. A simple explanation for this situation, to the extent

that it has any historicity at all, might be that Solomon was in

serious financial arrears and attempted to settle these with the

transfer of the territory of Asher as part of a deal which

included the gold. The net value of this transaction was however

well below Hiram’s expectations.

7: Josephus is untrustworthy

The only extra-biblical literary evidence for a relationship

between Hiram and Solomon derives from the 1st century CE historian

Flavius Josephus. The historicity of much of his work is however

suspect, drawing as it does heavily on the biblical text and being

permeated with unsupported anecdotes. Although he does claim to

have utilized now lost works of Dius and Menander of Ephesus when

compiling his list of Tyrian kings, these authorities are not

cited in the sections which deal with Solomon and Hiram. It thus

seems unlikely that these independent sources contribute to the

understanding of a treaty relationship between Jerusalem and Tyre.

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COUNTERING THE HYPOTHESIS: ‘THERE WAS A TREATY’.

1: There is more involved than glorification of the House of David:

There is extra-biblical evidence to support the argument that

the relationship between Tyre and Jerusalem was more than that of

a service contract. For example recent archaeological and

chronological research suggests a close synchronism between the

Tyrian-Šikil and Hebrew-Philistine conflicts, a conclusion which

would support Albright’s idea that Tyre and Jerusalem may have

been engaged in simultaneous struggles against mutual enemies. It

might also be noted that the concept of Phoenician military

activism during the 11th century remains a viable model in the

ongoing debate about the subject (Gilboa 2005, 51-52), and the

revised chronology now emerging from radiometric and theoretical

studies would also appear to lend support to this hypothesis.

More significantly attention should also be paid to the

serious commodity and trade challenges that faced the Near East

communities at that time. The collapse of the Hittite empire,

warfare in Mesopotamia, civil strife in Egypt and piracy in the

Mediterranean were among the many factors that had contributed to

the disruption of the traditional trade routes across the region.

For this reason the opportunity to re-open the Arabah-Aqaba trade

corridor would have been of significant interest to a trading

city-state such as Tyre which was already active in Cyprus. While

it is quite true that the embellishment of this relationship would

have benefited the Judahite state when the memories of this era

were finally committed to writing, there were solid economic

19

drivers which would have made participation in such a joint

venture an interesting opportunity. Thus Tyre did indeed have

reason to explore trade opportunities with the residents of the

Canaanite Highlands, and a push to the east might be seen as a

natural extension of the active development of commercial and

political involvement to the west. It therefore seems quite

reasonable that had Tyre and Jerusalem been allied against common

Aegean enemies (Albright 1975), they would have shared a common

goal of exploiting the commercial opportunities provided by access

to the Gulf of Aqaba. While embellishment of the text is a

systemic problem in biblical historiography, there is sufficient

extra-biblical evidence available to render this argument against

the existence of the treaty quite weak.

2: The economic driver was the crisis in the supply of strategic metals

In addition to providing access to the Red Sea, the Arabah

Valley also contained the only major copper reserves in the

Ancient Near East other than those in Cyprus. The importance of

this strategic element should not be underestimated in the study

of Iron Age Syro-Palestine, for as noted by Snodgrass, this

appears to have been one part of the Near East which did not

suffer from a shortage of copper, and where the general

utilization of iron occurred considerably later than most other

regions. A further piece of evidence of relevance to this

argument derives from the recent radiocarbon dating of copper

mining activities in the Arabah. In 2004 Levy et al. published new

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radiometric analyses of charcoal from Khirbat en-Nahas at the edge

of the rift valley south of the Dead Sea, which revealed that

copper extraction on a scale comparable to those of the Egyptians

at Timna and the Sinai during the New Kingdom, was carried out

between the 11th and 9th centuries (Levy et al. 2004). These

results have focussed fresh attention on the chronology and socio-

economic aspects of copper extraction not only at this particular

location, but also in the trade routes across the Negev highlands

during the early Iron Age. Although some of the chronological and

sociological conclusions reached by those authors have been

challenged,4 analysis of the primary data presented in that paper

is appropriate for this discussion. Of particular interest is the

radiocarbon dating of the earliest layers of the slag associated

with this site which strongly suggest that the operations

commenced during the first part of the11th century.5 Another point

which the recent research makes clear is that unlike the mines at

Timna and the Sinai, these operations were almost certainly not

under Egyptian control, for compared to those Egyptian operations

4 For critiques and responses see Finkelstein (2005), van der Steen

and Bienkowski

(2006) and Levy et al. (2005). 5 Averaging and calibration of the primary data from the lowest

strata in Levy et al. (2004, Table 1) using Intcal 2004/OxCal 3.10

yields 14C yrs BP and Calendar B.C.E. S4: 2899±27 (1130-1020);

Slag, middle: 2906±39 (1190-1010), 2876±38 (1130-1000); Slag

bottom: 2898±36 (1130-1010), 2864±46 (1120-970).

