Chapter 2 Investing in our future? The influence of social ... 2... · Chapter 2 Investing in our future? ... 1 Refereras till som: Nygård, M., Kuisma, M., ... (Béland and Cox 2010;

1

Chapter 2

Investing in our future? The influence of social investment ideas on family policy

discourses in Finland, Germany and the UK1

Mikael Nygård, Mikko Kuisma, Nicole Krüger and Verity Campbell-Barr

Introduction

The basic premises of European welfare politics have been transformed during the last

decades. This has taken place, on one hand, through the transformation of the structures of

society, experienced through new social risks, such as “reconciling work and family life,

lone parenthood, long-term unemployment, being among the working poor, or having

insufficient social security coverage” (Bonoli 2005, 431) As an outcome, European

countries now have a greater number of economically vulnerable households (Wehner and

Abrahamson 2006). On the other hand the capacity of national welfare states to counteract

economic vulnerability and promote wellbeing among families has become hampered by

recurring crises, sluggish growth and competitiveness imperatives in an increasingly

globalized world. This has not only put European welfare states under pressure and

brought along waves of austerity measures, it has also made politicians more susceptible

to supra-national ideas and policy recommendations on how to reform the welfare state

(Hemerijck 2013, Hulme 2005). Hence, the transformation that we witness is not only of a

purely structural nature. The core ideas at the heart of welfare policy have also gone

through a transformation. Since the 1980s, welfare politics has been influenced by a

double shift where more responsibility has been assigned from states to markets, families

and the voluntary sector. At the same time, the role of the welfare state has gone from

1 Refereras till som: Nygård, M., Kuisma, M., Krüger, N. & Campbell-Barr, V. (2015). Investing

in our future? The influence of social investment ideas on family policy discourses in Finland,

Germany and the UK. Ingår i Korkut, U. Mahendran, K. & Bucken-Knapp, G. (eds.), Discursive

Governance in Politics, Policy, and the Public Sphere. London: Palgrave (forthcoming).

2

being essentially about providing services and benefits in a here-and-now sense into being

essentially about “social investment” (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003, 81).

At the heart of the social investment perspective (henceforth SIP) are the ideas of

constant learning, orientation to the future and investments in individuals as a way of

enriching our future (Jenson 2012, 29-30). Consequently, the overall aim of this chapter is

to discuss what impact SIP has had on elite-level family policy discourses in Europe using

Germany, UK and Finland as cases. SIP is an influential ideational perspective to welfare

reform that has been highlighted in discussions relating to labor market policy, social

protection as well as family policy and (early) education. Family policy, which here refers

to public support to families (e.g. transfers and services) (Thévenon, 2011), is crucially

important for the key objectives of the SIP due to their mutual interest in children and

their wellbeing. Family policy can also be expected to be open to ideational inputs since it

is less institutionally entrenched than many other social policy areas, such as pension

policy (Clasen 2005, 181–182). The evidence on SIP influence on family policy across

European countries still remains scant however. Therefore, in this chapter we contribute

to this literature by focusing on how SIP ideas have been used in government discourses

on family policy.

More specifically the chapter discusses the influence that the SIP has had for

government-level discourses on family policy in Finland, Germany and the UK during the

2000s on the basis of analyses of government programs and other similar documents. To

what extent do government-level discourses entail ideas that can be related to the SIP and

how have such ideational impacts changed over time? What are the main factors that have

conditioned the SIP influence on family policy and what are the main discursive

mechanisms through which SIP ideas became influential? We argue that although the SIP

has been an influential perspective in all three country cases during the 2000s, there are

3

some differences as to the magnitude of this impact as well as the ways that these ideas

were adopted into national government discourses. In Finland they have been used mainly

as a way of consolidating a ‘Nordic’ welfare state approach to family policy and pursuing

higher parental employment, whereas in Germany and UK they have been used as

discursive tools to renew family policy and to bring the system closer to a ‘Nordic’

fashion.

The selected time period is interesting, since most European countries have

experienced fundamental social changes over this period (Esping-Andersen 2009), at the

same time as the SIP have gained increasing influence in national and international

debates on social policy (Morel et al. 2012). Certainly, the European Union’s Lisbon

Agenda has been much inspired by the SIP and the EU together with organizations, such

as the OECD, which “have preached the gospel of social investment for many years”

(Morgan 2012, 161). As such, the possibility for convergence and policy learning along

the SIP lines in the EU is certainly present.

The selected countries reflect variety as to how the state’s role for families is

institutionalized throughout Europe (Korpi, 2000). It also uses the variety in Esping-

Andersen’s well-known typology of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) as a

departure for analysis. Whereas the UK represents a market-oriented model focusing

squarely on poverty alleviation and tax-funded transfers, Germany represents a general

family policy model based on status maintenance and transfers funded mainly through

contributions. Finland, in turn, can be said to represent a dual-earner model that relies

heavily on public services and a variety of transfers to families (Korpi 2000).

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss the role of ideas for family

policy in general and present the SIP as a case study. Thereafter, we go look at the

4

magnitude of SIP influence on government-level family policy discourses. In the final

section, we draw some conclusions and discuss our findings.

