JURISDICTION Judicial StabilityAtty. Cabili vs. Judge
Balindong2011-09-06 | A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
FACTS:Illigan RTC issued a Writ of Execution for the
satisfaction of a decision against MSU, holding the latter liable
for damages for a vehicular accident. The sheriff served a Notice
of Garnishment on the MSU's depositary bank, the LBP. The OSG
opposed the motion for execution but denied. The MSU responded to
the denial by filing a petition with the Marawi City RTC presided
by the respondent judge, for prohibition and mandamus with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.
The respondent judge issued a TRO to temporarily restrain
Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued a TRO
restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing from MSU's LBP-Marawi City
Branch account. Later on, respondent judge dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the judge violated the elementary rule on judicial
stability or non-interference.
Held: YES.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere
by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought
by the injunction.The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution
order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all
the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.
A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power,
for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in
the course of the Court's deliberations, finds no application to
this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third
person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party
claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with
another court which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may
issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for
injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the
judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or
exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper
recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for
relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any
other court, or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for
certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the
Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to
seek recourse through another co-equal court presidedover by the
respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a
writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against
the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ
addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The
duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not
discretionary. The appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf
the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a
higher judicial body.
SPOUSES ALFREDO vs CAG.R. No. 118830 | 2003-02-24
Facts: This case involves three different cases filed in
separate jurisdictions.CFI Manila - Family Savings Bank (Bank)
filed a complaint with the CFI of Manila, for the collection of a
sum of money against its debtor Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc. and
Alfredo Ching, who acted as a surety for Cheng Ban. The Bank
obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants.
Respondent Ferdinand J. Guerrero, the deputy sheriff of the CFI of
Manila, proceeded to levy upon a conjugal property belonging to the
spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching. CFI Rizal Spouses Ching
filed a petition seeking to declare illegal the levy on attachment
upon their conjugal property. The trial court, however, dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction because the subject property was
already under custodia legis of the CFI of Manila.Meanwhile, CFI
MNL favored the Bank and granted its motion for execution pending
appeal (CA). As a consequence, the attached conjugal property was
levied upon and sold through public auction by the deputy sheriff
to the Bank.
RTC Makati - Spouses Ching filed a second annulment case to
declare void the levy and sale on execution of their conjugal
property on the basis that the sheriff had no authority to levy
upon a property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
The decision in the collection case became final.
The RTC of Makati rendered judgment in favor of spouses Ching
and declared void the levy and sale on execution upon the conjugal
property. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC of
Makati and declared that the Makati annulment case is barred by res
judicata because of the prior Rizal annulment case and Manila
collection case.
ISSUE: WON RTC of Makati has jurisdiction.
Held: RTC Makati has no jurisdiction.
RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy
and sale on execution that was ordered by the CFI of Manila, a
co-equal court. The determination of whether or not the levy and
sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly
falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
judgment and issued the writ of execution.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city,
having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to
confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
A separate and distinct case from that in which the execution
has issued is proper if instituted by a "stranger" to the latter
suit. Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part
of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to
the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only
be applied with, and obtained from, the executing court. This is
true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" NO. EXC: what were
executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a
spouse who was not a party to the case.
JURISDICTION OVER SM
HOME GUARANTY CORP. vs. R-II BUILDERS INC., and NHAG.R. No.
192649 | 2011-03-09Facts: NHA and R-II Builders, alongside
petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the
PNB (later replaced by PDB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool
Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for the
implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP).
The parties likewise executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby
HGC, upon the call made by the trustee and conditions therein
specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and
to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per
annum.However, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity
and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face value of
P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect
redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on
HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.R-II
Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA before Branch 24
of the MNL RTC, a Special Commercial Court (SCC); for HGC's failure
to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining
possession of the Asset Pool. Branch 24 of the MNL RTC issued the
writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders.HGC went on
to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative
defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue.R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for
resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original
complaint. In lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of
action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire
Asset Pool.Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order
to the effect, among other matters, that it did not have the
authority to hear the case. As a consequence, the case was
re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent
RTC) which subsequently issued an order which, having determined
that the case is a real action, admitted the aforesaid Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, subject to R-II Builders' payment of the
"correct and appropriate" docket fees. However, R-II Builders filed
a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that
its previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been
admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct docket fees
therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II
Builders' cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its
causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool.Respondent RTC denied HGC's
motion to dismiss; granted R-II Builders' motion to admit its
Second Amended Complaint;HGC filed the Rule 65 petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA, w/c denied the petition
and affirmed the order of RTC.ISSUES:1) Whether a branch of the RTC
which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to
remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the
defects on venue and jurisdiction.2) Whether the case is a real or
personal action; and whether correct docket fees were paid.HELD:
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a
cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred
by the Constitution and the law,the rule is settled that a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant
allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is
filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted.1) RTC Br. 24 did not have the requisite authority or
power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 24 could take on
the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.The
directive for the re-raffle of the case is an exercise of authority
over the case, which authority it had in the same breath declared
it did not have. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left
the impression that its previously issued preliminary injunction
remained effective since the case from which it issued was not
dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle
which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same
subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have
different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this
case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional
defect.
