Consti - Article 10 [Sections 5-21] Cases

8/13/2019 Consti - Article 10 [Sections 5-21] Cases

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Article 10The Local GovernmentCases on Sections 5-14

Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna

Manila Electric Railway Co., commonly calledMeralco, is the distributor of electric supply in theNCR and other adjacent regions. Laguna isrepresented in this case by its Provincial Treasurer,Enito Balazo.

Facts:

On various dates, certain municipalities of theLaguna, by virtue of existing laws then in effect,issued resolutions granting franchise in favor ofpetitioner Meralco for the supply of electric light, heat

and power within their concerned areas. On January1983, Meralco was likewise granted a franchise bythe National Electrification Administration to operatean electric light and power service in the Municipalityof Calamba, Laguna.

On January 1992, the Local Government Code tookeffect, enjoining local government units to create theirown sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees andcharges, subject to the limitations expressed therein,consistent with the basic policy of local

autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code,Laguna enacted a Provincial Ordinance providing atax for business enjoying a franchise.

Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to Meralcofor the corresponding tax payment. Meralco paid thetax, which then amounted approx. 19 million, underprotest. Meralco subsequently claimed refund,claiming that the franchise tax it had paid andcontinued to pay to the National Governmentpursuant to PD 551 already included the franchise tax

imposed by the ordinance. Meralco contended that

the imposition of a franchise tax under the taxordinance, insofar as it concerned Meralco,contravened the provisions of Section 1 of PD 551which provides that any provision of law or localordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, thefranchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises togenerate, distribute and sell electric current for light,heat and power shall be (2%) of their gross receiptsreceived from the sale of electric current and fromtransactions incident to the generation, distributionand sale of electric current.

Then Governor Jose Lina denied the refund claim,relying on the Local Government Code. The casewent to court, and the trial court ruled in favor ofLaguna. Meralco wasnt done and elevated the caseto the Supreme Court.

Issues:Whether the imposition of a franchise tax under theassailed tax ordinance, insofar as petitioner isconcerned, is violative of the non-impairment clauseof the Constitution and of PD 551.

Whether The Local Government Code has repealed,amended or modified PD 551.

Held:First of all, Laguna does not have the inherent powerto tax, but under Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution, ageneral delegation of that power has been given infavor of local government units. Therefore, Lagunacan enact whatever tax ordinance they can enactprovided it is in accord with the law.

Secondly, The Local Government Code explicitlyauthorizes provincial governments, notwithstandingany exemption granted by any law or other special

law to impose a tax on businesses enjoying afranchise.

Thirdly, The Local Government Code has provided arepealing clause which provides that all general andspecial laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executiveorders, proclamations and administrative regulations,or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent withany of the provisions of this Code are herebyrepealed or modified accordingly.

Therefore, Laguna was authorized to enact such law,and that law is enforceable. Meralco cannot doanything but to pay up.

NAPOCOR v. Cabanatuan City

National Power Corporation is a government ownedand controlled corporation tasked to undertake thedevelopment of hydroelectric generations of powerand the production of electricity from nuclear,geothermal, and other sources, as well as, thetransmission of electric power on a nationwide basis.Cabanatuan is the largest city in Nueva Ecija.

Facts:For many years then, NAPOCOR has been sellingelectric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City.

After some time, Cabanatuan enacted a taxordinance and ordered NAPOCOR to pay up taxes.Of course, NAPOCOR refused, arguing thatCabanatuan has no authority to impose tax ongovernment entities. NAPOCOR also contended thatas a non-profit organization, it is exempted from thepayment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees.

Cabanatuan filed collection suit in the RTC ofCabanatuan City, demanding that NAPOCOR pay theassessed tax due, plus a surcharge equivalent to


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25% of the amount of tax, and 2% monthly interest.Cabanatuan alleged that petitioner's exemption fromlocal taxes has been repealed by section 193 of RA7160 (The Local Government Code). The RTCdismissed the case in favor of NAPOCOR. Onappeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision ofthe RTC and ordered NAPOCOR to pay the citygovernment the tax assessment.

Issues:Whether the NAPOCOR is excluded from thecoverage of the franchise tax simply because itsstocks are wholly owned by the national governmentand its charter characterized is as a non-profitorganization?

Whether the NAPOCORs exemption from all forms oftaxes is repealed by the provisions of the LocalGovernment Code.

Held:

No. A franchise tax is imposed based not on theownership but on the exercise by the corporation of aprivilege to do business. The taxable entity is thecorporation which exercises the franchise, and not theindividual stockholders. By virtue of its charter,NAPOCOR was created as a separate and distinctentity from the national government. It can sue and besued under its own name, and can exercise all thepowers of a corporation under the Corporation Code.

To be sure, the ownership by the national governmentof its entire capital stock does not necessarily implythat petitioner is not engaged in business. Since thetax is imposed on entities engaged in business,NAPOCOR is not exempt.

Yes. One of the most significant provisions of theLGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of

instrumentalities and agencies of the nationalgovernment from the coverage of local taxation.

Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot imposetaxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the nationalgovernment, its agencies and instrumentalities, thisrule now admits an exception when specificprovisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to imposetaxes, fees, or charges on the aforementionedentities. This is in accordance with the legislativepurpose of the LGC. Since it would be impractical toattempt to enumerate all the existing statutesproviding for special tax exemptions or privileges, theLGC provided for an express and general withdrawalof such exemptions or privileges.

Therefore, NAPOCOR, with its contentions thwarted,must pay up.

Petron Corporation v. Mayor Tiangco

Petron Corporation is the largest oil refining andmarketing company in the Philippines, supplying morethan a third of the countrys oil requirements. TobiasTiangco was then the mayor of Navotas.

Facts:In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code,Petron was assessed a total tax of approx. 6 million.Petron, of course, filed a protest arguing that they areexempt from paying local business taxes as providedby Article 232 of the Implementing Rules andRegulations of the Local Government Code.

This protest was denied. Petron, unfazed, took thecase to the RTC of Malabon, which subsequentlydismissed the case in favor of Navotas, requiringPetron to pay the assessed tax. Petron, with a lot ofguts, filed a motion for reconsideration, but was

denied. Petron, like they know something everyoneelse dont, elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether a local government unit is empowered underthe Local Government Code to impose businesstaxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale ofpetroleum and petroleum products.

Held:Navotas cannot tax Petron. Section 133 of the LGCprovides that unless otherwise provided herein, theexercise of taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend tothe levy of excise taxes on articles enumerated underthe National Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes,fees or charges on petroleum products.

The power of a municipality to impose business taxesis provided for in Section 143 of the LocalGovernment Code. Under the provision, amunicipality is authorized to impose business taxeson a whole host of business activities. Suffice it tosay, unless there is another provision of aw whichstates otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is,would undoubtedly cover the business of sellingdiesel fuels, or any other petroleum products for thatmatter. However, Section 133(h) provides two kindsof taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs, andthose levied on petroleum products are included.

Note:A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the articleitself. A business tax is different from an excise tax.However, such distinction is immaterial insofar asSection 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase taxes,fees or charges on petroleum products does notqualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges that couldwithstand the absolute prohibition imposed by theprovision. It would have been a different matter had


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Congress, in crafting Section 133(h), barred excisetaxes or direct taxes, or any category of taxes only,for then it would be understood that only suchspecified taxes on petroleum products could not beimposed under the prohibition. The absence of suchqualification leads to the conclusion that all sorts oftaxes on petroleum products, including businesstaxes, are prohibited by Section 133(h). Where thelaw does not distinguish, the Court should notdistinguish.

Pimentel v. Aguirre

Aquilino Pimentel was then a Senator. AlexanderAguirre was then the Executive Secretary.

Facts:On December 1997, then President Fidel Ramosissued AO 372, which directed, among others, alllocal government units to reduce their totalexpenditures by at least 25% of their authorizedregular appropriations for non-personal services(Section 1). Further, the AO also effectively withheld10% of their internal revenue allotments (Section 4).The purported purpose of this AO was to alleviate thefinancial crunch that the country was experiencingthen. As an analogy, the mother (President) told herson (LGU) to be frugal and subsequently decreasedhis sons allowance.

Pimentel wasnt thrilled by this. He contends that thePresident, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercisingthe power of controlover LGUs. The Constitutionvests in the President, however, only the power ofgeneral supervision over LGUs, consistent with theprinciple of local autonomy. Pimentel further arguesthat the directive to withhold 10% of their IRA is incontravention of Section 6, Article 10 of theConstitution, providing for the automatic release to

each of these units its share in the national internalrevenue.

Issues:

Whether the President committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in ordering all LGUs to adopt a 25% costreduction program as such violates the LGUs fiscalautonomy.

Whether the President committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of theLGUsinternal revenue allotment.

Held:AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued bythe President consistent with his power of supervisionover local governments. It is intended only to adviseall government agencies and instrumentalities toundertake cost-reduction measures that will helpmaintain economic stability in the country, which isfacing economic difficulties. Besides, it does notcontain any sanction in case of noncompliance.Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO372 is well within the powers of the President. Sinceit is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannotbe characterized as an exercise of the power ofcontrol.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. Abasic feature of local fiscal autonomy isthe automatic release of the shares of LGUs in thenational internal revenue. This is mandated by noless than the Constitution. The Local GovernmentCode specifies further that the release shall be madedirectly to the LGU concerned within five days afterevery quarter of the year and shall not be subject toany lien or holdback that may be imposed by thenational government for whatever purpose.As a rule,the term "shall" is a word of command that must be

given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,therefore, imperative. This order is not undersupervision, but rather under control, and is therefore,invalid.

Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

Benjamin Borja, Jr. was the son of Cesar Borja, theincumbent mayor of Pateros who died while in office.Go slash your wrist if you dont know Comelec.

Facts:Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros onJanuary 1988 for a term ending June 1992. OnSeptember 1989, he became mayor, by operation oflaw, upon the death of the incumbent, CesarBorja. On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayorfor a term of three years which ended on June1995. On May 1995, he was reelected mayor foranother term of three years ending June 1998.

