CHAPTERV POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF MARITIME POWERshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/18827/10... · 11 Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, India's Maritime Security, (New Delhi: Knowledge World,

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CHAPTERV

POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF MARITIME POWER

This chapter examines the theory and practice of naval diplomacy and

highlights the concepts of naval suasion and gunboat diplomacy. It highlights how

India and China have employed and used their naval forces to support their foreign

policy objectives. The two countries have been active participants of several

maritime multilateral institutions and have encouraged confidence-building

measures (CBMs) and the security and safety of the maritime enterprise. They

have also adopted aggressive postures to safeguard their national interests as also

to maintain order at sea for peaceful uses of the seas.

The chapter turns to the writings of Edward Luttwak and James Cable on

the utilization of navies as an instrument of foreign policy. The impact of

UNCLOS III on ocean management is examined to highlight the sources of

conflict leading to disorder at sea. It then examines Indian writings on naval

diplomacy and how this instrument has been used in furtherance of foreign policy

objectives. The Indian contribution to preserving order at sea, participation in UN

maritime peacekeeping operations and its initiatives to engage in multilateral

confidence building exercises are discussed to highlight the Indian use of maritime

forces in naval diplomacy.

The next part of the chapter examines the Chinese writings on naval

diplomacy and also discusses the Chinese white paper on national defence.

Chinese military posturing against Taiwan provides an insight into Chinese

understanding of the use of maritime forces for national objectives. Beijing's

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engagement in multilateral confidence building initiatives shows its commitment to

safeguard maritime order at sea.

THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

The study of maritime power clearly illustrates continuity from the past.

Many ofthe several uses of maritime power and the principles associated with it

have endured and continued to be relevant in this century too. The earlier role of

navies, both in time of war and peace, have continued to fulfill national objectives.

There have been several writings on the utility of navies in peace that have

originated from strategists, practitioners and academics.

Edward Luttwak coined the term "naval suasion" to explain the ability of a

nation to use naval power for political roles. 1 He describes naval suasion as

"latent" and "active". Latent naval suasion is representative of the deterrent. It is

based on the premise that the adversary would be prevented from attacking, and

the naval deployment threatens to inflict unacceptable costs on an adversary and its

ally if any. On the other hand, active suasion is deliberate, purposeful and meant to

send out a signal of impending naval action. This can also be used to reassure an

ally or a client state about the determination of own support against the other

adversary.

James Cable argues that gunboat diplomacy is "the use or the threat of

limited naval force, other than an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to

avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign

Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses ofSeapower (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore,l974), p.7

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nationals within the territory."2 According to Cable, navies can be used in the

coercive mode in at least four different ways. These are:

(a) Definitive force.

(b) Peaceful force.

(c) Catalytic force.

(d) Expressive force.

These uses of force create crucial psychological pressures on the enemy

thereby signaling intention. In diplomacy, the use of navies is best expressed in the

view: "behind the gunboat are known to lurk a cruiser, and behind the cruiser a

formidable battle fleet". 3

Navies are flexible forces and can be deployed or withdrawn in short

periods unlike land forces. Navies equipped with powerful weapons can appear to

be dangerous when moving for the purpose of deterrence, but they can also be a

symbol of goodwill and humanitarianism. Besides, navies of neighbouring states,

as also blue water navies, cross paths on routine deployments. They take pride in

their right of free passage. Naval exercises provide opportunities for close

observation but at ~lose quarters these are viewed with suspicion and alarm.4

There is little doubt that naval forces play an important role in support of

national foreign policy objectives. In the past, states have used navies to further

their national interests. This is so because it is only naval forces that enjoy

2

3

4

James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991 (Macmillan: London, 1994) p.14.

L W Martin, "The Use ofNaval Forces in Peacetime", Naval War College Review, January/February, 1985.

H.J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992), p.21.

145

flexibility, mobility and visibility. Importantly, naval diplomacy is a term that has

follild an important place in the theory and practice of international relations.

Historically, waterways have been used as a means of trade and

communication and have provided the impetus for the development of maritime

enterprise. Waterways have also been instrumental in transporting state power

beyond national shores. Warfare at sea was traditionally concerned with the control

of sea lines of communications, maritime interdiction, and sea control. It had

nothing to do with conquering sea territory. Conquest was a term that was applied

only to land and did not find a place in nautical jargon since no sea territories were

ever conquered. 5 One cannot conquer sea because it is not possible to position

armed forces upon it, as one would do upon an enemy's territory. These territories

have an imaginary nautical fence, which requires constant policing and

maintenance. Today, when the nautical fence is intruded or transgressed, it is of

concern to a state. The seas therefore are of vital interest to states.

In the emerging security order, the seas are the most disputed territories.

This is so due to: (a) marine resources in EEZ, (b) maritime trade routes, and (c)

the friction between states to dominate a region's affairs. These ambitions make

the seas a potential battleground for states. The situation has become volatile, with

governments trying to extend the UNCLOS III regime to islands where sovereignty

is contested. This combination of both territory and nationalism, with a promise of

resources (marine and hydrocarbons) is compelling states to reinforce their claims.

Further, the seas are being used for piracy, gunrunning, drug smuggling and sea­

based terrorism that provide additional sources of nervousness.

5 Ibid., p.l6.

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These threats require a cooperative approach and in the absence of

cooperation there is the likelihood of confrontation. It is in this context that naval

diplomacy adds pressures on national political institutions to use their respective

navies to preserve order at seato support national interests and safeguard territory.

