Communication Accommodation Theory - RERO

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Communication Accommodation Theory

A Look Back and a Look Ahead

C I N D Y G A L L O I S

T A N I A O G A Y

H O W A R D G I L E S

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Theories aim to capture the complexityof life in formalized conceptualizations.

As time goes by, our understanding widensand at the same time becomes more precise.Theories undergo a continuous process ofrevising and refining; some disappear and arereplaced by better-adapted ones. Theories arenot only about life, they also have their ownlives. For theories as for people, milestones likethe turn of a century (or a millennium) or thecompletion of decades (see Giles, Mulac,Bradac, & Johnson, 1987) are occasions fora critical reappraisal of accomplishmentsand a look toward the future. As a theorythat has investigated the links between lan-guage, context, and identity for three decades,

communication accommodation theory (CAT)is at a stage where it is timely for a look backat its history, which should help to set theagenda for its future development.

This chapter documents the trajectory ofCAT, which has been particularly (but notsolely) developed in the context of inter-cultural communication since its inceptionin the 1970s. Indeed, it has been reviewedin many intercultural communication textsand handbooks (e.g., Gallois & Callan, 1997;Gudykunst & Kim, 1992; Gudykunst & Lee,2002; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1989; Martin &Nakayama, 2002) as well as in interpersonalcommunication and language texts (e.g., Bull,2002; DeVito, 2004; Holtgraves, 2002;

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Référence complète: Gallois, C., Ogay, T., & Giles, H. (2005). Communication Accommodation Theory: a look back and a look ahead. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.) Theorizing about intercultural communication. (pp. 121-148). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Robinson, 2003) and in general communicationtheory texts more widely (e.g., Littlejohn,2002; Miller, 2002). In addition, its cross-disciplinary impact has moved beyond socialpsychology and communication into hand-books and texts in sociolinguistics (e.g.,Coupland, 1995; Giles, 2001; Giles &Powesland, 1997; see also Meyerhoff, 1998)as well as being adopted to provide explana-tory weight to such linguistic phenomena assemicommunication (Braunmûller, 2002),code switching and mixing (e.g., Bissoonauth& Offord, 2001), language contact and dialectchange (Trudgill, 1986), and hypercorrection(Giles & Williams, 1992).

In our view, CAT is a theory of both inter-group and interpersonal communication,invoking the dual importance of both factorsin predicting and understanding intergroupinteractions (see Gallois & Giles, 1998). Assuch, intercultural encounters provide perhapsthe richest basis for understanding the theory,even though each intergroup context hasits unique characteristics (e.g., Fox, Giles,Orbe, & Bourhis, 2000; Watson & Gallois,2002; Williams, Giles, Coupland, Dalby, &Manasse, 1990). We examine CAT here onthe basis of the different sets of propositionsthat have been formulated since the early1970s (Ball, Giles, Byrne, & Berechree, 1984;Gallois, Franklyn-Stokes, Giles, & Coupland,1988; Gallois, Giles, Jones, Cargile, & Ota,1995; Giles et al., 1987; Street & Giles, 1982;Thakerar, Giles, & Cheshire, 1982). As weshall see, the evolution of CAT’s propositionsduring these three decades raises a number ofissues. The extensive amount of research andtheory development around CAT has madeparsimony a major concern, and, consequen-tially, recent overviews of the theory have beenmore discursive and have not invoked pro-positional formats (see Gallois & Giles, 1998;Giles & Noels, 1997; Giles & Ogay, in press;Giles & Wadleigh, 1999; Shepard, Giles, &Le Poire, 2001). Indeed, working toward thereduced number of propositions in the final

section has been a major challenge. In orderto conserve space and avoid redundancy withother reviews of communication accommo-dation, references to the many experimentalresults that support the theory are in generalleft out of this chapter. Interested readersshould consult the above-mentioned sources,as well as Giles, Coupland, and Coupland(1991) and, for more recent reviews, Shepardand colleagues (2001), Giles and Ogay (inpress), Sachdev and Giles (in press) andWilliams, Gallois, and Pittam (1999).

Background and Foundations

During the 1970s, social psychologists(Giles, 1973, 1977, 1979b; Giles, Taylor, &Bourhis, 1972) laid the foundations of whatwas then named speech accommodation theory(SAT) out of a dissatisfaction with socio-linguistics and its descriptive (rather thanexplanatory) appraisal of linguistic variationin social contexts (see Beebe & Giles, 1984), aswell as to provide the burgeoning study oflanguage attitudes with more theoretical bite(Giles & Powesland, 1975). Street and Giles(1982) put SAT in propositional form for thefirst time, although precursors to this hadalready appeared in the parallel-evolvingethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT; e.g.,Giles, 1978, 1979a; Giles & Johnson, 1981).Thakerar and colleagues (1982) revised thepropositions and restated them. Could theseauthors have imagined then the developmentsthe theory would undergo? Probably not, ifone considers the modest scope of the theory inthe early papers that formulated propositions:

SAT was devised to explain some of themotivations underlying certain shifts inpeople’s speech styles during social encoun-ters, and some of the social consequencesarising from them. More specifically, it orig-inated in order to elucidate the cognitiveand affective processes underlying speechconvergence and divergence. (Thakeraret al., 1982, p. 207)

122 THEORIES FOCUSING ON ADAPTATIONS IN INTERACTIONS


SAT soon generated a plethora of researchand related theories, resulting in an expansionof its scope:

SAT presents a broad and robust basisfrom which to examine mutual influences incommunication, taking account of socialand cognitive factors, and having the scopeto cover the social consequences of speechshifts as well as their determinants and themotivations underlying them. Furthermore,it is applicable to a broad range of speechbehaviors, and nonverbal analyses poten-tially, with the flexibility of relevance atboth interpersonal and intergroup levels.(Giles et al., 1987, p. 34)

The latest presentation of the theory inpropositional form indicates how much thescope of the theory widened in the ensuingyears, exemplified by the change from“speech” to “communication accommodationtheory” (CAT; Giles et al., 1987):

Overall, CAT is a multifunctional theorythat conceptualizes communication in bothsubjective and objective terms. It focuses onboth intergroup and interpersonal featuresand, as we shall see, can integrate dimen-sions of cultural variability. Moreover, inaddition to individual factors of knowledge,motivation, and skill, CAT recognizes theimportance of power and of macro contex-tual factors. Most important, perhaps, CATis a theory of intercultural communicationthat actually attends to communication.(Gallois et al., 1995, p. 127)

SAT was first formulated in order toexplore the sociopsychological parametersunderlying the moves speakers make intheir speech behaviors. Central to it is the ideathat communication is not only a matter ofexchanging referential information, but thatinterpersonal as well as intergroup relation-ships are managed by means of communica-tion. What are the motives and intentionsbehind speakers’ conscious (or nonconscious)

linguistic choices? How do listeners perceivethese choices and react to them?

Production and reception are thus the twobasic facets of communication on which SATfirst examined the original accommodativestrategies of convergence and divergence/maintenance. Convergence is defined as astrategy through which individuals adapt theircommunicative behavior in such a way as tobecome more similar to their interlocutor’sbehavior. Conversely, the strategy of diver-gence leads to an accentuation of differencesbetween self and other. A strategy similar todivergence is maintenance, in which a personpersists in his or her original style, regardlessof the communication behavior of the inter-locutor. Central to the theory is the idea thatspeakers adjust (or accommodate) their speechstyles in order to create and maintain positivepersonal and social identities.

SAT was derived in part from similarity-attraction theory (Byrne, 1971), which positsthat an increase in perceived interpersonalsimilarity results in an increase in interpersonalattraction. Thus, convergence is a strategy thatallows one person to become more similar toanother (or, more precisely, to one’s represen-tation of the other) and therefore presumablymore likeable to him or her. Giles (1978)also invoked Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) socialidentity theory of intergroup relations (SIT),and SAT thereafter has largely (but not solely)relied on the framework of SIT to explainthe motives behind the strategies of divergenceand maintenance. Why should one chooseto appear dissimilar to another? Referring tosimilarity-attraction theory alone would meanthat the motive driving divergence or mainte-nance behaviors would be to appear dislikable,or at least that the speaker’s need for socialapproval is low. Invoking the intergroup con-text, SIT explains the adoption of these strate-gies through the desire to signal a salient groupdistinctiveness so as to reinforce a social identity.