In the May 1998 elections, Benjamin Borja was acandidate for mayor of Pateros. He was very happybecause he would presumably follow in the steps ofhis late father. However, Capco spoiled his party andfiled a certificate of candidacy for mayor, goingdirectly against Borja. Borja obviously wasnt veryhappy with this. He sought Capcos disqualification onthe theory that the latter would have already servedas mayor for three consecutive terms by June 1998and would therefore be ineligible to serve for anotherterm after that. (Comelec ruled in favor of Borja andCapco was disqualified. However, the ruling camelate and the elections pushed through, in whichCapco won by a landslide.)


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Issue:Whether the candidacy of Capco was valid.

Held:Article 10, Section 8 contemplates service by localofficials for three consecutive terms as a result ofelection. The first sentence speaks of the term ofoffice of elective local officials and bars such officialsfrom serving for more than three consecutiveterms. The second sentence, in explaining when anelective local official may be deemed to have servedhis full term of office, states that voluntaryrenunciation of the office for any length of time shallnot be considered as an interruption in the continuityof his service for the full term for which he waselected. The term served must therefore be one forwhich he was elected. The purpose of this provisionis to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on thenumber of terms an elective official mayserve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term forwhich he was elected because he is simply continuingthe service of the official he succeeds, such officialcannot be considered to have fully served the termnow withstanding his voluntary renunciation of officeprior to its expiration.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective localofficials must be taken to refer to the right to beelected as well as the right to serve in the sameelective position. Consequently, it is not enough thatan individual has served three consecutive terms inan elective local office; he must also havebeen elected to the same position for the samenumber of times before the disqualification can apply.

David v. Commission on Elections

Alex David was then the Barangay Chairman ofBarangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City as well as thepresident of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas.Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked withthe enforcement of election laws.

Facts:Alex David was elected as the Barangay Chairman ofBarangay 77 of Caloocan City. He started to serve onMay 1994. According to the Local Government Code,he would serve for 3 years, and would therefore stepdown on June 1997. However, he enjoyed so muchthat he wouldnt step down. Before the scheduledbarangay elections on May 1997, David filed a casewanting to prohibit the holding of the barangayelection scheduled on May 1997. David insists thataccording to RA 6653 and RA 6679, approved onMay 1988, the term of office of barangay officials shallbe for 5 years. Therefore, according to this bonehead,he should serve until June 1999.

Issue:Whether the term of barangay officials is 5 years(according to RA 6653 and 6679) or 3 years(according to the LGC).

Held:RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enactedlater than RA 6653 and 6679. I t is basic that in caseof an irreconcilable conflict between two laws ofdifferent vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legisposteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationaleis simple: a later law repeals an earlier one becauseit is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed thatthe lawmakers knew the older law and intended tochange it. In enacting the older law, the legislatorscould not have known the newer one and hence couldnot have intended to change what they did not

know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed onlyby subsequent ones and not the other way around.

Under the LGC, the term of office of barangay officialswas fixed at 3 years which shall begin after theregular election of barangay officials on May1994. This provision is clearly inconsistent with andrepugnant to RA 6679 which states that such termshall be for five years.

Note:RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect sevenkagawads and the candidate obtaining the highestnumber of votes shall automatically be the punongbarangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven electedbarangay kagawads to select the punong barangayfrom among themselves. On the other hand, theLocal Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on thebarangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate,separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, underthe Code, voters elect eight barangay officials,namely, the punong barangay plus the sevenkagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they votefor only seven kagawads, and not for the barangaychairman.

During the barangay elections held on May 1994 (2ndMonday), the voters actually and directly elected onepunong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agreewith the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all thepunong barangays were elected illegally and thus,Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validlyelected barangay chairman, much less president ofthe national league of barangays which he purports torepresent in this petition. It then necessarily followsalso that he is not the real party-in-interest and onthat ground, his petition should be summarilydismissed.


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Supangan v. Santos

Johnny Supangan was then a member of theKabataang Barangay of Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereare a multitude of petitioners in this case. Luis Santoswas then the Secretary of the Department of LocalGovernment.

Facts:Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santosappointed several persons in respective local units,among them Supangan, as sectoral representativesof local legislative bodies.

However, Supangan and a whole lot of peoplecontested this, arguing that the President (or in thiscase, the Local Government Secretary) cannot makethe assailed appointments without an enabling law.They also argue that assuming that the LocalGovernment Secretary is possessed with the powerand authority to designate such sectoralrepresentatives, the designations made by theSecretary are null and void as they were not made inthe manner required by the same law, which providesthat before the President may appoint members of thelocal legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and

Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be adetermination to be made by the Sanggunian itselfthat said sectors are of sufficient number in the city ormunicipality to warrant representation afterconsultation with associations and persons belongingto the sector concerned.

Issues:Whether the assailed designations were valid.

