EN BANC DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZG.R. No. 141524FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :CABACUNGAN , Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.PUNO,PANGANIBAN,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO andGARCIA, JJ.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO ,namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondents . Promulgated : September 14, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O NCORONA, J.:
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CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO and GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, PresidingJudge, Branch 43, Regional TrialCourt, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the ―final order‖ appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctlydismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within thereglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement isfatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INDISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THEHON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THEPETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTALMINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED INRULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THERESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THATPETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OFTHE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKETFEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED INRULING THAT THE WORDS ―FINAL ORDER‖ IN SECTION 3,RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILLREFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGEHON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1,1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERSTHROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC.V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASETHEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS ANDCIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THESAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THEENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within
which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements
of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in allthese cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealedfrom. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the periodfor appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgmentor final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal isrequired, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record onappeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or finalorder.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timelymotion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension oftime to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall beallowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time
fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken byserving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial courtwithin thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, anotice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. Thetime during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order orfor new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless suchmotion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours ofthe last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must beperfected within the day following that in which the partyappealing received notice of the denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously
consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15
days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the
A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for theReopening of the Case1 on the ground of newly discovered evidence filedby A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was found guilty2 ofviolating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The BouncingChecks Law, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, inCriminal Case No. 21238.
On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented byits President, Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc. (Antrom), also represented by itsPresident, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreementwhereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodationin favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, willissue checks to guarantee the payment of its obligations.
A few months after a number of financing transactions were made,Elmyra's indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58.
As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank (drawee bank)
Check No. HO270451 with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October1985 in the amount of P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment withthe drawee bank, however, the said check was dishonored for insufficiencyof funds.
Consequently, on 16 December 1985, an Information3 charging Dinglasanwith Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed before the RTC of
Makati, Branch 62, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21238, People of thePhilippines v. A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. The Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality ofMakati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, well knowing that he has nosufficient funds in or credit with the bank, did there and then willfully,unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue Commercial Bank of ManilaCheck No. H0207451 dated October 3, 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00in payment of his obligation to Antrom Inc., represented by Rosanna E.Velasco, but when said check was presented to the bank for payment, thesame was dishonored and/or refused payment for reason "Drawn AgainstInsufficient Funds" and accused, despite repeated demands and lapse offive (5) banking days from notice thereof, failed and refused to make good
the said check and/or to deposit with the drawee bank the necessaryamount to cover the aforesaid check, to the damage and prejudice of theherein complainant in the aforementioned amount of P515,000.00
On 16 December 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for havingcommitted the crime charged. In a Decision4promulgated on the same date,the court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating BatasPambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, he is hereby sentenced to sufferan imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Two Hundred ThousandPesos (P200,000.00); and, to indemnify ANTROM, INC., the sum of FiveHundred Fifteen (sic) (P515,000.00) Pesos, at [the] legal rate of interestfrom October 3, 1985, until the full amount of P515,000.0 is fully paid.
Dinglasan, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 which was deniedby the same court for lack of merit in an Order 6 issued on 4 September1992.
On 25 September 1992, Dinglasan appealed to the Court of Appeals theadverse RTC Decision dated 16 December 1991, finding him guilty ofviolating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the RTC Order dated 4 September1992, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.7
On 26 October 1998, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, Peopleof the Philippines v. A. Rafael. C. Dinglasan, handed down a
Decision,8 dismissing the appeal, thereby, affirming in toto the Decision ofthe RTC finding Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violatingBatas Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Decision now onappeal is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
Aggrieved, the accused filed before this Court a Petition for Review onCertiorar i9 questioning the 26 October 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 137800, A. Rafael C.Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals, and was raffled to the Third Division of thisCourt. In a Resolution10 dated 28 June 1999, this Court resolved to denythe petition for failure to show that a reversible error had been committedby the appellate court.
A Motion for Reconsideration11 was then filed by Dinglasan on 26 August1999, but the same was again denied by this Court in a Resolution dated13 September 1999 for failure to raise substantial arguments that wouldwarrant reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 June 1999 with an adcautelam that such denial is final.12
Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but thesame was merely noted without action by this Court in view of the En BancResolution dated 7 April 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the sameparty shall be entertained. In a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, thisCourt directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
The Resolution of this Court dated 28 June 1999 denying Dinglasan'sPetition for Review became final and executory on 14 October 1999 asevidenced by the Entry of Judgment.13
By virtue of the final and executory judgment rendered by this Court in G.R.No. 137800, the prosecution, on 19 September 2000, filed a motion14 with
the RTC for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and writ of execution inorder to satisfy the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-departure order be issued in order to prevent Dinglasan from leaving thecountry until he has fully served his sentence.
