Remedial Law Review 1 || Rule 39, Execution of Judgment
[G.R. No. 132592. January 23, 2002]
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.[G.R.
No. 133628. January 23, 2002]
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.D E C
I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
These two petitions stem from the decision[1] dated September
23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil
Case No. CEB-16765. The first[2] seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals decision dated March 21, 1997, setting aside the orders
dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court.
The second[3] prays for the reversal of the resolution dated
February 10, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-56265,
denying the motion to dismiss.
The antecedent facts, as gathered from the parties pleadings,
are as follows:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
20, decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the
legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the
dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division
of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half
share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children;
the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net
assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession
of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located
at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common
children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify
said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte
motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the
Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to
pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of
respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering
the administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino B.
Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys fees chargeable
against the aforecited 5%.[4]
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez
sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses.
On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written
opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the
reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.
On November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for
moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses but gave due
course to the execution pending appeal. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the
petitioners motion to modify decision is hereby ordered denied.
But, petitioners motion for execution of decision pending appeal is
hereby granted. Consequently, let a writ of execution be issued in
this case to enforce the decision for (1) respondent to vacate the
premises of the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa
Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City and for (2) respondent to
surrender the use and possession of said Mazda motor vehicle
together with its keys and accessories thereof to petitioner.
Atty. Edgar Gica, the Special Administrator, appointed in this
case, is hereby ordered to make the necessary computation of the
value of the one-half (1/2) share of petitioner in the net
remaining conjugal assets of the spouses within 10 days from
receipt of this order.
The petitioner is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of
P1,500,000.00 to answer for all the damages that respondent may
suffer arising from the issuance of said writ of execution pending
appeal and to further answer for all the advances that petitioner
may have received from the Special Administrator in this case
pending final termination of this present case.[5]
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 1997, the appellate
court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 1, 1996 and the Omnibus Order
dated November 22, 1996, insofar as (1) it authorized the release
of the sum of P100,000.00 to private respondents counsel as the
advanced share of private respondent [Aida Baez] in the net
remaining conjugal assets, and (2) granted the motion for execution
pending appeal by ordering petitioner [Gabriel Baez] to vacate the
premises of the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa
Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, and to surrender the use
and possession of the Mazda Motor vehicle to private respondent are
hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of execution dated December 2, 1996 and
the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion filed by the
sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject house and motor
vehicle to the administrator of the partnership are also SET
ASIDE.
As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the conjugal
partnership is hereby ordered to cause the reimbursement by counsel
for the private respondent [Aida Baez] of the amount of P100,000.00
released to him as advance payment of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied Aidas motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed
by herein petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels
Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15, 1997 the entire case
records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Gabriel
had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. On
February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals decided the motion,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitionerappellants motion
to dismiss filed on November 3, 1997 is hereby DENIED. The
appointment of the petitioner-appellee as administratix of the
conjugal properties is hereby AFFIRMED.
In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed
on November 27, 1997, and for failing to pay the required docket
fee within the prescribed period under Rule 41, Section 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appeal instituted by the
petitioner Aida P. Baez is hereby DISMISSED.
In continuance of the appeal of respondent-appellant [Gabriel
Baez], he is hereby ordered to file his brief with the court within
45 days from receipt of this resolution. The petitioner-appellee
[Aida Baez] shall file her own brief with the court within 45 days
from receipt of the petitioner-appellants [Gabriel Baez] brief.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The appellate court also denied herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, hence, the petition in G.R. No. 133628.
On January 19, 2000, we consolidated the two petitions.
Petitioner Aida Baez now avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. G.R. No. 132592
... IN SETTING ASIDE THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY
THE TRIAL COURT OF THE PORTIONS OF ITS DECISION ORDERING RESPONDENT
TO VACATE THE SMALLER RESIDENTIAL HOUSE LOCATED AT THE MARIA LUISA
ESTATE PARK SUBDIVISION, CEBU CITY, AND TO PAY P100,000.00 TO
PETITIONERS COUNSEL AS ATTORNEYS FEES TO BE TAKEN FROM HER SHARE IN
THE NET CONJUGAL ASSETS.[8]
II. G.R. No. 133628:
... IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS
ORDINARY APPEAL AND/OR NOT RETURNING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE NO.
CEB-16765 TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU.[9]
In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer
questions the Court of Appeals decision on the Mazda vehicle
because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential house, she
claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she
and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house
considering that during the entire proceedings before the trial
court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she
posted a bond of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may
suffer.[10] For these reasons, she asked for execution pending
appeal. The amount of P100,000 as advance payment to her counsel
was a drop in the bucket compared to the bond she posted, according
to her. She also suggested as an alternative that she simply be
required to put up an additional bond. She also agreed to submit to
an accounting as regular administratrix and the advance attorneys
fees be charged to her share in the net conjugal assets.
In his comment, respondent denied petitioners allegation that
she did not have the chance to occupy the residential house. He
averred that she could have, had she chosen to. According to him,
as the inventory of the couples properties showed, petitioner owned
two houses and lots and two motor vehicles in the United States,
where she is a permanent resident. Respondent contended that there
was no compelling reason for petitioner to have the judgment
executed pending appeal.
Essentially, the core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386
(1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when superior
circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may
result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being
an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a
tool of oppression and inequity.[11]
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we
are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance
that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were
ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute
respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house,
and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where
she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for
execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary,
the rule rather than the exception.[12]
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance
payment to petitioners counsel was properly granted. We see no
justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals
concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial
courts judgment was already on appeal.
In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action
for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may
be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal,
pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,[13] is
required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should
have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal
within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule
50 of the Rules of Court.[14]
Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not
dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we should direct the appellate court
to return the records of the case to the RTC of Cebu. Thereafter,
according to her, respondent should file his record on appeal for
approval and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the
alternative, she prays that the appellate court retain only the
pleadings and evidence necessary to resolve respondents appeal
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 44[15] and Section 6, Rule 135[16] of
the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case records to the
RTC.
In turn, respondent argues that Section 39 of B.P. 129[17]
expressly abolished the requirement of a record on appeal, except
in appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109,[18]
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. An action for
legal separation, he avers, is neither a special proceeding nor one
where multiple appeals are allowed.
Now, is an action for legal separation one where multiple
appeals are allowed? We do not think so.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in
actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for
partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions
of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind
allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the
rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that
may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the
same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting
the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule
against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The
issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same
marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and
liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and
custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal
separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may
be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from
the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of
legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple
appeals.
Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss
the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require
respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to
the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant
to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are
effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple
appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are
effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6,
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support
therefor in law or jurisprudence.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED, so that the Order dated October 1, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioners
counsel; the Omnibus Order dated November 22, 1996 granting the
motion pending appeal; the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996; and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion by
the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the house and vehicle are
SET ASIDE. Further, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership
is ORDERED to cause the reimbursement by petitioners counsel of the
released amount of P100,000. The Court of Appeals is hereby
DIRECTED to give due course to respondents appeal, and the Division
Clerk of Court of this Court is likewise DIRECTED to promptly
remand the record of these cases to the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-02-1535 March 28, 2003FERNANDO FAJARDO, complainant,
vs.SHERIFF RODOLFO V. QUITALIG, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:As frontline officials of the justice system,
sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the
final stage in the litigation process is completed without
unnecessary delay.
The Case and the FactsIn a Sworn Complaint1 dated April 11,
2000, Sheriff Rodolfo V. Quitalig of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of San Carlos City was charged by Reverend Fernando
Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and/or dereliction of duty.
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) as follows:
"Complainant, who is one of the plaintiffs in [Civil Case No.
MTCC-2266 entitled Spouses Fernando Fajardo and Evangeline Perez
vs. Maria Datuin], alleged that the complaint for ejectment which
they filed on July 17, 1997 was finally decided on July 29, 1999
against the defendant. The decision was appealed to the Regional
Trial Court but it was dismissed on November 29, 1999, and the
decision became final and executory. His lawyer filed a Motion for
Execution, and on March 7, 2000, the Court issued a Writ of
Execution which was brought by the respondent Sheriff to the
defendant Maria Datuin on March 9, 2000.
"Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was
served, defendant asked for a period of two (2) weeks for her to
remove her personal properties on the land. After two (2) weeks he
went to Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be
implemented but he was told that a restraining order was issued,
but when he asked for it, the respondent told him that he left it
in the office.
"Complainant stated that on March 24, 2000, he and his lawyer
went to the court to verify whether a restraining order has really
been issued but they found out that there was none; so he told the
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. Respondent,
accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the
place where the Writ of Execution is to be implemented at 10:00
that morning but when they reached the place, respondent did not do
anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her personal
properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office,
Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining
order was brought to the place, and the respondent told him that
the writ of execution can no longer be implemented.
"Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or showed
partiality in favor of the defendant to his prejudice."2In his
Comment3 dated October 3, 2000, respondent denied the charge. He
asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had already
implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as evidenced by his August
25, 2000 Report of Service.4 He also pointed out that he had made
an inventory of the personal properties recovered from the subject
premises. That he had done so was attested to by defendants mother,
Rufina Datuin, and witnessed by the barangay captain and two
councilors.
The OCAs Finding and RecommendationIn its October 29, 2001
Report,5 the OCA found respondent to have been negligent in the
performance of his duty as a sheriff. It said thus:
"Respondent was negligent in the performance of his duty as
sheriff. The Writ of Execution was issued on March 7, 2000, and was
served on the judgment obligor on March 9, 2000. Respondent
admitted that the judgment obligor promised to vacate the premises
on March 29, 2000, but he was not able to implement the Writ of
Execution because on March 24, 2000, RTC, Branch 56, San Carlos,
Pangasinan issued a Temporary Restraining Order. The Temporary
Restraining Order did not ripen into an injunction so it lapsed
after twenty (20) days from the date it was issued, but the Writ of
Execution was implemented only [on] August 24, 2000 which is more
than four (4) months from the date the restraining order lapsed. It
is the duty of the sheriff to enforce a writ of execution without
delay once it is given to him unless restrained.
"The Writ of Execution was finally and/or implemented only on
August 24, 2000, as shown in the Report submitted by the respondent
in court. Complainant claimed that the respondent was reluctant to
implement the Writ of Execution because a certain Leonardo Martinez
intervened. This allegation of the complainant was not denied by
the respondent in his Comment. Respondent just stated in his
Comment that he implemented the Writ of Execution on August 24,
2000, and made inventory of the personal properties pulled out form
the building and signed by defendants mother and Barangay Captain
Nestor Poquiz. Respondents deliberate refusal to traverse or refute
the charges is an admission that the allegations are true and he
cannot deny them."6 (Citation omitted)
The OCA recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of
P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.7This Courts RulingWe
agree with the OCAs findings and recommendation.
Respondents Administrative LiabilityAs frontline officials of
the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain public
trust in the performance of their duties. Having the forsworn duty
to uphold the majesty of the law, they must see to it that the
final stage in the litigation process is carried out without
unnecessary delay.8A review of the records of this case reveals
that respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000
only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of
Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days
thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is
required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action
taken on a writ of execution. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules
provides the manner in which the execution is to be implemented, as
follows:
"SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of execution
shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days (30) days after his
receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and
state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by
motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty
(30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or
periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings
taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
promptly furnished the parties."
Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation
of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns
thereof.
Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return
of the Writ after duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9,
2000. Nonetheless, because of the request of the defendant and her
promise that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000, he
allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March
24, 2000, he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued
by the RTC of San Carlos, Pangasinan. He averred that he was
finally able to execute the Writ on August 24, 2000 and to submit
his Return thereof on the next day.
We find respondents explanation to be utterly wanting. He is
guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed
to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof,
(2) submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make
periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully
satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the
Reports.
By his own words, respondent admitted his dereliction of duty.
First, as we have said earlier, he should have immediately executed
the Writ when he served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he
was unable to enforce the Writ because another court had issued a
TRO enjoining him from doing so. Third, he should have informed the
parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about his
inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have immediately
enforced it twenty days after its issuance.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the MTCC until
the judgment was fully satisfied and the parties furnished a copy
thereof. Sixth, within thirty days from his receipt of the Writ, he
should have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should
have immediately furnished the parties.
Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if
not outright defiance, of the MTCCs authority. In the absence of
instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a
Writ with reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with its
mandate.
In several cases,9 the Court has said that the failure to make a
return of a writ within the required period is nonfeasance. In
Bautista v. De Castro,10 the provincial sheriff of Zambales and his
deputy were suspended without pay for 30 and 15 days, respectively,
for dereliction of duty. In Barola v. Abogatal,11 a sheriff who had
received a writ of execution on January 15, 1978, but made a return
thereof only on May 22, 1978, was fined a months salary. In Lapea
v. Pamarang,12 a sheriff whose Return was four days late was fined
P2,000.
