BA Thesis: The role of education for the nationalizing regimes in Central Asia: the case studies of Fethullah Gulen schools in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

1

American University of Central Asia

Department of International and Comparative Politics

The role of education for the nationalizing regimes in Central Asia: the case studies of Fethullah Gulen schools in Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan

Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements of degree of

Bachelor of Arts

Supervisor: Temirlan Moldogaziev

May 2005

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

2

“At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner,

but the professor. Not the guillotine, but the (aptly named) doctorat d’etat is the

main tool and symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education

is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence.”

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism1.

“Mosques are wonderful; we have the greatest respect for them.

However, it would be better if you open a school.”

Fethullah Gűlen2

Part I: Introduction

Massimo d'Azeglio said after Italian state unification: “We have created Italy, now

we have to create Italians.”3 It is easier to create a state than to create its nationals. As

many nationalism scholars note, in most of the cases it was the creation of a state that

preceded the formation of a national identity, not vice versa. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

acquired independence in 1991. After this sudden independence, which was not wanted

by the overwhelming majorities of their populations4 these Central Asian states made

efforts to reshape their national identities in order to turn their citizens’ loyalties away

from the common Soviet and Russified identity to the new genuinely native ones. As a

result both countries employed a number of policies and practices that emphasized the

identity of the titular nationality. Through the use of mass media, legislative acts and

government rhetoric the respective governments have attempted to create a “sleeping

beauty” myth, that is to make people believe that the ancient nations of Uzbek and Kyrgyz

have belonged to their current territories since primordial times and that they had always

striven for independence and separate statehood.

1 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 34.

2 Turgut, Hulusi, Fethullah Gűlen and the Schools: What does Fethullah Gűlen Say? The official web-site

of Fethullah Gűlen, available at http://www.fethullahgulen.org/a.page/life/education/a780p2.html

Accessed on Jan 14, 2005. 3 Frie, Matt, Getting the Boot. (New York: Random House, 1995), 154.

4 On March 17 1991, in the referendum on preservation of the USSR, 94% of Uzbekistan’s population

(95% turnout) and 95% (93% turnout) of Kyrgyzstan’s voters expressed their will to keep the Union.

(Source: Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

3

The focus of this study is the role that education at the school level plays in

governments’ cultural nationalization projects and how the nationalizing states interact

with the non-state educational institutions in the framework of these projects. The

network of the Turkish (Gűlen) schools in both republics represents a valuable example of

the non-state civil society actor. Firstly, we will explore the concept of a nationalizing

state as such. Further, by applying this concept to the Central Asian context we will look

at how the nationalizing states utilize schooling in their nationalization efforts. Finally, we

will look at how the nationalizing states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan reacted to the

private schools, run by the followers of the Gűlen movement.

I.1. Research Questions:

This thesis paper will attempt to answer the following research questions:

1. What role does education play for the nationalizing projects in Kyrgyzstan and

Uzbekistan?

2. How do the Gűlen schools fit into the state educational systems in terms of

promoting the state-sponsored nationalizing projects in the respective

republics?

3. How do we account for the different responses of state to the movement’s

educational activities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan?

I.2. Hypotheses:

The work will be based on the following hypotheses:

1. An educational system is utilized as a cultural nationalization policy;

2. The non-state schools will not be tolerated by a nationalizing state if they are

perceived to produce a kind of graduates

a) whose loyalties are turned towards outside/broader identities more than towards

the native national identity

4

b) or those identities that are associated with or promoted by the opposition forces,

challenging the current regimes.

Why is it important to address the questions outlined above? The author’s

motivation in pursuing this topic of research was not purely academic. From the very

beginning this research subject was of interest to me for personal reasons as well as out of

academic curiosity. I arrived at the present topic backwards. First, I was involved with

the Turkish schools, then I got interested in the Gűlen movement and its educational

activities in Central Asia and only afterwards, did I start asking questions regarding the

schools’ significance in the framework of nation-building and identity formation

processes in Central Asia.

The subject matter is worth studying for a number of convincing considerations.

First of all, the subject of Gűlen community activities in Central Asia is greatly under-

researched. This thesis will be just a small step in the direction of greater understanding

of the impact that the Gűlen movement has had in the area. Secondly, education is a field

that always has important implications for public policy. From Plato to Rousseau, to

Makarenko, great thinkers have put education at the center of projects for political and

social change. Education is often seen and utilized as a means of controlling and

producing knowledge and as a tool of socialization within particular groups or societies.

Besides, education in this thesis has significance not only as a matter of domestic politics

and ideology, but also as a matter of foreign policy of Turkey towards the Central Asian

states, which in its turn is a continuation of its domestic politics5. Finally, this research

pursues the topic of the importance of education for national identity consolidation in the

post-Soviet Central Asia, which is an area that still remains unexplored by both local and

foreign scholars of the region.

5 Kosebalaban, Hasan, “The Making of Enemy and friend: Fethullah Gűlen’s National-Security Identity” in

Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement

(Syracuse University Press, 2003).

5

Another question that needs to be addressed before we proceed with the topic is the

choice of the case studies. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were picked because they are

located rather far apart on a spectrum in terms of degree of society’s openness (although it

is argued that Kyrgyzstan has been rapidly approaching Uzbekistan in degree of

authoritarianism of regime) and have responded to the schools’ activities in opposite

ways. While the schools in Uzbekistan were closed down, similar institutions in

Kyrgyzstan are hailed and Fethullah Gűlen gets awards from Kyrgyzstan’s Spiritual

Society. In the analytical part of this paper the nature and degree of the nationalization

processes in both states are discussed in more detail. Table 1 in particular compares and

contrasts the factors influencing the nationalizing projects in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

I.3. Methodology

This research is qualitative and based on a combination of methods, including the

review of secondary sources, in-depth interviews with two representatives of the schools’

administrations (Genel mudurluk) and two graduates of the schools. It also involved to

some extent the study of the primary sources, such as the official website of Fethullah

Gűlen, his movement’s daily newspaper “Zaman”, legislation on education and relevant

issues and official documents provided by “Sebat” educational institution. In this work,

thus, due to the time constrains and lack of resources I took the answers to my questions

that seemed valid where they seemed to be available. As a result, this thesis draws from a

variety of sources and disciplines.