2) R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint both interposed causes of action for
conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entire Asset Pool,
for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the
assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been
assessed and paid. Despite the R-IIs withdrawal of its Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that
respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for
non-payment of the correct docket fees.The test in ascertaining
whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation is by determining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered
capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for
recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered incapable of
pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only
incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief
sought. To our mind, the application of foregoing test does not,
however, preclude the further classification of actions into
personal actions and real action, for which appropriate docket fees
are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract, or the recovery of damages, real actions are those which
affect title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. While personal actions should be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff,the venue for real actions is the court
of the place where the real property is located.In Gochan v.
Gochan, this Court held that an action for specific performance
would still be considered a real action where it seeks the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the
execution of deeds of conveyance of real property. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a
sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental
and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action.(An action for declaration
of nullity of share issue, receivership and corporate dissolution
is one where the value of the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.)Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees
shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding", the
well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed
filing and docket fees.Applying the rule that "a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,77 viz.:1. It
is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.3. Where
the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.For non-payment of the
correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on
the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is
none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant,
respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders'
Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Although a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the
application of the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case, said
decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the
party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to
evade payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of
R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees
for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint
but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second
Amended Complaint.DESPOSITION: REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the regular courts'(RTC
Branch 22, 24) orders. The complaint of R-II Builders first before
Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC of Manila is
hereby DISMISSED.
JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES
CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, et. AlG.R. No.
162416 | 2006-01-31
FACTS: Chester de Joya was among the incorporators and members
of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management
Corporation charged as participants in the conspiracy to commit the
crime of syndicated estafa.
The respondent judge found the existence of probable cause that
justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his
co-accused. De Joya filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest
issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No.
03-219952.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to seek relief from SC or from
the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit
to the court's jurisdiction.
HELD: NO.
There is no exceptional reason (when it is necessary to prevent
the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice) in this case to allow petitioner to
obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its
jurisdiction. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the
accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the
charges against him. It should be remembered that he who invokes
the court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
(Justice Regalado)Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction
and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is
acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory
pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is
acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant
or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the
court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by
law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred
on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined
and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or
by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at
times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to
object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is
the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or
by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal
with the property or subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits
involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a
non-resident defendant.
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case,
even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a
non-resident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
res, as when the action involves the personal status of the
plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant
claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by
publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with
due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code,
while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it
may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or
administrative tribunals.
The documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable
cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
JUROSDICTION OVER THE RES
MELINA P. MACAHILIG vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALITG.R. No.
141423 | 2000-11-15
FACTS: Magalit filed with the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission -- now BFAR-- Fishpond Application for 11 hectares of
land situated in the Municipality of Batan, Province of Aklan.
Macahilig protested Magalit's application contending that for a
period of 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the
five-hectare area included in Magalit's application.
The Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict, Office of the
President and IAC concluded that Macahilig was merely Magalit's
laborer and caretaker.
Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Then it filed a
Motion for Correction of the Implementation for the court to
properly implement the IAC decision.
On September 17, 1992, Judge Maria Carillo-Zaldivar issued the
following Order:
"Finding from the Ma[n]ifestation of counsel on record for the
movant that the two (2) hectares of land she desires to be executed
thru an alias writ is outside the ten (10) hectares awarded to her
by the Fisheries, this Court has no jurisdiction over her
claim.
Subsequently, Dr. Magalit filed a "Petition for Contempt Against
Melina Macahilig," alleging that Macahilig had refused to turn over
Lot 4417 to her. The trial court and CA ruled in favor of
Magalit.
ISSUES:
1. WON the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res - Lot
4417. 2. WON September 17, 1992 Order constitute res adjudicata
barring the June 18 and July 14, 1993 Orders of the trial
court.
HELD:
1. YES. It is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge
the jurisdiction of the trial court. She clearly submitted to its
authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517.
We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it
rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation in
all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a
party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly
reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to
its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's
opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If, by deed or
conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner,
estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent
position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or
injury to the latter.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in
the actual custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by
virtue of the institution of the Petition for a Writ of Execution
filed by the respondents' predecessors in interest. Without taking
actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly
recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the
res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued
the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr.
Magalit.
2. NO. September 17, 1997 Order of the trial court is an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order cannot give rise to res
judicata. Only a final and unappealable judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction can effectively bar
another action that has identical parties, subject matter and cause
of action as the prior one.
Petitioner insists that said Order has become final and
executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it. We disagree.
Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49
of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense,
it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to
do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the
highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that
it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as
distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to
a final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that
settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter
arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial,
denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that
give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only
to those falling under the second category.
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must concur:
(1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. For
example, an order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise
to res adjudicata that will bar a subsequent action, because such
order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until
the rendition of the final judgment.
