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Chapter XXThe Right against Double Jeopardy
34.P. vs Inting, 70 SCRA 289
Considering that this petition for review on certiorari of the order dated October 21, 1975,
of the City Court of Davao, Branch II, in its Criminal Case No. 8053-B, entitled "The People of
the Philippines vs. Jose Alvarado, for Estafa" which order dismissed the case "on the ground
that. the p prosecution has failed to prove the crime charged", is an actual attempt by the
petitioner to appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that became final and
executory upon its promulgation, an appeal that would, as correctly contended by the Solicitor
General, place the accused in double jeopardy because there was a trial on the merits and the trial
court in the full exercise of its jurisdiction found the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to
support conviction of the accused, this Court resolved to deny the petition for review.
Charged with estafa under Article 315, 3rd case, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused, Jose Alvarado, was acquitted by the trial court on its reasoning that his failure
to return a typewriter he bought from complainant Business Machines Corporation "with
reservation of title, right of repossession and forfeiture of all partial payments upon default",
after the postdated check for P854.25 issued as payment had been dishonored, could be simply
considered as a breach of civil obligation and not a violation of Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Solicitor General in his comment dated January 5, 1976, contends that a contract to
sell as the one involved herein must be distinguished from a contract of sale, and that in the
former case the failure of the purchaser to pay as agreed would prevent the contract of sale from
taking place and the purchaser would be duty bound to return the very same thing received or
become liable for estafa under par. (b), sub. no. 1 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although he believes that the trial court committed an error in the interpretation of the law and in
acquitting the accused, nevertheless he concedes that a correction by appeal of such an error in
the guise of a petition for certiorari, an error which is non-jurisdictional in character, would
result in a violation of the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy (Article IV, Section
22, 1973 Constitution).
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Since the Solicitor General who has control of all appeals by the State in criminal cases
and the private respondent (accused) are in accord that the present petition (by way of appeal
from an acquittal on the merits) would place the accused in double jeopardy, the petition must be
denied outright without need of going into the correctness of respondent judge's ruling. Since no
appeal by the State lies from an acquittal verdict, the petition must be as it is hereby denied.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
35.De Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619
In this original Petition for Certiorari, which was given due course in our Resolution of February
6, 1980, the sole question to be resolved is whether or not respondent Municipal Circuit Court
Judge, in Criminal Case No. 2450-D, had jurisdiction to try the offense charged and render
judgment although the criminal Complaint which was filed before him was only for preliminary
investigation.
The Complaint charged the accused Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday with "Illegal
Possession of Explosive locally known as 'dinamita' (P.D. No. 1058)" before the Third Municipal
Circuit Court at Daanbantayan Medellin, Cebu (Crim. Case No. 2450-D), and reads as follows:
That on the 20th day of July, 1979 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio
Suba, Bgy. Maya, Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while in the
seawaters of the above-mentioned place, confederating and mutually helping with one another,
without authority of the law and without proper permit from authorities, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA'
in their banca purposely for use of illegal fishing in which case, three (3) bottles of explosives,
two (2) paddles, two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and one (1) banca were recovered
from their possession and control, which acts of the above-named accused is a gross violation ofPD No. 1058.
All contrary to law.
The Complaint was precipitated by the fact, as disclosed by the Sworn Statements of CIC Carlos
Dosdos and Sgt. Jose Andales 2 that when they conducted a seaborne patrol along Daanbantayan
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Cebu, in the morning of July 20, 1979, they spotted the accused Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano
Dayday aboard a banca. As they approached the banca Rodrigo attempted to light a bottle of
dynamite but which the succeeded ill slopping. Both accused were arrested and three bottles of
dynamite and two fishnets were confiscated from them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Instead of conducting a preliminary investigation, respondent Judge motu proprio treated the
Complaint as one for Violation of Act 3023 3 and, therefore, within its jurisdiction, since the
offense charged did not warrant prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 9 relating to crimes
against national security. He then proceeded to arraign the accused both of whom pleaded guilty,
and rendered judgment on August 6, 1979, quoted in full hereunder:
DECISION
This case was originally filed in violation of Section 2 of PD No. 9, but is prosecuted under Act
3023 upon suggestion of the Court, for under the facts and circumstances of this case the
interests of justice require that this offense be prosecuted under Act 3023 inasmuch as the
possession is not in connection with subversion or insurrection and that the quantity and quality
of the homemade explosive do not come to the level of destructiveness contemplated under PD
No. 9.