Family policy, ideas and the SIP

European countries are recalibrating their welfare systems as a consequence of changing

societies, sluggish growth and globalization (e.g. Hemerijck 2013). Policy fields being

particularly exposed to cost containment reforms are pension, and unemployment benefit

schemes (Hemerijck, 2013). Also family policy has been prone to reform, but for other

reasons than sheer cost containment. Some European countries, such as Germany or

Switzerland, have extended parental leave systems and invested in childcare as a way of

promoting gender equality and maternal employment (Erler 2009, Fagnani 2012, Kuebler,

2007) while others, such as Finland and the UK, have focused on counteracting soaring

child poverty (Daly 2010, Nygård and Krüger 2012). One can count ongoing

transformations of household structures and labor market participation as well as a

growing proportion of vulnerable households as causes of these reforms (Wehner and

Abrahamson 2006). Yet to some extent the reforms are also related to policy learning

processes in an increasingly globalized world where increasing uncertainty confronts

national policy makers while electoral change (Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2012) and

policy recommendations of supra-national actors, such as the European Union (EU) or the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), challenge traditional

ways of doing politics (Hay and Rosamond 2002, Mahon 2009). On the whole, however,

this suggests that national policy makers have become more susceptible to influential

ideas and policy recommendations insofar as these inputs provide policy alternatives and

cognitive maps for decision-makers in a world of increasing complexity and uncertainty

(Béland and Cox 2010; Hulme 2005).

5

Since the 1990s the EU has played an important role advocating ideas on social

inclusion and child poverty alleviation among its member states and used means of

‘positive integration’ (van Vliet, 2011) for bringing welfare state ‘latecomers’ in Southern

or Eastern Europe closer to other countries. Yet, processes of policy learning and idea

diffusion can also take other forms than ‘top-down’ learning. Sometimes countries adopt

best practices from other countries (Legrand, 2012): many continental European countries

have used the Nordic countries as exemplars of best practices for family policy reform

due to their dual-earner constellations and high provision of public childcare (Leitner and

Wroblewski 2006, Lister 2009).

The SIP can be discussed in light of this development as it offers an ideational

perspective containing both specific policy solutions and more general programs or even

‘world views’ underpinning these solutions (Schmidt 2008, 306). It is based on a world

view that originates from old-style Social Democracy as well as Neo-liberal debates, and

that emphasizes the role of state flexibility and responsiveness in a state of constant

change and globalization. When it comes to specific ideas on families and children, the

SIP emphasizes investments in human capital development (such as early childhood

education or lifelong learning), activation measures (such as active labor market policies

or supporting mothers’ employment through work/family reconciliation), and a more

flexible use of social protection schemes, so-called ‘flexicurity’ (Morel et al. 2012).

Instead of focusing on redistribution in accordance with traditional notions of social

equality, family policy is seen as a productive factor that is expected to enhance economic

competitiveness and growth in the future (Jenson 2010). Some of the ideas in this

perspective, such as investments in public education or active labor market policy, have

been practiced for a long time, notably in the Nordic countries (Lister, 2009).

6

The origins of the SIP can be found in the thoughts of 20th century theorists like

Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, as well as the works of John Maynard Keynes. Later, the works

of Giddens (1999) and Esping-Andersen (1990 and Esping-Andersen et al. 2002) have

often served as ideational guidance. However, notwithstanding a mutual consent on the

need for welfare state renewal, Giddens focused more on activation and reciprocity (1999)

while Esping-Andersen (1990, 2009) accentuated ‘family-friendly’ policies and income

protection as elements of an investment-based and child-oriented social policy. Instead of

viewing social security as conditioned by recipient activity, Esping-Andersen et al. argued

that “income security is a precondition for an effective social investment strategy” (2002,

5).

As pointed out above, some of the ideas inherent in the SIP have already been

practiced for a long time in the Nordic countries, whereas this is not necessarily the case

in other countries. This would suggest a stronger prevalence of SIP ideas in Nordic

government-level discourses than in other countries. Yet we can also expect to find an

increasing influence of SIP on government-level discourses in Germany and the UK

through processes of policy learning, such as open-method-of-coordination procedure

(van Vliet 2011).

In the following section we discuss these questions on the basis of qualitative

content analyses (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) of eight government programs launched since

the mid-2000s in Finland, Germany and the UK. We used a deductive variant of this

method meaning that the programs were coded on the basis of a theoretically derived

codebook, consisting of five central ideational categories central for the SIP (see Table

2.1).

The first two categories refer to human capital investments and equality of

opportunity. The third category relates to the idea on income security and child-oriented

7

social policies as suggested by Esping-Andersen et al. (2002). The fourth category is

based on the idea of (parental) employment promotion and it thus also relates to the idea

of gender equality. Both of these ideas are central in the SIP, and gender equality has

often been seen as a central characteristic of how social investment policies have been

conducted within the Nordic welfare state model (Lister 2009). The fifth and final

category expresses ideas on the need for a recalibration of welfare protection schemes and

the enhancement of reciprocity of social rights.