Strictly speaking, res judicata does not apply to decisions or
orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.
The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 is
evident from the fact that the trial court proceeded to hear and
determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in the Fishpond Case.
PETITION DENIED.
CAUSE OF ACTION
SPOUSES HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES EMBUDoG.R. No. 149554 |
2003-07-01
FACTS: Spouses Huguete instituted against respondent spouses
Embudo a complaint for "Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration
No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorney's
Fees," before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged
that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo Embudo, sold to them a
50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land
situated for a consideration of P15,000.00. However, the TCT was
issued solely in Teofredo's name and that despite demands, Teofredo
refused to partition the lot between them.
Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the RTC is
for the annulment of deed of sale and partition, and is thus
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on the other hand,
insist that the action is one for annulment of title and since the
assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is
P15,000.00, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction
HELD: NO. Designation or caption is not controlling more than
the allegations in the complaint.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in
filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter
portion of the property which they purchased from respondents; it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof.
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Pineda vs. CA and the Department of Education, etc.G.R. No.
181643 | 2010-11-1
FACTS: Pineda entered into a MOA with Lakandula High School
(LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Blas, for a 5-year lease of
the school canteen. The faculty and personnel of LHS questioned the
validity of the MOA.
DepEd, through Usec. Gascon, declared the MOA "null and void ab
initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also ordered to
"cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen.
Pineda filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC, which the latter
granted.
DepEd, this time represented by Asec. Montesa, filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the orders of the
RTC.
CA affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEd's motion to
dismiss but reversed its order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
ISSUES:1. WON Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the
petition2. WON MR s/b filed before going to the CA on certiorari3.
WON CA erred in disolving the Writ of Injunction in favor of Pineda
HELD:1. YES. Respondents were sued in their official capacities.
What was actually being assailed by Pineda in her petition before
the RTC was the implementation of DepEd's existing guidelines with
the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then
principal of LHS.15 As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions
of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute the
petition before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies
of his office - DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will
surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final
resolution of the case before the RTC.
2. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie,
its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however,
recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil
action for certiorari without first filing a motion for
reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,17 it was
written:
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions,
such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo
had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
3. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA
could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already
been accomplished or consummated.20 The DepEd already prohibited
Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the
CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the
operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC's preliminary
writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The
Court agrees with the CA when it explained:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party
may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully.
Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and
uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which
is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the
trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter
such status.
Petition DENIED.
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, et.al vs. SPOUSES PABLO &
ANTONIO RICAFORTG.R. No. 150159 | 2003-07-25
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Pablo and Antonia Ricafort and spouses
Renato and Teresita Villareal entered into a compromise agreement
approved by the court, to divide in half a portion of land under
the name of Spouses Renato and Teresita Villareal.
Not long thereafter, respondents filed a motion to cite Renato
and Teresita in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the
terms of the compromise agreement. Before the motion was heard by
the trial court, the siblings of Renato and his co-heirs to the
subject lot, filed a motion for intervention and substitution of
parties, alleging that Renato and Teresita have waived their
interest in the disputed lot in their favor.
Later, upon realizing that the compromise judgment was already
final, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment.
They insist that the compromise judgment was a nullity because they
were not impleaded as parties-defendants despite the fact that they
were co-heirs of Renato and indispensable parties therein. They
alleged that they only learned of the compromise judgment a year
after it was promulgated.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are indispensable parties?
HELD: NO.
This assertion has no merit given the fact that on its face, the
certificate of title shows that the property is solely owned by
Renato Villareal, married to Teresita Villareal, and without any
indication whatsoever that petitioners have an interest in the
disputed lot. It must be emphasized that respondents cannot be
expected to know details that are not reflected on the face of the
certificate of title. In other words, no one could have guessed
that petitioners were claiming a right over the property by virtue
of succession or, assuming petitioners' allegations to be true,
that Renato only held the property in trust for his brothers and
sisters.
Petitioners are also estopped from denying Renato's absolute
title to the lot.Verily, since petitioners themselves admitted that
they donated and caused registration of the lot in Renato's name,
they cannot now be allowed to defeat respondents' claim by
conveniently asserting that they are co-owners of the lot.
Thus, for purposes of the action for annulment of TCT No.
199241, the only indispensable party-defendant was Renato and his
wife. He is the registered owner of the lot and is conclusively
presumed, for all intents and purposes, to be its owner in fee
simple. A certificate of registration accumulates in one document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held
by its owner which, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title showing exactly the owner's real interest over the property
covered thereby.
VENUE
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, Petitioners, versus HON. JANE
AURORA C. LANTION, et.alG.R. No. 160053 | 2006-08-28
FACTS:
Petitioners defaulted on the payments for peso and dollar loans
to the respondent bank, so the latter foreclosed the mortgaged
lots.
Subsequently, petitioners filed against PDB and its officers a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale
and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting,
Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City,
Batangas. They alleged that only their peso loans were covered by
the mortgages and that these had already been fully paid, hence,
the mortgages should have been discharged. Private respondents
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro
Manila.
The respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she dismissed the case for improper venue.
HELD: NO. Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this
purpose any other venue" are restrictive and used advisedly to meet
the requirements.
Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply
where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly
agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on
the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties
from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to
show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed
as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place.
REAL ACTIONCABUTIHAN vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONG.R. No. 146594 | 2002-06-10
A case for specific performance with damages is a personal
action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties
reside.
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific
performance or for rescission. A suit for such breach is not
capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the
real estate, subject of the said action, should not be considered
in computing the filing fees.
FACTS:
Respondent Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation
entered into an Agreement with Petitioner Cabutihan to execute the
appropriate document assigning, conveying, transferring and
delivering particular lots (situated in the Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal) in favor of the latter, as a
compensation upon accomplishment of some undertakings. Cabutihan
performed and accomplished the undertakings in the agreement but
the respondent failed to comply with its obligations, as embodied
in the agreement, despite petitioner's formal demand.
Cabutihan filed an action for specific performance with damages
before the RTC of Pasig City.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismis alleging improper venue
as one of the issues.They contended that the case is for recovery
of respondent corporation's land or her interest therein. Thus, a
real action or an action in rem.
ISSUE: WON Venue was improperly laid.
HELD: YES.
The action is in personam. The petitioner ultimately sought the
conveyance of real property, not located in the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is an anticipated consequence and
beyond the cause for which the action was instituted.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in
accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of
contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance
or for rescission.
In Commodities Storage cited earlier, petitioner spouses
obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over their land and ice plant
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to pay the loan,
the mortgage was foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the
RTC of Manila, they sued the bank for damages and for the fixing of
the redemption period. Since the spouses ultimately sought
redemption of the mortgaged property, the action affected the
mortgage debtor's title to the foreclosed property; hence, it was a
real action.[18] Where the action affects title to the property, it
should be instituted in the trial court where the property is
situated.[19]
In National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court held
that "an action in which petitioner seeks the execution of a deed
of sale of a parcel of land in his favor x x x has been held to be
for the recovery of the real property and not for specific
performance since his primary objective is to regain the ownership
and possession of the parcel of land."
However, in La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada,[21]
private respondents filed an action for specific performance with
damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly
reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located
in Bago City - - a piece of property which the latter sold to
petitioner while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private
respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of
lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants' ownership thereof.
This Court ruled that the venue had properly been laid in the RTC
of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals,[22] private respondent filed a
case for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon
City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of petitioners,
they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in
Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's
order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific
performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners' position that
the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had
jurisdiction over the original Complaint.
ACTION IN PERSONAM
GOMEZ vs. CAG.R. No. 127692 | 2004-03-10
FACTS:
Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino
mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage
was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public
auction and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses
Trocino sold the property to petitioners who in turn, redeemed the
same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to
convey ownership of the properties to petitioners.
An action for specific performance and/or rescission was filed
by herein petitioners.
Defendants filed for the annulment of the judgment rendered by
the RTC-Cebu in favor of the plaintiffs. They alleged that the
trial court's decision is null and void on the ground that it did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not
validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint.
ISSUE: W/N action is an action in personam
HELD: YES.
To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on
respondents, the nature of the action filed against them must first
be determined. It will be helpful to determine first whether the
action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on
service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.
In the present case, petitioners' cause of action is anchored on
the claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino reneged on
their obligation to convey ownership of the two parcels of land
subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their complaint
that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the appropriate deed
of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or
in the alternative, that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and
spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their down payment
in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted
by petitioners affect the parties alone, not the whole world.
Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
Contrary to petitioners' belief, the complaint they filed for
specific performance and/or rescission is not an action in rem.
While it is a real action because it affects title to or possession
of the two parcels of land, it does not automatically follow that
the action is already one in rem.
The objective sought in petitioners' complaint was to establish
a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to
them the title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from
their father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the
properties to petitioners. Hence, this case is an action in
personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein
respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such,
personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in
order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their
persons.
PLEADINGSNHA versus BASAG.R. No. 149121 | 2010-04-20
FACTS:NHA obtained a Writ of Possession from RTC, ordering
spouses Basa to vacate the lots extrajudicially foreclosed in favor
of the former. Spouses Basa filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
and assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and their
right of redemption.
Issue:W/N the petition complies with the requirements of Rules
on verification of pleadings
Held:
3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the
same are true and correct to the best of my own personal
knowledge."
A reading of the above verification reveals nothing
objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that he had read the
allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on
his personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best"
before the phrase "of my personal knowledge" did not violate the
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the
affiant declared that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct based on his personal knowledge.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information
and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to
secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and
correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made
in good faith.[37] To achieve this purpose, the verification of a
pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming
that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true
and correct of the affiant's personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.[38]
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits,
after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules,
resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided.