INDIAN NAVAL DIPLOMACY

It is a well-known fact that flexibility, visibility and mobility are important

characteristics of a naval force. These are unique in nature, primarily due to the

medium in which the navies operate, i.e. the sea. Further, the shape, size, and war

fighting capabilities of a navy are three important determinants for use as

instruments of foreign policy.

In the Indian context, according to Rahul Roy-Chudhury, the navy has only

been deployed for "lower end of the spectrum of political action, such as foreign

ports visits".6 It is argued "naval diplomacy ranges from acts involving the

application of force - gunboat diplomacy- to those that will improve relations

between states. The latter, is essentially a ceremonial practice, and is popularly

termed "showing the flag". 7 This includes goodwill visits to foreign ports. The

visits by the head of the state to different countries should be coordinated with the

visit of warships to that country. This would add to prestige as also send a benign

signal of national power and would also help in showcasing a state's technological

prowess.

Naval diplomacy is an important function of any navy. Commander B M

Dimri, a naval legal expert, notes that navies are important tools for foreign policy

6

7

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "Indian Naval Diplomacy", Indian Defence Review, January- March 1997, p.53.

Ibid.

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management without actual use offorce.8 Naval diplomacy is guided by three

factors: (a) strong political will to deploy warships to achieve foreign policy

objectives, (b) the right types of warships, and (c) an opportunity to deploy. He

argues that, "To achieve foreign policy objectives, states use their navies in \·arious

ways that involve, inter alia, the use of warships for communicating one's

intentions, demonstrating strength to coerce others, impelling to do or abstaining

from doing any act, supportive role, influence building or representational task of

various kind". 9

It is to be noted that Indian security remained land oriented that resulted in

strengthening the army and the air force. Consequently, the navy remained less

significant in defence planning and allocation of fiscal resources. The Indian navy

continued the legacy of the Royal Navy and undertook several port calls that made

little difference. Unfortunately, these visits were devoid of"any clearly defined

role" and therefore diplomatic functions were not clearly visualized. 10 HoweYer, in

recent years the Indian navy has effectively been used for port visits, joint

exercises, training, humanitarian relief, search and rescue and even for

safeguarding the sovereignty of smaller nations. 11 Joint exercises have helped

8

9

Lieutenant Conunander B. M. Dimri, "Naval Diplomacy and UNCLOS III", Strategic Analysis, April 1994, p.55.

Ibid. 10 Ibid., p.66. 11 Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, India's Maritime Security, (New Delhi: Knowledge

World, 2000), p.179. Between 1989 and 2000, the Indian Navy conducted forty-five joint naval exercises with at least twenty countries. The Indian navy has also been hosting "MILAN" meetings in the 1990s. These biennial meetings that began in 1995, are aimed at fostering closer cooperation among navies of countries in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian navy has institutionalized interaction with several foreign navies. These include: US, France, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Besides, the navy has also conducted Passage Exercises with visiting warships from Germany, Mauritius, Seychelles and Japan. These have contributed to a greater understanding

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promote closer cooperation and understanding between the respective naval

communities.

The new nautical regime under UNCLOS III has also affected naval

diplomacy. 12 The extension ofterritorial waters out to 12 nautical miles and an

EEZ of 200 nautical miles have created sovereign territories at sea. Dimri argues

that there are three ways in which UNCLOS will impact on naval diplomacy. First,

naval diplomacy will become more effective as "legal and psycho-legal boundaries

would offer states a chance to send clear diplomatic signals with the passage of

warships especially by intruding into waters over which a coastal state will have

greater interest and stronger feelings". 13 Secondly, the existing EEZ regime

resulted in 40 percent of the world's ocean brought under national jurisdiction.

This has created a process of creeping jurisdiction that will ultimately lead to the

demise of naval diplomacy. It is important to keep in mind that warships and

merchant ships enjoy the status of neutrality in the EEZ's and therefore naval

diplomacy will continue to be effective since the nautical regime does not hamper

coercive/demonstrative military manoeuvres. 14 Finally, there will be no effect of

UNCLOS on naval diplomacy as it will not be able to prevent naval influence

involving port calls, naval assistance and humanitarian aid. 15

among navies, built trust and contributed to transparency. Also see Second Lieutenant Scott A Cuomo,"US and Indian Navies Close Again" US Naval Proceedings, February 2002, p.41.

12 Dimri, op.cit., p.70. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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Commander P. K. Ghosh, a naval practitioner, has noted that the

distinguishing character of gunboat diplomacy is use of naval forces. 16 This is so

due to the subtle nature of the deployment of warships. Unlike the army and the air

force, the navy is non- intrusive and does not cross into another state or territory

and therefore does not cross the threshold of tolerance. The operational flexibility

and the reach of a navy make it an ideal instrument for diplomacy without the fear

of an actual war.

The Indian Navy's Strategic Defence Review defines naval diplomacy as

"the use of naval force as a diplomatic instrument in support of foreign policy and

is designed to influence the adversary in peace time and in all situations short of

full hostility". 17 This application of naval diplomacy is to be achieved in three

distinct ways: (a) presence, (b) preventive and precautionary diplomacy, and (c)

pre-emptive dipbmacy. One of the traditional ways of signifying naval presence is

through port calls to remind local inhabitants of the effectiveness of the navy and

the state that owns it. These visits are not intended to represent threat of force;

instead, the ships act as goodwill ambassadors to create a favourable impression.

