INTRODUCTION - Shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/18827/5/05_introduction.… · Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's, India's Maritime Security, undertakes a comprehensive analysis

INTRODUCTION

This study aims to determine the growth of maritime power in India and

China during the 1990s. It undertakes an in-depth analysis of several elements of

maritime power. These elements include both the classical (Mahanian) as also

those elements that have emerged due to technological developments and the

United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).

Historic;ally, maritime power has been associated with economic wealth.

During the glorious Greek and Roman eras, the Mediterranean was the centre of

maritime power. With the decline of European colonial domination and the ascent

ofthe United States of America, the axis of maritime power shifted to the Atlantic.

Likewise economic growth among several Asia Pacific countries has resulted in a

change of the maritime power axis. The Asia Pacific region has experienced

economic dynamism and booming trade. Importantly, maritime developments

occupy a significant place in the regional economic environment.

Meanwhile, the security architecture in the Asia Pacific region has

undergone a change. For many countries in the region, economic vitality is

dependent on long sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Regional waterways have

therefore strategic significance for both merchant and naval shipping. Regional

economic prosperity is intertwined with maritime affairs. Most of these nations

are either island states or have long coastlines. Besides, there is a determination to

assert greater control over newly acquired maritime territories under UNCLOS III

and to safeguard maritime interests. Hence, regional military modernisation has a

maritime orientation. Navies have been given greater priority than armies and air

forces. Regional countries are engaged in aggressive arms acquisition programmes.

Some of the new hardware has offensive capabilities.

2

Economists and security specialists have viewed the shift in the economic

and maritime axis with great attention. To an economist, the Asia Pacific security

environment appears to be calm, stable and confident. On the other hand, for a

security specialist, the region is full of flash points due to territorial disputes, and

ongoing military modernisation is marked by the ambition to dominate the regional

balance of power. Every time there is a shift in the balance of power, regional

countries perceive it as a security problem.

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

There are at least three important reasons for this study. First, both India

and China have experienced substantial growth in their maritime power in the

1990s. Good economic growth rates, increased energy demands to support the

economy, recognition of the importance of SLOCs, and the safety of marine wealth

in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) have led to the modernization of navies.

Secondly, during the last five decades, conflict has been the dominant

characteristic in India-China relations. 1 In 1951, China annexed Tibet leading to a

mounting nervousness in New Delhi about the permanent stationing of the Chinese

military on its northern borders. This also obviated the buffer that insulated India

from the north. The capture of Aksai Chin in 1962 (claimed by India as part of

Jammu and Kashmir), the border dispute involving 90,000 square kilometer in

John W Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 377. Garver notes that given Chinese economic growth and military capabilities, it is likely that India will accommodate itself to a steadily expanding Chinese presence and role in South Asia. According to Garver, the major question for India is whether it can accept such an arrangement. He also notes that emergence of China, as a superpower, will depend upon New Delhi's future equations with Russia and the United States. Also, unification with Taiwan and the tenor of its relations with Japan will also impact upon Beijing's long-term relations with India.

3

Arunachal Pradesh, und the extensive military infrastructure build up in Tibet also

impacted on Indian security and added to uneasiness in New Delhi. The situation

worsened in 1963. whL·n Pakistan ceded more than five thousand square kilometers

of territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to China that culminated in the

construction of the Karakoram Friendship Highway.

Indian threat perceptions are well grounded in China's nuclear capability,

and New Delhi's efforts at redressing the nuclear asymmetry have led Beijing to

help Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, thus complicating India's nuclear

calculations? China is also actively involved in modernising Pakistan's maritime

infrastructure, particularly Gwadar, which is geo-strategically located astride the

sea-lane originating from the strategic choke point ofHormuz.3 Similarly, Chinese

military aid and investment in strategic infrastructure resulted in an Asian diplomat

in Bangkok noting that: ''Myanmar is close to being a Chinese satellit~." 4

Given Indian and Chinese economic growth and naval capabilities, neither

side is willing to accommodate the other and be the junior partner. 5 India is

building relations with the US which China views as the only global competitor. In

response, China is actively engaged in a competition for influence in South Asia

among the small states, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

2

3

4

5

C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C.Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000), pp.149-154.

Vijay Sakhuja, "Sino-Pakistan Maritime Initiatives", Article No 730, April 10, 2002, available at the website of Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at http://www .ipcs.org.