Table 2.1 Coding book for the content analysis

Ideational

category:

Description: Examples:

“Investment in

human capital”

Utterances relating to future-oriented

investments in human capital

formation and development, e.g. early

childhood education, basic education

“Good education is an essential

prerequisite for good employment

prospects”

“Equal

opportunities for

children”

Utterances relating to equality in

opportunity and equal rights to

education, services or inclusion of

children

“Child care services bring about equality

of opportunity for all children”, “Our

policy is to give all citizens the chance to

take an active part in economic and social

life”

“Poverty

alleviation”

Utterances relating to measures

combating child/family poverty, e.g.

single-parent benefits, tax-exemptions

for low-income parents etc.

“Targeted assistance that relieve the

burden of poor families are of major

importance”

“Employment

promotion”

Utterances relating to the promotion of

employment and activation of parents

(notably mothers) and youth, e.g. day

care services, balancing work and

family, and active labour-market

policies

”Childcare helps to make family and work

compatible for women and men and

women to take up work”

“Flexicurity and

reciprocity in

social protection”

Utterances relating to higher flexibility

in social protection schemes,

conditionality in terms of benefits and

the balance between rights and duties

“The attractiveness of work can be

increased by reducing taxes and reforming

the social protection system”, “The goal is

to enhance a active responsibility in order

to increase social and economic

participation and to dismantle material

dependency on state benefits”, “Individual

responsibility must be increased for

breaking out of the spiral of social

exclusion through self-help”

In total we analyzed eight government programs. Three of these were Finnish (2003, 2007

and 2011), three German (2005, 2009 and 2013) and two British (2005 and 2010).

8

Although government programs are often quite concise as to their textual composition and

do not allow analyses of the deeper deliberations and mechanisms underlying the

formulation of policy objectives, they can be seen as official declarations, or ‘lists’ of

policy objectives for governments that say something about how governments ‘think and

talk’ about a certain policy field. Since no official government program was launched for

the Labour government taking office in 2005, we used the 2005 Labour manifesto as a

proxy.

The SIP and family policy discourses

Table 2.2 shows that since the mid-2000s, SIP ideas have been present in all government

programs of the three countries under study. Contrary to our initial expectations, Finland

as a Nordic welfare state is by no means leading in this sense, although SIP ideas have

admittedly played an important role for Finnish government discourses on family policy

during the 2000s. Instead it can be argued that it is Germany and also UK (under New

Labour rule) that hold leading positions in terms of SIP adherence, even if there seems to

be a strengthening of SIP ideas over time also in Finland.

Table 2.2 The prevalence of social investment ideas in Finnish, German and British

government programmes during the 2000s

Finland Germany United Kingdom

2003 2007 2011 2005 2009 2013 2005 2010

“Investment

in human

capital”

-

(+)

+

+

+

+

+

(+)

“Equal

opportunities

for children”

(+)

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

“Poverty

alleviation”

+

+

(+)

+

+

(+)

+

+

“Employment

promotion”

+

+

(+)

+

+

+

+

+

9

In a way this is surprising, since SIP ideas and practices have a longer history in Finnish

family policy. For example, investments in children’s social, mental and cognitive

capacities have a long tradition in both the childcare and early education system, but these

elements have not, until quite recently, been distilled as ‘human capital investments’ in

accordance to the SIP elements (Campbell-Barr and Nygård 2014).

If we look a bit closer on the patterns revealed in Table 2.2, we find some

interesting differences between countries as well as some suggestive developments over

time. If we study ideas relating to human capital and equality in opportunities for children,

we find that in Finland there is a strong and continuous accentuation of equal

opportunities for children, although this is not addressed at all in the 2003 government

program. In the later programs, this is something that is linked to the ambition to curb

intergenerational poverty and that accentuates the education system’s role for the

achieving of equal rights for children. The 2011 Government Program declared that “the

cycle of poverty and social exclusion being passed down from one generation to the next

must be broken. Everyone deserves a fair start and genuine, equal opportunities in life

(2011, 7).

As we noted above this suggests an ideational innovation in the Finnish context,

moving away from family equality traditionally framed as equality in outcome rather than

in opportunity. On the other hand, ideas of human capital investments in childhood have

not played an explicit role in Finnish government programs, except for the 2011 program,

where it is linked only loosely to youth and labor market. Instead this idea has referred

“Flexicurity

and

reciprocity”

- / +

- / +

+ / +

+ / -

+ / +

+ / -

- / +

- / +

Note: + signifies an explicit mention of the SIP idea in question, (+) signifies an indirect mention of the SIP

idea in question, - signifies non-occurrence of SIP ideas.

10

mainly to the skill level of the workforce and has been seen as a general prerequisite for

international competitiveness.

In Germany, we find a much more explicit accentuation of the idea of human

capital formation of children than in Finland. In the German programs the (early)

education system is depicted as the best generator of human capital of children. The 2005

Grand Coalition program accentuated this idea as well as the 2009 program between the

Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP). Also the 2013 program touches

on this idea, even if the accentuation is related more generally to science and research.

