April 7, 2009 Adam Berg Nancy Hayden Michael Kniss
Oct 30, 2014
April 7, 2009
Adam Berg
Nancy Hayden
Michael Kniss
Country Overview and Background
Conflict in the Congo
Intervention
Current Situation
Lessons Learned
Size 3rd largest population in Africa (66
million) About the size of Western Europe Over 200 ethnic groups
Potential 2nd largest rainforest in the world Large areas of fertile land,
temperate climate, and plentiful rainfall
Rivers and lakes with potential for hydroelectric power
Resources: cobalt, coltan, gold, diamonds, zinc, iron ore, copper
Death 5.4 million deaths since 1998
45,000 deaths a month National mortality rate is 60% higher
than the sub-Saharan average
Rape 300,000 rapes in the past decade
Corruption Highly corrupt: ranked 168 out of
179 by Transparency International
Poverty GNI per capita: $130, 2nd lowest in
the world 74% of the population is
undernourished
Infrastructure 1,500 miles of paved roads (in a
country the size of Western Europe)
Failing Grade Congo is one of three
countries listed as “failed” by the Brookings Institution’s 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
How and why did the state collapse?
Belgian Rule Created by Belgian King
Leopold as a personal colony in 1885
Resources Ivory Rubber Gold
Brutal style of rule Estimated 5-10 million
deaths Belgian government took
control in 1907
Post-Colonial History 1960 – Independence
Democratic Republic of Congo created
DRC’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, is assassinated
5 years of chaos
1965 – Colonel Mobutu takes over Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu becomes a Cold War client of the U.S. Instills sense of national identity – yet Mobutu does little to develop
anything except his personal wealth Authoritarian and repressive regime Renames the country Republic of Zaire Changes his name to Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga
(“The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”).
Cold War Mobutu is propped up
by aid from the U.S. U.S. interested in anti-
communist stance and resources: Copper Gold Diamonds Cobalt
Zaire’s income and services decline, but Mobutu is able to hold onto power.
Post-Cold War Nation slips further into decline as the
West loses interest in Zaire Already notoriously inept army goes
unpaid Ungoverned east
RPF Ends the Genocide Hutu civilians, interahamwe, and
defeated Rwandan soldiers flee to Kivu provinces in Eastern Congo
UNHCR sets up refugee camps Interahamwe ran many of the refugee
camps and refused to allow people to repatriate
Mobutu had strong ties to the deceased Habyarimana regime and saw the refugees as a way to control Eastern Congo and act as a conduit for aid
Rwandan Outrage Interahamwe launch offensives into Rwanda International community did not intervene to stop genocide, but is now
spending millions to shelter perpetrators Rwandan desire for reconciliation with citizens and justice for killers
Foreign Invasion + InsurgencyForeign Invasion + Insurgency
1. Expulsion of Tutsis triggers Congolese to organize under veteran revolutionary Laurent Kabila (AFDL)
2. Rwanda leads AFDL against Mobutu, supported by Uganda, Angola
Rwandan objective: secure border800,000 Hutu refugees return to RwandaHutu “Death March” to Kinshasa
Mobutu regime fallsSeeks Western aid to no avail
3. Kabila proclaimed President
US PolicyBilateral Talks
•Praise for Kabila: “strong start” on reforms •“Shared interests and joint willingness to solve problems.” •$40 million in aid for health programs and infrastructure projects
Instability and Despotism Continues…
Short honeymoon period Alienates potential political supporters
Alienates Mobutu opposition in Kinshasa (NGOs, political parties, civil society)
Refuses to cooperate with international inquiries into fate of Rwandan Hutus in war
Imposes Marxist-style dictatorship Rwandan Tutsi officers offend military
Fails to provide security Ugandan rebels in North Militias re-engage and recruit in East
Fails to establish democratic institutions
1997-2001
1998 Russia/NATO S&T MOU
CombatantsMai-Mai militia Tutsi-aligned Rebel ForcesHutu-Aligned Forces (RCD-G, RCD-ML, MCL)DRC Uganda
Namibia Rwanda
Zimbabwe BurundiAngola Chad
Strength Tutsi-aligned Rebel Forces:
Hutu-Aligned Forces: 10,000 25,000Mai-Mai: 20-30,000 Rwanda: 8000
Congolese: 30,000 Uganda: 3000Angola:4000
Zimbabwe:2000 Casualties
Civilians Killed: 3,500,000+
July 27, 1998 Rwanda military oustedAugust 2,1998 Rwanda and Uganda back rebels against Kabila; form RCD and advance to KinshasaAugust 23, 1998 Angola intervenes for Kabila to stop advanceAugust 1998-August 1999 Stalemate and proliferating rebellionsAugust 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire
July 27, 1998 Rwanda military oustedAugust 2,1998 Rwanda and Uganda back rebels against Kabila; form RCD and advance to KinshasaAugust 23, 1998 Angola intervenes for Kabila to stop advanceAugust 1998-August 1999 Stalemate and proliferating rebellionsAugust 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire
Ceasefire negotiated by regional powers to:
Provide UN mandate Establish three regions of control Demilitarize, disarm, and resettle,
repatriate, and reintegrate “Genius” is that it
Recognized overlapping layers of inter-state and intra-state actors Recognized security concerns of Rwanda & Uganda
Runs counter to established rules that allow legitimate governments to seek and receive military assistance but not rebel movements
Legitimized rebels and sponsors; delegitimized rebels not present at the negotiations
Lacked real support of parties involved
GLOBAL AND INCLUSIVE AGREEMENT ON TRANSITION IN THE DRC
Intended to: End war Facilitate power sharing in transition
government Rebuild national civil institutions Establish election process
Key players Five combatants Regional facilitator: Botswana
Failed to achieve results Rwanda, Uganda withdraw under
separate agreements
Transition government July 2003
Laurent Kabila assassinated 2001
son Joseph installed as president
Motivations
Group Leader Security Political Economic Social
FARDC Kabila army Congo ? +K RCD+ rebel East Congo -K $ MLC+ Bemba rebel North Congo -K $ CNDP Nkunda rebel East Congo X -K,-FDRL $ !