The interviews were conducted in January and February 2005 in Bishkek. I

interviewed one Turkish teacher who has been teaching in Kyrgyzstan for six years and

one representative of “Sebat” educational institution, which runs the schools in

Kyrgyzstan. These two interviews were conducted in Turkish and then translated by the

author into English. The other interviews were with two graduates of the Gűlen schools:

6

one from Kyrgyzstan and the other from Uzbekistan. The interviews were semi-

structured and are not intended for making conclusions or generalizations in this study.

Rather they will be useful as illustrations for the points made here. The full transcripts of

the interviews are found in the Appendices section of this paper.

The evidence thus collected was analyzed using the theoretical framework provided

by the sources discussed in the literature review section of this paper. The facts were

examined in order to respond to the research questions outlined above.

7

Part II: Literature Review

When building a framework for this paper, literature available in three major fields

was used: nationalizing states in Central Asia, literature on education and political

socialization and that on Fethullah Gűlen’s educational activities and schools in Central

Asia. Due to the lack of research on educational policies of nationalizing states in Central

Asia, this review attempts to synthesize the studies of nation-building and the

nationalizing policies in the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia as well as political

socialization and Gűlen schools in Central Asia. Further the main ideas and concepts that

were used in writing of this thesis are sketched.

II.1. Nationalizing states

There has been a considerable amount of writing done on nationalism in the post-

Soviet states6. The newly independent states of Central Asia are particularly attractive for

the scholars of nationalism as they represent valuable case studies and in a way, testing

grounds for the predictive power of the nationalist conflict theories. It is not within the

scope of our interest here, however, to study the nationalizing states for the purposes of

seeing a potential for interethnic conflict in the region.

This study takes the modernist approach in the nationalism studies as its underlying

assumption (as opposed to primordialist). It is thus believed that nationalism is a modern

phenomenon that has emerged out of certain historical circumstances and that the

category “nation” is not objective and primordial, although that is how most nationalists

would like it to appear. Rather, nations emerge as a result of socio-cultural

6 Bremmer, Ian, “Post-Soviet Nationalities Theory: past, present, and future” in Bremmer, Ian and Taras,

Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1997); Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New

Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Kolsto, Pal, Nation-Building and Ethnic

Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1999); Everett-Heath, Tom (ed), Central Asia: Aspects of Transition (London, New York: I. B Taurus

Publishers, 2000).

8

transformations, whereby education and school systems play a central role7. However,

here we will not concern ourselves with nationalism as ideology or as emotion, but will

look at nationalism as a political force. Nationalistic politics are usually aimed at

establishing a separate statehood to ensure a polity for an already existing nation. In our

case, the already existing polities are making efforts to create nations. In other words, we

will see how states are motivated to pursue a particular public policy by the considerations

of nationalization of their polities.

As the title suggests this thesis will make an intensive use of the term “nationalizing

state” coined by Rogers Brubaker and further applied in the Central Asian context by

Annette Bohr. Brubaker introduced this concept in the triadic relational model with other

two elements – national minorities and “homeland” states. I am taking the concept of the

nationalizing state out of this relational nexus. This is done because the purpose of this

paper is not to analyze the conflict between the three parts of the model, but to examine

the role of education in the process of implementation of the nationalizing projects in

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Nationalizing states are described by Brubaker as “an ethnically heterogeneous, yet

conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the

language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of

the nominally state-bearing nation”8. The use of the term “nationalizing state” by

Brubaker suggests that the elites in such a state view it as an incomplete and deficient

kind of a nation-state and therefore deem it necessary to undertake a project of

nationalizing its territory and institutions9. Such nationalizing projects are launched in

order to remedy the past (real or perceived) injustices that prevented the full realization of

7 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anderson,

Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London, New

York: Verso, 1936-). 8 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 57. 9 Ibid, 79.

9

the nation-state. Thus, a “nationalizing state” differs from nation-state not in its essence.

The term is useful in terms of reflecting the degree of development of a nation-state,

which is an on-going process. One could argue that all currently established nation-states

are constantly undergoing a nationalizing project of their own. They pursue a number of

policies aimed at reproduction of their cultures10, therefore the term “nationalizing state”

refers to the nations in making, those that undergo a process of nation-building.

Annette Bohr11

lists several tools of nationalizing regimes in the Central Asian

states, among them are the use of state iconography and semiotics, the language policies,

the ‘nativization’ of the state power, re-writing of the national history and other

techniques. Arguably, consolidation of state-controlled standardized schools system is

also a tool employed by the governments in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in their nation-

building projects. Schools have long been used by nation-states to reproduce their

cultures and national identities. In this sense all modern nation-states, regardless of the

stage or degree of their development are nationalizing. They constantly undergo the

process of utilizing their institutions, such as schools, to socialize the children into being

good nationals of their respective states.

As to whether the states in Central Asia are going to pursue nationalizing policies

there seems to be no question. They have clearly made their point in favor of a

nationalizing state. The question thus emerges among the scholars as to what kinds of

nation-state the states are planning to build – civic or ethnocultural, based on the identity

of the titular nations12

. Although the claims of civic nationalism (which enjoys high level

of international legitimacy) are made by the governments of Central Asia states, the

10

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anderson,

Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London, New

York: Verso, 1936-). 11

Bohr, Annette, “The Central Asian States as Nationalizing Regimes” in Smith, Graham at al (eds.),

Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998), 139. 12

Kolsto, Pal, Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia

and Kazakhstan. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).

10

perception of the state by the governing elites is that of a “common house”, which

nonetheless has its legitimate owners (the titular nation/ethnic group) and “flat renters”

(non-titular groups)13

. While state rhetoric might emphasize the peaceful coexistence of

more than a hundred ethnic groups, tolerance toward other ethnic and cultural groups is

presented as a virtue of the state-bearing nation. Moreover, the states of the post-

Communist Central Asia are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous, yet perceived as

nation-states as a result of the national politics of the USSR and the legacy of the

discourse of nationality practiced by the Soviets14

.

The newly independent states of Central Asia were confronted with national identity

formulation tasks in the very first years of their existence. As a part of the nation-building

efforts the states were trying on identities of Islam and Turkism while trying to rid

themselves of the colonial Soviet/Russian identity15

. Overcoming the mankurtization16

has become an important task in the cultural nationalization in Kyrgyzstan17

.

The other question regarding the nationalizing regimes in Central Asia is raised in

this paper. It is the question of not only the nature but also the degree or depth of the

nationalizing projects in Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. See Table 1

in the Analytical part for the attempt to classify the two regimes according to the levels of

their nationalizing policies.