Held:The designations were valid. Two pertinent provisionsof BP 337 (LGC under the 1973 Constitution) are

worth looking at. These are Sections 173 and 146,which provides as follows:

The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative bodyof the city shall be composed of the vice-mayor, aspresiding officer, the elected sangguniangpanlungsod members, and the members who may beappointed by the President of the Philippinesconsisting of the presidents of the katipunangpanlungsod ng mga barangay and the kabataangbarangay city federation.

In addition thereto, there shall be one representativeeach from the agricultural and industrial labor sectorswho shall be appointed by the President of thePhilippines, whenever as determined by thesangguniang panlungsod, said sectors are ofsufficient number in the city to warrant representation,after consultation with associations and personsbelonging to the sector concerned.

The Sangguniang Bayan shall be the legislative bodyof the municipality and shall be composed of themunicipal mayor, who shall be the presiding judge protempore, eight members elected at large, and themembers appointed by the President consisting of thepresident of the katipunang bayan and the presidentof the kabataang barangay municipal federation.

In addition thereto, there shall be one representativeeach from the agricultural and industrial labor sectorswho shall be appointed by the President of thePhilippines whenever, as determined by theSangguniang Bayan, said sectors are of sufficientnumber in the municipality to warrant representation,after consultation with associations and personsbelonging to the sector concerned.

Section 9, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitutioncommands that all legislative bodies of localgovernments must have sectoral representativesamong its members, and the appointment ordesignation of individuals thereto must be done inaccordance with provisions of law, whether that lawexists or has still to be passed. But in this case thatlaw already exists in BP 337 particularly Sections 146and 173 quoted above. Further, BP 337 was stilloperative, even after the ratification of the newConstitution, because the transitory provisionsprovide for the continued operation of all existing lawsnot inconsistent with it. Since there was, as of thetime of this case, no law repealing BP 337, suchwould continue to have effect as it was notinconsistent with the Constitution. In effect, theselaws are the bases for the designations made.In some of the cases in this consolidated petition, theSanggunian concerned has not yet determined thatthe Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in theirparticular city or municipality are of sufficient numberto warrant representation. In this case, there willabsolutely be no basis for the designations. Thesedesignations would therefore be invalid.

The Constitution does not prescribe the qualificationsfor the position of sectoral representatives to the locallegislative bodies. However, the use of the term"sectoral representation" implies that the person to beappointed must possess the necessary qualificationsto represent that particular sector. At the very least,the appointee must actually belong to the sectorwhich he purports to represent; otherwise there canbe no true representation. Again, in some of thecases herein, the appointees do not belong to theconcerned sectors. Therefore, their appointments arelikewise invalid.

Tan v. Comelec


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I couldnt find the original text of the case. We canonly assume that Tan was an interested party in thiscase. Maybe he was the congressman of NegrosOccidental and, therefore, didnt want hisconstituency to shrink.

Batas Pambansa 885created a new province in theIsland of Negros to be known as the Province ofNegros del Norte. The cities of Silay, Cadiz and SanCarlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto were included inthe new province.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, theComelec scheduled a plebiscite for January 1986.Petitioners opposed, contending that the BP 885 isunconstitutional and not in complete accord with theLocal Government Code because:

The voters of the parent province of NegrosOccidental, other than those living within theterritory of the new province of Negros delNorte, were not included in the plebiscite.

The area which would comprise the newprovince of Negros del Norte would only beabout 2800 sq. km., which is lesser than theminimum area prescribed by the governingstatute.

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so thepetition was not timely considered. Consequently,petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained washeld earlier.

Issue:

Whether the plebiscite was legal and complied withthe constitutional requisites under Article 11, Section3 of the Constitution (which is now Article 10, Section10), which states that no province, city, municipality orbarrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, orits boundary substantially altered except inaccordance with the criteria established in the LocalGovernment Code, and subject to the approval by amajority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or unitsaffected.

Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or mergedand there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite inthe unit or units affected must first be obtained. Thecreation of the proposed new province of Negros delNorte will necessarily result in the division andalteration of the existing boundaries of NegrosOccidental, the parent province.

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that twopolitical units would be affected. The first would bethe parent province of Negros Occidental because itsboundaries would be substantially altered. The otheraffected entity would be composed of those in thearea subtracted from the mother province toconstitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

Note:Paredes vs. Executive Secretary should not be takenas a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, thedissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable,which says when the Constitution speaks of the unitor units affected it means all of the people of themunicipality if the municipality is to be divided such asin the case at bar or of the people of two or moremunicipalities if there be a merger.

Following this school of thought, for the plebiscite tobe valid, everyone in Negros Occidental, even thosewho would not fall under the new province, must takepart. Such was not the case here. Therefore, theplebiscite is null and, therefore, has no legal effect.

Food for Thought:When the boundaries of a LGU is substantiallyaltered, there are necessarily more than one unitaffected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that wascreated as a result of the alteration. Therefore, thevotes of all the members of the two units must beobtained.

Padilla, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

Roy Padilla Jr. was then the governor of CamarinesNorte. Comelec is the constitutional commissiontasked with the enforcement of election laws.

