1878 Cabul--The Ameer His Country and his People by Robinson s.pdf

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LOLL



CONTENTS.

T i e Kingdom of Czbul, I-BouncZaries: Phy sica l Fea tu re s a?zc?

Pro ducts , 2-5.-Mountains, Rivers,Minerals, Vegetables, Animals

-Climate, ?.-Population, 8-21-General Character-The

Afghans proper, their language, descent, history, manners an d cus-

toms, amusements, women-Other races-Governvzent

and A~wzy

21-27-Religion-provincial governors-court officials-regular

array-militia.-The

meer nd

his Paqniily, 2737-Shere i

IIhan,

AbduUah

Jan

Ahmed Ali, Yakub E h a ~ r bdul Rahman.-

Recent H i s t o ~ y u s s i a 0

th

Afg ua Eialztier, 3744-The

Umball Durbar-aCzar's

honour-Wakhan-Ehiva-Turcomans

- fern-X eratR ussian Railways.-Dde d m e e ' s Grievaltces,

44-50 -The heir elect-makhan--Seistan-Yahb *Khan-

P e s h a m Conference-Quetta-oux Indian Frontier.-Boutes,

50-71--Qnetta to Candahar, 504 5-Candahar

to

H em t, 56-58.

Candahar to Ghuzni 58-Thzil,

vih

Ghuzni, to Candahar, 59-63

-Pcshamur to Cabnl, vib the I(hyber

Pass,

63-71.-Pronfiep

a n d 1LTozratain Passes, 72-85-lKoh?t, Brahoe, Bolan,

c.-

SuleimanPasses-Gomnl, Draband,

lilzram, c.-Eh-j-ber-Hhoord

Rhyber-Korthern Passes-Basses i n th e Interior-The Xouw-

f a in Tribes, 85-90--Tow blockade-Frontier policy-List of

chief tribes-Persian Afairs, 90-1-Genealogy of Royal

Family of Cabul, 92.









C A B U L

A F G H A N I S T A N

BEINQ

PAMPHLET OF FACTS ABOUT THE COUNTRY

THE AMEER

ND

THE PEOPLE

W I T I - I

M A P

O F

TI-IE

C O U N T R Y

SHOWING

ROUTES OF

ADVANCE

AND PASSlS

PROM

THE

CASPIbN BEA TO

THE

IBDUS

ND PROM

THE

ILUBBIAN LINES

BEYOND

THE OXUB

TO

T I I I Q

PERSIdN GULP

nx

PI-IIL R O B I N S O N

tltriYott

S MPSON

LOW

MARSTON SEAIZLE

I i IVINGTON,

CROWN DUILDINGIB,188

PLZET BTRXET



NOTE.

INprefacing a compilation of th is kind, i t is hardly

necessary to say that the compiler has gladly utilized

in his work

ll

the material he could find to his

hand th at was a t once autlzoritative and well written

-whether in the columns of the Press or in books.

The oilly authors qnoted are acknovlcdged masters

of the subject-Rawlinson, Valnbery, Bellem, Elphin-

stone, Ferrier, and S c h ~ ~ y le r . he nlap lllny

be

safely

accepted as correct, nlld nll clistances accurately cal-

culated from the scale given. I t combilles the latest

clata of the Indian Frontier Survey publications

aail

of the most recent maps of Central Asia.

P R .



C A B U L ;

A FGHAN I S T AN .

from its present political aspect the king-

of the b e e r of Cabul, Sheye Ali Khan, is

of interest for the student as the theatre of'

conqueat and Islamite growth, the scenc of

nd havoc, a very hotbed

of

ohammedan bigotry and fanaticism, tllc ityell2

f Shia nnd Sunni hostility, the battle-field of

fghaas and Persians, the scene of British conquests

disasters

and

as if nature hacl clcsigned it to

the object of the world's attention,

Afghanistaa

tands uplifted from the great plains of Inclin and

hanates upon the shoulders of the great

ountain ranges tha t bound it on the north-east ant1

ast. T he mountains of the Hindu KCsh Cower u

its

eastern frontier as a landlvnrlr to all Bsin,

nrny

to India.

m th e gre at range irregular spw s diverge in

a

net-



work of mountain chains.

Between them lie valleys

of suipvsing fertility, ancl watered by pereni~ial

streams. Here every cncmy of Inclia has rccruitecl

his forccs, ancl more than once the hardy moun-

taineers have themsclves poured through the passes

of thc Snleimiin range that separates Afghanistan

from India, to ravage the territories of the infidels of

Hindustan. Known to the world generally by the

name of Afghallistan, or country of the Afghans, it

is not so designated by the Afghans themselves, al-

thongh the name is not nnknown to them. By the

Afghans their country is nsnally called

c c

Wilayat

(hence the term Wilayati, often applied to it s

p e o ~ l eby the natives of Hindustan) or native

country.

It

is also distinguished by two appella-

tions, inclncljng different portions of

territory

vie.

IIab~d, or Kiibnlist%n,'' which includes all that

mountainons clistrict nol-th of Gliuzni ancl the 8afed2

Icoh, as far as the Hindti Kdsh, limited towards th e

ves t by the Huzarah country (the ancient Paropa-

misns), ancl eastward by th e Abba-Sin, or ( Father of

R i ~ e r s , ' ~he Inclns

; mcl

c ICllorZs~an, or r c Xzbu-

listiin, which includes all that extensivc track of

country, Alpinc n its Eastern limits, ancl table-land

or desert in its vestern extent, which stretches



TH M O U N T A I N S .

3

southmarcl and weatmard from about tho latitude of

Ghuzni, and borders on the confines of Persia, from

which, towards the south, it is separated by the

desert of Seisthn . glance at the map will acquaint

the

reader with the bo~mdariesof the kingdom.

The main features of Afghanistan, vllich measures

about

430

miles from east to vest ,

ancl

460

miles from

south to north, are t,he mountain chains, the general

direction of wl~ich s east and vest, but which throw

ont buttresses t o the north ancl south.

Afgliailistan

is traversed across tho centre, from east to vest, by

the Hindti-Ichsh, or more properly the Hinail-

Koh, encling in the Koh-i-Baba, a huge mass

north-v est of and a t no great distance

from

the

city of Cabnl. It is covered v i th perpetual snow,

ancl its loftiest peak is nearly 18,000 feet high.

Thence run two parallel chains, one called the

Safed Koh, or white monlltain

;

the other-the

s o ~ ~ t h e m m o s tne-the Siah Koh, or

( (

black rnoun-

tain. These mountains are of no great height.

North of the ICoh-i-Baba and th e Safed Koh

is

a

high plateau, intersected

by

minor ranges, and

called th e Hnzara district. Running

in

a

south-

west direction from Cabt11, past Candahar to

Girishk, is another chain of m o ~ ~ n ta in s.



CABUL

for should the project of invasion as announced be

executed and a force enter Afghanistan by may of

Thal and the Riirnm river th e Safed 1<oh will do

duty as an effectual barrier against any at tem pt

from the north to disturb the advancing column for

i t covers the line of advance up to the turn ing point

of th e l < i ~ m m iver whence by the reg ~~ llaroad

both Gllnzni ancl the t o m of Cabnl may be corn-

m m ded . The high ground about Glluzai forms th e

vater-shed for the drainage of both divisions of

Afghallistan. All to th e north of this site flows

northwarcl to the Cabnl river and ultimately reaches

the stream of the Indus. B u t a11 to the south of i t

flows sonthward ancl westward and is either lost i n

the sancls th at prevail in tllcsc directions or else

joining the rivers Tarnak and Argnnclub ultimately

reaches the lake of Seisthn. Two streams only flow

south-castward toward the Indns . Of these th e

Gomal is lost in the soil soon after leaving the hills

it drains and the KErnm reaches th e Iudns ne ar

Isa-1<11ail.

Towards th e west watering the table-land of

C andal~ar nd Hera t are the several rivers flowing

into the lake of Seistbn. Of these the Halllland is th e

largest and before reaching the lake it rcceives the



TII

RIVERS.

months all these streams, with the exception, pcr-

hapi, of the river Halrnand, become almost com-

pletely dry.

In Cabul the rivers are more numer-

ous for the extent of surface tha n in Khorassan,

and are of greater volume, though of less extent.

The principal are the stream s of

Logar, Khasgar,

and Swat, which, joining the Gabul river in dif-

ferent parts of it s course, add their waters to those

of the Indus a t Attock. Of these the Logar and the

I as11gar stream s the latter with its tributaries

draining the hills of Enfiristan) are fordable at most

seasons throughout their course. B L I ~,he Swat and

Cabul rivers are ollly fordable with ease during the

earlier part of their course.

Though seen now in th e lowest depth of its

poverty, Clle kingdom of the Ameer has a past

history of some grandeur, and the vast arcllitec-

tura l remains th at heap many of it s valleys and

strew its plains bear witness to z prosperow age

t l1at has gone. Thus, from Ghuzn i westward,

all along the valleys of the Tarnak and the Hal

rnund, down to the basin of Seistan, the whole

country is covered with the ru ins of former

towns, obliterated canals, and deserted cultivation,

the sad memories of the T artar devastations under



those who have studied its resources that Afghanis-

tan requires only a settled governlnent to regain al l it s

past power and wealth. I t s mineral resources are

gre at; gold silver iron and lead are among the

indigenous metals and salt saltpetre snlphur ancl

antimony abound. I n vegetable products it is aoto -

rionsly rich for here the flora of th e East ancl W est

meet as on neutral ground. Besides all the I n d im

cereals slnd the lx~nclred arieties of the melon ancl

cucumber kinds known to Asia the castor-oil

tobacco cotton madder and other valuable

econoinic plants of th e E ast there are found the

f r ~ ~ i t snd flowers of Europe also. The olive mnl-

berry oak cedar walnut ancl pine flourish with all

our orchard trees and garden shmbs. English vege-

tables are in every bazaar ancl in tlie country side th e

rose jessamine and hyacinth grow wild. A coin-

plete catalogue would almost exhaust bo tany ; but

sufficient varieties have alreacly been cited to denote

tlie vast range of the vegetable world of Cabnl.

Froin Chis nlay be inferred corresponding variety of

climate. Though lying between the 29 th and 35th

degrees of latitude Afghanistan taken as a whole

escapes by i ts elevation th e heat th at shonlcl





CBBUL.

people.

The few mannfactnres they have merely

suffice for their ordinary vants.

The aiiirnals of Afghanistan are the horse camel

and shecg.

The first are largely exportecl. into

India ancl. for the most p art come from th e countries

on the west of Afghanistan. Of late years however

large numbers have been bred in Afghanistan ex-

pressly for the Indian market ancl. th e breed is

becoming greatly improved o-cving to the care and

jndicions breeding.

As race there are few to compare in physique

and

energy of cllaracter with tlie Afghans proper-

for the country is peopled by an infinite diversity of

races. The Tajik of Persian origin and th e

Hnzara the residue of Tarta r invasion Usbegs and

Turkomans of varions tribes I~ nzz il bashMoguls

ancl. a bewildering variety of Hindi and Kashmiri

colonists all combine to form th e population mhile

southward but still subjects of th e Arneer of Cabul

are th e Brahoes and Relnchis descended from dif-

ferent stocks and speaking different languages and

medley of emigrant communities froin H industan

and Persia.

It should be remembered that Afghanistan never

has had and never can have th e cohesion ancl.



TH

AFGHANS N O T A N A TIO N .

F

The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes

held together more or less closely accorcling to the

character of their chief. The feeling of patriotism

cannot exist for the re is no common country.

Indeed there is no etlmical reason why H ers t and

Candahar should be at1;nchecl to Cabul.

The

hill tribes of Huonra for instance are not at

all or little uncler the control of th e Cabul Govern-

ment m though they achowleclge the ruling king

there as heacl of their nation they would in case of

invasion or attack

from without rush as reaclily

to

th

standard of their own chiefs iu Ghe hope of

local pluncler as io the standard of the

Iring

for the

protection

of

their country.

n

imes of peace they

withdraw to their own bigl~land homes and inde-

penclence. The total population has never been

accurately calculated and while some authorities

fix

it much lower others estimabe i t a t about

nine millions.

A

great variety of races contri-

bute to the total but the most numerous and most

im po rta l~ t in every way are th e Afghans proper.

They number nearly four millions. Their lan-

guage proves on analysis one of tlze most in -

teresting known to plzilologists for its roots strike

equally into Hebrew Sanscrit Asiatic and Persian



1 0 CABUL.

known source.

I t is called Pushtn, and is almost

entirely a spoken language, tlle character being

Arabic, with only very slight modifications to express

particular sounds which in the spoken language have

no corresponding s o ~ u dn any other Oriental tongue.