The 2009 Government Program indicated that “every fifth young person in Germany

attains such poor levels in reading and mathematics that they jeopardize their

opportunities in the education and labor market. For this reason, we must start as early as

possible in the educational development of a child to prevent this from happening” (2009,

82). Furthermore, an interesting aspect in the German programs is that human capital

investments also relate to migrant children’s need of language skills and integration into

society. Moreover, the idea of equal opportunities for children has been central in the

German programs. It has mostly been linked to the (early) education system, and has been

framed as a social right and a precondition for a just society by creating equal life chances

for all children.

Finally, in Britain the focus on human capital formation of children has been

central, but more so in the 2005 Labour government program than in the 2010 coalition

program. However, the content related more to the quality of education and support to

weaker pupils, but not so much to future life chances of pupils. Providing equal

opportunities for children was a central part of the 2005 Labour manifesto insomuch as it

related to education as a precondition for equal ‘life chances’ for children. The tone is

quite supportive in terms of children as the role of schools is to give all children equal

11

opportunities: “[e]very child can and should be able to fulfill their potential. We will

achieve this by uniting our commitment to equal opportunities for all children with a

reform program, which gives every child and young person/… /the personalized package

of learning and support they need” (Labour Party 2005, 31). Hence, the Labour

government placed strong accentuation on early childhood education and care as a way of

streamlining children from different backgrounds. By contrast, the 2010 Coalition

program focused more on early intervention in terms of helping pupils with learning

difficulties and identifying child-related social problems: “We will take Sure Start back to

its original purpose of early intervention, increase its focus on the neediest families, and

better involve organizations with a track record of supporting families” (British

government 2010, 19). The tone of the discourse in the Coalition program can thus be

seen as more harsh and targeting than in the Labour manifesto. The idea is not so much to

put all children, regardless of background, on the same starting level, but to make schools

and welfare programs more effective when it comes to counteracting problems that can

become expensive for society in a long run.

As for the idea of poverty alleviation the content analysis shows that it has played

a central role in all countries’ government discourses. This is not surprising considering

the fact that all countries experienced increases in child poverty rates during the 2000s –

more so though in Germany and the UK than in Finland (Eurostat 2014). What is perhaps

most interesting here is the changes in nuance over time in poverty discourses. The first

one is more traditional and pertains to a preventive – i.e. Social-Democratic – ideology,

emphasizing state support for guaranteeing income security for families. The second one

is market-related, i.e. neoliberal, in its ideological stance and accentuates (parental)

employment as the best way of fighting poverty.

12

In Finland, both of these discourses were present and intertwined in the 2003 and

2007 programs of the coalitions led by the Centre Party, whereas in 2011 program the

market-related employment discourse acquired the upper hand. In this program, work is

portrayed as the best remedy to poverty, yet child poverty is not even addressed in an

explicit way. The government program indicated that “[i]mproving employment and

raising the employment rate are essential to combating poverty, inequality and social

exclusion. These are also necessary to ensure social protection funding. Work is the best

form of social security. Individual and family incomes are primarily obtained by means of

work” (2011, 96). Interestingly, the government policy objectives become more targeted

in focus as they tend to accentuate selective poverty measures, such as increase of lone-

parent income support, rather than large-scale improvements of family transfers. A

glimpse at the policy development in Finland during the 2000s supports this observation.

The piecemeal improvements of family transfers that were made in Finland during the

two Centre Party-led coalitions’ time in office (2003-2011) reflected an ambition to

improve the basic income security of families whereas the improvements made during the

conservative-led ‘six-pack’ government related mainly to improvements in targeted

measures (social assistance single-parent supplements) and tax cuts in order to promote

parental employment (cf. Nygård and Autto 2014, Nygård, 2010).

German government programs mentioned child poverty in 2005 and 2009 with a

few explicit policy recommendations relating either to targeted measures supporting

working low-income parents (Kinderzuschlag) or tax reliefs for working parents. The

2005 program indicated that “[w]e want to reduce child poverty and are therefore

developing the child supplement scheme with effect from 2006. Greater incentives must

be provided to encourage parents to move out of unemployment and into jobs and

encourage their systematic integration into the workforce” (2005, 96). Also the 2013

13

program mentioned the need to support families economically by improving existing

transfers (tax reliefs) and giving parents more family time through the expansion of

parental leave, but there are not any direct references to child poverty. Instead the

discourse on family incomes, and poverty, tend to relate primarily to the market-related

and employment-oriented discourse, implicitly nurturing the central role of parental work

for family incomes whereas state transfers are not framed in an equally visible way.

Finally, in the UK, poverty alleviation became a central idea in government

programs, both in the 2005 Labour Manifesto and in the Coalition program in 2010. There

appeared, however, some crucial differences between the two showing that SIP ideas on

poverty reduction can be used differently depending on the ideological perspective of the

incumbent government. The 2005 New Labour manifesto discourse related more squarely

to an income-protective, anti-poverty discourse following Esping-Andersen – backed up

by the party’s ideological ambition to use the state for allocating more resource to

families in the form of expanded leave schemes, childcare and higher family transfers

(2002). Thereby, “[we] will help parents balance work and family, expand paid leave,

deliver the biggest ever expansion in childcare and child poverty in a generation”

/…/”Our starting point is that for children to come first parents need to be given choices:

a tax and benefit system to raise family incomes and tackle child poverty” (Labour Party

2005, 75).

