Bodies and incorporeals in stoics.pdf

The Stoics on Bodies and IncorporealsAuthor(s): Marcelo D. BoeriReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723-752Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131617 .Accessed: 15/04/2012 09:20

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THE STOICS ON BODIES AND INCORPOREALS MARCELO D. BOERI

I

It WAS A WIDESPREAD view IN LATE ANTIQUITY that the Stoics main tained theses contrary to common conceptions?absurd, incompre hensible, or simply false. In other words, the Stoics were generally ac

cused of having been guilty of incongruity, self-contradiction, and

absurdity.1 Indeed some specific Stoic claims2 must have been partic ularly baffling for authors coming from the Platonic and Aristotelian

tradition, mostly because these sorts of tenets were in disagreement with some basic assumptions of such a tradition. Alexander of Aphro

disias, for example, correctly suggests that the tensional movement,

Correspondence to: Campos Salles 1853, Dto. 2, (1492) Cuidad Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Plutarch, On common conceptions 1073D-1074C. See Herman von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (hereafter, "SVF"), 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-5), 2:525. On common conceptions 1081C (SVF 2:519; An thony A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers [hereafter, "LS," followed by the section and text number], 2 vols. [Cambridge: Cam

bridge University Press, 1987], 51C). See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, On mixture, 223, 18-20, from Alexandri Aprodisiensis praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora, ed. Iva Bruns, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), where the Stoic doctrine of KVEv\ia is said to be absurd and false. On this topic see the remarks by Robert B. Tood, Al exander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De mixtione with

Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 29-49. See also Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 25 {SVF 2:316), who calls the Stoic thesis of supreme genus "incomprehensible and absurd" ( aovvexov atJTo?? xai aXoyov). By "Stoics" or "Stoicism" I mean especially the early Sto icism, namely the doctrines attributed to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. 2 See especially those topics related to (a) the "tensional" movement of jtveDâ; (b) the assertion that "one body is place for another and one body

passes through another"; Plutarch, On common conceptions 1077E (this translation is my own and is based on Harold Cherniss's text, Plutarch's Mor alia, Part II [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976]; translations are my own, unless otherwise stated); Alexander of Aphrodisias, On mix ture, 223, 18 (with Todd's comments on the issue, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, 81-8) and (c) the basic ontological distinction between body or existent (o?>u.a-T? ?v) and incorporeal or nonexistent (aoobâxov-x? îfi ?v). For this last topic see the further evidence quoted below in note 10.

The Review of Metaphysics 54 (June 2001): 723-752. Copyright ? 2001 by The Review of Metaphysics

724 MARCELO D. BOERI

attributed by the Stoics to Jtve?3?ia, does not fall into the Aristotelian classification of xlvti?lc.3 No doubt Alexander is right in noting this

point because, according to Aristotle's view, jrvei3?ia's movement would be neither substantial (generation/destruction), quantitative (increase/diminution), qualitative (alteration), nor locative (locomo tion). Nonetheless Alexander's attempt to reject the Stoic thesis of tensional movement on this ground is misleading. The fact that the tensional movement is not included in Aristotle's scheme does not show that such a type of movement does not exist or that it is not pos sible to explain phenomena making use of an explanatory mechanism in which the tensional movement is crucial. It only indicates the im

possibility of trying to grasp Jtveuîa and its properties with criteria which turn out to be useless for the assessment of such an entity that

is for the most part described in our sources as moving "simulta

neously inwards and outwards" (xovixf|v Tiva eivai x?vr|Gtv jtbqL x? o(b[iaxa 8l? to e?oco ?|ia xai ei? to eôo xivou?i?vriv).4

I have cited and briefly commented on Alexander's remark

against the Stoics because I think that this type of criticism is repre sentative of what we can find in the testimonies for early Stoicism, particularly in those sources hostile to the Stoics, such as Plotinus, Pl

utarch, Galen, and of course Alexander himself. Plotinus, for exam

ple, seems to be attacking the Stoic doctrine of principles when he

says that if something is active and involves in some sense the charac teristics of a form (or of an energeia), this something cannot be bodily or material. In other words, Plotinus cannot accept the Stoic thesis of the material principles5 for, as he puts it,

3 Alexander seems to suggest this when saying "xai nax? xi ei?o? xivr|0? ? vivrai [that is, the JtveDîa]; xaT3 ov??v y?g otov t3 ?oTi vofjoai tl aîa etc x? evavTia xivo?îevov xa?' aire?"; On mixture, 224, 25-7. On Aris totle's distinction of the different kinds of xivr|Oi?, see Categories 14.15al3 14.

4 Nemesius, On the nature of man, 18, 5-8, in Nemesi Emeseni De natura hominis, ed. Moreno Morani (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), {SVF 2:451; LS, 47J); Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories, 269, 14, from In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, in Commentatia in Aris totelem Graeca, vol. 2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), (SVF, 2.452). For Alexander's

version of the issue see On mixture, 224, 24-5 (SVF 2:442; LS, 471): "

Jtve?3?ia XLvoi)ji8vov ?cîa eS; ai5Toi3 xe xai etc aire?"; and Todd's remarks in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, 219.

THE STOICS ON BODIES AND INCORPOREALS 725

god for them [namely for the Stoics] is posterior to matter as well, for it is a body composed of matter and form. And where did it get its form from? But if he does not have matter, because of hav ing the nature of a principle, that is to say, because of being reason

(aQxoeibri? oov xai X?yoc), then god would have to be incorporeal, and the active would have to be incorporeal (?oobjiaTo? ?v e?r\ o 6e?c, xai t? jroLT]TLX?v aoob^iaTov).... then, how could matter be a principle if it is a

body?6

In fact, for Plotinus to tl^ilov, that which involves greater value,7 does not pertain to the sphere of the corporeal, since this is directly related to the material things that, as material, imply passivity and

lack of form. Plutarch is in the same line of thought when arguing that if the Stoic god is neither something pure nor something simple but

something composed, he must be dependent on something else (for the Stoics, matter, in being simple, involves the features of a princi ple).8 By contrast, the Stoics held that only corporeal things have a

5 t? Jtoio?jv 9e?c; t? Jt?o/ov ?jcoio? ovo?a, vXr\. Both principles are as sumed to be bodies. For evidence see Diogenes Laertius 7.134-5 (SVF 1:85, 2:299, 2:300; LS, 44B, 45E, 50E). In Diogenes Laertius 7.134.17 (H. S. Long's text, Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorvm [Oxonii: Scriptorum Classi corum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, 1964]), I read o(b\iaxa, following MSS. Both von Arnim (SVF 2:299) and H. S. Long read aocojiorcouc following the Suda lexicon. This reading puts forward philological as well as philosophical prob lems. As noted by Jaap Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium: Critical Observations on a

Recent Study," Mnemosyne 31, no. 2 (1978): 162-3 and 169, it is likely that ?ocDiicrcou? is an anticipation of ?[iOQ(j)ou?;, which is said of the principles as

well, von Arnim's reading (followed by Robert B. Todd, "Monism and Imma nence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics," in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978], 139-43)

goes against a number of testimonies maintaining that, according to the Sto ics, a real cause is what is bodily. Indeed, god is a cause. The new edition of the Diogenes Laertius text by Miroslav Marcovich, Diogenis Laertii Vitae

Philosophorvm (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1999) gives o(b\iaxa follow ing the MSS. On this point, see LS 1:273-4, who argue in favor of the reading oobfiaTa on the ground of strong philosophical reasons. 6 See Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 26, 11-17 (SVF 3:315; the same remark oc curs at Ennead 2.9, 1). The passage is quoted following the text established by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer, Plotini Opera (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973). 7

Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 27; SVF 2:314. 8 An unbelievable assertion to Plutarch (On common conceptions 1085B-D, partially quoted by LS, 47G; see also SVF 2:444). On the Stoic prin ciples see Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (SVF 1:85; LS, 44B) and Michael Lapidge, "aQxai and OTOi/eta: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology," Phronesis 18 (1973): es

pecially 244-53.


real causal power with respect to other things. It seems to me that

this thesis contains an implicit and serious attack on the Platonic and

Aristotelian view according to which forms and ends are not only the

real causal factors but also the items that especially deserve to be

called causes, at least if they are compared to the material things whose causal agency is primarily restricted to the domain of neces

sary conditions.9

Among the ancient authors there was a wide acceptance that the

Stoics were the champions of the idea that the corporeal is the essen

tial hallmark of the existent.10 According to the Stoic orthodoxy,

something is actually real if it is corporeal. Thus, the Stoic philoso phers did leave aside the Platonic and Aristotelian ontology which

gave the intelligible the highest place in the hierarchy of beings, and they did so by maintaining that only what is corporeal is capable of

acting or of being acted upon.11 The Stoics are also said to have devel

oped a complex theory of incorporeals (?o(b\iaxa), "somethings" which, albeit nonexistent in a strict sense, are subsistent.12 But if the

9 See Plato, Phaedo 99b, Timaeus 48a-c, and Aristotle, Physics 2.9.200a5-15. For Aristotle a principle must be something primary, namely it

must not come from another thing (Physics 1.5.188a26-30). He considers that form (eldos) as a principle is the terminus ad quern of generation (see 1.9.192al6-30 and especially 193a30-bl2, where Aristotle tries to show that in the matter/form relationship, form is prior to and determinant of matter.