Casal v. Concepcion Jr.13 ordered the dismissal of respondent
sheriff from the service and the forfeiture of all his benefits,
with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or service of the
government including government-owned and controlled corporations.
After the lapse of two years from the issuance of the original Writ
in a simple ejectment case, he not only failed to exert reasonable
efforts to fully implement its subsequent issuances, but likewise
failed to account for the amounts he got from complainant.
Furthermore, he abandoned his work during the time that the charges
against him were being investigated.
In Concerned Citizen v. Torio,14 the respondent therein was
suspended for a year without pay when he failed to act promptly on
the Writs of Execution issued from 1998-2001. And in Lumbre v. Dela
Cruz,15 respondent, after being found guilty of an inexcusable
seven-month delay in carrying out a lawful Writ of Execution was
fined P5,000. Justifying the penalty, the Court said:
"When a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff,
it is his duty, in the absence of contrary instructions, to have it
implemented forthwith. The sheriff is primarily responsible for the
speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs
originating from the court and its branches, including such as may
be properly delegated to him by other courts. The delay of more
than seven months, from the time the writ of execution was issued
by the court on 07 August 1998 to the time when respondent sheriff
posted the notice of sale or levy on 23 March 1999, is an
inordinately long period for respondent to act thereon. The
importance of the role played by all court personnel in the
administration of justice is never to be taken lightly. It is the
sheriffs particularly who are depended on, and who must properly
attend to, the proper implementation of court decrees and orders,
and they are expected to do so with utmost diligence and
dispatch."16WHEREFORE, Sheriff Rodolfo V. Quitalig is found guilty
of dereliction of duty and is ordered to pay a FINE of five
thousand pesos (P5,000). Considering that he has already retired
from the service, this amount is hereby ordered deducted from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155618 March 26, 2003EDGAR Y. SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA,
respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent
Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001
elections. On May 16, 2001, after the votes were counted and
canvassed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent
Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, which was docketed as SPL
Election Protest No. 1-M(2001). After trial and revision of the
ballots, the trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes
while respondent received only 2,105. Hence, on April 2, 2002, it
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaiming
protestant/petitioner Edgar Y. Santos as the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, in the mayoralty elections
held on May 14, 2001 with the plurality of Seventy Six (76) votes
over and above his protagonist-protestee Pedro Q. Panulaya setting
aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee made by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on May 16, 2001, ordering to pay
protestant/petitioner the costs and expenses that the latter
incurred in this protest in accordance with Section 259 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. 881) and Section 7
of the COMELEC Resolution 1566, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby directed to furnish
copy of the DECISION to the following: Office of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC); Office of the Commission on Audit; Office of
the Department of Interior and Local Government; Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Oriental, in accordance with
Section 15 of the COMELEC Resolution 1566.
SO ORDERED.1Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on
petitioners motion, respondent filed on April 22, 2002 with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for certiorari,
docketed as SPR No. 20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial
court.2 Likewise on April 22, 2002, respondent appealed the trial
courts decision to the COMELEC, where it was docketed as EAC No.
A-12-2002.
The COMELEC, in SPR No. 20-2002, issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, which effectively enjoined the trial court from acting
on petitioners motion for execution pending appeal. Subsequently,
on August 19, 2002, the COMELEC dismissed SPR No. 20-2002 after
finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Moreover, the
COMELEC held that the remedy from the decision of the court a quo
was to file a notice of appeal, which respondent precisely did in
EAC No. A-12-2002. Hence, it directed the trial court to dispose of
all pending incidents in SPL Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) with
dispatch, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division)
RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for
lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on 16 May
2002, as well as the Order issued on 27 April 2002 by the
Commission (First Division), are hereby set aside and lifted,
respectively. The Court a quo is hereby directed to dispose with
immediate dispatch all pending incidents in SPL Election Case No.
1-M (2001) entitled "Edgar Y. Santos, Petitioner/Protestant versus
Pedro Q. Panulaya, Respondent/Protestee."
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. (italics ours)3Thus, on August 20, 2002, the trial
court issued an Order as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby upholds and
approves the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Further, finding
good reasons therefor, the Court hereby directs and orders the
immediate execution of the Decision promulgated on April 18, 2002,
and as prayed for install protestant/petitioner EDGAR Y. SANTOS as
the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, to take his
oath of office and assume the functions and duties of Mayor after
he shall have filed a bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4After petitioner posted the required bond, the trial
court issued the Writ of Execution,5 thereby installing petitioner
as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Accordingly,
petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter assumed the
duties and functions of his office.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition in SPR No.
20-2002.6 After five days, or on August 26, 2002, he filed a
supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002,7 wherein he prayed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioner [herein
respondent] respectfully prays unto this Honorable Commission that
the following Orders of the public respondent:
1. Resolution dated 20 August 2002;
2. Order dated 20 August 2002;
3. Writ of execution dated 21 August 2002;
Be nullified and set aside.
It is further prayed that in the event that the public
respondent has carried out its Order of ousting petitioner [herein
respondent] from his position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, that the same be nullified and considered of no legal
effect. It is likewise prayed that a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER be
issued by the Honorable Commission in order to reinstate the
petitioner to his rightful position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental.
Other reliefs, just and equitable are likewise prayed
for.8Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while his
motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition in SPR No.
20-2002 were pending, respondent filed another petition with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002.9 The petition contained the
same prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR
20-2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioner [herein
respondent] respectfully prays unto this Honorable Commission that
immediately upon the filing of the herein petition, the following
Orders of the public respondent:
1. Resolution dated 20 August 2002;
2. Order dated 20 August 2002;
3. Writ of execution dated 21 August 2002;
Be nullified and set aside.
Pending trial and final judgment, and soon after the issuance,
but during the effectivity of the Temporary Restraining Order, a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued prohibiting, restraining
and/or enjoining the public respondent from further implementing
the highly unjust, irregular and oppressive Orders
above-quoted;
It is further prayed that in the event that the public
respondent has carried out its Order of ousting petitioner [herein
respondent] from his position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, that the same be nullified and considered of no legal
effect. It is likewise prayed that a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER be
issued by the Honorable Commission in order to reinstate the
petitioner to his rightful position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental.