II.2. Education in nation-building/nationalization process

13

Speech of the Deputy of Legislative Chamber of the Kyrgyz Republic Adaham Madumarov published in

‘Asaba’ newspaper. Reference to that speech found at the website of the “Slovo Kyrgyzstana” newspaper

http://www.sk.kg/2005/n12/obch4.html . 14

Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25. 15

Kirimli, Meryem. 1997. “Uzbekistan in the New World Order”. Central Asian Survey 16(1): 53. 16

Mankurt is a term attributed to Chingiz Aitmatov, who first used the word in his novel “Buranniy

polustanok”. A mankurt was a person , who, by means of physiological manipulations, was turned into a

zombie. A mankurt did not know his name, his parents and where he came from. This word became a

metaphore for all the people, who lose their “roots”, their culture and identity. 17

Bohr, Annette, “The Central Asian States as Nationalizing Regimes” in Smith, Graham at al (eds.),

Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998), 140.

11

There is still little degree of consensus among the scholars regarding the role of

schooling in shaping the future political attitudes and behavior. The influences

throughout a person’s life are multiple and ambivalent and one cannot argue that a

particular kind of schooling produces a certain type of adult political behavior18

.

However, many authors seem to agree that the closer an institution in its structure to the

actual patterns of authority in the state and the closer in time to the actual political

participation, the more likely that people will be socialized into a particular kind of

political attitudes and behavior19

. Hepburn and Niemi thus advocate the rehabilitation of

the field of political socialization with the future focus being on the age group between 14

and 25, since it is exactly the period, when the youth are most malleable and when they

are about to enter political life and therefore are targeted by the various institutions aimed

at their political socialization. The students of the Turkish high schools in Central Asia

fall into this age group. On average they spend the period between age 12 to 18 within

the educational institutions.

Schools make a perfect medium for (re)production of national identity. They rate

second to family among the social institutions in their impact on child socialization20

.

Some types of schools, as Brint writes, make a better choice for nations “under

construction”. In his classification of the school socializing environments Brint suggests a

historical development from village or communal type to industrializing, to bureaucratic

or mass consumption patterns of school socialization. It can be speculated that the

schools in the developing Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan stand somewhere between the

18

Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five

Nations. (Newbury Park, London, New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1989); Jowett, Garth S. and O’Donnell,

Victoria, Propaganda and Persuasion (Newbury Park, London, New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1992).

19 Hepburn, Mary A., Niemi, Richard G. 1995. “The Rebirth of Political Socialization”. Perspectives on

Political Science 24 (1): 7ff; Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes

and Democracy in Five Nations. (Newbury Park, London, New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1989). 20

Brint, Steven, Schools and Societies (Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli: Pine Forge Press, 1997),

136.

12

village/communal and industrializing models, with rural schools following more of the

former while the urban ones adhering more to the latter pattern of socialization.

However, it can be argued that the schools in all post-Soviet countries have a

functioning system of consolidated school curricula, where all the students are expected to

study a minimum of subjects that the states deem necessary. In this sense we could say

the schools use the industrializing model of socialization. The purpose of the schools is to

raise individuals capable of functioning in an industrializing society and who would have

a strong sense of belonging to the nation by internalizing through the curriculum the new

version of history, by learning the national geography and by studying the official state

language(s). Such schools put a serious emphasis on achieving the moral and behavioral

conformity of the students. The analysis of the legislative acts on education of the two

republics in the Analytical part of this thesis shows that the school curricula in both

countries allocate special time for the moral and patriotic upbringing of the youth.

Many scholars of nationalism emphasized the importance of the state-controlled

standardized educational system in the process of nation building21

. The monopoly over

the educational institutions thus becomes imperative in cultivation of good citizens:

Only the state can do this [ensure reproduction of culture] and even in countries in which important

parts of the educational machine are in private hands or in those of religious organizations, the state

does take over quality control in this most important of industries, the manufacture of viable and usable

human beings22

.

Some definitions of a nation include education as a necessary component of

belonging. Thus, for instance, Gokalp’s and Ataturk’s definitions of a nation reflect the

notion that any one regardless of her race and religion can be included into a nation by

virtue of her feelings, because it is believed that when a person is educated in a particular

21

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Miller,

David, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

22 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 38.

13

society, he or she “absorbs” all its values and becomes its “reflection”23

. Schools are also

utilized as a means of national identity formulation in the new nationalizing states of

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

II.3. Gűlen schools in Central Asia

The schools known as Turkish Lyceums in Central Asia were founded and run by

the followers of Fethullah Gűlen, an influential and respected religious leader in Turkey,

whose followers run schools and universities, mass media outlets and publishing houses

in Turkey and beyond.24

Reportedly, the movement owns more than 200 high schools and

six universities in more than fifty foreign countries; 500 companies, 200 foundations, a

TV channel and a daily newspaper – figures differ in different sources25

. Thus, Fethullah

Gűlen’s movement is an influential social and political force in Turkey. He and his

followers preach moderation and tolerance. They believe that Islam and modernity,

religion and democracy, faith and secularism are compatible. In short, the ideology of the

movement is a curious blend of Islamism and Turkism that claims to have an apolitical

nature. Education is central to the ideology of the movement as it is seen as a means of

modernizing Islam and society while maintaining and strengthening faith. Gűlen was

strongly influenced by the ideas of Said Nursi, a Sufi scholar, who argued that there is no

contradiction between Islam and science, modernity, and industrialization26

. Gűlen’s

guiding philosophy in his educational practices is the conception of a blend of traditional

23

Segars, Andrews., “Nation-Building in Turkey and Uzbekistan. The use of language and history in the

creation of national identity” in Everett-Heath, Tom (ed.). Central Asia: Aspects of Transition (London,

New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 83-84 24

Technically the schools do not belong to Fethullah Gulen, nor do the media outlets and publishing houses.

However, their owners are the businessmen, who consider Gulen their spiritual leader. Gulen’s ideas

inspired them to start the worldwide educational movement.

25 Aras, Bulent and Caha, Omer. 2000. “Fethullah Gűlen and His Liberal “Turkish Islam” Movement”.

Middle East Review of International Affairs 4 (4) [online]. Available at:

http://meria.idc.il/journal/2000/issue 4/jv4n4a4.html [accessed Sept 19 2004]; Balci, Bayram. 2003.

“Fethullah Gűlen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in Spreading of Turkism and Islam”.

Religion, State & Society 31 (2): 151-177 (Found on EBSCO database on Sept 2, 2004 ; Howe, Marvine.