The Coalition discourse follows a different ideological route even if it declares the

government’s dedication to the aim of eradicating poverty by 2020 (British government

2010, 19). Hereby, child poverty is viewed not so much as a problem of insufficient state

support but a problem of low employment and low activity of parents. Therefore, any

state intervention seeking to counteract poverty should take the form of activation in line

with a Giddens-influenced line of thought such as by pursuing tax cuts and increasing tax

14

breaks for families in order to increase employment and thus to ‘help’ families ‘take care’

of their own situation. Interestingly the focus is put squarely on working families, whereas

those on welfare did not receive much consideration: “[w]e will increase the personal

allowance for income tax to help lower and middle income earners” (British government

2010, 30). If we consider the family policy change that took place in the UK after the

conservative-liberal coalition came to office, we see that discourse tends to correspond to

policy. While New Labour pursued quite momentous investments in both family transfers

and childcare facilities and services for (disadvantaged) families (e.g. Sure Start), the

Coalition chose to commit squarely to cost containment and a major overhaul of the

welfare system by, among other things, changing child benefits from being universal

entitlements to targeted benefits for those on lower incomes (Daly 2010, Millar 2011).

However, the area where SIP ideas seem to have played the strongest role in

government discourses on family policy is parental employment promotion. This is not

surprising if we consider the significance of employment for welfare state funding and

economic growth, and if we consider the multitude of policy recommendations on

employment promotion that have been launched, for example by the EU and its Lisbon

Agenda or the OECD. As a consequence, we find that the need to secure and increase

parental employment mentioned in all programs. It was also striking that these goals were

connected to the availability of childcare and other family-work reconciliation measures

as well as tax solutions. Allegedly, more parents moving from welfare to work will

benefit not only the families, but also the economy as a whole. In all programs the

question of parental employment was connected with ambitions to enhance gender

equality and most notably women’s right to take up paid work and to receive equal

payment as men.

15

In Finland, with its legacy as a dual-earner model, employment promotion is

framed mainly as a way promoting gender equality, but it is also seen as a way of

securing necessary welfare state funds and as a way of combating poverty. In this respect,

the Finnish government highlighted public childcare as a central prerequisite: “The

Government will enhance the conditions for employment and entrepreneurship with

respect to men and women, such as quality day care and other public services (2003, 14).

Yet, we can also find a counter discourse arguing that parents should be free to choose

between public childcare and publicly subsidized home child care. This notion of parents’

freedom of choice has long roots in Finnish family policy and is reflected in policy

through the duality of public childcare and subsidized child home care. Interestingly

however, the only program that explicitly addresses this freedom was the 2007 program,

whereas in the 2003 and 2011 programs did not mention this at all. Interestingly, the

conservative-led government formed in 2011 nurtured an ambivalent attitude towards the

home childcare system. One the one hand it has been seen as a right for parents to choose

home childcare, but on the other hand it has also been viewed as an obstacle to gender

equality and as a possible women’s trap. Consequently, in August 2013 the government

suggested that the home care allowance should be divided between parents. Officially this

was framed as a measure aiming at counteracting women’s traps and increasing father’s

involvement in the care of small children.

The German government discourse framed employment promotion as a way of

boosting growth as well as a way of securing household incomes. All three German

programs under study contained such references and also emphasized the need to invest in

childcare and other family-work reconciliation measures in order to create ‘family-

friendly’ work places. Thereby, the German government indicated that “[g]etting more

people back into jobs will also improve our country's financial health and relieve the

16

burden on our social security systems […] To enable parents to achieve a better work-life

balance, we will improve the range of childcare services and expand the provision of full-

day care (2005, 7-8). Interestingly, Germany is the foremost country that justifies family

policy investments from a perspective of population policy by pointing out that it needs

more children: “We want to raise the birth rate in Germany by creating a pro-children and

pro-family environment and improving conditions for families” (German government

2009, 94). This is something that is totally absent in the British and only vaguely visible

in the Finnish discourse even if a similar statement was observable in the Finnish

government program in 2003. The program read that “[s]table family policy and a better

reconciliation of work and family life have a favorable effect on population trends and

mean that there is no need to delay starting a family for financial or work-related reasons”

(Finnish government 2003, 18).

Although female employment, as well as the question of public childcare versus

home care of children, has previously been contested in (Western) Germany with its

male-earner-dominated model, all three German government programs accentuated

women’s rights to paid labor and to equal rights in working life. The program in 2009

indicated that this coalition intended to ensure equal opportunities for men and women

both within the family and in the workplace (German government 2009, 95). We can also

find a strong accentuation of the need to expand childcare facilities and other family-

oriented services in order to increase parental employment. While in 2005 and 2009

programs, such objectives were in a very central position with quite radical policy

recommendations such as the introduction of individual entitlements to public childcare,

the 2013 program focused merely on parental leave. The coalition partners endorsed the

legal obligation to expand childcare services for the under-threes, established in the Child-

Day-Care Expansion Act (TAG), as an essential social policy and committed to creating

17

230,000 additional places by 2010 (German government 2005, 92). These programmatic

ambitions gave a good reflection of the momentous changes made in family policy in