Form, in fact, determines matter in virtue of its active character). On the is sue that the real cause of something is a body acting upon another body see

Michael Frede, "The Original Notion of Cause," in Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burn yeat, and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), especially 221 34. Reprinted in Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapo lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 125-50; in what follows I cite from the 1980 edition. Anna Maria Ioppolo, "II concetto di causa nella filosof?a el lenistica e romana," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der r?mischen Welt, ed.

Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 4494-505. 10 For evidence see especially Plutarch, On common conceptions 1073E (included in SVF 2:525): "ovto y?Q M^?va Ta o(b\iaxa naXovoiv ?jtei?ri ovto? t? Jtoie?v Ti xai Jt?o/eiv." As indicated above (note 2), in the citations of Plu tarch I follow Cherniss's text, Plutarch's Moralia. Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 28 (included in SVF 2:319): "to yag oob^iaTa vo?i?oavT?c dvai Ta ?vTa." Alex ander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics, 301, 22-3, from In Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo Commentaria, ed. Maximilianus Wallies, in Commen taria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1891), (included in SVF 2:329 and in LS, 27B):

" exetvoi (that is, the Stoics) vo|io6eTr|oavT?? a?TO?? t?

?v xaT? o(x)\i?x(x)v ^t?voov ?iyeoGai."


things truly existent are bodies, what role do incorporeals play in

Stoic ontology? Why did the Stoic philosophers consider it necessary to put forward a strict distinction between the corporeal and the in

corporeal in their world's explanation, an explanation so strongly dominated by the thesis that only the bodily beings are real? These are some of the questions this paper intends to answer.

In the first part, I shall begin by making reference to some An

cient interpretations of the Stoic doctrine of incorporeals. At this

point I hope to show that some views on Stoicism held by authors like

Proclus, Plutarch, or Alexander are misleading, mostly because either

they take incorporeals to be secondary realities (bodies being the pri mary ones) or because they raise their objections to Stoic claims start

ing from quite a different conceptual scheme. Although the view that

incorporeals are inferior realities would seem to be plausible (and in fact this view has been accepted by conspicuous contemporary schol

ars), I shall endeavor to demonstrate that this sort of interpretation is not consistent with Stoic philosophy as a whole and that, accordingly,

11 As David Hahm points out, the characterization of body as what is ca pable of acting or of being acted upon does not appear in our sources as a theoretical definition but it is always presupposed in a number of arguments as a distinctive aspect of what is a body. See his The Origins of Stoic Cos

mology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 3. See also Cicero, Acad?mica 1.39 (SVF 1:90; LS, 45A); Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathemat icos 8.263 (SVF 2.363; LS, 45B); Tertulian, On the Soul, chapter 5; Nemesius,

On the nature of man 21, 6-9; Diogenes Laertius 7.5 (SVF 2:40), 7.55 (SVF 2:40; LS, 33H); Seneca, Letters 106, 2-7 (SVF 3:84). 12 See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.212. For the distinc tion "existent" (?v)?"subsistent" (?)(|)iOT?^?vov) in connection with the issue of time see Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.106, 5-23, from Joannis Stobaci Anthologii libri duo miores qui inscrib? soient eclogae physicae et ethicae, ed. Curtius

Wachsmuth (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), (SVF 2:509; LS, 51B); Alexander, On Aristotle's Topics, 301, 19-25 (SVF 2:329; LS, 27B) and Victor Goldschmidt,

"vn?QXEiv et vfyzox?va? dans la philosophie sto?cienne," Revue des ?tudes Grecques 85 (1972): 331-444. A thoughtful discussion on ^exTci, one of the in corporeals, can be found in Anthony A. Long, "Language and Thought in Sto icism," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. Anthony A. Long (London: The Athlone

Press, 1971), especially 88-90, and most recently LS 1:163-76 and Michael Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a lekton," in Companions to Ancient Thought 3. Language, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 109-28. See also the essay by Jacques Brunschwig, "On a Stoic Way of

Not Being," in his Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158-69, who also deals with the Stoic notion of incorporeals and interestingly discusses some topics con nected with the Stoic psychology of action and lekta.


incorporeals can plausibly be thought to be of such a kind that they turn out to be essential in accounting for bodily things as well. Sec

ond, and following this line of thought, it will be suggested that bodies and incorporeals are complementary terms. At this point my argu

ment will be that bodies and incorporeals serve to complement each

other in the sense that one cannot exist without the other. Thus, be

tween 0(b\iaxa and a?co^iaTa there seems to be a reciprocal depen dence. Finally, in the last part some key passages of Stoic physics and ethics (in which the mentioned dependence can be corroborated) will be examined and I shall provide arguments to clarify the corporeal/in corporeal issue in Stoic philosophy.

II

The four species of incorporeals (A,exT?v, xev?v, t?jtoc, xq?voc) are listed by Sextus Empiricus.13 As already indicated, due to their

"physicalism,"14 the Stoics made corporeality the essential clue of the

existent, of the real. Yet if the existent in the strict sense consists of

bodies, one can legitimately raise doubts about the role (if any) incor poreals play in the Stoic account of reality. Some ancient authors have assumed that incorporeals must have a dependent way of being, and for this reason they were thought to be "subsistent." This was

Proclus's view. He maintained that the Stoics made time a mere

thought, insubstantial and very close to the nonexistent. This is so, Proclus goes on to argue, because time is one of the incorporeals, which are despised by Stoics as being inactive, nonexistent, and

merely subsistent in mind (?v ?mvoiai? ?(j)ioT?[i?va ipi?m?).15 In spite of what Proclus says, I do not think that the Stoics re

garded incorporeals as secondary or dependent "somethings."16

13 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218. 141 am taking this terminology from Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy

of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 37 8.

15 See Proclus, On Plato's Timaeus 271D. I agree with LS 2:304, that "nothing in reported statements of Stoic philosophers justifies Proclus's re duction of time to a mere thought." According to Long and Sedley, Proclus

may have been influenced by some doxographical formulations as Sextus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.277:

"aoob^iaTov tl xa65 a?T? voo?jievov i)jt?OTT|oavTO Tov xq?vov." A very similar formulation occurs at Adversus

Mathematicos 10.218 (SVF 2:331; LS, 27D).


Neither do they seem to have assumed that incorporeals should be de

spised because of being inactive and nonexistent. The difficulty raised by Stoic philosophers is that, even though place, time, void, and

sayables17 are incorporeal, they turn out to be fundamental to consti tute the realm of the existent. The case of time is especially sugges tive: despite being an incorporeal, time is a necessary condition for

the constitution of objective reality (by "objective reality" I mean the realm of the corporeal things, the set of objects that constitute our "objective experience"). There is a passage in Clement of Alexandria, in a context that is supposed to be Stoic in character, where time is shown to be a cause in the sense of a necessary condition.18 In this text Clement says that time is that which offers the notion of the con

ditions without which the effect cannot be produced (? ?? XQOvo? tc?v (bv oux aveu

^?yov eji?/ei).19 This is specially applied to the case of learning: the father is a preliminary cause (jiQoxaTaQXTix?v a?xiov) of learning, the teacher the synectic cause (?uvexTix?v a?/ciov), the natu ral disposition to learning is the auxiliary cause (ouvepyov a?/ciov),

16 Nonetheless, this is what Andreas Graeser seems to think when point ing out that "in Stoic usage the Greek language equivalent to our 'subsist' clearly signifies what may be called a subordinate or rather dependent mode of existence, one that is distinct from being real in the sense of being tangible and thus capable of acting and being acted upon." See Graeser, "The Stoic Theory of Meaning," in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (Berkeley and Los Ange les: University of California Press, 1978), 89. Long ("Language and Thought in Stoicism," 90) seems to imply the same thing in saying that

"

hyphestanai hyphistasthai expresses a state subordinate to that denoted by hyparchein or einai." It is true, as Graeser observes, that an incorporeal like a lekton is not real in the sense of being tangible. As I hope to show, however, it does not follow from this that "the lekta are not something in the world"; Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism," 89. In analyzing the Stoic theory of cat egories or genera of being, Graeser appears to imply the same thing. See An dreas Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1975), 18^23.

