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Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman Thursday, September 18, 2014
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Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Jan 28, 2020

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Page 1: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA

Amendments Act

Professor Emily BermanThursday, September 18, 2014

Page 2: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Thursday, September 18, 2014

Wrap up In re Directives

Continue Discussion of Programmatic Surveillance

• Closer look at Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008

• [Case Title Redacted], FISC, 2012 (Bates, J.)

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Page 3: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Implemented shortly after 9/11

Initially included four elements (internet

& telephone content and metadata)

2001-2007: Authorized by executive-

branch officials

January – May 2007: TSP authorized by

FISC judges

August 2007 – January 2008: Protect

America Act

July 2008 - Present: FISA Amendments Act3

Page 4: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Facts:

• Government acquired an order to engage in non-

individualized warrantless surveillance

• [Redacted] telecommunications company

(Yahoo) challenged the directive with respect to

its customers.

Holding:

• Programmatic surveillance qualifies for a warrant

exception under the “special needs” doctrine.

• The surveillance is reasonable because of the

strength of the government interest and the

privacy protections built into the statute.4

Page 5: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Relevant Privacy Protections:

• Targeting Procedures

• Minimization procedures

• Requirement that foreign intelligence

collection be a “significant purpose” of the

surveillance

• Executive order 12,333

• Defense Department procedures (NSA is

part of the Defense Department)

• [Redacted] procedures5

Page 6: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

(a): Empowers the AG and DNI to “authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year . . . the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”

(b)(1): May not target anyone known to be in the US.

(b)(2): May not target someone outside the US in order to collect communications of a particular person in the US.

(b)(3): May not target a US person abroad.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a (a/k/a FAA § 702) (619):

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Page 7: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Former CIA analyst and NSA contractor

Leaked a number of classified documents to, inter alia, Glenn Greenwald, a reporter for The Guardian.

Documents relate to FAA § 702 andother programs. 7

Edward Snowden

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Page 12: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Collection

Target or

“facility”

Selectors

Tasking

Contact chaining

Queries

Minimization

12Edward Snowden

Page 13: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

Facts:

• Government was seeking recertification of

a collection program that had been

approved by the FISC in “prior dockets.”

• Government disclosed new information

about the nature of the NSA’s “upstream

collection” of Internet communications that

changed the FISC’s opinion of the

constitutionality of the collection, given

existing minimization procedures. 13

Page 14: Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the ... · Class #8: Electronic Surveillance: Edward Snowden & the FISA Amendments Act Professor Emily Berman ... •Closer look

New Information provided to the FISC (115):

• “[Internet transactions that the NSA collects]

could and often do contain multiple discrete

communications, including wholly non-target

communications and other non-target

communications to, from, or concerning USPs.

. . . “[T]he net effort of the procedures [was]

that thousands of [communications] that are

not to or from a targeted selector but that are

to, from, or concerning USPs, would be

retained by NSA for at least 5 years.”14