CERT. AGAINST FS
HEIRS OF JUANA GAUDIANE et.al vs. CAG.R. No. 119879 |
2004-03-11
FACTS:Felix executed a document entitled Escritura whereby he
sold to his sister Juana his one-half share in Lot No. 4156 covered
by TCT No. 3317-A. However, the Escritura stated that Lot No. 4156
was declared under Tax Declaration No. 18321 and said tax
declaration was for another parcel of land, Lot 4389 and not Lot
4156.
Descendants of Juana, the Isos, claimed that the sale included
not only Lot 4156 but also Lot 4389. So they filed a pleading in
the trial court seeking to direct the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City to cancel OCT 2986-A covering Lot 4389 and to issue
a new title in favor of the Isos. This was later withdrawn after
respondents' predecessors-in-interest, Gaudiane, opposed it on the
ground that the Isos falsified their copy of the Escritura by
erasing "Lot 4156" and intercalating in its place "Lot 4389."
The Isos again tried their luck to acquire title in their name
by filing in 1975 a case for quieting of title of Lot 4389 but the
same was dismissed without prejudice.
The Isos later filed another action for quieting of title,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6817, but it was again dismissed by the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, due to the failure of the
plaintiffs (the Isos) to prosecute and to comply with the orders of
the court. When the judgment became final, respondents sent a
letter to Ines Iso asking her to surrender the possession of the
one-half portion of Lot No. 4389 comprising Felix' share. The Isos
refused.
The respondents filed the present case for partition of Lot
4389, accounting of proceeds and damages against herein
petitioners.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: WON the defense of ISOS in present case is barred by res
judicata
Held: YES.
We cannot delve anymore into the legality and validity of the
order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 6817 because it has long
become final and executory for failure of the petitioners to file
an appeal. In accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure,[8] said order had the effect of judgment on the
merits although no trial was conducted because it did not contain
any statement that the case was dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of a similar future action. As such, based on the principle
of res judicata, the petitioners are barred in another action
(involving the same subject matter, parties and issues) from
raising a defense and from asking for a relief inconsistent with an
order dismissing an earlier case with prejudice.
Considering the similarity of petitioners' defense in this case
with their main averment in the case for quieting of title,
petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership
of Lot 4389.
In Medija vs. Patcho, et al. we ruled that a case for partition
and an action for quieting of title have identical causes of action
and can therefore be the subject of res judicata.
For reasons of public policy, res judicata cannot be waived by a
party because the time and energy of the State and the taxpayers
are wasted by the re-litigation of settled issues.
Genuiness of a Document
SPOUSES DONATO vs. CAG.R. No. 102603 | 1993-01-18
Facts: In this case, the petitioners possessed a land which is
not the same land they hold title to. The land in dispute is Lot
5145. owned by the deceased mother of the respondents, but is still
in possession of the petitioners, who likewise owned Lot no. 5303
(foreclosed mortgage from Carolina, original vendee) located near
the land in question. The petitioners believed that Lot 5145 is the
very same Lot No. 5303 over which they hold the title of ownership;
that it was a matter of oversight on the part of the Bureau of
Lands, that the identity of these two parcels was not reflected in
their title. According to the petitioners, Ochave's (original
vendor) ownership over the same parcel finds support in the Deed of
Sale executed by Basilio Rarang, who allegedly derives his
authority as petitioners mother's agent from a Special Power of
Attorney duly executed in his favor.
Issue: 1. WON the SPA executed by the mother of the respondents
is null and void.2. WON respondents deemed admitted the genuiness
and execution of the SPA.
HELD: The SPA is null and void and all subsequent transactions
involving Lot 5145 and springing from the SPA are also null and
void. Consequently, on this alone, petitioners' claim of ownership
should be rejected outright.
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
rule on implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document subject of an action or defense, the same is not without
exception. One such exception is when the adverse party does not
appear to be a party to the instrument. Respondents Lolita and
Ernesto were mere witnesses to the SPA in question and as such,
they cannot be considered as parties to the instrument. Moreover,
the same document should not be afforded a presumption of
genuineness and due execution. In view of the various discrepancies
found by the trial court, it lacks the veracity to entitle it to
any degree of credibility.
Negative Pregnant
PHILAMGEN and TPI vs. SLI, DVAPSI and CAG.R. No. 87434 |
1992-08-05
Facts:SLI is an interisland carrier used by a foreign common
carrier to tranship to Davao two consignments of cargoes covered by
Bill of Ladings. The cargoes took on board at Baton City, LA for
shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao. Both
cargoes consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company
of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics. However, when the
cargoes were discharged from the interisland carrier into the
custody of the consignee, it was found out that some bags were
either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the bags were torn,
the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially
emptied, but, worse, the contents thereof contaminated with foreign
matters and therefore could no longer serve their intended
purpose.
The petitioners filed for damages due to respondents negligence
and the trial court ruled in their favor. However, the CA reversed
the lower court's decision, in effect dismissing the complaint of
petitioners.
Issue:WON respondent court erred in upholding, without proof,
the existence of the so-called prescriptive period.