Upon due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of
the petitioner [herein respondent] and against the respondent
[herein petitioner] as follows:
1. Making the Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
permanent;
2. Declaring Resolution dated 20 August 2002, Order dated 20
August 2002, and Writ of Execution dated 21 August 2002; as null
and void for being highly unjust, irregular and oppressively
prepared in utter violation of the Constitutional provisions on
equal protection of the laws and due process, and for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
3. A writ of Prohibition be issued specifically commanding
public respondent to cease and desist from further implementing the
highly unjust, irregular and oppressive Orders above-mentioned are
concerned (sic); and
4. Ordering the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
Such other reliefs and remedies, as are just and equitable in
the premises, are likewise prayed for.10On September 3, 2002, the
COMELEC issued the assailed Order directing the parties to maintain
the status quo ante and enjoining petitioner from assuming the
functions of Mayor. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
In the interest of justice and so as not to render moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition, the Commission (First
Division) hereby directs the parties to maintain the status quo
ante, which is the condition prevailing before the issuance and
implementation of the questioned Order of the court a quo dated
August 20, 2002 and the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto
dated August 21, 2002, in SPL. ELECTION CASE NO. 1-M (2001)
entitled "EDGAR Y. SANTOS versus PEDRO Q. PANULAYA." Accordingly,
effective immediately, private respondent EDGAR Y. SANTOS is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from assuming the duties and functions
of the office of Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until further
orders from this Commission.11Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above Order. However, the COMELEC First
Division did not refer the said motion to the COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, petitioner, citing our ruling in Kho v. COMELEC,12 brought
the instant special civil action for certiorari with this
Court.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 2002, petitioner filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) To Dissolve The Status Quo Order As It Was Based On An
Unverified And Dismissed Petition With Pending Motion For
Reconsideration; And (2) To Refer This Motion To The Commission En
Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure."13
On October 14, 2002, the COMELEC issued a Resolution in SPR No.
37-2002, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the August 20, 2002 Resolution of the respondent judge
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal as well as his
Order also dated August 20, 2002 directing the issuance of the Writ
of Execution and his Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002 are
hereby set aside. Private Respondent Edgar Y. Santos is enjoined
from assuming the function of mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental
until the final determination of the election appeal case.
This resolution shall be immediately executory.
The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) is hereby
requested to assist in the peaceful and orderly implementation of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.14The petition is impressed with merit.
It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that
respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he instituted SPR No.
37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For it
to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.15In the case at bar,
respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR
No. 20-2002 was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for
the nullification of the trial courts order for the execution of
its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplemental
petition, and while the same was very much pending before the
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs
prayed for in the supplemental petition. This is plainly evident
from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the
petition for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so,
respondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the
incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were at his own
instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a favorable
decision in another petition. He filed the second petition on the
supposition that the COMELEC might look with favor upon his
reliefs.
Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely
affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the
court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of
the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes.16 The
most important factor in determining the existence of forum
shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by
a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related
causes or grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs.17Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of
forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should
have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC.18 Willful and
deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the
case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.19The petition for
certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial courts orders for
the execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of
execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers
of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders
in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not
merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
"Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.20We
find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial
court. In its order granting execution pending appeal, it held:
It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected
last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left. Relative
to this Courts jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule
that the mere filing of the notice of appeal does not divest the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve
pending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal
(Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be
overemphasized.21However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid
order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for
execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of
office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated
in Fermo v. COMELEC22 that:
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending
appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons"
and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant
execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of
the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the
term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the
election contest has been pending (italics supplied).23The decision
of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered
on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of
the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with
the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to
the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of
the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to be
respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election
protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
determined to have been chosen by the people.
Between the determination by the trial court of who of the
candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of
Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that
should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case of
Ramas v. COMELEC24 in this wise:
All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to
allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution
should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order." The rationale why such execution is allowed in election
cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique,25 "to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which
is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board
of canvassers." Thus:
Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice
as basis of the right to assume office, subject to future
contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a
court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared
to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their
being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the
board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while,
on the other hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the
parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation
and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for
conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering
judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the
immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals
therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the
court, good reasons therefor.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution
pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC,26bring
back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest"
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past
in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office.
This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the
electorate.27Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in giving due course, instead of dismissing outright, the petition
in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent was
guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial courts
order granting execution pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Order dated September 3, 2002 and the Resolution dated
October 14, 2002 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 37-2002
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the said case is ordered DISMISSED
on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order dated August 20, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, granting
the execution pending appeal of its decision in Election Protest
No. 1-M(2001), and the Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002, are
REINSTATED. The full enforcement of the said Writ must forthwith be
made. The court of origin shall transmit immediately to the
Commission on Elections the records of SPL Election Case No.
1-M(2001), and the Commission on Elections shall dispose of the
appeal in EAC No. A-12-2002 with deliberate dispatch.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152878 May 5, 2003RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs.MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU, BENITO SY
and ANDERSON UY, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:WE ARE PERTURBED that this case should drag this
Court in the banal attempts to decipher the hazy and confused
intent of the trial court in proceeding with what would have been a
simple, straightforward and hardly arguable collection case.
Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute
was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed and set aside to
reinstate the civil case and have it ready for pre-trial are
matters which should have been clarified and resolved in the first
instance by the court a quo. Unfortunately, this feckless
imprecision of the trial court became the soup stock of the parties
and their lawyers to further delay the case below when they could
have otherwise put things in proper order efficiently and
effectively.
On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin
Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy.1 On
26 April 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment.2 On 4
June 1999 the writ was returned partially satisfied since only a
parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
attached.3 In the meantime, summons was served on each of the
defendants, respondents herein, who filed their respective answers,
except for defendant Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without
prejudice as party-defendant as his whereabouts could not be
located.4 On 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ
of attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a quo
denied.5Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial.6
For about six (6) months thereafter, discussions between petitioner
and respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy
and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518, were
undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of respondent Magwin
Marketing Corporation.7 On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
payment scheme for the corporation which on 15 May 2000 was
communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated 10 May 2000
for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as
President/General Manager of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof.8 Only respondent Nelson
Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to
the terms and conditions of the restructuring.9On 20 July 2000 the
RTC of Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order
dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of
petitioner as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time . . .."10 On 31 July 2000 petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial court
of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the case amicably
through a loan restructuring program.11 On 22 August 2000
petitioner notified the trial court of the acquiescence thereto of
respondent Nelson Tiu as an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation
and defendant in the civil case.12On 8 September 2000 the court a
quo issued an Order reconsidering the dismissal without prejudice
of Civil Case No. 99-518 -
Acting on plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Order
dated 20 July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute,
it appearing that there was already conformity to the restructuring
of defendants' indebtedness with plaintiff by defendant Nelson Tiu,
President of defendant corporation per "Manifestation and Motion"
filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probability of
settlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20
July 2000 is hereby set aside.
Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within
15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to
submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of
the required docket fees for re-filing of this case.13On 27 July
2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 99-518 a Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o
date, only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
May 10, 2000 letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin Marketing
Corporations request for restructuring of its loan obligations to
plaintiff but subject to the terms and conditions specified in said
letter."14 This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by
petitioner's Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that
petitioner "could not submit a compromise agreement because only
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000
letter . . .."15 Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the foregoing
submissions of petitioner while respondents Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy neither contested nor
supported them.16The trial court, in an undated Order (although a
date was later inserted in the Order), denied petitioner's motion
to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial stating that -
Acting on plaintiff's [herein petitioner] "Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference," the "Opposition"
filed by defendant Uy and the subsequent "Supplemental Motion"
filed by plaintiff; defendant Uy's "Opposition," and plaintiff's
"Reply;" for failure of the plaintiff to submit a compromise
agreement pursuant to the Order dated 8 September 2000 plaintiff's
motion to set case for pre-trial conference is hereby denied.17On
15 November 2000 petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal from the 8
September 2000 Order of the trial court as well as its undated
Order in Civil Case No. 99-518. On 16 November 2000 the trial court
issued two (2) Orders, one of which inserted the date "6 November
2000" in the undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for
pre-trial in the civil case, and the other denying due course to
the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders dated 8
September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders and
therefore, no appeal may be taken . . .."18On 7 December 2000
petitioner elevated the Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November
2000 and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.19 In the main, petitioner argued that the court a
quo had no authority to compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518
to enter into an amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a
pre-trial conference on the ground that no compromise agreement was
turned over to the court a quo.20On 28 September 2001 the appellate
court promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit and affirming the assailed Orders of the trial court21
holding that -
. . . although the language of the September 8, 2000 Order may
not be clear, yet, a careful reading of the same would clearly show
that the setting aside of the Order dated July 20, 2000 which
dismissed petitioner's complaint . . . for failure to prosecute its
action for an unreasonable length of time is dependent on the
following conditions, to wit: a) The submission of the compromise
agreement by petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice; and
b) Failure of petitioner to submit the said compromise agreement
shall cause the imposition of the payment of the required docket
fees for the re-filing of the case; so much so that the
non-compliance by petitioner of condition no. 1 would make
condition no. 2 effective, especially that petitioner's
manifestation and motion to set case for pre-trial conference and
supplemental motion . . . [were] denied by the respondent judge in
his Order dated November 6, 2000, which in effect means that the
Order dated July 20, 2000 was ultimately not set aside considering
that a party need not pay docket fees for the re-filing of a case
if the original case has been revived and reinstated.22On 2 April
2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied; hence, this
petition.
In the instant case, petitioner maintains that the trial court
cannot coerce the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to execute a
compromise agreement and penalize their failure to do so by
refusing to go forward with the pre-trial conference. To hold
otherwise, so petitioner avers, would violate Art. 2029 of the
Civil Code which provides that "[t]he court shall endeavor to
persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise," and this Court's ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals23 where it was held that the trial court cannot
dismiss a complaint for failure of the parties to submit a
compromise agreement.
On the other hand, respondent Anderson Uy filed his comment
after several extensions asserting that there are no special and
important reasons for undertaking this review. He also alleges that
petitioner's attack is limited to the Order dated 8 September 2000
as to whether it is conditional as the Court of Appeals so found
and the applicability to this case of the ruling in Goldloop
Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Respondent Uy claims that the
Order reconsidering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-518 without
prejudice is on its face contingent upon the submission of the
compromise agreement which in the first place was the principal
reason of petitioner to justify the withdrawal of the Order
declaring his failure to prosecute the civil case. He further
contends that the trial court did not force the parties in the
civil case to execute a compromise agreement, the truth being that
it dismissed the complaint therein for petitioner's
dereliction.
Finally, respondent Uy contests the relevance of Goldloop
Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and refers to its
incongruence with the instant case, i.e., that the complaint of
petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for its
reckless disregard to present an amicable settlement as was the
situation in Goldloop Properties, Inc., and that the dismissal was
without prejudice, in contrast with the dismissal with prejudice
ordered in the cited case. For their part, respondents Magwin
Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy waived their right
to file a comment on the instant petition and submitted the same
for resolution of this Court.24The petition of Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation is meritorious. It directs our attention to
questions of substance decided by the courts a quo plainly in a way
not in accord with applicable precedents as well as the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings; it offers special and
important reasons that demand the exercise of our power of
supervision and review. Furthermore, petitioner's objections to the
proceedings below encompass not only the Order of 8 September 2000
but include the cognate Orders of the trial court of 6 and 16
November 2000. This is evident from the prayer of the instant
petition which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the
appellate court and to direct the trial court to proceed with the
pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 99-518. Evidently, the
substantive issue involved herein is whether the proceedings in the
civil case should progress, a question which at bottom embroils all
the Orders affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On the task at hand, we see no reason why RTC-Br. 135 of Makati
City should stop short of hearing the civil case on the merits.
There is no substantial policy worth pursuing by requiring
petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it has already
discharged this obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
complaint for collection of a sum of money. The procedure for
dismissed cases when re-filed is the same as though it was
initially lodged, i.e., the filing of answer, reply, answer to
counter-claim, including other foot-dragging maneuvers, except for
the rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with since the
re-filed complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to which
the original case pertained.25 A complaint that is re-filed leads
to the re-enactment of past proceedings with the concomitant full
attention of the same trial court exercising an immaculate slew of
jurisdiction and control over the case that was previously
dismissed,26 which in the context of the instant case is a waste of
judicial time, capital and energy.
What judicial benefit do we derive from starting the civil case
all over again, especially where three (3) of the four (4)
defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and
Benito Sy, have not contested petitioner's plea before this Court
and the courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference? Indeed, to
continue hereafter with the resolution of petitioner's complaint
without the usual procedure for the re-filing thereof, we will save
the court a quo invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting should we rule
otherwise.