Upon arraignment, both accused entered a plea of guilty. in view thereof, the Court hereby
renders a decision finding and declaring above two accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Illegal Possession of Explosive at the time and place stated in the complaint, in
violation of Act 3023, and they are thereby sentenced to suffer a penalty consisting of
imprisonment for four (4) months and fine of P 1,000.00 each, in accordance with the penal
provisions of said Act, and to pay the costs.
Apprehended explosives contained in two (2) beer bottles are confiscated and ordered turnedover to the 342nd PC Company, Bogo, Cebu, for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
Both the accused have served their sentence.
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Contesting the course of action taken and the judgment rendered by respondent Judge, herein
petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated National Police
Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these certiorari proceedings
alleging mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of explosives intended for illegal
fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not
for violation of Act 3023 which had long been repealed by several laws and decrees; that the
penalty provided for by current legislation is one which falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that respondent Judge's Decision has no legal
basis.
For his part, respondent Judge submits that only possession of explosives in connection with
subversion is covered by Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal possession of
explosives, Act 3023, has not been completely repealed; that having found that the possession by
the two accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was solely for fishing purposes and had
no connection with subversion, the illegal act should fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but
under Act 3023; that having arrived at said conclusion there was nothing irregular in his
assuming original jurisdiction and not merely conducting the second stage of the preliminary
investigation, for under Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act the Municipal Court has jurisdiction
over illegal possession of explosives. Respondent Judge further justifies his course of action as
being in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
The accused, Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday, whom we ordered impleaded as party
respondents, filed their Comment on the Petition, stating that they freely and voluntarily entered
a plea of guilty with the able assistance of counsel; that before handing down the Decision,
respondent Judge made them understand the nature and gravity of their crime; that even the state
prosecutors showed their conformity and appreciation for the wisdom and practicality of the
judgment of respondent Judge; and that they appreciated the sentence imposed on them because
they did not contemplate to commit so grave an offense, the two bottles of confiscated explosives
being adulterated and not of genuine quality, and considering that they are illiterates and ignorant
of the destructive use of these explosives.
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Significantly, the Solicitor General representing the People of the Philippines and whom we
likewise ordered impleaded as party petitioner, has joined petitioner De Guzman in assailing the
validity of the action taken by respondent Judge in the criminal case before him.
We find this Petition, indeed, impressed with merit and that respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he rendered the questioned Decision of August 6, 1979.
The complaint filed against the two accused specifically alleged that they wilfully and
unlawfully possessed in their banca explosives locally known as "dinamita" purposely intended
for use in illegal fishing in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1058.
Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for certain
forms of illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree No. 704 or
the "Fisheries Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential Decree No.
704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person
to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of
electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided,
that possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined
shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ...
Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, correspondingly provides
(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years
in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ...
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People
of the Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for,
indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the
Complaint.
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General that no jeopardy may be deemed to have attached by virtue of the erroneous and void
judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge as to bar a subsequent indictment and trial
of the case in the proper Court with jurisdiction over the offense.
WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the Decision of August 6, 1979 rendered by respondent
Judge Marcelino M. Escalona of the Municipal Circuit Court of Medellin, Cebu, and remand this
case to him for preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
36.P. vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289
Before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, Rogelio
Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio Caranza and Damian Senit were charged with
Homicide in an information filed on February 6, 1973, for the killing of Benjamin Atcha
(Criminal Case No. 254-A).
Arraigned on March 29, 1973 before Hon. Magno B. Pablo, all the aforenamed accused pleaded
not guilty. Hearing started on April 23, 1973 and was reset on May 3, 1973 after the presentation
of state witness Pepito Ordonio, there being another case also scheduled for hearing.