From the presence of Hebrew derivatives in their

speech, and of Hebrew ceremonies in their c ~ s t o m s ,

it has long been surmised that they were of Jewish

degree. They style tliemselves Bani Israel, or

children of Israel, affect to trace their descent from

Saul, the king of Israel, and preserve among their

traditions, amongst medley of Moham medan doc-

trines, the accounts of the deliverance of Egypt, the

ark of the covenant, and th e names of the Philistines,

Amalek, Anak, and others. Be this as i t mny,

history first recognizes the existence of tlle tribes

called Afghans, when they were settled a t Ghor,

in Western IChorassan, in tlie eighth century, and

after becoming subject in turn to Delhi, and to

Persia, they attained to independence

by

the daring

of Ahmed Shah, an Afghan, who on th e death of

Nadir Shah, the I h g of Persia, seized the vast

treasure wlich the Persian army was carrying home

from tlie plunder of India , and proclaiming himself





men hacl crotvclecl the Pass hurried on toward the

devoted city. The Ghilzais tried to oppose th e aven-

ging force at thc Jugdullah defile but were hurled

back upon the main army encaml~ed t Jngdeen. I n

five days more General Pollock mas upon them in

their stre ng tl~ . H e inflicted a shattering defeat s a d

th en swept down on Cabul and th e ruins in th e capi-

ta l of th e Arneer bear eloquent mitlless to th is day of

the completeness of our triumph stlld our retribn-

tion. t has been forgotten by some t h a t to enact t h a t

splendid vengeance the British army had to march

through the Punjab-not then a British province bu t

a possession of a dist~ffectecl f not actually hostile

government-and through the Khyber Pass while i t

was still swarming with th e very same men tha t a few

months before hacl rnadc such easy prey of the

blocked mass of f~~gitivesncl were still exulting

in the successful carnage. To-day hovever th e

circumstances are altogether changed ancl in our

favour. .The Pnnjab is p e ac e f~ ~ ll yn our possession

an d affords us some of th e finest soldiers in t h e

vorld the Sikhs who ha te the Afghans with a

traditional hatred and would prefer them to any

other enemy. More th an this the Viceroy L ord





4

CABUL.

storm ing of G h ~ ~ z n iever stood for day against

our troops.

To retu rn to the people, in their government and

customs, th ey resemble othel. Mohammedan nations,

but tllong11 proud of the ir devotion to Is lam , they clo

not hesitate to break all its laws mhen their inclina-

tions prompt them . I n one respect notably, their largo

co n s~ m p tio n f intoxicating liquors, they habitually

transgress their creed. I n character, t h e Afgh m is

bigoted and revengeful. H is treachery is prover-

bial u the E ast , and hardly less notorious is his

readiness to join in plunder or murder. Vlrithout

being brave, in the sense that the long-endnring

Sikh ancl patient Ghoorka are brave, he possesses a

certain dashing boldness, wiiich the first reverse

dissipates; and, thong11 boastf~~ln promises, is

avaricious ancl m ean iiz performance. H is code of

hospitality illustrates this trait. So long a s th e

guest

is

under his roof, t he Afghan will t ~ e a t inl s

z brother, ancl all th e delicacies th a t th e women i n

his harein can prepare-and every Afghan wom an

is a slrillecl cook-are a t his service. B u t t h e

mom ent that the stm nger has got a gunshot off, his

whilom host, if he shoulcl have taken a fancy to his



A F G H A N

HOSPITALITY

1 5

before he had liglltecl his pipe for him.

By nature,

ancl in many p u t s of the country by profession,

robbers ancl banditti, the smnllest pretext suffices o

excite them to deeds of blood, alld in their tribal

ancl religions jealousies sucll pretexts are always at

hand. As Sunnis they hold in detestation the

adverse sect of hias, ancl this difference of doctrine

is at all times enough to justify plunder ancl murder,

while from the many varieties of races living among

and near them, excellent reasons for desolating a

homestead, or Id lin g a traveller, are never wanting.

I t is sufficient excuse to an Afghan for firing his

long-barrelled jizail at a stranger that the latter mears

his tu rb m differently to llimself-and is not looking.

The turban is in Afghanistan what tlie tartan was

in th e Higl~lancls of Scotland, for each clau has

its distinctive pattern of cloth and often peculiar

method of wearing it. These clans are very

nnm erous, but group themselves roughly into no-

mad ancl agrict~ ltu ra l communities* The foriner

are found chiefly in the wilcler co t~ntryof the Kho-

rasan, where a more ample pasture is founcl than

n

the north, and where they can wander with their

herds at will. Nominally, of course, they are under

th e government of the Ameer, but virtually they are



1 6 CABUL.

pay their tribute to the central authority, ancl mllo

have complete control over the mutnnl relations for

peace or war of the v rious ribes. They contribute

a contingent to tlie regular arm y, aiicl form th e bulk

of th e reserve militin. T he maill portion of the

regular army is drawn from the ngricultnral class;

and, except as a soldier or a cultivator, the Afghan

in his own country has no occupation open to him.

W hether from vanity or from traclitional an tipathy to

useful labour, he refuses to follow any trade, ancl

history gives ample precedents to justify us in refer-

ring to this tra it of character, the fact tha t the

Afghans u e the ruling race. In personal all-

pearance few nntions in the world can compare mit'h

these s~ ~ bj ec tsf the Ameer. Travellers agree

in

des-

cribing both the men ancl women as remarkably hand-

some, fair complexioned, ancl with dignified, aquiline

features. I n figure they are almost invariably mell-

proportioned, tall, and muscular. W ith such ad -

vantages it is no t strange th a t the Afghan is pa s-

sionately addicted to all exercises that call for

athletic limbs, sound l~ m g s , and tongh sinews.

Hunting and hawking are nationel nm~~sements,

and, all kinds of sport aye p o p ~ ~ l a r ,As horsemen



SPORTS

AND

PASTIUES 7

rifle, spear, or stonc, they are remarkably proficieut

W ith such tas tes ancl pursuits hcartiness in con-

viviality is generally found i~ssociated but t he

Afghans, in iheir boisterous debauchery, distort this

allliable trait into bestiality of the vilest dcscription.

This is especially the case alllong th e higher classes

for the bulk of the pcople are unable

£ram

their ex-

cessive poverty to indulge their tnsies. As an

evening amuselvent chess finds favour wit11 every

grade but, in common with all Orientals, th e

Afghan psefers to listen to a story-teller to doing

anything else. T he

interminable

natnrc of Eastern

tales, which go on from night to night, br sn ch ii~ g

off from th e original nal.1.aLive a t every opportunity

into the adventures of other characters that happen

to

be

introduced, would be macldening to a Euro-

ropean

audience;

but th e Afghan, patient in this

alone, lies on h is sheepskin hour after hour quite

content if sollle one n the company will oilly clrone

out the involvecl ltlbyrinth of inclecent episocles tha t

118 calls tale.

T he women are fair-complexioned, handsom e, aucl

of a good figure. They enhance tlieir charllls by all

ih e artifices of cosmetics, dyes, and p ic tu re sq ~ ~ eress

and tatooing mitli indigo, takes the place of thc



8

CABUL.

long plaits, is often aclornecl with tassels and rough

but effective ornaments of metal or glass ; but the

jealous seclusion in which the

bitter classes are

kept by their lords and masters, has prevented tra-

vellers from obtaining details of personal appearance.

The secl~~ciednd idle life they are forced to lend

within the religionsly guarded haram,' influences

their moral character very injuriously; and since

they know they are not tmsted, they

io

not care to

gain the confidence of their masters. Intrigues are

consequently of corninon occurrence, though, on

cliscove~y he parties are most severely punished,

usually with death. Yet the ,zccolzzplishment of

their forbidden desires is often the daily occupation

of the innlntes of lnany a

'

haram,' and ihe licen-

tiousness of the men and their neglect of their wives

tends to increase the frequency of such iaisons,'

and affords opportunities for their concealment.

The men sometimes dye their hands and feet mith

henna (the leaves of the Lavsonia enennis),

and also apply surma (powdered antimony) or

kohl (lampblack), to the edges of the eyelids.

These personal embellishments, howevel-,belong Inore

properly to the women, and are onlypractisecl by those



AFGHAN

WOMEN.

1 9

even among them the habit is by 11 means general.

Those wlzo adopt it are considered fops ancl effe-

minate. But among the wornenthese arts of the toilet

are universally observed, The women also a re gene-

rallymore or lesstattooed per m an ea tly ~ th in cl ig o . A

few dots are nsnally punctured on the

chin

and on the

foreheacl at the root of the nose. Frequently

a

few are

marked on the skin between the breasts, a nd iu the

same nzanner rings are marked on the fingers, wrists

and rmg. T he complexion of the women of the

better classes is very fair, and sometimes even rosy,

thong11 nsnally a pale, sallow colonr prevails. The

features are generally handsome, and like those of

the men have a Jemish cast, ancl their fascinating

glances are enhanced by the use of the snyma ancl

kohl above mentioned. These substances im par t to

the eyes a peculiar charm alld captivating lustre,

mixed with spark of diablerie when th eir owner

is animated, vllich are considered essentials in the

qualities of a beautiful woman, ancl objects of ad-

miration to the otlier sex generally.

Next to the Afghans, the T + k of Pers ian origin

are the most numerous class of the Am eer's subjects.

Physicnlly, they rival the Afghans in graces of

persons, but differ from them widely in characte r and



2

CABUL

nbiding race, and though as ignorant ancl super-

stitious as their neighbonrs, are less turbulent ancl

bigoted. I n th e rnra l districts they follow agriculture

as profession, and in t o m s occnpy themselves in

any trade or i n d ~ ~ s t r y .A considerable num ber join

the army, in which they are known as Toorks, and

not few are to be found serving in th e Punjab

branch of the Blitish force. Among the rem aining

elements of the population of Afghanistan, the

Xazzilbash Moghul and the Huzara tribes deserve

s ~ e c i a l otice. The former are of Turki origin,

and wherever they go enjoy the reputation of being

splendid soldiers. In th e irregular cavalry of India,

one of the finest arm s of

any service, they are nlarlted

men, and in Afghanistan they form the bulb of th e

cavalry and artillery forces in the Ameer s service.

The H uzaras are of Tartar descent, as th e b unpre-

possessing features and diminutive stature abun-

dantly testify. They serve the other races as menials,

and, as such, are looked upon as fzitldul and docile.

I n independence, however, they display a remarkable

hatred of the Afghans, who,

oming to the savage

dar ing shown by these rno~~nt~~lkeers ,ave never

been able to pierce to the strongholds.

Brief as are these sketches of the chief races of



G O V E R N M E N T

AND

LAWB 2

contaills within itself all the elements of intestine

discorcl. and nono of c o h e s io ~ n com mon canse.

Tile Sunni Afghaus a t a word mould tu rn in the

name of religion upon the Shia Moghuls while th e

Hnzaras, and besides them the Hindu tribes scattered

about the co~nbrywould readily, in the hope of

plunder, fight against both.

The Afghans, in fact, are incapable of resisting

a Enropean invasion, whether it come from Kho-

kand or the Pnujab. They could contribu te very

materially to the defence of tlleir Fatherland, if it

be undertaken by a firm ally. They can, for in-

stance, enable England to defend t h e line of the

Oxus, and Balkh, *or Badakshan, or they could per-

form the same service to Russia, garrisoning Cabnl

or Ghnzni. They exercise th e two enormous advan-

tages of being on th e spot, and of lulowing the

country. But i t cannot be denied, th a t t h i s is th e

utmost Cabnl can do, and that we have too per-

sisten tly exaggeratecl. the difficulties of occupyiug

Afghanistan onrselvcs.

In their governmellt and lams the Afghans are

guided by the precepts and ordinances of the

Mohxlnmedan religion and Koran codes. T h e



CABUL

governs the country by the aid of provincial gover-

nors, who are responsible to him for the revenues

of the provinces under their respective charge,

and also for the efficiency of the military forces

under theis cominand. The surplus revenues, af ter

defraying the expenses of the govelument, are

added to the imperial treasury, which is for the

support of the royal family, and is entirely a t the

disposal of the king. These provincial governors

generally, and more particularly those at a distance

from Cabul, oppress the people for theis o m ag-

grandizement, and often defy the authority of the

king, and assert their own independence.

This is

especially the case with that portion of the nation

occupying the mountain barriers of the kingdom.

Few of these tribes pay revenue to the Cabul

government without coercion, and the difficulties

attending its collection are so great that they are,

for the most part, left alone for many years together,

or until the imperial e x c h e q ~ ~ e requires replenish-

ing, and opportunity off'ers, when a force is marched

to the refractory district, and by fair means or foul,

makes up the ayrears of revenue by a general

plunder of its inhabitants.

At the seat of government the Iring is assisted by



THE

A ~ ~ E E R SRMY. 3

or chief jndge and priest, who snperintends the

department of lam ancl religion. T he details are

transacted by his

Nhib, or depnty, assisted by

th e Mufti for law, ancl the Sheik or ( ( Imam

for religion. All the officials connected with these

departm ents are compreheilsively styled 'Ulam a

or Doctors of the Law.