2000. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

26 Ibid.

14

religious education (madrassah), secular training (mektep) with religious mysticism of

Sufi lodges (tekke) and discipline of military barracks27

.

When asked about the goals of founding the schools in Central Asia Fethullah

Gűlen answered to the Turkish journalists: “Our schools are missionary like other

missionary schools of Europeans and Americans. Our purpose is to carry out missionary

activities and to prepare the suitable conditions for creating a Turkish lobby and to train

bureaucrats.”28

These schools are commonly recognized as model institutions that equip their

graduates with good command of English (in which the hard sciences are taught), Turkish

and computer science. The graduates are highly competitive on the job market and well

prepared for university entrance examinations. The schools’ curriculum does not include

any training in religion. Arguably, Muslim moral values are communicated to students

through informal interaction outside of the classroom.

The first Turkish schools in Central Asia were established in 1992-93 after the

republics acquired their independence and as a result of the initial enthusiasm and

cordiality that had place in the Uzbek- and Kyrgyz-Turkish relations in those first days of

their rapprochement29

. According to the information provided by “Sebat” educational

institution, in 2004 there were 14 schools in Kyrgyzstan with 3,727 students enrolled.

27

Agai, Bekim, “Towards an Islamic Ethic of Education. Fethullah Gűlen and the Activities of His

Movement in the Field of Education”, in Yavuz, Hakan and Voll, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular

State, The Gűlen Movement. (Syracuse University Press, 2003), 56. 28

Turgut, Hulusi, “Fethullah and his schools”, Yeni Yuzyil newspaper, 15 January 1998 cited in Demir,

Cennet Engin, Balci, Ayse and Akkok Fusun. 2000. “The Role of Turkish Schools in the Educational System and Social Transformation of Central Asian Countries: the case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.”

Central Asian Survey 19(1), p. 151 29

Balci, Bayram. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in Spreading

of Turkism and Islam”. Religion, State & Society 31 (2): 151-177 (Found on EBSCO database on Sept 2,

2004; Kramer, Heinz, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington,

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Winrow, Gareth M, “Turkey and Former Soviet Central Asia: A

Turkic Culture Area in the Making?”, in Warikoo, K (ed.). Central Asia: Emerging New Order (Har-Anand

Publications, 1995).

15

The Uzbek government in 2000 closed the 18 schools established across the country.

There were 3,334 students studying in the schools at that time30

.

Despite a considerable amount of scholarship, which concentrates on philosophical

and political aspects of Fethullah Gűlen’s educational movement worldwide little has

been written on the impact of the schools in Central Asia. The articles by Bayram Balci

and the joint study by Demir, Balci and Akkok were the only two scholarly sources

available in English31

that focus specifically on the schools in Central Asia. Balci

describes the Gűlen educational institutions in Central Asia as “missionary schools” of the

kind similar to those of Jesuits the purpose of which is to convert the young people, to

Islamize and Turkify them. The study by Demir, Balci and Akkok was funded by the

Turkish International Cooperation Agency and, therefore, was limited in its evaluation of

the schools’ activities. This fact should be kept in mind when considering their findings

and the conclusions that they arrived at. They positively characterize the role of the

schools as a model for the local educational systems and envision the graduates of the

schools as the positive and progressive force that would bring about the development and

social progress in their respective countries. Both studies envisage that the graduates will

develop positive relations with Turkey in the future, when some of them will enter the

ruling elites in their countries.

Gűlen schools are different from the state schools in that they combine the

industrial model with elite model of British boarding/public schools. They are semi-total

institutions the ultimate goal of which is to bring up young Central Asians according to

Gűlen’s ideal of “Golden Generation” or “Golden Youth”32

. Gűlen’s followers believe

30

Balci, Bayram. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in Spreading

of Turkism and Islam”. Religion, State & Society 31 (2): 156 31

Bayram Balci wrote a PhD dissertation on the schools in Central Asia in French (Balci, Bayram. 2000.

“Les ecoles privees de Fethullah Gűlen’s en Asiecentale Missionnaires de l’Islam ou hussards de la rucite?”

PhD. Diss., IEP Universite Pierre Mendes France, Grenoble ) and Bekim Agai also defended his doctoral

thesis on Gűlen’s schools in Europe IN German. 32

Agai, Bekim, “Towards an Islamic Ethic of Education. Fethullah Gűlen and the Activities of His

Movement in the Field of Education” and Kuru, Ahmet T. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Search for a Middle

16

that humankind’s problems are the manifestations of the lack of love and education.

Anything from poverty to terrorism can be rooted out by a proper kind of education, the

product of which should be a moral/ethical man or ahlakli insan (See Appendices III and

IV). Hakan Yavuz writes: “For Gűlen serving God means rising ‘perfect youth’ who

combine spirituality with intellectual training, reason with revelation, and mind with

heart.33

”.

Whether the nature and the content of the educational practices in the Gűlen schools

are likely to succeed in bringing up the Golden Youth/ insani-kamil is a subject for further

studies. Hakan Yavuz in his work suggests that the success of the schools in

manufacturing an “ideal human” is dubious given the “conservative nature of the

education system”34

. In any case, the Gűlen schools meet the desires of the Central Asian

states’ governments of educating a generation of individuals capable of functioning

successfully in the conditions of free market, and who would simultaneously perform the

nation-building function.

Gűlen schools can also be classified as “total institutions” as defined by Erving

Goffman in his work on mental asylums. Cookson and Hodges35

refer to boarding

schools as total or semi-total institutions in their study of American elite schools, because

they possess the characteristic features of such institutions. Boarding schools, like in

other total and semi-total institutions, are aimed at re-socialization of individuals by

means of restricting their options of communications with outside world and former

sources of authority (in this case the family and peers from outside of schools). All the

activities in such institutions are conducted in the same space under a single authority in

the immediate company of other people, thus erasing the boundary between the private

Way between Modernity and Muslim Tradition”, in Yavuz, Hakan and Voll, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and

the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement. (Syracuse University Press, 2003). 33

Yavuz, Hakan, “The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.).

Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement ( Syracuse University Press, 2003), 20. 34

Ibid, 40. 35

Cookson, Peter W. and Hodges Persell, Caroline. 1986. “The Price of Privilege; Elite Prep Schools

Demand Conformity as the Rite of Passage into the Upper Class”. Psychology Today 20: 30ff

17

and the public. Boarding schools have strict schedules and all the activities of the

students and the teachers are directed to achieving the goals of the institution (See

Appendices I and II).