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of similar magnitude at Timna, very little evidence of a Ramesside

presence was found at Khirbat en-Nahas (Bartlett 1989, 74-5).

These data all suggest that the Khirbat en-Nahas operations

first began during the mid- to late-Ramesside period, after the

Egyptians had withdrawn from Palestine and abandoned the Sinai.6 It

seems likely that the copper extracted from these veins probably

made its way north and west across the Negev highlands to the

urban centres of Palestine and beyond, with Tel Masos being an

important intermediate centre of metallurgical activity. The

significance of the assembly of Iron Age ‘fortresses’ in the

Negev has been the subject of considerable debate. While some

earlier scholarship suggested that these were Israelite

settlements established by Solomon, it now seems more likely that

they were founded by nomadic pastoralists who had begun to enjoy

participation in a more settled way of life during the improved

economic conditions of the post-Egyptian era.(See further: Cohen

1980; Herzog 1983; Finkelstein 1984; Na’aman 1992, 71-74;

Finkelstein and Perevolotsky 1990; Mazar 2005, 19-20, 26). In

spite of some disagreement there does seem to be general consensus

that the network of settlements in the Northern Negev and

Highlands were related to the production of copper in the Arabah

6 The operations at Timna ceased during the reign of Ramesses V

shortly before the final Egyptian withdrawal from Palestine

(Rothenberg and Glass 1983, 76-9). Depending on the absolute

chronology preferred, this occurred somewhere in the range 1130-

1060.

22

which flourished during that timeframe (Levy et al. 2005, 129-163.).

That the Egyptians retained an interest in the economic resources

of the Beersheba Valley is suggested by the probable destruction

of this network by Pharaoh Shoshenq I during his Palestinian raid

of ca. 925 BCE (Cohen 1980, 78; Finkelstein 2005, 121). Thus

although there is no firm evidence that a 10th century polity

existed in the Jordanian lowlands (Bartlett 1989, 70-74;

Finkelstein 2005; van der Steen and Bienkowski 2006), the

radiometric results do reveal that it was a centre of considerable

industrial activity during the 11th – 9th centuries. Although the

ethnicity of neither the miners at Khirbat en-Nahas nor the Iron I

Negev residents is known, it is surely no coincidence that the

commercialisation of the copper deposits in the Arabah commenced

shortly after the decline in exports from Cyprus early in the 11th

century.

It is therefore not unreasonable to speculate that these

mines, and the associated trade network that crossed the Negev,

would have been of great interest to both Hiram and David as soon

as the Philistine and Šikil threats had been brought under

control. In light of these commercial attractions Hiram’s generous

terms and modest expectations may be described as an investment in

both trade and ‘copper futures.’ The potential value of such an

investment to Hiram becomes apparent when considering the

interruption of the Cypriote source of supply, and the political

power vacuum in the Sinai. Hiram’s contribution to the success

of the United Monarchy was thus entirely appropriate for the

23

potential return in profit which he would have anticipated from

the combination of trade and exploitation of the copper reserves

in the Arabah which had been untouched for some fifty years. Nor

are the quantities and value of imported goods described in the

text unreasonable, for as Kitchen has pointed out, the nine tons

of gold which Solomon reportedly received is a comparable quantity

to that which Tiglath-pileser III was later to obtain from Tyre

(Kitchen1989).