171 follow LS (section 33) in rendering lekta as "sayables." For recent discussion on the difficulties involved in translating the term lekton and its philosophical implications in Stoic philosophy, see Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a lekton," especially 110-19. 18 Clement, Stromateis 8.9.25, from Clemens Alexandrinus. Stromata. VII und VIII, ed. Otto St?hlin and Ludwig Fr?chtel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970), ( SVF 2:346). Indeed it would be inconsistent to speak of time as a spe cies of causality because, as suggested above, if a factor is a cause of another one, such a factor must be corporeal. Actually, evidence that time is a cause is scanty and Clement's example is, as far as I know, the only source which takes time to be a kind of causality. 19 Clement, Stromateis 8.89, 24, 4.


and time, finally, is the necessary condition of the learning process. Here it is suggested that learning, because it is a process, is supposed to imply a certain duration. In other words, if learning is understood as a process, it requires a before and an after: a before in which the in

dividual has not yet learned and an after in which the individual has

already learned. If one seeks to establish a coherent account of this

phenomenon, one has to take into account time, because learning in

volves a process that is only understandable in time which, despite

being incorporeal, measures motions or shifts of corporeal things in

orderly sequences.20 However, this does not resolve the aforemen

tioned inconsistency, according to which time cannot be considered a

cause in the strict sense because of being incorporeal. It could be

suggested, though, that Clement is making reference to a very general use of the word "cause," one of the Stoic uses of the term.21 Following Clement's line of thought, according to which "if something is a 'be cause of which' (?i'o?) it is not in all cases also a cause" ("in the strict sense," I would add),22 one could think of time as being a cause just in the sense of a "because of which." As a result of the fact that time is an indispensable requirement for the explanation of any phenomenon in the material world, it is a "because of which" cause inasmuch as it

gives assistance to the constitution of the existent, that which, in the

strict sense, is a cause.

Therefore, despite the fact that time is incorporeal, it is, like the

other incorporeals, a necessary condition for the existence of bodies.

All existent things must exist in a place; but in addition to this it is im

possible to establish causal relations among things if there is no time, that is to say if there is no factor capable of setting the before and the

after of the possible combinations among the existent things, so that

it can be possible to determine, for example, that A in tx is a cause of B

20 Chrysippus is said to have posited the basic distinction between time as the dimension of motion, according to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of, and time as the dimension "accompanying the world's

motion"; Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.106, 5-9; see SVF 2:509; LS 1:304. 21 See Frede, "The Origina 1 Notion of Cause," 220-1 and Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.138, 14-23, who

clearly attributes this wide sense of cause both to Zeno and Chrysippus. As Ioppolo puts it, "to say that the cause is 'that because of which' means to know what the thing is in its generality but without capturing its essential feature"; "II concetto di causa," 4526.

^Stromateis 8.9.27.3, 1-3 (SVF2:347).


in t2. Although time does not seem to fit into the more orthodox char

acterization of cause (for it is not a body), it is the factor which allows us to establish a relation of causality, a relation for which the temporal

component is essential for distinguishing what the cause and the ef

fect are. Time, as incorporeal, appears to have an intermediate posi tion between that which is absolutely (body) and that which is nothing (time being a something for it is different from nothing). Regardless of time being incorporeal, we should not conclude, as Proclus does, that time is something purely mental and only subsistent in the mind.23 The Stoics also introduced the notion of

"being present" or "being there" (ujtaQX?LV): time, insofar as it is an incorporeal something, is subsistent; but according to a subtler distinction, the past and the fu

ture only subsist (vfyeoxavai), while the present is there, that is, exists in some way.24 I suggest, then, that, in Stoic terms, there is no existent

which, in order to be what it is, can exist without time.

The same thing can be said about void and sayables: singular ob

jects (the existents) cannot exist unless they are in the domain of spe cifically defined spatial-temporal relationships. There is a passage in Sextus Empiricus that might confirm, at least partially, my hypothesis that there must be a relationship of complementarity between bodies

23 The expression "nonexistent" should be understood in two senses: (a) in the technical Stoic sense that something (as time or void) does not exist

but subsist, and (b) in the common sense that something does not exist in any way. The confusion between (a) and (b) is probably the one that Proclus has in mind when attacking the Stoic position. I am indebted to Ricardo Salles for urging me to clarify this point. 24 See Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.106, 5-23 (SVF 2:509; LS, 51B). However, ac cording to Chrysippus, no time is wholly present (enistatai). There is no present in the strict sense, although broadly it can be called such. The ex pression "to be present," "to be there" (hyparchein) can be properly applied to the present; by contrast, the past and the future merely subsist (hyphe stanai). For a very clear and persuasive discussion of this passage, see Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a lekton," 117-18, whose translation of hy parchein as "being present," "being there" I am following. It would be conve nient, it seems to me, to avoid rendering hyparchein as "to be real" (as David Sedley does in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Ke impe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield [Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 398). According to Sedley, the point of Chrysippus's remark with regard to the present is "to make it a spe cial kind of incorporeal." That is probably true but the present is already an incorporeal and, as such, it is not "real," at least in the sense of something fully existent. Whatever the case may be, the language in the case of the in corporeal time is very misleading and extremely hard to render.


and incorporeals. In effect, he quotes25 the Stoic distinction between

?^ov and jt?v, and notes that, in accordance with the Stoics, the world is a whole (o?,ov) whereas the external surrounding void to gether with the world is an all (jt?v). Clearly what is involved here is that the void (one of the incorporeals) does not subsist without the

world, which is of course a body. Yet the world does not exist with

out void. Therefore, neither the world nor the void can be what they are except in close connection. Sayables (^exT?i) also play a crucial role in the constitution of the real and corporeal world, for one of

their basic functions consists in establishing the logical-linguistic rela

tions which permit us to categorize the object, so that we can know it. To be sure, for the Stoics there is a crucial difference between saying

(?iyeiv) something and uttering (jCQO^?peoBat) it: sounds are uttered (or "pronounced") but things or the states of affairs (x? 7iQ?y\iaxa),

which indeed are sayables, are said (X?yeTai).26 It is obvious from this passage not only that for the Stoics sounds are uttered and meaning ful things (or simply "meanings") are said (because they are lekta) but also that if a corporeal thing X is something to a human, it must be

meaningful, and X is significant if and only if it is analyzed through the logos.27 So sayables are clearly important in the constitution of the

material world for a human being. A sayable, as the significant inten

tion of the discourse (whether this is a true or false proposition, or a

complex argument), plays a relevant role in the Stoic psychology of action, too. According to the evidence, the structure of the Stoic psy

chology of action is described as having the following steps: the first

one is the presentation (fyavxaoia), which in the case of the human being is expressed through articulated language. The presentation is

followed by an assent (ouyxaTa08oL?) which is the act of accepting such a presentation as true.28 Finally, when one gives assent to the

proposition expressing the content of a presentation, the assent be

comes an impulse (?Q|if|) for action. This accounts for the fact that, as Stobaeus reports, "all the impulses are assents."29 The relevance of

sayables can be seen more clearly when looking into the Stoic thesis

25 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.332. 26

Diogenes Laertius 7.57 (LS, 33A; compare SVF 2:149 ). 27 For a clear discussion of the Stoic distinction between "saying" and "uttering" see Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1993), 283-4.


that there is no rational action in the strict sense unless there is an in

termediate process of "rational evaluation" between presentation and

action itself. The capacity of expressing in words the contents of pre sentations is a typically human feature for, as Diogenes Laertius says in reporting Stoic doctrine,30 the human thought is capable of

28 The sequence presentation-assent-impulse is reported by Cicero, Aca d?mica 2.24-5; this testimony is confirmed by Plutarch, On Stoic self-contra dictions 1057A (SVF 3:177; LS, 53S) and partially by Diogenes Laertius 7.49 . Seneca, for his part, offers the sequence presentation-impulse-assent (Let ters, 113, 18) but his evidence is isolated and does not fit into the orthodox explanation. However, when explaining how anger is produced Seneca ap pears to go back to the supposedly orthodox account. In fact, he says that anger (ira) is set in motion by a presentation (species) received of a wrongful act (iniuria), and suggests that anger does not follow immediately without the involvement of mind giving assent to the presentation (On anger 2.1.3). Seneca is probably rendering the Greek synkatathesis ("assent") with the ex pressions uaccedents animus" or ''animus adprobans" and uphantasia" with

species. For a detailed discussion of the topic see Janine Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de S?n?que et la philosophie sto?cienne des passions (Paris: Klincks iek, 1984), 164-6; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Sto icism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 42-101, and "Seneca and Psychologi cal Dualism," in Passions & Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially 164-80; Ana Maria Ioppolo, "Presentation and Assent: A

Physical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism," Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 444, and more recently, "L'?Q^if] jtXeovoi^ouoa nella dottrina stoica dellapassione," Elenchos, 1 (1995): especially 49-54, where she examines the assent in the case of the passionate person; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of

Mind, 75-85; A. W. Price, Mental Conflict (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 146-7, 153. I agree with Richard Bett that "it is hard to accept that there is any sense in which impulse precedes assent." See his review of An nas's Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, m. Ancient Philosophy 14 (1994): 195? 6, where he argues against Annas's suggestion (Mind, 97-8) that the Stoics use the word impulse in both a broad and a narrow sense.