It is important to note that the schools being boarding schools facilitate acquisition

by the students of certain values and behavioral patterns by means of limiting and in a

way controlling their interactions with alternative sources of information and

socialization. The teachers thus become the role models and the peer recognition gains

more importance in the process of formation of the teenagers’ identity, if they attend a

boarding school36

.

36

Demir, Cennet Engin, Balci, Ayse and Akkok Fusun. 2000. “The Role of Turkish Schools in the

Educational System and Social Transformation of Central Asian Countries: the case of Turkmenistan and

Kyrgyzstan.” Central Asian Survey 19(1): 151.

18

Part III: Analysis

In this part of the paper we will first undertake a comparative analysis of the

nationalizing states in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in other words, to paraphrase

Brubaker, we will see, “how they are nationalizing and how nationalizing they are”37

. We

will further see how the two states pursue cultural nationalization through the use of

education by means of analysis of legislature concerning education in the respective

states.

III.1. Nationalizing states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: nature, degree and

peculiarities of the process

As different as the two countries are they are nonetheless undergoing similar

processes of search for their identity, which is in the state of constant flux. Both

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (nuances in degree granted) have had to confront the task of

what Rogers Brubaker refers to as “polity-based nation-shaping”38

. The Soviet rule has

firmly established the understanding of these multiethnic entities as the legitimate

property of the titular nations, while the post-Soviet experiences have left the elites in

both countries with the deep dissatisfaction with degree to which the native interests were

realized. The states have been struggling ever since their unwanted independence with

the inferiority complex. They have been trying to remedy the injustice made to the status

of the native language, the degree of economic well-being, political predominance,

cultural and historic heritage or, in case of Kyrgyzstan, the very survival of the titular

nationality, i.e., escaping the fate of assimilation/Russification/mankurtization. Thus,

particular practices and policies of the state and non-state actors have taken shape that

37 Brubaker writes: “The question is therefore not whether the new states will be nationalizing, but how they

will be nationalizing – and how nationalizing they will be.” Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed:

Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

106.

38 Ibid, 79.

19

were deemed essential in the process of rediscovering native identities and that were not

perceived by any means as threatening to the status of non-titular groups or discriminatory

but as remedial and compensatory. Brubaker outlines all these characteristic features as

defining a nationalizing state39

. And in fact these are the features shared by all of the

post-Soviet states, Central Asian states included.

It is significant for this paper, however, to determine how Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan differ in their nationalization process and whether these differences are the

matter of essence or degree. Annette Bohr suggests that there is a positive dependence

between the degree of ethnic heterogeneity as well as level of democratization and

openness of a society and the degree of controversy that politics of nationalization give

rise to40

. Therefore, any nationalizing policies or practices become sensitive issues in

Kyrgyzstan, which has a considerable share of non-Kyrgyz population and a more open

political system. At the same time, these similar practices and policies are taken for

granted by the majority in Uzbekistan, which is more ethnically homogenous and is ruled

by an authoritarian system. In the table below we undertake a comparative analysis of the

aspects that inform and set the pace for the nationalizing policies and practices in

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. This is done in order to help categorize the two states and

see where they diverge and converge in their approach to nationalizing politics. Placing

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on a continuum according to the degree of their

nationalization will help us in testing our hypotheses.

The table below is based on multiple sources. It synthesizes the information and

ideas expressed in the works by Bohr, Segars, Gleason, Hansen and Dukenbaev, Lowe,

Huskey and many other scholars of Central Asia. The full citations are given throughout

this paper as well as in the bibliography. The table as a whole, however, is my own.

39

Ibid, 83. 40

Bohr, Annette, “The Central Asian States as Nationalizing Regimes” in Smith, Graham at al (eds.),

Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998), 141.

20

Table 1

Aspects affecting the nationalizing projects of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

Aspect Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan41

National

consciousness

Strongly articulated national

independence ideology

Weaker national identity

Nation-building

model

Titular nation as primus inter pares

“Peoples of Uzbekistan” “Kyrgyzstan is our common

home”

Leadership Personalistic

Authoritarian

Conservative

“Uzbek way”

Balance of interests

Shifting more towards

authoritarianism

Pro-Western /democracy

orientation

Titular

language status

Uzbek is the only state

language

No special status for Russian

Majority of population fluent

in Uzbek

Ruling elites are Uzbek-

speakers

Delicate issue

Kyrgyz – state language

Russian – official language

Less than half ethnic Kyrgyz fluent

in the language

Most of the elite are Russophone

Minorities

status

Number insignificant for

cultural unity

In 1997 – 39% non-Kyrgyz

Significant Slav and Uzbek

minorities

Opposition Outlawed (Birlik and Erk

parties and the IMU)

Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic

identities

Serious political force

Now being marginalized

Nationalist

Economy State-controlled gradualist

reform

Relatively stable

Protectionist neo-mercantilist

industrializing

Relatively free market

WTO member

Dependent on foreign donors and

regional partners for infrastructure

and carbohydrates

Relations with

Russia

Detached

A lot of anti-Russian rhetoric

Very close strategic partnership

Russian military base

Sub-national

allegiances

Regionalism

Clanism

North-South

Tribalism

Supranational

allegiances

Turkicness

Islam

Sovietism

Regional status Regional hegemony ambitions Dependent position in the region

41

The data in the table concerning Kyrgyzstan refers to the situation prior to the “revolution” and the

overthrow of the former President Askar Akaev on March 24, 2005. Definite changes have occurred in the

opposition and leadership of the state since then. However, since the situation is quite complex and

unpredictable right now it is impossible to make any judgments.

21

III.2. Education as a means of cultural nationalization

Schools are used as the main arena for the cultural nationalization politics42

. They

are central to renewing a society by means of bringing up a generation that will not

possess the loyalties held by their parents. Schools are vital for implementation of

language policies as well as for teaching a new version of history. For the nationalizing

project to work beyond the state, government and symbolic domains, not only the

nationalization of territorial and political space should take place but nationalization of

persons as well. As we see from Table 1, both in Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan people

have sub-national allegiances that interfere with the formation of truly national identity.

Education thus becomes the invaluable tool for nationalizing individuals.

So how are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan pursuing nationalizing policies in the sphere

of education? In attempt to find an answer to this question, we have to study the

legislation that has been adopted since independence and that deals with education in the

respective republics. The first step is naturally to have a look at the Laws “On Education”

of the two states. Uzbekistan’s law “On Education” from 1997 proclaims education as “a

priority in the sphere of social development of the Republic of Uzbekistan”. Similarly,

Kyrgyzstan’s law “On education” from 2003 declares that education is “a direction in the

state policy of the Kyrgyz Republic of strategic priority”. Both documents emphasize the

mandatory nature of school education as well as its secular character.