T he military forces of Afghanistan consist of a

reg~zlar tanding army and of a militia. The former

comprises some seventeen or eighteen reginleilts of

infantry, dressed, drilled, and equipped in imitation

-a sorry one though i t be-of the British army,

whose cast-off ancl conclelnnecl clothing they buy up

on the frontier stations of Ind ia alld adopt as their

nniform-a proof of th e prestige th a t th e British

recl-coat still maintains in their country. Besides

these, there are three or four regiments of light

clragoons got

up after th e same model

;

also a small

force of artillery, with perhaps a total of 1 pieces

of cannon, chiefly of brass, ancl home-inade. T he

Afghans have, however, a few iron guns ; bnt thoy

are very old an d msty, ancl probably as dangerous

to themselves as to their enemies. The army is

supposed to be under the direct command-iu-chief

of th e king ; but the regimental commands are dis-



4 CABUL.

conntry is divided, vithont respect to their mili-

ta ry qnalifications or capacities for command, T h e

internal economy of the regiments is carried on

by the comruanclant, styled Kom6diin, and is i n

accordance with his own ideas on the subject, and

he is assisted by a body of comlnissioiled and non-

comivissioiled officers, who are solnetimes selected

by merit, though, as a rule, they get their appoint-

ments through interest as blood-re18

'

olls or as

slaves, or else as partisans of the chief in corninand.

The arm s and uniforlns of th e soldiers are provided

by Government, at a fixed price, which is deducted

from tlieir pay. The arm s, like th e uniform, are fo r

the ivost part derived from th e British. Tliey are

the old flint-lock musket or smooth-bore percussion

guns.'

These las t, l~ow ever, re little used, ns th e

Afghans h m e not yet succeeded in manufacturing

caps

for

them, and can depend but upon

a

very sm all

supply from the British. Of late years they have

turned out a nuivber of two-grooved rifles an d ca r-

bines both a t Cabul nnd C andahar, on the pa tte rn

of those used by th e frontier corps of th e British

Ind ian ar m y ; but as before noted there is

a

diffi-

c u l t ; ~ n tlie finpply of percnssioil caps for them .

I t ust ot bo forgotten t ha t

w

have given the meer



T Z

F G H N bTILITIA

The pay of tl:e rcgnlar army is for the most part

settled by a cash papnent in many cases grants

of rent-free lancls are made instead. On these re-

side the familias of the soldiery, or else the lands

are hired out by tl1e111 to farmers. The infantry is

for the most part composed of true Afghans of

various tribes, though amongst tllern are many Tajiks

and a fern Persians. The latter, ancl the Tartars,

are mainly found in the ranks of the cavalry ancl

artillery forces, of which, indeed, they constitute the

bulk whilst in the ranlw of the three divisions of the

army are to be found many Hindostanes who llavc

desertecl from the ranks of the British

Indian

army.

The militia force is a very numerous body, the

numbers of which it is very difficult to ascertuin.

But in case of foreign invasion it would inclucle al-

most the entire male polsnlation between the ages of

sixteen and sixty. Their arms are the azail, or

long Afghan rifle the sworcl, or, in its stead, the

charall, or Afghan knife, ancl the shield. The

yeomanry division of this force, though sometimes

they carry the rifle, are, as a rule, only armed with

the lance, SWOPCI, pistols, or the bl~~nclerbus

with bell-shaped muzzle.



6 CABUL.

they are under t l ~ e irect control and command of

th e chiefs of their respective tribes, vhose interests

are identical with their o m , ancl under whose stan-

dards accorclingly they range tl~emselvesas fencla-

tories. Indeecl, th e coinposition of this force is very

anom alous. As a mass they are little, if a t all,

nncler the control of th e king or his governlneilt, and

are moreover divided amongst tl~emsclvesaccording

to th e opposing interests of their different tribes and

clans. T he militia provide their o m arms, ancl re-

ceive no pay except when on active service for the

S ta te . The ir triba l chiefs, however, receive gran ts

of rent-free lands

n

their respective territories by

way

of military fief.

From the foregoing pa,rticulars it will be noted

th a t the Afghan army is an armed, and for the most

part nndisciplinecl mass, with divided and often con-

flicting interests, and, consequently, not a t all times

to be clepended on for its fidelity to the king or his

government. Indeed from th e fact of their being

more or less nnder t h e control of their o m ribal

chiefs w l~ o , hemselves, are mere feudatories of the

king-sometimes snpporting, and a t others resisting

his authority), they look to them as their real

m aste rs , and accordingly, espouse their cause, what-



-so jealous of each other, and so constantly in-

triguing for asceudailcy n the councils or govern-

lnellt of the country. And th is ismoreover th e main

cause of the weakness of the Cab111 government,

for its authority does not extend much beyond the

capital and the acljacent provinces, unless backed

by troops to enforce compliance.

Such, in brief, are some of the peculiarities of the

armed forces of Afghanistan. As a military power

they are contemptible (at least at the present clay)

anywhere but on their o m hills. Even th e Kaffirs

-a savage race inhabiting the southern slopes of

the

Hincli~K i~ sh , nd whose only weapons 'are the

bow and arrow, atones, mcl th e dagger-have, times

svithout number, proved a formidable foe, and, in

tru th, more than match for th e Afghans, as

those of this race whom the Afghans own

s

valued

and faithful slaves, they have acquired ' not by their

superiority in fair fight, but by base treachery and

i n t r i g ~ ~ e . ~

heAnzee~ nd is Fc~nzi1y. It is now B tee n years

ago since Shere Ali Khan, dashing at Caldahar

to punish the rebel chiefs who bacl disputed his

snccession to the throne, sank in the hour of



first-born-the heir to his throne. T he gallant

youth, Mahomed Ali IChnn, had sought out the

loader of the rebels ill single combat, and afte r a

fierce fight in which he three times mounded his

antagonist, mas sh ot dead, and his father, in the

extrem ity of his sorrow, abandoned his ariny and his

kingdom to their fate, refusing for sevcral days

t

see even n hum an face. Three sons, it is trn e , still

remained to him , but so completely had his affec-

tio ns been centered

in

th e one that was gone, th a t

he could not look on either of the others as his

snccessor. A fourth son was in time born, and

t

him , the child of a favonrite wife, he gave both his

heart and throne. T he one gift has already more

than once nearly cost th e other, for the clis-

inhcrited sons sornc seven years ago alnlost shook the

aceptre from his hand by their snccossf~ll revolt.

But death has now removed the object of theil*envy.

Abclullah J a n , tlie son of th e Anleer s favourite vife ,

th e daug hter of th e N cer Afznl Khan, governor of

F nrra h , was proclaimed heir-apparent i n

1873

and

to secure h is succession his father imprisoned one

so n and drove

a

second in to exile. But fate has

proved too pomerf~ll or t he b e e r .

It is a picturesqne history this that closed a t the



worked well in .her husband s cause when th at cause

seemed clesperate, and Shere Ali mas a wanderer in

his onrn kingdom for

it

was she who kept th e camp

s n ~ p l i e dwith money, and the dethronecl rnler well-

informed of th e movements of the enemy and th e

intrigues of the court. W hen, therefore, Shere Ali

returned in triumph to his capital she claimed a s

her remard the elevation of her son to th e throne ,

and the promise then given in 1 869 was perfarmed

in 1873. At the great festival of

the Eed,

and in

the presence of all the Moslem city, the Ameer

solemnlyplaced in the hands of th e lad,Abdl~l lahJan,

th e Koran and the sword which his father, Dost

Mnhomecl, had in the sake wny placed in his, as

th e insignia of heirship, some thirty years before.

Three years Inter his health began to fail, he became

subject to fevers and rheumatic attacks, and to these

causes, perhaps, is due th e death which m on th

ago turned th e eyes of Asia to the capital of

Afghanistan. Not less picturesque is the sto ry of

th e Aineer s own life, nnd the lessons to be drawn

from

it are

su h

as should have warned Shere Ali

agninst disregarding claims of succession.

The Arneep Dost Mahomed died in 1 8 6 3 a t

H era t after subduing th at revolted province, and left





Ali.

But the fortunes of war were still against the

ex-Ameer, who suffered in lserson a decisive defeat

in January, 1867, while his general, after gaining

two victories, was finally defea,ted in September.

Afzul Khan died at Cabul in October, and Azim

Khan, at th e bear1 of a victorious asnly, formally

assumed the throne of Afghnnistan. Sliere

Ali

was

at this time in Tnrkistan, and lis soil Yakub I<hnn

at Herat, and against these the new ruler now

directed his army. B u t Shere Ali, waiting till Abdul

Rahman was well into Turlcistan, slipped past him

into Cabul, and while the Turldstan chiefs lrept the

enemy occupied, he despatclled Yakub Khan against

Candahar. That gallant soldier defeated th e forces

opposed to him, and then Shere Ali, leaving his son

Ibrahim Khan at H era t, marched upon Candnhar,

which he entercd in trinillph in June, 1 868 and a

snccessf~~lntrigue sooil after leacXng to th e m u ti~ ly

of the army a t Cabul, the capital also declarcc1 for

Shere Ali, wlio thus in September re-entered Cabul

as Ameer.

To s ~ ~ c c c c dliere Ali in that dignity there are

three claimants. The first, in point of strength of

claim, is Ahlned Mi, th e son of Shere Ali s eldest

son Maliomed M i Khan, who fell ill 1865 , fighting



32 CABUL.

himself intelligent and adventurous, She re Ali h as

always shown his grandson especial favour, and a s

late as 1 8 7 1 it appeared a s if his choice were not

yet made up, mhether Ahmed Ali or Abdullah Jan

should be declared th e heir-apparent. T h e former,

indeed, avowedly entertained hopes of the successioil

un til the superior influence of the mother of Abdullah

J a n obtained th e throne for her soil to h is exclusion,

and now th a t th e rival is dead his hopes of heirship

may with reason be revived. Ahmed Ali is described

as an intelligent youth of about

eigh teeli with

z

pleasing demoanour, and fairly well educated. T he

mother of Abdullah J a n is said to have another son

still living, b ut incapacitated for rule by being

totally deaf and dumb.

Yakub Kha n was born in the year 1849 , of a

noble mother. H is first appearance in public life

may be said to be th e occasion when he detected

th e European beneath tile disguise of th e der-

vish, mcl despite the flueacy and nerve of Armi-

nius Vambkry. T hat was in November, 1863

mhea th e Afghan prince appeared to t h e trave ller,

a

good-humoured, inexperienced child. Since

then, whether he has retained his good humour or

not, he has certainly acquired a vast experience of





34 CABUL

no roof th a t he has been murclerecl in prison, nor

is there any spccial ground for snpposing th a t , after

th e manner of E as te lv captives whose intelligence is

dcemed dangerous by th e m ler , his rcason has given

way during his confinement but should either

event prove to have occurred, ancl Yakub I<haa be

dead or renclerecl imbecile by tortu re , there will be

nothing in thiut to surprise the student of Afghan

lis to rg in general, or of th e character of She re Ali

in particular. Personally, Yalrub K han ha s a

pleasant address, ancl .is admittccl on all hands

to be the most intelligent of tlie Cabul grhces.

Of lcs

generalship

there can be only one

opinion, wllile as adm inistrator he has more th a n

once proved himself both capable and long-sighted.

H aug hty ancl rcve ng ef~ ~l ,s a ll Afghans are , he is

distinguishcd from the majority of his c o ~ ~ n t r y

Inen by his

frankness,

liberality, and enterprise.

There are some who declare th at Yakub K han ha s

loudly proclaimed his hostility to E ngland , and She re

Ali himself encleavo~~rednce to make him appear as

a Rnssophile. On th e other hand, he is saicl to have

cxpressccl in

872

to Captail1 Marsh very friendly

sentiments towards US and to have commenced the



ABDUL

RAHRfAN, TH

RENEGADE NEPHE W

5

study of English in proof of his good feelings ton~arcls

our country

The th ird clftiillant will be Abdnl R shm an, th e

eldest son of Shere Ali s eldest brother. By bi rth

he might, elsewhere th an in Cabul, assert certain

rights but where the sceptre goes to th e strongest

p l imogen i t~~reoullts for little, wllile in his personal

history Abdul R ahm an bas certainly no claims to

favour. H is whole life has been marked by stubborn

opposition to Shere Ali, against whom he saccess-

f111ly excited a revolt in

1865.

Having occupied

T ~ r k i s t a n , e ufnrched on Cabul, overthrew Shere

Ali, nt the ba ttle of Shekabad, and, re leasing h is

father Afznl I(hz11 from prison, placed hiin on the

throlle of Cabul. B ut Afzul Khan s incapacity

gave his brother Azim I<han su1)reme power, and

wit

hiin Abdul Rahinan q ~ ~ a ~ ~ e l l e dn consequence.

teinpornry reconciliation-during vhich he twice

defeated Sbcre Ali and his generals-resulted in

renewed hostilities ancl whe7n, d t e r his father s

death, Aziin

Kllsm,

l i s uncle, assumed the title of

Alneer of Cabul, be retired illto Tnrlristan

Shere

Ali, meanwhile, vas recovering his power, and

Abdul Ralllnan, finding his nriny melting from him,

proceeded to Ichiva, hoping there to secure sufficient



CABUL.