29Excerpts 2.88, 1. Indeed this explanation is simplified. I do not intend here to engage in the complex debate of the doctrine that impulses involve assent. For an illuminating treatment of the issue see Inwood, Ethics and

Human Action in Early Stoicism, 53-66; Ioppolo, "Presentation and As sent," 441-9; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. Moral

Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 172-86; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of

Mind, 91-102, and Pierluigi Donini, "Struttura delle passioni e del vizio e loro cura in Crisippo," Elenchos 2 (1995): 305-29 (on assent and impulse see par ticularly 319-25). 30

Diogenes Laertius 7.49.


expressing (?ioivoia ?xXa^r]TLxr|), and communicates with language that which it experiences due to the agency of presentation.31

In all these cases the core function of a sayable seems to be both to articulate and to give meaning to the reality through the discourses in which existents are expressed or accounted for. In other words, in

corporeals cannot be despised (pace Proclus) since they are neces sary conditions for understanding the existents. To be sure, it is

through language, which involves a connection between thinking and

reality, that we articulate reality in such a way that it is significant to us. The fact is that the (incorporeal) meaning of something can be only conveyed by words (which are corporeal); indeed, words are in dispensable for the expression of a sayable (namely a proposition or an argument). Thus words and meanings never appear separately. Sayables, despite being incorporeals, are somethings that enable us to establish the connections between ourselves and the universe, utiliz

ing the logos through which we articulate reality.32 Incorporeals, then, are not placed on a level lower than bodies because we cannot fail to include incorporeals as part of what constitutes and accounts for the

objective reality, that is, the corporeal reality. The Stoic standpoint seems to be that although incorporeals are inexistent (and therefore they are "unreal"), they are yet indispensable conditions that make up the reality of the corporeal. In this sense incorporeals occupy an in termediate position in Stoic ontology: because they lack body, which

gives an objective reality to beings, they are incorporeal. However, at

31 At this point I am assuming (without argument) the orthodox position according to which the Stoics distinguished the psychological states of non rational animals from those of rational animals. Salient holders of this thesis are Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," in Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 151-76 (especially 152-70); In

wood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 73-5, and LS 1:239-41. For the other interpretation (that is, that the Stoics are not taken to hold that perceptions of animals are completely devoid of propositional contents) see Richard Sorabji, "Perceptual Content in the Stoics," Phronesis 35 (1990): 307-14, and more recently, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (London: Duckworth, 1993), 20-8. 32 See Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge (Belfast: Vincent Baxter Press, 1966), 42-3; for the Stoic account of the process of acquiring knowledge see Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Im pressions," 157-70, and more recently, "Stoic Epistemology," in The Cam bridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keipe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcom Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 295-322.


the same time they have the status of "somethings" because they are

different from absolute nothing. It has been suggested in recent years that "it is apparent that in

the Stoic philosophy the term Incorporeal' is a cause of embarrass

ment and that further analysis of the question of time might increase

their perplexity."33 The same suggestion is repeated later when Tza

malikos says that "for Origen incorporeality and reality are not incom

patible ontological realities, as they virtually are for the Stoics."34 As

far as I can see, this scholar gives no arguments to prove the alleged Stoic embarrassment with regard to incorporeals and, as far as I

know, there is no evidence that the Stoics have regarded their incor

poreals as embarrassing to their ontological scheme. Tzamalikos's

opinion may be understood once one realizes that this scholar be

lieves that for the Stoics incorporeality and reality are incompatible

ontological statuses.35 If Tzamalikos's assumption concerning the

term incorporeal is correct (quod non), the role of incorporeals in

physics and ethics would become inexplicable. However, from the

distinction between a?/riov and ahta and between the adjectives in -Tov and -Teov (in both the spheres of physics and ethics respec tively) it becomes plain that incorporeals not only play a relevant role but also they are not incompatible ontological realities, that is to say, their status as incorporeal is not at odds with the "real" things. I have

briefly quoted this interpretation of Stoic incorporeals because this

type of explanation is paradigmatic of what I take to be misleading when trying to account for the relation between ?v and ?ir) ?v within the sphere of Stoic ontology. Tzamalikos's view on Stoic incorporeals is very similar to that of Proclus and, as I have said above, I cannot

find evidence for this sort of interpretation. There is another piece of evidence (in the domain of Stoic dialec

tic) which should be briefly commented on for it might be useful to throw light on the issue. In a well known passage Sextus suggests that

the Stoics seem to have made an interesting connection between the

discussion of the problem of truth and ethics.36 Sextus says that,

33 Panayiotis Tzamalikos, "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," Journal of the History of Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991): 540.

^Tzamalikos, "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," 553. 35 The issue of Stoic "embarrassment" is repeated again later (see "Ori gen and the Stoic View of Time," 554).

MPyrrhoneae Hypotyposes 2.81-3 (SVF 2:132; LS, 33P); see also Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.38-45.


according to the Dogmatists (that is to say, those who systematically maintain positive theses on different topics),37 the true (akr\Q??;) is dif ferent from the truth (??T|6?ia) in three ways: in substance (ouoia), in constitution (ovox?oei), and in function (ouv??iei). The Stoics con sidered that the true in substance is an incorporeal (ovoia ?lev, eitei t? ?lev cd?iG?? ?o(b[iaxov ?oTiv) because it is a predicate taking part in a

discourse (it is a sayable). The true, understood in terms of a prop erty of the proposition, turns out to be an "incorporeal quality" per

taining to the genus of lekta, but the truth is a body (namely, some thing corporeal) since it is knowledge declaratory of all true things,38 and knowledge is conceived of as the commanding part of the soul in a certain condition, the commanding part being a body (for it is breath, pne?ma, in a certain state). In constitution the true differs from the truth since the true is something simple (like "I am talking"), and the truth consists of the knowledge of many true things. Finally, in function the true differs from the truth since the latter always exists

within the sphere of knowledge and, therefore, it just belongs to the virtuous person. The true can also exist in the base person, since such a person can say something true but the truth is related to the

mental disposition proper of the wise person and such a mental dispo sition (that is, knowledge understood in terms of the commanding part of the soul disposed in a certain way) is a body. In this case it is also clear enough that for the Stoics the true/truth distinction involves a concern which is not only epistemological but also ethical. The

mentioned distinction implies crucial connotations in the field of eth ics and it is helpful to understand the rigid Stoic differentiation be tween the wise and the base person: to account for the epistemic state

proper to the wise person ("knowledge"; episteme) and that to the base or "inferior" person ("opinion"; doxa) one has, once more, to pre suppose incorporeals as well as corporeal somethings.39

As indicated above, in order to speak of a body or of a series of

bodies related by order of occurrence, we must always posit certain

temporal, locative, and linguistic determinations and, in general terms, a number of factors connected with what the Stoics used to

37 In this passage the Dogmatists Sextus is referring to are the Stoics. ^Sextus, Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes 2.81: "x\ ?? ??,f|6eia o(b\ia eoxi yap

8JtLOTf||ir] jt?vTcov ??,r|0u)v ?jto(j)avTLxr|." 39 For a complete discussion of the distinction at issue see Long, "Lan guage and Thought in Stoicism," 98-104.


call "the incorporeal." On this ground it is possible to argue that be tween bodies and incorporeals there is a relation of reciprocal depen dence. This proposal, it seems to me, helps to clarify at least two

points: first, the reason why the Stoics think it is necessary to include

incorporeal things in a strongly corporealistic ontology. Second, this

interpretation may help us to understand why the Stoics did not talk about incorporeals as "ways of not being in an absolute sense," as Plu

tarch misleadingly suggests. In fact, in Plutarch's opinion, "it is absurd

and at odds with the common conception to say that something is but

is non-existent"?* It is obvious here that Plutarch is putting emphasis on the Pla

tonic doctrine of \ir\ ?v in the sense of "an absolute non-being."41 But this way of interpreting the issue, I contend, would not have been ac

cepted by the Stoics. The absolute not being (like evvor|?iaTa, for in stance) would be a nothing, not an incorporeal.42 Concepts (?vvor|(iaTa) and ideas (i??ai) are figments ((j)avT?oîaTa) of the soul that neither subsist (a distinctive feature of the incorporeal) nor are

somethings.43 Despite Plutarch's view, and as far as I can see, there is no evidence to suggest that the early Stoics have maintained that in

corporeals are "not beings," that is to say ways of not being in an abso

lute manner. What seems to be suggested in Stoic sources is that in

corporeals "are not" or they "are nonexistent" in the sense that they are not bodies. However, the fact of not being a body does not imply not being absolutely.

40 See On common conceptions 1073D (Harold Cherniss's translation, Plutarch's Moralia). Indeed Plutarch's remark is in agreement with the con fusion (noted above, note 23) on the two senses of "nonexistent." 41 See Plato, Sophist 258d-259b. 42 See Alexander (reporting Stoic doctrine), On Aristotle's Topics 359, 14-16 (SVF2:329; LS, 30D:

" ei ye to ^l?v ev xai xaTa toD ?wor|âTo?- to ?? t?

xar? (i?vcov oooî?tcov xai ?acDji?TO?v xb ?? evv?rjjua jurj??regov rovr v nax? xov? Ta?Ta X?yovTa?)." 43 Actually, the Stoics are assumed to have said that concepts are "quasi somethings" (oboavei Tiva; Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.136, 2-23 ( SVF 1:65). See also Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories 105, 8-21 (compare SVF 2:278) and Frede, "Principles of Stoic Grammar," in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (Berke ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 32. Certainly the issue of concepts in Stoic philosophy is highly controversial. For a compre

hensive discussion of the topic see Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Phi losophy, 99-104, and Victor Caston, "Something and Nothing: The Stoics on

Concepts and Universals," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17 (1999): 145-213 (especially 150-71).