There are occasions when states influence the adversary in the initial stage of a

crisis by positioning naval forces and carrying out offensive manoeuvers. This

demonstration contributes crisis prevention. The doctrine also notes that "Navies

are the only instruments of state which can be legally deployed in peace or war

anywhere on this strategic frontier. Any aspirations that India may have of

emerging as an independent regional power would have to be furthered by our

16 P K Ghosh, "Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy: An Instrument of Threat or Use of Limited Naval Force" Strategic Analysis, February 2001, p.2007.

17 Strategic Defence Review: The Maritime Dimension, A Naval Vision (New Delhi: Naval Headquarters, 1998), p.35.

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strength at sea, and the navy with it's great strengths of strategic mobility and

inherent strategic deterrents capability, would have to play the key role in the

shaping of the nation's destiny in the emergent world order". 18 It further notes that

navies are being increasingly·used to build maritime bridges and CB\ls. 19

Since its inception, the Indian navy has been actively engaged in building

closer relations with several navies across the globe. It has participated in

international fleet reviews, royal functions, offered humanitarian assistance, and

carried out disaster relief activities, anti-piracy patrols and joint exercises aimed at

building confidence and trust. Currently, India is an active member of several

international and regional arrangements for maritime cooperation. It is signatory to

the UNCLOS and an active participant in several other arrangements such as the

Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-AR(). Association

for Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation

(BIMST-EC), South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SA-\RC),

Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and ASE.-\N Regional

Forum (ARF).20

By the mid 1980's, the Indian government began to appreciate the Indian

' navy's role as an instrument of diplomacy. Indian naval ships began to engage in

joint naval exercises and frequent flag showing missions. In 1992, Indian naval

vessels participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia. The

navy demonstrated the ability to serve as an important instrument for achieving

foreign policy objectives. Several incidents/events have proved that the Indian

navy has the capacity and capability to further national interests. In that context,

18 Ibid., p.2. 19 Ibid. 20 Roy-Chaudhary, op.cit., pp29-45.

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power projection platforms like aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and

frigates have added to India's prestige and provided the opportunity to showcase

India's resolve to safeguard maritime interests and also to project Indian naval

capability.

Naval Coercion

The Indian experience with naval coercion presents a mix bag of successes

and failures. In the past, on two different occasions, the Indian navy was a victim

of coercive diplomacy. During the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, Indonesia had

dispatched its submarines to Pakistan to deter India against Pakistan as also to

threaten the opening of another war front in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. 21

The second event was the US Seventh Fleet, comprising the aircraft carrier USS

Enterprise, and its escorts sailing through the Bay of Bengal to deter India against

Pakistan.during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict. It is believed that the motive of

this display of force was "to ensure the protection ofUS interests in the area".22 No

Indian naval vessel encountered the US Seventh fleet.

· During the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, the Indian

Navy deployed both the Western and Eastern naval fleets in the Arabian Sea. This

display of force was aimed at compelling Pakistan to vacate Indian territory in the

21 Pakistan Navy Historical Section, Story of Pakistan Navy, 1947-72 {Islamabad: Elite Publishers, 1991), pp.228-229. During the 1965 India­Pakistan war, President Soekarno oflndonesia noted that an attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and agreed to provide whatever Pakistan needed for its war effort against India. The Indonesian naval Chief was of the view that the Andaman and Nicobar islands were an extension of Sumatra and even enquired if Pakistan wanted Indonesia to take over the island. The Indonesian navy began to patrol around the islands and also dispatched a submarine and missile boats to Pakistan. But these vessels arrived only after the cease-fire due to the long distance and later returned.

22 B Dismukis and J. McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1990), cited in P. K. Ghosh, op.cit., p.2013. Indian warships in the area did not encounter the US Fleet supposedly due to a Soviet anti-carrier group present in the area.

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Kargil sector in North India. The build up was also aimed at imposing a naval

blockade of the Karachi port. The Indian fleet conducted offensive manoeuvres in

the Arabian Sea resulting in the Pakistani naval fleet operating very close to its

coast. A Pakistani commentator interpreted this to mean that the Indian Navy was

preparing to enforce a "quarantine or blockade of the coastline" and prevent the

supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. 23 It is argued that this "was an important

factor, which led to Pakistan's humiliating withdrawal from the heights of Kargil

and the Indian navy played its part in convincing the Pakistani military leadership

of the futility of prolonging the Kargil conflict". 24

Confidence Building Measures

India has made noteworthy efforts at improving the security environment in

the Bay ofBengal-Andaman Sea area and the Arabian Sea. New Delhi enjoys a

high degree of trust and confidence with its maritime littorals in the Bay of Bengal.

The maritime boundaries with Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have

been defined, and with Bangladesh the process is in progress. However, the

security environment in the Arabian Sea region is plagued with tension and

mistrust. Both the P,akistan navy and the Indian navy meet each other frequently at

sea. They harass each other, and these acts have the potential to escalate into a

conflict. It is a common practice for both navies to "shadow" and "buzz" ships and

aircraft while operating in the Arabian Sea. Both sides appear to have remained

23 P K Ghosh, op.cit., p.2014. 24 Gurmeet Kanwal, "Pakistan's Military Defeat", in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Kargil

1999- Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), p.220.