Tnrkistan. H is movements since th at date have

been obscured by mnnr rumonrs and the only facts

beyond all doubt are that his time is spent in

alternate

intrigues

with th e Tnrkom ans ancd th e

Russians ancd that his one object is to disturb

the peace of Afghaaistau. I n May 1870 he

was entertained kindly by General Kauffman

at

Sarnarcancd ancd since th at da te has repeatedly asked

for Russian help to assist him to conquer Afghan-

istan never ceasing to beg th at he might carry his

case to S t. Petersburg ancd even boasting ~vitl i h e

view of increasing his personal importance with the

Tnrkomans that he is in the pay of the Rnssian

government. H is military abilities mark llim out

s a dallg.erons enemy in the field but politically

and socially his influence cannot now stand so high

as

when fifteen years ago fighting for his father he

carried with liim th e sy i~ ipath yf the majority of the

Afghans. At tha t cdate ih e cause of Shere Ali as

shown by his loss of his throne in the successful

interpolation of two b e e r s of the elder stock was

undoubtedly unpopular and Abdul Rahm an had

he struck for the throne for himself as being th e

elder son of the eldest son might have permanently



Abclul Rahman has during all his outlaved life been

striving for. B n t if, casting about for a successor

v h o s l ~ a l l t

the

same time be acceptable to Russia

and clistastef~~lo England, t h e present Ameer shonld

select Abdul Rahman, there would in the choice be

nothing extraordinary.

Receizt Histolay Rz~ssin

12

the

Afghniz Fvo~ztic~ .

The stupicl catchword of masterly inactivity h a s

been adopted to designate a policy of which Sir J o h n

Lawrence (in vhose defence ill-informed p t' sans

persist in quoting it) had grown heartily sick in

1867

H e then advised active interference in C a l~ u l ffairs,

and Sir Stafford Northcote agreeing, it mas arranged

to subsidize the Ameer Shere Ali. Lorcl Mayo

arrived in January,

1869,

and to him therefore it

fell to carry ont Lord Lav rence 's active policy.

c

met Shere Ali a t Umballa, in M arch, and so

far

accedecl to the Ameer's earnest desire for an

offensive and

defensive

treaty, as to give a written

declaration th a t the British government would view

mith severe displeasure a ny attelnpt on tlle part of

his rivals to disturb

his

position. This declaration

Shere Ali exaggerated into acquiescence mrith his

clemancls, ancl,

contented

mith it, as witli th e royal



8 CBBUL.

nrhicb, as a matter of fact, had formed, to his omn

mind, the special object of his .irisit to Lorcl Mayo.

His satisfaction was justified by the ~ulprecedented

throng of nobles th a t crowded on his re turn to do

liolnnge to tile hononrecl guest and presumed ally

of tlle Viceroy of Hindustan.

On the very day of the Umbnlla conference, really

concerted with reference to the advances of Russia,

Lord Clarendon commenced the correspondence with

Rnssia as to the lim its of the Asiatic boundaries of

the tmo powers, which after some riclicnlous errors

of geography owing to the use of a wrongly-coloured

map, :mcl solne discussion as to a nentral zone

betweell the two territories, resulted in the settlem ent

of the Oxus as the northern bo~m dary f Shere Ali s

dominions (along two-Chirds of its extent) , Russ ia

conceding to the b e e r his r ight to Badakshan ancl

W akhan,z and recognizing the ir fkontiers as th e

Wnlrhan is a slndl territory lying north

of

the LliudQ

Kbsh, between the C hitral coun try and the Pam ir K ha na te of

Shagnnn. Th e importance of Walthan is twofold. n t h e

first place, i t holds the sou thern ro ute of the caravan tr ade

between. Eastern Turlristan and W es ter n Turkistan, and

Afghanistan. In the second place, i t commands th e n orth ern

entrance to the Baroghil Pass leading from Kash gar to th e



ON

TH HONOUR

O F

A CZAR.

9

line of demarcation which limits her own dependen-

cies of IChokancl and 130khara to the south . Prince

Gortchalroff then formally ancl spontaneously dc-

clared th a t Afghanistan was completely outside th e

sphere within mhich she might be called upon to

exercise her influence. H O M ar this is true mecl

hardly to-day be pointed out.

Nor does the Czar shine as a

man

of honouy

in the next Central Asia manceuvre-the >eizare of

Khivs. I 869

a

Russian detachment establishecl

itself on th e eastern shore of th e Caspian, th e Czar

assuring Eng land for entirely commercinlpul~poses.

Beco~noi t r ing ,iotvever, co~nmencecl t once, and mi-

litary posts were extended eastward, until three years

later Russia found herself strong enougli to resort t o

torical stand-point, Wnlrhnn must be adm itted t o be a

portion of th e Afghan empire, although, perhaps, ethno-

logically, it should form one of n confederation of m ou n ta in

states which should extend from Swat to K a r a te g in . T h e

strntegical importance of Walrhan will become very clear

should Russia absorb Ktlrategin alone; but if Darw nz ancl

Shngnan are t o share the samo fate then our eye will have

to

be

constantly fixed upon the whole northern frontier fro111

Pam ir t o Merv. Fro in W akhan , now a border province of th e

Chinese empire, to the Tarkomnn country round M erv, th er e





RUSSIA

AND

FIERAT.

41

W hen they are overpowered, Russia vi ll have free way

t o

Merv, where, strengthening herself, she can nvai t

the moment for seizing Hera t by

n

c o z q d e n z a i l t . The

vast TnrBomsln contingent a t her disposal, under t h e

commancl of Abclul Rnhmm, thc rebel nephew of

Shere Ali, nom

in

the Russian camp, ancl a leader of

T~zrkomans rom his youth up, vould ennble Russia

to wage, 3t no cost to herself, an extensive unofficial

war, and absolutely control both Cabul and Persia.

Successive

annexations since the h ~ a s i o a of

Kl~iva n 1873 with the virtual mediatixntion of

Bolchara, have given Russia the choicc of three

routes to the neighbourhood of Afghcmistan. Shc

cominnnds a road by Charjui

t o

Merv, and thence

t o

Hera t, a seconcl by K a ~ k h i o Anclchuj, and a

T h e tcJian

Woo7cly

eview

makes, x i t h reference to tho

Russiau movements, tho following original and sagacious

comment

:-

T he re is an other point to b e considered,

x h i c h is th a t i t u-ould be hard ly v o r lh the while of t h e

Russinns t o go some

2 50

miles out of their way to E e r n t

in o rder to t u r n th e Bamian wl~ i loa to lerably d irect ro ut e

ex is ts frotn Bnllrh o r from IClilutn lying just s outh of t h e

ferries t o Cabul. IVIoreover,

a

move by H e r a t o r t o I x e r n t

would n t once rouse England to i ts centre

;

rrhereas in t h e

case of Bnllrh or Khulm, al though absolutely nearer to O TY

frontier , t he nam es of th e places a re unknown t o t h e majollity



4 CABUL.

thircl by Xhoja Sal ih to Bnlkll ancl the Bamian Pass.

The steamboat service on Lake Aral and the Oxus

voulcl co-operate n conveying s~~pplies.

As far as

th e Hinclh K t-~sh he course of a Rnssian army is

fairly open T he short linc th at already exists

between Pot i and Tiflis f o m s a ready base for further

extensions and th e true importance of Batoum is as

a suitable terminus for a railway to Erivan Tabriz

ancl Teheran . T he grea t sche~ve f the line beyond

Orenbnrg may be considered as permanently shelved.

B u t railways from Erivan t h o u g h Azerbijan

Ghilan Mazanderan nnd Khorassan are not

open to nny lvomentous objections while they

cannot fail to be botli politically and strategically

of the highest importance. W e inay 11ass

over the Orenburg-Khiva-Merv line to Hernt

as purely visionary and we may ignore also th e

scheme for connecting Sam arcand with Cabul

but it would not bc prudent to remain equally

inclifferent to the third proposed line that is to

P ~ S S rom Erivnn to Teheran and thence to H erat .

At the present time it is incontestable that a

scheme for a railway from Telzeraii to H era t

receives additional significance from th e fact t h a t



agencies in the north-west of Afgllsnistan xncl to

visit H era t and th e neigl~bourhoocl whither for all

we lcnom to the contrary he may have gone ere

this.

In

January

1873

the agent of the Alneer visited

Lord Northbrook a t Simla ancl i t soon became

ap-

parent tliat th e Aineer

was

then a very different

individnal from the Ameer of

1569.

H i s four years

of ~~n chal len gedule had relieved him from all ills

prel~ension f rivals and llad made him lsroncl and

self-roliant. I t had also given him an insight into

foreign politics which renilered him not only ex-

travagant

in his demands but stubborn in pressiag

those demands and sullen mllen they were negatived.

H e had in fact learned th at in Englmd there vas

a party which delsrecatecl all action i ~ 1 efence of

British interests. Accorclingly

in

spite of the

splendid liberality with which he was trented-

for he received

120 0001.

and 15 00 0 rifles E n -

fields and Sniclers-he sullrocl refused at first to

take our subsidies ordered

t8hc

British llzissioa

under Forsyth

returning

from lcashgar out of his

territories nci otherwise demeaned himself as a

beggnr proverbially does wllcn islaced in

the

saddle.

He opened z treasonable co~.responclencewith the



CABUL.

Knuffman contemptnonsly on British procedure,

T h e veneer of the Mnyo memory had worn off.

Sllere Ali begnn to remember that he had ancient

grudges agninst us, and h e catnlognocl. thein a l ~ d

shouted them out. H e had gone mad, for the gods

h a d resolved upon his ruin. I have seven crores

of mpees by me, every rupee of which will hurl a t

th o head of the Eritisli government ; and I will roll

the border tribes ngainst them like blasts of fire.

lzcAnzeel- s Gj.ievnnces . -VVhenDost Malloin ec7,

t h e father of t,he present Ameer, died in

1863

L o rd Lawrence recognizecl. Sliere Ali as his

snccessor. The throne , liomever, v a s soon

shaken under him, and two usurpers in succes-

sion ruled in Cabul, Shere Ali being n~eanm hilo

an

exiIe in Tnrkistan, and Lorcl. Lamrence re-

cognized first one and then the other as Ameer.

Shere Ali, thanlrs to his son, Yalmb Khan, regaincd

t h e th o lie , and tllough he in his turn v n s again

hailed as Ameer by th e Ind ian Government, he had

not

forgotten that an equally ready recognition ltnd

strengthened his two predecessors against him. I n -

deed, t he r em ~r n br ~m cef that pitif111 policy -was so

vivicl. in the Ameer's mincl. in 1869, vhen he t is i tcd







SHERE A L I

A N D

OUR ADVANCE TO QUETTA. 7

volnntarily referred his claims.

T h e next griev-

ance of tlie Pesham nr Conference has been fai rly

a 10115

tntecl. by S ir Lewis Pelly himself. The nego ti t

he tells ns, came a t once to a dead-lock, because, on

the British side, a preliminary discussion of the

Ameer s complaints against us co ~ ~ lc lot be agreed

to, and, on t h e Afghan, becanse Shere Ali s repre-

sentative would not listen t o onr preliminary con-

dition for f ~ ~ t m eriendship- h e presence of a Brj ish

official a t th e Cabnl conrt. H is last grievance on

the list, the occul3ntion of Qnottn, cnnnot be enter-

tained as a cause of complaint, Shere Ali himself

agreed to th a t occupation ~ v h e n n prospect, an d

described himself as pleasecl. a t it . Now thn t i t i s

an acc~mpli~hecl .act, and he finds it to be a strong

bit

in

t he m outh of Cabnl, th e b e e r protes ts . But

the time for protest has passed. W he n t h e , two

countries were on friendly teims any opposition

from him woulcl. have been received with deference

but now that the immense strategic value of the

position ha s been made prominent by the rupture

of those friendly relations, objection to our presence

a t Quetta m us t be futile. T o undesstand our posi

tion here, i t is necessaryto refer briefly to th e frontier

of British Ind ia and th e changes i t has ~m dergo ne.



8 CABUL

is

to say in i ts most comprehe~lsive extent fronl

Laclakh on th e borders of th e Chinese eillpire to

the Arabian S ea is for tlie most part defiilecl by

mouritain ranges. There is the Karakoram range

north of Cashmere the Snleiman west of Pesal~mur

and Bunnoo and the Khir thar west of Scinde. Tlle

frontier of Gaslimere is satisfactory for defensive

p ~ ~ r p o s eor tlie Indus s~ q q ~ le m c n tshe great range

of luountains. From Torliola to Dera G hazi K han

our frontier may be clefiilecl as an irregular line

clrawn at the base of {;he Suleiman and Safecl ICoh

mountains backed by th e river l i d u s a t a clisiance

vn rjing from ten miles to fifty. Along th at frontier

illere are mauy im l~ orian t osts Peshawur ICohat

Bunnoo Tank Dcra Ismail IUlau ancl Dern Gllazi

Khan being the chief and each of these po sts is to

all intents and purposes dependent u l~ o n ts own

resources quite detached from our centres of polver

ancl have moreover in their rear th e Inclus which

is often two ancl som etimes three rivers. E ven

Dern G h ~ z i han the best off of these places can

only preserve com unnications with Milltan it s base

and a station on the Incl~ lsValley Railway ~m cler

difficult ancl uncertain conditions for 730th th e In dus



TH

IN D U S FRONTIER.

9

iillinense ancl it is only at Sukknr, where the Indns

'Valley Railway crosses the river, that they have been

successf~~llyoped with.