Dermot Tatlow, "China's Shadow: A Growing Presence From Next Door Spurs a Rethink in Yangon", see website of Asia Week at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0528/nat4.html.

C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, op.cit., p.l55.

4

Thirdly, the Indian and Chinese navies have not had a very satisfying

relationship going back to 1956. Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Enlai visited an

Indian naval ship in Mumbai (then Bombay) and was hosted at a luncheon. Earlier,

a Chinese military delegation had spent a day at sea off Cochin on board the Indian

Flagship. However, this nascent naval relationship was marred by some incidents

caused by the Chinese."'

At the time of the 1962 Indo-China war, the Indian military leadership

perceived a combined naval threat from China and Pakistan. 7 The Chinese navy

had 25 submarines, and twenty-one of these had the capability to operate in the

Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. A reassessment of the Chinese naval threat ruled

out naval conflict but the presence of Chinese submarines had been confirmed. 8

Interestingly, an American aircraft carrier was present in the Bay of Bengal to offer

air cover over Calcutta in case the conflict escalated.9

6

7

8

9

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Nmy 1951-65 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992), pp.486-488. In 1958, Mysore, a cruiser of the Indian navy paid a goodwill visit to Shanghai. Enroute, she visited Hong Kong for fuelling and had to pass within 12 miles of the Chinese coastline but well outside the then internationally accepted three-mile territorial waters limit. A suitable reply, rejecting the Chinese protests, was made. But there was worse waiting to happen. At Shanghai, the Chinese did their best to sow seeds of distrust among Indian sailors over some boxes of beer they had sent to the ship for the seamen. Incidentally, Indian sailors are not permitted to drink alcoholic beverages.

Ibid., pp.57-58.

Ibid.

K.R. Singh, Navies of South Asia (New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2002), p.63. By some accounts, it was the USS Enterprise. Interestingly, Indians appear to have a "love and hate" relationship with the Enterprise. During the 1971 Indo­Pakistan conflict, it was the same carrier and its escorts that sailed through the Bay of Bengal to deter India against Pakistan. It is believed that the motive of this display of force was to ensure protection ofUS interests in the area. But Indian naval officers, particularly Vice Admiral M.K. Roy, argue that no Indian naval vessel encountered the US Task Force 74. However, he notes that during his meeting with Admiral S.G.Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief, Soviet navy, it was revealed that a Soviet nuclear submarine deliberately surfaced in the Bay

After the 1962 war, relations between Beijing and New Delhi remained

sour. Interaction between the two navies, however, finally began in 1994 with the

visit by a Chinese naval ship Zhang He to Mumbai and, as a reciprocal gesture, in

September 1995 two Indian navy ships visited Shanghai. 10 Again, in 2000, while

enroute to Pusan, South Korea, to participate in the South Korean International

Fleet Review, two Indian ships visited Shanghai on a goodwill visit, but this time

they faced a situation that had elements of the 1958 visit by Indian ship Mysore.

China objected to the presence of the Indian navy in the South China Sea,

claiming that the responsibility of patrolling the sea was that ofthe Chinese navy.

The Chinese had to be told that the Indian ships were passing through and would

even carry out Passex (passage exercises) with the Chinese navy. According to

Admiral R H Tahiliani, former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, the Chinese protests

only amounted to "pressure tactics". 11 In response, the Chinese navy "backed out"

and declined to participate in the Indian navy's International Fleet Review

(IFR),"bridges of friendship" to commemorate India's 50 years of independence.

Chinese protests over Indian naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea may have

been one of the reasons. Another reason may have been that the Pakistan navy had

not been invited to participate in the event. 12

of Bengal to send a signal to the US that the Soviets could intervene if the Americans were to get involved in the India-Pakistan war.