Held: Although the bills of lading that contains the shortened
periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action
against the carrier were never offered in evidence, the litigation
obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are practically
the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably
involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the
determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of
prescription, since that defense was so considered and controverted
by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of
by the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as
its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant
pleadings. In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative
defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer, except that the
bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in
evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not
prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in this
case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere references
thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under
the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of lading, such
bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which
under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action
or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of which are
deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party. The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to
both a cause of action or defense based on said documents
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments in
question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or
written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no
evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be
contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when the due
execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified
denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts
to a denial, it has the procedural earmarks of what in the law on
pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an
admission of the averment it is directed to. Thus, while
petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being
contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and
said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.
WAIVER OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA and PASTORG.R. No. L-47847 |
1981-07-31
Facts:Respondent Manuela Pastor applied for the registration
under R.A. 496 of 13 parcels of land. The respondent claims that
she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of
the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30)
years.CFI granted the application. Upon appeal, the petitioners
contend that some of the lots are subject of a Cadastral case,
which either way, whether the decision in such case had become
final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under
Act No. 496 cannot prosper because of the principles of res
adjudicata and litis pendentia. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC
in toto.
Issue: WON the defense of res judicata and/or litis pendencia
were deemed waived by failure to set up during the trial.
Held: YES. The oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein,
did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res
adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on
the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a
procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal.
Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no
uncertain language, provides that:
"SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. -
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived; . . ."
The defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion
to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded
for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata
was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE still hold that,
factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of. The
decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the
application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a
cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final
decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration
Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does
not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D.
No. 1073).
SPECIFIC DENIAL
RP, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.DE NERIG.R. No.
139588 | 2004-03-04
FACTS:OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of Deeds of CDO
City as compliance to Decree No. N-361749 issued by the CFI in its
decision granting the heirs of Graciano their application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title for Lot
2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, which was also approved by the Land
registration Commission and certified by the Bureau of Forest
Development as alienable and disposable.
Subsequently, the OSG thru the Director of the Bureau of Lands
sought for the annulment of the OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of
the property, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction over the person
and on the subject matter, as well as due to non-compliance with
Comm. Act No. 141, which mandates that a copy of an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title should be duly served on
the Director of the Bureau of Lands; and non-compliance with
Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which requires the plan to be
re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in
this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor
of the private respondents and that the CA committed a reversible
error in affirming the same.
Held: YES.
As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the private respondents had
the burden of complying with the statutory requirement of serving
the Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their
application and amended application, and to show proof of their
compliance thereon.
The question that comes to fore then is whether or not the
petitioner was burdened to prove its allegation that the Director
of the Bureau of Lands had approved Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The answer
to the question is dependent on the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the private respondents admitted the same, impliedly
or expressly, in their answer to the complaint and in their
pleadings.
"As regards the Report required by the provisions of Section 3
of PD 239, the records show that a Report has been made to the
Director of Lands, Manila, by the Regional Office of the Bureau of
Lands in Cagayan de Oro City. "
The private respondents failed to specifically deny the
petitioner's averment in its complaint that LRC Plan SWO-150 had
not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The
private respondents thereby impliedly admitted that the Director of
the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan as required by
Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239.
In light of the private respondents' admission, the petitioner
was relieved of its burden of still proving that the Director of
the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan of Lot 2821
before the trial court rendered its decision.
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The submission
of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by
the Director of Lands, the same are of no value.
Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with
the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in the final analysis,
the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by
the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The
test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which
party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence
competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he
seeks to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party
would be successful if he offers no evidence.
However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the
petitioner in the trial court to prove the material allegations of
its complaint. This is provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court which reads:
Burden of proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the
defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts in
issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven by
evidence except the following:
(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial
to the issues.
(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the
answer, provided they have been sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts
between the parties; as well as those admitted by the party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
(5) Facts which are legally presumed.
(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite
party.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie
case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered
will prevail; it does not shift the burden of proof.[36] In this
case, the personnel of the Land Registration Commission and the CFI
in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of
serving a copy of the application and its appendages to the
petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner to prove..
A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and
opt to adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case
for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary
evidence.
On the first issue, the rule is that only questions of law may
be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held
that the finding of facts of the appellate court may be questioned
in this Court, where as in this case, the latter's judgment is
based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are
contrary to the admissions of the parties, or when certain relevant
facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would justify
a different conclusion.
COUNTERCLAIM
SPOUSES JAVIER vs. IAC G.R. No. 75379 | 1989-03-31
FACTS: Private respondent has been charged with estafa under
B.P. Blg. 22 in the RTC of Makati for issuing a check subsequently
dishonored. The civil case was not reserved. Subsequently, private
respondent filed a civil action - a complaint for damages - against
the petitioners in the RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar. In this
complaint, the defendants were charged with having inveigled
Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the criminal case
in the Makati court. The complaint in effect explains why he issued
the check for which he is now facing prosecution.
Issue: WON respondent can raise the reason for issuing the check
in another court, in a separate civil action for damages filed by
him against the petitioners.
Held: NO. As the civil action was not reserved by the
petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
case in the RTC of Makati.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court
of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other cases,
the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the
court shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no
payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party
without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the
Clerk of Court.
It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as
defendant in the criminal charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil
action based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was
also before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute
the claim for damages made by the petitioners. This he should have
done in the form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged
deception by the petitioners. In fact, the counterclaim was
compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent
upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the
criminal action.
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set
up where the following circumstances are present: (1) that it
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim. 12
All these circumstances are present in the case before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
As Chief Justice Concepcion said in Aytona v. Castillo: 14
Good faith, morality and propriety form the basic foundation of
claims to equitable reliefs . . . Needless to say, there are
instances wherein not only strict, legality, but also fairness,
justice and righteousness should be taken into account.
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments for
harassment and the circumvention of the law through cunning
manipulations of the procedural rules by counsel who may be too
clever for their own good. Rules of procedure are intended to
expedite rather than complicate, and much less to obstruct, the
administration of justice. There is no excuse why the bench and the
bar should not know this principle by now.
The applicable provision is Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of
Court, reading in full as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has
been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
CALIBRE TRADERS, INC. vs. BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC.G.R. No. 161431
October 13, 2010
FACTS:
Calibre was one of Bayerphils distributors/dealers of its
agricultural chemicals within the provinces of Pangasinan and
Tarlac. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to Calibre
after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total
amount of P1,751,064.56. As Bayerphils authorized dealer, Calibre
then enjoyed discounts and rebates. Subsequently, however, the
parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations
of these discounts. Calibre, although aware of the deadline to pay
its debts with Bayerphil, nevertheless withheld payment to compel
Bayerphil to reconcile its accounts.
Calibre then filed a suit for damages, accusing Bayerphil of
maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating
Calibres accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it,
charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and
favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business.
Bayerphil counterclaimed the unpaid accounts of Calibre, but failed
to pay docket fees on the belief that their counterclaim is
compulsory.
Issue: WON Bayerphil's counterclaim is permissive.
Held:
YES. Bayerphils counterclaim is permissive, but the trial court
should have given it the opportunity to pay the docket fees since
it did not avoid paying said fees.
Court has already laid down the following tests to determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the
issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's
claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that
the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the court? The fourth test is the compelling
test of compulsoriness.
Bayerphils suit may independently proceed in a separate action.
Although the rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on
the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each
other are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. The
counterclaim for collection of money is not intertwined with or
contingent on Calibres own claim for damages, which was based on
the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions involve the
presentation of different pieces of evidence.
All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees
on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory.
VERIFICATION
Attys. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs. Judge RALPH
S. LEE and Sheriff DE LA CRUZ JR.A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518 |
2004-01-15
FACTS: Petitioners filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Lee with manifest partiality, incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law; and Sheriff de la Cruz Jr. with unjust,
oppressive, irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of
attachment.
The complainants are counsels for the defendants in a civil case
for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. Properties
of the defendants were attached bu later on discharged because of
the bond deposited by the defendants. Subsequently, respondent
judge through an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw cash deposit,
ordered the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and
released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was
rendered.
In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that the Complaint was
fatally defective, because complainants did not have legal
personality to file it; neither did they present affidavits,
verified statements or any authority to represent their clients.
Further, the Complaint did not contain a certification of non-forum
shopping, but instead had a handwritten verification not sworn to
or subscribed before an administering officer.
Issue: WON the complaint is fatally defective.
Held: NO.
Specious is the argument of respondent judge that complainants
have no legal personality to file the instant Administrative
Complaint against him. His contention that the allegations
contained therein are hearsay also deserves scant consideration.
Rule 140 allows the institution of disciplinary proceedings against
judges, not only upon a verified complaint -- supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents substantiating the allegations --
but even upon an anonymous one. Complainants herein have the
requisite personal knowledge and have, in fact, executed a joint
Complaint-Affidavit and substantiated their allegations with
pertinent documents.
The verification in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after
the jurat, is sufficient in form and substance. Such verification
is a clear affirmation that they are prepared to establish the
truth of the facts pleaded. In fact, the lack of it is "merely a
formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal." This Court
may order the correction of a pleading, "if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice." The jurat
that preceded the verification simply evidences the fact that the
Affidavit was properly made and sworn to before the officer
certifying it. Furthermore, a certification against forum shopping
is not needed in this case; Rule 140 makes no such requirement.
However, With respect to the charges against respondent judge,
we find that his grant of the withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an
Order he later reversed by ruling that the deposit be returned to
the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not an act
revealing gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the
outcome of a trial -- specifically, the satisfaction of a pecuniary
obligation.[12] Such order is enforced through a writ that may be
issued at the commencement of an action,[13] commanding the sheriff
to attach property, rights, credits or effects of a defendant to
satisfy the plaintiff's demand.[14] Hence, the property of a
defendant, when taken, is put in custodia legis.[15]
In order to prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on
property, the defendant (also called the adverse party) may make a
deposit or give a counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in
the order of attachment. Such deposit or counter-bound is intended
to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff (also
called the attaching party or the applicant to the writ) may
recover in the action.[16] After a writ has been enforced, however,
the adverse party may still move for the discharge of the
attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a
counter-bond to secure the payment of any judgment[17] the
attaching party may recover in the action.[18] The property
attached shall then be released and delivered to the adverse party;
and the money deposited shall be applied under the direction of the
court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may be rendered in
favor of the prevailing party.[19]
In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered[20] the
withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and released it in
favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This
action was clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after
the discharge of an attachment, the money deposited shall stand in
place of the property released.[21] However, the inadvertence[22]
of respondent judge was not gross enough to merit sanction.
ESTEL vs. DIEGOG.R. No. 174082 | 2012-01-16
FACTS: Respondents and petitioners entered into a contract of
sale of a parcel of land. After receiving the amount of P17,000.00
as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and
material possession of the subject property to respondents;
respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject lot. However the petitioner, together
with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the
subject property and dispossessed herein respondents thru the use
of force and violence. The respondents then filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for
TRO.
In petitioners' Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims, she denied the material allegations in the
Complaint. MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was
affirmed by the RTC and CA.
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner raised the issue that
complaint states no cause of action because the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are
defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
ISSUE:WON the complaint should have been dismissed due to
non-compliance with the requirement regarding verification.
HELD: NO.
Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court
again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even
granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a
quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would
have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as
there is compliance with the requirement regarding
verification.
A reading of respondents' verification reveals that they
complied with the above quoted procedural rule. Respondents
confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which
were true and correct based on their personal knowledge. The
addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own
personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section
4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that
the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on
their personal knowledge.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in
the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct.
As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a
reading of respondents' Verification/Certification reveals that
they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any
similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best
of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The
only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been
filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court.
This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been
substantial compliance on the part of respondents.
It is settled that with respect to the contents of the
certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of.22 This is because the requirement of
strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification
of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded.23 It does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant
case.
MEDADO vs HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSINGG.R. No. 186720 |
2012-02-08
FACTS: Spouses Medado) and the Estate of Consing, as represented
by Soledad, executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for
the former's acquisition from the latter of the property in Cadiz
City identified as Hacienda Sol. Records indicate that the sale
included certain parcels of land. As part of the deal, Spouses
Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with PNB. Subsequent
to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject
lots to the government via the DAR's Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
program. The Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, Branch
44 of Bacolod City an action for rescission and damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 00-11320 against Spouses Medado, PNB and the
Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the
spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. In the meantime
that civil case for rescission was pending, LBP issued in favor of
the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian
reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered by the VOS. It
prompted Spouses Medado to institute an action for injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO, with the RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz
City. They asked that the following be issued by the trial court:
(a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from releasing
the remaining amount of the VOS proceeds of the lots offered by the
Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from
receiving these proceeds; and (b) writ of mandatory injunction to
compel LBP to release the remaining amount of the VOS to the
spouses. The RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order granting Spouses
Medado's application for the issuance of writs of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. However, this was nullified
and set aside by the CA upon appeal.
Issue: WON CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari
filed before it, notwithstanding alleged deficiencies in its
verification and certification against forum shopping.
Held: The requirements for verification and certification
against forum shopping in the CA petition were substantially
complied with, following settled jurisprudence.
The petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition filed with the
CA was defective for being signed only by Soledad, instead of by
all the petitioners.
Records show that Soledad signed the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of her
co-petitioners by virtue of a SPA attached to the petition filed
with the CA, which provides that their attorney-in-fact
Soledad.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the authority of Soledad
includes the filing of an appeal before the CA, including the
execution of a verification and certification against forum
shopping therefor, being acts necessary to protect, sue, prosecute,
defend and adopt whatever action necessary and proper in relation
to their rights over the subject properties. In any case, we
reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who
share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the
fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or
certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from
proceeding with the action.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of
strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification
of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Furthermore, we have
consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not
a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that
the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or
act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
LIM versus NAPOCORG.R. No. 178789 | 2012-11-14
FACTS:
This case is about the consequence of a party's failure to
explain in his motion why he served a copy of it on the adverse
party by registered mail rather than by personal service.
Respondent NPC filed an expropriation suit against Lim before
the RTC of Lingayen covering Lots 2373 and 2374 that the NPC needed
for its SualCoal-Fired Thermal Power Project. Pending the case,
respondent spouses Arcinues filed a motion for leave to admit
complaint in intervention, alleging that they owned and were in
possession of Lot 2374, one of the two lots subject of the
expropriation. On January 7, 1997 the RTC granted the Arcinues'
motion and but Lim and the NPC failed to file their answers to the
complaint-in-intervention. The Arcinues filed a motion for judgment
by default. Lim sought to expunge the motion on the ground that it
lacked the requisite explanat