I n history and in colninon talk the Inclns is called

the western bom dary of our Indian empire. Bnt

history lags, anil people tallring together prefer

metaphor to exact fact. Fronz the Indns

t

the

Bay of Bengal is a co~n-prehensive, onveniellt, an6

sylnl~~etr ica lllrase but our fate in India-the fate

th at forbicls the conqueror to cease from conq~ ~es t-

has now carried

ns

beyoncl th e great river. When

we strnck empire from tlie hand of the Lion of the

Punjab , the great Sikh chieftain Runjeet Sinah our

frontier outposts reclclenecl the spurs of the Sulelman

range far beyond the Inclus and wllen, tarclily es -

asperated, we clrove the Ameers of Mind11 from their

capitals, the border line was again carried vestwarcl

thl-ongh their principality to the marches of Beln-

chistan. Yet once again we have had to step for-

ward, westward, ancl this time into the very heart of

th e Beluchis co~lntry-to Qnetta.

This advance was necessitated by the treachery of

Shere Ali, which five years ago was snspectecl, ancl

tllree years ago assured. The Peshaw~zr ollferences

was the last chance offered to Shere Ali to recover



5 CABUL

Pelly had it in his gift to niake the Ameer bo th

~ t r o n gnd rich but the Ameer had lost his reason,

so the Iildian government, c a r e f ~ ~ lf the coining

s t o m , o c c u p i c d Q ~ ~ c t t a ,nd assured tl~einselves of

possession of the succession of ravines or gorges,

gradually ascending from east to west, knovn as the

Bolan Pass. I n the days of his friendship with us

Sllcre Ali had agreed to that step, expressed hiillself

pleased a t it but to-day he would give much if h e

could only drive th e red line back fro111 Qnetta to

th e Indus, and shu t tlie postern that lays his capital

open to our advance and his pover at our feet.

Quetts, i t must be here premised, does no t belong

to Cabul, but to I(11elat and we are perrniited by

treaty with the Khan t o station troops in any

part of the territory of Khe lat as may be though t

advisable by the British antl~orities.

z~ettn

Candnha~.-From Qnetta to Candahar

the advance tvonld meet wit11 few obstacles if the

inhabitants were well disposed. Tlie lley north-

wards, looking from Qnetta, is overshadowed by the

Zarghull rmgc iafested by the Kakarr tribe, the

most hardy mountaineers of a country vhere all are

harcly, and hopelessly lavless . Other freebooting

clans again malre unsafe for travellers, and even



arm ed force coulcl offer little molestation. These

tribes muster in all some 7000 households, but they

are scattered over so vide an area that when recently

their snzerain, the Khan of I<hel~zt, organized a

punitive expedition against tliem, no trouble mas

fouad in reclucing them in detail to submission.

n

Deceivber snow falls, and often after that the road,

though never impassable, is difficnlt. Tlie M ~ u g l ~

Pass leads by an eensy ronte down to the Peshin

clistrict, and a t I<uslilac, fonrteeil miles from Quettn,

a sm all. stream of that name is passed, which de -

lmxcates th e frontier of Khelat ancl Cnbul. Anothcr

eighteen miles

of

practicable road brings tllc tra-

veller by the Snrmaghazi Pass to Hykalzai, situated

on s plain of red clay soil-a, favonrite rendezvous

of the nom ad Tnrins, and marlced by nLm eroas ruins

and several inhabited villages. Froin Hybalaai, a

march of fifteen miles attains Aranbi Rariz, several

stream s being crossed.

iz 9 - oz~ t e

and

sl

fair

prinkl ling

of inhabitants enco~utered.

Excellent roaclmay obtains thence past the spurs

of the Toba rmgc, the populous illa ages of thc

Dihsuri G len, to the Khojak Pass, at all times

practicable in spite of its nsrrom exs. On the

southelm side the elevation has been recorded to be



Cl~aoliall, n the northern encl, 5600, and here , a s

everynrhere else along th e road, pasture is a l~ n n d an t

for three-fonrths of t he year. From Chaolrah Lo

Chaman, and thence to Gatni, sollie twenty-five

miles, the route lies north-westerly along a gradual

slope on to th e unclulatiilg sweep of th e plain ancl

from Gatai n march of fourteen liiiles reaches Me1

niIancla11, the road lying across a plain and ro lling

clowns, without inhabitants, as pasturage is very

scanty, aiid the water brackish. After eighteen

miles f ~ ~ r t h e r aku Icarez is made the Barghana

Pass , which lies midway a t an elevation of 4100 feet

presenting no difficulty to th e traveller. Thence

n

nrinding ravilie leads to the village of M aku, nd six-

teen llliles f ~ ~ ~ t l l c r ,cross an nnclnlating plain as far

s

th e Arghesan river a very shallow stream , though

of considerable wividth), lies Munci I-Iissar, Froin here

to I<anclahar is twelve miles. The whole rou te, it

will be seen, is as easy as an invading army has any

riglit to expect, and from end to end water and

pasturage abound, mhile in the numerous flocks of

sheep that are driven into the district to graze n

abundant source of m ea t is a t hand . T he only

,apprehension, therefore, is from the inhabitants

~khemselves but from the mell-established popnlarity



BY THE

B O L 9 N PASS.

5

of the Belnchis towards us, there seems no grouild

for snspecting interference with the advance.

General Sir Henry Green writes,-

There is no position on the mhole length of the

frontier of India better snited to maintain snch

a

guarantee to clefend Afghanistan tllan is Qnetta.

I n th is position, comrnnnding the entrance to tho

Bolan Pass, in a friendly country, snrronnded by

friendly tribes, a British foorcc coulcl. assemble,

baclrecl. by the resources of England and of India, in

a climate favo ~u ab leo the Enropean constitution,

aild from this ~ o s i t io n t c0111d act either upon the

offensive or defensive.

The advance of S ~ Yolin Iceane into Afghanistan

in 839 was effected by the Bolan Pass. It Tvns the

refusal of Rnnjeet Sing11 t fulfil his promise of pre-

~ a r i n ghe way for an easy advance of the British

u in y throng11 bhc Sikh conntry to Cabul vhich finally

led to the selection of Shilcarpnr, in Scinde, a s the

principal rendezvous of our forces, and the deter-

mination to approach the Afghan capital by the more

circuitous way of the Bolan, Qnetta, and Candahar

-the Ameers of Sindh, more com plaisant th an the

ruler of the Pnnjab, having promised to provide



lougliby Cotton, consistil~gof

95

nlen and tlie

enormous number of 80 ,00 0

C ~ Z ~ X P

ollon~ers,were

rather of

a

physical th an a military kind. The Bolnn

Pass is sixty-six miles in length, wiuding, rugged,

ancl flanlrecl by high rocks, its width gradually

narrowing from three miles to abont 16 0 feet, ancl

forage ancl water being entircly wanting. W hen the

co l~ unn eached Daclur, at th e foot of th e monntains,

on the 6th of March, provisiolls were already so

short that th e camp followers mere pui on half-

raLions. Nevertheless, the troops reachecl. Quetta,

after euclnring great privations.

At

Quetta the

troops, failing to fincl the snpplies they expecied,

mere compelled to pnsh forward in a famished con-

dition to Ganclnhar, distant 150 miles, which place

they reacliecl on th e 26 th of April, having marchecl.

1000 miles since leaving. Feroze pi~ r. The Bombay

column, with Shah Shoojah s contingent, tvllich

entered the pnss on th e 1 2 th of April, encoanterecl

still greater fatignes and privations, and snffered,

inorcovcr, fiolne harassnleni from the preclatory

tribes which infest the ranges of liills in that clistrict.

No serious opposition, ho~vever, v a s enconnterecl

from the A fg l~ ~m s,



TH

C I T Y O CANDARAR.

through i t passes the best line of communication

between Cab111 and Hera t. I t is also the capital of

Southern Afgha~listan,nncl wlloever holds th e city

in force is master of th e wl~oleof that part of

the c0~111try. Canclahnr i s on the site of an ancient

city, conjectured to have been founded by Alexander

th e Great, and narnecl Alexandria, whence th e old

name Iskmclria, and tlie present Candal-~nr,ounded

by Ahrned Shah, in 1747. t was the seat of

governinent till 177 4, wheu Cabul became th e

capital. The city is large and populous, containing,

it is snpposecl, abont 150,000 inhabitants, chiefly

Afgliana. enernl form i t i s oblong, and planllecl

vexy regularly, four main streets, cach fifty yards

wide, meeting

in

the centre, (where is a clolrted

ma,rlret,) and leading to the fotur gates.

Entering by the Cabul Gate, th e traveller

traverses a

long and tortuons line of narrow ancl

filthy lanes, tvhich converge on the Sllahi Bazaar,

or Royal Market, and

parade-gronncl, beyond

and occ~~p;yinghe northern quarter of the city,

is

th e Arg, or Citadel. Passing

O L L ~

of the

(

Herat

Gate, th e visitor finds hiinself in th e summer

gardens of the former rulers of C a ~ d a h a ~nd the

ruins of the olcl city, which cover

a

gi-esi extent of



OABUL.

bare rock Ihat riscs on tlie plain about fo~onr iniles

west of the present city. I n the suburbs are inally

gardens ancl vineyards prodnaiilg various grapes of

fine hinds am1 great variety of fru its th e peaches,

figs, innlberries, ancl pomegranates being of especial

excellence. T he military force in garrison a t C an-

clahar is always coasicleral~le. The city is well

vnlerecl by cannls from n tr ibutary of th e Halnlnnd

river, nncl a s~lznllaqueduct runs along each of th e

main streets.

Cn?ztlahctl. Hel-(it.-The road for the first six tecu

miles from Candahar is bad, owing to the numerous

unbriclged strcaivs nncl ~sate rcourses hich it crosses.

The nex t two clays nlarches to Girislilr tlie road

passes over a stony desert, in which water is scarcely

to be procured. Girishlc is an illlportailt point on

tlie road for tlie Halmancl, which in the boginning

of May is 100 yards broad and thrcc-and-a-half feet

deep, ancl can oilly be forded a t that town. W h en

the river floods a t th e begin nkg of June , it is com-

putecl to be aboat a mile broad. T he left or so u t l~ e ru

is higher than the right or northern b nnk. T he

country in the neigl~boarhoocl

s

fertile, but the road

then crosses a sterile plain, or ra ther plateau. T he

next clay s march water is to be obtained. At



roncl then passes throng11 a stoily valley, but levcl

aid good, vith the drawback, however, ihat little

vnter is Co be obtained. Fnrreli 11 the Furreh

road or river, is but a heap of ruins, vith little cul-

tivation in the aeighbourhoocl. Tlle river is

dry

three-quarters of thc year Lnt at Che beginning of

summer it is about

2

yards vide. Between Fnrreh

and Subzewar tliere are no villages, the couiltry

passecl through being a jriid.de of valleys and hills,

with small plains inhabited by nomads.

t

is

almost needless to say illat p~ovisionsa re scarce.

On

leaving Subzcizznr the road traverses

a

valley

vell cultivated and coverecl by large flocks ancl

herds. The road itself is good. Through the chain

of ino~~iltainsntervening between Subzewar nild

Herat the road is very rough, ailcl between tlle

111011th of the pass and Herat the cormtry is

a

perfect

desert of hills and ruins, ancl water is scarcely to be

obtained.

Herat itself possesses natural aclvantages of

clnitc exceptional

importance

It is the frontier

town between Persia

mcl

India, and is conncctecl by

high ronds with the capitals of all the surrounding

countries ait li Cabnl through the Haznra hills

with Balldl ancl Bokliara through Mailnena wit11





TIIAL

TO O H U Z N I A N D C A N D A H A R .

0

Thctl

t o

Cnlzdlihal

v i

Ghlizili altcl Ichilat-i-Ghilzai.

-Thal or Tlzull), which ha s ncq ~~ire clmportance

ns a strategic point, is situated about lnidway be-

t ~ e e u

he frontier outposts of Rohat ancl Banau.

I t commands the entrance to the ICt~r~zmalley.

T h e following

p~ec i s

of th e m arch of th e Mission of

IS57 from Thal to R a n d a l~ a r nam erates th e different

stagos, nnd describes t h e country traver~ecl.

S ta rt in g from Th~ zl, hey found thelnselves tra -

versing a ravine-scored valley in vllich imnine~.ablc

s o ~~n c l e r ef wild pig f o ~ ~ l l dovert. Next

day

t he

river had t o be forded, and th e current mas

th en in March) very rapid. F o r tment,y miles of

clifficult and rocky road no inlhabitants or nniinal

life

hardly any vegetation ~ v a s ncountered but,

approaching

Boghxai, the tiavellers founcl a hamlet

of

good size, in mlzich every male went fully arm ed.

F r o m Boghzni to Saclclah, t h i ~ t e e nmiles, a sncces-

sioil of corn-fields and orchards occupied the banks of

the

I C I I SL I ~~

oopholed huts peopiug out from among

th e fruit-trees. Thc next sixteen miles to Killa-i-

K ururn the fort of K ~ ~ m i n )ay through similar

scenes, many of the villngos having a coinpnct fort-

like appearance , and being am ecl with

chevcczlx

le



6 CABUL

described a s of large extent, possessing e ight bastions,

each s u m o ~ z n te d y a round tower, an d the whole

surrouncled v i t h a m oa t crossed by drambridges with

cc,verecl ways. H ere th e Mission was haltecl for four

clays, n o t to enjoy th e extraordinary natn ral beau-

ti e s of t h e sp ot , bu t to give time for ccrtain mur-

derous banditti, mdlo had occupied the road with the

object of in tercept ing th e travellers, to move off. As

they r e f ~ ~ s e do do so , t h e Mission hncl to alter i ts

so as t o avoicl t h e obstruction.