Because of the absence of Dr. Duque as witness, the prosecution prayed for a postponement to
judge Pablo. The prosecution was denied twice by the court but they were permitted to appeal on
the denial of the motion for the postponement to the appellate court. Despite the granting of the
request for ten (10) days within which to elevate the incident of the denial of the motion for
postponement, Judge Pablo granted a "Motion to Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and
Motion to Dismiss" filed by the defense in the afternoon of the same day, July 17, 1973, in an
order also dated July 17, 1973, acquitting all the accused for failure on the part of the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt their guilt, with cost de oficio, without giving the prosecution
time to file its opposition to the aforesaid motion, which the prosecution in fact filed promptly on
July 18, 1973 after receipt of a copy of the defense motion of July 17, 1973.
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While the respondent judge never raised the issue of double jeopardy, the private respondents
may have in mind invoking the principle of double jeopardy, although not expressly, when they
contend that the dismissal of this case amounts to an acquittal (p. 5, Memorandum for Private
Respondents). The principle, however, may not be successfully invoked because the action of the
respondent judge complained of in this petition being clearly one constituting grave abuse of
discretion, same amounts to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from
attaching (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; People v. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; and People v.
Navarro, 63 SCRA 264).
37.Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700
Facts: On 19 October 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D. Castro", alias
"Rolando Moreno", alias "Norberto de Ramos"; Corazon R. Serrano, and Atty/ Domingo V.
Flores, Jr., and two other "John Does" were charged before the Military Commission No. 13 with
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and falsification of commercial documents
(Criminal Case MC 13-2). Flores and his co-accused were arraigned on 25 October 1973 and all
pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter set for trial. The presentation of evidence for the
prosecution which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974, and the
reception of the evidence for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27, 1974. On 25 March
1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, in a memorandum to the Judge Advocate
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the withdrawal of the charges against
Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay, et al., from Military Commission No. 13. The next day, the day
scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants, counsel for Magpantay handed to
the Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the letter of the
Judge Advocate General, directing the withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The
prosecution deplored the withdrawal of the case, claiming that they have proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the Military Commission held itself to be without
discretion on the matter. On 28 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, after a
full consideration of all the aspects of the case, withdrew his previous order and directed the
Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the accused. Pursuant thereto, the Military
Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for the
defendants to 1 April 1974. Pleading double jeopardy, in that the "Withdrawal Order of the
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Honorable Secretary of the Department of National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an
acquittal of the accused Flores and a revocation and reinstatement of the case against the
Domingo V. Flores, Jr. constitutes 'double jeopardy", Flores moved to quash the case against
him, but the Military Commission denied his petition to quash. Flores filed the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. The other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other
hand, started presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. But, the proceedings were suspended upon
the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense was violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew
his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case.
Held: The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution
which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as "No
person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense; but no proceeding
in which an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification
shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be one, the
confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case"; and in Section 70-C of the
Manual on Courts Martial which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted,
acquitted or put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, cannot be further or again
pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity." For double jeopardy to exist,
it is essential that the first judgment of conviction or acquittal or dismissal is final; otherwise,
there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not
claim double jeopardy. Herein, Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of the
Military Commission 13, terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974 pursuant to the
Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General and of the
letter of the latter to the Commission, is not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. Under military
law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal, is merely
recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority, the review boards, and the
reviewing authority. It is apparent that in the administration of justice by the military, a military
commission acts merely as a commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the
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convening and reviewing authorities with his recommendation. While the Military Commission
13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of Criminal Case MC 13-2, pursuant to the
Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General, and the letter
of the latter to the Military Commission 13, directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt.
Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment
since it was not passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the
President. Although jeopardy had attached, it has not yet terminated. Being so, the constitutional
mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was not
violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and
directed that further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the Secretary of National
Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The constitutional mandate against putting a
person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going
through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is
no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy.
38.
Tangan vs. P., 155 SCRA 435
Petitioner has been charged on July 1, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
136 in an information that described the commission of the crime of murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm and docketed as Criminal Case No. 17587. Subsequently, the offense
charged was changed to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, with the information
amended on August 16, 1985.
On September 18, 1985 a resolution was issued by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
finding probable cause to hold petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions used
in the commission of homicide as defined and punished under Section 1 of Presidential Decree
1866 (Rollo, p. 97) and on the same date, information was filed in the same court indicting
petitioner for the offense (Rollo, p. 20) docketed as Criminal Case No. 19350
On October 30, 1985 petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
19360 on the grounds that: (1) the information charges more than one offense which are
separately punishable under existing laws; (2) the criminal action or liability of the accused has
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been extinguished; and (3) the accused is in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted, of the
offense charged (Rollo, p. 3).