Germany during the ‘Grand coalition’ and its forerunners. In 2005 the childcare provision

was expanded through the TAG (Tagesbetreuungs-ausbaugesetz) legislation and the same

year the needs-tested child allowance supplement (Kinderzuschlag) was adopted in order

to support low-wages parents. These reforms can be seen as path-breaking shifts away

from a traditional ‘male-breadwinner’ model towards a dual-earner or adult-worker model

focusing on female employment and gender equality (Fagnani 2012). They also opened

up for a further expansion of childcare services and a reform of the parental leave

allowance (Elterngeld) in 2007. In 2008 the Children Support Act

(Kinderförderungsgesetz) was adopted not only opening up individual entitlements for

one-year-olds to public childcare but also forecasting the introduction of a child home

care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) by the year 2013 (Fagnani 2012). Hereby, we can see a

strong influence not only of SIP ideas on higher parental employment and the ambition to

facilitate work/family balance, but the impact of good practice informed by the

Scandinavian countries (Fagnani 2012).

In Britain the attitude towards parental, and notably maternal, (part-time)

employment became favorable during New Labour government (Daly 2010). For example,

in 1999 and 2003 the government made changes in the tax credit system in order to

support working parents and defray the costs for childcare. At the same time extensive

investments to expand childcare provision was made as a way of promoting maternal

employment. According to Daly, also the reforms that took place during New Labour rule

(1997-2010) were momentous, since they expanded childcare, improved family transfers

as well as tax credits and supported parental employment through more efficient ways of

balancing family and working life (2010). Moreover, they sought to enhance gender

18

equality, for example by introducing paternity leave. The 2005 New Labour manifesto

revealed that these policy changes were underpinned by a discourse strongly advocating a

move from welfare to work for parents (and notably mothers). The manifesto indicated

that work was the best anti-poverty strategy. “Tailored help, especially for lone parents, is

key but we are also committed to making work pay – with a guaranteed income of at least

£258 per week for those with children and in full-time work” (Labour party 2005, 75).

Also the 2010 coalition program highlighted employment promotion as a way of getting

‘Britain working’, but this ambition was linked squarely on bringing unemployed back

into jobs and to the creating of simpler and more effective welfare-to-work systems.

Thereby, the 2010 program indicated that the government would end all existing welfare

to work programs and create a single welfare to work program to help all unemployed

people get back into work (British government 2010, 23).

Finally, when it comes to the ideas of flexicurity and reciprocity, we find that

flexicurity has played a somewhat lesser role that reciprocity. For example, all three

Finnish programs contains statements that the obligation of unemployed (parents) to

accept job offers should be strengthened and that the social protection scheme needs to be

reformed in order to become more activating and rewarding. The government program in

2007 indicated that the goal of the social protection reform was to offer more incentives

for work, alleviate poverty, and provide an adequate level of social protection in all life

situations (Finnish government 2007, 45). The 2011 program mentioned flexicurity linked

to the use childcare and labor market services.

Meanwhile, the German programs gave references to both flexicurity and

reciprocity. The 2005 and 2009 programs related flexicurity to the terms of the Hartz

reform of synchronizing unemployment benefits and social assistance and the use of

parental leave whereas the 2013 program referred mainly to the use of parental leave. The

19

2005 program indicated that the CDU, CSU and SPD remained committed to the merging

of unemployment assistance and social assistance in the basic income for jobseekers.

Bringing together help for the former recipients of social assistance and unemployment

assistance in one system was and remained the right thing to do. However, such a

complex and extensive reform project required a flexible approach to necessary

adjustments and improvements (German government 2005, 23-24). The only German

program where we found explicit references to reciprocity was the 2005 program

suggesting sanctions for young unemployed that do not honor their obligations: “This

intensive assistance is based on the principle of “support and challenge”, with the young

people being expected to fulfill the obligations set out in an individual occupational

integration agreement. Sanctions apply to those who do not fulfill these obligations”

(German government 2005, 19).

As for the British programs, we could not find any explicit reference to flexicurity

whereas both the 2005 and notably the 2010 programs made direct references to

reciprocity. The 2005 Labour manifesto invoked the ‘active welfare state’ and stated the

importance of balance between rights and responsibilities (2005, 8). Similarly, in the 2010

coalition program there were a number of statements about the coalition’s ambition to

secure a balance between rights and obligations as well as an effective control of how

benefits were used: “[w]e will reform the administration of tax credits to reduce fraud and

overpayments […] We will ensure that receipt of benefits for those able to work is

conditional on their willingness to work” (2010, 19, 23). It thus seems like the Coalition

inherited the New Labour discourse in reciprocity and strengthened it with attempts to

achieve a more effective use of social benefits. In a way, the Coalition continued to

emphasize those ideas of the SIP that it found to be favorable for its rhetorical attack on

the ‘big state’ while putting aside other SIP elements.

