Bicameralism in Federal Systems: Three Different Approaches

7/28/2019 Bicameralism in Federal Systems: Three Different Approaches

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Bicameralism in Federal Systems: Three Different Approaches

Shaun Alvis

Professor Sanford Levinson

Constitutional Design Seminar

May 23, 2013


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I. Introduction

Of the 162 sovereign nations that currently exist, 122 have a unicameral

legislative body.1 The remaining 51 have bicameral legislatures, featuring second houses

with varying power, composition, and prestige.2 Of those 51 bicameral legislatures, 23

are found in states that can be described as federal in nature.3 These second houses have

increasingly been in the news over the last few years. Norway, in 2009, abolished its

upper house-the Lagting-in favor of a unicameral system based on its former first house.4

In Italy, the Italian Senate was heavily in the news after the inability of a government that

would have had a large majority in Italy's Chamber of Deputies to find a majority in the

Senate led to a prolonged period of governmental instability.5In the United Kingdom,

there are continuing questions over the logic of a modern democratic state retaining a so-

called House of Lords. While most parties in the U.K. House of Commons support

reform of the Lords, opposition and division within the governing coalition prevented

action on a recent bill.6 Abolition is on the minds of many in Canada, as its unelected and

malapportioned Senate is gripped in the midst of its most serious scandal in decades and

the government runs into problems over its effort at reform.7

In Germany, the Bundesrat-

now controlled by the opposition- has sought to draw distinctions with Angela Merkel

1 "Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism," in Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, ed.

Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 2

2 id

3 "Forum of Federations - Federalism by Country," Forum of Federations - Federalism by Country,

Accessed May 23, 2013, http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry.php

4 Hkon Gundersson, "Ett Ting Mindre," Morgenbladet, April 17, 2009, accessed May 23, 2013,

http://morgenbladet.no/samfunn/2009/ett_ting_mindre5 Elisabetta Povoledo, "Italian Lawmakers Elect Speakers, but Stable Government Remains Elusive," The

New York Times, March 17, 2013, accessed May 23, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/world/europe/italian-lawmakers-elect-speakers-but-stability-is-

elusive.html?_r=0

6 Nicholas Watt, "Rebel Tories Scupper Motion for House of Lords Reform Bill," The Guardian, July 10,

2012, accessed May 17, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/jul/10/rebel-tories-motion-

lords-reform

7 Nick Taylor-Vaisey, "How to Abolish the Senate of Canada," Macleans, May 23, 2013, accessed May

23, 2013, http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/05/23/how-to-abolish-the-senate-of-canada/


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and the Christian Democratic Union ahead of upcoming elections.8 And finally in the

United States the Senate remains a focal point in efforts to obstruct President Obama's

agenda with reform of its archaic rules a strong desire for many activists and Senators.9

This paper will examine the history and development of the concept of the upper

house broadly before turning to examine in detail three different upper houses: the

American Senate, the German Bundestag, and the Canadian Senate by looking at their

individual histories, composition, powers, and ways that each could be reformed.

II. A brief history of bicameralism

Legislative bodies of some sort have existed since pre-historic times. The Roman

Republic for instance, featured at least 4 distinct legislative bodies throughout its

history.1011While the Roman Empire and its successor states broadly ignored and

marginalized legislative bodies12 the rise of feudalism in medieval Europe saw the

creation of many of the ancestral legislatures of modern Europe.13

These bodies often differed from the looser Roman legislative arrangement in that

there were strict relations and rules set between the various bodies.14 Many though were

not bi-cameral, instead they were multi-cameral bodies such as the tri-cameral Estates

General of France (consisting of the First, Second, and Third Estates representing the

clergy, nobility, and commoners respectively)15 andthe tetra-cameral Riksdag of the

8 "Bundesrat Bringt Gesetzesentwurf Zur Homo-Ehe in Den Bundestag Ein," SPIEGEL ONLINE, March

22, 2013, accessed May 17, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesrat-bringt-

gesetzesentwurf-zur-homo-ehe-in-den-bundestag-ein-a-890415.html

9 Sarah Binder, "Banning Filibusters: Is Nuclear Winter Coming to the Senate This Summer?," The

Brookings Institution, May 23, 2013, accessed May 23, 2013,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/23-reid-nuclear-senate-ban-filibuster-binder

10 Klaus Bringmann,A History of the Roman Republic (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007), 14, 45, 5, 8.

11 The Roman Senate, the comitia curiata, the comitia tributa, and the comitia centuriata.12 P. A. Brunt, "The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime," The Classical Quarterly 34, no. 02

(1984): 423, http://www.jstor.org/stable/638300

13 And in some cases the actual legislature. Iceland's Althing for example has existed in some form since

930. (http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/02/world/la-fg-iceland-free-speech-20110403) The Manx

Tynwald has met continuously as a parliamentary body since approximately the 13 th century.

(http://www.tynwald.org.im/Pages/default.aspx)

14 Senates, 2

15 William Doyle, "The Estates General," in The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002), 86-112.


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Estates of Sweden (consisting of chambers for the nobility, clergy, city dwellers, and

peasants).16 However it was the bi-cameral English Parliament with its House of Lords

and Communes (later transformed into Commons) that would have the most influence on

the development of legislatures worldwide.17

The development of bi-cameralism in the English Parliament was actually

something of a historical accident.18 Originally the clergy was meant, as in other medieval

Parliaments to have their own separate House.19But for unknown reasons the lower part

of the clergy withdrew from parliamentary representation, leaving the only the upper

clergy who began setting with the other members of the nobility to form what would

become the House of Lords.2021 Historically the House of Lords was the more powerful of

the two Houses.22 However this began to change in the 18th century with the House of

Commons assuming ever more power until in 1912 the Parliament Act essentially

recognized the ability of the House of Commons to pass legislation over the objection of

the Lords in certain circumstances.23

One of the daughter Parliaments of the United Kingdom, the American Congress,

was created at a point when the House of Lords and House of Commons were equal in

power. And the Houses of Congress continue to reflect that balance.