Mai Mai various militia East Congo X <K> $ !FDRL "refugee"
army East Congo -R $
*LRA Kony rebel North Congo -U $
RWANDA army Border X =K $
Uganda army Border X =K $
Zimbabwe army Congo X +K !
Cease Fire and Dialogues Fail East dominated by splinter rebel
groups & militias with shifting alliances who fight for control
Congo forces ineffective – looting Former combatants in integrated
battalions riot frequently Ongoing cross-border raids by
Rwanda Hutu (FDLR) Institutionalized corruptionLucrative rebel/militia trade with
Rwanda & Uganda Endemic poverty and disease
Doctors Without BordersDoctors Without BordersTeam reports horrifying abuse suffered by Congolese diamond miners forcibly driven across the border into the DRC from their homes in mining areas in Angola. In addition to being tortured with fire and machetes during the day, men were forced to perform sexual acts on soldiers while women were raped. Prisons for miners are surrounded by anti-personnel mines to prevent escape, contain between 1000 and 2000 people.
Genocide continuesMutilation and rape are tools of warKidnapping for forced labor, military service, ransomDenial of services, infrastructure, and international aid deprives citizens of basic needs
US/Global Interests Regional Stability
Conflict and war in the Great Lakes region undermines US and EU goals in Africa–stability, anti-terrorism, increased trade, Millennium Development Goals
Resource Wealth The world has much to gain
from stable and just resource extraction
Development and peace decreases the seemingly never-ending regional demand for foreign aid from the US and international community
Humanitarian/Human Rights Credibility 5.4 million deaths, 300,000
rapes, and continuing violence unacceptable by any value judgment
Background and Mandate
The signatories to the July 10, 1999 Lusaka Agreement called for UN peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire and disarm the various militant groups throughout the country (Article III, par. 11.a) UN Security Council agrees to
creation of MONUC on September 30, 1999 (Res. 1279) and approves deployment of 5,537 peacekeepers on February 24, 2000 (Res. 1291)
MONUC 4-Phase Approach Phase I: Implement Ceasefire Phase II: Monitor/Report
Violations Phase III: DDRRR
(Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration)
Phase IV: Facilitate Elections
Challenge of Size Mandate of 5,537 peacekeepers
inadequate for massive size of Congo and termed a “meaningless number” by Rwanda’s UN envoy Joseph Mutaboba African leaders requested
15,000-20,000 troops France advocated 10,000
deployed immediately U.S. Ambassador to UN Richard
Holbrooke and Secretary of Defense William Cohen felt 5,000 troops should be the maximum
Zimbabwe’s foreign minister Stan Mudenge was more direct, asking “Why does the UN act so quickly to [control] conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor but drags its feet when it comes to the DRC, Somalia and Rwanda? One cannot but wonder if the racial composition is the reason.”