20

Conclusion

The objectives of this chapter were to discuss to what extent Finnish, German and British

government discourses on family policy have entailed social investment ideas and what

role such ideas have played for the discursive governance of family policy during the

2000s. On the basis of discussion above a number of conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly it is evident that SIP ideas have played a major role for how governments

in these countries have constructed the role for family policy, since many policy

objectives described in these programs draws squarely on the wordings, social knowledge

and policy recommendations inherent in the SIP. Moreover it seems clear that SIP ideas

have been influential on the ways that governments construct family policy and that this

has also created a certain amount of discursive and also policy-related convergence

between the countries. The best examples of this kind of convergence are perhaps the

accentuation of equality in opportunity for children, the strong emphasis of parental

employment and gender equality. Children’s equal opportunities are highlighted mostly in

relation to (early) education and childcare, whereas parental employment is seen as

essential for the economy as a whole, for family incomes (and poverty) as well as gender

equality. In what ways this ideational influence has materialized beyond government

discourses is difficult to tell on the basis of government programs. However, a plausible

interpretation is that all three countries have been exposed to similar ideational influences

on, for example, employment promotion and poverty alleviation through, for example,

supra-national actors like the EU and its OMC procedures. It also seems likely that the

ideas around SIP have now become internalized mechanisms through which political

actors mark their socially constructed realities in Finland, Germany and the UK. In

Finland the SIP has been used mainly as a way of consolidating a ‘Nordic’ welfare state

21

approach to family policy and pursuing higher parental employment. In Germany and UK,

on the other hand, is has been used as discursive tools to renew family policy and to bring

the system closer to a ‘Nordic’ fashion. Having said that, the convergence here is also

limited and still informed by the existing national logics of appropriateness and, as such,

drawing inspiration from Streeck’s (2000) seminal work, we might talk more about

Europeanisation of existing systems of welfare rather than the emergence of a European

social model of family policy.

Secondly we see that the pattern of ideational adherence to SIP remain fairly

constant over time save some smaller changes in the finer nuances of the SIP ideas. For

example we found that an employment-oriented discourse on poverty alleviation has

become stronger over time in all three countries and that the policy recommendations for

preventing poverty has shifted more towards targeted measures in Finland and the UK. It

is, however, important to note that the studied time frame probably has bearing upon the

results. It can be argued that the abovementioned stability is no longer the case, if we

consider the most recent policy changes and the discourses underpinning them in

countries like the UK, but also Finland. In both countries the policy changes and cuts in

welfare can be said to have undermined the whole concept of a social investment state,

which would necessitate a more detailed analysis of such developments. It is also worth

noting that the observed ideational influence has not changed the overall picture of three

unique family policy systems, since all of three countries have adopted SIP ideas in a

rather path-dependent way.

The third conclusion concerns the mechanisms, through which SIP ideas have

become influential in government discourses on family policy. Although our analyses of

government programs provides only a restricted picture of such influence, it points to the

facts that these ideas, and also concepts such as human capital, investments, and equality

22

in opportunity, have been incorporated in national discourses as means of policy renewal.

Since these ideational elements have a positive connotation and often revolve around

children, they are powerful markers that can be used for legitimating policy shifts. One

such example is the shift from here-and-now income redistribution between families

towards redistribution across different phases of the life cycle. Here, the concept of

human capital and equality of opportunity serve as powerful discursive markers that help

to legitimate, for instance, the rollback of income transfer schemes in favor of (early)

education. It also seems plausible that such discursive maneuvers that help to shape, but

also renegotiate, governance in the field of family policy, have been fuelled by processes

of policy learning between the EU and the national level. In the face of changing social

needs and staggering political maneuverability, national politicians and program makers

eagerly turn to the EU, and other influential agencies, for advices on policy (Hulme 2005).

What then are the factors that have conditioned the SIP influence on government

discourses and these developments over time? At least two such factors can be identified:

the ideological composition of governments as well as the overall economic situation. The

most important examples of SIP influence can be found in governments led by Social

Democrats, or governments with involvement from Social Democracy. But also the

economic situation plays an important role. In times of favorable economic outlooks,

policy objectives relating to the investment in children and families are easier to formulate.

Yet, we see that the financial crisis has had a negative impact on the further development

of SIP ideas within family policy in Finland and notably the UK. The main lesson here is

perhaps that SIP ideas were adopted by Social Democratic governments as a way of

finding effective solutions to changing social needs and globalization, and that this also

meant that traditional discourses on families and state support changed. After the financial

crisis hit Europe in 2009-2010, however, the conservative-led governments in Finland and

23

the UK started to roll back some of the achievements made by its predecessors, most

notably so in the UK, where the Labour era was depicted as an ‘bad’ example of how the

‘Big State’ has undermined the fabrics of ‘Big Society’. Consequently the policy towards

austerity measures and a stricter interpretation of state support for families. This meant

that principles of income protection of families, preventive poverty measures and also the

Finnish accentuation of freedom of choice for parents have been sacrificed on the altar of

economic necessity and austerity policy. By contrast, the current German government

seems to follow the policy paths drawn up by its predecessors, for example by envisaging

a continuation of the development of the public day care system, introducing more

‘family-friendliness’ in working life and promoting the financial situation of families with

children through higher tax allowances.

References:

Béland, D. & Cox, R. H. (2010, eds.). Ideas and politics in social science research. New

York: Oxford University Press.

British Government (2010). The Coalition: our programme for government. London: HM

Government, 2010.