Both Kyrgyz and Uzbek states alike have state educational standards, which all the

educational institutions regardless of their forms of property are obliged to adhere to.

Apart from containing such conventional subjects as mathematics, chemistry, physical

training, foreign languages, geography and history the school curriculum in Uzbekistan

allocates distinct time and resources for teaching such classes as Odobnoma (Ethics),

42

Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92.

22

Ma’naviyat va Ma’rifat (Spirituality and Enlightenment), O’zbekiston Konsitutsiyasi

(Constitution of Uzbekistan), Milliy Istiqlol G’oyasi (Ideology of National Independence).

The Kyrgyz state educational standard is aimed at “instilling onto the students” the values

that develop personal qualities “meeting the requirements of the society and the state” and

provides for such subjects as Adep/ Yyman Sabagi (Ethics and religious studies) and

doprizyvnaya podgotovka (pre-enlistment preparation for the service in the army).

Uzbekistani legislation guarantees the right to choose the language of instruction

and even allows different ethnic groups to establish schools functioning in their own

language in the “areas of their compact residence.” The general trend is however, that

the number of non-Uzbek schools has been steadily decreasing since independence and

the majority of schools are operating in Uzbek. Moreover, given the fact that starting

from September 1st 2005 all organizations, companies, businesses and other legal entities

are obliged to keep the records in Uzbek and all the organs of the state power must work

in the state language, Uzbek becomes imperative to advance one’s life opportunities.

Russian language is not given any special status in the law “On State language” and thus

became equalized to any “other language” (the respect for which is, of course, guaranteed

in the document).

Article 6 of the Kyrgyz law “On education” obliges all educational institutions

regardless of form of ownership “to provide knowledge and development of Kyrgyz

language as the state language, and the learning of the Russian language as the official

language…”. In the wording of the above stipulation one can hear the urgency for

guaranteeing the preservation and development of the language, which has been neglected

during the Soviet period. However, the language issue still being a very delicate one with

less than half ethnic Kyrgyz actually being fluent in the language and negligible share of

non-Kyrgyz proficient in it, the learning of Russian language is still required by the state

standard.

23

The Kyrgyz law on education possesses a number of outstanding clauses that

deserve to be mentioned here. First of all, the law emphasizes the independence of

education from political and religious institutions. This principle is first outlined in the

Article 4 (Principles of the State Policies in the Sphere of Education). It is further

reiterated in Article 39 (Relationships of educational organizations with social, political

and religious organizations, associations and unions), which prohibits establishing

political and religious parties and organizations in the educational institutions. These

stipulations are not paralleled in the Uzbek law on education.

Another curious provision in the Kyrgyz law also attracts attention. Article 51

reads as follows:

The Kyrgyz Republic will provide the ethnic Kyrgyz living abroad, other foreign citizens and

persons without citizenship with educational services, which might include establishment of

special educational institutions. The order of rendering such services are regulated by the inter-

state agreements as well as agreements with private persons.

The ethnic Kyrgyz, who are citizens of other states will be allocated quotas for admission to the

state educational institutions and will be educated at the state budget’s expense.

This is clearly an instance of a nationalizing policy. The state gives special educational

rights and privileges not to all of its citizens equally but specifically to the representatives

of the titular ethnicity group. It seems that these provisions are there to avoid cultural

assimilation of the Kyrgyz abroad. In other words, the legislation is so articulate on the

issue exactly because the Kyrgyz perceive the situation of the titular nation in Kyrgyzstan

as insufficiently reflecting the fact of their “ownership” of the entity. In Uzbekistan the

state does not have to assert the status of the titular group through the legislation since it is

stable and unchallenged.

Uzbekistani legislative acts constantly refer to the “rich national cultural and

historical traditions and intellectual heritage of the people (naroda)”, meaning apparently

the Uzbek people. The young people educated within the state education system are

expected to become individuals “dedicated to the principles of national independence and

capable of making a real contribution to the progress of society.” In the process of moral

24

and spiritual upbringing of the young generation a blend of national values (milliy

kadriyatlar) and the values common to all human kind (umuminsoniy kadriyatlar) are to

be employed. The lessons on Spirituality and Enlightenment, however, include

exclusively discussion of the “rich cultural heritage left to us by our great ancestors”,

meaning the primordial Uzbeks.

Similarly, the Conception of the Development of Education in the KR until 2010

adopted in 2002, proclaims as its task the preparation of a citizen, who would possess the

following personal qualities “civic spirit, patriotism, internationalism, pro-activism,

tolerance, high ethics, flexibility and the liking for hard work.” These professional and

moral qualities are to be formed on the basis of seven commandments of Manas as well as

the values common to all humankind.

25

Part IV: The Case Studies of Gűlen schools in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Gűlen schools’ place in the cultural nationalization efforts

In this part of the paper we will undertake an analysis of the Turkish lyceums’

contribution to the process of nationalizing educational systems of Kyrgyzstan and

Uzbekistan will be weighted in order to test our hypotheses. As Brubaker argues,

nationalizing policies and practices can be adopted by various institutions of a society, be

it state or non-state structures, provided that they act out of conviction that some steps

should be made in order to ensure the privileged status of the titular group in order to right

the wrongs done to it in the past. The Gűlen movement is a transnational civil society

organization, which has a self-defined mission of educating the youth of Central Asia.

The Central Asian region is seen by the Turks (and the fethullacis are not an exception) as

the cradle of all the Turks (there is no special term in Turkish to differentiate between the

Turkish and the Turkic). The region is the center of the movement’s educational activities

because its members identify with the local people as with their milk brethren. Gűlen

himself was once a member of an anti-Communist movement in his home province of

Turkey43

. He says: “I always thought about and cried for rescuing Asia and bringing Asia

to [our] nation’s line.”44

. Therefore, the Gűlen movement shares the ideas of the titular

nations in the region regarding the urgency of ethno-national revival and the need for

remedial “affirmative action” educational policies.

The Gűlen schools in Central Asia promote the state nationalizing projects in a

number of ways. First of all, they celebrate the national culture of the titular group. This

is manifested in flying the national flag, singing of the national anthem, naming the

schools after the national heroes and even holding the days of the national culture abroad.

43

Yavuz, Hakan, “The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.).

Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement ( Syracuse University Press, 2003), 22. 44

Kosebalaban, Hasan, “The Making of Enemy and friend: Fethullah Gűlen’s National-Security Identity” in

Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement

(Syracuse University Press, 2003), 175.

26

However, there is an equal number of Turkish national symbols, which magnifies the

feeling of brotherhood and unity between the nations. Secondly, the schools incorporate

the state educational standard. Thirdly, the personal example of their teachers and the

content of education are intended to inspire the young people to serve their communities

and nation, to be able to self-sacrifice and to be altruistic. The graduate from

Uzbekistan’s Tashkent Boy’s lyceum told me:

I think my teachers were great people. They came from far away to teach us and give some knowledge.

And I am sure they did their job very, very sincerely. I still sometimes do not understand how a person

could be so sincere, no matter what goal he has. They were very devoted for their job. I think that was

their main aim to come to Uzbekistan i.e. to give better knowledge so that in the future we could

become excellent specialists to serve our country and to maintain its independence and prosperity.

(Appendix II)

The teachers, who come to teach in the Gűlen schools all over the world, are indeed

very dedicated to the cause (See, for instance, Appendix 4). The educational ethics of the

movement are based on the ideas of service (hizmet), self-sacrifice, activism and humility.

Work of a teacher thus becomes a form of religious worship and of getting the message of

God across to the people around by personal example if not by direct propagating45

.

Gűlen believes that the next century will become a “Golden Age” for believers. For

that time to come a new generation of people is to emerge. These individuals will

represent a fine balance between emotional and rational, and “wed the heart to the

intellect”. They will be free but subservient to God. They will go hand in hand with

modern developments but stay true to their values. They will be selfless and altruist,

always asking what more they could give to others. Gűlen also sees them as “conquerors”

of their own minds and those of others. They have a mission to enlighten, for which they

are ready and willing to go into a journey (hujra)46

. Ahmet Kuru summarized the

characteristics of the “Golden Generation”47

as follows48

:

45

Ozdalga, Elizabeth, “Following in the Footsteps of Fethullah Gűlen: Three Women Teachers Tell their

Stories” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen

Movement ( Syracuse University Press, 2003), 97. 46

Fethullah Gűlen. 1998. “The Ideal Human: The New man and woman” from Toward a Global

Civilization of Love and Tolerance (originally appeared in Zamanin Altin Dilimi [The Golden Slice of

27

1. Faith

2. Love

3. Balanced view of science

4. Re-evaluated views of man, life and the universe

5. Free thinking and respect for freedom of thought

6. Habit to counsel and collective consciousness

7. Mathematical logic

8. Appreciation of art

Could this agenda of Gűlen community interfere with Central Asian states’

cultural/personal nationalization projects? Did the order of Uzbek government to close

down the Turkish lyceums in Uzbekistan have anything to do with their underlying

ideology and the perceived threat of a “fifth column” coming out of these schools?

Ahmed Rashid mentions this fact in his “Jihad”, “ In 1999 the Uzbek government shut

down a chain of Turkish schools run by the Sufi cleric Fethullah Gűlen, accusing him of

supporting radical Islamic groups and the banned opposition party Erk”49

. Indeed, the

leader of the Erk party was in exile in Turkey, which refused to extradite him to

Uzbekistan. He also called on the Turkish government to oppose Karimov’s regime in the

name of Turkic brotherhood. Muhammad Solih said in his speech for a human rights

conference in Borne, Netherlands on June 10, 1995:

Uzbekistan is the cradle of Turkish civilization. There are currently 23 million people living in

Uzbekistan. It would be wrong to assume that these people are hungry only for bread. Our people are

in need of freedom together with bread. I would like to have my voice reach my brothers in Turkey.

Turkey should help Uzbekistan in its democratization process. We do not need Turkish investment and

credits that will help the current regime in Uzbekistan to become even stronger!

Of course Turkey is right in considering Uzbekistan as brother, and so its president Karimov.

However, people who are suffering under the oppression of “brother Karimov” are also your brothers.

I wish Turkish government would pay more attention to the suffering of these masses.50

Time], Kaynak, Izmir, pp 157-160). Accessed on 21.02.2005 from the F. Gulen’s official website:

http://en.fgulen.com/a.page/books/toward.a.global.civilization.of.love.and.tolerance/the.ideal.human/a1814.

html 47 These ideas of the Golden Age and the Golden Generation are characteristic for most nationalist

ideologies (primordial nationalism theories). It would make an interesting subject for future studies to

investigate how these notions in Gűlen ideology correspond with his ideas on distinctly Turkish brand of

Islam. 48

Ahmet T. Kuru. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Search for a Middle Way Between Modernity and Muslim

Tradition” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gulen

Movement. Syracuse University Press, p. 119 49

Ahmed Rashid, Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Yale University Press, New Haven and

London, 2000, p. 222

50 Quoated in Kirimli, Meryem. 1997. “Uzbekistan in the New World Order”. Central Asian Survey 16(1), p

59

28

Thus, the Turkish schools in Uzbekistan came to be associated with opposition.

There were rumors spreading around that the schools’ students and graduates are Islamic

fundamentalists or so-called wahabbiylar and that during the searches of the schools by

the SNB (National Security Service) Islamic books of extremist content were found.

Besides, the schools could be undesirable because they were spreading Turkism

even more than they were spreading Islam. There were such sentiments among the

nationalist cultural elites in Uzbekistan that over-emphasizing the Turkic identity would

undermine the feeling of Uzbekness. Nasimjan Rahmonov states the following, ‘…The

understanding of ‘Turkness’ is finding such a place in our vocabulary that the concept of

‘Uzbek’ is becoming increasingly meaningless and soulless.”51

. Similarly, Ahmadali

Askarov and Boribay Ahmedov, the authors of the school and university textbooks on

history of Uzbekistan, write: “Uzbeks are not Turks but rather a Turkic group, the

language of Uzbeks is Turkic but there is a great difference between the Turkish and the

Uzbek languages.”52

. The Uzbek government was anxious from the very moment of the

schools’ opening in 1992 that they emphasize the Uzbek identity more than any other.

For instance, the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On

Organization and Development of Activities of the Uzbek-Turkish lyceums” of 1993

stipulates “to bring the ritual greetings and forms of communication between the teachers

and students used in the [Turkish] lyceums in accordance with the existing national

customs and traditions of the Uzbeks.” The same document orders the state association

“Uzbeklegprom” and the state corporation “Mahalliy sanoat” in cooperation with the

Ministry of Education to “design models of the uniforms with national Uzbek symbols for

the students of the [Turkish] lyceums.”