Another fundamental resource for SAT isattribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley,

Communication Accommodation Theory 123


1973), which inspired the propositions on thereception side. How are accommodative strate-gies perceived and evaluated by interlocutors?Attribution theory suggests that we explainand appreciate people’s behavior in terms ofthe motives and intentions that we thinkcaused it: in other words, those to which weattribute the behavior. In general, we evaluatea person who performed a desired behaviormore favorably when we attribute the behaviorto an internal cause (e.g., intention to act inthis way), rather than to an external one (e.g.,situational pressure). Conversely, we evaluatea person who performed an undesirablebehavior less negatively when we attribute thebehavior to an external than to an internalcause (e.g., malevolent intention).

Propositions of SAT andCAT in Historical Perspective

During its development, SAT/CAT hasreceived broad empirical support. As Table 6.1indicates, two phases can be distinguished inthe articles where propositions have beenformulated:

• a first phase (speech accommodation theory)of definition and refinement of the initial setof propositions, focused on the strategies ofconvergence and divergence of speech stylesduring social encounters;

• second phase (communication accommodationtheory), characterized by a major extensionof the focus from the two accommodationstrategies of convergence and divergenceto the whole process of communication ina number of intergroup contexts, alongwith the integration of satellite theoriesdeveloped to account for communicationbetween ethnic groups (Giles & Johnson,1981), second-language acquisition (Beebe& Giles, 1984), and communicationbetween generations (Coupland, Coupland,& Giles, 1991; Williams & Nussbaum,2001).

Furthermore, CAT, along with some ofthe satellite theories, was the foundation forindependent models (themselves subject totheir own later refinements and elabora-tions) in which accommodative processes anddilemmas were embedded within wider socialforces. These models include the communi-cative predicament model of aging (e.g., Ryan,Giles, Bartolucci, & Henwood, 1986), thegroup vitality model (Harwood, Giles, &Bourhis, 1994), the intergenerational con-tact model (Fox & Giles, 1993), the model ofmulticulturalism (Sachdev & Bourhis, 2001),the workplace gender nonaccommodationcycle model (Boggs & Giles, 1999), and thecommunication management effects model ofsuccessful aging (Giles & Harwood, 1997).


Table 6.1 Number of Propositions in Versions of SAT (Phase 1) and CAT (Phase 2)

Authors and Date of Paper Number of Propositions

Phase 1: SAT

Street and Giles (1982) 6

Thakerar et al. (1982) 6 (revision of Street & Giles)

Ball et al. (1984) 6

Giles et al. (1987) 6

Phase 2: CAT

Gallois et al. (1988) 16 (revised, integrates satellite theories)

Gallois et al. (1995) 17


It is now time for a third phase, in whichCAT is consolidated and revised in a clearermanner. Gallois and Giles (1998) notedthat CAT’s focus is most appropriately aroundthe extent to which interlocutors apprehendthe interaction in intergroup or interpersonalterms. Everything else, from motives to strate-gies to actual behavior to evaluations ofbehavior, flows from this. We adopt a similarapproach in this reformulation.

PHASE 1: SPEECHACCOMMODATION THEORY

The first presentation of SAT’s propositionsper se was in Street and Giles (1982), and arevised set appeared in the same year inThakerar et al. (1982). The early propositionsfollow a symmetrical structure for the strate-gies of convergence and divergence/mainte-nance, exploring motives for the strategies andmagnitude on the production side, and evalu-ation of them on the reception side.

Production

• Convergence: People are more likely toconverge toward the speech patterns oftheir recipients when they desire recipients’approval and when the perceived costs fordoing so are proportionally lower than theanticipated rewards.

• Divergence/Maintenance: People are morelikely to maintain their speech patterns ordiverge them away from those of theirinterlocutors’ either when they define theencounter in intergroup terms and desire apositive ingroup identity, or when they wishto dissociate personally from another in aninterindividual encounter.

Magnitude

• Convergence: The magnitude of speechconvergence is a function of the extent ofspeakers’ repertoires and the factors (person-ality and environmental) increasing the needfor approval.

• Divergence/Maintenance: The magnitude ofspeech divergence is a function of the extentof speakers’ repertoires, as well as contextualfactors increasing the salience of group iden-tification and the desire for a positive ingroupidentity, or undesirable characteristics ofanother in an interindividual encounter.

Reception

• Convergence: Speech convergence is posi-tively evaluated by recipients when the resul-tant behavior is perceived to be at an optimalsociolinguistic distance from them and isattributed with positive intent.

• Divergence/Maintenance: Speech mainte-nance and divergence are unfavorably evalu-ated by recipients when they attribute themto negative intent, but favorably evaluatedby observers of the encounter who define theinteraction in intergroup terms and whoshare a common, positively valued groupmembership with the speaker.

Functions of Accommodation

In its early days, SAT explained conver-gence in terms of the need for approval, anddivergence in terms of the need for positivedistinctiveness. Another function of conver-gence and divergence rapidly emerged, how-ever. Thakerar et al. (1982) introduced intothe propositions the idea that accommodationstrategies have not only an affective function(i.e., of identity maintenance), but also a cog-nitive one involving speakers’ organizingtheir output to take account of the require-ments of listeners, and hence facilitatingcomprehension. Thakerar and colleagues men-tioned the cognitive organization function onlyfor convergence, however.

Street and Giles (1982) brought to thepropositions the idea that divergence can alsobe enacted in order to facilitate compre-hension, rather than being only an expressionof the desire to show distinctiveness. Forexample, a bilingual may purposely exag-gerate his or her accent or pretend to have



difficulty in finding words in order to remindhis or her interlocutor that any breaking ofnorms (linguistic, but also interactional andsocial) should be attributed not to intentionbut to the speaker’s foreignness. In othercontexts, divergence can function as a strategicmove to encourage interlocutors to changetheir speech patterns, for instance when thera-pists diverge in their quantity of talk toencourage their patients to talk more. Streetand Giles introduced only this second functionfor divergence in their revised propositions, asdid Giles et al. (1987); the self-handicappingtactic was incorporated without being theo-rized in the propositions (see Gallois & Giles,1998).

Following Thakerar and colleagues (1982),subsequent presentations of SAT added thecognitive goal “attaining communicationalefficiency” to the two original affective goalsof accommodation: “evoking listeners’ socialapproval” for convergence and “maintainingspeakers’ positive social identities” for diver-gence/maintenance. It was not clear, however,whether this new goal should be linked only toconvergence or to both strategies. This ambi-guity can be resolved, as we have done here,by situating more clearly the different goalson the two dimensions of functions of accom-modation introduced by Giles, Scherer, andTaylor (1979)—the cognitive dimension ofcognitive organization and the affectivedimension of identity maintenance:

Cognitive Function:Cognitive Organization

• Convergence: Speaker (S) converges toRecipient’s (R) speech characteristics in orderto facilitate comprehension.

• Divergence/Maintenance: S diverges fromR’s speech characteristics in order to remindR of their nonshared group membershipsand hence prevent misattributions, orS diverges in order to encourage R to adopta more situationally appropriate speechpattern.

Affective Function:Identity Maintenance

• Convergence: S converges to R’s speechcharacteristics in order to appear more simi-lar and thus more likeable.

• Divergence/Maintenance: S diverges from R’sspeech characteristics in order to emphasizedistinctiveness, and thus reinforce S’s positivesense of identity.

Exploring the goals of accommodationleads us to the subjective dimension of com-munication, reflecting interactants’ percep-tions of their own and their counterparts’goals and behaviors in an interaction.Thakerar et al. (1982) investigated the incon-gruity between objective speech (i.e., speech asobserved by an outsider such as the researcher)and its perception by interactants. Theyobserved that, in dyads characterized by statusinequality, high-status participants slowedtheir speech rates and made their accentsless standard, while lower-status speakersincreased rate and produced more standard-ized accents. On objective measures, the dyadswere diverging, but they actually thought thatthey were converging. Lower-status speakersdid not accommodate to the actual speech pat-terns of their partners, but to their stereotypeof high-status speakers talking faster andhaving a more standard accent. ThereforeThakerar and colleagues brought an impor-tant modification to the original propositions,stating that one does not converge toward(or diverge from) the actual speech of therecipient, but toward (from) one’s stereotypesabout the recipient’s speech.