3. David’s military strategy does appear to mirror Tyre’s objective:

As discussed above, the pattern of David’s military strategy

is very much what one would expect if the primary target of the

allies was to secure access to both Edomite copper and the Gulf of

Aqaba. Another point of interest is the observation that the

biblical authors quite possibly included the Negev highlands in

their definition of Edom (Bartlett 1989, 44). For this reason the

description of David’s determined invasion, genocide and

garrisoning of Edom makes sense for this conquest would have given

David, and by extension Hiram, access to the Gulf and control of

the extraction and trade in copper. With the Philistine and Šikil

threats under control, David’s early campaigns may be seen as an

attempt to neutralize his eastern competitors for trade and

material resources. There is also the possibility that the Syrians

may have been involved in the Arabah. This is hinted at in the

confusion between Aram and Edom in the text, and the MT variant of

2 Sam 8:13-14 according to which ‘David made a name for himself

24

when he returned from smiting Aram in the valley of salt.’ 7 These

coincidences raise the possibility that the Syrians and Edomites

may have been allied, an hypothesis which might also explain the

description of Aram having much nehosheth in spite of the paucity

of natural resources in that territory, and the evidence that

Syria had no copper or metal working industry of its own at that

time. (Muhly 1973: 209-213).

The Assyrian records also provide an explanation as to why

such a bold military adventure into Syria may have been possible.

During the first half of the 10th century David’s Assyrian

contemporaries Ashurnasirpal I and Ashur-rabi II were engaged in a

drawn out conflict with Aramaean settlers in the Euphrates and

Habur valleys. This information provides support for a literal

interpretation of verses describing David’s capture of Damascus,

for it seems likely that Syria would have been relatively poorly

defended and thus vulnerable to attack at that time. The counter

argument once again emphasizes the economic opportunities and

threats then present to the east and south of Jerusalem. Conquest

of these competitors was essential to realize the goals.

4: The regional politics of the time explain the Edomite and Egyptian stories.

The political and economic situation in the region may also be

used to interpret the significance of the stories relating the

7 2 Sam 8:8. The phrase ‘Valley of Salt’ is found in the MT variant

of 2 Sam 8:13. For possible confusion between Edom and Aram see

Bartlett 1989, 110-112.

25

Edomite prince Hadad with Egypt. It is suggested that these may

best be understood by taking into consideration the regional

threats and dynastic conflicts which were dividing Egypt during

the 10th century (Hagens 1996). It seems likely that the long

lived Psusennes I, whose reign commenced at about the same time as

that of David, would have seen Hadad as a potential ally who might

have been of value in assisting Egypt to regain control of the

Canaanite territories, including the rich resources of the Arabah

which had been lost a half century earlier. After Psusennes’

death however, the political landscape in Egypt changed, and his

successors in Tanis were faced with the growing threat of the

Libyan dynasty in Bubastis. For chronological reasons, and

because there is some evidence of his military involvement in

Palestine, Siamun (950-931) is usually identified with the Pharoah

who gave his daughter in marriage to Solomon. (Green 1978; Malamat

1982; Kitchen 1986, 279-282). Since it seems likely that Siamun

was threatened by his contemporary Shoshenq in Bubastis for much

of his reign a marriage alliance between the weakened Siamun and

the Hebrew monarch would have made political sense. A related

passage in this drama which tells of the flight of Solomon's

lieutenant Jeroboam to Shoshenq's camp at about the same time

also fits into the picture of the Siamun-Solomon alliance being

matched by a parallel liaison between two other pretenders who

would soon control their own kingdoms. By the time Siamun passed

from the scene Shoshenq I (945-922) had achieved complete control

of Egypt.

26

The question of Egyptian royal marriages to foreigners, which

related to both the Hadad and Solomon stories, has been addressed

by Kitchen who showed that such practices were commonplace during

the 21st dynasty, that being a time of national weakness very

different from the New Kingdom (Kitchen 1986: 282). Kitchen has

also argued that the only explanation for the astonishing 383 tons

of gold and silver which the 22nd dynasty Pharaoh Osorkon was able

to offer the gods lies in the Palestinian raid of his predecessor

Shoshenq shortly after Solomon’s death (Kitchen 1989). Although

it cannot be demonstrated that this booty derived from Jerusalem,

this record does provide evidence of considerable prosperity in

Palestine at that time, which would appear to support the biblical

assertion that the region had prospered economically during that

time.