In an Order 15 issued on 21 September 2000, the trial court, acting on thesaid motion, issued a warrant for the arrest of Dinglasan and a writ of
execution for the enforcement of his civil liability and, at the same time,enjoining him from leaving the country.
Alarmed, Dinglasan on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for NewTrial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case16 based onnewly discovered evidence, which was docketed as G.R. No. 145420,entitled, "A. Rafael C. Dinglasan Jr. v. Court of Appeals." He urges thisCourt to uphold substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discoveredevidence he seeks to introduce in this case is so material and of suchweight that, if, admitted would probably change the judgment, hence,suspension of procedural rules is warranted.
The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed by Dinglasan are theaffidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-
President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. DeDinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was theCashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits,together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached toSolidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma.Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made good ofthe check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not,therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for oneof the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed andrefused to make good the said check within five banking days from the
notice of dishonor, is absent.
In her affidavit,17 Ma. Elena Dinglasan attested that she was the ExecutiveVice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra for the period of 1985-1986. Assuch, she was in-charge of disbursing and sourcing of corporation fundsincluding the preparation of checks and approval of vouchers supportingthe disbursements. In the course of its business, the affiant caused theissuance of Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 on 27 September 1985 inthe amount of P515,000.00, but postdated on 3 October 1985, which was
dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds and which eventuallycaused Dinglasan's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.Upon receiving the notice of dishonor, she caused the preparation ofSolidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 in theamount of P150,000.00 intended to cover a part of the amount of thebounced check. The Solidbank check, together with its transmittal letterdated 8 October 1985, stating the purpose of the said check, was sent to
Antrom and was received by its representative as evidenced by thesignature appearing on the receiving copy thereof.
Explaining why the said transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 wasbelatedly offered as evidence on this case, Ma. Elena Dinglasan reasonedthat that she was not aware that the said letter has any significance onDinglasan's liability. She explained further that in 1993 she was diagnosedof breast cancer and had to undergo surgical operation and chemotherapy.
To corroborate the statements of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, Encarnacion Vda.De Dinglasan on her part, narrated under oath that her late husband usedto bring some of Elmyra's documents home to work on at night and afterher husband's death in 1994, such documents were kept inside a box andleft somewhere in one corner of their house. It was only when a minor
renovation was made therein several years after her husband passed awaythat she was able to chance upon the said documents again. The saiddocuments were turned over to Dinglasan on 21 October 2000. It was laterdiscovered that the said documents include the transmittal letter dated 8October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom.18
In contrast, private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition for NewTrial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidenceshould be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally andsubstantially defective.19
Elaborating, Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, theMotion for New Trial should be filed at any time after the appeal from thelower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellatecourt convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this Court inG.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory on 14October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. The present petition,on the other hand, was filed only on 30 October 2000 or a year after thefinality of the decision in G.R. No. 137800. The filing of the instant action,therefore, has already prescribed.20
Moreover, Antrom continues, considering for the sake of argument that theinstant action was filed within the reglementary period, still, the petitionmust fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground for newtrial were not satisfactorily complied with. Let it be noted that the transmittalletter dated 8 October 1995 was previously attached as evidence in a
Petition for Review filed by Dinglasan before the Ministry of Justice (nowthe Department of Justice) on 15 December 1986, assailing the Resolutionof the Fiscal dated 11 December 1986 recommending the filing ofInformation against him. The same letter was also introduced as evidencebefore the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 when Dinglasanassailed the RTC decision dated 16 December 1991. Hence, the claim thatthe alleged evidence was not available during the trial in the courts below,and is thus, newly discovered is erroneous, if not misleading.21
Finally, Antrom stresses that, granting for the sake of argument, that thepetition at bar was filed on time and the alleged evidence is newlydiscovered within the purview of the law, such evidence introduced andadmitted, nevertheless, would not exculpate Dinglasan from liability. Thegravamen of the offense is the act of the drawer in making or issuing a
check with the full knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds tocover the amount. Such awareness was admitted by Dinglasan when heexpressly requested Antrom not to deposit the check without his explicitconformity in anticipation that such check will be dishonored if presentedfor payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check and not thenonpayment of the obligation is punished by law because of its deleteriouseffect on public interest.