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silent out of pride or ego. The "buzzing" and "formatting", as these incidents are

called, have continued without an incident so far. 25

In a reckless and an avoidable sortie, a Pakistan navy Atlantique violated

Indian airspace and intruded into the Kutch area in Gujarat. Two MiG 21 aircraft of

the Indian Air Force intercepted the Pakistani Atlantique. There was no

communication between the intruder and the interceptors. The hostile turning

maneuver of the Atlantique resulted in the shooting down of the aircraft. A 1991

agreement clearly spells out that aircraft will not fly within ten kilometers of each

other's airspace.26 The failure to abide by the agreement resulted in loss oflife as

also a maritime asset.27

25 "Buzzing Fleets in the High Seas", Asian Defence Journal, 10/99, p.34. In 1983, an Indian Kashin II class destroyer nearly opened fire on a Pakistani Atlantique. In 1996 there was a near collision between a Pakistan navy SA. 316B Alouette III helicopter and an Indian navy Sea King shadowing the Pakistan navy's annual Sea Spark exercise in the Arabian Sea. The Pakistani Atlantique and Indian Sea Harrier V/STOL fighters scrambled from the aircraft carrier INS Viraat have repeatedly warned off P3C Orions. In August 1995, a Pakistan Navy Allouete flew dangerously low over an Indian warship at anchor in the port ofTanjung Priok, Jakarta. Both the Pakistan navy and the Indian navy had been invited to the Indonesian International Fleet Review. Indian navy Sea Hartier aircraft have often intercepted and "formatted" the Atlantique and Orion aircraft acting as snoopers. They have been firmly informed to clear the area or face a nasty situation. An Indian Navy official notes, "Every time our warships enter the northern Arabian Sea, it is shadowed by either an Orion or an Atlantique. We do the same to them using our Bears, IL-38s, Donrnier-228s and Sea Kings". During the Cold War, the same game was played by US P3C Orions and Soviet Tu-142 Bear long-range maritime patrol aircraft. These incidents continue unabated with few diplomatic protests from either side.

26 See "Agreement between Pakistan and India on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements" signed between Shaharyar M. Khan and Muchkund Dubey, dated April6, 1991, at New Delhi available at the website of Henry L Stimson Centre, Washington D. C., at http:/ /www.stimson.org/southasial?sn=sa20020 109216.

27 Discussions with Indian Air Force officers at New Delhi in December 2002.

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Pakistan and India have, in the past, made positive declaratory statements

to serve conciliatory purposes.28 Unfortunately, these statements have failed to

generate trust and confidence. Besides, they have rarely been pursued to their

logical end. The result is a recurring breakdown in conciliatory processes. Admiral

Fasih Bokhari, former Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan Navy, was quoted as

saying:

I would like to see India and Iran trading across our soil, Central Asia and India trading across our soil, because that is a part of integration into the region which gives our neighbours a stake in our security ... moving away from fifty years of India centric policies which have been hostile and confrontationist into the next fifty years of befriending India.29

The shooting down of the Pakistani naval aircraft over Indian airspace is an

example of the level of mistrust between the two navies. Besides, there is a dispute

with regard to the maritime boundary in the Sir Creek area. Despite several

meetings of experts from both sides, the boundary dispute continues. The area is

rich in fish, and fishermen of both sides routinely cross into each other's EEZ. The

Coast Guards of the two countries have often intruded into each other's EEZ to

exercise control. These fishermen are apprehended and spend long periods

languishing in jails. Under the circumstances, the bilateral naval relationship

between India and Pakistan is uncertain and volatile.

28 PR Chari, "Declaratory Statements and Confidence Building in South Asia", in Michael Krepon, Jenny S Drezin and Michael Newbill (et al.), "Declaratory Diplomacy: Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence Building", Report No. 27, April 1999, Henry L Stimson Centre, Washington D.C., p.89.

29 "An Interview With Admiral Fasih Bokhari, CNS Pakistan Navy", Defence Journal, December 1997, p.6.

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As far as the US is concerned, a series of high-level visits to New Delhi

marked the beginning of a new relationship between the two countries.30 Of

particular interest were the Malabar series of joint naval exercises. The two navies

conducted three such exercises held in 1992, 1995 and 1996.31 At the beginning,

the exercises were basic in nature and progressively improved in content and

complexity. The introduction of advanced surface.ships, submarines and long-

range maritime patrol aircraft acted as a catalyst to nascent naval cooperation.32

These exercises paved the way for greater understanding among the naval forces

and helped to develop a broad framework for operating together in support of non-

military operations such as anti-piracy, safety of sea-lanes and anti-drug and

gunrunning patrols. The exercises also encouraged understanding of each other's

rules of engagement, operating procedures, and communication plans and aircraft

operations.

The 1998 Indian nuclear tests abruptly ended cooperation between the two

navies, and the US imposed sanctions on military sales, education and training and

military assistance. By 2000, President Bill Clinton had lifted the ban on naval

education and training.33 Bilateral exercises were resumed, and high level naval

visits recommenced. A series of events like the US Millennium Naval Fleet

30 Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Henry Rowen visited India in 1990 and General Claude Kickleighter offered a proposal to increase military-to-military cooperation in 1991. A Joint Services Committee was setup at New Delhi. An Indo-US Naval Steering Committee was established in 1992 at New Delhi to chart out naval cooperation involving naval personnel exchanges, joint exercises and information sharing.

31 Roy-Chaudhary, op.cit., p.l79. Also see Cuomo, op.cit., p.41. 32 The US navy fielded a P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and the nucleur­

powered submarine Birmingham. The Indian navy deployed the conventional German built submarine, Shankush.