Types of Accommodation

Thakerar et al. (1982), thus, elaborated thedistinction between linguistic accommodation(referring to actual speech behavior) and psy-chological accommodation (referring to speak-ers’ motivations and intentions to converge ordiverge). A further distinction was introduced



by dividing linguistic accommodation into anobjective and a subjective dimension: Whilespeakers’ linguistic shifts can objectively bedescribed as diverging (or converging), speak-ers may believe that they are converging (ordiverging). Thus we can account for cases likethe one above, where linguistic divergence isobserved while interlocutors intend to con-verge and attain psychological integration.Such a mismatch between linguistic and psy-chological accommodation happens in manyrole-defined situations characterized by statusdiscrepancy, like interactions between doctorsand patients, professors and students, or menand women. In cooperative situations involv-ing people of different status, interlocutorsmay contribute through different speech pat-terns to the attainment of a common goal.Social norms in these types of settings require“speech complementarity” (Giles, 1980)rather than convergence. Differences corre-spond to an optimal sociolinguistic distanceand are psychologically acceptable to bothparticipants.

Prior research had mostly assumedequivalence between speakers’ intentions,what they actually do, and what they thinkthey are doing. With these subtle (yet crucial)distinctions, SAT opened up the complexityof communication, underscoring the impor-tance of elucidating both cognitive and affec-tive processes underlying a wide range ofverbal and nonverbal behaviors (Giles et al.,1991; Giles & Wadleigh, 1999). Perhaps mostsignificant, SAT accorded central importanceto the sociopsychological processes of commu-nication, conceptualizing communication as anegotiation of personal and social identities.This affective function of accommodationrepresents the historical core of SAT. It allowspredictions about speakers’ accommodativemoves as a function of the interpersonal orintergroup salience of the interaction forthem—in other words, their perception of howmuch their personal and social identities arecalled into question by the interaction.

Interpersonal andIntergroup Accommodation

Even though convergence leads to an increasein similarity, and divergence to an increasein distinctiveness, it should not be concludedthat convergence is linked only to the inter-personal dimension of communication or thatdivergence is linked only to the intergroupdimension. This would allow for only inter-personal convergence and intergroup diver-gence. It is true that most SAT research ondivergence is about intergroup contexts, asthis strategy is a powerful means for interac-tants to differentiate from relevant outgroupmembers and to reinforce their social identi-ties. Yet both strategies can in principle beeither person-based or group-based, depend-ing on the salience of the interpersonal orintergroup dimensions for the interactants, aswell as their motivation (see Gallois & Giles,1998, for a discussion of this and relatedissues). Gallois et al. (1988) noted, however,that interpersonal and intergroup accommo-dation are likely to involve different behaviors(i.e., personal and group markers, respec-tively).1 Hornsey and Gallois (1998) followedthis issue up empirically in the context ofintercultural communication by examiningevaluations of cultural ingroup (Australian)and outgroup (Chinese) speakers who con-verged to an Australian speaker’s personalstyle, converged to typical Australian speechmarkers, or who diverged from interpersonalor intergroup markers. They found a tendencyfor some evaluators to be more responsive tointerpersonal and others to intergroup conver-gence and divergence.

It is also likely that convergence has oftenbeen considered as interpersonal and diver-gence/maintenance as intergroup becausethese concepts were originally explained byreference to different theoretical frameworks:convergence to similarity-attraction and diver-gence to social identity theory. It is importantto explain these two concepts using the



same theory, because they are theorized aspsychologically opposing strategies. SIT, andthe concepts of social and personal identityin particular, allows for this possibility, butsimilarity-attraction theory probably does not;thus, CAT can be theorized more completelythrough social identity processes.

Reception of Accommodation

On the reception side, early SAT research(e.g., Giles, 1973) found that convergencegenerally evokes positive reactions in its recip-ients and divergence evokes negative reac-tions. According to Street and Giles (1982),“that convergence functions to establish opti-mal speech patterns represents a basic tenetof SAT” (p. 211). Converging speakers havebeen found to be perceived as more com-petent, attractive, warm, and cooperative;convergence is also appreciated by recipientsbecause it means a reduction of the cognitiveeffort they have to provide in the interaction.

Other research has specified the ante-cedent conditions for these evaluations,demonstrating that convergence is not posi-tively evaluated in all situations, and thatdivergence is not always negatively evalu-ated. For example, Simard, Taylor, and Giles(1976) investigated attribution processes inthe evaluation of accommodation strategies.They found that listeners perceived con-vergence favorably when they attributed itto speakers’ intent to break down culturalbarriers (internal attribution of positiveintent), but when speakers attributed theact to situational pressure (external attribu-tion), their reaction was not positive. Conver-sely, when divergence was attributed tosituational pressures, the response to it wasless negative than when divergence was inter-nally attributed, for example to a lack ofeffort on the part of the speaker. In the samevein, Ball et al. (1984) investigated the influ-ence of situational constraints on the evalua-tion of divergence and convergence. Their

results showed that, in a context wherestrong social norms operate (such as a jobinterview), adherence to sociolinguistic normsdetermines the positive or negative evaluationof the speaker, not the display of convergenceor divergence itself (see Gallois & Callan,1997, and Giles & Johnson, 1987, forextended discussions of the role of norms).

The propositions in these papers, thus, statethat convergence is positively evaluated whenit is attributed positive intent, and that diver-gence is negatively evaluated when it is attrib-uted negative intent. These propositions donot indicate how convergence is evaluatedwhen perceived intent is negative, or howdivergence is evaluated when perceived intentis positive. Even so, Street and Giles (1982)argued that we should not conclude that “therelationship between degree of convergenceand positive evaluation is necessarily linear”(p. 212). They named attribution processes aswell as “listeners’ tolerance or preference lev-els for various magnitudes and rates of speechdiscrepancies and adjustments” as moderatingvariables of the evaluation of convergence anddivergence. Furthermore, Ball and colleagues(1984) stated that convergence is negativelyevaluated when “prevailing situational normsdefine the convergent act as a violation ofthem” (p. 126). These papers open up thepotential for the same strategy to be evaluateddifferently in different circumstances, whichbecame a key part of CAT.

The next revision of SAT (Giles et al.,1987) went back to the original structure, stat-ing that convergence is positively evaluatedwhen perceived as adhering to a valued norm,and that divergence is negatively evaluatedwhen perceived as departing from a valuednorm. They noted in the text that “in somecases this sort of divergence that adheres to avalued norm would be expected to producepositive evaluations in fact. Similarly, conver-gence that departs from a valued norm shouldproduce attenuated positive or even negativeevaluations” (p. 39). Overall, the thrust has



been that both convergence and divergence/maintenance can involve affective as well ascognitive functions, and that both can beattributed internally (to a positive or a negativeintent) or externally, so that both can lead topositive or negative evaluations—perceptionsand attributions are privileged over actualbehavior. Nevertheless, statements of thepropositions have maintained the originalform. In this chapter, we address this issue byfirst stating the general tendency to evaluateconvergence positively and divergence nega-tively, and then specifying the moderatingvariables (or “conflicting variables”; Gileset al., 1987, p. 39) that may change the valenceof these evaluations.

Furthermore, the propositions in SAT men-tion only internal attributions (to a positive ornegative intent) and not external attributions(to situational pressures), as investigated bySimard et al. (1976; see also Ball et al., 1984;Gallois & Callan, 1991). SAT and CAT havetheorized the role of norms as constraintsto accommodative processes, but social and

situational norms and pressures have not yetreceived the attention they deserve. Table 6.2illustrates the diversity of possible attributions(and, therefore, evaluations) for convergenceand divergence/maintenance.

Other research has also investigated theerrors in attribution processes. This researchshows that we do not attribute meaning objec-tively to the behaviors we evaluate, but thatattributions are biased. The “fundamentalattribution error” describes our tendency tooverestimate the influence of internal factors(personality, effort, intent) over external ones.The “ultimate attribution error” (Hewstone,1990) adds intergroup processes to the attri-butional biases. If we are interacting withingroup members, we tend to attribute theirdesirable behaviors to internal factors andtheir undesirable behaviors to external ones(situational constraints). Conversely, whenwe interact with outgroup members, we tendto attribute their desirable behaviors to exter-nal factors, and their undesirable behaviorsto internal ones. The assumption of SAT is


Table 6.2 Attributions and Evaluations of Convergence and Divergence/Maintenance

Internal Attribution by Recipient R of Speaker S External Attribution by R

Convergence

Divergence/maintenance

Benevolent Intent by Se.g., R thinks that S isconverging because Swants them to becomefriends.