The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on theirpart, submitted that the instant petition should be dismissed because it was
filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be admitted is neithermaterial nor newly discovered so as to warrant new trial or reopening of thecase. The alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not in anyway alter the judgment. Upon perusal of the transmittal letter dated 8October 1985, it was nowhere stated therein that Solidbank Manager'sCheck No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 was intended as partial paymentof Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 dated 3 October 1985 thatbounced. The said letter was a mere proposal wherein a payment in kind ordacion en pago was offered by Elmyra. The Solicitor General likewise
noted that the letter dated 8 October 1986 was already introduced asevidence in the Petition for Review with the Ministry of Justice filed byDinglasan.22
For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION WAS FILED ONTIME.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THECASE BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
ALLOWED.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the appeal fromthe lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of theCourt of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the lattermay move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidencematerial to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions ofsection 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should befiled before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accusedbecomes final.
While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petitionshould be filed before the finality of the judgment convicting the appellant,he, however argues that judgment attains finality only upon the receipt ofthe order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.
Dinglasan's argument is without merit.
Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motionfor Reconsideration was denied by this Court as the subject matter thereofis a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was merely
noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc Resolutiondated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a secondmotion for reconsideration and was further emphasized by the provision ofthe Revised Rules of Court which provides that:
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. – No second motionfor reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the sameparty shall be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at therisk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final atsome definitive date fixed by law.23
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of theresolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration wouldresult to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue ordersor resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in orderthat the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolongingthe disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing aprohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust tothe winning party.
It bears stressing further that on 14 October 1999, the Resolution of thisCourt in G.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executoryas evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according to the pertinent provisionof the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Rule 51. - Judgment.
"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. – If no appeal ormotion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time providedin these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith beentered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The datewhen the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall bedeemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain thedispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signedby the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolutionhas become final and executory.
After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laid to rest. A decision that acquiredfinality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longer bemodified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correcterroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made bythe court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.24
Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopeningof the Case on 30 October 2000 was made way beyond the prescriptiveperiod for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestly believed thatthis Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in hisSecond Motion for Reconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-mature to file the instant petition before receiving the Court's ruling on thesaid motion, could not be given credence.
The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made todepend on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise wouldcompletely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service,which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processesbeyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.25
Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly madebecause the evidence sought to be admitted were not available at the timethe instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly, he claims that thisevidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence ascontemplated by law.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial . — The court shall grant a new trial onany of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantialrights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which theaccused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered andproduced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted wouldprobably change the judgment.
The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidencewas discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have beendiscovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probablychange the judgment.26
These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia27where the Supreme Court ofGeorgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are notfavored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be apretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a partywho asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, tosatisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge sincethe trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did notcome sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different
verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz;speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th.That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absenceaccounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object ofthe testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.
These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining thepropriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of
showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with therequisites to justify the holding of a new trial.28
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newlydiscovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newlydiscovered evidence which could not have been discovered by duediligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has twoaspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and apredictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.29
Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma.Elena Dinglasan and Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that thetransmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was discovered recently or justbefore the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. Therecords, however, show otherwise.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court alreadyconsidered that transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 in rendering itsDecision dated 26 October 1998. The pertinent portion of the Decisionreads:
It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10,1986, (Exhibit "B") no mention was made of the two (2) manager's checks,considering that at least one of the two (2), both dated October 8, 1988 (pp.2-3, Records) was allegedly given to private complainant on the said date(pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment in kind or dacion enpago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial court correctly notedthat, "x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of morethan one million pesos, in the form of manager's checks, as replacement ofa check that bounced, without any supporting document." (p. 8, Decision,
Criminal Case No. 21238).
We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is noevidence establishing that accused-appellant asked for the return of theCombank Check in the same way that the PTB Check had been returned,other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check had beenconsidered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check hadalready bounced. (p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd thataccused-appellant would replace the Combank Check with an amountmore than the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was still subject to
final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit "5") accused-appellant issued Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check. Hence, it isquite quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask for the return of theCombank check after having issued two (2) manager's check.30 (Emphasissupplied.)
Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to bepresented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperateattempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause that has long
been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this Court but never didso in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked anevidence which was decisively claimed to have such significance that mightprobably change the judgment.
The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 wasalready offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even
annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newlydiscovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was alreadyweighed by the appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgatesto an endless review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying thedisposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through amotion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discoveredevidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.Costs against the petitioner.
possessors of Lot 5155 entitled to protection by injunction againstanyone disturbing their peaceful possession of said Lot.
The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establishownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in
fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong tothe public domain of the State, unless acquired from theGovernment either by purchase or by grant, except landspossessed by an occupant and his predecessors since timeimmemorial, for such possession would justify the presumptionthat the land had never been part of the public domain, or that ithad been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
In this case, the land in question is admittedly public.The respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all.His claim of ownership is based on mere possession byhimself and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession of the land in question, under a bona f ide claimof ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years.However,the survey plan for the land was approved only in 1992, andrespondent paid the realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992,shortly before the filing of the suit below for damages withinjunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin asserting
his adverse claim to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 wascertified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, percertificate of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources. It is obvious that respondent’s possession hasnot ripened into ownership.
x x x x
Consequently, respondent De Leon has no clear legalright to the lot in question, and a writ of injunction will not lie to
protect such nebulous right of possession. x x x[19]
The Court does not subscribe to De Leon’s argument that the issues
of ownership and possession of the subject lot should not have been taken
up by the court on the ground that his complaint is only for damages.
dispute as to its exact location. Hence, whether or not there is a
government project existing within the premises or that which traverses it is
not relevant to the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of the disputed
lot and, therefore, has legal possession thereof.
As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Demolition, Section 7,[32] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the
general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of
origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for
a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of
judicial courtesy.[33] The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to
be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar ,[34] the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied
indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a
new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as
follows:
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case withinten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court ortribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property . - The officer shalldemand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery
or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claimingrights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three(3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgmentobligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such personstherefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peaceofficers, and employing such means as may be reasonablynecessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligeein possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents orprofits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the samemanner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject ofexecution. - When the property subject of execution containsimprovements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor orhis agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove saidimprovements, except upon special order of the court, issuedupon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and afterthe former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable timefixed by the court.
As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging
for more than 15 years and the execution of this Court’s judgment in PEA v.
CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because
De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTC’s order of execution
based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is
prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. TheCourt agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention
that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
SPOUSES RODOLFO A. NOCEDA and ERNA T. NOCEDA, Petitioners,vs.AURORA ARBIZO-DIRECTO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals(CA), dismissing the appeal on the ground of res judicata.
On September 16, 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed acomplaint against her nephew, herein petitioner Rodolfo Noceda, for"Recovery of Possession and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment ofDonation" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71,docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-354-I. Respondent alleged that she andher co-heirs have extra-judicially settled the property they inherited fromtheir late father on August 19, 1981, consisting of a parcel of land,described as Lot No. 1121, situated in Bitoong, San Isidro, Cabangan,Zambales. She donated a portion of her hereditary share to her nephew,but the latter occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership thereof sinceSeptember 1985.
Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent on November 6, 1991,where the RTC (a) declared the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated
August 19, 1981 valid; (b) declared the Deed of Donation dated June 1,1981 revoked; (c) ordered defendant to vacate and reconvey that donatedportion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1,1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns; (d) ordered the defendant toremove the house built inside the donated portion at the defendant’sexpense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency; and (e)ordered the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount
of P5,000.00.2 The decision was appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.CV No. 38126.
On January 5, 1995, spouses Rodolfo Dahipon and Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, andannulment of sale and damages against spouses Antonio and Dominga
Arbizo, spouses Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora Arbizo-Directo with
the RTC, Iba, Zambales, Branch 70. This was docketed as Civil Case No.RTC-1106-I. In the complaint, spouses Dahipon alleged that they were theregistered owners of a parcel of land, consisting of 127,298 square meters,situated in Barangay San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, designated as Lot1121-A. The Original Certificate of Title No. P-9036 over the land wasissued in the name of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon, pursuant to Free Patent No.548781. Spouses Dahipon claimed that the defendants therein purchasedportions of the land from them without paying the full amount. Except for
Aurora, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, as aresult of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed, and TCT No. T-50730 was issued in the name of spouses Noceda for their portion of theland. For her part, Aurora questioned Dahipon’s alleged ownership over thesame parcel of land by filing an adverse claim.
In the meantime, a decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126 onMarch 31, 1995 with the following fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendantRodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot "C" of Lot 1121 perExhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo-Directo. Except forthis modification, the Decision dated November 6, 1991 of the RTC, Iba,Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby AFFIRMEDin all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.3
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court, which wasdocketed as G.R. No. 119730. The Court found no reversible error, muchless grave abuse of discretion, with the factual findings of the two courtsbelow, and thus denied the petition on September 2, 1999.4 The decisionbecame final and executory, and a writ of execution was duly issued by theRTC on March 6, 2001 in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I.
On December 4, 2003, petitioners instituted an action for quieting of titleagainst respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 2108-I. In the complaint,petitioners admitted that Civil Case No. RTC-354-I was decided in favor ofrespondent and a writ of execution had been issued, ordering them tovacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which wasthe subject matter of Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, was the same parcel ofland owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they purchased a portion; andthat a title (TCT No. T-37468) was, in fact, issued in their name. Petitionersprayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated March 6, 2001 in Civil CaseNo. RTC-354-I, and that "a declaration be made that the property bought,occupied and now titled in the name of [petitioners] was formerly part andsubdivision of Lot No. 1121 Pls-468-D, covered by OCT No. P-9036 in thename of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon."5
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.Respondent averred that petitioners, aware of their defeat in Civil Case No.RTC-354-I, surreptitiously negotiated with Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon for thesale of the land and filed the present suit in order to subvert the executionthereof.
The trial court denied the motion, holding that there was no identity ofcauses of action.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 25, 2006, after petitioners presentedtheir evidence, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, stating that theclaim of ownership and possession of petitioners on the basis of the titleemanating from that of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon was already raised in theprevious case (Civil Case No. RTC-354-I).
On February 22, 2006, the trial court issued a resolution granting thedemurrer to evidence.
The CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners now come to this Court, raising thefollowing issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA ORDOCTRINE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLEUNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING IN THE PRESENT CASE[;]
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER TITLE THANTHE PETITIONERS[; and]
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING ON PURCHASERS IN BAD FAITH IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE[.]6
Petitioners assert that res judicata7 does not apply, considering that theessential requisites as to the identity of parties, subject matter, and causesof action are not present.
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of theRules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment orfinal order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction topronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to thematter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could havebeen raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties andtheir successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencementof the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing andunder the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or theirsuccessors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged ina former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to havebeen so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included thereinor necessary thereto.
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the meritsconcludes the litigation between the parties and their privies andconstitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of actioneither before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, ormatter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in thedetermination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment ordecree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgmenttherein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privieswhether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction betweenthe principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment mayoperate as evidence.8] The first general rule above stated, and whichcorresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 ofthe Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while thesecond general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the samesection and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."9
The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City 10 explained thesecond concept which we reiterate herein, to wit:
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact orquestion which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passedupon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action andpersons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated inany future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court orany other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or differentcause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by properauthority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action canbe conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the sameparties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point orquestion, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies willbe final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was inissue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merelyidentity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA
179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgmentwhich bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which barsthe relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between thesame parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questionswhich were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly appliedto all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto andalthough such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and werenot actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of theformer trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered withoutdeciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled thatmatter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself .11
The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably,the present case is closely related to the previous case (Civil Case No.RTC-354-I), where petitioners raised the issue of ownership andpossession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said lot tothem. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation sheexecuted in favor of petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to vacateand reconvey the donated portion to respondent. The decision of the RTCwas affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the petition forreview by this Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court noted theestablished fact "that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portiondonated to him by respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also fenced
the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus,petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondentDirecto without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpationwhich is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as anact of ingratitude of a donee against the donor."12 Clearly, therefore,petitioners have no right of ownership or possession over the land inquestion.1avvph!1
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material factbecomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, orwhen an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of thecourt, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon theparties and those in privity with them.13 Thus, petitioners can no longerquestion respondent’s owner ship over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit forquieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigationof particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same partieson a different claim or cause of action.14
Furthermore, we agree that petitioners instituted the instant action withunclean hands. Aware of their defeat in the previous case, they attemptedto thwart execution and assert their alleged ownership over the landthrough their purported purchase of a lot from Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon. Thislater transaction appears to be suspect. A perusal of G.R. No. 119730reveals that the Court was not unaware of Dahipon’s alleged claim over thesame parcel of land. It noted that Dahipon did not even bother to appear in
court to present her free patent upon respondent’s request, or to intervenein the case, if she really had any legitimate interest over the land inquestion.15 In any event, petitioners’ assertion of alleged good title over theland cannot stand considering that they purchased the piece of land fromDahipon knowing fully well that the same was in the adverse possession ofanother.
