Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011 LICENSING PROCESS LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP: FOR BELENE NPP: CURRENT STATUS CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPS AND NEXT STEPS Tinko Ganchev Tinko Ganchev Head of Department Head of Department Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency
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Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011 LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP: CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPS Tinko Ganchev Head of Department.
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Bulatom Annual Forum, Bulgaria, Varna - Riviera, 2-4 June 2011
LICENSING PROCESS LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP:FOR BELENE NPP:
CURRENT STATUS CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPSAND NEXT STEPS
Tinko GanchevTinko GanchevHead of DepartmentHead of Department
Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory AgencyBulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency
LICENSING PROCESS LICENSING PROCESS FOR BELENE NPP:FOR BELENE NPP:
CURRENT STATUS CURRENT STATUS AND NEXT STEPSAND NEXT STEPS
Tinko GanchevTinko GanchevHead of DepartmentHead of Department
Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory AgencyBulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency
Main Advantages of AES-92 Main Advantages of AES-92 Design- Generation III LWRDesign- Generation III LWR
•• Provision of a “core catcher” for severe Provision of a “core catcher” for severe accident cases, leading to a core melting accident cases, leading to a core melting and reactor pressure vessel breach and reactor pressure vessel breach
• • Long design operation life time: 60 Long design operation life time: 60 provisional years of operationprovisional years of operation
• • Substantial reduction of core damage Substantial reduction of core damage frequency : frequency : ~10 ~10 -7-7/y/y
Main Advantages of AES-92 Main Advantages of AES-92 Design- Generation III LWRDesign- Generation III LWR
•• Two individual completely Two individual completely independent reactivity control independent reactivity control systemssystems
• • Redundancy for all safety functions Redundancy for all safety functions provided by the use of both active provided by the use of both active and passive safety systems and passive safety systems
• • Use of a special double containment, Use of a special double containment, designed to withstand a large range designed to withstand a large range of internal and external eventsof internal and external events
Legislation applied to Legislation applied to licensing new nuclear facilitylicensing new nuclear facility
• Primary legislationPrimary legislation– EU legislation, Conventions, Constitution of the Republic EU legislation, Conventions, Constitution of the Republic
of Bulgariaof Bulgaria– Act of the Safe Use Act of the Safe Use
of Nuclear Energy (Nuclear Act)of Nuclear Energy (Nuclear Act)– Energy ActEnergy Act – Environment Protection Act Environment Protection Act – Act on the Territorial StructureAct on the Territorial Structure
• Secondary legislationSecondary legislation
- - 2222 regulations for the application of the Nuclear Act regulations for the application of the Nuclear Act
Nuclear Act: Nuclear Act: Types of Authorisations Types of Authorisations
° permit for site selectionpermit for site selection° order for approval of the selected siteorder for approval of the selected site° permit for designpermit for design° order for approval of the technical designorder for approval of the technical design° permit for constructionpermit for construction° permit for commissioningpermit for commissioning° licence for operationlicence for operation° licence for decommissioninglicence for decommissioning
Main NRA regulations Main NRA regulations applied during licensingapplied during licensing
• Regulation for the procedure for issuing licenses Regulation for the procedure for issuing licenses and permits for safe use of nuclear energy (2004)and permits for safe use of nuclear energy (2004)
• Regulation on ensuring the safety of nuclear Regulation on ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants (2004)power plants (2004)
• Regulation on basic norms of radiation protection Regulation on basic norms of radiation protection (2004)(2004)
• Other relevant regulations issued under the Other relevant regulations issued under the Nuclear ActNuclear Act
Regulation on Ensuring the Regulation on Ensuring the Safety of NPPsSafety of NPPs
Design limits and safety assessmentDesign limits and safety assessment
• Acceptance criteria for the barriers;Acceptance criteria for the barriers; • Radiological and other technical Radiological and other technical
acceptance criteriaacceptance criteria • Frequency of a large radioactive release Frequency of a large radioactive release
into the environment that requires into the environment that requires undertaking of immediate protective undertaking of immediate protective measures for the population shall not measures for the population shall not exceed 1E-6 events per NPP per year.exceed 1E-6 events per NPP per year.