Positive evaluation e.g.,R thinks that S isdiverging/maintainingbecause S wants toremind R that this isnot S’s mother tongue(perceived self-handicapping strategyby S).

Positive evaluation

R Situational Constraintse.g., R thinks that S isconverging because ofsocial role and is forcedto do so.

Less positive/negativeevaluatione.g., R thinksthat S is diverging/maintaining because S hasnot had an occasion tolearn how to behaveappropriately in anotherculture.

Less negative evaluation

Malevolent Intent by Se.g., R thinks that S isconverging because S ismaking fun of R’saccent.

Negative evaluatione.g., R thinks that S isdiverging/maintainingbecause S wants toshow disdain ordisinterest in theinteraction

Negative evaluation


that convergence in general reflects desirablebehavior and divergence/maintenance undesir-able behavior, so that the integration of theultimate attribution error leads to the followingattributions: convergence by ingroup membersattributed internally to benevolent intent;convergence by outgroup members attributedexternally to situational constraints (and thus asless desirable); divergence by outgroup membersattributed internally to malevolent intent; diver-gence by ingroup members attributed externally(and thus as less undesirable).

From SAT to CAT

In their 1987 paper, Giles et al. assessed thefirst decade of SAT and presented a reformu-lation of its propositions in light of recentresearch, renaming the theory communicationaccommodation theory (CAT). As can be seenfrom Table 6.3, the propositions still followedthe original structure, with the exception ofthe order of presentation.

These revised propositions introduce theprocesses of self-presentation and impressionmanagement (see Baumeister, 1982, 1993;Giles & Street, 1994) as another theoreticalresource. Indeed, the production and receptionof language behaviors can be understoodin terms of the image that individuals want toconvey to others. According to self-presentationtheory, communication is a process by whichindividuals manage the impressions they makeon others, attempting in particular to create apositive impression on socially influential others(e.g., by adopting speech features, like deeppitch, fast speech rate, standard accent, thatsocial knowledge associates with competence).This positive impression is crucial for the acqui-sition and maintenance of social power andinfluence, and hence for positive self- andgroup-esteem (see Ng & Bradac, 1993).

A comparison of these revised propositionsto the first set shows how much subtler, and atthe same time broader, the theory had become.Speech and linguistic features are no longer the

only focus of the theory, which progressivelyhas grown into a theory of communication. Asignificant number of new theoretical conceptshave been inserted into the six original propo-sitions. Furthermore, proposals for furtherresearch and refinements abound in the papersreviewed so far, which would lead to evenmore complex propositions. As Giles et al.stated, the challenge for SAT in 1987 was

whether or not SAT can be expanded com-fortably to accommodate more and morecomplexity in its propositional format. Atthe same time, another challenge thatwill have to be met involves explaining thisincreased propositional complexity in termsof a parsimonious and unique set of integra-tive principles. (p. 41)

In the next section, we consider how thenewly named CAT managed these challenges.

PHASE 2: COMMUNICATIONACCOMMODATION THEORY

Since 1987, CAT has been expanded intoan interdisciplinary model of relational andidentity processes in interaction (Coupland &Jaworski, 1997, pp. 241-242). It has beenapplied to communication between differentsocial groups (cultures, generations, genders,abilities) and within and between organi-zations, in face-to-face interactions, as well asthrough different media (radio, telephone,e-mail, etc.), in different countries, and byresearchers of diverse cultural and languagebackgrounds (for a review of this variety, seeGiles & Ogay, in press). In particular, com-munication between generations (Coupland,Coupland, Giles, & Henwood, 1988; Fox &Giles, 1993), along with communicationbetween cultures and linguistic groups (Galloiset al., 1988; Gallois et al., 1995), has beensignificantly considered in the theoreticaldevelopment of CAT (in the further areaof intergender communication, see Abrams,Hajek, & Murachver, in press, for a review).




Table 6.3 SAT/CAT’s Revised Propositions (after Giles et al., 1987)

Production

Reception

Convergence

1. Speakers attempt to converge toward the speechAND NONVERBAL PATTERNS believed to becharacteristic of their message recipients, BE THELATTER DEFINED IN INDIVIDUAL,RELATIONAL, OR GROUP TERMS, whenspeakers: (a) desire recipients’ social approval(and the perceived costs of acting in an approval-seeking manner are proportionally lower than theperceived rewards); (b) desire a high level ofcommunicational efficiency; (C) DESIRE A SELF-,COUPLE-, OR GROUP PRESENTATIONSHARED BY RECIPIENTS; (D) DESIREAPPROPRIATE SITUATIONAL OR IDENTITYDEFINITIONS; WHEN THE RECIPIENTS’ (E)ACTUAL SPEECH IN THE SITUATIONMATCHES THE BELIEF THAT THE SPEAKERSHAVE ABOUT RECIPIENTS’ SPEECH STYLE;(F) SPEECH IS POSITIVELY VALUED, THATIS, NONSTIGMATIZED; (G) SPEECH STYLE ISAPPROPRIATE FOR THE SPEAKERS AS WELLAS FOR RECIPIENTS.

2. The magnitude of such convergence is a functionof: (a) the extent of speakers’ repertoires, and (b)individual, RELATIONAL, SOCIAL, andcontextual factors that may increase the needs forsocial comparison, social approval, and/or highcommunicational efficiency.

5. Convergence is positively evaluated by messagerecipients, THAT IS, WILL LEAD TO HIGHRATINGS FOR FRIENDLINESS,ATTRACTIVENESS, AND SOLIDARITY whenrecipients PERCEIVE (A) A MATCH TO THEIROWN COMMUNICATIONAL STYLE; (B) AMATCH TO A LINGUISTIC STEREOTYPEFOR A GROUP IN WHICH THEY HAVEMEMBERSHIP; (c) the speaker’s convergence tobe optimally distant sociolinguistically, AND TOBE PRODUCED AT AN OPTIMAL RATE,LEVEL OF FLUENCY, AND LEVEL OFACCURACY; (d) the speaker’s style to adhere toa valued norm; ESPECIALLY WHEN (E)PERCEIVED SPEAKER EFFORT IS HIGH; (F)PERCEIVED SPEAKER CHOICE IS HIGH; (g)perceived intent is altruistic or benevolent.

Divergence / Maintenance

3. Speakers attempt to maintain theircommunication patterns, or even divergeaway from their message recipients’SPEECH AND NONVERBALBEHAVIORS when they (A) DESIRE TOCOMMUNICATE A CONTRASTIVESELF-IMAGE; (b) desire to dissociatepersonally from the recipients or therecipients’ definition of the situation; (c)define the encounter in intergroup orrelational terms WITHCOMMUNICATION STYLE BEING AVALUED DIMENSION OF THEIRSITUATIONALLY SALIENT IN-GROUPOR RELATIONAL IDENTITIES; (d)desire to change recipients’ speechbehavior, for example, moving it to amore acceptable level; WHENRECIPIENTS (E) EXHIBIT ASTIGMATIZED FORM, THAT IS, ASTYLE THAT DEVIATES FROM AVALUED NORM, WHICH IS (F)CONSISTENT WITH SPEAKERS'EXPECTATIONS REGARDINGRECIPIENT PERFORMANCE.

4. The magnitude of such divergence is afunction of (a) the extent of the speakers’repertoires, and (b) individual,RELATIONAL, SOCIAL, and contextualfactors increasing the salience of thecognitive and affective functions in (3)above.

6. Divergence is negatively rated byrecipients when they perceive (A) AMISMATCH TO THEIR OWNCOMMUNICATIONAL STYLE; (B) AMISMATCH TO A LINGUISTICSTEREOTYPE FOR A GROUP INWHICH THEY HAVE MEMBERSHIP;(C) THE SPEAKER’S DIVERGENCE TOBE EXCESSIVELY DISTANT,FREQUENT, FLUENT, ANDACCURATE; (d) the speaker’s style todepart from a valued norm; especiallywhen (E) PERCEIVED SPEAKEREFFORT IS HIGH; (F) PERCEIVEDSPEAKER CHOICE IS HIGH; (g)perceived intent is selfish or malevolent.

NOTE: The additions by Thakerar et al. (1982) are italicized; those by Street and Giles (1982) are underlined; theadditions inspired by Ball et al. (1984) are in bold font; and those by Giles et al. (1987) are in SMALL CAPS.

McLaughlin, M., Communication Yearbook 10, pp. 13-48, ©1987 by Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted by Permissionof Sage Publications, Inc.