Thus, we find no reversible error in the appellate court’s ruling thatpetitioners are in fact buyers in bad faith. We quote:
With appellants’ actual knowledge of facts that would impel a reasonableman to inquire further on [a] possible defect in the title of Obispo,considering that she was found not to have been in actual occupation of theland in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126, they cannot simply invoke protection of the
law as purchasers in good faith and for value. In a suit to quiet title,defendant may set up equitable as well as legal defenses, includingacquisition of title by adverse possession and a prior adjudication on thequestion under the rule on res judicata. Appellants’ status as holders in badfaith of a certificate of title, taken together with the preclusive effect of theright of possession and ownership over the disputed portion, which wasadjudged in favor of appellee in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, thus provideample justification for the court a quo to grant the demurrer to evidence anddismiss their suit for quieting of title filed against the said appellee.16
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.87026 is AFFIRMED in toto.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS of JESUSAMADO ARANETA, respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.
Antonio P. Barredo for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner impugns the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November10 and December 2 and 3, 1987 which, in effect, gave due course toprivate respondents' petition for annulment of judgment.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, as mortgagors, andIslamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines (Council for brevity), asmortgagee, executed a real estate mortgage over a 4,754 sq. m. parcel ofland located in Cubao, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) No. 30461 as security for the payment of a one million pesopromissory note in favor of the mortgagee. The mortgagors were unable topay their obligation, hence, the Council instituted foreclosure proceedingswith the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43746. OnFebruary 5, 1985 the parties submitted a compromise agreement wherein itwas stipulated that because of the Da Silvas' inability to pay their debt tothe Council, and for the additional consideration of P 500,000.00, they
jointly agree to cede, transfer and convey to the Council the land theymortgaged to the latter. On February 12, 1985, the Regional Trial Court
approved the compromise agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. 328021 wasissued in the name of the Council by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Subsequent thereto, on August 8,1985, Jesus Amado Araneta filed with theRegister of Deeds a notice of lis pendens in connection with Civil Case No.Q-47989 entitled "Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. Jesus
Amado Araneta" for ejectment. The complaint was converted into an action
for collection of rentals with damages but was later on withdrawn by theCouncil. On August 13, 1985 Araneta also filed with the same Register ofDeeds an affidavit of adverse claim in connection with Civil Case No. Q-43469 entitled "Marconi Da Silva, et al. v. Jesus Amado Araneta, et al." forrecovery of possession. The notice of lis pendens and adverse claim wereannotated at the back of TCT No. 328021 by the Register of Deeds.
On October 9, 1985 the Council filed in the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession andDamages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Aranetapraying, inter alia, for the cancellation of all the annotations at the back ofTCT No. 328021. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. Q-46196.
