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Sponsor: 5th Special Forces Group Broadcom Week 1: Problem Provide wide-area broadband internet in denied areas (e.g. Syria, Iraq) Solution: Aerial based solution to beam Internet directly to denied area Week 9: Problem Provide wide-area broadband internet in denied areas (e.g. Syria, Iraq) Solution: Aerial based solution to beam Internet directly to denied area Total Interviews: 118
37

Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Jan 21, 2018

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Steve Blank
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Page 1: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Sponsor: 5th Special Forces Group

Broadcom

Week 1:Problem

Provide wide-area broadband

internet in denied areas (e.g.

Syria, Iraq)

Solution:

Aerial based solution to beam

Internet directly to denied area

Week 9:Problem

Provide wide-area broadband

internet in denied areas (e.g.

Syria, Iraq)

Solution:

Aerial based solution to beam

Internet directly to denied area

Total Interviews: 118

Page 2: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Team

Fabien Villemalard

Economist & IT

Teun de Planque

Computer Scientist and Electrical Engineer

Mechanical Engineer

Yitao Zhuang

Page 3: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Total Interviews: 118

OD-As Journalists Syrian and Iraqi

Citizens

Domain experts

Page 4: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Proposed Solution Week 2 Proposed Solution Week 9

Our Journey

Page 5: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Team Formation

Have a solution

Chaos

4 Potential Solutions

MVP

Deployment? +

Team member left

Happy Sponsor

Emotional

State

Time

Page 6: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

A Slow StartIncomplete Team, No Strategy

Page 7: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Broadcom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

Team Formation

Have a solution

Chaos

4 Potential Solutions

MVP

Deployment? +

Team member left

Happy Sponsor

Page 8: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

A team with experts

Page 9: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

We have a solution

Experts in telecommunication and UAS + 5 mins brainstorming

= A solution !

Page 10: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Broadcom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

Team Formation

Have a solution

Chaos

4 Potential Solutions

MVP

Deployment? +

Team member left

Happy Sponsor

Page 11: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

- “Wait a minute, who are your beneficiaries?

ODA in 5th SFG?”

- “We are not sure. By the way, what does

ODA mean?”

Page 12: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Know your beneficiaries before having a solution!

Broadcom: Lesson Learned

Page 13: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Initial Secondary Beneficiaries and Value Proposition

SFOD-A (Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha)

- Need telecommunication capability to other OD-A units,

allies and local population

Page 14: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Beneficiaries Rejected by the Sponsor

“We already have enough

telecommunication gadgets for our

soldiers.”

Col. Leahy, Commander of 5th SFG

Page 16: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Lesson Learned

“It is all about winning hearts and minds (of local

people)”

-Former Navy Seal

-Sponsor

-Former British Special Forces

-Delta Force

Page 17: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Local Civilians

Confirmed Beneficiaries and Value Propositions

SFG (Company Commander)

● Provide unbiased information and

counter-propaganda

● Know what local citizens are thinking

and talking about

● Communicate to local population

directly

● Access to accurate information or

entertainment

● Capability to communicate to the

outside world

Page 18: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Broadcom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

4 potential solutions

Team Formation

Have a solution

MVP

Deployment? +

Team member left

Happy Sponsor

Chaos

Page 19: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

4 Solutions Proposed

1. Mesh Network

2. Cell Tower 3. Truck Based4. Aerial Based

Page 20: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Interviews with Experts → Winner

1. Mesh Network

2. Cell Tower 3. Truck Based 4. Aerial Based

Page 21: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Positive Feedback!

“Your recommended solution is the

BEST of all hypotheses. YOU ARE

TALKING”

Col. Krummrich, Operational officer

for USAJFKSWCS, military liaison

Page 22: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Broadcom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

Team Formation

Have a solution

Deployment? +

Team member left

Happy Sponsor

Chaos

MVP

4 Potential Solutions

Page 23: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: MVP

•3G/4G communication

•Satellite communication as backhaul

•Onboard server for cached material

•COTS parts (total est: ~$70K)

•Mounted on a proposed MALE UAS

platform or existing Group III UAS

Page 24: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Mission Achievement

5th Special Forces Group Local Civilians

● Number of users of the internet service

● Number of Facebook/Twitter posts created

(intelligence collection)

● Number of downloads of the cached content

(counter-propaganda)

Page 25: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

Deployment? + Team

member left

Team Formation

Have a solutionHappy Sponsor

Chaos

4 Potential Solutions

MVP

Page 26: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Concepts of Operation

Page 27: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Emotional Rollercoaster

Emotional

State

Time

Team Formation

Happy SponsorHave a solution

Chaos

4 Potential Solutions

MVP

Deployment? +

Team member left

Page 28: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Could we use many of these

together? ... so why not fly 20 of

them over the target area. The

concept looks great!