10 The author was present onboard the ship Juring the visit to Shanghai in September1995.

11 Gaurav C. Sawant, "China Objects to Indian Presence in South China Sea", Indian Express, October 14, 2000.

12 Interestingly, just three months later, in May 2001, two Chinese naval ships Harbin and Taicang, with Rear Admiral Zhang Yan, Deputy Commander of the North Sea Fleet on board, visited Karachi in connection with the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Pakistan-China relations. Rear Admiral Zhang noted that the two countries were close neighbours, and their friendship enjoyed a long history and was time-tested. Rear Admiral Shahid Karimullah,

5

A NOTE ON EARLIER WORKS ON INDIAN AND CHINESE

MARITIME POWER

In the past, several scholars and experts have written on Indian naval

power. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's, India's Maritime Security, undertakes a

comprehensive analysis of the economic, political and military dimensions of

6

India's maritime power. 13 Roy-Chaudhury argues that India lacks a comprehensive

maritime security policy and highlights the need for a holistic approach to the

various elements of maritime power. As regards Chinese activities in the Indian

Ocean, the book notes that China has been actively involved in developing

economic, political and military relations with several states in the Indian Ocean

and it could have a naval presence in the coming years. 14 Roy-Chaudhury's earlier

work, Sea Power and Indian Security, undertakes an analysis of the growth of the

Indian navy and provides important inputs with regard to naval acquisition

polices. 15

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns and Blueprint to

Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951-65 trace Indian navy's history from 1945 to

Commander, Pakistan Fleet, said that Pakistan-China relations represented a model for peaceful, co-operative and friendly relations between countries with different political and social systems and cultural backgrounds and the friendship had stood the test of time under all circumstances, whether it be war or peace, economic or political difficulties or even international pressure. For more details, see "Chinese Admiral Lauds Pakistan Foreign Policy", The Dawn, May 21 ,2001 available at website of Defence News at http:/ /www.PakistaniDefence.com.

13 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000).

14 Ibid., p.1 02. 15 Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, Sea Power and Indian Security (London: Brassy's,

1995).

7

1950 and from 1951 to 1965 respectively. 16 This was followed by Vice Admiral

G.N. Hiranandani Transition to Triumph: History ofthe Indian Navy, 1965-

197 5. 17 These are very good accounts of the growth of the Indian navy but do not

cover developments in India's maritime power.

G.V.C. Naidu's The Indian Navy and South East Asia examines the growth

and development of the Indian navy in the context of South East Asia. 18 He notes

that the Chinese navy is undergoing modernization both in terms of doctrine and

capability. Similarly, the Japanese navy is expanding and remains technologically

superior. The Indian navy, despite recent funding constraints, continues to develop

a limited power projection capability. According to Naidu, India's major concern

in the Bay of Bengal arise as a result of Chinese military activity in Myanmar. 19

Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars by Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon

culls from postulates of many maritime strategists and argues that the benchmark

for maritime strategy is how it affects the national political purpose.20 Menon

resurrects Philip Colomb and contrasts him with Mahan. The book examines

several wars in operational and tactical contexts.

As regards China, Lieutenant Commander David G Muller, Jr. US Navy

authored China as a Maritime Power and traced developments in China's maritime

16 Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989) and Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951-65 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992).

17 Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 2000).

18 G.V.C.Naidu, The Indian Navy and South East Asia (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000).

19 Ibid., pp.191-192. 20 Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars

(London: Frank Cass, 2000).

8

power during the period 1945-1983.21 Muller argues that maritime power is often

defined in terms of naval strength, but a study of China as a maritime power cannot

be limited to an account of the development ofthe Chinese navy. He undertakes a

comprehensive analysis of Chinese maritime economy, domestic political

influences on naval developments and its status in the Chinese political system.

The work also describes maritime foreign relations and the evolution of China's

position on the Law of the Sea. The study, however, does not deal with maritime

history.

This aspect has been dealt with by Gang Deng in Maritime Sector,

Institutions, ·and Sea Power of Premodern China.22 Deng argues that China once

had a continental outlook, it neglected its maritime frontiers and there was no

significant maritime tradition. This was so because China's greatest military

threats, b~fore the nineteenth century, came from the grasslands of inner Asia. In

the later years, however, China's economic superiority among its maritime trading

partners was driven by superiority in maritime technology. This was challenged by

the European fleets in the nineteenth century that led to a long century of

degradation and humiliation at the hands of the Europeans and, later, the Japanese.

Cole D. Bernard's The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the

Twenty-first Century argues that China is the most important and dangerous rising

power and is usfng its continuing economic growth to restore its historical position

of regional dominance in Asia. 23 Cole notes that in the last two decades China has

21 D~vid G Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).

22 Gang Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China (Westport: Greenwood, 1999).

23 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001).