F r o m th e fort th e travellers advanced through th e

valley, he re from eighteen to twenty m iles in wiclth,

nncl crowded wit11 orchards ancl cornfields, inter-

s ~ e r s e d s usual mith embattled villages, m d, as

usua l also, iuhnbitecl by lawless tribes. The next

ha l t was a t H sb ib E l l a s ixteen miles), situated a t tlle

foot of the Sitn

Ram

pcak of th e S d e ? Koh.

D uring th e ha l t rum onrs got afloat th a t the Ja j i

trib e had innsterecl i n force on th e other sidc of th e

hill a n d m ea nt mischief. T h e Mission, however,

apprehended no danger, ancl started, but were soon

stoppecl by a band of fifty men, branclislGng wildly

the formidable Afghan knives they carried, and

c l ~ a n t i n g

war

song. A s if to lnak e a murdcrons



THE JAJIS. 61

ancl t h e Jaj is quietly allon~ecl the cavalcade to file

by unm olested. The next instant two black bea rs,

startled from their lair by the noise, came out upon

t h e path , nnd one of th e party fired. T h e bcars

ve1.e cloomccl in any case, for th e escort soon cnt

the in devil with their swords ; bnt th e shot, mis-

construed by the savage Jajis as a taunt, resultecl

in

a camp follower who had lagged behii~clbeing hacliecl

to pieces. Though th e atrocious act was committed

i n full sigh t of th e baggage escort, pnnishment was

impossible, for th e Jaj is le ap t away, over and am ong

tlie roclcs, with th e speed of monkeys, and clisap-

~ e a r e c l rom sight as suddenly as they had come.

A n o t l ~ e r llustration of t h e exceptional savagery of

t h e tribe is afforded by th e natu re of their hn ts.

These a re squa re s t r~~c tn resf stone ancl mud,

erectecl on log platforms, and prof~~selyoophooled.

T h e entrance is from beneath, by a trap-door and

rope ladder, which is dr avn

LIP

when the ininate is

h o ~ ~ s e d .W hen neighbouring families are

t

feud,

th ey keep snch

a

vigilant eye on each other's shoo t-

ing

boxes th a t no t unfrequenlly they are shu t

LIP

m utua lly for meelrs together.

Towards the Mission they contiilued obstinately

hostile, ancl at Ali Khail a tragedy seenled immi-



CX UL

ship of an Aknnclzada

(

viseborn, a term applied

only to those most revercd for pic$ or lea rning) ,

llad assembled to dispute th e passage of the defiles.

A

council mas held, ancl it was decided to send for

succour to the I<nrum Fort and to Cabul, but for

the latter journey no one would volunteer.

The

short cut to th e capital wonld have taken a swift

horseman four clays, whilc the p o p ~ ~ la t io n as

eminently dangerous, nncl th e inountain passes,

from the heavy snow still lying, frequently im practi-

cable. Negotiations were, therefore, opened, and

the Jnjis eventually calmed down.

From Ali IUlnil to H az ra (26 miles), through a noble

gaine country, as th e many horns of ibex and m arkllor

testified, ancl so on by the Defile of th e Tllonsnnd

Trees to the outpost of K att a Sang, the boundary

between the Jnji and Ghilzai territories. From here

to Hnzra or Ucha Mnrgha, forage and food were for

th e first time scarce, but the horses ate freely th e

vild wormwood vhich was growing in profnsion.

h c l he11 the Mission passed o over the Camel's

Neck into th e beautiful valley of Logar, where the

stream sparkled with the bright hues of thc porpllyry,

hornblende, and syenite th a t foimed its bed, and the

village ofI<llushi,or A11Deligl1ts (20 m. fromHazra),



ORUZN I T

CBNDAHAB.

ra1~10 m.), along R district of extraordinary plenty

and thickly popnlatecl-to Tmgi Wmclak (18

in.),

dovn tlirongll the Tangi defile, to Hsidar Rhail 12

ln.)--a village notorions, even in Afghanistan, for

the

audacity and skill of its robber folk. Next Smara

15 in ) ,and then by the gorge of the Lion's Month,

and past the tomb

of

the Snltan Mallmud

22

m.) ,

to

Ghnzni.

The fortress which mas blown L ~ by Lord

ICcane in 1842 had beell rebnilt, a fomiclable-

looking placc vith a citadel at the north angle in

a

co~nmandingsitnation, and containing solve fonr

tl~onsancl onses.

From Gl~nzni he route lay across a treeless ex-

panse of plain to Yarghatti (18 m.), and tlience to

Mukkar 42

m.).

Over a grassy plain, along vliich

caravans were ~villclingo Gholjen (12

m.),

the site of

the slaughter .of the Ghilzais by Nadir Shall, and

thence to Moinin Icilla (14 m.) and Sir-i-Asp, where

an escort from tlie Governor of Khilnt-i-Gllilzai 45

m. from Molnin ICilln) met tlie Missioil aucl conducted

it

into the city. From Khilat-i-Gllileai to Jaddal~,

thirteen miles; Jaddak to Shalar-i-Safa, twenty-

eight to Khail-i-Akhnn, fonrteen to &Iahmancl

Iiilla, twelve to Candahar, ten miles.



3

4.

CABUL

ably certain that in

s

actnnl illvasion z column

would enter Afghanistail

by

th e ICllyber Pans. T he

road is quite practicable for

all

arm s and pro-

visions are to be obtained aliliost everymhere along

th e ronte. W ater also is abnnclant. T he luonth

of the pass is abont twenty miles froin PesBaw~~r

and miclwny stan ds th e fort of Jnmroocl erected by

Rnnjeet Singh and n o v memorable as th e scene of

tlic repulse of the Brit ish Mission. Tliere arc two

erltrallcas withill

a

short distance of each other

H.R .H.

the Prince of W ales on th e 22nd Janua ry

18?G

k~ ioc ke d n th e last ri re t of the railway bridge over th e river

Chenab and now it is ill worlcing order well towards A ttock on

t h e Ind us . Attock on t h e In du s is a large fort cornmancling

th a passage of th e river and would become a place of groat

importance in case of nn invasion by the Kh yber. T h e size of

t h e present fort and numerous towers tells how im po rtan t it

has been considered by i t s former possessors. E xc ep t i n th e

raiuy leaso on there is a bridge of boats a t this place when the

river rises and a ferry only can take men or baggage across.

Peshaw ur is th en in a military sense c u t off fro111 i ts base.

T h o

rlifficulty will soon cease to exist for n railway bridge will

i n a short time be completed an d the Ind us will then be no

longer source of anxiety in t h e event of operations tak ing

place on th e frontier. t is abo ut twenty miles from Attoclr to

Pesha w ur and t h e road follows aloug th e right bank of th e

Cabu l rirer. Peshawur itself is on a slightly rising ground with



TEE KHY ER

PASS.

5

one, the main entrance, is called the Shader

Bhnginree, th c other the J~ tb og ee . T he former is

the shorter , being oilly five nlilcs from th e fort of

Ali Mnsjicl. the la ttcr, which joins th e main pass

near th at fort, i s twice as long. Froin the mouth

of the pnss by th c maill road to its cnd a t Dhnka is

about twenty-six miles. Prom Dalrka to Jellnlabacl.

is abont four marches, or about forty miles. T hc

Khoorcl Cnbul Pass , where General Elphinstone s

army was destroyed is only about ten miles

from Cabul, ancl is the most formidable physical

obstacle to a force marching from Jellalabacl on the

capital. There is, hornever, another pass a shor t

distance to the south, so the defenders attention

might easily be clistracted.

A

deep interest a ttaches to theadvance of

Sir

Claude

Wade tl~ ro n gh h e Kliyber Pass in the teeth of the

opposition of it s defenders. W ade s force consistecl

of considerable but irregular levies of Mnssulman

Pnnjabees, partly led by British officers, conjoinecl

to small detachm ent of native infantry, and accom-

panied by two howitzers

of

our native horse artil-

lery. W ith this force, intended to act in concert

with a corps of thc Silrh anny-an auxiliary which,

of course, was not forthcomii~g ntil after news had



CABUL.

Wade zldvanced fi*om Peshawur. Attempts had been

made to obtain l~ossession f the defiles of the Khyber

by corrnpting the Mohmands on the left bank of the

Cabnl river and the ICllyberi tribes in the monntain

fastnesses, bnt those intrigues failed. Mahomed

Akhbar, the eldest son of Dost Mahorned, made a

resolute defence of the famous forb of Ali Musjid,

~vllich tands at a point in the pass where the valley

narrows and the road follows the course of a clear

monntain stream. A traveller from the Afghan side,

me are told, might pass by this fort without perceiv-

ing

t

bnt wllen he has followed the rivnlet a sho rt

distance down he mill,. if he faces abont, see its

towers fromilig from a lofty and insulated eminence

and completely commanding the only approach.

When the troops of the Ameer occnpied this strong-

hold they were posted in the fort itself and on thc

snmmits

of

the mountains which eaclose alld loolr

down upon the valley. From these Colonel Wade s

troops drove them , however, by ascending the

heighte at distant poiats, and, advancing along the

ridges, while the howitzers of our artillery, placed in

battery in the hollow, clislodged th e garrison with

their shells.

Thns, driven from Ali M nsjid, Mahomed Akhbar yet



FORCING TH

KHYBER.

67

sent a bold front to the invaders.

As the disposition

of his forces was skilful, it is probable t h a t he mould

have made an energetic resistance; but his intentions

mere frustratccl by the capture of Glinzni, which

now rendered the defence of .the capital tlie most

pressing object. Accordingly, the force under Waile,

finding its enemy dimiilished

u

its front, penetrated

Lhe last passes of the ICl~ybe~,nd after .establishing

a chain of posts along th c mountain ronte, s l l lc l on

the right margin of the river, advanced witllont

f ~ ~ r t h e rbstacle to the neigl~bo~~rlioocdf Cab~bnl. I n

brief, the passage of ihe drcaclecl Ichyber had proved

to Wade s army

an

enterprise of li tt le difficnlty

but the circumstances mere obviously favourable.

The attempt of General Pollock with his rmy

of relief to force the Khyber Pass was t e d i o ~ ~ s

and difficult. At the fort of Ali Musjicl he expe-

rienced a severe check, m it was not until the

10th of April that he was heard of a t Jella labad as

having reached the illidclle of the Pass. O n the

14th of th a t month the bcsiegecl garrison received

the joyful news th at the clifficulties of the passage

were all surmounted, and that his losses in th is

scconcl atteinpt did not exceed one officer killecl, two





an earthmorlr near the Ali Musjicl fort, and merci-

lessly put to the sworcl

4

of it s N ~ ~ j e e blefenclcrs,

part of the British forces, mas significant and the

occasional appearance of bands of these robbers,

described as men of clmarfish stature, and remark-

able for a peculiarly wild air ancl illean ancl squalid

clothing, creeping along cautiously out of point-

blank range of rnuslretry on the ridge of th e moun-

tains, rendered it advisable for the co ln m i~o move

in closc and guarded srray, Once more, however,

the terrible Khybcr tvas passed by a British army

without any serious irnpecliineiit.

The disasters which subsequently befell th e British

forces in Cabnl, isolated and snrronnded by hostile

tribes-the assassination of Sir Alcxancler Bnrnes

and Sir William Macnaghten, th e convention nnder

which Major Pottinger and Galstailla Laurence

m l

Mnclrenzie were delivered up as hostages to Aklibar

Khan, and the massacres which onsnred-are matte rs

of history. Twenty-aix thonsand inen, ~ ~ o m e i1 ,ncl

children fell in th e rocky defiles and monlltain gorges

of Afghanistan, partly nnder tlie incessant harass-

ment ancl mnrderous attacks of the Afghan troops

and the wilcl hill tribes, but more from liz~nger nd the



0

CABUL

Of all that host o n l j one D r . Bryclon made h is

may ali.ile to Jellslabad bringing the news tha t t h e

nrmy of Cabnl had ceased to exist. Seven or eight

only of the survivors were taken prisoners the rest

ve re killed. Tho scene of those terrible disasters

however was no t the Rhyber Pass-which t h e

retreating multitncle in fact never reached-but

the Koorcl-Cabnl and sollie minor passes. T ho

attack incleed began almost as soon as the rc treat

though it was continned only in an irregular fashion;

for even famished and without hope th e Brit ish

forces still foaght desperately and kept their foe

as rule at rc sp ec tf~ ~ listance. Tlie ICoorcl-

Cabnl pass is clescribed as five m iles long shut in

on either hand by a line of lofty hills with a to rrent

clashing c l o m the centre which even the iutense

frost was powerless to arrest. The clestrnction

of

life a t this stage was great. On the next clay tlle

retreat mas continned through a defile oniinonsly

named the Dark Pass only fifty yards long sncl th e

Texeen Pnss three i d e s long. On the 1 1 t h

General llphinstons th e cominancler-in-chief fe ll

into the hands of the enemy. On the following day

they entered the terrible pass of Jngdullnk two



TBE

BRNY 3

VENGEANCE. 71

holly-oak stretched across tlie defile.