5: Ships of Tarshish may not only have gone to Tarshish

The absence of material evidence near Eliat and Jezirat Faroun

cannot be used to discount the possibility that Hebrew-Tyrian

trade goods made their way through the Gulf of Aqaba. The

duration of the activities was relatively short and material

evidence could easily have been lost. However a more reasonable

explanation for the phrase יייי

’may be that ‘Tarshish יייי ייייי ייייייreferred to a type of trading vessel rather than a particular

location of that name, or perhaps to the sea itself (Gordon 1978;

Jidejian 1969, 30-31). Here two related verses mentioning

Tarshish are of interest: 1 Kgs 22:48 and 2 Chron 20:35-37 present

27

different versions of a combined venture of the 9th century kings

Jehoshaphat and Ahaziah. The former passage relates that

‘Jehoshaphat made ships of Tarshish to go to Ophir’ while in the

later, and probably corrupt, Chronicles verse the kings built

ships at Ezion-geber ‘to go to Tarshish.’ These suggest that the

term may have referred to either a place or a type of vessel in different historical periods. Some support for the historicity of

Tarshish vessels and Ophir, may also be provided by the discovery

of the phrase ‘[G]old of Ophir’ on an eighth century sherd found

at Tel Qasile (Kitchen 1989, 31). The challenge to the

historicity of the Trade Agreement on the basis that Tarshish was

not the source of exotic imports is therefore invalid, for it is

quite possible that the word could have had more than one meaning.

6: Hiram’s disappointment may be explained by Solomon’s military losses:

It is unlikely that a supplier of goods and services would have

continued in business for some two decades without demanding

regular payment in some other form or other. A more likely

explanation for the Cabul outburst is that it was related to

Hiram’s long term expectations. As discussed above it is

suggested that Hiram was investing in copper futures, and his hope

for success was sustained by the string of victories enjoyed by

David. The evidence however suggests that Solomon was not able to

realize the fruits of these victories. From Hiram’s perspective

Solomon’s most serious failure may have been related to

information provided by the text that Hadad and Rezon were a

28

source of trouble throughout Solomon’s reign (1 Kgs 11:25). This

reference appears to be an admission that Solomon was incapable of

realizing the benefits of David’s earlier victories in those

territories. It is also interesting to note that references to

nehosheth as a metal for extraction or commodity trading in the

biblical text is conspicuous by its absence. Thus not only does

the Hebrew not distinguish between copper, brass and bronze, but

very few of the 40 or so uses of this word in the Hebrew Bible

reveal any interest in, or indeed familiarity with, the concept of

metallurgy. The inescapable conclusion is that whatever was

happening at Khirbat en-Nahas during the second half of the 10th

century, the mining operations were not managed and controlled by

the Hebrew monarchy. The deal which involved transfer of

territory in Galilee in exchange for some 3600 kilos of gold,

appears to have been considerably less than satisfactory from

Hiram’s point of view. I suggest that Hiram’s expression of

disappointment was a reflection of his recognition that his plans

to access Arabah copper had fallen through. Some support for the

historicity of this passage may also derive from the evidence of

an archaeological site associated with the name Cabul dating from

this timeframe (Gal 1993).

]

7: Josephus is trustworthy:

29

While it is undeniable that much of Josephus’ treatment of

Solomon’s reign is based on the biblical record, there is a

certain amount of content in his works, including factual material

not found in the Bible such as the information that Tyre at that

time was an island.8 The fact that Josephus cites stories involving

Hiram’s interactions with Solomon with a pro-Tyrian bias gives

further reason to believe that a non-biblical tradition is being

cited.9 It would also seem unreasonable to deny the statement of

Josephus that he had access to copies of earlier Tyrian annals,

and a king list which he cites specifically to ‘prove that these

assertions are not of my own invention.’10 The existence of these

independent traditions suggests that Josephus’ contribution to the

historicity of the treaty should not be rejected.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: BALANCING THE PROBABILITIES

8 Josephus Antiquities 8.147; Against Apion 1.113.9 Josephus provides two different accounts of intellectual

competitions between Hiram and Solomon. In Antiquities 8.143 he tells

us that Solomon was quick witted enough to solve riddles sent to

him by the king of Tyre. A passage from Dius based on the Tyrian

archives (Against Apion 1.114-5; Antiquities 8.148-9) however gives a

different version. In this, riddles which Solomon sent to Hiram

were successfully solved by one Abdemun of Tyre who then

propounded others which Solomon failed to solve.10 Antiquities 8.144; Against Apion 1.107, 112, 116.