While this case was pending, on July 6, 1987, the heirs of Jesus Amado
Araneta, private respondents herein, filed with the Court of Appeals apetition to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for foreclosure. Insupport of their petition the heirs of Araneta narrated the following events:
(1) on December 20,1953 Jesus Amado Araneta purchased the4,754 sq.m. parcel of land located in Cubao from the SpousesGarcia and since then he and his family have always been inpossession thereof;
(2) for some reason known only to Araneta and Fred Da
Silva,an employee of the former, title to the property was placedin the latter's name as evidenced by TCT No. 30461 althoughfrom the time of its issuance the owner's duplicate copy of saidTCT has always been in the possession of Araneta,
(3) on January 31, 1963, the parties decided to terminate thetrust that had been created over the property, thus, Da Silvaexecuted a deed of sale over the same parcel of land in favor of
Araneta but no consideration was given by the latter to theformer for said sale and any recital of consideration appearingin the deed is purely fictitious;
(4) the Register of Deeds, however, refused to register thedeed of sale because the title is in the name of "Fred Da Silvamarried to Leocadia Da Silva" and is thus presumed conjugaland the conjugal partnership should first be liquidated as thewife had already died;
(5) alleging that their copy was lost and/or destroyed, onFebruary 1, 1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, two of thethree surviving children of Fred Da Silva who died in 1963, fileda petition, docketed as LRC record Case No. Q-2772, for theissuance of a new copy of the owner's duplicate copy of TCTNo. 30461. The petition was granted by Judge Vera on March24,1984:
(6) Araneta learned about this and immediately filed a motion tore-open the proceedings stating that he has in his possessionthe ,- owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 30461 and explainingthe reasons for such possession;
(7) the motion was granted and on December 7,1984 the land
registration court ordered the Da Silvas to (a) return to theRegister of the second owner's duplicate copy of the title and(b) neither enter into any transaction concerning said secondowner's duplicate copy nor utilize the title for any purpose otherthan to return the same to the Register of Deeds;
(8) on November 11, 1985, the Da Silvas manifested before theland registration court that the title to the property wastransferred to the Council based on a compromise agreementin Civil Case No. Q43746 for foreclosure; and
(9) on motion of the heirs of Araneta, who substituted him uponhis death in 1985, Judge Vera consolidated Civil Cases Nos. Q-2772 and Q-43469, both of which were raffled to his sala, withCivil Case No. Q-46196 but the judge hearing the latter casewould not heed the order of consolidation.
(10) and then set out their case for annulment of judgmentalleging that the Da Silvas, with the connivance of the Council,executed a purported promissory note secured by a real estatemortgage the terms and conditions of which were made veryonerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of the propertyby virtue of a confession of judgment; and, the Council hadalways known of the Araneta's claim of ownership over the landbecause the former's executive officer and secretary general isthe lawyer of the Da Silvas in the cases they filed against the
Araneta's. The heirs of Araneta in their petition prayed, interalia, that (1) the judgment in Civil Case No. Q- 43746 beannulled and set aside and (2) a restraining order be issued toenjoin the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-46196 [Petition,
Annex "A"].
In a resolution dated November 10, 1987 the Court of Appeals issued atemporary restraining order enjoining the trial judge from hearing Civil CaseNo. Q-46196 until further orders from the court. In the same resolution theparties were ordered to appear for a pre- trial conference. The Council fileda motion for reconsideration of this resolution. Later on the Council filed aSupplement to Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismissquestioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the petition forannulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council
also invoked the additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the Aranetas are not valid claimants of the property; lack of legal capacity tosue because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case; litispendentia because of the pendency of the quieting of title case betweenthe same parties; and, abandonment, waiver and unenforceability underthe Statute of Frauds [Petition, Annex "H"]. On December 2, 1987 the Courtof Appeals denied the Council's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.In the hearing conducted on December 3, 1987 the Council reiterated thegrounds it raised in its Supplemental Motion and Motion to Dismiss but thesame were summarily denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petitionfor certiorari .
Petitioner contends the following: first, that the Court of Appeals should notcontinue to hear the petition for annulment of judgment since it is alreadyfully executed and the purpose for which the case for annulment was filedwill no longer be served, the parties having already complied with thedecision; second, private respondents have no right to question the validityor legality of the decision rendered foreclosing the mortgage since they areforeign to the transaction of mortgage between petitioner and Freddie and
Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims that private respondents haveanother remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-46196 for Quieting ofTitle where the question of ownership may be passed upon.
At the outset it must be clarified that the instant petition is onefor certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the inquiry thisCourt should address itself is limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion committed by the Court, of Appeals, in particular, whether ornot respondent court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion in giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment.This clarification is rendered necessary because the parties themselves, intheir pleadings, have gone beyond this issue and have discussed themerits of the annulment of judgment case now pending decision with theCourt of Appeals.
In its Petition, the Council contends that a Regional Trial Court has theauthority and jurisdiction to annul a judgment of another Regional TrialCourt, a coordinate or co-equal court Specifically, petitioner alleges that thefiling of a separate action for annulment of judgment is unnecessarybecause the Regional Trial Court hearing Civil Case No. Q-43469 forQuieting of Title can annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for
Foreclosure rendered by another Regional Trial Court [Rollo, pp. 15-16). Inits Memorandum, however, the Council admitted that the Court of Appealshas the exclusive jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional TrialCourt [Rollo, pp. 152-1531.