9

focused on economic development and is currently building a navy capable of

projecting its power beyond its littorals. How it will choose to use its increasingly

capable military has global implications.

Srikanth Kondapalli's China's Naval Power focuses its attention on the

command structure and organization, personnel and training, and the near and

long-term strategic intentions of China's navy.24 The work warns that China's

other neighbours, such as India, will certainly be affected by these changes as

"tensions are bound to rise with the rise of China's naval power. "25

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai's authored China's Strategic Seapower:

The Politics· of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age. 26 It documents China's

acquisition of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, a programme that

dates back to the 1950s. The book shows that despite China's technological

backwardness, it was able to develop advanced weapon systems. The authors

conclude by noting that China's military industry can shed the legacy of past

political upheavals and move into the modem age.

As is evident, in the past, several scholars and experts have written on the

diverse facets of the broad theme of maritime power in India and China. However,

no work has been undertaken that compares contemporary developments,

particularly in the 1990s, in terms of the growth of the maritime power of India and

China. Besides examining the classical elements of maritime power, this study also

examines the impact of information technology on the Indian and Chinese

24 Srikanth Kondapalli, China's Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001).

25 Ibid., p.218. 26 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of

Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

understanding of naval warfare. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a

greater awareness of the maritime ambitions of India and China, and how this

instrument of power is employed for regional influence.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND MARITIME POWER: A BRIEF

OVERVIEW

The very location oflndia on the globe lends it 'maritimeness' .27

Cartographers have aptly named an entire ocean after India. Although this fact is

deeply rooted in the maritime strategic thinking of India, no theories for the

10

application of maritime power have been developed. Much of the understanding of

matters maritime is still based on British thought and practice. Besides, there is a

tendency to look at maritime power as narrowly as the navy or simply maritime

infrastructure.

Indian writings on maritime power or sea power draw inspiration from

Western concepts of maritime power.28 Naval forces are considered an element of

maritime power to further national interests, be they economic, diplomatic or

strategic. Admiral O.S. Dawson, former navy chief and subsequent High

27 Commodore S.W. Bateman, Australian navy, a retired navy officer notes that 'maritimeness' is based on the state's dependence on the sea and this is an amalgam of factors such as maritime traditions, size of the navy and merchant fleet, dependence on sea borne trade, size of EEZ, value of offshore resources, and the capability of the domestic shipbuilding industry. For more details see his "Sea Change in Asia-Pacific", Jane's Navy International, October 1996, p.26.

28 S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and Indian Ocean: With Special Reference to India (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp.23-26. Admiral S.N. Kohli, former Chief ofNaval Staff, Indian navy, notes that there is a mistaken belief that sea is synonym for a strong navy. He believes that this is a myopic view and argues that sea power embraces all that makes nations great by the use of sea. He then goes on to examine the Mahanian elements of maritime power against Indian settings.

11

Commissioner of India to New Zealand argues, "Sea power is an important

commodity. A country likes India without sea power is a weak state".29

The more contemporary writings also describe maritime power as military,

political and economic power exerted through an ability to use the seas. Rear

Admiral K. Sridharan has argued that sea power is not merely warships and cites

Jawaharlal Nehru:

Mercantile marine represents power of a different type; not power of armed might but the power of a country's growing wealth and prosperity.30

Given these views and those of other Indian practitioners, it is generally

agreed that maritime power encompasses a much wider definition. 31

India's maritime interests envisage a secure maritime environment for

sustained national development. 32 This demands maritime areas are secure and that

the sea is used effectively both as a medium of trade and resource generation.

Protecting India's energy lifelines, promoting overseas markets and fulfilling

international commitments like peacekeeping and upholding maritime order under

UNCLOS III are some of the other interests that have been identified.

India lays claim to an EEZ of2.3 million square kilometers that is a

repository of great wealth in terms of oil and gas, as well as marine resources, both

29 Raju G.C. Thomas, "The Sources oflndian Naval Expansion", in Robert H. Bruce ( ed. ), The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean (Perth: Curtin University of Technology, 1989), p.90.

30 Rear Admiral K. Sridharan, Sea: Our Saviour (New Delhi: New Age International, 2000), pp.l57-158.

31 Discussions with Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, former Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admirals M. K. Roy, I Bedi, and R.B. Suri, all former Commanders-in-Chief, and Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon during September-October 2000 ..

