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Part 1 Cryptography 1 Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography Knapsack RSA Diffie-Hellman key Elliptic Curve Cryptography Public key crypto application
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Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

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Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography. Knapsack RSA Diffie-Hellman key Elliptic Curve Cryptography Public key crypto application. Public Key Cryptography. Two keys Sender uses recipient’s public key to encrypt Recipient uses private key to decrypt Based on “trap door one way function” - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Page 1: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 1

Chapter 4:Public Key Cryptography

KnapsackRSADiffie-Hellman keyElliptic Curve CryptographyPublic key crypto application

Page 2: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 2

Public Key Cryptography Two keys

o Sender uses recipient’s public key to encrypto Recipient uses private key to decrypt

Based on “trap door one way function”o “One way” means easy to compute in one

direction, but hard to compute in other directiono Example: Given p and q, product N = pq easy to

compute, but given N, it’s hard to find p and qo “Trap door” used to create key pairs

Page 3: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 3

Public Key Cryptography Encryption

o Suppose we encrypt M with Bob’s public keyo Bob’s private key can decrypt to recover M

Digital Signatureo Sign by “encrypting” with your private keyo Anyone can verify signature by “decrypting”

with public keyo But only you could have signedo Like a handwritten signature, but way better…

Page 4: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

What we learn here wrt PKC Knapsack

First PKC proposal insecure

RSA Standard PKC

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange key exchange algorithm

ECC(Elliptic Curve Cryptography)

Chapter 4 -- Public Key Cryptography

4

Page 5: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 5

Knapsack

Page 6: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 6

Knapsack Problem Given a set of n weights W0,W1,...,Wn-1 and a

sum S, is it possible to find ai {0,1} so thatS = a0W0+a1W1 +...+ an-1Wn-1

(technically, this is “subset sum” problem) Example

o Weights (62,93,26,52,166,48,91,141)o Problem: Find subset that sums to S=302o Answer: 62+26+166+48=302

The (general) knapsack is NP-complete

Page 7: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 7

Knapsack Problem General knapsack (GK) is hard to solve But superincreasing knapsack (SIK) is

easy SIK: each weight greater than the sum of all

previous weights Example

o Weights (2,3,7,14,30,57,120,251) o Problem: Find subset that sums to S=186o Work from largest to smallest weight o Answer: 120+57+7+2=186

Page 8: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 8

Knapsack Cryptosystem1. Generate superincreasing knapsack (SIK)2. Convert SIK into “general” knapsack (GK)3. Public Key: GK4. Private Key: SIK plus conversion factor Ideally…

o Easy to encrypt with GKo With private key, easy to decrypt (convert

ciphertext to SIK problem)o Without private key, must solve GK

Page 9: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 9

Knapsack Keys Start with (2,3,7,14,30,57,120,251) as the SIK Choose m = 41 and n = 491 (m, n relatively

prime, n exceeds sum of elements in SIK) Compute “general” knapsack(GK)

2 41 mod 491 = 823 41 mod 491 = 1237 41 mod 491 = 28714 41 mod 491 = 83

30 41 mod 491 = 24857 41 mod 491 = 373

120 41 mod 491 = 10251 41 mod 491 = 471

GK: (82,123,287,83,248,373,10,471)

Page 10: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 10

Knapsack Cryptosystem Private key: (2,3,7,14,30,57,120,251)

m1 mod n = 411 mod 491 = 12 Public key: (82,123,287,83,248,373,10,471) Example: Encrypt 150=10010110

82 + 83 + 373 + 10 = 548 To decrypt,

o 548 12 = 193 mod 491o Solve (easy) SIK with S = 193o Obtain plaintext 10010110=150

Page 11: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 11

Knapsack Weakness Trapdoor: Convert SIK into “general”

knapsack using modular arithmetic One-way: General knapsack easy to

encrypt, hard to solve; SIK easy to solve This knapsack cryptosystem is insecure

o Broken in 1983 with Apple II computero The attack uses lattice reduction

“General knapsack” is not general enough! This special knapsack is easy to solve!