Working in the intergenerational context,Coupland and colleagues (1988) replaced theoriginal structure of SAT’s propositions witha model of the communication process as apath, starting with the psychological orienta-tions of speakers; going through their goalsand sociolinguistic strategies; and endingwith evaluations of the interaction, which aredynamically related to orientations in subse-quent encounters. This model was taken upagain by Gallois et al. (1988), who developedCAT for the context of intercultural commu-nication, and also incorporated propositionsfrom ELIT (Giles & Johnson, 1981, 1987).In 1995, a second elaboration of CAT waspresented (Gallois et al., 1995).

In the vast literature produced withinCAT’s framework, the two papers by Galloisand colleagues in 1988 and 1995 are the onlypublications to continue the task of developingCAT’s propositions, although a number ofother papers present formal models of theaccommodation process, particularly in thecontexts of health, emotions, and intergener-ational communication (e.g., Williams et al.,1990). By problematizing issues of miscom-munication and sociopsychological processesin communication, CAT is especially relevantto the study of intercultural communicationand represents an alternative to the approachof communication effectiveness (see Gallois &Giles, 1998). Moreover, cultural groups (orgroups with different linguistic codes oraccents) were the most frequent ones studiedin the early days of the theory; from the start,this gave SAT and CAT an intercultural flavor.

Figure 6.1 presents the full CAT model,incorporating concepts and variables fromall its variants. As can be seen, intergroupencounters are theorized as occurring in asociohistorical context, which is a key influ-ence on the initial orientation of speakers totreat each other in intergroup terms, inter-personal terms, or both. This part of themodel shows the influence of SIT and ELIT.In the immediate interaction situation, whichis governed by norms that may enhance or

inhibit accommodative moves, speakers take apsychological accommodative stance, depend-ing upon the salience of affective or cognitivemotives and social or personal identities. Asthe interaction proceeds, their addressee foci,strategies, behavior, and tactics change as afunction of changing identity salience and thebehavior of the other speaker, as well as oftheir perceptions and attributions about theother’s behavior. Finally, speakers take theirevaluations of the other person and the inter-action away with them, leading to futureintentions about interactions with the other ormembers of his or her ingroup.

It is worth asking whether this modelshould really be constrained to interculturalcontexts alone. Indeed, the “interculturalness”of the model is limited to the dimension ofindividualism- collectivism, all other variablesbeing applicable in other intergroup contexts.Individualism-collectivism describes the rela-tive importance attached by a cultural groupto the individual versus the group (e.g.,Triandis, 1995). According to Gallois andcolleagues (1995), individualism-collectivismhelps to characterize the strength and exclu-siveness of identification with ingroups.Collectivists belong to few ingroups and sharestrong beliefs about ingroup identification andloyalty, whereas individualists belong to manyingroups and have weaker beliefs about iden-tification and loyalty. Collectivists emphasizegroup identity and thus tend to make sharperdistinctions between ingroup and outgroup. Incontrast, individualists value group identitiesless and personal identity more. They havemultiple and changing group identifications,and make more interpersonal than intergroupcomparisons.

These characterizations of individualistsand collectivists have implications for thestudy of communication accommodationprocesses. For example, individualists mayreact to convergence from outgroup interlocu-tors in a relatively positive manner, and con-verge toward outgroup speakers reciprocallyas well. With softer intergroup boundaries,




Sociohistorical Context• History of intergroup relations• Vitality and status of groups• Intergroup boundaries• Stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations• Societal norms for intergroup contact• Cultural values

Individual A

Initial Orientation

• Perception of sociohistorical context• Strength of identification with ingroups• Perception of potential for conflict and threat from outgroups• Interpersonal relationship history• Personal values

Individual B

Initial Orientation

• Perception of sociohistorical context• Strength of identification with ingroups• Perception of potential for conflict and threat from outgroups• Interpersonal relationship history• Personal values

Immediate Interaction Situation

NORMS

Psychologicalaccommodation

Salience of personalidentities

Affectivemotives

Cognitivemotives

Salience of socialidentities


Salience of personalidentities

Affectivemotives

Cognitivemotives

Salience of socialidentities

Addressee fociand

accommodationstrategies

Evaluation Evaluation

Future intentions tointeract

and accommodate

Future intentions tointeract

and accommodate

Addressee fociand

accommodationstrategiesPerceptions

Attributions

BehaviorTactics

Figure 6.1 Full Model of Communication Accommodation Theory, Containing All Variables FromPrevious Versions of the Model


their thresholds for allowing linguisticpenetration by outgroup members may belower. Conversely, people from collectivisticcultures, who perceive harder intergroupboundaries, may react to attempts at commu-nicative convergence from outgroup membersmore negatively, and diverge from them moreif they perceive the convergence as overstep-ping a valued cultural or national boundary.In general, speakers from collectivistic culturesare likely to diverge more from outgroup inter-locutors, both psychologically and linguisti-cally, than their individualistic counterparts(Gallois et al., 1995; see Giles, 1979a, for theintroduction of the ethnic boundary model).

The dimension of individualism-collectivismis centrally interesting and important to intercul-tural communication. Nevertheless, other con-cepts in the theory can probably do the samework as this variable, in a more generic way. Forexample, to characterize how individuals relateto their ingroups, both the 1988 and 1995 ver-sions of CAT refer to dependence on the ingroup(available alternatives for ingroup identification;cf. Giles & Johnson, 1981) and solidarity with it(strength of identification to the ingroup andsatisfaction with it). More generally, the con-cepts of social categorization and comparisonprocesses, personal and social identity, and per-meability and softness of group boundaries havealready been integrated in CAT and can proba-bly incorporate individualism and collectivism.This would be compatible with Gallois andGiles’s (1998) presentation of CAT as “a sys-tematic attempt to take account of intergroupand interpersonal variables, at macro andmicro levels, in accounting for behavior in inter-group interactions” (pp. 157-158).2 This is notto deny how central intercultural communica-tion is to CAT, however, both as a key contextof intergroup encounters and as the most fullydeveloped context of the theory.

According to Shepard et al. (2001), whileresearchers first tended to apply CAT to awide range of contexts, they are now formu-lating “specific context-driven theories using

basic CAT propositions” (p. 41). Gallois andGiles (1998) noted that

CAT has become very complex, so that thetheory as a whole probably cannot be testedat one time. This means that researchersusing CAT must develop mini-theories tosuit the contexts in which they work, whileat the same time keeping the whole of thetheory in mind. (p. 158)

Given the complexities of CAT’s history, itis not crystal clear what “basic CAT proposi-tions” (Shepard et al., 2001) or the “whole ofthe theory” (Gallois & Giles, 1998) refer to. Forexample, Gallois et al. (1988; Gallois et al.,1995) adopted the hierarchical conceptualstructure proposed by Coupland et al. (1988).Accommodation is the big picture; when peoplewant to accommodate, they use “attuningstrategies.” There are four strategies: inter-pretability, discourse management, interper-sonal control, and approximation; Giles et al.(1991) suggested two more—emotional expres-sion or relationship-maintenance strategiesand face-related strategies—that have recentlybegun to be studied. Under the approximationstrategy, we find the original convergence,divergence, maintenance, and speech comple-mentarity. This structure and the underlyingterminology are not always represented consis-tently in texts and propositions, however. Weattempt in this chapter to make the language ofCAT more consistent and clear.

Overall, it seems timely to consider theachievements made so far in order to producea revised set of propositions that can be con-sidered as the general theory, and to whichspecific context-driven subtheories can berelated. A general cross-contextual theory iseven more important because theories focusedon specific contexts entail the risk of consider-ing one group membership (culture, genera-tion, gender) on its own, thereby overlookingthe multiplicity of identities that are negotiatedthrough communication (Gallois & Giles,1998; Gallois & Pittam, 1996).