Here, with

twenty m uskets for tlieir only weapons, the miserable

remnant of our forces made their final s tand

( he rest was silence.

B L I ~

n

gallant, well-led army soon effacecl. the

and the year that had opeilecl. mith disaster

closed with a very memorable tri~ iruph, he forcing

of t . 1 ~Cl~yber and the desolation of th e Ameer's

capital. Tho history of th a t splendid vengeance

has been often written, but

it

is well to-day to recall

to lnind the true circnmstallces of that splendicl

episode. Englishmell have been fo~m d,at this

crisis, who either from shameful ignorance of a

glorious passage in our military annals or no less

shameful perversion of notorious facts, have, in

speeches to their constituencies, declared th e t the

lessoils of th e past ongM to teach

us

cowardice in

the present; and that because in Jannary, 1842

m m y Christian people, and more Hindoos-men,

women, and children-fell victims to the pitiless

treachery of the Afgllans and their allies, we a re

now to fear the ruler of Afghanistan.

The defence aacl victory of Jellalabad, under

General Sale, and the captnre of G huzni by General

Nott, are other memories of this lloteble campaign.



CABUL.

F r o ~ z t i e ralzd i l l b z l ~ ~ t ~ b i l ~asses.-The Icohat Pass

is aa independent strip, held by Africli tribes, of

whom the chief are th e Jowaki, th e Galli, ancl Adam-

Irheyl. The defile is about nine miles in length,

and runs nearly dne north ancl south.

I n t h e

former direction it opens on to the plain or valley

of Peshawur but towsll.ds the south i t is shut off

from th e adjoining district of Kohat by a high hill,

which closes the pass in that direction, and must he

s ~ r m o u n t e dn order to emerge from the defile on

to the Kohat Valley. T he southern slope of th is

hill is held by th e British , who have threa round

towers along it s crest. E ach of these shelters a

party of the military police, whose clnty it is to keep

open th e road, and preserve it s safety within British

limits. The eastern side of the pass is formed

by tolerably regular iidge of hill th a t

runs fiom no141 to sou th. But th e opposite

side, though formed of th e same sort of bare nnin-

terestkg looking rock, presents a very uneven out-

line, being formed

by

off-shoots from the I 1iyber

Hi l le , wl~icl~

un

eastward or in direction across

th e leng th of the pass, the general width of which

they in eome places reduce to very narrow limits by



THE A FRID IS O THE PASS

7

ridges are the villages and fields of the Afridi tribes

who hold th is territory. Thesc people a re entirely

independent, and ackllomledge tlle authority neither

of the Ameer of Cabul nor of the British.

They are robbers by profession, ancl eternally

a t enmity among themselves or elsc v i th their

neighboars. Owing to their oft-recurring feuds

slncl clnarrels, the pass, th e passage through wliich

in former times was always attended v i th risk of

life or property, is even now sometimee closed to the

traveller.

BnC since the establishment of B ritish authority

so close to them, its salutary influence seem s in

some

ineasure to have curbed the lawlcss propensities of the

Afridis,

and

the pass, as a rule, is pretty safe for trn -

vellers, cxcept on those occasions wllcu the tribes

are up, and then it is entirely closed (for

a

longer

or shorter period, till terins are come to with the

British authorities on the frontier), ancl the direct

commnnication bctween tlie military stations of

Peshawar and Rohat becomes temporarily cut off.

Through the lnonllCain ranges that at present

form th e north-west fsontier of India there exist Fu

numerable passes of various degrees of practicability.

The smaller of th ese ilzonlltnin ranges, known as th e



Scincle, and divides tlie Beluch district of Rachhi

from the metropolitan State of Khelat. Kuchhi was

conquered from the Nawabs of Scincle by Abclullah

ICban, of IChelat, in 1730 and ever since th at year

has formed part of the Sta te of Belnchistan.

Tlirongh th is range are several passes, notably th e

Bholan ancl Mula, but there are nine others which

the natives illage use of in passing from Rachh i to

Saram~an

and

Jlialawan, ancl th e crossing of vllich

occ~lpics even days. The Nagau and Bhore Passes

lead to the city of Khelat direct, and are, if feasible

for camel traffic, the most advantageously sitnatccl

of all the Brahoe Passes. T he Mula and Bholan

31-e formed by the action of the rivers, or rather tor-

rents, of those names, and mark respectively the

sonthe1.n ancl. northern limits of this mountain range.

The Mula (Mnlob), or Gandava Pass, begina a t a

place called Pir Chdtta, nine miles dista~trom the

town of Xotri, which is ten miles sonih-west of

Ga~~clavs .Between Pir Chatta ancl the next stage,

Kuban, the M ula ~ i v e r as to be crossed nine times.

During the later s tages of th e joai-ney the same strcam

has to

be

passed repeatedly, so tortuous is its conrse.

The lsass continues in a southerly direction as far as

Narr, which is a cultivated spot where supplies could



THE

M U L A

AND B O L d N

PASSES

7

Che village of Gaz, to the Belncll town of Khozclar,

bnt thc Mula Pass t ~ x i l s orth-west in the direction

of Ichelat. The top of the pass is reached at tlle

village of Angirn, vhere the altitude is

525

feet,

but it is only for a short distance Chat the heigh t

escceds 4000 feet. The great objection to the

Mnla Pass is i ts length-102 miles-and th e fact

tha t i t only leads to Xhelat, 1 0 3 miles south of

Queita for otllern~ise t is preferable, in a military

sense, to the Bholnn. The average risc for the whole

distance is forty-fivc feet in the mile. General

VVillshire retnraed by this pass after the csptt~se

of Khelat, and Mr. Masson had also travellecl by it,

At the present mol-nent this pass is open, and con-

tinues so thronghout the year; it is only in J td y

and August dangerous from the floods that come

dnring the met senson.

The Bholan Pass, of which me practicnlly hold

possession by our garrison at Qnetta, and its

s n ~ l o r tat Daclar, begins five miles to the north-

west of tllc latte r place. I t s great advantage over

the M~xla s that it is only sixty miles in length , slncl

that it leads straight to Quetta on the Afghan

frontier. I t s crest is 5800 feet above the sea , and

itss average ascent gives ninety feet to th e mile.



7 CABUL

torrent but th at was only active during a few weeks

in the wet season. I n th e old clays this pass used

to be invested by the Muriis alld Icakarrs Bel~zch

tribes; but since our occupation of Qnetta the re

has been complete tranquility. I n 1839 the army

of Sir John Iceane took six days to traverse it ancl

th is must be held to h a ~ eeen calital marching

when we consider the vast multitude of camp fol-

lowers ancl the clifficulties of transporting a siege-

train.

A

l i g h t c o l ~ ~ l n nould perform the distance

in three days.

It

is necessary to remember in com-

puting these distances th a t these passes take one

far illto the Afghan territory and no t like th e

northern passes only into its outskirts. Quetta is

very nearly in the same longitude as Khelat in the

Ghilzai country and considerably westward of Cabnl

and Ghuzni.

North of the Brahoe range but 15 miles t the

east of it comes th e ~nleil? lan . That distance i3

th e ill-defined border between Icachhi and the Afghan

provinces of Siwistan and is held by the Murris

Bugtees and other tribes. The Lusharees ancl

Lugarees are thei r neighbours and acknowledge in

some very vague sense their Afghan nationality.

Through the Suleiizzan range proper the re are



PASSES I N

TH SULEIM N RANGE.

K h m he Sari and Sounhm Passes from Lund; tho

Bangar11 Pass from T aunsa; the D rug Pass fi'om

Jholr Boclo; the Burkoie and Vahown Passes from

Vahowa th e Shnkau and Drabancl Passes from

Dera Ismail Khan h e Gumal or Gornul from Tak

or Tank and the Dawar from Bnnnoo. Of all of

these pssses we know little or noth ing; but their

principal drawbsclr is that they are beyond the

Inclns, and out oC the may of our two true points of

passage at Attoclr and

Sukhnr.

O m lrnomledge of

the Gomnl Pass is principally derived from General

Chamberlain's expedition against the Muhsoods in

1860, when th e force under his command operated

against those m arauders in the very heart of the hill

country. T he most striking past of this campaign

was the gallan try with which an original plan was

csr1-iecl ont. T he li tt le army,

5000

strong, left its

base of

T m k ,

in the month of April,

1860

and

pas ing its way up the Zam stream, passed on boldly

and steadily for th e Muhsoocl stronghold. T he force

tvas accompanied not only

by

mountain guns on

mules, but also

by

ordinary field-guns. Their

village of Xot Shingee was occupied, and a sur-

priso on our camp at Pnloseell was repulsed, after



we marched on their capital of Xnneeghorum

which was occ~~pieclfter

a

severe fight had taliell

place along the banks of th e Znm. T h e Muhsood

country su rro~uc ls th e lo fly pinnacle of Peerg.11111

aiid is very inaccessible to attaclr. Tlle lesson read

th e m by the lsresellt Sir Neville Chamberlain wns

a severe one although it ha d cost us m any lives

a n d no small sum of money; aild ever since the

M nhsoods have not givon 11s much trouble on a large

scnle although petty ncts of marauclii~gcontinue.

T h e Gom nl Pass leads straight to Gliuzni and was

th e principal one used b;y Mahmond of Gliuzni in his

numerous illvasions of H industan but i n view of the

hostility of the Muhsoods and other Waziris it may

be held to be at prescn t useless to us. I t has been

suggested th at the Draban d Pass froin D cra Ismail

Khan th rough the S l i ev ranee co~~~l t ryight prove

am ong th e passes in th is quarter to be of h11ort-

m c e to -LIS

iu

any carnl~o ign s there are thence

ronds of som e kind that lend clnemest intohfghanista iz

an d tha t vo uld strike tlle C abul road probably a t

M ~~lclzn r alf-way betmeen Xhelat i Gllilzai and

Gliuzni.

N orth of the Damnr P a ss and B um o o the W aziri

country makes an i l lclel l t~~rento the Indian fi-oil-



TBE SHORT

CUT T

CABUL BY TBAL

79

to n g u e of land between Kohat and Peshawar and

tmenty-five miles to the north of Bnnnoo, with tlle

TV aziri territory iiltel-veiling, lies the small place of

T lm l, on the lsanlcs of the Knm m ri~rer. I t s

importance is that from it there is a pass by

t h a t river to Cabul aild Ghuzni. Sir

H

Lums-

d e n 's M ission entered Cabul by this road. So far

as t h e fort of Mahoineil Azim, fty miles, tlie road

is direct and fairly passable. Proin tl is place to

H a b ib fort, and thcllce through the Paiwar Pnss,

tlie English Mission in 1857 worked its way by a

devious route to Haidarkhel, a village on the Cnbnl

ro a d , a little to th e sontli of Sliaikhabad. Bnf; there

is a shorter road to Calsul than this, which is nvail-

a b le during thc snlnmer months at all events, and

tliat is by the Shatnrgardan Pass, north-west of

h e Paiwar, w lich debouches on the places named

o b n nd i nnd Zurgonsha, in the iinmediate vicinity of

l i e cap ital. By this road the distance from Thal to

C ab ul is under 150 miles. In order to reach Ghnzni,

ff near the village of Knshi.

T h e Khyber Pass, from its Peshawnr encl, near

nroocl, to its Jellalabad end, a t Dakka, is twenty-



8 0

CABUL.

eight miles long.

Excep tiag the Valley of Lalbeg-

gurhec, six iniles long and one and a quarter broad,

th e rest of the Pass, twenty-two miles in length , is

completely commanded, and there aTe few placcs

where an advancing arm y could fincl cover. As, in

the course of these tmenty-two miles, th e width of

the pass ranges mostly from 100 to 200 yards, and

nowhere exceeds 300, and as an Afghan jazail, fircd

from a rest, will kill a t 8 0 0 yards, t follovs that

any troops in th e defile with hostile intent would be

exposed to a inurderous fire.

The summit of the

pass is near the village of Lundeelrhana, nine miles

from Dakka. H ere th e greatest height is reached-

2488 feet above sea-level, or 1420 feet above Pesh a-

w w , and 1084 feet nbove Lalpoora, a village close

to Dalrlra. The descent to Dak ka is not very abrupt,

but the road is contracted botmeen precipitous

cliffs, covored with stunted bushes, and th e p a th is

rough and stony for the best part of th e dis-

tance. Beyond Dakka again comes th e Knm , or

Khoorcl Khyber, otherwise he Little Khyber,

gorge three-quarters of n mile long, where two

horsemen can scarcely ride abreast. T he most im-

portant section of th e pass, however, i s near Ali

Mnsjeed, and i t was there th a t th e piincil)al oppo-



TH LITTLE KIZYBER.

July, 1530 to the Sikh a~~ xiliuriesn Octobcr, and

to solve British detachments in November of t.he

same year. This section is about a mile ancl z half

long, and is con~maudedby jnghirs towers)

nl l

s ~ ~ n g a h sstone breastworks) at every point. For th ree

miles, fsom Ali Kusjeecl towards Jumrood, the pass

is from 1 50 to 200 yards wide, contracting in some

parts to

O

or 80. Ali Mnsjeed itself i s perched on

a roclr 2,433 feet above the sea, or 940 feet below

the surnlnit of the Passat Luadeeldlana. The fort is

about 150 feet long, and O feet vide bu t th e whole

of the enclosed space is about 300 by 200 feet.