Page 12: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 12

RSA

Page 13: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

RSA What is the most difficult?

addition

123 + 654 -------- 777

multiplication

123 x 654 --------- 492 615 738 ----------- 80442

factoring

221 = ?x? 221/2 = 221/3 = 221/5 = 221/7 = 221/11 = 221/13 = 221 = 13 x 17

Easy Difficult

Part 1 Cryptography 13

Page 14: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 14

RSA Invented by Clifford Cocks (GCHQ), and later

independently, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (MIT)o RSA is the gold standard in public key crypto

Let p and q be two large prime numbers Let N = pq be the modulus Choose e relatively prime to (p1)(q1) Find d such that ed = 1 mod (p1)(q1) Public key is (N,e) Private key is d

Page 15: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 15

RSA Message M is treated as a number To encrypt M we compute

C = Me mod N To decrypt ciphertext C compute

M = Cd mod N Recall that e and N are public If Trudy can factor N=pq, she can use e to

easily find d since ed = 1 mod (p1)(q1) Factoring the modulus breaks RSA

o Is factoring the only way to break RSA?

Page 16: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 16

Does RSA Really Work? Given C = Me mod N we must show

M = Cd mod N = Med mod N We’ll use Euler’s Theorem:

If x is relatively prime to n then x(n) = 1 mod n Facts:

1) ed = 1 mod (p 1)(q 1) 2) By definition of “mod”, ed = k(p 1)(q 1) + 13) (N) = (p 1)(q 1)

Then ed 1 = k(p 1)(q 1) = k(N) Finally, Med = M(ed 1) + 1 = MMed 1 = MMk(N) =

M(M(N))k mod N = M1k mod N = M mod N

Page 17: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 17

Simple RSA Example(1) Example of RSA

o Select “large” primes p = 11, q = 3 o Then N = pq = 33 and (p − 1)(q − 1) =

20 o Choose e = 3 (relatively prime to 20)o Find d such that ed = 1 mod 20

We find that d = 7 works Public key: (N, e) = (33, 3) Private key: d = 7

Page 18: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 18

Simple RSA Example(2) Public key: (N, e) = (33, 3) Private key: d = 7 Suppose message M = 8 Ciphertext C is computed as

C = Me mod N = 83 = 512 = 17 mod 33 Decrypt C to recover the message M by

M = Cd mod N = 177 = 410,338,673 = 12,434,505 33 + 8 = 8 mod 33

Page 19: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 19

More Efficient RSA (1) Modular exponentiation example

o 520 = 95367431640625 = 25 mod 35 A better way: repeated squaring

o 20 = 10100 base 2o (1, 10, 101, 1010, 10100) = (1, 2, 5, 10, 20)o Note that 2 = 1 2, 5 = 2 2 + 1, 10 = 2 5, 20 = 2

10o 51= 5 mod 35o 52= (51)2 = 52 = 25 mod 35o 55= (52)2 51 = 252 5 = 3125 = 10 mod 35o 510 = (55)2 = 102 = 100 = 30 mod 35o 520 = (510)2 = 302 = 900 = 25 mod 35

No huge numbers and it’s efficient!

Page 20: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 20

More Efficient RSA (2) Use e = 3 for all users (but not same N or d)

+Public key operations only require 2 multiplieso Private key operations remain expensive- If M < N1/3 then C = Me = M3 and cube root attack- For any M, if C1, C2, C3 sent to 3 users, cube root

attack works (uses Chinese Remainder Theorem) Can prevent cube root attack by padding

message with random bits Note: e = 216 + 1 also used (“better” than e =

3)

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Part 1 Cryptography 21

Diffie-Hellman

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Part 1 Cryptography 22

Diffie-Hellman Invented by Williamson (GCHQ) and,

independently, by Diffie and Hellman(Stanford)

A “key exchange” algorithmo Used to establish a shared symmetric key

Not for encrypting or signing Based on discrete log problem:

o Given: g, p, and gk mod po Find: exponent k

Page 23: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 23

Diffie-Hellman Let p be prime, let g be a generator

o For any x {1,2,…,p-1} there is n s.t. x = gn mod p Alice selects her private value a Bob selects his private value b Alice sends ga mod p to Bob Bob sends gb mod p to Alice Both compute shared secret, gab mod p Shared secret can be used as symmetric key