TOWARD PHASE 3

This final section moves from the issuesdiscussed above into a revised formulation ofCAT. The challenge is to formulate proposi-tions that respect the principle of parsimony asmuch as possible, while making allowance forthe richness of research findings. The revisedmodel is presented in Figure 6.2. Like previousmodels, it situates intergroup encounters in asociohistorical context. This version highlightsintergroup and interpersonal history, alongwith norms and values. The model features aninteraction between two individuals, includingwhat they bring into the interaction (their

initial orientation) and what they take out ofit (their evaluations and future intentions forthe partner and his or her social group). Withinthe norm-constrained immediate interactionsituation, speakers derive a psychologicalaccommodative stance, including the aspects ofthe interlocutor they are attending to (previ-ously called addressee focus), which influencesthe accommodative and nonaccommodativestrategies they adopt. We posit that behaviorand tactics happen in a dynamic environment,influenced by the other’s behavior as well aschanging motives and identities. In addition,behavior leads to perceptions of the interlocu-tor and attributions about his or her motives,


• Intergroup history• Interpersonal history• Societal/cultural norms and values

NORMS

Individual B

Initial orientation

• Intergroup• Interpersonal


• Accommodative• Nonaccommodative

Strategies

EvaluationsFuture intentions

Perceptions Attributions

Behavior Tactics

Individual A


• Accommodative• Nonaccommodative

Strategies

Initial orientation

• Intergroup• Interpersonal

EvaluationsFuture intentions

Immediate Interaction Situation

Sociohistorical Context

Figure 6.2 Revised Model of Communication Accommodation Theory as a General Theory ofIntergroup Communication


which in turn influence evaluations and futureintentions. In our view, this revised modelforegrounds the key variables in CAT, leavingother variables for more specific contexts.

The present version of CAT is formulatedas a general framework for intergroup com-munication. Specific contexts generate sub-theories within CAT, for example forintergenerational (Coupland et al., 1988;Giles, Coupland, Coupland, & Williams,1992) or organizational (Gardner, Paulsen,Gallois, Callan, & Monaghan, 2001) commu-nication. As such, CAT highlights the fact thatintergroup encounters are never exclusively orpermanently intercultural, intergenerational,or other per se, but that different group member-ships may become salient during the sameencounter and may affect the communicationprocess.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,1979) remains the major theoretical referencefor CAT, along with attribution theory(Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1990; Kelley,1973). Reference to the similarity-attractionhypothesis (Byrne, 1971), which inspired ear-lier formulations, has been left out, as theperception of intergroup and interpersonalsimilarity and distinctiveness has since devel-oped into an important topic within socialidentity theory (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Jetten,Spears, & Manstead, 1999). In addition, wehave omitted references to anxiety/uncertaintymanagement theory (e.g., Gudykunst, 1995),which also influenced earlier versions of CAT.

Assumptions

CAT is based on three general assump-tions (A):

A.1: Communicative interactions areembedded in a sociohistorical context.

As stressed by sociolinguists (e.g., Gumperz,1992), communication never occurs in avacuum, but within a sociohistorical context.The influence of context on communication

operates at two levels: a direct influencethrough the opportunities for intergroup con-tact that are provided, and, more importantfor CAT, an indirect influence by means ofinteractants’ perceptions of the context. Arange of macro-level factors delineates theintergroup power configuration reflected inthe interaction:

• History of relations between the groups withwhich interactants identify;

• Vitality of these groups (Giles, Bourhis, &Taylor, 1977). A group’s vitality is influencedby three structural factors: status (in terms ofeconomic and sociocultural prestige), demog-raphy, and the institutional support enjoyedby the group. Giles et al. call vitality “thatwhich makes a group likely to behave asa distinctive and active collective entity inintergroup situations” (p. 308).

• Permeability (or impermeability) of inter-group boundaries (see Giles, 1979a); and

• Stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations(see Giles, 1978).

Along with the value priorities of theculture (for a review of cross-cultural researchon values, see Smith & Schwartz, 1997), thesefactors contribute to the establishment ofsocietal norms for intergroup contact thatspecifies with whom, when, and how it isappropriate to interact. In particular, societieswhere two or more ethnolinguistic groups ofunequal vitality are in contact tend to establishnorms regarding bilingualism, diglossia, andcode-switching.

A.2: Communication is aboutboth exchanges of referentialmeaning and negotiation ofpersonal and social identities.

This assumption refers directly to theorigin of CAT (Giles, 1973). Giles pointedto the affective as well as cognitive functionsof communicative behavior. Personal andsocial identities are negotiated throughout thecommunication process, whereby interactants



regulate the social distance between themselves.As formulated in social psychology by Brewer(1991; Brewer & Roccas, 2001) and in inter-cultural communication by Ting-Toomey(1993), interactants strive for a compromisebetween two antagonistic identity needs: theneed for assimilation (or, in Ting-Toomey’sterms, desire to belong) and the need for differ-entiation (desire for uniqueness).

A.3: Interactants achieve theinformational and relational functionsof communication by accommodatingtheir communicative behavior, throughlinguistic, paralinguistic, discursive,and nonlinguistic moves, to theirinterlocutor’s perceived individualand group characteristics

Accommodation is the process throughwhich interactants regulate their communica-tion (adopting a particular linguistic code oraccent, increasing or decreasing their speechrate, avoiding or increasing eye contact, etc.)in order to appear more like (accommodation)or distinct from each other (nonaccommo-dation, including counter-accommodationthrough divergent or hostile moves, under-accommodation through maintenance andunempathetic moves, and over-accommodationthrough oftentimes patronizing or ingratiatingmoves). These processes occur at the levelof communicative behavior per se (termed“linguistic accommodation” by Thakerar etal., 1982), as well as at the psychological level(speakers’ motivations and perceptions). Thetwo levels may not coincide, for example, insituations characterized by status discrepancyrequiring complementarity (cf. Giles, 1980). Inaddition, objective linguistic accommodationdoes not always equate to subjective linguisticaccommodation (as perceived by interactants;Giles et al., 1991). This distinction highlightsthe importance of interactants’ perceptions,which are privileged in CAT. Interactantshave expectations regarding optimal levels ofaccommodation, based on stereotypes about

outgroup members as well as prevailing socialand situational norms.

Scope of CAT

These assumptions help to describe thescope of the theory: what CAT does, and whatsupplementary theory CAT relies on. First,CAT theorizes communication (and thenceaccommodation) as motivated. The motiva-tion in a specific communicative encountermay be intergroup, interpersonal, both (seeGiles & Hewstone, 1982), or neither (althoughthe latter two are not included in the proposi-tions below), and is influenced by the socio-historical context and more directly by theinitial orientations of participants.

Second, CAT theorizes accommodativestrategies, motivated by initial orientationand the salience of particular features ofthe interaction like the desire to appear similaror identify, to be clearly understood and tounderstand, to maintain face, to maintain therelationship, to direct the flow of discourse,and to maintain interpersonal control. Likeinitial orientation, accommodation is in parta function of the context, salient societaland situational norms, and salient behaviors.Overall, motivation and perceptions areprivileged over behavior as measured by out-side observers. Even so, behavior is importantbecause it is a major influence on the percep-tions of recipients, which lead to attributionsfor behavior, evaluations of the other personand the encounter, and future intentionstoward the other person and his or her group(see Figures 6.1, 6.2).

CAT allows for the role of conver-sational tactics—the ongoing behavioralmoves that are driven by norms, the behaviorof others, and so forth. This means that thereis no one-to-one correspondence betweenstrategy and behavior, or between behaviorand evaluation (Gallois et al., 1995; Jones,Gallois, Callan, & Barker, 1999). In addition,motivation and accommodative strategies canchange throughout the course of an interaction



as a consequence of behavior or tactics(Gallois & Giles, 1998, give examples of suchchanges in terms of accommodative dilem-mas). Overall, there is a cycle beginning withinitial orientation and progressing through aninteraction to future intentions, which influ-ence initial orientation in the next iteration.

This scope is large, but many processes areinevitably left out and must be described byother theories. First, it is important to have awell-developed theory of social norms or rules.CAT theorizes norms as part of the societal andsituational context, taking them as read butemphasizing that intergroup and interpersonalhistories and initial orientation influence toler-ance about their application. Norm theoriesshould themselves deal with social rules as afunction of the group memberships of interac-tants. Second, CAT relies on a thorough taxon-omy of verbal and nonverbal behavior, in termsof both function and meaning. CAT assumesthe existence of intergroup and interpersonalcommunicative markers, which have differentimpacts, but the task of describing these is left toother theory and research. Finally, CAT reliescrucially on attribution theory. CAT deals withattributions as moderators (e.g., evaluation ofbehavior is exaggerated when attributions areinternal; behavior is attributed more favorablywhen the other is an ingroup member).