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Bocar, supra; Buscayno v.
Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, 109 SCRA 273 [1981]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
There is no double jeopardy in the filing of the information for homicide in Criminal Case No.
17587 and in the filing of the information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition used
in the commission of homicide in Criminal Case No. 19350 for the simple reason that the first
jeopardy had not yet attached. It is well-settled that the mere filing of two information or
complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion
to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason
that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been
convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his express
consent. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. (Bulaong v.
People, 17 SCRA 746 [1966]; Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10 [1978];
Buscayno v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, supra; People v. Milfores, 115 SCRA 570
[1982]). (Rule 117, Sec. 2(h), Rules of Court).
39.P. vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516
Upon arraignment on February 18, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to all the three
information regarding defamation. Thereafter, she moved to quash the same on the ground that
the charges should have been initiated not by the fiscal but upon complaint of the offended party
herself.
The argument of the accused was that the remarks allegedly made by her imputed to the
complaining witness the crime of adultery, a private crime. Under Rule 110, Section 4 (now
Section 5), of the Rules of Court and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, no criminal action
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for defamation imputing such offense "shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party."
The trial judge agreed and granted the motion. The charges were dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution was denied.
The prosecution then came to this Court to challenge the dismissal, and that is how double
jeopardy entered the picture. The private respondent now claims that reversal of the dismissal
and reinstatement of the cases would violate her rights under Article IV, Section 22 (now Article
III, Section 21) of the Constitution.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that the crime imputed by the alleged
remarks was prostitution, a public offense. As such, it could be the basis of a prosecution for
defamation through an information filed by the fiscal.
That is doubtless true. However, the Court notes that in addition to allegedly calling the
complainant a whore, the private respondent is also charged in one information with having
described the former as "a paramour of my husband," which is a clear imputation of adultery. A
paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the place without the legal rights of a
husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover." Accordingly, that imputation was covered by the
aforecited Rule 110.
It is not denied that the charges were made through the information filed by the assistant
provincial fiscal and not formally commenced in court by the offended party. Nevertheless, it is
also clear that these information were based on the three criminal complaints earlier filed by
Tranquilan with the fiscals office, which conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation
thereon.
Conformably to the procedural rules then in force, the complaints and the records of the
preliminary investigation were transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the corresponding
information. Hence, although the charges were not initiated through complaint of the offended
party and the information did not state that they were based on her complaint, such
circumstances did not deprive the respondent court of jurisdiction.
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theProvincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting
Atty.Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative (to the
incident)that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has
first taken cognizance of said cases."
-No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge untilSaturday,
August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before himby P.C.
Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748. On that same day, therespondent
Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru
(his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the
latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and
fifty (50) John Does.
-An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty.
Batuampar(joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent
holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been
"hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The
respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of basis.-The petitioners contend:
- that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;- that failure constituted a
denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the
warrant for the petitioners' arrest;
- that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from8:00
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to
determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations
were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same
day";
- that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge whorelied
"mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to
him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.";
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- that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges"... in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..."who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken
cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct hisown investigation
of the same; and- that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed
the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons
or things to be seized.
Issue: Whether or not the warrant of arrest was null and void. More specifically stated, WON
completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Ruling: The warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of
the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "JohnDoes."
The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record
of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for
further appropriate action.
41.Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 144
MAIN POINT:
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving his
sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant
has waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of
defense of double jeopardy timely invoked
***
5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the penalty
imposed?
No, since double jeopardy has set in. (PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340
SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000). As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
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happens at the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on
certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs. Sandiganbayan.
However, if the accused was the one who appealed the decision of the CFI convicting him of
homicide (though he was charged of murder), the appellate court may convict him of murder if
the evidence warrants and that the lower court mis-appreciated the evidence. This is so because if
the accused appeals the decision, the same will be subject to a complete re-examination of the
evidence on record.
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, March 2, 2009
FACTS: The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their
house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed
with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel
Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered
Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her children died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime,
appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would
tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already
passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation,
and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental
disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech
and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out
when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were
manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center
examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the
appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
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HELD: No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the
finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very
moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was
presented was proof of appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but
not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had
the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,
Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to
kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total
deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties
will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all
acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a
person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment
the crime was committed.
1-a. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. CA, GR. No. 41859, March 8, 1989
On July 2, 1968, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th
Judicial Region, Branch V, charging herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor
Avila Chua with the crime of estafa, as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between April 1961 to December 31, 1961,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the President and
treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank, located at Surigao, Surigao del Norte,
which is a private development bank organized under the provisions of Republic Act 2081,conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Central Bank of the Philippines and the
Development Bank of the Philippines, banking institutions duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows, to wit: The said Surigao
Development Bank, as such private development bank, began operations on April 19, 1961, in
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1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEAL HAS
JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION ENTIRELY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE DULY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE CONSISTING MAINLY OF DOCUMENTS AND INSTEAD, ADOPT ITS OWN
FINDINGS OF FACT BASED (a) ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURES, (b.) ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND (c) CONTRARY TO THE DOCUMENTS AND
EXHIBITS OF THE CASE, THUS, LEADING IT TO NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO
FORMULATE INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE ABSURD AND
POSITIVELY IMPOSSIBLE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEAL HAS
JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON AN EXHIBIT WHICH WAS
NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, MUCH LESS ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE DURING THE
TRIAL; and,
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS
JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON A DOCUMENT AND
GIVING THE SAME A MEANING COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO ITS CONTENTS THUS
DISTORTING THE CORRECT CONTEXT OF THE SAME.
We rule in the affirmative.
Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of the appellate court on appeals
taken to it, thus:
Section 11. Power of Appellate Court on AppealUpon appeal from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment and increase or
reduce the penalty imposed by the trial, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new
trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review
in order to resolve not only questions of law but also questions of facts. The Court of Appeals
may thus re-examine and re- weigh all the evidence on record and affirm, modify or reverse the
findings of facts and conclusions of the lower court. 11 That its findings of facts or conclusions
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Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the
merits. Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision involved being one
of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to the accused's constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy.
We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the judgment of the
appellate court on the merits. While the petition at bar is denominated a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt with
the jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioners' attack on the appellate court's jurisdiction is
premised on the conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court were based on
conjectures and speculations, or on misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and
exhibits; (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been offered nor admitted in
evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court gave to a document a meaning contrary to its
contents. But how valid and tenable these premises are remains a question. To determine their
validity would entail a review and re- evaluation of the evidence on record as well as the
procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the appellate court; in effect, a review of
the judgment of acquittal, which we cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without violating
the private respondents' constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The argument that the
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because
whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of
error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the
error may be. 20 The rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not
reviewable by a higher court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the
accused in second jeopardy for the same offense.
Moreover, the case of People vs. Ang Cho Kio tells us:
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No error, however flagrant committed by the Court against the State can be reserved by it for
decision by the Supreme Court when the defendant has once been in jeopardy and discharged,
even though the discharge was the result of the error committed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
1-b. P. vs. Montemayor, January 30, 1969, 26 SCRA 687
To state the question raised in this mandamus proceeding is to render evident why the Comment
of Solicitor General Mendoza was quite emphatic as to its being devoid of support in law. The
prosecution in a criminal case for homicide, apparently dissatisfied with the decision of
respondent Judge Jesus B. Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of the First Judicial District
stationed in Tuguegarao, Cagayan convicting private respondent Rodrigo Mamanao of homicide
but finding him entitled to the benefits of incomplete self-defense, there being unlawful
aggression from the victim and no provocation on his part, filed a notice of appeal. More
specifically, the objection was to the penalty imposed of six months and one day and the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased fixed at P4,000.00. Respondent Judge having failed to
honor such notice of appeal, he was sought to be compelled by this petition to comply with what
the prosecution considered "a purely ministerial act."
The petition must fail.
1. It is indeed surprising that Assistant Fiscal Teodoro L. Hernando, who prepared and
signed the petition, 5 could so confidently assert that he could rely on Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court. He completely ignored Section 2 which reads thus: "The People of the
Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all
other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant." 6 He likewise ignored the explicit
ruling in Ang Cho Kio. In People v. Paet, decided two years later, Justice Montemayor, speaking
for the Court reaffirmed such a doctrine: "With the view we take of the propriety and legality of
the appeal, we find it unnecessary to go into the merits of the contention of the parties, although
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it may not be out of place to state that according to the decision of June 10, 1955, as well as the
appealed resolution, the penalty imposed which did not include the confiscation of the amount of
$3,140, was upon the recommendation of the prosecution itself. In the first place, the
confiscation or forfeiture of the above mentioned sum would be an additional penalty and would
amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the accused. To reopen the case for
the purpose of increasing the penalty as is sought in the Governments appeal, would be placing
the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118, section 2 of the Rules of Court, the
Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy."
2. There ought to have been awareness on the part of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Hernando
that on at least two occasions the Ang Cho Kio ruling was sought to be reconsidered, but in each
time it failed. In People v. Pomeroy, the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion, explained
why: "The prosecution in the case at bar urges a reexamination of the question decided in the
Ang Cho Kio cases and a reconsideration of the view therein expressed by this Court. To our
mind, however, the reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in support of his pretense are not
sufficiently weighty to warrant a reversal of said view which is a mere corollary of the practice
established in the Philippines and in the United States, for so long a time as to form part and
parcel, not merely of the settled jurisprudence, but, also, of the constitutional law, in both
jurisdictions." In People v. Arinso, it was the same fate that attended such a move.
3. The tone of confidence quite marked in the petition was most certainly unwarranted.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Hernando and Provincial Fiscal Bello would have been well-advised
had they exerted greater efforts to acquaint themselves with the state of the law. They must ever
keep in mind that decisions of this Court are authoritative and therefore call for deference and
respect. Moreover, as appealed criminal cases, when allowable under existing legal norms, are
handled by the Office of the Solicitor General, it certainly would have been dictated by
prudence, to say the least, if that dignitary were consulted. Then blunders of this kind would
have been avoided. The prosecutors, responsible for this petition would have been spared the
mild reproof implicit in the comment of Solicitor-General Mendoza, arising from their
inadequate grasp of controlling doctrines, especially those of constitutional dimension.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is dismissed. No costs.
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2. P. vs. Ruiz, 81 SCRA 455
- Missing -
3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67
The defendant in this case was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
fraud or infringement of literary rights or property. The information charges substantially that the
defendant, with intent to defraud, and to the prejudice of the complaining witness, the owner of a
certain literary work, a "Reduction Table," feloniously, fraudulently and without authority
copied, printed and reproduced this "Reduction Table" and sold and distributed fraudulent copies
thereof to the damage and prejudice of the complaining witness in the sum of P3,000.
The trial court based its judgment dismissing the information and discharging the defendant on
the ground that no copyright law exists in the Philippine Islands and that the complaining witness
could have no exclusive rights in the pamphlet in question which were subject to violation or
infringement, so as to sustain a conviction. No finding was made as to the alleged facts touching
the reproduction by the defendant of the pamphlet of which ownership is claimed by the
complaining witness.
The allowance of an appeal by the Government would undoubtedly place the defendant twice in
jeopardy in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights, set out in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, as those provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Kepner v. United States (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669).
As indicated in the opinion in that case, the protection afforded by the prohibition against the
putting of any person twice in jeopardy for the same offense, is a protection not merely against
the peril of second punishment, but against being tried a second time for the same offense. In that
case the court expressly held that:
"It follows that Military Order No. 58, as amended by Act of the Philippine Commission, No.194, in so far as it undertakes to permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal, was
repealed by the Act of Congress of July, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for the
same criminal offense."
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But the reasoning of the opinion goes further and denies the right to the Government to procure
the reversal of erroneous proceedings and commence anew, save only in those cases in which the
first proceeding did not create legal jeopardy. So that, without his own consent, a defendant who
has once been brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be again put on trial for
the same offense after the first trial has terminated by a judgment directing his discharge,
whether his discharge be the result of a formal acquittal, or of a ruling of the court upon some
question of law arising at the trial.
This court has frequently held that legal jeopardy attaches in criminal proceedings in this
jurisdiction after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the moment when
the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated, and it is quite clear that the defendant in
this case having been brought to trial after arraignment and plea and all the governments
witnesses having testified on his trial, is entitled to protection against the peril of being again
brought to trial for the offense with which he was charged at that trial and this whether the
rulings of the trial judge on which he based his order discharging the defendant and dismissing
the information were or were not erroneous. (U. S. v. Ballentine, 4 Phil. Rep., 672; U. S. v.
Montiel, 7 Phil. Rep., 272; U. S. v. Gemora, 8 Phil. Rep., 19.)
The appeal entered in this case on behalf of the Government should be dismissed with costs
against the Appellant. So ordered.
4.
P. vs. Ang cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1952, in Mountain Province, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then a passenger of
Philippine Air Line Plane PI-C-38 enroute from Laoag to Aparri while the said plane was flying
over Mountain Province, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without
authority of law, compel Pedro Perlas, pilot of the aforesaid plane, against the latters will and
consent, to change the route of the plane and take him (Accused) to Amoy, and when Pedro
Perlas failed to comply immediately with said order, said accused who was than armed with .45
and .38 caliber pistols, with treachery and known premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shot said Pedro Perlas, thus inflicting gunshot wounds on the
different parts of his (Pedro Perlas) body and as a result thereof said Pedro Perles died instantly.
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Appeal was dismissed on account of double jeopardy.
6. The Supervening Fact Doctrine.
It simply provides that an accuseds conviction shall not be a bar to another prosecution for
an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information
when the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge or that the facts constituting the graver charge became
known only or were discovered after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information.
(Section 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260; P vs. Villasis,
46 O.G. 268; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766; P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712; P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA
462; P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; and P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637
Read:
1. 76 SCRA 469
- Missing -
2. P. vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260
On October 16, 1938, the appellant and his wife (the deceased Inocencia Itok) went to the house
of one Sotera Baroro for the purpose of asking the latter permission to extract oil from some of
her coconuts. Having been granted permission, Inocencia Itok borrowed a bolo with which to
husk the coconuts. When the deceased saw that her husband was not doing anything to help her,
she asked Segundino Itok, son of Sotera Baroro, to assist her in husking the coconuts; whereupon
the appellant told the deceased to give him the bolo as he would do the husking himself. On
receiving the bolo, the appellant turned on his wife and started hacking her, as a result of which
she was wounded in several parts of her body. The appellant was consequently indicted for the
crime of serious physical injuries, to which he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to suffer a
penalty of seven months and one day. While appellant was serving this sentence, Inocencia Itok
died of meningitis which was caused by the infection of the wound on her forehead inflicted by
the appellant; whereupon he was indicted in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros for the
crime of parricide. To this charge the appellant interposed the plea of double jeopardy, but the
lower court found him guilty of the crime as charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate
sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion
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The judgment of the lower court, herein appealed from, is accordingly reversed, and the
information for parricide against the defendant-appellant, Ponciano Tarok, hereby dismissed,
with cost de oficio. So ordered.
3.
P. vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268
- Missing
We would have no alternative to dismiss the present appeal. However, this Court in its recent
decision in the case of Melo vs. People et al. (85 Phil., 974), has already repealed the doctrine
laid down in the Tarok case as contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy as intended by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court and "obnoxious to the administration of justice," and has
reverted to the rule that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offenses and together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense." That rule applies to the present case
where, after the first prosecution for a lesser crime, new facts have supervened which, together
with those already in existence at the time of the first prosecution, have made the offense graver
and the penalty first imposed legally inadequate.
4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
FACTS: Carmelo was charged with frustrated homicide. On arraignment, Carmelo pleaded not
guilty, on the same day the victim died. The information was amended charging Carmelo with
homicide. Carmelo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the amended information constitutes double jeopardy
RULING: No, the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. After
the first prosecution, when new facts supervened, changing the character of the offense which the
accused is responsible for, he cannot be said to have been in double jeopardy.
5. P. vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712
FACTS: Accused was charged with less serious physical injury, wherein he pleaded guilty. After
serving sentence, the wounds inflicted upon the victim did not heal. A complaint was filed
against him for serious physical injury.
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