33 Scott A Cuomo, op.cit., p.42.

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Review in New York and the Indian International Fleet Review at Mumbai

restored naval cooperation to its original agenda. Naval ships from both sides

participated in these fleet reviews, thereby charting a new course for naval

cooperation. The two navies also engaged in search and rescue exercises. J-l

Cooperation got a boost with the Indian navy dispatching a naval helicopter to the

USS Hewitt to carry out the medical evacuation of a US navy sailor.35

Peacekeeping is another facet of naval diplomacy. Despite the fact that

India has been an active member of the United Nations since 1945 and has a large

naval fleet, its participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations at sea has been

disappointing. In 1992, two ships of the Indian navy operated off Somalia as part

of UNOSOM. 36 The Indian naval forces comprised offshore patrol vessels and a

landing craft. The area of operation was between Mombassa and Mogadishu and

their mission was to provide humanitarian aid.

The Indian ships were part of the larger UN maritime peacekeeping force

consisting of the US, Canadian, Italian and French navies. Operating alongside the

multi national maritime peacekeeping force gave Indian ships the opportunity to

carry out joint patrolling and also understand Western navies, operating

34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. Also see the transcript of Adm. Dennis C. Blair Commander in Chief,

U.S. Pacific Command interview with Times of India, October 25, 2001, "I went on my second visit down to Mumbai and met with Admiral Singh ·the Western Fleet Commander and we had very detailed tactical discussions of the situation between the Straits of Hormuz and Mumbai which of course is a very complicated geopolitical and naval situation. About three or four months later, the USS Hewitt, a US navy ship that was transiting by Mumbai, had a sailor who had an illness that could not be treated on board the ship and Admiral Singh dispatched a helicopter out to the ship, picked up the sailor, brought him into a hospital in Mumbai where he was successfully treated. So I saw some quick ability for the navies to cooperate on a life-saving level. I'm not sure we would have even known the phone numbers three and four years before to make those sorts of calls".

36 Roy-Chaudhary, op.cit., p.181.

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procedures. UNOSOM also had 5000 Indian troops ashore but naval ships did not

induct these. However, at the time of de-induction, the Indian navy deployed three

warships offthe southern Somali port ofKismayu to transport their organic

equipment/stores. 37

Since 1995, the Indian Navy has hosted several navies from South Asia and

South East Asia as part of"Milan", a bi-annual gathering of warships. More

recently the Indian Navy hosted the International Fleet Review (IFR), the first of

its kind, since independence. Addressing the gathering of naval ships from twenty-

three countries the Indian Prime Minister noted that the Indian Navy "plays a

crucial role in India's co-operation with other countries, especially those that share

maritime borders. Active co-operation between navies is a must in [these] times of

sea piracy, gunrunning and drug menace, which are all part of international

terrorism". He said "by institutionalised arrangements we can actually say that we

have built bridges of friendship" which happened to be the theme of the fleet

review. 38

Preserv!ng Order at Sea

On November 3, 1988, two trawlers carrying 150 PLOTE (People's

Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam) mercenaries landed in the Maldives.39 The

mercenaries quickly overpowered the Maldivian Militia using rockets and machine

guns and attacked the President's residence. A panicked Maldivian Government

sent out calls asking for assistance and India responded. Operation Cactus was

launched and a large contingent of paratroopers made an unopposed landing at

37 Ibid. 38 See "PM Calls For Institutionalisation of Co-operation Between Navies" at the

website of Red iff at http://rediff.com/news/200 1/feb/18fleet.htm .

39 See "Operation Cactus", at the website of Bharat Rakshak at http:/ lwww. bharat -rakshak.com/CONFLI CTS/Operation cactus.html.

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Male. Shortly afterwards, a vessel was seen. An Indian Navy maritime

reconnaissance aircraft detected the ship fleeing with mercenaries and hostages

including the Maldives' Minister of Education. Indian navy warships later captured

the PLOTE vessel. The island was secured within thirty minutes after the arrival of

forces. In a show of force, fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force were also

deployed to the island and helicopters landed commandos to the outlying island to

search for any mercenaries.40 The hijackers were a determined group and did not

heed to warnings. The vessel was stopped after firepower was used, and Indian

maritime Special Forces boarded the vessel and apprehended culprits.

The· standoff between the hijacked MV Alondra Rainbow, a 7000-ton

Panama registered vessel, belonging to Japanese owners, and an Indian warship in

November 1999 was a classical case of Indian efforts to maintain the safety of

international sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.41 The vessel was en

route from Kuala Tanjung, Indonesia, to Milke in Japan, and had been hijacked.

The Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau had announced

through a worldwide broadcast that pirates had captured the vessel and were

heading towards the Arabian Sea.42 Following the alert, the Indian maritime forces

swung into action. Maritime surveillance aircraft shadowed and tracked the vessel.

Sri Lanka has been an important arena for Indian naval diplomacy.

Beginning in 1971 ,Indian naval ships operated off Sri Lanka to blockade any

supply of arms, and ammunitions/stores for the militant group Janatha Vimukti

40 Ibid. 41 Vijay Sakhuja, "Maritime Order and Piracy", Strategic Analysis, August 2000,

p.2007. 42 According to the Piracy Reporting Center, the crew of the vessel were found

safe in Thailand and the vessel was expected to appear in any Indian port to discharge cargo.