III. A brief history of the pre-XVIIth Amendment Senate

After the British House of Lords perhaps no other upper house has been as

influential on the development of legislatures as the United States Senate. The U.S.

16 "The History of the Riksdag," Sveriges Riksdag, March 29, 2012, accessed May 23, 2013,

http://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-works/Democracy/The-history-of-the-Riksdag/

17 Senates, 3

18 id19 Chris Given-Wilson, "The House of Lords, 1307-1529," inA Short History of Parliament: England,

Great Britain, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Scotland, by Clyve Jones (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell

Press, 2009), 16

20 id

21 Even today, 26 bishops of the Church of England retain a seat and vote in the House of Lords. See

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16702806

22 Senates, 16

23 "The Parliament Acts," UK Parliament, accessed May 23, 2013,

http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/parliamentacts/


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Senate was perhaps the first upper house developed with a supposed primary purpose of

reflecting the role of geographic constituent units within a governmental polity rather

than a group of people.24 However even though the Senate's supposed primary purpose

was to be a body that formed a convenient link25 between the state and federal system,

some of the traditional elitism from the House of Lords crept through. 26 The Senate also

had a massive influence on the development of state legislatures in the United States. Of

the 50 state legislative bodies, only Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.27 The Senate's

power and influence have helped to deeply engrain the idea of bicameralism into the

American psyche.28

This was not always the case. Under the Articles of Confederation the U.S.

Operated under a unicameral legislature comprised of members appointed by state

legislatures.29 Each state could send between two and seven members to the Congress of

the Confederation but each delegation had only one vote in Congress.30 Furthermore

State's had the ability to recall members of the delegation for any reason and to replace

them with others.31 This arrangement reflected the fact that there was no real national

government as such. Instead the states were supreme and what exceptionally limited

national government did exist was constituted solely by the 13 states.32

After several

years of relatively ineffective government under the Articles, many in the United States

began thinking about reform.33

24 Barbara Sinclair, "Coequal Partner: The U.S. Senate," in Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary

World, ed. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999),

34

25 The Federalist No. 62

26 Sinclair, 34

27 Sanford Levinson,Framed: America's Fifty-one Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2012), 10028 Levinson, 135

29 John Altman, "The Articles and the Constitution: Similar in Nature, Different in Design," Pennsylvania

Legacies 3, no. 1 (May 2003): http://www.jstor.org/stable/27764871, 21

30 United States,Articles of Confederation (1781), accessed May 24, 2013,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp

31 Christopher Collier and James Collier,Decision in Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of

1787(New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), 5

32 Altman, 20

33 Collier, 6


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At the Constitutional Convention that resulted from this reforming desire, one of

the first and most protracted battles was over the nature of the new national legislature. 34

There were two primary competing plans over the nature of this new legislature. The

Virginia Plan, proposed by James Madison, would have created a bi-cameral legislature

based on population.35 The upper house of this new legislature was to be elected by the

lower house from candidates proposed by state legislatures, thus maintaining some

semblance of state involvement in the upper house.36 The New Jersey Plan, proposed by

William Patterson, would featured a unicameral legislature which would have essentially

retained the unicameral Congress of the Confederation in structure but enhanced its

powers.37

The small states rallied around the New Jersey Plan as a method of ensuring that

the larger states could not dominate the new polity. Perhaps unsurprisingly the large states

were equally invested in the Virginia Plan.38 After weeks of debate at the convention, a

compromise was reached whereby a bi-cameral legislature with a lower House of

Representatives apportioned by population and an upper Senate apportioned equally by

state would be created.39 Madison and others were deeply frustrated by this compromise

finding the idea of equal representation by state to be deeply offensive and counter to the

supposed ideals of the rest of the Constitution.40 A voter in Delaware for instance had

11.5 times the power of a voter in Virginia, based on representation in the Senate.41Today

the voter in Wyoming has 70 times the power of a voter in California.42However

Madison defended the new Senate on the grounds of political expediency and felt that it

34 Collier, 119

35 Collier, 7436 James Madison, "Variant Texts of the Virginia Plan," Avalon Project, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vatexta.asp

37 William Patterson, "Variant Texts of the Plan Presented by William Patterson," Avalon Project, accessed

May 24, 2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/patexta.asp

38 Collier, 122

39 Collier, 174

40 Collier, 176

41 Levinson, 35

42 id


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would serve a role in linking the federal and state governments together.43 Other members

of the Convention linked it more directly with the House of Lords.44They felt that the

differing eligibility requirements between Senate and House would ensure that the Senate

would be composed of the better elements in society and that the Senate would have a

tempering affect on the on the popular heat generated in the House of Representatives.45

The Senate which first met on April 6th, 1789 was composed of 20 members, two

from each of the then 10 states which had ratified the new Constitution, selected by their

state legislatures.46 Appointing members by state legislature had not been an especially

controversial part of the development of the Senate, indeed only one member of the

Constitutional Convention, James Wilson, favored popular election of Senators.47

However for the most part, people were happy with state legislative selection.48 It was

viewed as a key way to maintain a link between the federal and state governments.49

Furthermore the early era represented perhaps the high point of the Senate in terms of

American historical lore, Senators like John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Henry Clay

cultivated the image of the Senate as a place of intelligent debate and compromise.50 The

Senate of this period was perhaps viewed in the sense that it was created for, a place

where different states could come together and calmly and intelligently work out their

interests.