32 Rear Admiral K. Sridharan, op.cit., pp.159-161.

12

living and non-living.33 India also holds "pioneer investor" status with mining

rights in the central Indian Ocean region to extract poly-metallic nodules rich in

critical materials.

India's entire development process rests on the availability of energy

resources, and therefore energy availability and affordability are absolutely vital to

the country. Ninety percent of Indian oil comes from offshore oil fields or is

transported over the sea from abroad. 34 Ensuring the security of energy supplies is

one of the important facets of India's maritime challenge.

As far as China is concerned, there have been periods of maritime glory in

ancient times. During the period between the Song Dynasty and the Ming Dynasty,

China's imperial system focused its attention overseas and several voyages were

dispatched to distant lands as far as Africa and Persian Gulf.35 China was regarded

as one of the strongest sea powers in that period. But this was short-lived because

subsequent Chinese rulers began to look inwards and maritime enterprise took a

back seat.

However, after the communists came to power in China in 1949, the

leadership once again began to salvage some of their ancient maritime glory and

maritime infrastructure was developed with the Soviet Union's assistance.36 Since

independence Chinese maritime strategic thinking has grown and developed into a

33 R.C. Sharma and P .C. Sinha, India's Ocean Policy (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1994), pp.25-63.

34 P.K. Ghosh, "The Maritime Dimension", in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Oil and Gas in India's Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001), p.75.

35 C.P. Fitzgerald, The Horizon History of China (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1969), pp.239-242.

36 Muller, op.cit., pp.l1-12.

13

sophisticated maritime strategy.37 The Chinese believe that, to build China into a

real maritime power, the country must intensify maritime resource studies and

invest in the sinews of maritime power. 38

Much of contemporary Chinese maritime understanding traces its origin to

the writings of Admiral Liu Huaqing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese

navy (1982-86) and later Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission.39 He

believed that if China was to become a great power it must develop maritime

capabilities and build a navy capable of defending its maritime interests.40

China's maritime economy involves more than twenty sectors, including

maritime transportation, fishing, salt industry, and offshore marine resources (both

living and non- living). In addition, high-tech marine industries have begun to take

shape in terms of the utilization of seawater, sea energy and the exploitations of

seabed resources. 41 During the last decades, Chinese r.1aritime economy has grown

at a rapid pace and the coastal provinces have played an important role towards the

d 1 f . . 42

eve opment o maritime power.

37 Ibid., p.44. According to Muller, the Chinese did not inherit a national maritime strategy and the primary purpose of the navy was to assist in moving ground forces into and out of coastal areas.

38 Ibid., pp.57-68.Durihg the first decade of the Communist rule, economics of sea-borne trade and developmP.nt of fishing industry were in the forefront and served as the motivation for Chinese naval development in the 1950s.

39 For a detailed career profile of Admiral Liu Huaqing, see Srikanth Kondapalli China's Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001 ), pp.190-196.

4° For an interesting discourse on Admiral Liu Huaqing's maritime thought, see You Ji, "The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001 ", Paper No 22, The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, pp.6-8.

41 The Chinese government White Paper titled "Development of China's Marine Programs", available at the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China Washington, D.C. at http://www.chinaguide.org/e-white/index.htm.

42 Li Rongxia, "Marine Economy: New Economic Growth Point", Beijing Review, November! 0-December 6, 1998.

14

As noted above, there is a general sense of insecurity in the region. There is

also a widespread apprehension throughout the Asia Pacific region concerning the

. future of the balance of power. 43 Both India and China are seeking a greater role in

regional political and security affairs that is commensurate \\ith their economic and

military capabilities. The ongoing modernisation of the tv.'o navies is a reflection of

the intention of these countries to develop a greater and more assertive role in

determining regional affairs. Given the active arms buildup in the Asia-Pacific

region, and the desire to safeguard maritime interests, there is a potential for

conflict. Such a scenario would have profound consequences for most nations of

the Asia-Pacific including the US, Japan, South East Asian countries and Russia in

the long run.

ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

The study is based on an analyses of empirical data obtained from several

sources. An attempt has been made to discuss maritime infrastructure, naval

equipment and capabilities, the impact of information technologies on maritime

power, and an appreciation of the maritime environment in India and China.