Campbell-Barr, V. & Nygård, M. (2014). Losing Sight of the Child? Human Capital

Theory and its Role for Early Childhood Education and Care Policies in Finland and

England since the Mid-1990s. Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood 15(4): 346–359.

Clasen, J. (2005). Reforming European Welfare States. Germany and United Kingdom

compared. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Daly, M. (2010). Shifts in family policy in the UK under New Labour. Journal of

European Social Policy 20(5): 433–443.

Erler, D. (2009). Germany: taking a Nordic turn? In S. Kamerman and P. Moss (eds.),

The politics of parental leave policies (pp. 119–134). Bristol: Policy Press.

Esping-Andersen, G (2009). Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). Incomplete Revolution:

Adapting Welfare States to Women’s New Roles. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. & Myles, J. (2002). Why we need a New

Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity

Press.

Eurostat (2014). Statistical database. Statistics by theme. Available on-line:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database. Retrieved 2

november 2014.

Fagnani, J. (2012). Recent reforms in childcare and family policies in France and

Germany: What was at stake? Children and Youth Services Review, 43(3): 509–516.

Finnish Government (2011). Programme of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government,

22 June 2011. An open, fair and confident Finland. Helsinki, 2011.

Finnish Government (2007). Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second

Cabinet, 19 April 2007. A responsible, caring and rewarding Finland. Helsinki, 2007.

Finnish Government (2003). Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's

Government, 24 June 2003. Employment, entrepreneurship and common solidarity: the

keys to an economic rebound. Helsinki, 2003.

German Government (2013). Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen

CDU, CSU und SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode. Berlin, 2013.

German Government (2009). Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt. Koalitionsvertrag

zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP. 17. Legislaturperiode. Berlin, 2009.

German Government (2005). Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit.

Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD. Berlin, 2005.

Giddens, A. (1999). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge:

Polity Press.

Hay, C. & Rosamond, B. (2002). Globalization, European integration and the discursive

construction of economic imperatives. Journal of European Public Policy 9(2): 147-167.

Hemerijck, A. (2013). Changing welfare states. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hulme, R. (2005). Policy Transfer and the Internationalisation of Social Policy. Social

Policy & Society 4(4): 417-425.

Häusermann, S., Picot, G. & Geering, D. (2012). Rethinking Party Politics and the

Welfare State - Recent Advances in the Literature. British Journal of Political Science

43(1): 221– 240.

Jenson, J. (2010). Diffusing Ideas for After Neoliberalism: The Social Investment

Perspective in Europe and Latin America. Global Social Policy 10(1): 59-84.

Korpi. W. (2000). Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in

Different Types of Welfare States. Social Politics 7(2): 127-191.

25

Kuebler, D. (2007). Understanding the Recent Expansion of Swiss Family Policy: And

Idea-Centred Approach. Journal of Social Policy 36(2) : 217–237.

Labour Party (2005). The Labour Party manifesto 2005. Britain forward not back. London.

Legrand, T. (2012). Overseas and over here: policy transfer and evidence-based policy-

making. Policy Studies 33(4): 329–348.

Leitner, A. & Wroblewski, A. (2006). Welfare states and work-life balance. Can good

practices be transferred from the Nordic countries to conservative welfare states?

European Societies 8(2): 295-317.

Lister, R. (2009). A Nordic Nirvana? Gender, Citizenship, and Social Justice in the

Nordic Welfare States. Social Politics 16(2), 242-278.

Mahon, R. (2009). The OECD’s Discourse on the Reconciliation of Work and Family

Life. Global Social Policy 10(1): 59-84.

Millar, J. (2011). Desperately seeking security. UK family policy, lone mothers and paid

work. Family Matters 2011/87: 27–36.

Morel, N., Palier, B. & Palme, J. (2012). Beyond the welfare state as we knew it. In N.

Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (eds.), Towards a social investment state (pp. 1–30)?

Bristol: Policy Press.

Nygård, M. & Krüger, N. (2012). Poverty, families and the investment state. The impact

of social investment ideas on political elite discourses in Finland and Germany. European

Societies 14(5): 755–777.

Nygård, M. (2010). Family policy in the context of social change and post-industrialism –

A study of family policy positions among Finnish parties 1970-2007. Social & Public

Policy Review 4(1): 50–78.

Nygård, M. & Autto, J. (2014). Finnish family policy at the crossroads? The financial

crisis and its repercussions on state support for families with children. Paper to the 2014

Annual Conference of the Comparative European Politics Specialist Group of the Political

Studies Association, UK, A Europe in Crisis, A Europe in Flux, University of Gothenburg,

Sweden, November 6-7, 2014.

Schmidt, V. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and

Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science 2008 (11): 303-326.

Thévenon, O. (2011). Family Policies in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis.

Population and Development Review 37(1): 57–87.

Wehner, C. &Abrahamson, P. (2006). State Recognition of New Family Forms?, in

Bradshaw, J. and Hatland, A. (eds.), Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in

Comparative Perspective (pp. 61-77), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

26

van Vliet, O. (2011). Convergence and Europeanisation the political economy of social

and labour market policies. Diss. Leiden: Leiden University Press.