Beginning in the 1870s, calls began to appear for the direct election of Senator.51

Perhaps one potential explanation can be constructed by viewing the changing situation

in American politics post-Civil War. The House of Representatives was at the forefront of

43 The Federalist #62

44 Todd J. Zywicki,Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and

Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165 at 180 (1997)45 id

46 United States, Senate,Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, vol. 1 (New York, 1789),

7, accessed May 24, 2013, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsj

47 Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth

Amendment, 73 Or. L. Rev. 1007, 1013 (1994)

48 idat 1014

49 idat 1015

50 Sinclair, 35

51 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 185


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American political power, surpassing even the President.52 In the aftermath of such a

violent conflict and the rejection of slavery by Radical Republicans the compromises of

the pre-War era looked quite different.53 The Senate of the post-War era also began to be

dominated by the powerful monied interests that arose during the American Industrial

Revolution and the Gilded Age.54Senators in this period were often viewed as either the

pawns of the rising class of industrial robber barons or were counted amongst the robber

barons themselves.55Because of this perception the so called muck racking journalists

were often brutal in their depictions of a Senate they felt was controlled by men like John

D. Rockefeller.56

This increasing perception of the Senate as a tool of corrupt politicians and major

financial interests revived and strengthened the calls for popular election of Senators.57

Many states had already implemented some form of popular preference election prior to

the XVIIth Amendment.58 The most common method was to simply hold state legislative

elections alongside Senate elections, with candidates for the state legislature running

alongside the men they would proceed to vote into the Senate after the election.59 This

method in fact was the immediate catalyst for the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates.60

Oregon had gone even further, holding an election for Senator and legally requiring the

legislature to vote for the winning candidate.61 This meant that by the time of the XVIIth

Amendment, the link between Senate and state legislature was already quite attenuated.

IV. The Modern Senate

52 Robert Remini, The House: The History of the House of Representatives (New York: Smithsonian

Books in Association with HarperCollins, 2007), 254

53 Hans L. Trefousse, Thaddeus Stevens: Nineteenth-century Egalitarian (Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press, 1997), 7954 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 185

55 Bosses of the Senate," NBC News, New York, NY: NBC Universal, 10/14/2007, Accessed 24 May

2013: https://archives.nbclearn.com/portal/site/k-12/browse/?cuecard=798

56 id

57 45 Clev. St. L. Rev at 186

58 idat 190-191

59 Sinclair, 37

60 id61 45 Clev. St. L. Rev at 191


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Historians and political scientists often like to draw a line when dealing with the

Senate dividing it into pre and post XVIIth Amendment forms. This however is a bit

disingenuous. The XVIIIth Amendment as indicatedsupra, did little at the time to

fundamentally alter the makeup of the Senate, indeed many members serving at the time

of the amendment went on to be elected afterwards.62Instead a far more powerful

influence on the modern Senate and Senator has been the development of the modern

mass media.63Senators given that they (typically) represent a much larger area and

population than a member of the House of Representatives and their longer terms have

helped to give the average Senator a much higher profile than the average member of the

House.64 The Senate is also increasingly viewed as a training ground for potential

Presidents.65 For instance many of the most commonly mentioned potential candidates

for the Republican Presidential nomination in 2016 are current Senators.66 And in the past

four presidential elections 6 of the 15 candidates (excluding sitting presidents and vice-

presidents) were Senators.67This is likely due to the increased media attention they

already receive and their proven success at winning statewide election.68 It actually

contrasts with past history when Senators where not considered particularly electable.69

This was perhaps due to the fact that Senators prior to the advent of televised

mass media were often primarily focused on extremely narrow areas of policy, typically

that of their primary committee or of particular importance to their state.70 This was in

many ways the product of a combination of an increased reliance on the committee

62 idat 189

63 Sinclair, 38

64 Sinclair, 44-4565 Timothy O'Neill, "The Senate Is No Steppingstone," Chicago Tribune, February 04, 2007, accessed

May 24, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-02-04/news/0702040491_1_senate-john-mccain-

sen-john-edward

66 Manu Raju, "Rand Paul, Marco Rubio Face 2016 Bind," POLITICO, May 7, 2013, accessed May 24,

2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/rand-paul-marco-rubio-2016-bind-90987.html

67 Barack Obama, Joe Biden, John McCain, John Kerry, John Edwards, and Joe Lieberman

68 Sinclair, 38

69 O'Neill

70 Sinclair, 43-44


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system and the growing importance of the seniority system after the XVIIth

amendment.71

The unique rules and institutional structures of the Senate have created a body

where individual members have immense power.72The Senate's rules, developed in an era

where gentlemanly restraint and discretion reigned, created a system where unanimous

consent was required for virtually any action.73 As such, even a single senator has

immense power to disrupt or even halt the business of the Senate.74 This power, which is

relatively less known and certainly less reported on than the filibuster, is typically

referred to as the power to place holds.75 A hold backed by a substantial minority of the

Senate can morph into a filibuster.76

It is the filibuster that is perhaps the most well known feature of the modern

Senate rules. Originally the Senate had no mechanism for limiting debate (as did the

House which instituted debate limiting rules in the 1850s.)77 That changed however

during the debate over a proposal to arm merchant vessels during World War I.78 Wilson

focused public attention on this so called small group of willful men and was able to

force the Senate to adopt rules establishing the cloture system.79Originally cloture

required that 2/3rds of the membership of the Senate vote to end debate and in the first 60

years of its existence cloture was successfully invoked very rarely.80

For many years this system worked relatively efficiently, though Southern

Senators were able to use the threat of withholding unanimous consent and filibusters to

71 Sinclair, 42

72 Sinclair, 32

73 Sinclair, 43, 46-4774 Sinclair, 47

75 id

76 Sinclair, 47

77 Sinclair, 35

78 Sinclair, 36

79 id

80 Richard Sammon, "Putting Cloture in Perspective," www.kiplinger.com, September 8, 2009, accessed

May 24, 2013, http://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T043-C012-S001-putting-cloture-in-

perspective.html


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foreclose the possibility of effective civil rights legislation.81 Following the Civil Rights

movement and an increasing view of obstruction of legislation by such a small minority

of Senators led to a revision of the cloture requirement from 2/3rd to 3/5th of Senators.82

The revision of cloture came at a fortuitous time, the increasing uniformity of political

parties and increasing sense of partisanship meant that the number of filibusters has

increased rapidly.83 As such further reform of the filibuster is currently the most heavily

discussed and debate aspect of the Senate's structure.84 In fact, some are saying that

filibusters on Presidential nominations could be eliminated this summer given the current