Facts:RA 7155 created the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa inthe Province of Camarines Norte to be composed ofbarangays in the Municipality of Labo in the sameprovince. Comelec subsequently ordered a plebiscitethroughout Labo, but only 2,890 votes favored itscreation while 3,439 voters voted against.Consequently, the day after the political exercise, theindependent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa wasdeclared rejected by a majority of votes.

Padilla was saddened. He filed a case which seeks toset aside the concluded plebiscite conductedthroughout Labo and prays that a new plebiscite beundertaken as provided by RA 7155. Further, he saysthat the plebiscite was a complete failure and that theresults obtained were invalid and illegal because theplebiscite should have been conducted only in the


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political unit or units affected, not in the whole ofLabo.

Issue:

Whether the plebiscite conducted in the areascomprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the motherMunicipality of Labo is valid. Practically, whether theplebiscite should include the whole of Labo or just theareas which would be included in the proposed newmunicipality.

Held:It stands to reason that when the law states that theplebiscite shall be conducted "in the political unitsdirectly affected," it means that residents of thepolitical entity who would be economically dislocatedby the separation of a portion thereof have a right tovote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what iscontemplated by the phase "political units directlyaffected," is the plurality of political units which wouldparticipate in the plebiscite.10 Logically, those to beincluded in such political areas are the inhabitants ofthe 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality ofTulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parentMunicipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, weconclude that respondent COMELEC did not commitgrave abuse of discretion in promulgating ResolutionNo. 2312.

Note:In the deliberations of the 1986 ConstitutionalCommission, then Commissioner Davide expresslystated that in the plebiscites to be conducted, it mustinvolve all the units affected. This established theintent of the 1987 Constitution framers.

Food for Thought:

In Paredes, the Court said that only those who wouldbe included in the new unit should participate in aplebiscite. Justice Abad Santos strongly dissented.

In Tan, the dissent was substantially used. In this1986 case, the Court reversed itself and said thateveryone should participate in a plebiscite. Both thenew unit and the parent unit are affected and,therefore, must be included.

In Padilla, the Court said that the 1987 Constitutiondid not junk the ruling in Tan, in accordance with itslegislative intent manifested in the deliberations. Theruling and doctrine established in Tan should bemaintained. Everyone should be included in aplebiscite.

League of Cities v. Comelec

League of Cities is a formal organization of allthe cities in the Philippines. Presently, 122 cities arepart of this organization. Comelec is the constitutionalcommission tasked with the enforcement of electionlaws. This is reconsideration, so I will provide thebackground.

Facts:During the 11th Congress, Congress passed 33 lawsconverting 33 municipalities into cities. However,Congress did not act on bills converting 24 othermunicipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,Congress enacted into law RA 9009, which amendedSection 450 of the Local Government Code byincreasing the annual income requirement forconversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100 million. The rationale for theamendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator

Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities toconvert into cities solely to secure a larger share in

the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact thatthey are incapable of fiscal independence. After theeffectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representativesof the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No.29, which sought to exempt from the P100 millionincome requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalitieswhose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11thCongress. However, the 12th Congress endedwithout the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.During the 13th Congress, the House ofRepresentatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to theSenate for approval. However, the Senate, were toobusy sleeping together and again failed to approvethe Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator

Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, throughtheir respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provisionexempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement in RA 9009. OnDecember 2006, the House of Representativesapproved the cityhood bills. The Senate alsoapproved the cityhood bills in February 2007, exceptthat of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (CityhoodLaws) on various dates from March to July 2007without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Lawsdirect the Comelec to hold plebiscites to determinewhether the voters in each respondent municipalityapprove of the conversion of their municipality into acity. LCP (League of Cities of the Philippines) was notvery merry with this. They filed the present petitions todeclare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional forviolation of Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution,as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversionof municipalities into cities will reduce the share ofexisting cities in the Internal Revenue Allotmentbecause more cities will share the same amount of


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internal revenue set aside for all cities under the LocalGovernment Code.

Issue:

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article10 of the Constitution.

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equalprotection clause.

Held:The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article10 of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

Applying the P100 million income requirement in RA9009 to the present case is a prospective, not aretroactive application, because RA 9009 took effectin 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more thanfive years later. Second, the Constitution requires thatCongress shall prescribe all the criteria for thecreation of a city in the Local Government Code andnot in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article 10of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and

just distribution of the national taxes to localgovernment units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed inthe Local Government Code, as amended by RA9009, for converting a municipality into a city areclear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort toany statutory construction. Fifth, the intent ofmembers of the 11th Congress to exempt certainmunicipalities from the coverage of RA 9009remained intent and was never written into the LocalGovernment Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11thor 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutionsare not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed inthe 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption inthe Cityhood Laws were written in the LocalGovernment Code, the exemption would still be

unconstitutional for violation of the equal protectionclause.

In short, in the November 2008 decision, the Court enbanc, by a 6-5 vote, nullified the 16 cityhood laws forbeing violative of the Constitution, specifically itsSection 10, Article 6 and the equal protection clause.