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Perumuna (NP). This was in response to a Sri Lankan request that India provide

naval vessels to carry out patrolling in waters in south Sri Lanka and prevent gun

running /incursions by the militant groups. India also provided six helicopters of

the Indian air force for relief, rescue and humanitarian duties.43

The Indian navy participated in Operation Pawan in pursuance of a request

made by the Sri Lankan government to counter the L TTE. 44 The Indian navy was

required to undertake maritime operations in the waters around Sri Lanka and

particularly Palk Bay, north of Sri Lanka. Palk Bay was frequently used by the

L TTE for carrying out strikes against the Sri Lankan naval forces and to keep the

arms supply lines open at sea. The L TTE had hired several small vessels to

transport arms, ammunition, stores, and logistics to sustain them. These vessels

would originate from several South East Asian countries and transit through the

Bay of Bengal .The Indian navy was tasked to:

(a) Provide tactical support operations through joint patrolling of Sri

Lankan waters in conjunction with the Sri Lankan navy to prevent

military activity such as movement of arms and personnel in Sri Lankan

waters.

(b) Conduct joint operations with the army and the air force.

(c) Conduct military operations to support the Sri Lankan political agenda .

(d) Provide humanitarian ·relief.

(e) Help in detenus and refugee transfers. 45

43 Dimri, op.cit., p.67. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

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CHINESE NAVAL DIPLOMACY

In 1998 China published a white paper titled China's National Defence.46

The paper notes that China conducts military exchanges and cooperation with other

countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Towards that

end, the Chinese armed forces have developed extensive contacts with several

countries. These exchanges have taken place in the field of scientific research,

academic studies, military education, armed forces administration, culture, sports,

and medical and hygiene work. The paper further notes that the military diplomacy

serves the Chinese foreign policy. 47

These interactions have encouraged more nations to engage in military

cooperation with the Chinese armed forces. The initiatives have promoted mutual

understanding and trust between the militaries. The paper notes that the Chinese

armed forces have "presented themselves before the world as a civilized force and

a force of peace, a force which has made its due contributions to keeping regional

peace and peace throughout the world".48 As part of its military diplomacy, China

has encouraged confidence-building measures (CBM) in the military field. The

Chinese believe that CBMs are effective tools for maintaining stability and

security. These initiatives have resulted in security dialogues and cooperation with

several Asia Pacific countries.

46 c ln1ormation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defence, July 1998, Beijing, available at the website ofthe Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Washington at http://www .chinaguide.org/e-white/index.htm.

47 lbid.,p.28 48 "Cohen Signs, Hails Deal in China Pact Could Thwart Miscalculation",

Washington Times, January 19, 1998. Also see "Sino-US Armies Advance Ties", Beijing Review, 16-22 February 1998.

161

China has played an active role in regional security institutions and has

advocated regional-security dialogue and cooperation at different levels. It

participates in both track I and track II dialogues, workshops and conferences. It

has been active in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Conference on Interaction

and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Council on Security

Cooperation in Asia and Pacific Region (CSCAP), and the Northeast Asia

Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).49

China's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has been regular and

significant. The white paper asserts, "As a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, China has consistently engaged in efforts to maintain international peace

and security. It cherishes and supports the role of the United Nations in keeping

international peace and security under the guidance ofthe principles of the Charter

of the United Nations." 50

According to an official articulation by Liu Huaqiu , during the last two

decades China has followed Deng's ideas on diplomacy and scored great

achievements in diplomacy. It has worked for peaceful reunification of its

territories and promoted good-neighbourly relations with its neighboring countries.

49 China's National Defense, op.cit., p.32. 50 Ibid., p.34. Since 1990, China has sent 437 military observers in thirty two

groups to six UN peace-keeping operations. These are: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, United Nations Iraq­Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIK.O:t-.{), United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and United Nations Obser.-er Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In 1992, a 800-men engineer unit was sent to Cambodia as part of the UNT AC peace-keeping operations.. There are 32 Chinese military observers serving with UNTSO, UNIKOM and MINURSO.

162

It has enhanced co-operation with developing countries and created an

international environment for reform, opening-up, and expansion of trade. 51

There are a few articulations or writings in the public domain on the

Chinese view of naval diplomacy and navies as instruments of foreign policy. In

one such articulation, Admiral Chen notes:

As the navy plays a role in all historical periods, whether peace or war, it is also a means of pursuing national foreign policy. Navies possess many specific characteristics that differ from those of the other armed forces. The navy has international capabilities of free navigation on the high seas, and in peacetime can cruise the world's seas, even conducting limited operations outside the territorial waters of hostile countries ... but even more important is its peace time national foreign policy role. 52

Srikant Kondapalli argues that Chinese:

Diplomatic efforts for a conspicuous policy of threat reduction combined with power projection constitute Chinese policy. The former has been

followed through diplomatic dialogue and qualified accommodation with competitors like US, Japan, Vietnam and India. Power projection has been demonstrated through a massive military modernisation and build up, to reinforce claims on what China terms as territorial integrity, to include Taiwan, sovereign rights over the disputed South China sea islands, and to demonstrate an assertive presence on the vital strategic sea passes. 53

Naval Coercion

During the last decade, China has relied on maritime power as the currency

for doing business in the unstable and challenging environment of the Asia Pacific

region. On several occasions it has used force, coercive diplomacy, intimidation

and threat of use of force. Notwithstanding this posturing, China has also engaged

in confidence building measures aimed at enhancing stability and security in the

51 Liu Huaqiu, "China's Foreign Policy", December 1, 1997 available at the website of Chinese Embassy, Washington D.C. at http://www.china­embassy.org.