Page 24: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Discrete Logarithm Problem known: large prime number p, generator g gk mod p = x Discrete logarithm problem: given x, g, p, find k Table g=2, p=11k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10gk 2 4 8 5 10 9 7 3 6 1

Cyclic Group G

α1 α2 α3 …Generator α αx = β

1st element

nth element

Page 25: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 25

Diffie-Hellman Suppose Bob and Alice use Diffie-

Hellman to determine symmetric key K = gab mod p

Trudy can see ga mod p and gb mod po But… ga gb mod p = ga+b mod p gab mod p

If Trudy can find a or b, she gets key K If Trudy can solve discrete log

problem, she can find a or b

Page 26: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 26

Diffie-Hellman Public: g and p Private: Alice’s exponent a, Bob’s exponent b

Alice, a Bob, b

ga mod pgb mod p

Alice computes (gb)a = gba = gab mod p Bob computes (ga)b = gab mod p Use K = gab mod p as symmetric key

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Part 1 Cryptography 27

Diffie-Hellman Subject to man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack

Alice, a Bob, b

ga mod pgb mod p

Trudy, t

gt mod pgt mod p

Trudy shares secret gat mod p with Alice Trudy shares secret gbt mod p with Bob Alice and Bob don’t know Trudy exists!

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Part 1 Cryptography 28

Diffie-Hellman How to prevent MiM attack?

o Encrypt DH exchange with symmetric keyo Encrypt DH exchange with public keyo Sign DH values with private keyo Other?

At this point, DH may look pointless…o …but it’s not (more on this later)

In any case, you MUST be aware of MiM attack on Diffie-Hellman

Page 29: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 29

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Page 30: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 30

Elliptic Curve Crypto (ECC) “Elliptic curve” is not a cryptosystem Elliptic curves are a different way to

do the math in public key system Elliptic curve versions DH, RSA, etc. Elliptic curves may be more efficient

o Fewer bits needed for same securityo But the operations are more complex

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Part 1 Cryptography 31

What is an Elliptic Curve? An elliptic curve E is the graph of

an equation of the formy2 = x3 + ax + b

Also includes a “point at infinity” What do elliptic curves look like? See the next slide!

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Part 1 Cryptography 32

Elliptic Curve Picture Consider elliptic curve

E: y2 = x3 - x + 1 If P1 and P2 are on E, we

can define P3 = P1 + P2

as shown in picture Addition is all we need

P1

P2

P3

x

y

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Part 1 Cryptography 33

Points on Elliptic Curve Consider y2 = x3 + 2x + 3 (mod 5)x = 0 y2 = 3 no solution (mod 5)x = 1 y2 = 6 = 1 y = 1,4 (mod 5)x = 2 y2 = 15 = 0 y = 0 (mod 5)x = 3 y2 = 36 = 1 y = 1,4 (mod 5)x = 4 y2 = 75 = 0 y = 0 (mod 5)

Then points on the elliptic curve are(1,1) (1,4) (2,0) (3,1) (3,4) (4,0) and the point at infinity:

Page 34: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 34

Elliptic Curve Math Addition on: y2 = x3 + ax + b (mod p)P1=(x1,y1), P2=(x2,y2)P1 + P2 = P3 = (x3,y3) where

x3 = m2 - x1 - x2 (mod p)y3 = m(x1 - x3) - y1 (mod p)

And m = (y2-y1)(x2-x1)-1 mod p, if P1P2

m = (3x12+a)(2y1)-1 mod p, if P1 = P2

Special cases: If m is infinite, P3 = , and + P = P for all P

Page 35: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 35

Elliptic Curve Addition Consider y2 = x3 + 2x + 3 (mod 5).