League of Cities v. Comelec (Reconsideration)

Facts:By a decision dated November 2008, the SupremeCourt, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions andnullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for beingviolative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10,

Article 10 and the equal protection clause.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the samewas denied in a 6-6 vote. Note that this was aresolution, so a majority is not needed. If the Courtended in a tie, which is the case in this one, thereconsideration would lose and such would bedenied. However, Section 4 of Article 7 of theConstitution mandates that all cases involving theconstitutionality of a law shall be heard by theSupreme Court en banc and shall be decided with theconcurrence of a majority of the members whoactually took part in the deliberations of the issues inthe case. Therefore, the Court accepted this secondMotion for Reconsideration, considering that the 1stdecision never attained finality with the deadlock voteon its reconsideration.

Issues:Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article10 of the Constitution.

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equalprotection clause.

Held:The legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the Php 100million criterion would hold sway, as long as thecorresponding cityhood bill has been filed before theeffectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipalityqualifies for conversion into a city under the originalversion of the LGC.

In short, Congress did not intend the increasedincome requirement in RA 9009 to apply to thecityhood bills which became the cityhood laws inquestion. In other words, Congress intended thesubject cityhood laws to be exempted from theincome requirement of Php 100 million prescribed byRA 9009.The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exemptrespondent LGUs from the Php 100 million incomerequirement.

The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress onunapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids ininterpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It isreally immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body.The hearings and deliberations during the 11 thand12thCongress may still be used as extrinsic referenceinasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filedbefore the passage of RA 9009 were beingconsidered during the 13thCongress. Courts may fallback on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aidof statutory construction if the literal application of thelaw results in absurdity or injustice.

The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities isbased on the fact that each had pending cityhood billslong before the enactment of RA 9009 thatsubstantially distinguish them from other


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municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this,each of the 16 also met the Php 20 million incomelevel exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991LGC.

Therefore, the 16 laws are declared valid andconstitutional.

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association

MMDA is a government agency tasked with thedelivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-AirVillage Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profitcorporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVAis the registered owner of Neptune Street, a roadinside Bel-Air Village.

Facts:On December 1995, Bel-Air Village Assoc. receivedfrom MMDA, through its Chairman, a noticerequesting respondent to open Neptune Street topublic vehicular traffic starting January 1996. BAVAwas apprised that the perimeter wall separating thesubdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenuewould be demolished. On January 1996, BAVA,obviously furious, instituted a civil case for injunction.

MMDA claims that it has the authority to openNeptune Street to public traffic because it is an agentof the state endowed with police power in the deliveryof basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basicservices is traffic management which involves theregulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure thesafety, convenience and welfare of the general public.It is alleged that the police power of MMDA wasaffirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases ofSangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From thepremise that it has police power, it is now urged that

there is no need for the City of Makati to enact anordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.

Issue:

Whether the MMDA has authority to open NeptuneRoad to the public.

Held:Police power is lodged primarily in the NationalLegislature. It cannot be exercised by any group orbody of individuals not possessing legislative power.The National Legislature, however, may delegate thispower to the local government units. Once delegated,the LGUs can exercise only such legislative powersas are conferred on them by the legislature. Localgovernment units exercise police power through theirrespective legislative bodies.

There is nothing in RA 7924 that grants the MMDApolice power, let alone legislative power. Even theMetro Manila Council has not been delegated anylegislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of thelocal government units, there is no provision in RA7924 that empowers the MMDA to enact ordinances,approve resolutions and appropriate funds for thegeneral welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, adevelopment authority. It is an agency created for thepurpose of laying down policies and coordinating withthe various national government agencies, peoplesorganizations, non-governmental organizations andthe private sector for the efficient and expeditiousdelivery of basic services in the vast metropolitanarea. All its functions are administrative in nature.

Clearly then, the MMC is not the same entity as theMMDA. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power toenact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Itis the local government units, acting through their

respective legislative councils that possess legislativepower and police power. In the case at bar, theSangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not passany ordinance or resolution ordering the opening ofNeptune Street, hence, its proposed opening bypetitioner MMDA is illegal.

Abella v. Comelec

Adelina Larrazabal was the candidate who obtainedthe highest number of votes in the local elections ofFebruary 1988 and was proclaimed as the dulyelected governor of Leyte but who was later declaredby the Comelec to lack both residence andregistration qualifications for the said position asprovided by Section 12, Article 10 of the Constitutionand is hereby disqualified as such Governor.Benjamin Abella was the one who obtained thesecond highest number of votes for the position ofgovernor but was not allowed by the Comelec to beproclaimed as governor after the disqualification ofLarrazabal. Comelec is the constitutional commissiontasked with the enforcement of election laws.