52 Geoffrey Till,"The Navies of the Asia Pacific in a Revolutionary Age" in Dalchoong Kim, Seo-Hang Lee, Jin-Hyun Park (ed.), Maritime Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific: Towards the 21st Century (Seoul: Dooilnet, 2000), p.31.

53 Srikant Kondapalli, op.cit., p.205.

region. It has shown signs of resolving disputes in an amicable manner. These

initiatives can be broadly divided into at least four categories: (a) sovereignty

163

issues and boundary disputes, (b) military posturing, (c) military CBMs, and (d)

challenging disorder at sea.

The Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands have conflicted with those of

Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Chinese maps depict

virtually the entire South China Sea encompassing the Spratly Islands and the

Paracel Islands as their territory. Further, the Chinese view the presence of any

economic or military activity as an invasion of their territory. 54 In 1974, China

clashed with Vietnam and seized the Paracel Islands. In 1988, China took over

several islands in the Spratly Islands in a two-day clash. The stakes in the Spratly

Islands, as seen from Beijing's eyes, outweigh any other threat. 55 Towards that

end, China clashed with the Philippines over MischiefReefin 1995.56 The trend

towards assertive jurisdiction continued unabated, and in 1996, the two sides were

again engaged in a skirmish over the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by the

Philippines.

Nevertheless, despite the presence of such assertiveness by China,

diplomatic activity to prevent the escalation of disputes has taken place on each

occasion. At the bottom of Chinese assertiveness are two fundamental issues. First,

the Chinese will not be deterred from using force if their sovereignty is challenged.

Secondly, the Chinese are well aware of resources such as hydrocarbons, fish and

minerals that are available in the Spratly Islands. At the same time, the strategic

54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.

164

location of the islands serves as a base for protecting their long and vulnerable sea

lines of communications.

In comparison to the Spratly Islands, there has been no confrontation

involving a clash with Taiwan after the Jinmen and Matsu crisis in 1953. 57

Nevertheless, Beijing's concerns over Taiwan seeking independence and actions

thereof have resulted in the prospect of a flashpoint. 58

Repeated Japanese aggression from 1894 to 1945 led to a bitter sense of

national humiliation and personal suffering among the Chinese. In 1992, China

declared the Senkaku islands as part of its offshore island territories. 59 In 1996, it

began to undertake oil exploration activities that prompted Japan to respond by

dispatching its coast guard vessels.60 Since then the seas around the island have

witnessed PLA naval activity and Chinese naval vessels routinely monitor

Japanese activity. Despite the fact that the two sides have shelved the dispute, both

China and Japan continue to visit these islands for exploration (Chinese) and

patrolling (Japan).

On October 27, 1994, there was an incident involving the US navy aircraft

carrier USS Kitty Hawk and the PLA navy in the Yellow Sea (some 100 nautical

57 In December 1952, the Communists carried out raids on the heavily fortified Nationalist held islands of Jinmen and Matsu and these attacks had continued into 1953. For a detailed account on the incident, see David G Muller, Jr. China as a Maritime Power (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p.23.

58 Allen S Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat perceptions", The China Quarterly, no.146, June 1994, p.603. In July 1995, China fired surface-to­surface missiles that fell 80 nautical miles north east of Taipei and south east of Kaoshing. These were accompanied by amphibious exercises involving the PLA, Navy, Air Force and the Army.

59 Clive Schofield, " Island Disputes in East Asia Escalate", Jane 's Intelligence Review, November 1996, pp.519-521.

60 Ibid.

165

miles west of Kyushu, Japan). 61 The Chinese had intelligence of a US battle group

departure from Yokosuka Naval base in Japan and were aware of the presence of

forces operating in the Yell ow Sea. Chinese naval forces were to gather

intelligence on US naval units and if possible get into torpedo firing position. An

S3 antisubmarine aircraft from the carrier spotted a Chinese Han class SSN some

450 nautical miles from the carrier.62 The Chinese dispatched fighter aircraft and

intercepted US planes. No shots were fired and there was no communication

between the two forces. The cat-and-mouse game continued till the submarine

came twenty-one nautical miles from the carrier. It then returned to base. 63

Close on the heels of this incident, in 1995-96, Chinese were again

involved in an incident involving a display of force during the Taiwan Strait crisis.

The chronology of the crisis was as follows: 64

July. 1995 Six SRBMs fired

August 1995 Air/sea exercise, nuclear test.

November 1995 Naval amphibious (blockade) exercise.

December 1995 USS Nimitz transits Taiwan Strait.

January-March SAMs and aircraft deployed; amphibious exercise;

1996 four SRBMs fired; U.S. deploys aircraft carriers.

61 . Lieutenant Commander Ulysses 0 Zalamea, US Navy, "Eagles and Dragons At

62

63

Sea: The Inevitable Collision Between the United States and China", Naval War College Review, Autmn/1996, vol. XLI, no 4, p.62.

Ibid.

James C. Bussert, "China Taps Many Resources For Coastal Defence", Signal, November 2002, pp.29-32. Also see "US - China Confidence Building More Important than Detargeting", at the website of Global Beat at http://W\vw.nyu.edu/ globalbeat/ pubs/ib39.html.

64 Douglas Porch," The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy", Naval War College Review, Summer 1999, p.20 ..