III

This section will concentrate on some specific Stoic texts that show the way incorporeals work in the different parts of philosophi cal discourse. Thus I shall be examining some key passages in which

bodies and incorporeals display the character of complementary terms. First, my discussion will focus on Stoic physics. I shall begin by considering the presumably44 Stoic distinction between a?/riov

("cause" or "cause in the strict sense") and ama ("causal account") and offer an interpretation that makes consistent that distinction with a theory of causality, according to which the bodies alone are capable of bringing about something or other on another bodily thing.45 Sec

ond, I intend to explore the meaning of two important distinctions in

the domain of Stoic ethics: "being happy" (an incorporeal) and "happi

ness" (a body), on the one hand, and the adjectives with the verbal suffix -tov and those with the verbal suffix

-Teov, on the other hand.

The issue has been debated at length and scholars do not agree on the

true meaning of these distinctions.46 The main passages on this point are collected in the summary of Stoic ethics by Stobaeus, who is gen

erally thought to be quoting Arius Didymus' ethical doctrines.47 In this

context we will also refer to the topic of impulse and assent and will see how incorporeals work in the Stoic account of impulse, the im

pulse being that which goes intentionally toward what each one takes to be good. Following the intended line of argument, for each of the

passages under consideration I shall endeavor to show the relevance

of the corporeal/incorporeal distinction in the explanation as a whole, and offer some brief conclusions.

44 The sense of the adverb "presumably" is explained below in note 53. 45 In my judgment, by far the best discussion on the Stoic notion of cau sality continues to be Frede's; see "The Original Notion of Cause." A good abstract of the topic can be found in Jean J. Duhot, La conception sto?cienne de la causalit? (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Brin, 1989), 87-100. See also the penetrating and more philosophical remarks by Maximilian Forschner,

Die stoische Ethik. ?ber den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System (Die stoische) (Darmstadt: Klett Cotta Verlag, 1995), 85-97, and Ioppolo, "II concetto di causa," 4494-523. 46 See LS 1:400; Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 25 35; and Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 34, 396-7, and 401.


The issue that is not under dispute in our sources is that, for the

Stoics, the truly existent things are bodies.48 Zeno maintained that the

principles of all things are the active and the passive, and in saying this

he implies that all that is existent is either active or passive. This also

47 The authorship of Stobaeus' extract of Stoic ethics has been widely discussed; it was attributed to the first century Stoic philosopher Arius Didy

mus by August Meineke, "Zu Stobaeus," Sokrates: Zeitschrift f?r das Gym nasialwesen, 13, ed. Julius M?tzell, Band 1 (Berlin, 1859), 563-65, and Her man Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879), 69 and 78-88. One of the first scholars in the last decades in questioning some assumptions of the Meineke-Diels thesis was Michelangelo Giusta, / dossografi di etica, 2 vols. (Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore, 1964-7), 1:140-7, and "Ario Didimo e la diairesis dell'etica di Eudoro di Alessandria," in Atti delta Accademia delle scienze di Torino. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche 120 (1986): 102-3, although he keeps the hypothesis that one author was respon sible for the three doxographies (I dossografi di etica 1:39). In recent times the Meineke-Diels hypothesis was accepted (with some reservations) by Charles Kahn, "Arius as a Doxographer," and Anthony A. Long, "Arius Didy mus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics," both papers included in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. William W. Forten baugh (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1983), 3-13 and 41 65, respectively. David E. Hahm, on his part, after a detailed examination of the works by Meineke, Diels, Giusta, and other scholars has also concluded that the author is the court philosopher Arius Didymus. See his "The Ethical

Doxography of Arius Didymus," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der r?mischen Welt, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), es pecially 3047-9. Tryggve G?ransson, however, has challenged the orthodox interpretation and has argued vigorously against the identification of the au thor in Stobaeus with the Alexandrian philosopher Arius Didymus. See Albi nus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus (G?teborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgen sis, 1995), 203-4, 209-10, 212-13, 216, 225-6, and 230-1. For a well-balanced defense of the orthodox view see Brad Inwood, review of G?ransson, Bryn

Mawr Classical Review 7 (1996): 25-30. I have presented a brief review of the status quaestionis concerning Arius Didymus in the introduction to my Spanish translation of the extract of Stoic ethics included in Stobaeus; see Victoria Julia, Marcelo D. Boeri, and Laura Corso, Las exposiciones antiguas de ?tica estoica (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1998), 149-67. At any rate, whether the author of the extract is Arius Didy

mus or another person, what is beyond discussion is the fact that the content of the second extract of ethical doxographies in Stobaeus 2.7 is genuinely Stoic doctrine. The crucial passages in Stobaeus can be confirmed in Dio genes Laertius 7.84-131 and Cicero, On Ends 3. This conclusion looks naive and, in a certain sense, it is. Yet it also allows us to regard the doxography in cluded in Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.7 as a serious Stoic piece of evidence which informs us about details that are not developed in the other sources. Such details are crucial for the reconstruction of the early Stoic ethics.

^Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 28; 2.4, 1 (SVF 2:319-20); Alexander of Aphrodi sias, On Aristotle's Topics 301, 19-21 (SVF 2:329).


appears to be suggesting that anything which does not have these

characteristics must necessarily be nonexistent.49 The existent/non existent difference can be clearly seen in the theory of causality,

where a strict terminological distinction of the words meaning "cause" is noted. In Plato and Aristotle the Greek terms ama and

a?TLOv were used indistinctly.50 However, according to Stobaeus' tes

timony, Chrysippus asserted that aitia is the formula, an enunciation or account (k?yoc) of a cause (a?/ciov).51 In other words, we are told that an arr?a is a propositional item which is related to that which, strictly speaking, is a cause: a body. An a?Tta is not a cause in the strict sense because of being a propositional item; and if it is a propo sitional item it will be an incorporeal. In fact, a proposition is an in

corporeal. However, according to the orthodox doctrine nothing in

corporeal can be a cause.

It is true that Stobaeus' passage is quite brief and gives no details of what the aitia/aition distinction probably meant. Jaap Mansfeld

rejects the relevance of this distinction on the ground that in some passages52 aitia is given as one of the names used by Chrysippus for fate (8L|iaQ|i?vTi), others being a^f|6eia, cleric, and av?yxr].53 In a pas sage where Galen is reporting doctrines supposedly Stoic,54 Mansfeld

goes on to argue, aitia and aition are used promiscuously and in a

passage of Plutarch's,55 an alleged (although not necessarily) verbatim quotation of Chrysippus, the term aitia appears twice (and not mean ing ?xSyo? Tfj? aiTia?). To sum up, according to Mansfeld, the words

aitia/aition are indistinctly used. At first glance Mansfeld's remarks seem to be persuasive; but at any rate, the following should be noted.

First, Galen's text is a very hostile passage where he is trying to show the absurdity of the Stoic thesis of synectic cause (ouvexTixov a?/tiov; ?uvexTLxri ama); if this is so, we cannot assume that what he is saying is what the Stoics effectively intended to say. To be sure, in the Ga

lenic passage there is no difference between aitia and aition, and Ga

len uses both terms as meaning the same thing, but the fact that he

does not take the distinction for granted is not very significant be

cause he does not accept the sort of causation he is criticizing (the

49 Diogenes Laertius 7.134 ( SVF 1:85); Aetius 1.3, 25 ( SVF 1:85). 50 Timaeus 28a4-5; Philebus 26e; for Aristotle, see Physics 2.3. 51 See Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.138, 23-139, 4 ( SVF 2:336; compare LS, 55A). 52 Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.79, 1-20 ( SVF 2:913; see LS, 55M).


synectic cause), either. Second, there is another place where Galen tells us that there is clearly no difference between saying the word "cause" either in feminine or in masculine gender.56 Actually, what

Galen implies is that he uses both terms interchangeably, not that the Stoics use them in this way. Whatever the case may be, Galen gives no

clear reasons for proving the distinction is pointless. In Stobaeus' text

then, and pace Mansfeld, the distinction is explicitly made and the fact

that in other passages the words ama-amov are employed in the

53 See Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium," 157. Frede ("The Original Notion of Cause," 223) accepts the distinction as Stoic and holds that although the dif ference between aition and aitia (that is to say, causes, on the one hand, and reasons and accounts, on the other hand) was not generally accepted, the dis tinction itself between causes and reasons or explanations was accepted. Forschner, on his part, does find this distinction "interesting" and he thinks it presumably is valid (Die stoische, 87). More recently, and following Mans feld, Ioppolo has maintained that Chrysippus does not have a rigorous techni cal use of both terms ("II concetto di causa," 4497-8). This suggestion, it seems to me, is conjectural, and as far as I can see has no textual support. On the other hand, we have a passage where the distinction is explicitly attrib uted to Chrysippus (see Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.139, 3-4). Bobzein, on the ground of Aetius 1.11.5 (SVF 2:340; LS, 55G), asserts that "the aitia of any in dividual cause (aition) is the portion of rational pneuma which permeates that cause," and so she also appears to dismiss the distinction between aitia and aition. In fact, she notes that such a distinction seems lost in this pas sage. See Susanne Bobzein, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 53 n. 96. In her translation of the Stobaeus passage at issue (Excerpts 1.139, 3-4) she renders the word A,?yoc as "reason" and in doing so, the distinction vanishes (see 53 n. 97). Certainly "reason" is a possible rendering of logos; this translation is also adopted by