Facts:Larrazabal wanted to run for the position of LeyteGovernor. However, a certain person wanted todisqualify Larrazabal from running as governor ofLeyte on the ground that she misrepresented herresidence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident ofOrmoc City like her husband who was earlierdisqualified from running for the same office. In itsquestioned decision and resolution, the COMELECfound that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor aregistered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimedbut a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, acomponent city of the province of Leyte butindependent of the province pursuant to Section 12,


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Article 10 of the Constitution thereby disqualifying herfor the position of governor of Leyte. With thesefindings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner asgovernor of the province of Leyte. Unfazed,Larrazabal poses an alternative position that herbeing a registered voter in Ormoc City was noimpediment to her candidacy for the position ofgovernor of the province of Leyte.

Issue:Whether the fact that Larazzabal was of Ormoc City isnot an impediment to her candidacy.

Held:Section 12, Article 10 of the Constitution is explicit inthat aside from highly-urbanized cities, componentcities whose charters prohibit their voters from votingfor provincial elective officials are independent of theprovince. In the same provision, it provides forother component cities within a provincewhosecharters do not provide a similar prohibition.Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whosecharters prohibit their voters from voting for provincialelective officials are treated like highly urbanizedcities which are outside the supervisory power of theprovince to which they are geographically attached.This independence from the province carries with itthe prohibition or mandate directed to their registeredvoters not to vote and be voted for the provincialelective offices.

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission onAudit

Cordillera Broad Coalition was one of theinstrumentalities of CAR. COA is the auditor of thegovernment.

Facts:

EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of herlegislative powers under Section 6, Article 18 of theConstitution, created the CAR. It was created toaccelerate economic and social growth in the regionand to prepare for the establishment of theautonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its mainfunction is to coordinate the planning andimplementation of programs and services in theregion, particularly, to coordinate with the localgovernment units as well as with the executivedepartments of the National Government in thesupervision of field offices and in identifying, planning,monitoring, and accepting projects and activities inthe region. It shall also monitor the implementation ofall ongoing national and local government projects inthe region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional

Assembly as a policy-formulating body and aCordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm.The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Boardshall exist until such time as the autonomous regionalgovernment is established and organized.

In these cases, petitioners principally argue that byissuing EO 220 the President, in the exercise of herlegislative powers prior to the convening of the 1stCongress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtuallypre-empted Congress from its mandated task ofenacting an organic act and created an autonomousregion in the Cordilleras.

Issue:Whether EO 220 was valid.Held:

A reading of EO 220 will reveal that what it actuallyenvisions is the consolidation and coordination of thedelivery of services of line departments and agenciesof the national government in the areas covered bythe administrative region as a step preparatory to thegrant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not

create the autonomous region contemplated in theConstitution. It merely provides for transitorymeasures in anticipation of the enactment of anorganic act and the creation of an autonomousregion. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.

Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does notnecessarily mean that it is, as petitioner CordilleraBroad Coalition asserts, the interim autonomousregion in the Cordilleras. The Constitution provides fora basic structure of government in the autonomousregion composed of an elective executive andlegislature and special courts with personal, familyand property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide,we find that EO 220 did not establish an autonomousregional government. It created a region, covering aspecified area, for administrative purposes with themain objective of coordinating the planning andimplementation of programs and services. Todetermine policy, it created a representativeassembly, to convene yearly only for a five-dayregular session, tasked with, among others,identifying priority projects and developmentprograms. To serve as an implementing body, itcreated the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodiescreated by EO do not supplant the existing localgovernmental structure, nor are they autonomousgovernment agencies. They merely constitute themechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together theexisting local governments, the agencies of thenational government, the ethno-linguistic groups ortribes, and non-governmental organizations in aconcerted effort to spur development in theCordilleras.

Abbas v. Comelec


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Firdausi Abbas was a datu in the Mindanao area.Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked withthe enforcement of election laws.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, theAgreement Between the Government of the Republicof the Philippines and the Moro National LiberationFront with the participation of the QuadripartiteMinisterial Commission, Members of the IslamicConference and the Secretary General of theOrganization of Islamic Conference. It provided forthe establishment of autonomy in the southernPhilippines within the realm of the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippinesand enumerated the thirteen provinces comprising theareas of autonomy. In 1987, a new Constitution wasratified which for the first time provided for regionalautonomy. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate,RA 6734 was enacted and signed into law.

Petitioner Abbas argues that RA 6734 unconditionallycreates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contraryto the provisions of the Constitution on theautonomous region which makes the creation of suchregion dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.

Issue:Whether or not the provisions of RA 6734 is in conflictwith the Tripoli Agreement.

Whether RA 6734 creates an autonomous region inMindanao, contrary to the provisions of theConstitution which make the creation of such regiondependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite

Held:First of all, the Tripoli Agreement is not a bindingtreaty or international agreement. Therefore, it is notpart of the law of the land. If at all, RA 6734 would be

amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being asubsequent law. RA 6734 hinges upon theConstitution itself, and so, if it conflicts with the Tripoli

Agreement, the right action is to challenge the RAsconstitutionality.

Under the constitution, the creation of theautonomous region hinges only on the result of theplebiscite. If the Constitution is approved by majorityof the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduledplebiscite, the creation of the autonomous regionimmediately takes effect. The questioned provisionsin RA 6734 requiring an oversight Committee tosupervise the transfer do not provide for a differentdate of effectivity. Much less would the organizationof the Oversight Committee cause an impediment tothe operation of the Constitution, for such is evidentlyaimed at effecting a smooth transition period for theregional government. The constitutional objection onthis point thus cannot be sustained as there are nobases therefor.