166

On July 18, 1995, China announced that missile tests would be carried out

in waters about ninety miles northeast of Taipei. Six CSS-6/M-9 missiles (short-

range ballistic missiles) were fired. 65 In August 1995, about twenty PLAN ships

and forty PLA Air Force planes carried out joint exercises in the same area and

conducted missile and artillery firing. These exercises continued later into the year,

and in November 1995, as legislative elections approached in Taiwan, the PLA

held large scale naval and amphibious exercises off Dongshan Island, opposite

Taiwan. 66 These were followed by major military exercises for March 1996. 67

In 1992 the Chinese announced oil exploration concession to the US

Crestone Company and occupied Da Lac Reef. 68 This was followed by the

deployment of three Romeo-class conventional submarines to patrol the area that

aroused alarms among the A SEAN states, which had just called for the non-use of

force in r~solving the Spratly Islands dispute as part of the Manila Declaration on

the South China Sea. 69 Over a period of time, China has built basic but limited

naval facilities on these islands. These include satellite monitoring and

communication antennae/dish, anti-aircraft gun emplacements, a helicopter landing

pad, and wharfs capable of handling 3000 to 4000 ton vessels. Some PLA navy

vessels are based in South China Sea Islands. In the absence of more berthing

facilities, most of the vessels are at anchorage and during bad weather and cyclonic

periods return to the mainland. During this period, the South China Sea is patrolled

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Scott Snyder, "The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive

Diplomacy". Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, available at the website of Chinese Foreign Policy Net at http://www.stanford.edu/-fravel/chinafp/scs.htm

69 Ibid.

167

by airborne reconnaissance and through spy activities disguised in its fishing

trawlers.

In one of the more serious standoffs between the US and China, a US Navy

EP-3 spy plane collided with one ofthe fighters ofthe PLA navy. 70 The Chinese

naval fighter aircraft crashed, and its pilot was missing and presumed dead. The

US plane suffered major damage and was forced to land at an airbase at Hainan,

China. After several diplomatic parlays, the Chinese Government, out of

humanitarian consideration, decided to let the US crew go, but detained the

aircraft.

Confidence Building Measures

Till the 1994 and 1996 encounters with the US navy, the Chinese had not

felt the need of a maritime agreement with the US or any other nation in the Asia-

. Pacific. But the 1994 USS Kitty Hawk-PLAN Han incident forced both navies to

prevent a future occurrence. It also prompted Beijing and Washington to develop

an understanding of maritime contingencies in order to avoid misunderstandings

and inadvertent conflict and work towards common communication procedures. It

was almost two years after the Taiwan Strait crisis that the Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement (MMCA) was discussed. 71

In January 1998, China and the United States signed the :'Agreement

Between the Ministry ofNational Defence of the PRC and the Department of

Defence of the USA on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen

70 See the transcript of U.S. Pacific Command briefing on US-China plane incident available at the website of Defence -Aerospace at http:/ /www.defence-aerospace.com.

71 "Sino-US Armies Advance Ties", Beijing Review, 16-22 February 1998.

168

Military Maritime Safety".72 Between 1996 and 1997 there were a series oftalks

and visits that were initiated by the US side under the leadership of the then

Commander of the US Pacific Fleet Admiral Joseph Prueher. The agreement was

finally signed on January19, 1998 by the US Defence Secretary William Cohen

and China's Defence Minister General Chi Haotian. At its signing ceremony,

Secretary Cohen stated: "As our naval and air forces have more contact, the

agreement will increase understanding and reduce the chances of

. I I . " 73 m1sca cu atwn .

The MMCA is the first ever agreement on confidence-building measures

between the armed forces of China and the United States. The agreement paved the

way for establishing a forum of dialogue on maritime communication issues. It was

decided to hold these meeting on a regular basis to enhance mutual trust and

encourage cooperation between the two navies. 74 Among the issues discussed were

the techniques and procedures for communications at sea between ships and

aircraft. This was especially important because US naval officers have rarely

communicated with Chinese ships or aircraft at sea.

Preserving Order at Sea

China appears to have come under great international pressure both in

terms of being accused of not taking effective legal action against piracy and

72 The text of the agreement can be seen at the website of Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/nuke/controVsea/text/us-china98.htm

73 See "The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement", US Naval Proceedings, August 1999.

74 The first annual MMCA meeting in July 1998 established timeline and goals for two subsequent working group meetings that were completed in the summer of 1999. In latel998, the first working group meeting was held in San Diego to implement the charter established by Cohen and Chi.

169

providing safe haven for pirates and captured vessels. 75 The International

Maritime Bureau (1MB) and the Baltic and International Maritime Council

(BIMCO), on behalfofthe international maritime community, lodged a strong

protest with the Chinese govetnment in regard to the treatment of merchant vessels

in Chinese ports. Several incidents involving Chinese port authorities, the Chinese

Public Safety Bureau and the Chinese Police and the Navy were the basis for this

appeal. President Jiang Zemin announced the creation of a new unit from the

Customs Administrative and Public Security Department for anti-smuggling

operations. 76

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to explain the utility of the navy as a political

instrument of power. It has examined the understanding of Indian and Chinese

strategist~ and naval planners. The empirical evidence clearly illustrates that both

India and China have used navies as political instruments to influence events in

their respective areas of interests. These have been achieved through actual

deployment, presence and threat of use of naval force. The navies have also served

as instruments for building confidence and trust as also to preserve order at sea.

75 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the Period January !-December 31, 1998, p. 2.

76 Ibid.