Going over the specifics of this petition and the arguments of
respondent Anderson Uy, we rule that the Order of 8 September 2000
did not reserve conditions on the reconsideration and reversal of
the Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518. This
is quite evident from its text which does not use words to signal
an intent to impose riders on the dispositive portion -
Acting on plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Order
dated 20 July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute,
it appearing that there was already conformity to the restructuring
of defendants' indebtedness with plaintiff by defendant Nelson Tiu,
President of defendant corporation per "Manifestation and Motion"
filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probability of
settlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20
July 2000 is hereby set aside.
Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within
15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to
submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of
the required docket fees for re-filing of this case.27Contrary to
respondent Uy's asseverations, the impact of the second paragraph
upon the first is simply to illustrate what the trial court would
do after setting aside the dismissal without prejudice: submission
of the compromise agreement for the consideration of the trial
court. Nothing in the second paragraph do we read that the
reconsideration is subject to two (2) qualifications. Certainly far
from it, for in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals28 a
similar directive, i.e., "[t]he parties are given a period of
fifteen (15) days from today within which to submit a Compromise
Agreement," was held to mean that "should the parties fail in their
negotiations the proceedings would continue from where they left
off." Goldloop Properties, Inc. further said that its order, or a
specie of it, did not constitute an agreement or even an
expectation of the parties that should they fail to settle their
differences within the stipulated number of days their case would
be dismissed.
The addition of the second sentence in the second paragraph does
not change the absolute nullification of the dismissal without
prejudice decreed in the first paragraph. The sentence "[f]ailure
on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause
the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing
of this case" is not a directive to pay docket fees but only a
statement of the event that may result in its imposition. The
reason for this is that the trial court could not have possibly
made such payment obligatory in the same civil case, i.e., Civil
Case No. 99-518, since docket fees are defrayed only after the
dismissal becomes final and executory and when the civil case is
re-filed.
It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains
the attribute of finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees
anew because a final and executory dismissal although without
prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil
case as well as any residual power to order anything relative to
the dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is
docketed once again.29 On the other hand, if we are to concede that
the trial court retains jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for
it to issue the assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing
thereon would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on the
part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the setting aside
of the order of dismissal and the reinstatement of the
complaint.
Indubitably, it is speculative to reckon the effectivity of the
Order of dismissal without prejudice to the presentation of the
compromise agreement. If we are to admit that the efficacy of the
invalidation of the Order of dismissal is dependent upon this
condition, then we must inquire: from what date do we count the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which the alleged
revival of the order of dismissal began to run? Did it commence
from the lapse of the fifteen (15) days provided for in the Order
of 8 September 2000? Or do we count it from the 6 November 2000
Order when the trial court denied the holding of a pre-trial
conference? Or must it be upon petitioner's receipt of the 16
November 2000 Order denying due course to its Notice of Appeal? The
court a quo could not have instituted an Order that marked the
proceedings before it with a shadow of instability and chaos rather
than a semblance of constancy and firmness.
The subsequent actions of the trial court also belie an
intention to revive the Order of dismissal without prejudice in the
event that petitioner fails to submit a compromise agreement. The
Orders of 6 and 16 November 2000 plainly manifest that it was
retaining jurisdiction over the civil case, a fact which would not
have been possible had the dismissal without prejudice been
resuscitated. Surely, the court a quo could not have denied on 6
November 2000 petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518
for pre-trial if the dismissal had been restored to life in the
meantime. By then the dismissal without prejudice would have
already become final and executory so as to effectively remove the
civil case from the docket of the trial court.
The same is true with the Order of 16 November 2000 denying due
course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal. There would have been no
basis for such exercise of discretion because the jurisdiction of
the court a quo over the civil case would have been discharged and
terminated by the presumed dismissal thereof. Moreover, we note the
ground for denying due course to the appeal: the "Orders dated 8
September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders and
therefore, no appeal may be taken from . . .."30 This declaration
strongly suggests that something more was to be accomplished in the
civil case, thus negating the claim that the Order of dismissal
without prejudice was resurrected upon the parties' failure to
yield a compromise agreement. A "final order" issued by a court has
been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an "interlocutory order" is one
which does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something
more to be decided upon.31Besides the semantic and consequential
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our ruling in Goldloop
Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant case. In Goldloop
Properties, Inc., we reversed the action of the trial court in
dismissing the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
its case, which was in turn based on its inability to forge a
compromise with the other parties within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the order to do so and held -
Since there is nothing in the Rules that imposes the sanction of
dismissal for failing to submit a compromise agreement, then it is
obvious that the dismissal of the complaint on the basis thereof
amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity assailable by
certiorari. For such submission could at most be directory and
could not result in throwing out the case for failure to effect a
compromise. While a compromise is encouraged, very strongly in
fact, failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less an authority to jettison a civil complaint
worth P4,000,000.00 . . . Plainly, submission of a compromise
agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.32As
also explained therein, the proper course of action that should
have been taken by the court a quo, upon manifestation of the
parties of their willingness to discuss a settlement, was to
suspend the proceedings and allow them reasonable time to come to
terms (a) If willingness to discuss a possible compromise is
expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears that one of
the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding,
offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party
refused the offer, pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If
despite efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
negotiations still fail, only then should the action continue as if
no suspension had taken place.33Ostensibly, while the rules allow
the trial court to suspend its proceedings consistent with the
policy to encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of dispute
resolution, in the instant case, the trial court only gave the
parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a deal. This was, to say the
least, a passive and paltry attempt of the court a quo in its task
of persuading litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.34
Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a middle
ground between petitioner and respondents, we must not interpret
the trial court's Orders as dismissing the action on its own motion
because the parties, specifically petitioner, were anxious to
litigate their case as exhibited in their several manifestations
and motions.
We reject respondent Uy's contention that Goldloop Properties,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals is irrelevant to the case at bar on the
dubious reasoning that the complaint of petitioner was dismissed
for failure to prosecute and not for the non-submission of a
compromise agreement which was the bone of contention in that case,
and that the dismissal imposed in the instant case was without
prejudice, in contrast to the dismissal with prejudice decreed in
the cited case. To begin with, whether the dismissal is with or
without prejudice if grievously erroneous is detrimental to the
cause of the affected party; Goldloop Properties, Inc. does not
tolerate a wrongful dismissal just because it was without
prejudice. More importantly, the facts in Goldloop Properties, Inc.
involve, as in the instant case, a dismissal for failure to
prosecute on the ground of the parties' inability to come up with a
compromise agreement within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
court's order therein. All told, the parallelism between them is
unmistakable.