Note:As provided in the Constitution, the creation of theAutonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is madeeffective upon the approval "by majority of the votescast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called forthe purpose." Further, what is required by theConstitution is a simple majority of votes approvingthe organic act in individual constituent units and nota double majority of the votes in all constituent unitsput together, as well as in the individual constituentunits.

Cordillera Regional Assembly v. Comelec

Cordillera Regional Assembly was one of theinstrumentalities of CAR. Comelec is theconstitutional commission tasked with theenforcement of election laws.

Facts:A plebiscite was held for the creation of the CordilleraAdministrative Region. Every province, of course withrelation to such purpose, took part. However, onlyIfugao Province voted favorably.

Issue:Whether the fact that Ifugao Province favorably votedfor the creation of CAR is enough to legally constitutesuch region.

Held:The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitutethe Cordillera Autonomous Region. Section 15, Article10 of the Constitution provides that there shall becreated autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao andin the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities,municipalities and geographical areas. Therefore, theConstitution contemplates more than onegeographical area to constitute an autonomousregion.

Leonor v. Cordillera Bodong Administration

Leonor Badua was a native of the Cordilleras. TheCordillera Bodong Administration was aninstrumentality of the CAR.

Facts:Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own afarm land from which they were forcibly ejectedthrough the decision of the Cordillera Bodong

Administration, favoring a certain David Quema. Thebackground of this case reveals that David Quema


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owns the parcels of land evidenced by TaxDeclarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of landwere purchased from Dr. Erotida Valera.

Twenty-two years later, he was able to redeem theparcels of land through payment of 10,000 to thevendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Quema wasprevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua.Prompted by such turn of events, David Quema fileda case in the Barangay Council but failed to have thedispute settled. A judge advised Quema to file hiscase in the provincial courts. However, Quema didnot, and filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe.

Due to several warnings from the tribe, spousesBadua filed a petition for special relief, with thefollowing to be settled:

That the respondents be enjoined fromenforcing the decision of the tribal court inthe pending case.

The respondents be prohibited fromusurping judicial power.

That the legal personality of the CordilleraBodong Administration be clarified.

The Baduas also allege that they were denied dueprocess (or hearing) and that the tribal court has no

jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor therespondent are members of the Maeng tribe. Therespondents countered by saying that the SC has no

jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court is not apart of the judicial system.

Issue:Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicialsystem which consists of the Supreme Court and thelower courts which have been established by law.They do not possess judicial power. Like thepangkats or conciliation panels in the barangays, theyare advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principalobjective is to bring together the parties to a disputeand persuade them to make peace, settle, andcompromise.

An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitrationaward rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonablyrepudiated, has the force and effect of a final

judgment of a court but it can be enforced onlythrough the local city or municipal court to which thesecretary of the Lupon transmits the compromisesettlement or arbitration award upon expiration of theperiod to annul or repudiate it. Similarly, the decisionsof a tribal court based on compromise or arbitrationmay be enforced or set aside, in and through theregular courts today.

Pandi v. Court of Appeals

Lampa Pandi was then designated as the Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

Facts:On August 1993, Macacua, in her capacity asRegional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the

ARMM designated Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMMAssistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge ofthe IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On September 1993, Lanao del Sur ProvincialGovernor Mahid Mutilan issued designated Saberalso as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanaodel Sur.

On October 1993, then President Fidel Ramos issuedEO 133 transferring the powers and functions of theDOH in the region to the Regional Government of the

ARMM. On November 1993, Macacua, again in hercapacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate, issueda Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation asOfficer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

Issue:Whether or not the designation of Pandi was valid.

Held:Macacua, as Regional Director and RegionalSecretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August1993 and again on November 1993. The designationdated August 1993 is void since the RegionalSecretary at that time did not yet exercise supervisionand control over the provincial health offices of the

ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi onNovember 1993 is valid since at that time EO 133 hadalready been issued vesting in the Regional Secretaryof Health supervision and control over all functionsand activities of the DOH in the ARMM. Thedesignation of Pandi, however, while valid is onlytemporary in nature, good until a new designation or apermanent appointment is made.

Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial healthofficer became for the first an official of the provincialgovernment even though he is appointed by theRegional Governor and draws his salary from regionalfunds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the ProvincialGovernor the power to exercise general supervisionand control over all programs, projects, services, andactivities of the provincial government. Upon theeffectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power ofsupervision and control over the provincial health


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officer passed from the Regional Secretary to theProvincial Governor. From then on the ProvincialGovernor began to exercise the administrativeauthority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in theprovincial health office pending the appointment of apermanent provincial health officer. Notwithstandingthis, the Governor did not make a valid designationbecause he did not have the power to do so. Hemade the designation on September, while the EOwas issued on October.

Consti - Article 10 [Sections 5-21] Cases

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