Regulation on Ensuring the Regulation on Ensuring the Safety of NPPs:Safety of NPPs:
Safety Analysis and AssessmentSafety Analysis and Assessment
• Plant safety shall be analyzed using Plant safety shall be analyzed using deterministic and deterministic and probabilistic methodsprobabilistic methods to verify and confirm the to verify and confirm the established design basis and the effectiveness of established design basis and the effectiveness of defense in depth arrangement defense in depth arrangement
• Postulated initiating events (PIEs)Postulated initiating events (PIEs) shall be also analyzed shall be also analyzed
• Computer codes, analytical methods and plant models to Computer codes, analytical methods and plant models to be used in the safety analysis shall be verified and be used in the safety analysis shall be verified and validated, uncertainty of the results shall be quantifiedvalidated, uncertainty of the results shall be quantified
Probabilistic Safety Criteria of European Utilities Probabilistic Safety Criteria of European Utilities (EUR): (EUR): more restrictive than the criteria of the IAEAmore restrictive than the criteria of the IAEA EUR Probabilistic Safety Targets:EUR Probabilistic Safety Targets: - Core damage frequency: CDF<1 E-5- Core damage frequency: CDF<1 E-5 - Frequency of release>limited impact (LI): 1 E-6- Frequency of release>limited impact (LI): 1 E-6 - Early or large release frequency (ELRF): 1 E-7- Early or large release frequency (ELRF): 1 E-7 IAEA Probabilistic Safety Targets for future IAEA Probabilistic Safety Targets for future plantsplants(INSAG 3, 1999)(INSAG 3, 1999) - CDF: 1E-5 per reactor year - CDF: 1E-5 per reactor year - LRF: 1E-6 per reactor year- LRF: 1E-6 per reactor year
Examples of international Examples of international safety and reliability safety and reliability
Review and assessment of Review and assessment of the Technical Designthe Technical Design
EnproConsult Task: Review and assessment of EnproConsult Task: Review and assessment of chosen design solutions chosen design solutions
• Geotechnical issues • Primary circuit• Hermetic construction• Safety related I&C systems (including software) • Control Systems• Systems for management of severe accidents• Reliability of chosen main structures • Analysis of the fire risk and protection measures• Analysis of the measures for ensuing seismic
safety• Measures for ensuring radiation protection
Review and Assessment Review and Assessment of the PSAof the PSA
National TC project supported by the National TC project supported by the IAEAIAEA Assessment of PSA:– Preliminary Mission – February 2009– IPSART Mission for assessment of PSA Rev. 0 -
May 2009. Final Report - August 2009– Follow-up IPSART Mission, PSA Rev. 2 - October 2010. Final Report - February 2011
Importance ranking of findings:Importance ranking of findings:
BNRA internal review of BNRA internal review of consultants’ recommendationsconsultants’ recommendations
High level decision-making group has been created in High level decision-making group has been created in the BNRA:the BNRA:
Task:Task: To review and assess all the recommendations made To review and assess all the recommendations made by the BNRA experts and by the consultants and to take a by the BNRA experts and by the consultants and to take a decision about their importance for the current licensing decision about their importance for the current licensing stage - approval of the designstage - approval of the design
Results:Results: Class 1 recommendations (must be resolved Class 1 recommendations (must be resolved before approval of the plant design):before approval of the plant design):• RiskAudit – 83RiskAudit – 83• EnproConsult – 31EnproConsult – 31• Total – 114Total – 114List of missing Topical reports has been preparedList of missing Topical reports has been prepared
EU (ENSREG) “Stress EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” analysis of Belene tests” analysis of Belene
NPPNPP
“Stress test”: Stress test”: targeted reassessment of the safety targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs.margins of NPPs.
Technical scope:Technical scope:
a) Initiating events: earthquake; flooding;
b) Consequence of loss of safety functions from any initiating event: loss of electric power, including station black out; loss of ultimate heat sink; combination of both;
c) Severe accident management issues: loss of core cooling function; loss of the cooling function of the fuel storage pool; loss of containment integrity
EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” EU (ENSREG) “Stress tests” analysis of Belene NPPanalysis of Belene NPP
Progress report Final report
Licensee report August 15, 2011 October 31, 2011
National report September 15, 2011 December 31, 2011
• The final National report will be subject to a peer review process• The EC will present a progress report to the EU Council for the meeting scheduled on 9th December 2011 and a consolidated report for the meeting scheduled for June 2012.