30

This paper has been an attempt to determine whether it is possible

to reconstruct one aspect of the historicity of the biblical

traditions related to the United Monarchy. The objective here

has been to explore the specific question as to whether or not the

‘balance of probability’ favours the existence of a commercial

‘Agreement’ between Hiram I of Tyre and King Solomon. The

authenticity of this tradition is of relevance to understanding

both the historicity of the United Hebrew monarchy and the early

expansion of Phoenician mercantile activities in the eastern

Mediterranean. The question is also of importance for the study

of trade in the Ancient Near East during the Dark Age between ca.

1100-800 BCE as the material pertains to the earliest signs of

economic recovery during that obscure period. There has been no

attempt here to establish the historicity of other biblical

passages which do not directly relate to this specific question.

For this reason many details in the text which relate to this

period, but not to the topic of a Tyrian-Jerusalem trade

partnership, have been ignored. The methodology has involved

consideration of seven arguments considering the hypothesis that

‘no such Agreement existed.’

The conclusion is that not one of the arguments against the

existence of the treaty can be considered to be strong. In each

case the issues raised may be explained or rationalized by

consideration of the commercial opportunities and threats facing

the region at that time. Indeed the circumstantial evidence would

appear to support rather than deny the existence of joint trading

31

activities. For example it is noted that the major copper

producer in the region, Cyprus, became effectively isolated from

the nations and city-states in the Aegean and Syro-Palestine

sometime during the 11th century, as a result of which the Near

East suffered serious shortages of that strategic element. This

situation was exacerbated by the abandonment of the Egyptian

copper mines at Timna within the same timeframe. The radiocarbon

dating of the mining complex at Khirbat en-Nahas which reveals

that copper production at that location also commenced in the 11th

century is also of some significance. The description of David’s

wars and Hiram’s investment in the Hebrew Monarchy given in the

biblical text may thus be interpreted as an attempt to secure

access to this resource. Few treatments of the emergence of the

Israelite monarchies take into account the commercial

opportunities which access to the copper of the Arabah would have

made possible. Thus Na’aman (1992, 74) argued that although the

sites of the Negev highlands benefited from new economic

opportunities following the withdrawal of Egypt, Joab’s campaign

was ‘doubtless’ motivated by the danger to the Israelite kingdom

posed by the pastoral nomads in that territory. A further economic

driver for military and commercial interest in the Arabah existed

as a result of the disruption of many of the trade routes to the

east due to warfare in Mesopotamia and Anatolia. The position

argued here is that even if David captured the Edomite territory,

including the mines in the Arabah and the Negev highlands, it

seems likely that Solomon never was able to exploit this resource.

32

Although Hiram’s expensive investments in the United Monarchy of

David and Solomon had the twofold objective of participating in

trade to the east and exploitation of the copper mines in the

Arabah, both ambitions were thwarted by civil unrest in Edom and

Syria. Hiram’s expression of displeasure that the territory was

ceded to him by Solomon was worthless ‘Cabul’ may be therefore be

taken as a response to his disappointment in this development.

The testimony of Josephus may also be taken as evidence of

such an agreement in light of the fact that both extra-biblical

evidence, and pro-Tyrian stories are to be found in his works.

The importance of the copper trading network in the Negev

highlands, and by extension the copper reserves in the Arabah, is

also supported by the pattern of Shoshenq’s invasion which took

him deep into that territory shortly after Solomon’s death, while

the riches of Osorkon shortly after that raid would also support

the biblical position that a significant quantity of wealth had

entered the region. A good argument in favour of the agreement is

that it fits so well into what we know of the commercial trade

structure of the Pre-Classical period. Tyre did go on to develop

prosperous new trade routes, while the Hebrew records retained a

strong tradition of a brief period of economic superiority. In

conclusion the probability that a trade agreement between Tyre and

Solomon did exist is significantly higher than 50%.

I suggest that an analytical methodology in which the

arguments relating to competing models of a single stratum within

a multilayered literary structure may be a valid approach for the

33

reconstruction of other biblical passages. Although future

arguments or discoveries may alter the conclusion reached here,

the methodology itself offers a possible resolution to the current

historiographical impasse. That said, it must be recognized that

an essential aspect of the exercise involves correlation of the

biblical text with direct and circumstantial extra-biblical

material, and that it is consequently only valid for those layers

of the narrative for which sufficient external information exists.

For the substantial quantity of textual material for which no

extra-biblical correlation is possible authentic history may lie

beyond what astronomers call the event horizon. In such cases

even rough historical guesses may not be possible.

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NOTES

41