Roberto Radice in his recent Italian translation of the Stoic texts (compiled by von Arnim in SVF), Stoici Antichi. Tutti I Frammenti (Milano: Rusconi, 1998), 513. In my view, in order for the Stobaeus passage to make sense, logos is to be taken as meaning "formula," "enunciation." See LS, 55A (who give "judgement") and Karlheinz H?lser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker. Neue Sammlung der Texte mit deutscher ?bersetzung und Kom mentaren, Bans 2 (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1987), 899, text 762 (who renders

"die Rede"). In what follows I try to offer an explanation for why the evi dence, on which the interpretation that Chrysippus did not distinguish accu rately between aitia and aition is based, is not absolutely reliable. 54 Galen, On bodily mass 7:26-8, in Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, ed.

Gottlob K?hn (Berlin: Gnobloch, 1821-33; reprint, Olms: Heldesheim, 1964 5), (SVF 2:440).

55Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1055F-1056A (SVF2:994). 56 Synopsis of the books on pulse 9:458, in Claudii Galeni Opera Om nia, ed. Gottlob K?hn (Berlin: Gnobloch, 1821-33; reprint, Olms: Heldesheim, 1964-5): "Ei?r]ôv ?' ?tl ?ia(|)?Qei îr|??v f] Orûx??c eijre?v atTia?, f\

oi)?8T8QO)? ama."


same way does not account for the distinction which Stobaeus explic itly attributes to Chrysippus. It is not impossible that, depending on the context, Chrysippus would have made wider use of the two terms.

Perhaps this distinction might be a peculiar technical usage which, al

though it could be acknowledged by authors like Plutarch and Galen

(cited by Mansfeld), should not be necessarily admitted. I would sug gest that while making this distinction Chrysippus was thinking of something like this: when you say "the sun warms the stone," you are

uttering the "causal account," the propositional item describing the

fact or event caused by the aition and, eventually, the truth of the

proposition describing such fact or event. Such a causal account does describe the phenomenon of temperature's increasing which acts

upon the stone, and the increased temperature is produced as a result

of the sun's caloric energy, but the cause in the strict sense (ot?/riov) is the sun (a body) acting upon the stone (another body).57 The cause

(the sun) and the caused object (the stone) are bodies; on its part the effect ("being hot") is, as the orthodox Stoic doctrine on causality re quires, an incorporeal. Thus the sun (a body) becomes the cause to the stone (another body) of the incorporeal predicate "being hot."58

But if this is so (as it is), the effect is a predicate, an incorporeal. If the effect is a predicate, the difficulty of how to analyze the causal

processes whose result is the production of new entities arises. Such a difficulty probably led some Stoics to think that the effect is a predi cate as well as an entire proposition such as "a ship is built." Such a

proposition becomes true as a result of the shipbuilder's activity.59 One could wonder why a distinction between cause (a body) and

causal account (an incorporeal) should be put forward in a strongly

57 The example of the sun is taken from Sextus, Pyrrhoneae Hypoty poses 3.14, who probably has the Stoics in mind in writing: "the sun or the heat of the sun is cause of the wax melting or of the melting of the wax"; translation by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 58 The other example, also collected by Sextus, is that of the scalpel: a scalpel (which is a body) is a cause to the flesh (another body) of the incor poreal predicate "being cut." See Sextus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.207-11 and Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes, 3.14, with Jonathan Barnes's remarks in his "Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der r?mis chen Welt (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 2671-2. 59 See Clement, Stromateis 8.9, 26, 3-4, and the commentary by LS 1:340.


corporealistic ontology like the Stoic one. I would offer for consider ation the following conjecture: according to the basic Stoic ontologi cal classification, the first and highest genus is "the something" (to t?), in which bodies and incorporeals are included.60 If my approach? that bodies and incorporeals are necessary components of reality and

that between them there is no one component more important than

the other?is correct, one might draw the conclusion that incorpore als should somehow play a role even in the sphere of the doctrine of

causation. The causal account (ama), despite not being a cause in the strict sense, is relevant for the whole causal account insofar as it is the means through which a determined causal event can be expressed by language, and thus through which the object can be grasped. On the other hand, it should be noted that the cause/effect relationship is

closely related to the process of knowledge. For the human being the first contact with the world is through the senses; they offer the mate

rial aspect of knowledge. Although the soul (or rather "the command ing part of the soul"; t? f|y8^iovix?v) is like a sheet of paper ready for

writing upon,61 there are "ingrained or implanted preconceptions"

(jtQO^f|^8L? 8?ii(J)UTOi) as well,62 which are natural rational components whose function is to determine and to help interpret the stuff provided by the senses. According to Diogenes Laertius' report, for the Stoics a

preconception is a "natural conception of the universal things" (or simply "universals"; evvoia cj)U?ixfi x(hv xaB?Axnj).63 The function of preconceptions in the Stoic theory of knowledge seems to have been

searching for and finding out a new knowledge.64 Possessing the

60 Compare Alexander, On Aristotle's Topics 301, 19-25 ( SVF 2:329; LS, 27B) and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218 (SVF 2:331; LS, 27D). 61 Aetius 4.11 (SVF2:83; LS, 39E). 62 Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1041E ( SVF 3:69; compare LS, 60B). 63 See Diogenes Laertius 7.54. Sometimes Chrysippus is said to have held that prolepsis is, along with aisthesis, the criterion of truth. The issue is quite complicated and I do not intend to discuss it here. For a very detailed and clarifying account see Gisela Striker, Essays in Hellenistic Epistemol ogy and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-76 (see especially 57-68).

^Clement, Stromateis 6.15, 121, 4-5 (SVF 2:102); Cicero, Acad?mica, 2.26 (SVF 2:103); Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1037B (SVF 2:129; LS, 31P).


general notion of the distinctive characteristics of an object allows us to search for a more accurate knowledge of such an object. Human reason is completed from our preconceptions during our first seven

years of life. With the full development of reason65 the ability to dis criminate in conceptual terms and the relation among things is

stressed, and this relation can be expressed more accurately. The

cause/effect relationship is not left out of this process: if we want to

have a full understanding of the causal relationship, we are to make

the aition/aitia distinction, so that the true causal agent can be dis

tinguished from the causal formula that makes intelligible a particular

phenomenon by the agency of the articulated language. Moreover, as

indicated above, in the Stoic account of causality the effect is a predi cate, a sayable. Thus predicates are closely involved in the causal ex

planation of a bodily entity; in this sense, we should accept that say ables (one of the canonical incorporeals) are quite "real" and they do not depend on the human mind for their subsistence.66 In sum, both

aspects, the logical/linguistic and the strictly causal one, are indis

pensable for accounting for anything which can be explained in terms

such as "A is the cause to B" or "between A and B there is a causal re

lationship." As we have already said, in the sphere of Stoic ethics the corpo

real/incorporeal discrimination also appears, and in this domain it is

highly relevant as well. In this context the Stoic thesis that the truly real is corporeal also played a distinctive role. In the Stoic sources we

find the following argument: if quality is "matter disposed in a certain

way" (as, according to the Stoics, it is)67 and if the substance of a thing can be compared to the material constituent of an object (and the qualities of things must be themselves corporeal), the different states of the soul (namely virtues, passions, impulses, assents, and so forth) are to be corporeal, too.68 Virtue is the soul (or, more accurately, its

commanding part) disposed in a certain way. Once the material char

65 When the person is fourteen; see Diogenes Laertius 7.55-6 (LS, 33H); Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.48.8, p. 317, 21-4 (SVF 1:149). 66 See Dorothea Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. John J. Cleary and

Daniel C Shartin, vol. 6 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990), 213-15.

67 See Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 29; Plutarch, On common conceptions 1085E.


acter of the soul has been shown, it follows that the affective states of

the soul must be so, too. In fact, the states pertaining to the realm of emotions or feelings (such as shame and fear) become evident in one's face.69 Since there is neither action nor change that can take

place without contact, states of the soul, as well as the body, have to

be capable of acting or of being acted upon. Soul, then, shares its af fections with the body. This picture largely describes the Stoic corpo

realism, but even in Stoic ethics the corporeal/incorporeal relation was significant.