Points on the curve are (1,1) (1,4) (2,0) (3,1) (3,4) (4,0) and

What is (1,4) + (3,1) = P3 = (x3,y3)?m = (1-4)(3-1)-1 = -32-1

= 2(3) = 6 = 1 (mod 5)x3 = 1 - 1 - 3 = 2 (mod 5)y3 = 1(1-2) - 4 = 0 (mod 5)

On this curve, (1,4) + (3,1) = (2,0)

Page 36: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 36

ECC Diffie-Hellman Public: Elliptic curve and point (x,y) on curve Private: Alice’s A and Bob’s B

Alice, A Bob, B

A(x,y)B(x,y)

Alice computes A(B(x,y)) Bob computes B(A(x,y)) These are the same since AB = BA

Page 37: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 37

ECC Diffie-Hellman Public: Curve y2 = x3 + 7x + b (mod 37)

and point (2,5) b = 3 Alice’s private: A = 4 Bob’s private: B = 7 Alice sends Bob: 4(2,5) = (7,32) Bob sends Alice: 7(2,5) = (18,35) Alice computes: 4(18,35) = (22,1) Bob computes: 7(7,32) = (22,1)

Page 38: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 38

Uses for Public Key Crypto

Page 39: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 39

Uses for Public Key Crypto Confidentiality

o Transmitting data over insecure channel

o Secure storage on insecure media Authentication (later) Digital signature provides integrity

and non-repudiationo No non-repudiation with symmetric

keys

Page 40: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

PKC(1): message encryption

Encrypt message M by Alice’s public. Message M can be decrypted only by

Alice’s private key..

40Chapter 4 -- Public Key Cryptography

M

M

Everyone can haveAlice’s public key.

But only Alice have her private key.

Page 41: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

PKC(2): Digital Signature Digital Signature

Alice signs her message by encrypting it using her private key.

Same as signing by handwriting.

Bob verifies Alice’s signature by decrypting it using her public key.

Nobody can write the signature because only Alice can have her private key.

41Chapter 4 -- Public Key Cryptography

Page 42: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 42

Non-non-repudiation Alice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob Alice computes MAC using symmetric key Stock drops, Alice claims she did not order Can Bob prove that Alice placed the order? No! Since Bob also knows the symmetric

key, he could have forged message Problem: Bob knows Alice placed the

order, but he can’t prove it

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Part 1 Cryptography 43

Non-repudiation Alice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob Alice signs order with her private key Stock drops, Alice claims she did not order Can Bob prove that Alice placed the order? Yes! Only someone with Alice’s private key

could have signed the order This assumes Alice’s private key is not

stolen (revocation problem)

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Part 1 Cryptography 44

Public Key Notation Sign message M with Alice’s

private key: [M]Alice Encrypt message M with Alice’s

public key: {M}Alice Then

{[M]Alice}Alice = M[{M}Alice]Alice = M

Page 45: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 45

Sign and Encrypt vs

Encrypt and Sign

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Part 1 Cryptography 46

Confidentiality and Non-repudiation?

Suppose that we want confidentiality and integrity/non-repudiation

Can public key crypto achieve both? Alice sends message to Bob

o Sign and encrypt {[M]Alice}Bob

o Encrypt and sign [{M}Bob]Alice

Can the order possibly matter?

Page 47: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 47

Sign and Encrypt

Alice Bob

{[M]Alice}Bob

Q: What’s the problem? A: No problem public key is public

Charlie

{[M]Alice}Charlie

M = “I love you”

Page 48: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 48

Encrypt and Sign

Alice Bob

[{M}Bob]Alice

Note that Charlie cannot decrypt M Q: What is the problem? A: No problem public key is public

Charlie

[{M}Bob]Charlie

M = “My theory, which is mine….”

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Part 1 Cryptography 49

Public Key Infrastructure

Page 50: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Question in Public key

How can Bob be sure Alice’s public key?

Bob receives Alice’s public key from any source or Alice herself. Then how can he trust it is really her public key?

50Chapter 4 -- Public Key Cryptography

Page 51: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 51

Public Key Certificate Certificate contains name of user and

user’s public key (and possibly other info) It is signed by the issuer, a Certificate

Authority (CA), such as VeriSignM = (Alice, Alice’s public key), S = [M]CA

Alice’s Certificate = (M, S) Signature on certificate is verified using

CA’s public key:Verify that M = {S}CA

Page 52: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Part 1 Cryptography 52

Certificate Authority Certificate authority (CA) is a trusted 3rd party

(TTP) creates and signs certificates Verify signature to verify integrity & identity of

owner of corresponding private keyo Does not verify the identity of the sender of

certificate certificates are public keys! Big problem if CA makes a mistake (a CA once

issued Microsoft certificate to someone else) A common format for certificates is X.509

Page 53: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

X.509 certificate example(1)

Next lide is a certificate to verify the public key of www.freesoft.org

CA is Thwate Thwate signed at the bottom of the

certificate to verify the certificate. (signature)

Recipient can verify this certificate to confirm the signature by using Thwate’s public key.