Republican Senatorial leadership's intransigence on them.85

V. The role of the Senate

The history of then Senate then shows the often contradictory factors at work on

and within it. It is now a popularly elected body that was originally meant to represent the

will of the state governments in Washington. It's emphasis on member's individual power

contrasts heavily with that of the House where individual members are far less powerful

than the collective party leadership apparatus.86 The Senate is also a throwback to ancient

ideas about ensuring that the so called better elements in society have means to restrict

the lower house and its popular passions.87

These contradictory trends within the Senate's

development find themselves expressed within what is perhaps the world's most powerful

upper house.88

The only limit on the Senate's ability to initiate legislation is the Constitutional

requirement that so called money bills must originate in the House.89 In modern

practice, this requirement is virtually meaningless as the Senate has unlimited power to

81 id

82 id83 id

84 A google search reveals more than 5 million hits for filibuster reform.

85 Jon Terbush, "Are Democrats Finally Serious about Filibuster Reform? - The Week," The Week, May

22, 2013, accessed May 24, 2013, http://theweek.com/article/index/244574/are-democrats-finally-

serious-about-filibuster-reform

86 Sinclair, 33

87 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165 at 180

88 Sinclair, 32

89 U.S. Const. art. I, 7, cl. 1


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amend any House money bill into any form the Senate chooses.90 Further the Senate's

approval is required on all legislation passed by the House in the exact same format

before it can become law.91 This means that one House can either force its preferred

legislation on the other House92 or the two Houses can convene a conference committee

to hammer out language acceptable to both Houses.93 These conference committees

though are incredibly informal and often quite secretive.94

The House then has an interesting relationship with the Senate.95 They are

essentially co-equal partners in the legislative process.96 But the superior prestige that

accompanies being a Senator leads many members of the House long to serve in the

Senate, regardless of power or seniority accumulated in the House.97 For instance,

Massachusetts is currently holding a special election for the Senate seat vacated by John

Kerry.98 The Democratic candidate, Edward Markey, is a 36.5 year veteran of the House

which makes him the 8th most senior member of that body.99 Should he win and take up a

seat in the Senate he will be the 100th most senior member of the Senate, but so great is

the individual power of a Senator that such a shocking switch in seniority seems worth

it.100

The Senate also has an important relationship with the President.101

The Senate90 For an interesting recent example see the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which started life

as the Service Members Home Ownership Act in the House.

91 Levinson, 14292 Again see the debate over the Affordable Care Act for a recent example.

93 Sinclair, 51

94 Donny Shaw, "Secretive Conference Committee Fights Back," OpenCongress, December 20, 2012,

accessed May 24, 2013, http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/2520-Secretive-Conference-

Committee-Fights-Back-Attempt-to-Prohibit-Indefinite-Military-Detention-of-US-Citizens

95 Sinclair, 51

96 Sinclair, 32

97 Sinclair, 3798 Katharine Seelye, "Poll Shows Strong Lead for Democrat in Massachusetts Senate Race," The Caucus,

May 8, 2013, accessed May 24, 2013, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/in-mass-senate-

race-markey-has-strong-lead-over-republican-challenger/

99 Noah Bierman, "Once a Disrupter, Ed Markey Became a Master of the House," BostonGlobe.com,

April 9, 2013, section goes here, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/04/08/edward-markey-once-disrupter-became-master-

house

100 http://www.rollcall.com/politics/senateseniority.html

101 Sinclair, 52


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confirms many appointments to executive departments and must confirm all judicial

appointments.102 Furthermore the executive branch, through the Vice President's role as

President of the Senate, is in direct contact with the Senate, at least in theory.103 In

practice this role has been virtually abandoned, except when there is a tie that needs to be

broken (when the Vice President can save the administration's priorities) and at State of

the Unions. Dick Cheney attempted to use the Vice President's constitutionally

anomalous status as member of both executive and legislative branch to argue that he

belonged to neither, but this is an interpretation that does not seem to have lived long past

January 20th, 2009.104

The Senate then is a fascinating body. Created because of compromise it was

meant to do the dual job of representing both states and the upper class. Over time it has

gradually morphed into a body that is elected by the people while still reflecting a

radically undemocratic apportionment scheme. Senators have also become in many ways

the faces of Congress, as they are far better known and easier to cover in the modern

mass media age.105 It's vast powers, combined with that focus in coverage, serve merely

to exacerbate issues in its relationship with the House of Representatives, while it's

archaic rules serve mainly to confuse. The role of the Senate in American politics is likely

far larger than the Founders originally intended. They could not have foreseen the strange

story of the development of the Senate nor the impact it would have on other upper

houses around the world.

V. The Historical Development of the Bundesrat

The Bundesrat both is and is not an upper house. On the one hand,

constitutionally speaking, it is not a part of the German Parliament, that role is reserved

to the Bundestag alone.106 But on the other hand, its consent is required for a large

102 Senates, 24

103 U.S. Const. art. I, 3, cl. 4

104 Lloyd De Vries, "Cheney: The Fourth Branch?," CBSNews, February 11, 2009, accessed May 24,

2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500156_162-3011862.html

105 Sinclair, 38

106 Werner Patzelt, "The Very Federal House: The German Bundesrat," in Senates: Bicameralism in theContemporary World, ed. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan (Columbus: Ohio State University


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percentage of legislation and it is deeply and inextricably linked with the German

legislative process.107 The Bundesrat is the only body in modern Germany that can even

be described as an upper legislative house following the abolition of the Bavarian Senate

in 1998.108 It also developed its unique character and role from a number of historical

institutions found in predecessors to the Federal Republic.109 Perhaps its earliest ancestor

was Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire.110 This particular version of the Reichstag was

composed of three different colleges representing three different types of Imperial State

(the Electoral College-composed of electorates such as Bavaria, the college of Princes-

which was further divided into secular and ecclesiastical parts, and the college of

Imperial Cities.)111 This was not a parliament in either the modern sense or even in the

way that most medieval parliaments functioned.112 Instead it primarily served as a place

where the incredible number of constituent states of the Empire could come together to

discuss issues and seek to place limits on the power of the Holy Roman Emperor.113

After the Napoleonic Wars and the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire the

Reichstag was replaced by the Bundestag of the German Confederation.114 The Bundestag

was essentially a modified version of the Reichstag as states continued to use it as a

forum for the various German states to meet and discuss issues.115

This version of the

Bundestag was replaced by the Bundesrat of the North German Confederation which with

minor modifications became the Bundesrat of the German Reich.116 It was composed of

representatives from each of the constituent kingdoms, duchies, and principalities that

Press, 1999), 65

107 Patzelt, 61

108 Elisabeth Alber, "Ethnic Governance and Direct Democracy: Perils and Potential," inDirect

Democracy and Minorities, ed. Wilfried Marxer (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 83109 Patzelt, 62

110 id

111Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 56-

58

112 id

113 Whaley, 57

114 Patzelt, 62

115 id116 Patzelt, 62-63


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comprised the German Reich, and was designed to reflect and maintain the federal

character of the Reich.117 Votes were distributed based strictly on population, with states

having between one to 17 votes.118 Votes were to be cast en bloc, which meant that in

practice Prussia's 17 votes allowed it to easily dominate the body.119 In theory the

Bundesrat was the most powerful part of the Imperial Parliament.120 The Imperial

Chancellor for instance, always served as the President of the Bundesrat and it also had

the authority to force the dissolution of the Reichstag with the approval of the Emperor.121

It also had an absolute veto on all legislation passed by the Reichstag.122 However these

powers were little used in practice and overall the domination of the monarch and

chancellor meant that both the Bundesrat and Reichstag were often sidelined.123

Following the passage of the Weimar Constitution and the fall of the German

monarchies the Bundesrat morphed into the Reichsrat.124 The Reichsrat maintained the

essential structure of the Bundesrat with voting numbers and rules remaining the same;

only with representatives from the 25 new popularly elected state governments.125 The

major change, besides the name, was in terms of power.126 The new Reichsrat was

substantially less powerful than the old Bundesrat.127 Its power to dismiss the Reichstag

was now ended completely as was its absolute veto, though it maintained a suspensive

veto.128 After the rise of Hitler the Reichsrat lost even more power, in 1934 it was

dissolved completely after Hitler functionally dissolved the German states.129

VI. The Modern Bundesrat: A Parliament of Bureaucrats?

117 Patzelt, 63

118 id

119 id

120 id121 id

122 id

123 id

124 id

125 Patzelt, 63

126 id

127 Patzelt, 64

128 id129 id


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The unitary character of the Weimar and Third Reich period encouraged those

creating the post-World War II German constitution to look towards a federal system as a

means of preventing another Hitler.130 The negotiations around the nature the upper house

would take were drawn out and complex. While all parties desired a return to a federal

system, there was substantial disagreement over whether or not the federal entities should

have representation in the national government.131 The Social Democrats argued strongly

in favor of an upper house modeled closely on the post-XVIIth Amendment United States

Senate.132 They believed that while such a house was not necessarily the most effective in

terms of protecting the rights of states, they did believe that it had a measure of

democratic legitimacy that a body selected by state governments could not enjoy.133The

other major party, the Christian Democratic Union, preferred an upper house that drew

more heavily on earlier German models.134 Eventually after months of difficult

negotiations a compromise was reached and the modern Bundesrat was created.135

The Bundesrat was created by Article IV of the Grundegesetz, the German Basic

Law.136 It draws on the voting system of the Bundesrat and Reichsrat of the Imperial and

Weimar eras while creating a middle ground between the incredibly powerful Imperial

Bundesrat and the weak Weimar Reichsrat.137

The Bundesrat has the ability to absolutely

veto all legislation which affects the states or their powers under the Grundesgesetz.138 On

all other legislation it has a suspensive veto that can be overridden by either a majority of

the Bundestag-if a majority of the Bundesrat voted against the proposed law-or a 2/3rds

majority of the Bundestag if 2/3rds of the Bundesrat votes against.139 But it no longer has

130 id

131 id

132 id133 id

134 id

135 id

136 Germany, Bundestag, Grundegesetz, 43, accessed May 24, 2013, https://www.btg-

bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf

137 Stephen J. Silvia, "Reform Gridlock and the Role of the Bundesrat in German Politics," West European

Politics 22, no. 2 (1999): 170, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402389908425306

138 Silvia, 172

139 Silvia, 173


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any direct authority over the Chancellor or other members of the government.140

Approximately 40% of all legislation requires the absolute approval of the Bundesrat (a

Zustimmungsgesetze) while the remaining 60% is subject to the suspensive veto (a

Einspruchsgesetze.)141

Furthermore the Bundesrat has enormous discretion to initiate legislation though

in practice this power is rarely used.142 More importantly it has a unique right of first look

at legislation.143 Most legislation introduced by the Government itself (about 70% of all

legislation144) must first receive examination by the Bundesrat.145 After this examination,

the legislation which is not normally voted on at this stage, is sent to the Bundesrat with a

list of recommendations that are almost always at least partially incorporated into the

legislation.146 This ability to have the first look and make proposals is perhaps part of the

reason behind the relatively small number of vetos the Bundesrat has attempted, on

average less than 2% of all bills are successfully vetoed.147 The Bundesrat can also

influence treaties, as all treaties which affect state power must be approved by the

Bundesrat before they can be ratified.148 The Bundesrat also maintains an active EU-

Committe that is often called the mini-Bundesrat which is in charge of critiquing and

guiding rules from the EU which might impact the states.149

The Bundesrat also has enormous influence over domestic administrative

guidelines and bureaucratic rules, and bureaucrats have enormous influence on the

Bundesrat.150 All such rules which affect the states, which in Germany means the

overwhelming majority, must receive the approval of the Bundesrat.151 One key reason

140 Germany, 56

141 Silvia, 175

142 Patzelt, 76143 id

144 id

145 id

146 id

147 Silvia, 175

148 Patzelt, 81

149 Patzelt, 80

150 Patzelt, 81

151 id


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for this is in its overall institutional structure. The members of the Bundesrat are the

sixteen German states, with all states having at least 3 votes proceeding on basis of

population to at most 6.152 These votes are controlled by the state's government at the

moment and can be cast (as a block) by any member of the state government authorized

to do so.153 Because votes are cast by members of the state governmental cabinets, they

typically are not able to devote much time to their duties to the Bundesrat.154 As such, a

vast army of bureaucrats works to prepare information and legislation for the state

government members who arrive in Berlin on approximately three week intervals to

complete the legislative work.155 In fact the role of bureaucrats is so important in the

Bundesrat that it was cited by South African sources as a reason for their decision not to

implement the Bundesrat model in the Constitution of 1994.156

One of the most important and unique features of the Bundesrat and of the

German federal system in general are the Landesvertretung (roughly translated, State

Representation.)157 These function as embassies for the 16 German states in Berlin and

are fully staffed by a complement of state bureaucratic officials at all time.158They are the

focal point of each state's bureaucratic preparations in the Bundesrat and officials from

the Landesvertretungoften staff the Bundesrat committees.159

As such bureaucrats have an enormous influence over the running and legislative

production of the Bundesrat, something which contributes to its virtual non-existence in

the minds of many Germans.160 While the Bundesrat is often considered to be the world's

152 Germany, 44

153 id

154 Patzelt, 67

155 "Plenary Meetings," Bundesrat, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_11590/EN/funktionen-en/arbeitsweise-en/Sitzung-en.html156 Christina Murray, "South Africa's National Council of Provinces," inReforming Parliamentary

Democracy, by F... Seidle and David Docherty (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003),

209-210

157 "Im Bund," Vertretung Des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz, in German, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://lv.rlp.de/aufgaben/im-bund/

158 id

159 "Im Bund," Vertretung Des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz, in German, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://lv.rlp.de/aufgaben/im-bund/

160 Silvia, 168


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second most powerful upper house it has a very limited presence in the German media.161

Much of this is due to the dry and bureaucratic nature of much of the Bundesrat's

sessions.162 Infamously, a broadcast session of the Bundesrat dedicated to discussing a

defense treaty in 1953 was so difficult to understand that it left a permanent impression

amongst German citizens as the Bundesrat as simply a group of bureaucrats arguing over

technical details.163

This impression occasionally leads to a vague desire amongst Germans for some

sort of reform of the Bundesrat.164 This was especially true during the 1970s when a

determined and prolonged battle between the Bundestag (controlled by the Social

Democrats) and the Bundesrat (controlled by the Christian Democrats) resulted in a

prolonged discussion of the role of the Bundesrat in German politics.165 This discussion

tapered off following the return of the Christian Democrats to power in 1982 and since

then there has not been an equivalent period of Bundesrat-Bundestag tension.166 It

occupies a strange niche, as it both safeguards Germany's system of marble cake

federalism (i.e. a federalism that features federal and state authority mixing together

rather than being separated out167) and provides a powerful institutional voice for

Germany's strong states and bureaucrats.168

As Germany's first post war President,

Theodor Heuss, stated the Bundesrat is indeed a parliament of bureaucrats.169

VII. The Canadian Senate

The Canadian Senate is an outlier within the constitutional order of its own

country.170 It is the only remaining upper house in Canadian politics following the 1968

161 Patzelt, 71

162 Silvia, 174163 Patzelt, 87

164 Silvia, 174-176

165 Silvia, 176

166 id

167 Silvia, 171

168 Patzelt, 84

169 id

170David Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,2003), 3


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abolition of Quebec's Legislative Council.171 The Bundesrat, as discussedsupra, is a

model for how a unique upper house with real connections to a nation's history and with a

clearly defined and executed role in the constitutional order can be a major player in a

modern nation's politics. Unfortunately the Canadian Senate which lacks such a clearly

defined mission and history is a major player only in the sense that parties argue intensely

over whether total reform or abolition is preferable to the Senate's status quo. 172

The Senate of Canada was created by the British North America Act of 1867,

passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom following an extensive series of

conferences held be Canadian leaders.173 These conferences and the Act are part of the

process of Canadian Confederation, which began with the Charlottetown Conference of

1864.174 This conference was originally called by the Premiers of the Maritime colonies

of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island which were interested in

federating their colonies into a single union.175 Shortly before the conference was due to

begin, in the spring of 1864, the leadership of the conference received a shocking request

from John A. MacDonald.176 MacDonald was the Premier of the Province of Canada,

composed of the two colonies of Canada West (modern day Ontario) and Canada East

(modern day Quebec.)177

The Province of Canada was fraught with political problems

caused by it's split between anglophone Ontario and francophone Quebec and there was

concern in London that those problems could eventually lead to an invasion by the United

States.178 MacDonald's shocking request then was that the Province of Canada join with

the Maritime Colonies in a large federation.179 MacDonald was allowed to attend and the

focus shifted from merely creating a union of Maritime provinces to creating a union for

171 id

172 Gloria Galloway, "NDP's Mulcair Takes Aim at Senate Abolition," Globe and Mail, May 22, 2013,accessed May 24, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ndps-mulcair-takes-aim-at-

senate-abolition/article12058932/

173 Margaret Conrad,A Concise History of Canada (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 146

174 Conrad, 147

175 Conrad, 146

176 Conrad, 147

177 Conrad, 146

178 Conrad, 145

179 Conrad, 146


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all of Canada.180 The Conference, which sadly produced no minutes, was successful in

creating a plan for federation, the cornerstone was to be a bi-cameral legislature on the

American model, with one house reflecting population and another apportioned on the

basis of provincial equality.181

The broad agreement reached at Charlottetown was to be fleshed out in the

Quebec Conference of 1864.182 The predominant issue under discussion at Quebec and an

issue which nearly derailed the entire effort of Confederation was the Senate.183 The

Maritime provinces pushed for provincial equality in numbers of Senators but unlike

small states at the American Constitutional Convention, the Maritimes failed to achieve

it.184 This could possibly be explained by the different distribution of power and

population amongst the population of the future Canadian provinces versus the

relationships between the future American states.185 The population of Virginia (the most

populous state) in 1790 was 691,737 while the population of Delaware (the least

populous state) was 59,096 resulting in a population ratio of approximately 12 to 1.186

The population of Canada West (the most populous part of what would become Canada)

in 1861 was 1,396,091 while the population of Prince Edward Island (the least populous

part) was 80,857, a ratio of approximately 17 to 1.187

It was also clearly understood by

those at the Conference that while Canada West's population was expanding rapidly (it

had increased by almost 50% since 1851) Prince Edward Island and the Maritime

Provinces were reaching the limits of their ability to grow.188189 The overwhelming

180 Conrad, 147

181 Richard Gwyn,John A.: The Man Who Made Us (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2008), 304

182 Conrad, 148

183 Gwyn, 350184 id

185 id

186 United States, Census Bureau, Table 15, , accessed May 24, 2013,

http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabs15-65.pdf

187 Canada, Statistics Canada, Section A: Population and Migration, , accessed May 24, 2013,

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500092-eng.pdf

188 They were quite right. Ontario's population currently stands at nearly 13 million while Prince Edward

Island is currently at around 140,000.

189 Gwyn, 351


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differential between the Province of Canada and the Maritimes forced a compromise,

instead of provincial equality, there would be regional equality with Canada West,

Canada East, and the Maritime Region each receiving 24 Senators.190191 It was agreed that

Newfoundland, a British Colony that was expected to eventually join the federation

would receive four Senators upon entry.192193

VIII. A House Forgotten

As Canada's new Parliament was formally created and summoned following the

ratification of the Quebec Agreement in the British North America Act, John A.

MacDonald, now serving as Canada's first federal Prime Minister, expressed a desire that

the Senate would serve as a body of sober second thought.194 What MacDonald and the

other founders of the Canadian confederation could not imagine that rather than create a

body of sober second thought, they had created a body that would essentially be

forgotten.195From the earliest days of Canada the Senate was overlooked by both

politicians and the public.196

The Senate actually has a great deal of potential legislative power.197 It can initiate

any legislation (with the exception of money bills) and has a theoretically broad power of

amendment.198

Furthermore its approval is required before legislation can become law.199

Despite these broad powers, for much of Canadian history, the Senate has simply refused

to exercise them.200 Members of the Senate are appointed by the Governor General on the

190 Conrad, 148

191 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia received 10 while Prince Edward Island received four.

192 Newfoundland ended up waiting until 1949 to join. At which point changes to the method of granting

new provinces Senators meant that it received 6. Smith, 70

193 Gwyn, 317

194 CBC News, "Canada's Senate: Sober Second Thought," CBCnews, July 09, 2010, accessed May 24,2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/07/09/f-senate-background.html

195 C.E.S Franks, "Not Dead Yet, but Should It Be Resurrected? The Canadian Senate," in Senates:

Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, ed. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan (Columbus:

Ohio State University Press, 1999), 123

196 id

197 CBC

198 Franks, 122

199 Smith, 110

200 Franks, 122-123


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advice of the Prime Minister, something which makes the Senate unusually sensitive to

the political parties and desires of the Canadian House of Commons.201 Canada has a

history of long periods of political domination of the House of Commons by one party,

which allows for control of the Senate to remain with the party in government. The

Conservative Party of Canada (a distinct party from that which exists today) ruled from

1867 to 1896 with only a 5 year break.202 And the Liberal Party of Canada ruled for 70 of

the 88 years between 1896 and 1984.203 These long periods of one party rule combined

with the ability of the Prime Minister to appointment members of the Senate meant that

the Senate was often content to simply approve legislation passed by the House of

Commons without question.204 This willingness was also driven by a feeling that the

unelected status of the Senate severely limited its legitimacy in comparison with the

popularly elected Commons.205

During the first 100 years or so of Canada the Senate was only really able to break

into the Canadian political consciousness when some sort of scandal erupted.206 Perhaps

most famously, the Persons Case of 1929 held that women were not considered persons

within the meaning of the British North America Act and could not therefore serve in the

Senate.207

This decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was eventually overturned by

the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, at that point the

court of last resort for Canada, which allowed both women to serve in the Senate and

encouraged Canadian politicians to end the ability of the Privy Council to hear Canadian

cases.208 So even the Senate's early scandals were not focused on the actions of the Senate

201 Smith, 68

202 Canada, Parliament of Canada,How Canadians Govern Themselves, by Eugene Forsey, section goes

here, accessed May 24, 2013,http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/SenatorEugeneForsey/book/assets/pdf/How_Canadians_Gover

n_Themselves8.pdf

203 id

204 Franks, 125

205 Franks, 123

206 Conrad, 201

207Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General) found at

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/faculty_franke/CLT2009/Persons%20Case.pdf

208 Conrad, 201


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but of the institution itself. The lack of interest in the Senate can be most starkly shown

by the fact that between 1926 and 1978 it was the subject of only three major studies in

English.209

That lack of interest has recently begun to change.210 The beginning of this

increasing attention on the Senate can be traced to the mid 1980s.211 In 1984, the long

lasting Liberal coalition of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau collapsed, making Progressive

Conservative Brian Mulroney Prime Minister with what was at the time the largest

majority in Canadian political history.212 Mulroney, like many conservative politicians of

the 1980s, sought to implement neo-liberal reforms.213 The Liberals, who remained firmly

in control of the unelected Senate, were diametrically opposed and decided to use the

Senate as a means of stymieing Mulroney's agenda.214 The efficacy of this plan is

debatable, the Liberals were often unable to force Mulroney to change the substance of

his legislation beyond cosmetic modifications.215 This was even more apparent after

Mulroney used a virtually forgotten feature of the Constitution Act of 1867 to enlarge the

Senate by 8 members to create a Senate equally divided between the parties.216 Mulroney

left office in 1992 after passing the deeply unpopular Goods and Services Tax and his

party was reduced to a mere two seats in the following election.217

This was really the first time the Senate had actively attempted to change or defeat

large swaths of a Prime Ministers program and many Canadian politicians both Liberal

and Conservative were left deeply uncomfortable.218 This really marked the beginning of

the recent focus on reforming the Senate something which has only been exacerbated by

the recent explosive growth of Canada's western provinces.219 As Canada expanded to the

209 Smith, 3

210 Smith, 1211 Franks, 124

212 id

213 Conrad, 258

214 Franks, 125

215 id

216 Franks, 135

217 Conrad, 264

218 Franks, 141

219 Peter Meekison, "Alberta & The Constitution," in Government and Politics in Alberta, by Allan Tupper


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west in the late 19th and early 20th century 4 new provinces were created (Manitoba,

Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia) in keeping with the principle of regional

equality, the new Western Canada region was awarded 24 seats in the Senate, with each

new province receiving 6.220 While this might have made sense at the time, in modern

Canada this is patently unfair. Both British Columbia and Alberta have populations

equivalent to the total population of the Maritime Provinces combined but have only 12

seats in the Senate compared to the 24 seats held by the Maritimes.221 This shocking

inequality has led to increasing calls for Senate reform from the West, Alberta in

particular has emphasized the so called three Es (Elected, Equal, Effective.)222 All

Canadian political parties recognize that some sort of reform is necessary, with both the

New Democratic Party and the Bloc Quebecois (which between them hold over a third of

the seats in the House of Commons) advocating complete abolition.223 Currently the

Canadian government, led by the Conservatives is seeking to radically change the method

of selecting Senators.224 Bill C-7 would institute an 8 year term limit for Senators (at the

moment they serve for life with a mandatory retirement age of 75) and would require that

the Prime Minister appoint Senators selected by provinces in democratic elections.225The

bill is pending before the Supreme Court of Canada for an advisory opinion on it's

constitutionality and many in Canada believe that it is in fact unconstitutional to seek

these changes without amending the Canadian Constitution.226 Furthermore many in

and Roger Gibbins (Edmonton, Alta., Canada: University of Alberta Press, 1992), 257

220 Parliament of Canada

221 Canada, Statistics Canada,Population, Urban and Rural, by Province and Territory, accessed May 24,

2013, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo62k-eng.htm

222 Franks, 149

223 Galloway224 Michel Comte, "Canada PM Calls for Senate Reform amid Expenses Scandal," AFP, May 21, 2013,

section goes here, accessed May 24, 2013,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gLo2ZdvbJ24yBLpajoC1qiAZvVqA?

docId=CNG.2deed015095f5cee49916de6c2e98ac5.8e1

225 Canadian Bar Association,Bill C-7 Senate Reform Act, issue brief, January 2012, accessed May 24,

2013, http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/12-04-eng.pdf

226 Matthew Mendelsohn, "Abolish the Senate? Forget It: Change the Senate? Maybe," Globe and Mail,

May 24, 2013, accessed May 24, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/abolish-the-

senate-forget-it-change-the-senate-maybe/article12127063/?cmpid=rss1


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Canada point out that this would merely lend democratic legitimacy to the incredible

malapportionment currently in place and might lead to the democratically chosen

Senators seeking to become a more co-equal house of Parliament.227

The Canadian Senate is also again in the news for a rising scandal over Senatorial

expenses.228 A Senatorial scandal not focused on the rarified air of constitutional debates

over power and apportionment and instead focused on a baser economic discussion could

not have come at a better time for those seeking reform.229 Regardless of whether or not

the current reform legislation succeeds it seems clear that the Canadian Senate as

currently constituted is not long for the world.

IX. Conclusion: Bi-cameralism and Federalism

Many political scientists argue that a bi-cameral legislature is necessary to

maintain a federal system.230 This is ignores though both the history of bi-cameral

legislatures and the modern political experience. Upper houses did not develop out of a

desire to ensure representation of various regions, rather they developed out of medieval

parliaments that sought to ensure recognition for members of the elite. Upper houses are

also no guarantee against a centralization of power. The United States and Germany,

which have the world's most powerful upper houses, have both experienced an increasing

amount of authority migrating to the national government. Canada on the other hand, has

an incredibly weak, nearly useless upper house and maintains a federal system where

sub-national units retain their vast power.The important thing for maintaining a strong

federal system then is not merely having an upper house, but having the popular will and

desire to keep power located within the states or provinces.

The question is if upper houses are not necessary to maintain federalism what then

are they for? The U.S. Senate has not been a guarantor of federalism since at least the

227 Franks, 150

228 Steve Chase, "RCMP Now Looking into Senate Expenses Scandal," Globe and Mail, May 23, 2013,

accessed May 24, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/rcmp-looking-into-senate-

expenses-scandal/article12100393/

229 Mendelsohn

230 Nolan McCarty and Micheal Cutrone, Does Bicameralism Matter?, Princeton University, accessed

May 24, 2013, http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/bicameralism.pdf


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XVIIth Amendment if not before. Rather it functions as almost a house for media, with

it's smaller membership and stronger powers it has become the face of the U.S. Congress.

In Germany, the Bundesrat gives the states a voice in laws affecting them and gives

bureaucrats a powerful institutional role in the federal government. And Canada

maintains, for the time being, a Senate that seems to serve no purpose other than either

serving no real purpose or encouraging its own reform or abolition. The bi-cameral idea

is something deeply engrained into Western concepts of what a national legislature

should be, but when examined in detail it is not always clear why that should be the case

in the modern world.

Bicameralism in Federal Systems: Three Different Approaches

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