Even if we are to accept on face value respondent's
understanding of Goldloop Properties, Inc. as solely about the
failure to submit a compromise agreement, it is apparent that the
present case confronts a similar problem. Perhaps initially the
issue was one of failure to prosecute, as can be observed from the
Order dated 20 July 2000, although later reversed and set aside.
But thereafter, in the Order of 6 November 2000, the trial court
refused to proceed to pre-trial owing to the "failure of the
plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement pursuant to the Order
dated 8 September 2000." When the civil case was stalled on account
of the trial court's refusal to call the parties to a pre-trial
conference, the reason or basis therefor was the absence of a
negotiated settlement - a circumstance that takes the case at bar
within the plain ambit of Goldloop Properties, Inc. In any event,
given that the instant case merely revolves around the search for a
reasonable interpretation of the several Orders of the trial court,
i.e., as to whether the dismissal without prejudice was revived
upon petitioner's helplessness to perfect an out-of-court
arrangement, with more reason must we employ the ruling in Goldloop
Properties, Inc. to resolve the parties' differences of
opinion.
We also find nothing in the record to support respondent Uy's
conclusion that petitioner has been mercilessly delaying the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518 to warrant its dismissal. A
complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (a) if he
fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date
for the presentation of his evidence in chief, or when so required
at the pre-trial; (b) if he neglects to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; or (c) if he does not comply with the
rules or any order of the court. None of these was obtaining in the
civil case.
While there was a lull of about six (6) months in the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518, it must be remembered that
respondents themselves contributed largely to this delay. They
repeatedly asked petitioner to consider re-structuring the debt of
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation to which petitioner
graciously acceded. Petitioner approved a new debt payment scheme
that was sought by respondents, which it then communicated to
respondent Corporation through a letter for the conformity of the
latter's officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General
Manager and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof. Regrettably,
only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to
signify his concurrence with the terms and conditions of the
arrangement. The momentary lag in the civil case was aggravated
when respondent Benito Sy for unknown and unexplained reasons paid
no heed to the adjustments in the indebtedness although curiously
he has not opposed before this Court or the courts a quo
petitioner's desire to go ahead with the pre-trial conference.
Admittedly, delay took place in this case but it was not an
interruption that should have entailed the dismissal of the
complaint even if such was designated as without prejudice. To
constitute a sufficient ground for dismissal, the inattention of
plaintiff to pursue his cause must not only be prolonged but also
be unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial
processes. In the instant case, the adjournment was not only
fleeting as it lasted less than six (6) months but was also done in
good faith to accommodate respondents' incessant pleas to
negotiate. Although the dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, that judgment however must not be abused. The availability
of this recourse must be determined according to the procedural
history of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal,
and the diligence of plaintiff to proceed therein.35 Stress must
also be laid upon the official directive that courts must endeavor
to convince parties in a civil case to consummate a fair
settlement36 and to mitigate damages to be paid by the losing party
who has shown a sincere desire for such give-and-take.37 All things
considered, we see no compelling circumstances to uphold the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint regardless of its
characterization as being without prejudice.
In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in
fighting the civil case to the end. A court may dismiss a case on
the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious
exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff
is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on
his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party's conduct
is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to
provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to
default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider
lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired
end.38 In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as
in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than
wield their authority to dismiss.39Clearly, another creative remedy
was available to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of
Civil Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of justice.
Since the failure of petitioner to submit a compromise agreement
was the refusal of just one of herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy,
to sign his name on the conforme of the loan restructure documents,
and the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch in the
proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference was the
best-suited solution to the problem as this stage in a civil action
is where issues are simplified and the dispute quickly and
genuinely reconciled. By means of pre-trial, the trial court is
fully empowered to sway the litigants to agree upon some fair
compromise.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file
its complaint is a dangerous, costly and circuitous route that may
end up aggravating, not resolving, the disagreement. This case
management strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action, perhaps, may
have already been admitted by its adverse parties as shown by three
(3) of four (4) defendants not willing to contest petitioner's
allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes the
useless and thankless duplication of hard work already undertaken
by the trial court. As we have aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate
dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea
nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend
a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges,
they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In
the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice
is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and
final disposition of the cases before the court."40WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 September
2001 and Resolution dated 2 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 62102 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000 and 16
November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, of Makati
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-518, are also REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as these Orders are interpreted to impose upon and
collect anew from petitioner RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
docket or legal fees for its complaint, or to dismiss without
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518, or to preclude the trial court
from calling the parties therein to pre-trial conference, or from
proceeding thereafter with dispatch to resolve the civil case.
Civil Case No. 99-518 is deemed REINSTATED in, as it was never
taken out from, the dockets of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
135, of Makati City. The trial court is ORDERED to exercise its
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518, to CONDUCT the pre-trial
conference therein with dispatch, and to UNDERTAKE thereafter such
other proceedings as may be relevant, without petitioner being
charged anew docket or other legal fees in connection with its
reinstatement. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145260 July 31, 2003CITY OF ILIGAN, Represented by Hon.
FRANKLIN M. QUIJANO in His Capacity as City Mayor, Petitioner,
vs.PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. (PMGI), Represented by Its
President & Chief Executive Officer, FERNANDO M. SOPOT,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:The ascertainment of good reasons for execution
pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Normally, its finding will not be disturbed by a reviewing court,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
The CaseBefore this Court is a Petition1 for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 4, 2000 Decision2 and
the July 14, 2000 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 56952. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED."4The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The FactsThe facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this
wise:
"On October 19, 1998, Mayor Franklin M. Quijano, acting for and
in behalf of [petitioner] City of Iligan, requested from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod for: (a) Resolution authorizing him to open
a domestic Standby Letter of Credit (SLC) in the amount of
P14,000,000.00 in favor of the Land Bank Realty Development
Corporation and/or PNCC with the Principal Management Group, Inc.
(herein private respondent) as the funder/financial managers in
connection with the development of a project on a turn-key basis;
and (b) Resolution authorizing him to open a high yielding
depository account with the Land Bank of the Philippines in the
amount of P14,000,000.00 as a hold-out collateral for the domestic
SLC.