Challenge of Scope UN entered conflict under
Lusaka framework Secretary-General Kofi Annan
warned that MONUC represented “the substitution of armed force for the rule of law”
Ceasefire lacked internal legitimacy as signatories used it to pursue their own interests
Laurent Kabila depended heavily on foreign militaries and Inter-Congolese Dialogue threatened monopoly on political power
Rwanda and Uganda kept 10,000-20,000 troops in DRC and funded rebel groups
Security vacuum left by withdrawing foreign forces
Phase III of mandate required broad, assertive operations
Developed countries unwilling to contribute troops (only Sweden)
Challenge of Tactics Lack of infrastructure and
credible central government required UN to bring all supplies in from out of country
Pursuing armed groups and forcing disarmament not seen as credible peacekeeping functions Further complicated by fact
that targets feared returning home and had trouble assimilating
Disarmament inextricably linked with political change
MONUC failed to meet expectations of host populations, thus delegitimizing both Lusaka Agreement and MONUC mandate
Difficulty to control/regulate valuable natural resources
Intrastate nature of conflict required high-level diplomatic pressure
Initial Security Focus Phase I: Advance team sent to pave
way for troop deployments (August 1999) Warring parties exhibited initial
resistance to even the advance team
Phase II: Disengagement - Military observers, humanitarian assistance, and training Congolese police force MONUC infantry battalions
approved to monitor disengagement of front line forces and protect foreign personnel; no active military engagement
Due to continued violence and lack of U.S. support, first troops did not deploy until March 29, 2001; 1,869 by June, 2,408 by October
Phase III: Withdraw foreign forces Accomplished by October 2002 Increased MONUC troop mandate
to fill security vacuum
Unrest in the East Phase IV: DDR - Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration MONUC recognized ethnic
tensions in the Northeast (Ituri), but only positioned 10 military observers
Intense violence spurred by Uganda
Due to unwillingness for robust mandate, Security Council endorsed French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to pacify region (June 5, 2003)
MONUC mandate increased to 10,800 troops and given full force authorization (July 28, 2003)
Phase V: Assist Transitional Government Robust operations against rebel
groups; MONUC soldiers targeted
Increased effectiveness of DDR – Battle in early 2005 encouraged over 13,000 Ituri militia to disarm from April to June
Brief Assessment NEED INTERNAL ACCEPTANCE
OF CEASEFIRE FRAMEWORK! Phased approach intended to
foster positive developments via the threat or “prospect” of intervention Ignored the pressing need for
security forces on the ground and eroded ceasefire legitimacy with extended delays
MONUC achieved very limited, and long-delayed, successes in repatriating foreign forces and demilitarizing Ethnic cleansing opened the
world’s eyes to the need for robust operations
Once MONUC asserted itself, it was relatively effective
Even with robust mandate, confusion of loyalties prevents effective protection of civilians
Lingering Questions If UN/U.S. is unwilling or
unable to intervene in a robust fashion, should regional actors be supported instead?
Empower Rwanda with a mandate to intervene, but then work closely with them to prevent abuses…?
Appropriate role for private sector peacekeepers under IPOA guidelines?
How to regulate natural resources?
Kimberley Process parallel for non-luxury goods in high demand?
December 2008 UN’s “Panel of Experts” publicly
documents Rwandan support for Nkunda/CNDP
Sweden and Holland suspend aid to Rwanda, and the UK threatens to do the same
January/February 2009 Laurent Nkunda arrested by Rwanda
Leader of CNDP - Rwanda’s main proxy in Eastern Congo Nkunda had claimed to be fighting to protect Tutsi in Eastern Congo Nkunda was accused of war crimes and financed his operations
through resources (coltan) Nkunda was becoming a liability for Rwanda
Congo allows Rwandan troops to mount five-week operation to pursue FDLR within Eastern Congo
March 23, 2009 CNDP signs peace agreement
Signing overseen by special envoy Olusegun Obasanjo and head of MONUC CNDP agrees to become political party operating in North Kivu
Questions Remain What was the deal struck with
Rwanda? Arrest of Nkunda Allow Rwanda to operate in Congo DRC stops supporting FDLR CNDP goes from illegal militia to
legitimate political party Why now?
Pressure was mounting on Paul Kagame from donors
Nkunda was not a good proxy: loved media attention and was becoming more brutal
What of the FDLR?
Preventing state failure is in the US/international community’s best interests. Fully developing indigenous
capabilities to provide internal security is necessary before disengagement.
Supporting corrupt leaders for separate security interests undermines indigenous state legitimacy.
Post-Failure Intervention Need internal acceptance of
ceasefire/peace framework. Phased approach or the “prospect” of
intervention inadequate to end violence.
Need for financial decentralization so that central government is not a zero-sum game.
Incentivize rebel soldiers into a national army with higher salaries and offer of stability.
In resource conflict, intervention must address the demand side of commerce. Kimberley Process? SEC
Regulation…
“The more the dead pile up, the more the killers become the focus, the dead only of interest as evidence.”
-Philip Gourevitch
“A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.”
-Joseph Stalin
Francine Murengezi Ingabire Age: 12 Favorite Sport: Swimming Favorite Food: Eggs and Chips Favorite Drink: Milk and Fanta
Tropical Best Friend: Her Elder Sister Claudette Cause of Death: Hacked by Machete