Propositions

The propositions (P) below account forthe process of communication accommoda-tion in an intergroup encounter. They are writ-ten with reference to Speaker A and Partner B;of course, from B’s perspective, A is the part-ner. Encounters take place in a context thatincludes a salient intergroup history involvinggood or bad relations, social equality orinequality, and so forth. The context may beone of permeable or less permeable bound-aries, and an intergroup status that is per-ceived to be more or less stable and legitimate.The context also includes salient cultural values.Further, there is an interpersonal history

involving anything from no previous interactionto a long-term relationship of intimacy orenmity, and including salient personal valuesand identities. Thus, in the encounter, individ-uals are predisposed to a more intergroup ormore interpersonal orientation to each other.

Initial Orientation. This part of the modelconcerns the extent to which A is predisposedto have an intergroup or interpersonal orien-tation toward B, and thus with A’s motivationto accommodate or not to perceptions of B’spersonal and group characteristics.

P.1: A speaker A ispredisposed to havean intergroup orientationtoward interacting with apartner B, and be motivatedtoward nonaccommodation with B’sperceived group characteristics when:

• There is a salient negative intergroup historybetween A’s and B’s ingroups AND

• A identifies strongly with one or fewingroups and perceives this ingroup’s vitalityto be low or makes insecure social compar-isons with B’s group OR

• A has had an earlier negative interactionwith another member of B’s group whomA perceived as typical of B’s group.

However,

A is predisposed to have anintergroup orientation but bemotivated to accommodate to B’sperceived group characteristics when:

• A is a member of a subordinate group withwhich A identifies weakly, perceives thegroup’s vitality to be low and intergroupboundaries to be soft, and perceives inter-group relations to be legitimate and stable OR

• A is a member of a dominant ingroup withhigh subjective vitality and perceives inter-group relations as legitimate and stable OR

• A has had an earlier positive interaction witha member of B’s group whom A perceived astypical of B’s group.



P.2: A speaker A is predisposedto have an interpersonal orientationtoward interacting with a partner Band be motivated to accommodate to B’sperceived personal characteristics when:

• A and B share a positive interpersonal historyAND

• A identifies weakly with salient ingroups orthere are no salient ingroups.

However,

A is predisposed to have aninterpersonal orientation but bemotivated toward nonaccommodation withB’s perceived personal characteristics when:

• A and B share a negative interpersonal rela-tionship history.

Psychological Accommodation. Here, weenter the interaction itself. Speaker A’s initialorientation is transformed into A’s immediateand ongoing intention to accommodate or notto B, through A’s experience of the interaction.A’s psychological accommodation is shapedby A’s perception of the salience of personaland social identities in the interaction and byA’s conversational motives. Perceived situa-tional norms for contact and accommodation,as well as norms for other salient roles orgroup memberships, place constraints on theforms accommodation can take (Ball et al.,1984; Gallois & Callan, 1991).

Both the cognitive motive of facilitatingcomprehension and the affective motive of iden-tity maintenance or development correspond toa dialectic about the amount of distance (or dif-ference) to be expressed through communi-cation. On the cognitive side, comprehensionmay be facilitated by either increasing similarity(e.g., adopting the same language), or in othersituations by increasing dissimilarity (e.g., exag-gerating one’s foreign accent). On the affectiveside, identity maintenance or development canbe attained either by trying to assimilate to theother (and thus be recognized as an intimate oringroup member), or by trying to differentiate

from the other (and thus gain a positive sense ofidentity based upon comparisons with B or B’sgroups). The relative importance of cognitiveand affective motives in determining psycho-logical accommodation is especially significantwhen they do not coincide; for example, whenthe aim of facilitating comprehension requiresemphasizing similarity but the aim of identitymaintenance requires differentiation.

P.3: When A perceivesthat personal identities are salientin the interaction, A’s psychologicalaccommodation is directed at theperceived personalcharacteristics of B;

Whereas,

When A perceives that social identities aresalient in the interaction, A’s psychologicalaccommodation is directed at theperceived group characteristics of B.

P.4: When A has an intergroup orientation,A is likely to perceive narrower, moreconstraining norms for the behavior ofoutgroup members and wider, moretolerant norms for ingroup behavior;

Whereas,

When A has an interpersonal orientation,A is likely to perceive similar norms foringroup and outgroup members.

P.5: When affective motives predominatefor A in the interaction, and A feels aneed for assimilation, A is likely toaccommodate psychologically even atthe cost of facilitating comprehension;

However,

When affective motivespredominate for A but A feels aneed for differentiation, A is likely tononaccommodate psychologically, evenat the cost of facilitating comprehension.



P.6: When cognitive motivespredominate for A in the interaction,and A feels that comprehension would befacilitated through increasing similaritywith B, A is likely to accommodatepsychologically, even at the cost ofidentity maintenance or development;

However,

When cognitive motives predominate forA and A feels that comprehension wouldbe facilitated through differentiating fromB, A is likely to nonaccommodatepsychologically, even at the cost ofidentity maintenance or development.

P.7: In a status-stressing situation, A islikely to accommodate psychologicallyto the sociolinguistic markers andbehavior of the dominant group.

Focus, Accommodative Strategies, and Behavior.The motivational force of psychologicalaccommodation leads to the adoption of com-municative strategies through A’s focus on theneeds or behaviors of B (earlier referred to asaddressee focus). These strategies were called“attuning strategies” in earlier formulations ofCAT, following Coupland et al. (1988); wehave instead used the term accommodativestrategies to be more consistent with the wholecourse of SAT and CAT. Strategies maychange across the course of an interaction as afunction of tactics and behavior. Indeed, asrepresented in Abrams, O’Connor, and Giles’s(2002) transactional model of the relationshipbetween communication (accommodation)and identity, the very perception of accom-modative behaviors can trigger a social or per-sonal identity. Furthermore, foci and strategiesmay be mixed in a single interaction (not tomention across time).

Several main foci have been proposed,including productive behavior, conversa-tional competence, conversational needs, roleand power relations (Coupland et al., 1988),

emotional and relational needs, and facemaintenance (Giles et al., 1991; Williamset al., 1990). When the focus is on B’s produc-tive language and communication, A mayemploy approximation strategies of conver-gence, divergence, or maintenance, whichinvolve mutual perceived behavioral influence.The other foci may involve nonapproximationstrategies (Coupland et al., 1988). The first ofthese is interpretability, resulting from a focuson B’s interpretive (mainly decoding) compe-tence or stereotypes about it, leading amongother things to slower or simpler speech, moreuse of questions to check understanding, andthe choice of familiar topics.

The second nonapproximation strategy,discourse management, results from a focus onB’s conversational needs, and leads amongother things to sharing of topic choice anddevelopment, as well as shared conversationalregister. Interpersonal control results from afocus on role relations, and leads to use ofinterruptions, honorifics, and the like, to keepthe other person in role or to allow freedomto change roles. Emotional expression, result-ing from a focus on B’s emotional or relationalneeds, includes expressions of reassurance,care, warmth, and so forth (e.g., Watson &Gallois, 2002). Finally, face strategies, resultingfrom a focus on face maintenance, include pos-itive and negative face threats and face mainte-nance moves (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987).

These strategies, alone or in combination,are used to manage the psychological andsociolinguistic distance between interactants,making them more equal or emphasizingintergroup or interpersonal differences. Whilethere is some association between strategiesand behavior, there is no necessary connectionbetween them. For example, discourse man-agement is often reflected in topic develop-ment and turn-taking behaviors, but may bereflected in other behaviors, while topic devel-opment and turn taking can also reflect inter-personal control or interpretability strategies(Jones et al., 1999). Thus the model describes



strategies and behaviors separately: Strategiesremain covert; only behaviors are apparent inthe situation. Behavior is the focal pointthrough which the dynamic of the commu-nicative process develops.

In CAT, there is one main path to accom-modation: treating the other person more asan individual or ingroup member, and less asa function of the other’s outgroup member-ship. Accommodation may involve any (or all)of the foci and strategies, but the underlyingprocess is the same. On the other hand, non-accommodation can take a number of forms.The first is counter-accommodation (an elabo-ration of the original divergence). Whenspeakers counter-accommodate, they utilizethe strategies to maximize the differencebetween themselves and the interlocutors asindividuals and, when intergroup relations aresalient, as group members. This often involvesnegative and even hostile behavior.