According to Stobaeus' evidence, Chrysippus and his followers held happiness (8i)oai?iov?a) to be a goal or a target (oxojto?), while the end (T8?,o?) is attaining happiness (tu)(8lv euoai^ioviac), which ac tually is the same as being happy (8?oai?iov8?v).70 Like Aristotle, the Stoics used to hold that there was an end ("an ultimate object of de sire") for the sake of which the other things should be done, that is, being happy. As a matter of fact, according to the Stoics just being happy is the end (telos), for they take happiness and being happy to be two different things. Unlike Aristotle, who had used telos and skopos

interchangeably to make reference to the end,71 the Stoics distin

guished two kinds of finality.72 Attaining happiness is the end, the

68 For evidence see Plutarch, On common conceptions 1084A; Seneca, Letters 102, 2-7; 113, 7-11. See also Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1042E-1043A, where the thesis that goods are perceptible is explicitly attrib

uted to Chrysippus. ^Nemesius, On the nature of man, chap. 2, p. 21, 6-9, reporting a Stoic

doctrine. 70 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1-5; 25-7 (see LS, 63A); see also Sextus Em

piricus, Adversus Mathematicos 11.30, and Diogenes Laertius 7.88 (LS, 59J). 71 Politics 7.13.1331b30-4. Note that in 1331b31 ("For sometimes the goal is rightly proposed [o ji?v oxojz?? exxeirai xa^oo?] but in practice men fail to attain it") the language is the same as we find in the Stobaeus Stoic ex tract (Excerpts 2.77, 25: "happiness is proposed as the goal"; xr\v \itv Evbai\ioviav oxojt?v ?xxeioOai), but in Aristotle's case there seems to be no difference between skopos and telos. See also Rhetoric 1.5.1360b4-7. 72 See Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1-5 and Damianos Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag

GMBH, 1974), 107-8. Galen, an extremely hostile critic of the Stoics, none theless accepts the Stoic distinction between goal and end. The goal of med icine, Galen says, is health; its end is having health (see De sectis 1, Scripta

Minora 3,1, quoted by Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics, 108).


effective achievement of happiness, possessing happiness in the sense

of fully having it. Attaining happiness is the end in terms of our over

all telos, "that for the sake of which everything is done but which itself is done for the sake of nothing," "the ultimate object of desire (to eoxaTov T(bv ?Q8XT(ov), that to which everything else is referred."73

Each one is concerned not actually with happiness as a goal (skopos) but with happiness in the sense of the effective achievement (telos).

We are happy just when we have effectively reached happiness. On the other hand, happiness understood in terms of a goal (skopos) can be regarded as an object external to the virtuous activity; it is the body set forth or proposed which the human beings aim to attain, that

which I should pursue as an agent to be really happy.74 But the end as

the virtuous activity itself is the achievement of the intended goal; ac

tually it is the ultimate object of desire, to which all the others are re ferred.75 According to the Stoics, then, we aim at being happy, not at

happiness, which is our immediate goal.76 As is obvious, the distinction underlying the difference between

goal and end is the ontological distinction between corporeal and in

corporeal. While a skopos (expressed by a noun: "happiness") is a body, a telos (expressed by a verb or, in the Stoic jargon, by a predi cate:

"being happy") is an incorporeal. The expressions "living" (t,f\v) and

"being happy" (eu?ai^iove?v) used in Stoic definitions of end (te los) were considered predicates. This can be verified by considering some Stoic passages,77 and is confirmed by the Stoic thesis that the

73Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 16-17 (SVF3:16; LS, 63A); 76, 22-3. 74 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1-3. 75Stobaues, Excerpts 2.76, 22-3. 76 In Adversus Mathematicos 2.61-2 Sextus reports that a certain Alisto,

"friend of Critolaus," maintains that "persuasion is set up or proposed (exxeloOca) as the goal (oxojto?) of rhetoric, whereas its end (T8?,o?) is the attainment of persuasion" (t? ruxetv ttj? jt8i6oi5?). See Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 25-7 (SVF 3:16; LS, 643A), where the same language is used in distin guishing between happiness (the goal) and the attainment of happiness (the end). Certainly this Aristo is not the Stoic Aristo of Chios (the terminology is too technical for him and presupposes a theory of predication first attested for Chrysippus). The evidence is not certain enough for assuming that this

Aristo is the Peripatetic philosopher Aristo of Ceos, either. Perhaps the Aristo mentioned by Sextus is a third one, maybe a student or colleague of Critolaus in the Lyceum around 150 B.C. (I am grateful to Stephen A. White for this suggestion).

^Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.78, 7-11; 2.86, 5-7; 2.97, 15-98, 6.


end consists in "living according to virtue" or in "living consistently."78

In both cases the end in the strict sense turns out to be a predicate, an

incorporeal, not the thing itself but the agent's attaining the thing. The

goal can be set up before the agent, but in practice he can fail to

achieve it; so the agent is not happy unless he or really attains the end.

The goal's being set up before one does not suffice for being happy. This is a good case against the purely nominalist interpretation which

holds that Stoic incorporeals are inferior realities, since in the Stoic account the last object of desire is a predicate, an incorporeal some thing, not a corporeal one.

The second point to be discussed here is related to the Stoic dis tinction between the verbal adjectives -tov and -T80v (such as cxIq8T?v and alQ8T8ov). It is true that in none of the extant fragments which have come down to us and are commonly attributed to the first gener ation of leading Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus) does the contrast between the verbal adjectives -tos and -teos explicitly occur.79

However, such a contrast is frequently presupposed in the Stoic ac

counts of the psychology of action and is closely connected with the

already mentioned distinction between skopos (a body) and telos (an incorporeal). As a matter of fact, in the Stoic canonical definition of end attributed to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, such a distinction is explicitly referred to and sometimes it is taken for granted. So I

shall take the mentioned distinction as belonging to the older Stoics.80

78Stobaeus, Excerpts 2. 77, 18-19 (SVF3:16; LS, 63A). 79 See Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics, 104.

80 Stobaeus, Excerpts, 2.77, 16-27 (SVF3:19; LS, 63A). Certainly the evi dence is controversial: according to Galen, Chrysippus thinks that terms such as "to be chosen" (haireteon), "to be done" (poieteon), "to face with confi dence" (tarreteon), and "good" (agathon) refer to something different (Ga len, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 7.2. p. 436, 30-3, in Galen on the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 3 vols., edited, translated, and com

mentary by Phillip De Lacy [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1978-84]). Later (7.2, p. 438, 5-6, ed. De Lacy) Galen says that, in accordance with Chrysippus, only the good itself (to ?yaO?v out?) is to be chosen (aiQ8Tsov), and done (jtOLT]T8ov), and faced with confidence (OaQQryr?ov). Plutarch, on his part, at tributes to Chrysippus the thesis that "the good is choiceworthy" (TayaO?v a?QEx?v), which seems to fit into the doctrine we find in Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.97, 15-98, 6. What is uncontroversial is the fact that for the older Stoics "to be happy" is a predicate (not a body) since it consists in "living according to virtue" or

"living consistently," which is the same as "living in accordance with nature" (see the first reference to Stobaeus cited at beginning of this note).


In what follows some of the most representative passages (included in Stobaeus' excerpt of Stoic ethics) are fully quoted; then, a brief commentary is offered to show the body/incorporeal thesis at work.

1. They say that what is worth being chosen (a?QST?v) and what should be chosen (aigeTeov) are different. What is worth being chosen is every , while what should be chosen is every beneficial act ( ^?Xr\\ia), which is considered in relation to having the good. This is

why we choose what should be chosen; for instance, "acting prudently", which is considered in relation to having prudence. But we do not choose what is worth being chosen, but if in effect , we choose to have it.81

2. Among the correct acts (xaTOQ0o)^aTa), some are included in what is necessary ; others are not included.82 Among what is neces sary are the beneficial acts, which are predicates, such as "acting pru dently and with moderation."83

3. They say that just as what is worth being chosen and what should be chosen differ, so too what is worth being desired and what should be desired, what is worth being wished and what should be wished, what is

worth being accepted and what should be accepted differ as well. For goods are what is worth being chosen, wished, desired and accepted, since they are predicates, which lie alongside the goods. For we choose things that should be chosen and wish for things that should be wished, and desire things that should be desired. Cer tainly, choices, desires and wishes are included among predicates, such as are impulses, too. By contrast, we choose, wish and similarly desire having goods; this is why goods are not only what is worth being chosen and wished but also are what is worth being desired. For we choose having prudence and moderation, (tt]v y?g ?Q?vr\Giv a?Qoi3^i80a ?x?LV xai xr\v oa)(()Qooi)vr]v) but not acting with prudence and moderation (ov ?l? A?a t? (|)qov8lv xai OQKJ)QOve?v), which are incorporeal, that is to say predicates.84

These three passages are closely linked from a thematic point of

view. They are also a good example of the three parts of philosophi cal discourse at work. Although one can assume that the main sub

ject of these texts is ethical (due to the fact that they are within an al legedly ethical context), there are crucial elements of Stoic physics and logic, too. In fact, the Stoic thesis that the truly real are bodies

81 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.78, 7-11. 82 That is to say, some acts are mandatory and other acts are not manda

tory.

^Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.86, 5-7. ^Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.97, 15-98, 6 (SVF3.19; LS, 33J).


and the doctrine of lekta is present here. If one did not take these

points into account, this piece of evidence would be difficult to inter

pret. The evidence is indeed hard and there is no agreement about the

way it should be understood.85 The last lines of the third passage are

really puzzling. It is hard to understand clearly what is the difference

between "having prudence and moderation" and "acting with pru

dence and moderation," since one might think that you cannot act

with prudence and moderation if you are not in possession of pru dence and moderation. According to the Stoic position, we choose

what should be chosen, "to be happy" (eudaimone?n), a predicate. The direct object of our choice is the goal which is "proposed" or "set up before" us, a body. By contrast, the ultimate object of our choice is "to act with prudence and moderation" (a predicate), namely that for the sake of which everything is done but which itself is done in view of

nothing. In other words, we actually choose what should be done,

"acting prudently," an incorporeal predicate. If one concentrates on the distinction between -tos and -teos ad

jectives, it is easy once more to realize that it deals with the ontologi cal difference between things or bodies and predicates or incorpore als. The above cited passages show goods and prudence (a virtue) as suitable examples of something which is worth being chosen (goods and prudence, as any other virtue, are bodies).86 Virtue is a body inso far as it is the commanding part of the soul disposed in a certain way

and, as every good, it is worth being chosen, desired, and so on. A

beneficial act, on the other hand, due to its being a predicate and adja cent to the goods, should be chosen. The notion of (bc|)?Xr||xa involves some difficulties. In fact, owing to its being adjacent to the goods (which by definition are bodies) and happening just to virtuous peo

ple, it sometimes suggests that it is a sort of "correct act."87 But in other cases, like the one we are commenting on, a beneficial act is characterized as a predicate and, albeit adjacent to the goods, it con tinues to be incorporeal (at this point we can again clearly see the lekta, under the form of predicates, at work in the explanation of the

difference between good and beneficial act). While the adjectives with the suffix

-tos, then, are used to indicate the thing as something

85 For a full discussion and philosophical interpretation see Engberg Pedersen, The Stoic Theory ofOikeiosis, 25-35.

^Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.57, 20-2. 87 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.101, 7-9.


desirable, something worth wishing for, and so forth (that is to say, to indicate the immediate or direct object of desire, wish, choice, and so

on), the adjectives in -teos will make reference to the action itself. What should be chosen, desired, or wished for are the beneficial acts:

acting prudently, moderately, courageously, and justly. This is so be cause what should be chosen, wished, desired is what produces ac

tion in the practical context. Predicates, which are incorporeal, in some cases do not express an actual state of the world88 but in other cases certainly do express an actual state of the world (for instance, "to be a prudent person" said of the Stoic wise person). In general,

however, it must be said that predicates are incorporeal because they are lekta. Once more it is clear enough, it seems to me, that even in

the domain of the Stoic account of action we could constitute neither our personal world nor the objective world without taking into con sideration the bodies and the incorporeals working together. The ac

tual world is not real to us unless we evaluate it with incorporeals

and, more accurately, with the sayables. Incorporeals appear again

playing a central role since they are crucial items for assessing the in

formation given by the things affecting our perceptive capacities. Once we have evaluated this stuff, we have to put it in place and time, so that it becomes a "real" object.

IV

I am aware that giving definite conclusions on the corporeal/in corporeal issue in Stoic philosophy is, if not impossible, at least quite difficult. My conclusions and inferences are at best tentative. The

conjectural character of our assertions on ancient Stoicism is some times justified due to the state of the extant remains. Indeed, our at tempt to reach an accurate account of Stoic doctrines is always thwarted by the scanty and frequently confusing evidence. In spite of

this, it seems to me that it is possible to be sure about the fact that the

issue concerning the existent/nonexistent relationship appears to be

functioning all the time in Stoic philosophy. Thus it is necessary to

88 In this last sentence I am following Pedersen's line of thought ( The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 31). However, although provocative, his sugges tion that "phrone?n will be most appositely translated 'becoming (as op posed to being) phronimos1" seems to me an over-interpretation.


read the ovTa-^ ovtcx distinction as a whole in the different parts of

the philosophical discourse (physics, logic, ethics), and not simply as a point belonging just to physics. In this sense I would venture to say that, on the Stoic view, we should seriously consider existents and

nonexistents in all the fields of research, and that these must be un

derstood as working together. If my approach is right, it might be eas

ier to understand why the Stoics were so proud of the coherence of their philosophical system. They are said to maintain that there

should be a close connection among the parts of philosophy, since if one changed a single letter the whole system would fall down.89

It may be objected that my general proposal regarding bodies and incorporeals is rather radical since if it is true, the Stoic ontology re

sembles that of Plato. Thus, according to this objection, bodies ap pear to be not substantial entities?they do not exist by themselves but they need incorporeals to be what they are. I do not think that this

consequence follows necessarily because the Stoic incorporeals are

within this level of reality?they are immanent in the corporeal world. Thus there is no room to compare incorporeals to Platonic Forms.

For Plato, Forms are causes of and ultimately responsible for sensible

things. For the Stoics, I contend, there are no real things without in

corporeals nor incorporeals without real things. This is not the case

with sensibles and Plato's Forms.

My primary purpose in this paper was not to reach secure conclu

sions regarding the true sense of the bodies/incorporeals issue in

early Stoicism, but rather to provoke discussion in a field of research that has been interpreted in a number of different ways since antiquity (which surely proves how misleading it was for generations of philos ophers and interpreters). I have tried to answer the basic question of

whether Stoics held incorporeality (?o(b\iaxa-[ir\ ?vxa) and corporeal ity (o(b[iaxa-ovx?) to be incompatible ontological domains (as both some ancient and modern authors have maintained). My answer, as is obvious, is "no" because, as I hope to have shown, for the Stoics real

ity is the result of the combination of bodies and incorporeals. There

is no break between the two levels of reality. I think that the Stoics would agree that incorporeals without contents are empty, and bodies

without incorporeals are blind. This is the way in which a human

89 Cicero, On Ends 3.74. For further evidence see Diogenes Laertius 7.40 and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.17-19.


being is able to know and to categorize the world: by joining two realms which, in order to exist, must be linked to each other.90

National Council for Scientific and Technological Research

(Argentina)

90 The initial work on this paper began while I held a research fellowship from Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient?ficas y T?cnicas (Argentina) as a visiting researcher at the Department of Philosophy of Georgetown Uni versity (1994-95). The final version was done thanks to an appointment to the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D. C, as a Junior Fellow in the academic year 1999-2000. I am grateful to the directors, Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raaflaub, for their permanent support and encouragement. I am es pecially indebted to Richard Bett, whose detailed and acute remarks helped me to avoid a mistake. I would also like to thank Maximilian Forschner and Ricardo Salles for their criticism and concern. I read an abridged version of this paper at Departamento de Filosof?a, Universidade de Brasilia, Brazil, in December 1996. I benefited from comments of the audience in Brazil and es pecially from an observation by Jos? Gabriel Trindade Santos. Responsibil ity for errors remains my own.

Article Contentsp. [723]p. 724p. 725p. 726p. 727p. 728p. 729p. 730p. 731p. 732p. 733p. 734p. 735p. 736p. 737p. 738p. 739p. 740p. 741p. 742p. 743p. 744p. 745p. 746p. 747p. 748p. 749p. 750p. 751p. 752

Issue Table of ContentsThe Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723-992Front MatterThe Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals [pp. 723-752]Avicenna and Essentialism [pp. 753-778]Spinoza's Possibilities [pp. 779-814]Hegel's Family Values [pp. 815-858]Hegel and the Political Theology of Reconciliation [pp. 859-900]Book Reviews: Summaries and CommentsReview: untitled [pp. 901-902]Review: untitled [p. 902-902]Review: untitled [pp. 903-904]Review: untitled [pp. 904-905]Review: untitled [pp. 905-906]Review: untitled [pp. 906-908]Review: untitled [pp. 908-910]Review: untitled [pp. 910-911]Review: untitled [pp. 911-913]Review: untitled [pp. 913-914]Review: untitled [pp. 914-915]Review: untitled [pp. 915-917]Review: untitled [pp. 917-918]Review: untitled [pp. 918-920]Review: untitled [pp. 920-921]Review: untitled [pp. 921-923]Review: untitled [pp. 923-924]Review: untitled [pp. 924-925]Review: untitled [pp. 925-926]Review: untitled [pp. 926-930]Review: untitled [pp. 930-931]Review: untitled [pp. 932-934]Review: untitled [pp. 934-936]Review: untitled [pp. 936-938]Review: untitled [pp. 938-939]Review: untitled [pp. 939-941]Review: untitled [pp. 941-942]Review: untitled [pp. 942-943]Review: untitled [pp. 943-945]Review: untitled [pp. 945-946]Review: untitled [pp. 946-948]Review: untitled [pp. 948-949]Review: untitled [pp. 950-951]Review: untitled [p. 951-951]Review: untitled [pp. 952-953]Review: untitled [pp. 953-954]Review: untitled [pp. 954-955]

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