Page 54: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography
Page 55: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

X.509 certificate example(2)

Then, how can recipient know Thwate’s public key?

Thwate lets the recipient know its public key through another certificate which is signed by its private key.

Next slide is the certificate through which Thwate releases its public key.

Page 56: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography
Page 57: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

X.509 certificate example(3)

Then, how can recipients trust this certificate? In other words, how can they know that Thwate is a trusted CA?

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Part 1 Cryptography 58

PKI Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): the stuff

needed to securely use public key cryptoo Key generation and managemento Certificate authority (CA) or authoritieso Certificate revocation lists (CRLs), etc.

No general standard for PKI We mention 3 generic “trust models”

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Part 1 Cryptography 59

PKI Trust Models Monopoly model

o One universally trusted organization is the CA for the known universe

o Big problems if CA is ever compromised

o Who will act as CA??? System is useless if you don’t trust the CA!

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Part 1 Cryptography 60

PKI Trust Models Oligarchy

o Multiple trusted CAso This is approach used in browsers

todayo Browser may have 80 or more

certificates, just to verify certificates!o User can decide which CAs to trust

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Part 1 Cryptography 61

PKI Trust Models Anarchy model

o Everyone is a CA…o Users must decide who to trusto This approach used in PGP: “Web of trust”

Why is it anarchy? o Suppose a certificate is signed by Frank and

you don’t know Frank, but you do trust Bob and Bob says Alice is trustworthy and Alice vouches for Frank. Should you accept the certificate?

Many other trust models and PKI issues

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Part 1 Cryptography 62

Confidentiality in the Real World

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Part 1 Cryptography 63

Symmetric Key vs Public Key

Symmetric key +’so Speedo No public key infrastructure (PKI) neededo Disadvantage?

Public Key +’so Signatures (non-repudiation)o No shared secret (but, private keys…)o Disadvantage?

Page 64: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Comparison: symmetric key public key

Sym key crypto Need shared key Need 80 bit key for

high security (yr 2010)

~1,000,000 ops/s on 1GHz processor

>100x speedup in HW

Public key crypto Need trusted(authentic)

public key Need 2048 bit key

(RSA) for high security (yr 2010)

~100 signatures/s~1000 verify/s (RSA) on 1GHz processor

~10x speedup in HW

Page 65: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Encryption of large file by RSA

Time to encrypt 1024-bit RSA o ~1 ms on 1 GHz Pentium

Time to decrypt 1024-bit RSAo ~10 ms on 1 GHz Pentium

Time to encrypt 1 Mbyte file?o 1024 bits / RSA operation = 128 bytes = 27

o 1 Mbyte = 220 o time: 220 / 27 * 1ms = 213 ms = 8 sec!o Any other way of doing faster?

Page 66: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

conclusion? Public key crypto is inefficient for

encryption/decryptiono Take too much time

Symmetric key crypto is much faster to encrypt than public key crypto

However, symmetric key crypto raises a problem to exchange(distribute) symmetric key secretly

Page 67: Chapter 4: Public Key Cryptography

Key exchange for sym key crypto

Based on what we learned so far, we have the following methods to exchange(or distribute) symmetric keyo Manual exchange

Infeasible except for a small systemo Use Diffie-Hellmano Use public key crypto

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Part 1 Cryptography 68

Notation Reminder Public key notation

o Sign M with Alice’s private key[M]Alice

o Encrypt M with Alice’s public key{M}Alice

Symmetric key notationo Encrypt P with symmetric key K

C = E(P,K) o Decrypt C with symmetric key K

P = D(C,K)

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Part 1 Cryptography 69

Real World Confidentiality Hybrid cryptosystem

o Public key crypto to establish a keyo Symmetric key crypto to encrypt data…

Alice Bob

{K}Bob

E(Bob’s data, K)E(Alice’s data, K)

Can Bob be sure he’s talking to Alice?