In many interactions, however, nonaccom-modation takes a less obvious but also power-ful form. One way this can happen involvesunder-accommodation (an elaboration ofthe original maintenance), in which speakerssimply maintain their own behavior and dis-course without moving at all toward thebehavior or conversational needs of interlocu-tors. Coupland et al. (1988) described thisprocess for intergenerational communication(see also Williams & Giles, 1996). In the inter-cultural context, it can involve in extremecases the maintenance of a speaker’s languageeven when the speaker is aware that the otherperson cannot speak the language and thespeaker is competent in the other’s language.

Finally, nonaccommodation can take theform of over-accommodation (an elaborationof negatively perceived convergence). In thiscase, speakers accommodate to their stereo-types about interlocutors’ groups. Once again,over-accommodation has been articulatedparticularly for intergenerational communica-tion, mainly as patronizing talk or secondarybaby talk (e.g., Hummert & Ryan, 2001). In

intercultural contexts, a striking exampleinvolves foreigner talk, in which speakers“help” foreigners to understand by using asimplified—and unknown (often incomprehen-sible)—version of their language, frequentlyaccompanied by exaggerated intonation andloud volume. Over-accommodative behavioris paradoxical in that the speaker may havegood intentions (or appear to), but behave in aninappropriate way. Similarly, the receiver mayinterpret the behavior interpersonally and thusevaluate it positively as accommodation. Thisinterpretation frequently occurs when inter-group relations are not salient and the inter-personal history is positive. When intergrouprelations are salient and when speakers’ behav-ior is perceived as not accommodating to thereceiver’s own behavior or needs, it is likely tobe interpreted as nonaccommodative, whateverthe speaker’s intention. An important task forresearch is to specify and predict the conditionsin which each form of nonaccommodation—counter, under, or over—is most likely to occuror be perceived to occur.

Attributions, Evaluations, and FutureIntentions. The final part of the model con-cerns reception, although we again highlightthe transactive nature of accommodativeprocesses (Abrams et al., 2002). Essentially,CAT proposes that, all things being equal,accommodative behavior is attributed inter-nally, evaluated positively, and results in posi-tive future intentions toward interactions withthe other person. In addition, when the otherperson is considered to be a typical member ofhis or her ingroup, these positive intentions aregeneralized to the whole group (cf. Hewstone,1990). Likewise, nonaccommodation is attrib-uted internally, evaluated negatively, andresults in negative future intentions towardinteractions with the other person (and theother person’s group if it is an outgroup).

Of course, most of the time all things are notequal. As we noted above, social norms maydictate how behavior is initially perceived. For



example, convergence that violates social normsis not labeled as accommodative (and may beperceived as over-accommodative; cf. Ball et al.,1984). In the same way, norm-following behav-ior is likely to be attributed more externally,and evaluated less extremely, than behaviorthat does not seem to be dictated by the situa-tion. Third, all behavior by ingroup memberstends to be evaluated more positively than thesame behavior by outgroup members, at leastwhen intergroup relations are salient. Finally,future intentions toward an outgroup generalizeto interpersonal intentions toward the inter-locutor only when the interlocutor is perceivedas a typical member of his or her group.

These caveats lead to a plethora of proposi-tional permutations on the path from behaviorto future intentions. Gallois and colleagues(1988; Gallois et al., 1995) derived a largenumber of propositions in an attempt to capturethis complexity. Looking back, this may be whyit has been difficult to develop hypotheses thattest the propositions (see Gallois & Giles, 1998).In this presentation, we have tried to cut throughthe complexity by relying on attribution theory.We believe the propositions below capture theessential characteristics but leave the nuances tocontext-specific models and empirical research.

P.8: When a speaker Baccommodates to a receiverA, A is likely to interpretthe behavior and evaluateB positively, especially when:

• A attributes B’s behavior internally to benev-olent intent OR

• B is a member of A’s ingroup.

P.9: When a speaker Bnonaccommodates to a receiver A,A is likely to interpret the behavior andevaluate B negatively, especially when

• A attributes B’s behavior internally to malev-olent intent OR

• B is a member of a salient outgroup for A.

P.10: When A evaluates B positivelyin an interaction, A is likely tohave positive intentions toward

• Interpersonal interactions with B as anindividual or as an ingroup member;

• Interactions with other members of B’s groupwhen A considers B to be a typical member ofthis group;

However,

When A evaluates B’s behaviorpositively, A is likely to maintainA’s original intentions towardB’s group when A considers Bto be an atypical group member.

P.11: When A evaluates B negativelyin an interaction, A is likely to havenegative intentions toward

• Interpersonal interactions with B as anindividual;

• Interactions with other members of B’sgroup, especially when A considers B to be atypical member of this group;

However,

When A evaluates B’sbehavior negatively, A is likely tomaintain A’s original intentionstoward B’s group when A considersB to be an atypical group member.

These 11 propositions together delimit theCAT model, with one caveat. The process ofaccommodation, like the process of communi-cation (cf. Harwood & Giles, in press), isdynamic. Thus, something may happen in aninteraction—sudden awareness (or change) ofthe situation or relevant norms, unexpectedbehavior (positive or negative) by the otherperson, a change to a more intergroup or inter-personal frame of reference, and so forth—thatshifts a speaker from an interpersonal to anintergroup orientation (or vice versa) or froman accommodative to a nonaccommodative



stance (or vice versa). The accommodativedilemmas in Gallois and Giles (1998) go someway toward describing this phenomenon. Thismeans that the path from initial orientation tofuture intentions has many twists and turns,and predicting it will never be a simple task.

CONCLUSIONSAND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

So where are we now, after three decades withcommunication accommodation theory, andwhere do we go from here? It is fair to say thatCAT has stood the test of time in that it is stillgenerating research up to the present day. Ithas also spun off a number of more specifictheories, of which communication predica-ment of aging theory (Ryan et al., 1986) is per-haps the most fully developed and productiveexample; in the health arena, Street’s (2001)linguistic model of patient participation in careis also gaining momentum. It has providedthe impetus for research in intercultural com-munication, as well as intergenerational,intergender, interability, and organizationalcommunication. In all these contexts, CAThighlights the intergroup aspects of communi-cation, something that many theories of inter-personal communication neglect.

In the case of intercultural communication,the intergroup aspects of interactions arealways there. Intercultural encounters takeplace in the context of an intergroup as well asan interpersonal history, and in the context ofdifferent (and sometimes contradictory) socialnorms. Effective or good communicationdepends crucially on these factors. For thisreason, the communication skills models thathave been so prevalent in intercultural com-munication training are frequently likely tofail (cf. Cargile & Giles, 1996; Gallois, 2003;Gallois & Giles, 1998; Hajek & Giles, 2003).It is essential both for theory developmentand for effective applications that researcherstake full account of the intergroup aspect ofintercultural, and indeed all, communication.

CAT provides a comprehensive way to do thiswithout neglecting the interpersonal and idio-syncratic aspects of conversation.

We have attempted in this chapter to clarifythe propositions of CAT to at least some extent.We have reduced their number from 17 in 1995to 11 here. In doing this, we have acknowledgedthe scope of CAT, invoked supporting theoriesexplicitly, and tried to make the use of termsconsistent. Our aim is to make CAT more acces-sible and easier for researchers to use to derivetestable hypotheses. In addition, we have tried tomake CAT more generic, so that researchers candevelop more specific models for particular con-texts. These models may invoke extra variableslike values and personality, and situational char-acteristics such as formality, task orientation,and uncertainty management.

A great deal of work is still to be donebefore we understand the process of accommo-dation fully and in detail. There is a need toexplore the strategies beyond approximation,especially the more recently theorized strategiesof emotional expression and face maintenance.It will also be important to elaborate theimpact of social norms as against intergrouprelations. The role of multiple identities is a keyfactor that has hardly been explored usingCAT, but that CAT can handle (see Joneset al., 1999). Finally, there are many importantintergroup contexts where CAT has not beendeveloped at all, involving interactions in insti-tutionally driven contexts and elsewhere. Ourhope is that CAT will be useful in all thisresearch, and that in 30 years we (or others)will be able to take stock of it again.

NOTES

1. Sometimes “accommodation,” which atthe inception of SAT included both convergent anddivergent moves, became rather loosely associatedwith convergence. “Nonaccommodative” movesincluded everything else: maintenance/divergence,and later under- and over-accommodation. SeeGiles, McCann, Ota, and Noels (2002) for the



invocation of this distinction (following Williams &Giles, 1996) in the sphere of cross-cultural inter-generational communication.

2. Gallois and Giles (1998) do not presentpropositions, but four “cases” showing how theelements of the model interplay.

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