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case wherethe judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The judgment may beannulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud [Canlas v. Hon- Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 77691, August 8,19881. Jurisdiction over actions forannulment of Regional Trial Court judgment has been clarified by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Actof 1980). Prior to the enactment of this law, different views had beenentertained regarding the issue of whether or not a branch of a RegionalTrial Court may annul a judgment of another branch of the samecourt. * However, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court of Appeals exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expressly provides that:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ...
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; Thus, it is beyond disputethat it is only the Court of Appeals that can take cognizance ofthe annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 renderedby the Regional Trial Court.
The next issue raised in this petition deals with the question of who mayproperly institute a petition for annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's
contention that the remedy is available only to one who is a party to thecase where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. Privaterespondents, on the other hand, allege that "there are sufficient facts andcircumstances sufficient to show prima facie that [they] have a substantialinterest in the ownership of the property which had been foreclosed withouttheir knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the question deals withwhether or not the heirs of Araneta have a cause of action against theCouncil.
In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA4731, an action for annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 betweenEdrosolano and Belosillo was filed by Militante. The petition stemmed froma complaint instituted by Militante on September 6, 1965 againstEdrosolano for damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On
January 18,1966 Militante obtained an order of preliminary attachment onthe property of Edrosolano. Alleging that he purchased all of Edrosolano'sTPU equipment on February 28, 1966, Belosillo filed a third-party claim. Itappears that on February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by defaultagainst Edrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for collection of amount ofP45,000.00, the value of the promissory note executed by the latter onFebruary 1, 1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts, Militante, in hispetition for annulment of judgment contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil CaseNo. 6216 "was based on a fictitious cause of action because [the]promissory note was without lawful consideration whatsoever" [at 476]; (2)Edrosolano did not file any answer to Belosillo's complaint and allowed thelatter to obtain a judgment by default which judgment attained finalitywithout the former appealing therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in CivilCase No. 6216 was promulgated iii 1963 it was "only on January 19, 1966when . . . Belosillo caused the execution thereof after [Militante] hadalready instituted his civil case for damages against ... Edrosolano and anorder for issuance of preliminary attachment issued" [at 477]. The trial courthowever dismissed Militante's action for annulment on finding that it did notstate a cause of action. Thereafter, Militante filed an appeal to this Tribunal
and in setting aside the trial court's order of dismissal', the Court, speakingthrough then Mr. Associate Justice Enrique Fernando, stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. More specifically, the view entertained by the lower court inits order of dismissal that an action for annulment of judgment
can be availed of only by those principally or secondarily boundis contrary to what had been so clearly declared by this Court inthe leading case of Anuran v. Aquino t38 Phil. 291, decided in1918. It was emphatically announced therein: "There can be noquestion as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a
judgement to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement andto have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion
practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment whensuch fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in theissues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment . x x x."[at 3233.] Such a principle was further fortified by anobservation made by this Court through Justice Ozaeta inGarchitorena v. Sotelo [74 Phil. 25 (,1942)j'. These are hiswords: "The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure
suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason ofwhich the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in thisseparate action [citing also the case of Anuran]. Aside from the
Anuran-Aquino case, innumerable authorities from other jurisdictions may be cited 'in support of the annulment. But werethere not any precedent to guide us, reason and justice wouldcompel us to lay down such doctrine for the first time." [at 481-482-, Italics supplied.]
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party tothe judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can provehis allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud andcollusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to theforeclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the
judgment rendered therein. However. their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and betweenthe Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of evidence, could be thebasis for the annulment of Civil Case No. Q-43476.
Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of annulment of judgmentapplies only to final and executory judgment and not to that which hadalready been fully executed or implemented.It is the Council's contentionthat as the judgment in the foreclosure case had already been executed
evidenced by the fact that title to the property in question had beentransferred in its name the judgment can no longer be annulled. TheCouncil's contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra,the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment onforeclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lotsubject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosedthe mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person whobought the same and finally to another individual in whose name theTorrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal.
In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court of Appeals neitheracted without jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in givingdue course to the petition for annulment of judgment as would warrant theissuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the orders of theCourt of Appeals dated November 10 and December 2 and 3,1987 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez,Jr., Feliciano and Bidlin,JJ., concur.