"The City Council approved Mayor Quijanos requests and passed
Resolutions Nos. 1050 and 1051 series of 1998 on October 20,
1998.
"On December 29, 1998, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on a
turn-key arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano, representing the
City of Iligan, with Land Bank Realty Development Corporation
(LBRDC) as General Contractor and Principal Management Group, Inc.
(PMGI) as Developer - Financing Manager. The project to be
undertaken was the construction of a Sports Complex which upon
completion shall be turned over to Iligan City for acceptance and
the issuance of Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to
enable Land Bank Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC.
"The project started on November 26, 1998 despite the fact that
some drawings had not yet been completed, since the MOA provides
for a construction period of one hundred twenty days from the date
of the signing.
"The construction site of the Sports Complex was donated by San
Miguel (Iligan) Enterprises, Inc. wherein the City of Iligan as
donee was bound to provide for all expenses for the transfer of the
occupants therein.
"On or about January 1999, the work on the project stopped due
to the refusal of some of the occupants to vacate the premises
claiming that they have not been paid x x x their disturbance
compensation. By then, PMGI had already accomplished 78.27% of the
contracted project equivalent to P10,957,800.00 of the total
project cost of P14,000,000.00.
"On February 24, 1999, PMGI requested from the City of Iligan
for a deductive change order to enable it to collect the
above-stated amount based on the 78.27% accomplishment of the
project. The City of Iligan, however, claimed that PMGIs
accomplishment was only 52.89% or equivalent only to P6,958,861.59
based on the Accomplishment Report as of February 9, 1999.
"The City of Iligan refused to pay for the reason that the
mutually agreed price of P14 Million shall only be paid after the
completion of the project and acceptance by it and since the
project is not yet complete, no payment can be paid.
"The problem on the payment of the affected occupant, which was
the cause of the work stoppage, was accordingly brought to the
attention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which favorably acted on it
through Resolution No. 99-765 dated June 8, 1999 authorizing the
payment of the affected occupants in the project site.
"On November 8, 1999, PMGI filed a complaint against the City of
Iligan for rescission of the MOA and damages. After the filing of
City of Iligans Answer, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
filed by PMGI which claimed that there was no genuine issue as to
the fact of the obligation of the City of Iligan since it admitted
the accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59 of PMGI
and that the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath
the genuineness of the Letter of Credit and Memorandum of
Agreement.
"An Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
filed by the City of Iligan on December 7, 1999 which stated that:
it never admitted that PMGI made any accomplishment at all but
merely stated that with respect to the work accomplishment, it was
only 52.89% based on the report of Engr. Maatas team; the MOA or
the contract for the construction of the sports complex is between
the City of Iligan, as owner, and the Land Bank Realty Development
Corporation as General Contractor, PMGI only entered into the
picture to support LBRDC in accordance with their own separate
agreement; the grounds of lack of cause of action and jurisdiction
raised in the Answer should be set for hearing; LBRDC as an
indispensable party should be impleaded; and the court does not
have jurisdiction over the case in view of Sec. 4 of Executive
Order No. 1008 which vests exclusive jurisdiction over construction
disputes to Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).
"In private respondents Rejoinder to Opposition, it was alleged
that PMGI and LBRDC are solidary creditors, hence, there was no
need to implead the latter since the suit redounds to the benefit
of LBRDC, there was no disagreement or dispute as to the
accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59, hence,
there was no need to resort to arbitration; and the turn-key
provision in the MOA is not applicable since the 120-day
construction period lapsed due to the failure of the City of Iligan
to perform its obligation.
"In the Order dated December 20, 1999, the trial court granted
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and rendered the following
judgment/order:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, [respondents] motion
is GRANTED.
Partial summary judgment is hereby issued in favor of
[respondent] in the amount of Six Million Nine Hundred Fifty-eight
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty one & 59/100 (P6,958,861.59) Pesos
Only.
The Manager of the LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (Iligan City
Branch), or his authorized representative, or any competent officer
of said bank is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of P6,958,861.59
out of LC NO. 98003/D to Mr. Fernando M. Sopot, President and CEO
of [respondent].
In the event said LC NO. 98003/D is insufficient or has expired,
the Manager and/or any competent officer of said LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Iligan City Branch) is hereby ORDERED to pay to said
Mr. Fernando M. Sopot the amount of P6,958,861.59 out of any
accounts or moneys of [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.
"The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the City of Iligan to
the December 20, 1999 Order was denied in the Resolution dated
January 17, 2000.
"A Notice of Appeal was filed by the City of Iligan on January
26, 2000.
"A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal x x x filed on January
18, 2000 by PMGI which alleged that when the appeal is clearly
dilatory, order for execution upon good reasons may be issued with
the discretion of the court, was granted on January 24, 2000 over
the opposition of the City of Iligan, to justify the same, the
dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted. The trial court
further stated that:
The Court is convinced that there are good reasons to allow the
immediate execution pending appeal. Its adjudication is based on
[petitioners] own admission hence, any appeal would be
unmeritorious and would only serve to delay execution of the final
order subject of the instant motion. The fact that an appeal in
this case if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely dilatory tactic
has been declared by the Supreme Court as a good and sufficient
reason upon which to issue execution of the order under Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"A Demand Letter and Notice of Garnishment, both dated January
26, 2000, were served on even date by Sheriff Montoy B. Lomondot to
herein petitioner."5 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA held that "the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the execution
pending appeal since the appeal filed by petitioner was a dilatory
tactic and is not allowed in the first place."6 Ruling that the
trial court could grant executions pending appeal, provided that a
good reason therefor was stated in a special order, the appellate
court upheld "dilatory tactic" as one such good reason.
The appellate court also ruled that certiorari would not be
allowed in this case, because there were other remedies still
available to petitioner, like the filing of a supersedeas bond to
stay the execution or the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.1wphi1Hence, this Petition.7The IssuesPetitioner
raises the following issues for our consideration:
"A
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the Order of the trial court granting a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal to implement its previous Order dated December 20, 1999
approving respondents Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
"B
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the Order of the trial court that there were good reasons to allow
the immediate execution pending appeal; and
"C
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the Order of the trial court in spite of the latters failure to
take into consideration the provision in paragraph 8 of the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the herein parties."8
(Citations omitted)
Simply put, the main issue is whether the Order granting
execution pending appeal was proper.
The Courts RulingThe Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:Propriety of Execution Pending AppealExecutions
pending appeal are governed by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which reads: