Civil Affairs Handbook France Section 2A

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ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

FRANCESECTION 2 AMILITARY

GERMANGOVERNMENT

OVER EUROPE- FRANCE

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ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL M 52-2ACivil Affairs

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

FRANCESECTION 2A.:MILITARY

GERMANGOVERNMENT

OVER EUROPE - FRANCE

I- I I - I Il - I - I r I I---- C _ , - I- -

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NUMBERING SYSTE ,OFARMY SERVICE FORCES MLANUAL

The main subject m atter of each. Army Service Forces Manual is indicatedby consecutive numbering within the following categories:

Ml - M99Mloo - M199M200M300M400M500M600M700M80014900

- M299- M399-M499- M599- M699- M799- M899- up

Basic: and AdvaedTrinningaArmypecialized Training Program and Pre-Induct ion Training

Personnel and MoraleCivil AffairsSupply and TransportationFiscalProcurement and ProductionAdminis t ra t ionMiscellaneousEquipment, Materiel, Housing and Construction

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,Washington~ 25, D. C., May 16 , 194

Ara Service Forces Manual M 352 - 2A, German Military Government overEurope - France, has been prepared under the supervision of th e ProvostMarshal General, and is published fo r the information and guidance of


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This study on German Military Government Over Europe - France, was prepared for theMILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

by th eRESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES


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INTRODUCTION

Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbook.The basic purposes of civil affairs officers are (1) to assist the

Commanding General by quickly establishing those orderly conditions whichwill contribute most effectively to the conduct of military operations,(2) to reduce to a minimum the human suffering and the material damageresulting from disorder, and (3) to create the conditions which will makeit possible for civilian agencies to function effectively.

The preparation of Civil Affairs Handbooks is a part of the effortto carry out these responsibilities as efficiently and humanely as possible.The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies (which will depend uponchanging and unpredictable developments). It should be clearly understoodthat they do not imply any given official program of action. They arerather ready reference source books containing the basic factual informa-tion needed fc- planning and policy making.

This handbook on the German Military Government in France is one of


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CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOKS

TOPICAL OUTLINE

1. Geographical and Social Background

2. Government and Administration2A German Military Government Over Europe - France

3. Legal Affairs

4. Government Finance

5. Money and Banking

6. Natural Resources

7. Agriculture8. Industry and Commerce

9. Labor

10. Public Works and Utilities


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GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER EUROPE

A. Principles of Nazi Occupaion M 356 - 2BB. German Contrls-in Oicpied Euoe

1. The German Arny in Occupied Europe MA 356 - 202. The SS and Police in Occupied Europe MA 356 2D

3. Military and Police Tribunals in OccupiedEurope MA 356 - 2E

4. The Nazi Party in Occupied Europe P 356 - 2F5. Technical and Economic Troops in Occupied

Europe M 356 - 2G6. Economic Controls in Occupied Europe MA356 - 2H7. Labor Controls in Occupied Europe P 356 - 2J8. Propaganda in Occupied Europe MA 356 - 2K9. The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia PA 356 - 2L


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TLOF COTTSPage

I. THE PEIOD ~'OP TIC~ 1A. le tMeasres1

B. 'Economic Measure 2C. Administration of Pars 3

II . THE GENERL ORGANIZTION MILIARYM MN 4A, Introductio 4B. Paris Zone 41. General Organization '42. Functional Controls 73. Special Zones 94. Judicial Affairs 10C. Vichy Zone 11

1. Armistice Commission 112, Legislative and Executive Powers 113. Special Zones 12III. GERMAN POLICE ACTIVITY 13


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1. French Controls before German Invasion2. Industrya. The Law of 16 August 1940

b. The Law of 10 September 19403. Agriculture

a. General Organizationb. Agencies to Improve French Agriculture

4. German Use of French Machinery of Control5. German Organizations in France Eixercising

Xoonomic Controls6. Price Control7. German Penetration into French 'Economic Life

a. Acquisition of Interests by th e Germansb. German Supplies of Certain Raw Materialsc. Liquidation of French Investments Abroad

C* Controls over the Use of Manpower1. Labor for Production in France

a. Labor Organization under the ThirdRepublic

b. Labor Organization under Vichyc. Vichy Labor Charter

2. Labor for German Auxiliary Army Groups inFrance

a. Organisation Todtb. Techniache Nothilfec. NSKK3. Labor fo r Production in Germanya. Stages of Recruitment


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Controls overTaxationOccupation Co:

Foreign Trade

E. Controls over Transportation and Communication1. General2. Railroad Transport3, Motor Transport4. Inland Waterways5. Commercial Aviation6. Maritime Shipping

V. ANTI-JYISH LEGISIATIA. Anti-Jewish Measures in GeneralB. German Anti-Jewish Legislation in Occupied France

and Alsace-LorraineC. French Anti-Jewish LegislationD. Financial Measures against Jews

1. Occupied Zone2. Unoccupied Zone

VI. MAPS1. Departments of France2. Regional Division, 1941


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GE WAN MILITAY GOV T OVER ZRQPEI. TfHE PERIOD OP OPERATIONS

A. EARLIEST MEASURESThe period of operational activities in Prance was very short,beginning on 12 May and coming to an end as a result of the Armistice of25 June.As th e Germans advanced through Prance, their first administrative actin any locality was th e posting of a notice Jf indicating that th e Germanm ilitary commanders would assume all powers necessary to assure security ofth e army and to maintain order. Local officials were to continue to per-form their duties upon condition that they maintain a loyal attitude towardth e German Army. Each person to whom the German m ilitary authorities gave

an order was to comply with it. This notice was uigaed by th e Commanderin Chief of th e German Army, who thereby conferred th e above powers on sub-ordinate military commanders.

A number of measures which came into immediate effect in Prance werealready prepared before th e German armies set foot on French soil. One ofthese provided for th e application of German law by German m ilitary tribunalsor special tribunals. / Another gave th e force of law to all decrees andregulations issued during th e occupation by competent m ilitary authorities.The laws of th e occupied country were to rann in force only insofar asthey were compatible with such decrees and regulations. / These measuresclearly form part of a general pattern for occupation, probably used in allcountries where outright extermination was not intended.


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An ordinance of 18 May 1940 provided for the exercise of quasi-Judicial functions by local commandants in that they might punishpersons not subject to the military penal code. 3/B. ECONOMIC IfEASURES

A series of ordinances and decrees concerning economic matterswas issued toward the end of May 1940. By order of the Commander inChief, Army authorities were empowered to insure the operation ofbusiness whose usual owners or managers had fled by appointing tempor-ary administrators. 2/ Another ordinance, dated 20 May, which was alsoapplied in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg listed commoditieswhich were subject to immediate requisition. Anyone possessing suchcommodities was required to make a monthly declaration giving the quan-tity and location of such goods in his possession. Ownership of goodsmight not be transferred without the consent of the military author-ities. / Military authorities also had power to make detailed regula-tions to carry out the provisions of an ordinance of the Commander inChief controlling imports and exports of all the western occupied count-ries. / The Commander in Chief decreed on 23 May 1940 that customsduties, taxes, and imposts should continue to be collected accordingto laws in force in the country before 10 May unless military author-ities ruled otherwise; military authorities were also empowered toimpose other duties payable in currency. 5/ he supervision of indus-trial, agricultural, and forest production was also put in the hands ofGerman military authorities. W

It is clear that in this inital period all orders proceeded fromthe military branch, most being signed by the Commander in Chief.Economic and financial controls came into effect upon the orders of the


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The U"ilitrbefehlshaber Paris ordered the blackout of the city B/ issuedorders against the hoarding of food supplies, / and decreed the freez-ing of prices and wages. / A detailed proclamation of 20 June summedup various orders already given. A! It defined the offenses which wereto be tried in German military' courts: assistance to non-German militarypersonnel, aid to civilians fleeing occupied territory, transmission ofinforrmation abroad to enemies of Germany, relations with war prisoners,offenses against the German Army or its comnand, gatherings in streetsor distribution of tracts or organizing meetings without permission inadvance from the German commandan.t, cessation of work or incitementthereto. Local authorities and services were ordered to continue func-tioning and their heads made responsible to the German authorities forthe performance of their duties; this provision was supplemented bya more detailed decree of 26 June 1940. 5/ Another duty of the ) iili ii -befehlshaber was to proceed with restitution of German property seizedby the French as a war ieasure. French authorities holding such propertywere ordered to declare it to him and German claims for restitution wereto be submitted to him.~

Shortly after the Armistice, on 8 July 1940, the Army was ableto turn over the problems of government to a special military administra-tion, utilizing many civilian specialists.


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II. THE GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTA. INTRODUCTION

German administration in France is conducted in two zones, distinctas to the theoretical degree of German control and as to the means throughwhich control is exercised. The distinction tends to become less sharpas the occupation government remains longer in effect, but is preservedat least in form.

The relation between France and Germany is nominally that of twoindependent states. German diplomatic representation in France con-tinues. By the terms of the Armistice, France agreed to the occupationof part of its territory (in which part th e occupation authorities shouldhave those governmental powers necessary to the occupation) and agreedto the exercise of certain special controls in the unoccupied portionby authorit ies deriving their powers from th e Armistice Commission whichwas set up to supervise the execution of the Armistice. The FrenchGovernment has some degree of authority throughout the whole pf thenational territory except Alsace and Lorraine, which are in the processof annexation to the Reich. In the part of the territory (now mili-tarily occupied), which is not under th e administrative control of thegovernment of occupation (hereafter called the Vichy Zone in contra-distinction to the Paris Zone), the Vichy Government has ful l authority,subject to the international controls of the Armistice Commission. Italso has authority to legislate for the occupied Paris Zone, subject toprior approval of its legislation by German authorities.

For the purposes of German civil administration, the Paris Zone


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-I C- ~-ll__L5-its troops on French territory. The military administration serves notonly to supervise the French but also to supply and maintain the WesternArmy group in France; therefore there is the closest liaison between thefield Army and the military administration on all levels.

The chief of th e military administration in France is the MilitaryGovernor (Militarbefehlshaber), an office at present held by Generalvan Stulpnagel. He has administrative authority over the military sub-divisions in France (for operational purposes they are under th e higherauthority of the Field Army itself) and heads the administration of civilaffairs. Military affairs are directed by a Military Staff (Kommandostab),and matters of civil administration by an Administrative Staff (Verwalt-ungstab). The Administrative Staff has a number of functional s-IF

visions including one for economic matters. and one for propaganda. Forpurposes of military administration the Military Staff works throughvarious territorial subdivisions of the Paris Zone. The largest of theseis the District (Militarverwaltungsbe~zirk), of which there are four:

Headquarters Approximate area

Military District A Paris Territory north and eastof line Caen-Orleans-Troyes-Nancy

Military District B Angers West of above line andnorth of Loire River

Military District C Dijon Eastern France south ofline Caen-Orleans-Troyes-Nancy

Military District


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The Military Governor exercises Germn legislative power in France.Decrees and laws are signed by him and are executed by local Germanofficials, avting either directly or through the local French officials.The Feldkomnaxidanten often make detailed regulations implementing thedecrees f tie Military Governor. German legislation is in practiceconfined to a fairly narrow range of subjects; it has been found moresatisfactory to inspire French .authorities to enact desired legislationin such fiells as economic and social legislation, control of varioustypes of asseoiations, control of product ion, etc. The subjects dealtwith by Gerznn legislation are usually such as directly affect th esecurity of the Army -- definition of th e competence of militarytribunals, provision fo r th e prevention and punishment of sabotage, con-trol of means of propaganda, con-rol of all communications with . theVichy Zone acid with foreign countries, enactment of regulations forcivilian defense, control of stocks and stabilization of prices (thishas been turned over more and more to French authorities), etc. Onenotable field in which German legislation was the rule was anti-Jewishlegislation. The Military Governor enacted laws similar to those ofGermany for the Paris Zone; the Vichy Government enacted anti-Jewishlaws, but they were not as severe as those of the Paris Zone. TheVichy Government may make laws which apply in th e Paris Zone as wel l asin the Vichy Zone, provided the laws have the prior approval of Germanauthorities. Furthermore, established French laws continue to apply solong as they are not incompatible with German purposes.

Executin; of German decrees is carried out by the Military Staff,the Administr'ative Staff, and French officials. The chief of the Ad-ministrative Staff is Dr. Schmidt, who, in a press interview, described


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were made for the Paris Zone the approval of the German authorities hadto be obtained. Thus there was built up a personnel composed of French-men who could, for all practical purposes, be relied upon faithfully tocarry out German orders. The fact that often German offices werelocated in th e same buildings as those of th e French officials providedan initial check on the activity of the latter.

2. Functional Controls. The manner in which certain problems arehandled will now be described in order to shed light on the problemof functional controls in general. The control of communications is oneof vital concern to the maintenance and security of German militaryforces. Radio stations were seized outright, and all transmittingapparatus was ordered to be delivered immediately to the German militaryauthorities. j/ Another very early order limited postal service to theParis Zone, forbad the use of telegraph and teletype, and restrictedtelephone service to local networks except for assigning the French Govern-ment certain long-distance lines and certain lines between the two zones.Later these regulations were somewhat relaxed; postal service with certainforeign countries was resumed and, finally, service across the demarcationline. 2 Letters from the Paris Zone to th e Vichy. Zone go through th eGerman censorship office, then to a German military post office (DeutscheFeldpost) which delivers them to French exchange post offices on thedemarcation line. The observance of the prohibitions is assured throughFrench post offices. Some of the many German women auxiliaries who cameto France on the heels of th e German army first operated, and latersupervised, the operation by French personnel of telephone and telegraphservices; thus German authorities were able to keep a constant checkon suspect lines. Long-distance telephone calls and the sending oftelegrams was finally permitted, subject to authorization from the


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by French authorit ies was sufficient to satisfy German requirements.German control at th e demarcation line is, however, severe and undis-guised. Rules for crossing are set forth by th e M ilitary Governor Iand applied with all th e force at Germany's command.

An important instrument of German occupation is th e control of th evarious channels of propaganda. To exercise that control directly orthrough French authorit ies is the business of th e Propaganda Sectionof the Administrative Staff, at present under Major Schmidke. Allpublications in the Paris Zone were required to go to German authoritiesfo r permission to continue or resume after the occupation; in many casesa German political director was installed in th e editorial offices ofthe publication to supervise its work. Individual publishing firmsreceived a list of banned books which were to be withdrawn from saleand destroyed. The impression given by German authorit ies was that th eimposition of this list resulted from an agreement with the French as-sociation of publishers. This association now performs a preliminarycensorship of new publications which is subsequently reviewed by thePropaganda Section. / An instance of direct German action is an orderby the Military Governor forbidding the use of certain history textsin schools. 3 The enforcement of such an order would naturally devolveprimarily upon the French prefects, who exercise local control overteaching personnel, as well as on th e French M inistry of Education,whose control is national in scope. In the matter of cinemas, authori-

zation of the head of the Administrative Staff is necessary to run a motionpicture house. Request for such authorization is, however, addressedto th e French association of directors of motion picture houses. 4The head of the Administrative Staff also passes on all films before


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gm-out through a commission located at th e prefecture. The actual orderfor expropriation is issued by th e mayor of th e commune in which theproperty is located. Owners are compensated from funds in th e hands ofth e commission. French authorit ies cooperate with German in receivingth e arms which th e population is required to surrender. Such arms areturned in to th e Feldkommandantur, Kreiskommandantur, local city hall ,or local French police or gendarmerie. I/

German local offices exercise control over German nationals inFrance. A ll civilians are required to register with th e Kreiskommandanturand to report any change of address. 2 Claims for indemnification fo rwar damage to German nationals or German property are handled by theFeldkommandant with jurisdiction over th e place iwhere th e damage wascaused, subject to appeal to th e M ilitary Governor. In investigatingth e claim, th e Feldkommandant must consult th e Landesgruppe Frankreichof the organization of the Nazi Party abroad, if th e claimant 's resi-dence was in France, or the Beratungsstelle fur Velksdeutsche in Parisif his residence was in Germany.

3. Special Zones. German authorities have established a number ofspecial zones in which they take special measures and insist upon some-what tighter controls than in the rest of the occupied territory. Oneof these is the so-called Forbidden Zone, including the northern andeastern parts of France; th e line starts from th e Atlantic coast at themouth of the Somme River, proceeds eastward through Amiens, passes some-what south of Laon, apparently follows the course of the Aisne, passesthrough Chaumont an d east of Dijon, finally ending near the southernen d of Lake Geneva. (This description of th e course of th e line is onlyapproximate; in any case th e line was shifted locally from time to time.)


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only in the most urgent cases may German authorities be approacheddirectly. _/ Recently there has been still further l imitation, atcertain strategic points with regard to persons allowed to remain.Certain cities with important military or naval installations have beenordered evacuated by all except essential civilians, while possiblesites of invasion have in some cases been ordered cleared of all exceptGermans.

The northern Forbidden Zone presents the special problem of re-settlement in an acute form. A large part of its population fled beforethe oncoming Germans. Although the Armistice provided in general termsfor the return of French refugees through the aid of the French Govern-ment, the Armistice Commission ruled that they might not return im-mediately to certain zones. The restriction was not long retained inthe Coastal Zone. It persisted, however, in the Forbidden Zone, whereit was apparently part of th e clear policy of replacing French populationby Germans. No prisoners of war from this area were returned, an d heavylevies were made for labor in Germany. 2/

4. Judicial Affairs. Legal matters in France remain largely in th ehands of the French courts. German decrees and regulations must, how-ever, be enforced as th e law of th e land. 3/ French prosecutors mustturn over to German m ilitary tribunals all records of cases involvingth e following matters: offenses against the German Army or th e personnelattached to it, offenses committed in buildings or other space turnedover to th e German Army, an d offenses against German regulations for th esecurity of th e Army or the accomplishment of the purposes of th e occupation./ The German tribunal wil l examine the record and, if it is interested,conduct th e trial; otherwise the papers wil l be returned to French authori-


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preclude civil trial and punishment for the same offense. 1/ Authoritiesempowered to inflict such penalties are the Kreiskommandanen (Feld-komnandant where there is no competent Kreiskom andant), the Koimzn ndantof Greater Paris, and officials of the Sioherheitspolizei. I

French authorities are required to take part in German judicialadministration by executing sentences of imprisonment imposed by Germantribunals when the German authorities so request. Mnother type of casein which French authorities may be required to help Germans is therecovery by force of fines imposed as disciplinary measures by Kreis-kommandanton (o r other persons authorized to take such action) TheKreiskommandant may order the French percepteur to effect recovery . Ifthere is a :plea for suspension of th e sentence, th e Kreiskomnmandant mayrequire the te to make investigations, examii neBses, andsubmit to the Kreiskommandant an advisory report written in German.C. VICHY ZONE

1. Armistice Commission. As pointed out above, while the VichyZone remained unoccupie German control functioned through the ArmisticeCommission, which was an institution on an international plane. Itsdirect action was confined mostly to examination of incoming ships andsupervision of airfields. Special commissions were established at allthe principal airfields of the Vichy Zone for the control of personneland material. The staff at L~yon consisted of 138 officers and non-com-missioned officers and about ten inspectors. J A report from Switzerlandof December 1942 indicates that the Armist ice Commission at Wiesbadenwas dissolved because the occupation of the Vichy Zone made it superfluous.

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prefect who would pass their orders on to such French officials asthe regional military commissioners (comisires ionaux miltaires)for billeting; labor inspectors (insaecteurs 4a travail) for laborrecruits; inspectors of industrial production (insecteuars die -roductionindutrlle) for merchandise vouchers; road and bridge engineers(inrnie rs cam, m ss e chaussees) for transport; and treasury agents(treoriers--oay gdnraux) for financial matters. Such an office isknown as a Verbindunasstab and corresponds roughly to th e Feldkommandanturenof the Paris Zone. That at Lons-le-Saulnier (Jura) had a staff of abouttwenty-f ive persons. It also dealt with incidents between the Germantroops and the population. A German office was said to be located inevery town of ten thousand or more; smaller towns were not the seat ofpermanent military headquarters, although temporary headquarters mightbe established there from time to time. 1 In Toulouse German adminis-trators were attached to the french offices for highway police, statepolice, and the protection of state property for war industries. /German police personnel were to be found throughout the Vichy Zone(police activities will be described in detail below).

3. Special Zo es. in the Vichy ione as in the Paris Zone, certainareas were set aside which were especially important from a strategicpoint of view. One stretches the length of the Spanish frontier andothers cover almost the whole length of the Mediterranean coast. Theunua l restrictions as to travel, entry, and residence apply here as intli special areas of the Paris Zone. Evacuations have been carried outso strategic points, although to a somewhat less extent than in the ParisZore. A rumor that the entire population of able-bodied men was to beevacuated from a wide strip along the Mediterranean coast is unsubstanti-


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- 13 -III. GERMAN POLICE ACTIVITY

A. ORGANIZATION OF FRENCH POLICE UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLICBefore the German invasion the normal pattern of French policeorganization placed the police of all except the largest municipalitiesunder the control of the mayor as chief police officer. In addition tosuch police, a national police organization provided forces for thelargest cities and performed investigative, detective, and counter-

espionage services for the nation as a whole. Military police (gendarmerie)were held in reserve to be called in as shock-troops by civil authoritiesin case of need. Control at the top was vested in the Ministry of Justicefor judicial police functions (principally the pursuit and bringing tojustice of criminals), the Ministry of the Interior for administrativepolice functions (general surveillance for the purpose of preventingcriminal activity), and the Ministries of War and Navy insofar as thesecontrolled the various units of gendarmerie.B. ORGANIZATION OF FRNCH POLICE UNDER VICHY

Under Vichy, the police of all towns of over ten thousand populationwas placed under state rather than municip control and made dependentupon the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Laval, whose cooperation withGerman authorities is notorious. In towns down to two thousand population(and in exceptional cases, in smaller ones) the elected mayors and munici-pal councils were set aside and replaced by men appointed by Laval. Thusthe local police services came to be dependant on the central powerthrough these municipal authorities. Collaborationist attitudes on the


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C. GEIAN~POLICE ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE

The two most prominent types of German police in France are theGestapo and the Fridgndarmerie, There is no direct evidence of thepresence of any units of Geheime Feldpolizei or of Schui o BarrackBattalions. The Gestapo maintains representatives in many of the Frenchministries and their subdivisions. It has headquarters in Paris and asub-office in Vichy. j/ The chief of the Gestapo is responsible toOberg, of the SS, who is in turn responsible to Hiiumler. Oberg is proba-bly on th e same level as th e head in francs of the Wiji (see under "Eco-nomic Controls") or the chief of the Administrative Staff from the pointof view of subordinat ion to the Military Governor. The Gestapo usesFrench state police units to conduct its inquiries and may also haveassumed some direction over the French police charged with the surveillanceof subversive movements. A report of a refugee from France states thattwo members of the french political police in Lyon (members of the State'police) are in the pay of the Gestapo. Some of the reported activitiesof the Gestapo in France are the tracking down of French patriots, Jand the control of passports and foreign currency at the frontiers. TheSD headquarters in Rennes announced that, as of the beginning of 1943,it would have sole responsibility for surveillance over, and impositionof restrictions on, foreigners living in French occupied territory J(it is not clear whether this means the old Paris Zone, or the whole ofFrance). Gestapo and SD officials are considered civil police; theywear either plain clothes or the usual SS uniform.

In addition to Gestapo and SD, units of the Feldendarmerie, amilitary pblice, function in France. They are stationed at variousKommandanturen, where they maintain discipline among the civilian


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D. INFLUENCE OF GERMAN POLICE ON FRENCH POLICE

Short ly after th e German occupation of the Vichy Zone the officialpress agency, OFI (LGerman-controlled successor to Havas), declared thatFrench police continued to operate with full independence and under thesole authority of the French Government. However, much other evidencegives th e lie to this assertion. A member of the French amainistrationnow escaped from France described the situation in M arseil le in thespring of 1943 as follow.: about 1,500 German police were there, in-cluding Gestapo, Sichrhetsoelize1, and Feldzendarmerie. Division ofjurisdiction among them is confused, one group often launching on an in-vestigation already being handled by another. Relations with Frenchpolice are through the Intendent de Police, an officer appointed by theMinister of the Interior to cooperate with the regional prefect. Germanpolice intervene in French police matters at will, and when they them-selves fail to solve a case usually blame the French police. J/ TheGestapo in Toulon makes many arrests arising from difficulties betweenthe French population and the Germans. J/ The Gestapo arrived atMontpellier with the nominal purpose of searching for clandestine radiotransmitters. Actually its purpose was to instruct and control Frenchpolice. A large number of French-speaking German police were expectedto appear as Vichy police inspectors for this purpose. 1i

Very prominent among the recent activities of the German police,probably particularly of the Gestapo, is the r ounding-up of persons tosend to work in Germany. They carried on round-ups in the Vichy Zonebefore the occupation of that area. Such raids are usually accomplishedby forces composed partly of French police and partly of German, andare led by German police officials.


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Another security branch which is set up under the command forWestern Europe and which undoubtedly operates in Prance was announ'edin sarch 1943. It is under the jurisdiction of von Rundstedt, Commanderin Chief of the German Armed Forces in Western Europe, and its head isPolice General Oberg, head of the Gestapo in Prance. Special unitslocated in all industrial centers make up this new department. Theirfunction is to combat civilian uprisings which may take place in case ofan Allied landing. 1/


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IV. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL, CONT'OLS

A. CONTROL AND EXPLOITATION OF EXISTING STOCKS1. W ehrwir tsohaf ts-und Ruatun samt. The German administrators

in Franoe have placed emphasis on one phase or another of economiccontrol, according to the principal purpose of the Germans at thet ime. The initial period, from the first occupation until after theBattle, of Britain, was conceived as a short-term affair, in th e fullexpectation that the battle would be a quick victory for Germany andthat economic reorganization of France could then be accomplished atleisure:. Inthis period the German object was to drain France ofwhatever stocks of finished products , food, or ra w materials mightbe of immdia te use to Germany. The t ime element was so conceivedthat the. placing of orders for manufacture in France or the recruit-in g of French- labor for manufacture in Germany was of secondaryinterest. The W ehrwirtschafts-und Riltungsat (WiRU), responsibleto th e Supremei Coomnand an d to the Ministry of Armaments, was th e in.struaent fo r the initial looting. A Special War Economy and ArmamentBoard had to be established in France. It-administers not onlyspecial purchasing offices and special guarantee offices, / bu t alsofour /i. 7 Armaments Inspection Corps, each of which disposes of itsown field offices, economic troops, and salvage squads. These units.... work for th e m ilitary needs of Germany, whether these are directneeds, like economic support of the German troops stationed in France,or indirect ones, like shipping to Germany th e raw materials uncovered


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2. Reichskreditkassen. The WiRii units function best in th eearliest stages of occupation, when they take over abandoned stock-piles or installations, protect them from further damage, and convertthem where possible to German use. However, in more settled circum-stances outright confiscation is undesirable, inasmuch as Germanauthorities wish to avoid arousing the resentment of the civilianpopulation. The Reichskreditkassen, one fo r each occupied country,are the German answer to the problem. They are banks of issue attachedto the Army and directed from Berlin. j/ Their principal function isto supply invading forces with currency fo r necessary purposes -- aspecial currency which has no value whatsoever outside the particularoccupied country and which is exchangeable with native currency at.arate fixed by the German authorities. 2/ With this money the Germanspurchase what suits their fancy -- they can pay generous prices becauseGermany has no intention of redeeming the notes -- and the sellerstake this money to French banks, which are forced to exchange it forFrench francs at the official rate. The local banks pass the money onup until it reaches the central bank of issue, where it can only bepiled up uselessly. Thus Germans "purchase" what they want at th eexpense of the French Government, while the individual sellers areoften well satisfied with their payment. 3

To facilitate the above operations, it is important to the Germanauthorities that they know where stocks of goods are to be found.Hence an ordinance of 20 May 1940, applying to the Netherlands, Belgium,Luxembourg, and France, rules that all merchandise listed in the annexto the ordinance must be considered requisitioned (except a'reasonablesupply" found in private households), and ownership of it may not be


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4. Enemy and Jewish Property. It is not clear to what extent theGermans seized enemy property in France. Again, as in the case ofgoods liable to requisition, such property had to be declared to aGerman office in Paris. l After the first order extensions weremade to include Russian property (31 July 1941) 2 and Americanproperty (22 December 1941). The latter was to e declared to aspecial Office fo r the Declaration of American Property in Paris; itsaddress is, however, the same as that of the Office for the Decla-ration of Enemy Property. / All American interests were taken underGerman .rusteeship. American plants are being operated to producefor Germany. 4

Another source of loot fo r Germany was Jewish property. A finewas imposed on the Union des Israelites (a compulsory associationestablished by a French law of 29 November 1941) by the German MilitaryGovernor. The proceeds of the levy were to be deposited at theReichskreditkasse. French authorities were made responsible for theassessment and collection of this fine. 5 (See below, V.)

From the Bank of France the Germans seized gold deposits belong-ing to Belgium and Poland. Belgium thus lost $228,000,000 and Poland$62,000,000 worth of gold. 6/ This gold had been received with theunderstanding that the Bank of France would, if possible, keep itfrom falling into German hands. This promise was not kept. In th ecase of the Belgian gold, it was shipped back into Occupied Franceafter it had been sent to Dakar.

5. Control of Franco-German Economic Collaboration. A veryimportant French agency has been set up at German request to deal


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"Special Section" in charge of negotiations with the occupying powers.In the Ministry of Industrial Production there was, according tothe decree of 30 April 1941, a Service des Affaires Exterieures incharge of all questions pertaining to the application of the Armistice,to the relations between France and the occupying powers, and eventu-ally to the fulfillment of those conditions of the peace treaty whichwould refer to industrial production.B. CONTROLS OVER INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

After the intensive period of direct requisition of stocks forGerman use, German economic administration in France was concernedprimarily with turning French capacity for production, both in-dustrial and agricultural, to German use.

1. French Controls before German Invasion. Before the war, bothindustry and agriculture had remained essentially free of statecontrols. Heavy industry, in particular the manufacture of steeland aluminum and the mining of coal, were in many cases under extra-governmental associations which were of great influence but which werevoluntary in form. In the agricultural field, too, powerful associ-ations, like those of wheat growers or sugar-beet producers, repre-sented the most important farmers and were active in promoting protec-tionist policies; these also, however, were voluntary in form.

Many wartime agencies changed this outlook and paved the way tothe new Vichy setup.


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two fundamental laws and, in agriculture, by a long series of lawsand decrees.

2. Industry. The two fundamental laws referred to above arethose of 16 August 1940, creating the Organizing Committees, and of10 September 1940, creating the Central Office for Allocation ofIndustrial Products.

a. The Law of 16 August 1940. A threefold necessity under-lay the law, according to M. Rene Belin, Secretary of State forIndustrial Production and Labor, in his introductory Report. Privateactivities needed to be brought within the framework of nationalrequirements; remedies had to be found for those industries whichsuffered from a lack of raw materials or from insufficient demands;special assistance needed to be granted to those activities whichwere of particular importance to the majority of consumers. To attainthese aims "French production required a powerful and efficient leader-ship in which state's and employers' representatives would be closelyassociated."

As a first step, the government suppressed the pre-war nationalorganizations which had represented in the past, and on a nationalscale, the specific interests of employers and workers; the groundof the suppression was that their activity had been much morepolitical than economic. The dissolved organizations included:

Confederation Generale du TravailConfederation Generale de la Production FranoaiseComite des Forges


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left by the Germans to the Vichy Government, which acted on the adviceof the Committees. This was a further extension of the responsibili-ties of the Committees.

Membership in the Organizing Committees is determined by anagreement between governmental authorities, namely, the functionariesof the Ministry of Industrial Production, and employers in the fieldwhich is to be placed under a Committee. Labor is completely bannedfrom the new industrial setup.

Organizing Committees are placed under State Control; a govern-ment commissioner, who is practically a functionary of the Ministerof Production, must attend their most important meetings and approveor disapprove their most important decisions (Articles 3 and 5).But members of the Committee are not state employees. They areusually private business men selected by the government from a listof names prepared by the producers in every field. All expendituresof the new committees are paid from fees which are levied on allmembers of the industry concerned; their accounting is submitted tothe approval of the treasury (Art. 4).

The Organizing Committee have the broadest powers; their decisionsare compulsory for all members of the industrial group concerned. Infact, some activities which originally belonged to the Committeeshave been shifted to new agencies; allocation of raw materials issupervised by the several boards for the allocation of raw materialswhich will be described hereafter; with regard to price control, theCommittees only act in an advisory capacity. But their control overproduction is practically unlimiteds plants may be closed, workers


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Ministry of Production. Its chief was, for a long time, M. JeanBichelonne, but it was announced recently (December 1943) that GeneralInspector Salmon was in charge of the central operations of allocat-ing raw materials. This Board includes a small staff of statis-ticians, economists, and administrators. Around this Central Board,there are twelve Sections dealing with-specific commoditiess.

Pig Iron and Steel;Non-ferrous Metals;Coal;Petroleum, Gasoline, Liquid Fuels;Chemicals;Textiles;Paper and Paper Containers;Leather and Hides;Rubber and Carbon Black;Lumber;Industrial Fats and Soap;Building Materials;Miscellaneous Commodities.Each section is in charge of the allocation of the raw materials

which it supervises to industrial users. It supervises the purchases,inventories, and sales of these raw materials. It can:

(1) compel producers to sell to certain consumers, andconsumers to buy from certain producers;

(2) prohibit or restrict the use of raw materials forcertain purposes;


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more important and influential than the Organizing Committees them-selves. They are a true and pure bureaucracy with no special in-dustrial problems, and their social and human implications, to solve.

Their members (Allocators and their staffs) do not belong tothe regular French civil service; the Allocators are selected bythe Minister of Industrial Production, generally among former highemployees of French industry, and they select in turn their ownstaff. They are usually much better paid than regular French govern-mental employees of similar rank; in fact, there is no clear-outdistinction between the bureaucracy of the organizing Committees andthat of the Sections of Allocation with regard to background andsocial origin. It even happens that an Allocator is simultaneouslythe responsible leader of some important organizing Committee; suchhas been the case for textiles.

The Organizing Committees serve as the channel through whichGerman orders are passed to individual enterprises. The procedurein placing an order is as follows: once the necessary permissionfor placing the order in France has been secured in Germany, theorder is forwarded to the Zentralauftragsstelle (Central OrderOffice) in Paris. If Germany grants raw materials for filling theorder, as is the case with steel, German vouchers for the rawmaterial accompany the order and must be exchanged for Frenchvouchers to be given to the enterprise taking the order. Beforefinal placement the Zentralauftragsstelle,, which is responsible tothe Ministry of Economics, must obtain the sanction of the EconomicsSection of the German Administrative Staff in France, responsible

guardian of


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purchase prices fixed by the Secretary of State for Agriculture, anddispatch the supplies collected. These commissions operate underdepartmental directors. 1/ If collection is difficult, requisitionsmay be issued to producers through the mayors of communes, and, ifnecessary, the gendarmerie may be ordered to seize the goods. TheGermans have named agricultural leaders (Landesfuhrer), one for eacharrondissement, to keep detailed accounts of the production of indi-viduals. 2/ Joint Committees performing functions similar to thoseof the Allocation Offices have been set up for special products,such as wheat and other cereals, wine, dairy produce, horses andmules, fisheries, vegetable oils and fats, and meat. These productsare removed from the competence of the Allocations Offices. A centralcommittee is charged with the allocation of the products, such asfertilizers or feed, most indispensable for agriculture. 3

Agricultural producers are grouped together in a corporativesystem, membership in which is compulsory. This is composed ofcommunal units, regional units, and a national unit, the whole understate control. Regional Chambers of Agriculture, which replace theold departmental chambers, are composed half of delegates from theregional corporative units and half of. ppointees of the Secretaryof State for Agriculture.The regional prefect, representing the national government inthe field, has economic powers which he exercises in conjunctionwith an Intendant des Affaires Economiques, who is usually a career

administrator with much knowledge and experience. The prefectexercises supervisory control over all other national personnel deal-


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has traced this improvement back to a special office which the Germanmilitary authorities created in order that it might work exclusivelytowards better French agriculture. V

Th e Ostland Society, created originally to operate in Poland,was charged with the exploitation of "abandoned" farm lands in theForbidden Zone. According to th e Hamburger Fremdenblatt of 8 October1941, this organization has a main-o iicen Paris with branches inAmiens, Laon, Mezieres-Charleville, Nancy, and Dijon. J FieldCommanders (Feldkoammandanten) in th e regions where the Ostland isactive name administrators for abandoned holdings. / The Charlevilleheadquarters is reported to be headed by a German civilian and tomaintain subordinate offices for the arrondissements of Sedan, Rethel,Vouziers, Rocroi, and Stenay. Under these offices are officials foreach canton and for each commune. The last are often Austrians,Czechs, or Poles. In 1942 the name of the organization was changedto Reichsland, and the Amiens and Laon sections were merged, theothers remaining the same, By the end of 1942, 141,208 Germansettlers were official reported; the number may actually be muchhigher. / Cultivation is carried on in large tracts, fences havingbeen knocked down. The product goes directly to Germany. Laborersused are French prisoners of war, deported Jews, and Poles.

According to French sources, the Reichsland Society had intro-duced by th e first part of 1943 about 18,500 Poles in Eastern Franceas follows:

Departments Men Women Children Total


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and a single typist can administer an entire section. j A reportfrom a reliable source, recently escaped from France, indicatesthat economy of personnel was not the rule in the field offices.Three to four hundred German civilian officials concerned with eco-nomic and financial matters were stationed in Toulon (this probablyincludes personnel attached to other agencies as well as to Dr.Michel's economics section).

5. German Organizations in France Exercising Economic Controls.The Ve rb nd uness et ranrech is an outgrowth of the former GermanChamber of Commerce in Paris. It acts principally as an economicinformation department. The branch in Paris was established in1940, and in 1941 another branch was established in Lyon to insurecloser contact with the industrial regions of the Vichy Zone. Throughthe Organizing-Committees German orders could be placed in the VichyZone, but no detailed supervision such as visits to factories waspossible for the German administrative personnel established in theParis Zone. In th e Vichy Zone such direct contact with Frehch pro-duction was maintained by the Armistice Commission and its local com-missions or subcommission.

A fairly recent creation in German economic administration inFrance is the Beschaffungsamt, whose purpose is to coordinate the workof var ious German agencies in order better to use French product ivecapacity. The German agencies involved are: Dienststelle Paris desHeereswaffenamtes, Aussenstelle des auptausschusses III Panzer andZugmaschinen Verbindungsstelle fur Marine-Beschaffunen, VbindunsstelleParis des Geleralluftzemeister, Be chaffsungatelle des LuftgauesWestfrankreich, offices in France of Wehrmachtbeschaffungsamt,


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authorization by himself or his delegates; j in other words noperson having a claim against a firm manufacturing or capable ofmanufacturing for German order can have a judgment executed tosatisfy that claim without German permission. The German authoritiesalso exercise wide control through the allocation of transportfacilities. In the case of railroads and inland water transport theFrench Government controlled operation of such facilities before theGerman occupation. With German requisitions of rolling stock andgeneral increased pressure on the railroads it became necessary fo rthe Germans to participate with French authorities in the allocationof freight transportation. German authorities in France dealingwith railroads are the Wehrmachtsverkehrsdirektion and theEisenbahnbetriebsdirektion (the latter including a security unit).All French traffic managers are duplicated by German administrators.Extensive control is also exercised through the allocation of rawmaterials and of power; by this means many French industries wereforced to close. The Organizing Committees determine all suchallocations upon receipt of statements of need from individualenterprises.

6. Price Control. The exercise of price controls is, ingeneral, a duty of French authorities. However, a broadcast of15 June 1943 from Paris 2 is revealing as to the interference ofGerman authorities in the process: "Decisions of French authori-ties concerning prices, published in the Bulletin Officiel desServices des Prix, or in the Journal Officiel, are considered ashaving been decreed with th e approval of the German authorities."Indeed, no material may be so published without such approval.


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factory and are to have access to the books and take part in allmanagerial conferences. Their remuneration will be fixed by theauthority appointing them and paid by the factory. _/ Finally, anunconfirmed report from Zurich of May 1943 indicates that Frenchfactories are to be placed under German military command. / Inany case, a certain control over corporations is assured by the rulethat resolutions of share-holders' meetings are valid only whenapproved by the Military Governor. /

Several different devices have been utilized by the Germansto penetrate into French industry either in France or abroad.First, the Germans have taken over majority or minority interestsin some important French businesses. Second, as a counterpart ofthe requisitions of French goods, the Germans have consented tosupply French industry with equipment, certain raw materials, andthe communication and use of technical processes. Third, a certainamount of liquidation of French interests in Central and SouthernEuropean countries has taken place in which, as these countrieswere occupied by Germany, the French were offered in many cases thealternative of being paid or seeing their properties confiscated.

a. Acquisition of Interests by the Germans. One of themost spectacular achievements has been the establishment of theFranco-German concern, Franoolor, to take over the widespreadKuhlmann dyestuffs interests, with a 51 percent German participationin the share capital, subscribed by the I.G. Farbenindustrie.

The Germans have also acquired an interest in the publicityside of the Havas agency.


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wood pulp were also supplied by the Germans, who sent a few tech-nicians to supervise the management of the plant. The factory startedits operations on 27 April 1942,

The French Government, however, seems to have -succeeded insecuring th e voiding of many negotiations tending to bring aboutGerman participation in French industry; in the autumn of 1940, thesale to "non-residents" of French shares and participations wasprevented by the French Government. In fact, such a deal as theFrancolor bne had to be approved by the Vichy Government, and itmay even be surmised that th e Government itself imposed that dealon the French chemical indust ry.

b. German Supplies of Certain Raw Materials, When th eArmistice of June 1940 was concluded, important stocks of cotton,wool, and jute had been piled up both by the industrials and by theArmyr Quartermasters. Most of them were delivered to the Germans.The seizure of these stocks, together with its implications for thefuture of French textiles, was studied jointly by the German textileexperts, the French Ministry of National Production, and French in-dustrials, and their conclusions were embodied in the so-calledKehl-Plan. Its main features were as fol lows:

(1) All stocks of wool, jute, and cotton which hadbeen purchased by the French Quartermasters and piled up in Frenchports and in the occupied part of France were to be delivered toGermany.

(2) An important quantity of wool, of different kinds,


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the French insisted upon paymen t either through the clearing systemor in Divisen or equivalent. One exception, however, was the saleof the Mines de Bor , a French-owned copper mine in Jugoslavia,negotiated by Laval, Payment for the sale was to be made from theoccupation costs.

In the case of the Yugoslav Charbonages de Trifail, theRoumanian Petrol Companies of Colombia and Concordia, the BanqueCommerciale Roumaine, and the Banque GA'nerale de Credit Hongrois,payment was to be made by the transfer of French external bondsissued in Holland, which had been obtained by the German.

Further liquidation included the relinquishing of the Schneiderparticipations in the Societe de-s Mines etForges and the Berg andHutterewerks-Gesellachaft in Czechoslovakia, which were acquired bythe Bohemian Union Bank, and the Societe des Usines de Fabricationdes Tubes et des Forges do Sosnowice in Poland.

French capitalists with investments in German firms like theDeutsche Bank, Harpener, etc., were obliged to sell their share tothe Germans at the normal Berlin stock-exchange rate; the sums.weretransferred in French francs at' th e official rate of 20 francs forone RM.

Beside such administrative controls as have been noted, theGermans exercise still other controls in a number of cases throughthe ownership of shares in French companies. It is said thatGermans have insisted upon acquiring shares in return for theallocation of raw materials and have thus acquired large interests


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b. Labor Organization under Vichy. The power and independenceof the labor organizations were intolerable to Vichy, which alsofound their voluntary mrmbership and elected officers incompatiblewith the theories of the new French state. The whole system was notimmediately suppressed, but a law of 16 August 1940 -automaticallydissolved all th e confederations and permitted th e dissolution ofthose other associations whose activities might be found to be in-jurious to general economic activi ty. I/ The departmental unionsbecame th e most important centers of labor union activity. Many ofthe units continued their political activity underground as resistancegroups, but a number of union officials assumed posts in the VichyGovernment and tried to bring union membership to collaboration. Anumber of new semi-official coordinating groups were set up toperform the functions of the confederations in regard to purely eco-nomic activity, to which labor organizations were now strictly limited.

c. Vichy Labor Charter. The above Vichy set-up was, how-ever,, only temporary. A decree of 4 October 1941 set forth a laborcharter for France. 2 Its publication in the Journal Officiel in-dicates that it had been given German approval. French workers,according to the charter, are to be organized in professional unionson a vocational basis. These unions are to be set up in every in-dustrial district; there are to be separate organizations foremployers, workers, foremen, technical personnel, clerical help, andother employees. The unions are to be coordinated according toregions and headed by committees whose task it will be to investigateconditions of work and to arbitrate disputes. Each committee is underthe supervision of a government commissioner, and committee membersare fo r th e time being appointed, although it is promised that when


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German representative sits. Indeed, the union executives are appointedat every stage by the Government, and their proceedings are secret.Therefore they have no dependence whatsoever on the workers whomthey theoretically represent. All the former labor organizationswere to be dissolved as soon as the new ones were ready to take over,and their funds and property were transferred to the new ones. ByJanuary 1943, 2,900 Social Committees had been registered with theCentral Bureau of the Social Committees.

Until the program for sending laborers to Germany had removeda substantial number of workers from France, the hiring of labor forwork in Freqch factories was no problem. On the contrary, Vichyhad to take drastic measures to combat the unemployment produced bylack of raw materials and power and the consequent closing of facto-ries. Little or no difficulty was experienced in 'iring laborersfor work in the factories still functioning. But by April 1942 theneed for manpower was being felt throughout French industry. Tofree workers, hours of work were being lengthened. A decree of theGerman Military Administrator for France states that German authori-ties may regulate hours of work. The Military Governor himselfdetermines hours when a whole region or a whole branch of industryif to be affected, while the Feldkommandant may determine hours foran individual enterprise. Employers are required to submit to th eFeldkommandantur statements of the number and type of workersreleased through the lengthening of hours of work. I/

2. Labor for German Auxiliary Army Groups in France.a. Organisation Todt. Beside working


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The ranks of the Organisation Todt are filled by various means.In some cases men serving their term of compulsory service in laborcamps have been set to work under its direction. I/ Internees havebeen taken from their camps and set to work also. In the summerof 1942 over twenty-five German employment offices were operatingin the Vichy Zone to recruit labor for Germany. In each of thesethere was a representative of the Organisation Todt, who couldpresumably pull out any recruit he fancied or draw his quota fromthe rolls. Under the Vichy compulsory labor laws, French authori-ties provided such personnel as the German authorities demanded.According to a law published in the Journal Officiel, prefects ormayors who have been appointed by them may call up any Frenchnational from eighteen to sixty-five years of age for labor servicewith occupation troops in the Vichy Zone. 2 The extent or relianceon this kind of recruitment is not indicated.

Like the factories working for Germany, the Organisation Todtsuffered from the demand for more and more workers to go to Germany.Many young men assigned to the OT were taken directly from the OTcamps and sent to Germany. / This means that many had no chanceto visit their homes before leaving; it may be a device to facilitatethe sending of full contingents to Germany by not allowing anyopportunity to go into hiding and escape deportation.

The Organisation Todt in France is directed by a Frontfthrerfrom a central office in Paris. A delegate of the French Governmentis attached to the office to convey to the French authorities anyGerman decisions. The OT also has a number of French social inspectorswho serve as liaison agents between the French workers and the German


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are apparently no plans for its use in the rest of France.c. NSKK. Units of the RISKK (report specifically mentions

ten thousand Fvrq and Mechanics) collaborate with the OT in workon fortifications. From the context these appear, however, to beGermans rather than Frenchmen. j3. Labor fo r Production in Germa. With the return of Lavalto power, the recruient o French labor for Germany started on a

large scale. German exploitation of French labor will be analyzedin the following pages.

a. Stages of Recruitment.(1) Initial Stages. The export of labor from Franceto Germany began in 1941, chiefly with the deportation of foreign

workers. Interned Jews and other refugees were the first victims.

Recruitment of French nationals for work in Germany remainedvoluntary. Propaganda was launched to persuade Frenchmen that laborin the Reich was remunerative, comfortable, and secure whereaswages in France, blocked by German pressure, lagged hopelesslybehind prices, and the stpndard of living among working-classfamilies was rapidly declining.

Unemployment relief (allocations de chom )) o unemployedworkers was sometimes refusi teeground that work could besecured at the German Labor Exchanges (Offices de Placement).Volunteers secured their labor contracts through the German Labor


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The decision to group productive enterprises and-to close downbusinesses was left by the Germans to the Vichy Government, whichacted on the advice of the Committees. By the end of 1942 about10,000 factories had been closed down.

On 24 April 1943, all prefects of France were convened byLaval and Bichelonne, and it was announced that 240,000 workersmust be transferred from commerce either to fill the gaps left bythe departure of industrial workers or to make up the contingentswhich the Germans were demanding for export to the Reich.

(3) The Releve. In a speech broadcast on 22 June1942, Laval launched a new recruitment drive; the liberation ofthe prisoners was made the ostensible excuse for the deportationof the workers. This was the releve which has resulted in threedistinct agreements passed between Laval and Sauckel, GeneralCommissioner for German Labor.

In June 1942, the Germans agreed to repatriate 50,000prisoners in return for 150,000 skilled workers. At the end ofDecember 1942, the Germans offered another 50,000 in exchangefor 250,000 workers. In April 1943 they demanded 220,000 deporteesand an additional 190,000 French workers for employment in France;further, releases were to continue and in addition 250,000 prisonersin Germany would be transferred to civilian status.

On 21 October 1943 another agreement was announced: olderworkers would nowreplace the new ones and the ratio was to beone to one. It must be stressed that the Germans have never felt


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A census of unemployed and partially employed workers followed,and a decree compelled employers to place lists of their personnelat the disposal of the local Labor Exchanges.

The law of 25 November reinforced th e powers of the prefectsand the Secretary of State for Labor. The following list ofcategories of workers, arranged in th e order in which they wouldbe called up, was included in the text of the new law:

Unemployed.Partially employed.

SPersons employed in enterprises obliged to limit or reducetheir activities under th e terms of th e decrees on th e concentrationof industries.

Persons employed in work not essential to national welfare.On 2 February 1943 th e prefects were ordered to proceed to ageneral census of men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one.

On 15 February there was passed a law making two years' laborservice in agriculture, workshop, or factories compulsory for allmen born between 1 January 1920 and 31 December 1922. Certaincategories of workers, including coal miners, peasants, firemen inParis, Lyons, M arseilles, members of th e police, gendarmerie andgardes mobiles, and railway employees, were to be reserved. Studentswould not be called upon to leave unti l th e end of th e academicyear.


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for those belonging to specified professional categories. On31 May, Vichy announced the suppression of almost all exemptionsin the class which would have been due to be called up for militaryservice. Remaining exemptions were: refugees from Alsace andLorraine, colonials, freed prisoners of war, ex-combatants of theLVF, and young men who had completed more than two years' militaryservice. It was also stated that all men of the '41, '40, and thelast quarter of '39 classes would leave for Germany unless theybelonged to th e reserved occupations definod in th e law of15 February.

On 18 October, when the fourth Laval-Sackel agreement wasannounced, the French Government declared its intention of in-corporating the '43 class into the age-group subject to compulsorylabor.

(5) Conscription of Special Categories.

(a) Doctors , The Germans announced in March 1943that the medical staff of th e demobilized Armist ice Arn was to betransferred to Germany. All the military doctors under forty, notexempt by reason of health, have subsequently been sent for aperiod of one year's service. On 24 June Vichy announced that theentire medical profession, including students and women, wereliable to conscription and that the Secrtariat d'Etat a la Santeet a la Famille would nominate those required for work in Germany.

(b) Railwaymen. The Germans have demanded the


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it replaced the Direction de 1& Main d'Oeuvre. Robert Weinmannwas appointed Comnnissaire Gnea a and regional and departmentaldelegates were appointed to cover th e whole of French territory.

On 20 August Weinmann became Cormissaire General Inter-ministeriel a la Main d'oeuvre under a committee of directioncomposed of the M inisters of INational Econony and Finance, Educat ion ,Labor, Industrial Production, Agriculture, and Food Supply.

But the prefects remain entrusted with major parts of thedeportation schemes. In cooperation with the mayors they areresponsible for seeing to the departure of those who had beencalled upon for work in Germany. It is also to the prefects andmayors that the German authorities turn when they require locallabor for fortifications, armaments works, and guard duties.

c. Resul ts . At the end of June 1942 about 160,000workers had left France for Germany, but, taking account of thosewho had returned to France, about 70,000 were assumed to be stillin Germany.

From 1 June to 31 December 1942, the departures were asfollows according to German and French sources:

Skilled workers Unskilled workers Total

German source 127,990 111,760 239,750French source 137,410 102,970 240,380


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D. CONITROLS OVER FINANCIAL ACTIVITY AND FOREIGN TRADE1. The Reichskredi tkasse. The earliest of the German finncialcontrols were imposed toug the Reichskreditkasse, with currency

manipula t ion as the means of control. German soldiers enteringFrance were suppl ied with Reichslreditlasse notes and coins whichhad the status of legal tender. The exchange rate was set by anordinance dated 17 May 1940. J From time to time the Reichkreditkasseretired certain denominations of coins which it had placed incirculation. The Reichkreditkassen in different countries areresponsible to the Council of Administration in Berlin. This Councilis composed of a president named by the President of the GermanReichebank and delegates of the Finance Ministry, the EconomicsM inistry , the Supreme Command, and the Commander in Chief of theArnly. Beside regulating the flow of currency, payments, and creditin their respective territories, they may engage in the fol lowingoperations to carry out the decisions of the Council : buying andselling of commercial paper, making short-term (six months or less)loans, accepting deposits without interest, as well as other bankingoperations. /

2. Banking Controls. German banking manipulations in Francehave, however, been carried out to a great extent through th e Frenchbanking system. From July 1940 to July 1941 there was direct Germansupervision over French banks through a German official who was atthe same time commissioner to the Bank of France and head of theOffice for the Supervision of French Banks, which exercised itssupervision over all institutions having their headquarters or seatof management (si'ege social) in occupied territory. Since branch


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German approval since the relevant decrees were published in theJournal Officiel.

Quotation of bonds and shares on the Paris stock exchange,which was limited to state and other public bonds during thesummer and fall of 1940, was resumed on 17 March 1941. But it wasimmediately submitted to the stringent regulations enacted by thelaw of 28 February 1941. It stipulated that French or foreignsecurities could not be quoted on the official market or trans-ferred against payment without the intervention of a broker, anotary, or an approved bank. All shares were to be made out to anamed holder and not to bearer. This provision increases th edifficulty of transferring stocks -- an operation which can beperformed only through agents de change. This law had a twofoldpurpose:

a. to allow a strict supervision over shares and transfers,allegedly to prevent huge purchases by the German authorities;

b. to prevent hand-to-hand transactions, at prices muchhigher than official quotations, from giving rise to a new kindof black market.

Immediately after the reopening of the Paris Stock Exchange,the French Government passed a new law providing for a tax onappreciation in the value of transferable securities. The ratewas 33 percent of the fraction of the appreciation above 5 percentafter 19 March 1941. This very high levy was reduced to 20 percentof the earned surplus on 27 July 1941.


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the Commission do Controle des Banques, consisting of the Governorof the Bank of France as chairman, the Director of the Treasury,and the head of the Committee itself.

A large part of French insurance business, particularlyreinsurance, was in British hands before the war. Since theArmistice, the Germans have tried to replace the British, chieflyin the field of reinsurance, France has joined the German-inspired European insurance pool, the Veeinigung fur die Deckugvon Grosriskieren. Branches of ordinary German insurancecompanies, such as Gerling-Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs-A.G.and the Aachen-Munchner Feuervers icherungs-A.G. , have been openedin France.

According to the German-control led press in Paris, J attemptshad been made in October 1941 to organize a European pool ofinsurance. France was represented at the initial negotiationsby Jacques Guerard, an arch-collaborationist, chairman of thenewly created Comite des Assurances.~

4. Contro ls over Forei n Trade. In the field of financialcontrols affecting foreign trade, control is exercised primarilythrough French agencies. In the earliest period of occupationGerman military authorities had regulatory control over theimports and exports of all the western occupied countries, M butsuch control is hardly unusual in time of war. Later the servicesof the Supreme Comnand, the Reichskreditkasse, and Devisenkommandounits were empowered to request whatever information they mightrequire as to foreign exchange held by, or foreign credits owing


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kept strictly out of the field of foreign payments. To make thispossible, the Office of Exchanges, under the Secretary of Statefor National Economy and Finance, was set up to operate in bothzones and in North Africa. 1/ All payments for imports or exportsmust be made through this office. The Office receives paymentsfrom French importers and pays French exporters in the ordinaryinternal francs; it also pays amounts in gold or foreign exchangeowing to, and receives amounts due from, foreigners. Byregulating imports and exports in such a way as to secure anapproximate balance in payments, the Office is able to carry onFrench foreign payments without depleting French reserves of goldand foreign currency. This regulation is carried out by means ofexport and import l icenes, which are required for any suchoperations.

But the bulk of French exports -- over 70 percent -- go toGermany. Franco-German trade is financed under a clearing agreementof 14 October 1940. This is a multilateral agreement coveringpayments between France,. on the one hand, and Germany, Holland,Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway on the other. The head clearingoffice is the Verrechnungakasse in Berlin. By the agreement,French exporters are paid with French funds, the debt being reim-bursable by Germany. However, no upper limit is set on Germany'sindebtedness, and the French credit at the end of 1942 was about40,000,000,000 francs, the rate for the calculation of clearingdebts is fixed at 20 francs to one Reichsmark. The clearingcredit, like all French assets in Germany, is blocked, stillfalling under German laws on trade with the enemy. Although itis generally assumed that a large part of German imports from


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benefit of the French Government, except in the case of purchasesof merchandise, where a tax paid at an earl-er stage forms partof the retail price and is difficult to separate. I/

6. Occupation Costs. The financial situation of France hasbeen profoundly affected by the levy of occupation costs againstthe French Government. Article XVIII of the Armistice betweenGermany and France stipulated that the French Government shouldbear the costs of maintenance of German occupation troops onFrench soil, and it is under this provision that the levy isimposed. The original figure was set at 400 million francs a dayor 146 billion a year. The costs were at first paid out of theFrench Treasury, but, beginning on 25 August 1940, the Bank ofFrance was called upon to make special advances to the Treasuryto cover them. The amount of this indemnity remained unchangeduntil 10 May 1941. As a result of a meeting between Hitler andDarlan at Berchtesgaden, the daily indemnity was reduced from400 to 300 million francs. Since 10 November 1942 and the completeoccupation of France by both German and Italian armies, and upto the Italian collapse, the daily costs had been placed at 500million francs for Germany and 30 million for Italy.

The total yearly costs have been, then, as follows:1940 76.8 billion1941 122.5 billion1942 121.0 billion

To finance occupation costs, the French Treasury periodically


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finance the direct costs of occupation, and to pay for all kindsof requisition orders placed among French industrialists, forpublic works executed in France for the German Army, and the like.

In fact, the Germans do not immediately spend the totalamounts of their credits; part of them remain earmarked at theBanque de France (as unspent costs of occupation under "Currentand Deposit Accounts for the Reichskreditkasse." The study ofthis special account is particularly illuminating since it givesa fairly good idea of the tempo of German expenditures in France.When it increases, it means that the German authorities do notcompletely spend what they actually receive from France; when itdecreases, it means that, on the contrary, the Germans not onlyspend what they actually receive but also a part of their specialsavings at the Banque; this may result from a new influx ofGerman soldiers, from new requisitions, from new public works,or from all these reasons together.

The Reichskreditkasse account, starting from nil inAugust 1940, reached a maximum of 64.5 billion in December 1941and declined sharply from 58.5 billion in April 1942 to about16 billion at the end of 1942 and 8.7 billion in April 1943.Since April 1943 it has slightly increased.

For the entire year 1942, the so-called "Armistice expendi-tures" amounted to 157.1 billion, as follows:

Billion francs


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4.6

The Armistice gave Germany immediate control over maritimeshipping (Article XI), air transport (Article XII), railways,roads, and inland waterways (Article XIII and XV). In the caseof railroads, th e French Government was to turn over-withoutfurther damage railway lines and equipment, to supply labor forrestoration upon demand of the German authorities, and to supplypersonnel and equipment to maintain normal peacetime service. Asubcommission of the Armistice Commission was charged with super-vision of th e application of provisions concerning transport.

2. Railroad Transport. French railways had been placed understate control in 1937 with the formation of the Soci4te Nationaledes Chemins de Fer (SNCF), in which the Government owned a majorityof stock. A majority of the members of the Administrative Councilof th e SNCF was composed of Government officials. / The railwaysof th e Vichy Zone were left under the control of th e Vichy Govern-ment; those of the Occupied Zone continued to be operated by theFrench authorities,- subject to German control, although somecoastal lines were operated by German military personnel. 2/ Localbranch railroads were, in practice, controlled by the local nationalofficial, the prefect. Certain modifications in service werenecessary; these were determined in part by the Secretary of Statefor Commerce, in part by departmental committees of three memberseach, set up to eliminate duplication in road and rail services. /The German control authorities, who presumably dealt with the Frenchofficials in charge and did not administer the railroads directly,were the Wehrmachtsverkehrsdirektion and the Eisenbahnbetriebsdirektion,the latter including a special railroad security unit. All French


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This is accomplished by routing the German request to the localChief Engineer for Roads and Bridges, an official responsibleto the Secretary of State for Communications. The Chief Engineerthen passes the request on to enterprises registered with theRoads and Bridges Service or with the Road Transport-Group (aprofessional association). j German authorization is necessaryfor motor transport crossing the frontiers of Occupied France.A Fahrbereitschaftsleiter attached to the office of the Feld-kom ate exceptionally, to the office of a nearby Kreis-kommandantur) issues the necessary permits; this official isresponsible to the Bevollma.chtigte fur den Nahverkehr in theoffice of th e chief of th e military distritc

4. Inland Waterways. Another adjunct to the railways androads are the inland waterways. These have beon exploited byFrench authorities in order to relieve the pressure on therailways. Y he waterways too are under the French Secretaryof State for Communications and are controlled by the NationalOffice of Navigation. Delegates of the Organizing Committee fo rInland Water Transport cooperate with the Office in tho controlof operations. J (As noted above, a German commissioner isattached to each Organizing Committee). No contract for inlandwater transport is valid unless countersigned by the regionaldirector responsible to the Office of Navigation. / An exampleof German interference with waterway traffic is an order, probablygiven for security purposes rather than as a traffic control, ofth e Feldkommandant of Besanvon forbidding traffic on towpathsbetween certain hours. 2


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again. All French vessels outside French ports were to be directedto return and place themselves under similar surveillance (ArticleXI). Representatives of the Armistice Commission were to control,and still continue to control, the cargoes of incoming ships.Nothing may leave a ship until these inspectors have decided whatpart of the cargo is to be sent on to Germany. A&t the time of theoccupation of the former Unoccupied Zone, German and Italian authori-ties seized all except eighteen French comnercial vessels. Thoseleft to the French are of small tonnage. They are operated byFrench companies under the nominal control of the French Governmentbut are very closely supervised by German authorities. It isthreatened that if any of the ships makes an unscheduled call,reprisals will be undertaken against the crews and their familiesof all the ships. 2/


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V. ANTI-JEIWISH GISLATION

A. ANTI-JEWISH MISURES IN GEERAL

Anti-Semitic activity followed immediately upon the entry of the Ger-mans into France. The Jew-baiting Au Pilori ("To the Pillory") was published,and anti-Semitic demonstrationsiere organized on the Champs-Elysees and themain boulevards of the capital. A A law of August 1940 repealed the PressLaw of 1887, prohibiting press attacks upon individuals on religious or racialgrounds.

This preliminary propaganda was soon followed by direct action. UntilFrance was completely occupied (November 1942) th e German anti-Jewish strategywas as fol lows:

(1) to provoke anti-Semitic appeals and propaganda in the German-Con-trolled press;

(2) to follow up this propaganda by specifically German anti-Semiticmeasures to apply only in the occupied zone;(3) to bring pressure on the Vichy government to obtain the extension

of these anti-Semitic measures to all of France, on th e threat that, if theywere not extended, the fate of the Jews in the occupied zone would be madestill worse;

(4) to follow th e extension of these anti-Semitic measures by new meas-ures in the-Occupied Zone, and so on.

LqlPi*'


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- 50 -These preliminary steps were followed by the introduction of formalGerman anti-Jewish legislation:

(1) An initial decree issued on 27 September prohibited all refugeesprofessing either at present, or in the past the Jewish religion, or havingmore than two Jewish grandparents, from returning to the Occupied Zone. 1/

(2) Jews were ordered to register with the authorities before 20October and to have identity cards stamped with the word nJew."

(3) By the end of October 1940 every Jewish-owned business was to bemarked distinctly as a "Jewish Enterprise." Leaders of Jewish communitieswere required to supply the authorities with all materials and documentsnecessary for the execution this measure. Many Jewish businessmen, obligedto post the "Jewish Enterprise" mark on their windows, simultaneously postedexcerpts, of their military citations for acts of bravery either in 1914-18or in 1939-40. This, however, was soon forbidden by the Germans. ./

(4) On 18 October a new decree ordered the registration of all Jewishconcerne, and on 12 December "Aryan" Commissars in charge of them, wereappoi tsd.

(5) On 26 April 1941 a new order revising the terms of the originaldecree of September defined a Jew as anyone having at least three Jewishgrandparents, or anyone having but two, if he or she were currently soaffiliated or had a Jewish spouse. All persons falling within the newcategories were required to comply with the consequent regulations by 30 May./

(6) Jews were forbidden as from 20 May to engage in wholesale and re-tail commerce, restaurants, the hotel business, insurance, tourist agencies,


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A new stage in th e persecutions started on 13 ?Larch 1941, when allJews living in the northern coastal district were summarily expelledfrom their homes and interned in concentration camps in th e departmentsof Yonne and Aube. j/ Somewhat later, foreign Jews in Paris were seizedand sent to th e concentration camp of Pithiviers, near Orleans.

The internal administration of the Jewish community in occupiedFrance remained nominally in th e hands of the Consistory, headed by ChiefRabbi Julian 'Neill. In October 1940 th e Germans appointed as Commission-ers for Jewish Affairs Lieuenants Danaker and Lumper of th e SS Guard, andefforts were made by th e Nazi authorities to organize Parisian Jewry intoa closed comrmrunity in cooperation with the Jews; these attempts., however,failed as the French law did not recognise religious communities. TheGermans even introduced Austrian Jews with a view to indoctrinating FrenchJews, but this measure failed too.a/ German persecutions of Jews wereespecially severe

Civil Affairs Handbook France Section 2A

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