Several primary sources like official government publications, white papers, media

reports and interviews with practitioners of maritime power, naval specialists and

planners have supported the study. Likewise, visits to maritime infrastructure

(ports, shipyards and dockyards) in India have provided a rich source of data. It

was not possible to visit China during the study. Ho\vever, an earlier visit to

Chinese and Taiwanese naval bases, shipyards, ports, and recent interaction with

43 Jing Dong Yuan, "China's Defence Modernisation: Implications for Asia­Pacific Security"', Contemporary South East Asia, vol.l7, no .I, June 1995, p. 76. Also see Harry Harding, "A Chinese Colossus?", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.18, no.3., September 1995, p.120.

15

Chinese maritime specialists during Track II meetings provided valuable data for

the study.44

Inputs for this study include the author's meetings with the Chinese,

Taiwanese and the Indian naval Commanders-in-Chief. In 1995, on a visit to

Shanghai onboard the 1\irpan, the author met Admiral Zhang Lianzhong during an

official call. In 2000. the author visited Taipai and met the Taiwanese navy chief

Admiral Wu Shih-Wen. These meetings, though brief, provided important inputs in

terms of strategic thinking in China and the China threat as perceived by the

Taiwanese. Discussions with several Indian navy Commanders-in-Chief (both

serving and retired) helped in understanding maritime thinking among Indian

maritime practitioners and experts.

It is true that a realistic assessment of maritime power is an extraordinarily

complex empirical problem. The input elements of maritime power are both

objective and subjective. In this study, an attempt has been made to determine the

maritime power of India and China as systematically as possible. The study has

relied on RayS Cline's formula for calculating the power ofnations.45 Based on

this, the study created a model to determine the comprehensive maritime power of

a nation. This model is suitable because it encompasses the changes in the nautical

regime brought about by UNCLOS III and the impact of information technology

on the maritime power of a state.

44 The author is a member of the Indian Maritime Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and has attended several meetings.

45 RayS Cline, World Power Trends and US Foreign Policy for the 1980's (Colorado: Westview Press,l980), p.27. Cline put forth a formula to determine the power of nations for planning American defence and foreign policy.

16

The study has been divided into seven chapters. These chapters in tum look

at maritime power comparatively, i.e. they discuses various determinants of

maritime power in both the Indian and Chinese context. The chapters seek to

identify developments as also areas of neglect in maritime affairs. The study

analyses the commitment of the national leadership to maritime power and their

understanding of its utility in national strategy.

Chapter I examines the concept of maritime power as it has developed over

the years in the US, Britain, USSR/Russia, India and China. It analyses the

writings of several maritime strategists, academics, and practitioners, and argues

that the constituents of maritime power have undergone a change with UNCLOS

III and the ongoing revolution brought about by information technology. It

develops an input/output model for computing the maritime power of a state. It

also high!ights how states have used their maritime power to safeguard their

national interests.

Chapter II establishes a link between geography and maritime power. It

argues that the two are closely linked to each other and are vital determinants in a

country's march towards becoming a maritime power. The chapter examines in

detail the maritime geography of India and China. Chapter III analyzes Indian and

Chinese naval strategy, force structure and capabilities to achieve strategic

objectives set by the leadership.

Chapter IV examines the economic components of maritime power. It

examines shipbuilding, shipping, port infrastructure and the fishing industry of

India and China. It shows that both countries have intensified their efforts to build

:maritime infrastructure to harness the wealth available from the sea. Chapter V

examines the political component of maritime power. It argues that there is

17

continuity from the past with regard to the use of navies for coercion and gunboat

diplomacy. Importantly, the navy is the only instrument of the state that can be

legally deployed in peace or war anywhere on the seas for political purposes. Both

India and China have used their navies for diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region.

Chapter VI examines the impact of information-based technologies on the

growth of maritime power in India and China. Both countries have kept abreast of

developments in information warfare and are slowly adapting to changes brought

about by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The chapter also highlights

critical deficiencies in the RMA capabilities of China and India.

Finally, Chapter VII notes that the central feature of the Asia Pacific

security environment is a general sense of insecurity. It argues that, in the post

Cold War period, a new "quadrile" (India, China, Japan and the US) has emerged

that is shaping the regional balance of power. These countries want a favourable

and stable security environment for economic growth, but have adopted aggressive

arms acquisitions strategies that are indicative of the fact that the security

environment is fragile and has the potential to tum into a regional conflict.