There are three hills within from 200 to 300

yarcls from the fort, each hill with a fortified post

on it. I n the ceatrc of the paw,, which is here

150 yards wide, is

a

snngah.

There are varions slnall passes north and south

of the Khyber, which strike that pass to the rear of

li

Musjid, and which, if ntilized, wonld isolate

the garrison from all support. To make these

available for our forces both the Mohmands and

the Afridis must be propitiated. Recent t r a ~ e l s

have thrown considerable light on the Bajour dis-

trict north of the Cabnl River,

and

it vonld

seein to be quite possible to secnrc Lalpura, by an



CABUL.

Lalpnsa is nt the Afghan entilance to the IChybel ,

and a stsongholcl. of tho Mohmands.

It

conlcl only

be seized with their approbation, but it is

~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 2

to re~lleivber hat, in 1839 we intjtallecl. at this place

a new r~der,Tornbnz Ichan, who remzlined f a i t h f ~ ~ l

to ns thong11 goocl and ill-fortune. The l~ recedent

might prove to be of l~racticalmpoi tance.

Having described the chief passes tlmh lead

through the Snleiman ancl Safed Koh, we may glance

briefly a t those farther west in Cab111 itself. Between

Qnetta and Ranclahar there are two ranges of monn-

tains, ancl the country to be traversed-is far fiorn

being as easy as some would have us believe. The

English army took eighteen days in marching the

150 miles that intervene, although their advance was

unresisted. The conntry is admirably adapted for

purposes of defence, ancl a t Haiclarzai, Hyknlzni,

and the Khojak Pass a resolnte soldier could easily

retard the advance of an invading army. The

Khojak Pass though the Amran range is over

7000 feet.

Once we are a t I<andahar, thewhole of the Afghani-

stan south of the H in d i Kfish is at our mercy, for

between that city and Cabul there are no passes

worthy of the name, although the position on the



PASSES

IN

THE INTERIOR.

8

Herat there are several, bnt tliese need not be con-

sicl.erecl. here, as G irishl~ancl. the Halmancl. are the

lim its of the nleasures proposecl.

t

be taken

by

the

Indian Government, ~m less vents become cl.evolopecl

in Persia ancl. the Tnrkoinan country.

Of

the northern passes throng11 th e H in K i~ s h ,

the best known is that of Bamian or Sighan. The

altitucle of this, on the clirect road to K h ~ ~ l r nnd

Balkh, is 8500 feet, ancl the I-Iarakotal Pass a t

the northern entrance of the Sighan valley is the

same. From Bamian another road brallclles off

clno west t the Balkh river ancl. Shiborgan, ancl l;he

heights of the two or three passes here vary from

5000 t o 8000 feet. There is a fair roacl. in this

clirection from Banlian, wid Kilai Jahudi

t

Shibor-

gan, and Andchni to Rarklii, the Russo-Boldlaran

post on the Oxus.

Tile

distance from ICarkhi to

Bamian by this road is ollly 350 miles, ancl froin

Kl~ojaSalih ancl Kilif the distance is rather less.

East of Bamian there are the following passes

loading into the fertile valley of Palljlrir :-The

ICoushan, the Sala lm g, the Uirdshnk, and the

Ichawak. Their altitudes vary from 10,0 00 to

12,000 feet.

The

Girdshak, between Knadus,



8

CABUL

the Ishkasin and N~~ksal lasses, 13,000 feet high,

leading from Badakshan and ~ k h a no the Chitral

valley, and then, continuing along the Hincli~Khsh,

wc

come to the Baroghil, 12,000 feet, leading from

ICashgar.

B u t nltllough these are the nninea of all the

passes

w

know, it is evident, from the chronicle

of

.o w campaign of 1839-40 in these mountains that

there aye many more-in fact, tha t between the

valleys of nortllern Afghanistan-anc it is nothing

bat

a

s~zccession f valleys-there is constant com-

munication by means of passes of all degrees of

practicability.

he western portion of the Hindfi IIGsh, viz.

the Roh Sin11 and the Koh-i-Baba-there are passes

at frequent intervals, made either by the Halrnand

or the mountain torrents which rush clown to the

Heri. I n th is little-known quarter of Afghanistan,

held by Einak and Hazara m o~ ~ nta in ee rs,nd the

whilom seat of the great Abdali clan, tlzere are

several trade routes usecl. by the inhabitants.

They

l

point either to H era t, or southwarcl to Girishk

and Candahar, or no rtl~w ard o M aimena and Ballrh,

Bokhara and sam nrcand, tho cities of wealth and

lnxusy in the eyes of central Asiatics. Ancl

in

the



TH nTOUNTAIN

TRIBES 85

lying north of the mountains of Ghor thero is th at

main road from Hera t to Mailnena which crosses the

M nrg l~ab at tlle village of its name, and which is

traced on

througli l those no rtl~e rnKhunates until

it s t~ ike shat Little Pamir trade route which passes

through Walchan ancl Sirikol to Eastern Turkist an

and the westelm cities of China.

At the present time the passes of the Suleiman

are of the more immediate importance, but in a

political sense, ancl as mutter of fact in

a

f ~ ~ t u r e

day, those through

the

Hindb Khsh are of as great

and lasting importance to us.

The

foz~nta inTribes.-The hill-men are, in the

b e e r s eyes, a weapon of offence against India,

and 110 has threatened to i burl them upon our

territory. U nfo rt~ nately , however, for his High-

ness s project, the past year has seen a remarkable

change in the attitnde of the mountaineers.

Thc

stern bloclcade of the Jowukis in 1876-77 has effec-

tually clamped their ardonr for border distu~bauce,

and since that event the frontiers have enjoyed an

exceptional tranq~i1ity.l In the Hazara district

A

despatch relnting to the Jovnki campaign mas pnb-

l is l~ed n the las t Gazette

The Viceroy thanks the genornls



8 C BU

the minor colonies have all beell quiet, while the

Inore im portant, hitherto so iiro.c.cblesorne, have

a lolls

een alillost ostentatious in their demonstr t

of docility. The Chiggnzai, Akazai, and H as-

sanzai tribes have behavecl excellently, and the

young chiefs of Agror are quietly at school at Abbo-

tabad.

I n

the P e s h a m ~ rdistipict tbe Hassan Kheyl

ancl Pass Africlis, of course, gave trouble, for what

else could be expected from rnces who look upon the

murcler of relatives as

a

point of etiquette b u t all

th e other Afridi tribes remained on friendly terms,

ns clid the inl-portnnt section of the Mohmands.

With Swat our relations have been undisturbed, ancl

when the Uthmall Rlleyls committed a g ross outrnge

upon some British subjects, th e Akhoond of Swat,

th e most revered slsiritusl chief in th e N orthern

Himd,zyas

formnlly excommunicated them . I n tho

Rohnt district there was

a

serious ru ptu re of the

peace. T h e British governm ent had long clesirecl

to coastrrrct a cart-road through tlle Icohzlt Pass,

government

drams

at te nt io n t o t h e remnrlrable cha nge effected

i n border warfare b y breechloaders.

The

result of t h e cam-

pa ig u provea concl~lsively h a t th e coercion.

of

a n y hill tribea

is no w n m at te r of comparative ease.

Certainly this is an



THE HILL MEN. 8

nnd though all the other tribes slg~eecl

o

t h e pro-

posal one villnge obstii~atelyef~lsecl o permit t h e

roncl. L ord Lytton accordingly 0~ganizec1 syste-

matic blockade of the disaffectecl tribe and a s th eir

example infected their neiglibonrs the area

of

t h e

blockncle wns extended furthey and further 11uti1

all the troublesome sections

of

the Jownki monn-

taineers were inclnclecl. S o rigorous a n d so ull~rsual

was the procedure that the tribes were soon fright-

ened and one after t h e other they came in to tender

their submission to receive tlie punishment meted

out

to them a~icl t o construct the roncl. Tliis

policy of blockade is Britisli innovatioil in border

tactics and jnclgecl

y

i t s results an excellent

one. Since t h e Jowakis were besieged there has

been

no

disturbance on t h e frontier nnd when

last wcelr the Mission w as ref~lscd

a

passage

by

the officials of the Ameer t h e R h y b e~ is who

actually formecl the escort

of

Major Csvagnari

behaved excellently. The Ameer therefore

may

find the reed

hc

lenns on bl-t

a

weak staff; but even

should l i s intrigues succeed

in

spreading fresh clis-

nffection among the

now

tranquil monnta i~lce rsf t h e

Peshawur ICohat

md

Hazara

frontier^ ^

we shall no t



88 CABUL.

find their combined terrors more overmholming than

in years past. Had me to force a way over the

Suleiman range, vith every height cromded wit11

shar~~shooters ,lie hill-m en might, indeed, provo

formidable foe bnt by the possess ion of Quetta

we

have a co~lm odious ntrance to Cabnl securely a t our

com mand, and may use it to tnrn the flank of all the

mountnin tribes. In the open the Mohinancls, Africlis,

Hassaa flleyls , and tlie rest are useless, for tlleir

tactics are confined to night attacks, or to sudden

rnshes from ambush npon stray travellers. They

lisvo never yet faced ten men togother, nor dared

to go beyond running distalice of their roclcs.

L ike their o m hill lcopards, they have jnst nudncity

enougli to chop clown in the twilight npon passer-

by, but not the courage to face in tlie clayligllt

n

nrued man. But they monld be nseless wlien

opposecl to the Ghoorlms, mllo, sent to the front in

Phurnri

Syuds.

Peshnzuz~rdistrict-Hnssau Kheyls Afritliv

of

th e Pnss nnd other tribes, as Sipah

nnd

IIul~i heyl Ahicliu,

Scc ; Bassi Kheyls Mohmnnds Utlunnn Kheyls.

XoAat

district-Adam Kheyl Afridie; Jowalriu Ornlrzais Waziris.

nlznzr district-Mahsud and Darmesll IChcyls, Waziris.

Dern

I m u i l

XAan rlist7ict-lIasranis Ushteranns Sheranis



successive drafts, would soon clear o~zt h e fsoniier

ravines, aild one by one wonlcl render stel3 acco~ult

of the eyries where the milcl inountaiueerg l ~ a d

entrenchecl. tl~ em se lves; or the Ghoorka, ~ vhocall

steal upon

a

sleeping panther vithout awaking i t ,

ancl can out-tire the sturdy sainbh~~rn fair ellase,

has no eq11'~l n the E as t

fos

~no~~ntnin-warfase.

o

th is do,y he wonders horn the English bent him, hunt-

ing him over his o v a hills of Nepal, ancl clrivillg hiin

from one end of the wild T.3:nmnoni range to the

oth er; but, though mondering, he never hesitates to

express his aclmiration of th e British pluck that

westecl his country from him, or to demonstrate his

loyalty by claiming to have a sllare in every fight.

Let loose across the Indus, he would fly to the work

like a cheetah slipped from his lash at grazing

cleer, and 11p ~ 1lown the Cnbul hills would

hunt th e Africli soul out of the Ameer's men,

Shore Ali, therefore, when he vaunts his pomer

over the hill tribes, ancl his ability to burl

them up011 British India n blasts of fire, as

his Highness exl~ressed t, makes an empty boast.

the 1.hyberis are to -day more peacefully disposed

towards us than they have ever been sinco we

pusl~ecl our frontier up to the foot of their hills.



none

~d

willing t o sell their services i n th e Best

market. For

m n y

yealms they have beev anxions to

ai tain the dignity of tl~ea ty elations with us and

Lo rd Lyt toa wit11 t h e sa m e sagacious promptitncle

thht has mmkecl his dbection of affairs i s p re l~ared

t o accede to t h e i r w ish es . W ith the hill-men of the

Pass in

01-m

S O Z V ~ C ~ S

ab111 becomes at once as

British as P e s h n w ~ u .

I t is to be n o t e d in conliexion with the conduct of

Shere Ali and

the

Afghan

frontier question that

a

necessity h ~ s risen for strengthening the Blitisli

.naval

s q ~ ~ a d r o ~ iu t h e Persian Gulf. Between Persia

an d Afghanistan there exis ts indeed little love. The

nttacks heretofore made on Herat and the Seistan

dispute have lo t

bad

blood beliincl and Teheran

wo111d never

be

l i k e l y to sympathize much with

Cabul. But w i t h R ussia belrincl all these hostile

intrigues and

far t o o

influential in Persia we may

n eed to b e s t ro n g in the Persian Gulf for other

causes th an t h e p i r a c i e s which are repo~Zled here

nd it is s a ti s f a c to ry on all accounts to know tha t

a large addition

t o

our force

in

these important



CABUL.

tion of Herat have been met by British demon-

strations in th e Persian Gulf. L e t us

hope

t

may

be th e last and

th t

England

may

for tlie future

be so firmly settlecl iu Afghauistau tliat H era t v i l l

be for ever removed beyoncl the illflneace of Russian

francl.





1878 Cabul--The Ameer His Country and his People by Robinson s.pdf

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