Col. Leahy, Commander of 5th SFG

Page 29: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Dual-Use Applications

Telecommunication for

Disaster ReliefLow cost alternatives for

persistent ISR

Page 30: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

All components are commercially

available.

BroadCom: Internal Readiness Level

Page 31: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

BroadCom: Acknowledgements

5th Special Forces Group: Col. Leahy, Col. Krummich,

Joshua Burch, Paul Murphy

Military Liaison: Todd Forsman, Scott Sanders

TA: Isaac Matthews

Mentor: Craig Seidel

Special Thanks: Stanford DoD/IC community

Page 32: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Thank you!

BroadCom: Providing Internet

Service to the Denied Areas

Page 33: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Appendix

Page 34: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Primary: 5th Special Force Group (especially ODA teams)

Secondary: - Allied forces in denied areas (coordination purposes);- Population in denied area (informational purposes).

Third: potential other beneficiaries could include other military units, Gov’t org. that provide aid (FEMA, UN, USAID), NGOs, Private co. op. in denied areas (Oil & Gas, Mining, …)

- DIUX- Purchasing arm of the military through the SOCOM (Special Operations Command)known as Acquisition,Transport and Logistics unit;- Head of US 5th Special Forces Group.

- Warehouse and Assembly facility;

- UAS/Drones

- Telecommunication Engineer;

- Electrical/Mechanical Engineer.

BroadCom: Mission Model Canvas

- Purchase of off the shelf equipment;

- Assembly of equipment;

- B2Gov. distribution;

- Maintenance and Repair of equipment

- US 5th Special Forces Group;Drone Operator

- Telecommunication suppliers;L3, Cobham, AvL,Ericsson, Nokia

- Drone manufacturersAAI (RQ-7), Zenith Aerospace (Solar) CyPhy (Tethered Drone)

- Provide internet to local citizens so that 5th SFG can collect useful intelligence

- Local citizens post valuable information (for 5th SFG) on provided Internet- Leasing of equipment- Maintenance services

- Off the shelf elements- Assembly - B2Gov. Distribution and transport costs to destination.- Total = 70k

Beneficiaries

Mission AchievementMission Budget/Costs

Buy-In/Support

Deployment

Value

Proposition

Key Activities

Deploy an IP based broadband communication infrastructure which is(i) Compatible with smartphones on the ground (2G, 3G, 4G, LTE);(ii) Durable;(iii) Mobile;(iv) Discrete from obvious visual detection;(v) Highly customizable in terms of area coverage(vi) Target. Download 5MB/s. Upload 1MB/s. (Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook)(vii) Operated min. 30km range;(iix) Target urban areas with 1 to 3 story buildings and at least 1 city block;(ix) Min. concurrent connections of 40 users

Key Resources

Key Partners

- Direct sales channel where confidentiality is ensured, and select clients are chosen;

- Large conference gatherings;

- In the field, UAV should fit in the back of a humvee;

- Can take off over short distances

Page 35: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Create sense of urgency from the start!

Lesson learnt: Response time is slow

Week 1

Broadcom

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Expectation

5th SFG actual response

SOCOM actual response

Page 36: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Lesson learnt: How to talk to Special Forces

- SOCOM is trained keep information rather than share information;

- Quote: “I told all that my JAG could tell me I could say”

- Required creative approach:- Do homework before interviews as much as possible

to target questions as much as possible;- When talking use analogies;- Multiple touch points is essential;- Emails with images and open ended questions;- Use of intermediaries;- Use of former SOCOM officers; and- Talk to more senior ranking officers with more

comfort to share information

Page 37: Broadcom - Hacking for Defense - Stanford 2017

Lesson learnt: Model Canvas

- The model canvas is a powerful tool for assessing product-market fit;

- It is not a sequential tool to solving a problem but an iterative process whereby each new bit of information may disarrange the entire model canvas