51

Quoted from O’zbekiston Ovozi, 20 Jan 1994, “Turk mi yoki O’zbek mi?” in Kirimli, Meryem. 1997.

“Uzbekistan in the New World Order”. Central Asian Survey 16(1), p 56 52

Quoted ibid from “O’zbek Xalqining Kelip Chiqish Tarihi”, O’zbekiston Ovozi, 20 January, 1994

29

The Gűlen community uses a completely different terminology, which expresses

their pan-Turkic understanding of the Central Asian peoples and their languages. Seyit

Embel, the coordinator of the educational institutions in Turkmenistan is quoted on

Gűlen’s web site to say: “In our schools there, we teach Russian and English, and Turkish

in both the Turkmen and the Turkey dialects.53

” In other words, Turkmen and Turkish are

not understood as two separate languages, but rather they are dialects or corruptions of a

single Turkish language. As a consequence, the government in Uzbekistan associated the

schools with the opposition forces and they were believed to produce an undesired kind of

graduates, whose loyalties were too pan-Turkic and not sufficiently purely Uzbek in their

essence.

Another fact supporting the argument above is that Gűlen schools in a number of

subjects of the Russian Federation (Bashkortorstan, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Dagestan)

were closed down after the investigation of the FSB (Federal Security Council). The

investigation came to the conclusion that the schools “propagate extremist ideas” of pan-

Turkism and Pan-Islamism and are a threat to national security of the Russian

Federation54

. Allegedly, the schools in Bashkiriya (or Bashkortostan) were producing

“pro-Turkish youth”, which posed a threat to the national integrity of the Russian state.

Likewise, in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 Kabay Karabekov, a then member of the

Legislative Chamber of the Kyrgyz Parliament and a well-known journalist claimed that

the educational activities of the Turkish schools represent “a threat to the national security

of Kyrgyzstan”. According to him, these educational institutions bring up “potential

terrorists”, while their teachers and mentors are members of an extremist Islamic

53

Hulusi Turgut, “Fethullah Gulen and the Schools”. Accessed on F. Gulen official web page at

http://www.fethullahgulen.org/a.page/life/education/a780p2.html on 14.01.2005 54

The official web site of UFSB Rossii (Directorate of the Federal Security Council of the Russian

Federation) , “The Ministry of Education of Bashkiriya declined the cooperation with the Turkish Firm

“Serhat” propogating the ideas of Pan-Islamism”, 29.04.2003 Accessed on Jan 25, 2005 at

http://www.fsb.ru/smi/ufsb/2003/030429-4.html

30

organization outlawed in Turkey itself55

. Mr Karabekov, one of the opposition members

in Kyrgyzstan, is a representative of Russian-speaking intelligentsia nurtured by the

Soviet State. He is known to call the Kyrgyz language “a deficient” one and refusing to

speak it on that ground.

However, it has now been four years since Mr Karabekov made the statement

regarding the threat that the schools pose and the Kyrgyz government still has not closed

down the schools. On the contrary, the schools are praised as making a great contribution

to the development of the school education in the republic and in 2004 Gűlen was given

the award for “intersociety Adaptation and Contribution to Peace through his thought and

activities in education” also previously awarded to Presidents Nazarbaev, Akaev and

Demirel56

. The president of the award-giving organization, “Kyrgyzstan Spirituality

Foundation”, Mr Toktosartov pointed out during the ceremony:

"Turkish people, following the lead of [Mustafa Kemal] Ataturk, have looked after us since we

gained our independence. In this frame, Gűlen has put forward important ideas and

recommendations for our young to have a good education and for establishment of peace

between Eastern and Western countries. Today, the schools opened with his recommendations

are the most effective education institutions in this country."57

It is evident from the quotation above that the fact of the connection between the

schools and Fethullah Gűlen is no secret for the Kyrgyz government. Nonetheless, not

only the schools in the country are not considered threatening, their number is constantly

growing. Two new schools have been established in 2004: one girls’ schools in Issyk-

Kul and one boys’ school in Talas. The network of “Sebat” schools is expanding and the

number of applicants to these schools is steadily increasing. Thus, while in 1992 only 586

55

Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway web site. Weekly Kyrgyzstan press review № 47 (121) , 26 Nov-2

Dec, 2001. From material “Kyrgyz-Turkish lyceums “Sebat” pose a threat for the national security of

Kyrgyzstan”, Info-center “Bishkek”, Nov 26 2001. Accessed on March 10, 2005 at

http://rus.gateway.kg/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=339&story_name=doc2187.shtml 56

Fethullah Gulen’s Official web site. “Kyrghyz Grants Gulen 'Contribution to Peace' Award” by Zafer

Ozcan, Atif Ala, Zaman, 11.03.2004. Accessed on Dec 20 2004 at

http://fethullahgulen.org/a.page/press/news/2004/a1872.html?PHPSESSID=4262679f8d533e43c028376b2a

5e35e7 57

Ibid.

31

six-graders took part in the entrance tests, in 2004 the figure was 54,10058

. Given the

increased number of schools (in 1992 there were only three, while in 2004 fourteen

schools) these figures mean that in absolute terms the number of applicants has increased

about 20 times. Even after schools started to require that the students pay tuition the

number of the applicants did not decrease. All these facts speak in support of the schools’

popularity, prestige and effectiveness in preparing students for entering a university.

They also demonstrate that the Kyrgyz state does not have any objections to the schools’

activities. On the contrary, the government continues to license and give attestation to

“Sebat” schools and allows new ones to be established almost each year (See Appendix

V).

What does it mean in the light of the hypotheses put forward above? Firstly, we

have established with a considerable degree of certainty that the nationalizing states of

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan use the education at the school level in their cultural

nationalization of persons processes. Therefore, we can say that the Hypothesis 1, which

is “An educational system is utilized as a cultural nationalization policy” finds support in

evidence.

Secondly, the fact of the Kyrgyz State’s tolerance towards the schools could signify

a weakly articulated nationalization program. While the state might be determined to

pursue the nationalizing project it might be prevented from it by a number of factors.

Among those factors we could identify the prevalence of the sub-national allegiances, the

demographic composition, the political situation within the country as well as the

geopolitical position of the state, especially as regards its relations with the Russian

Federation. As Bremmer put it, “ while the post-Soviet states engaged in nationalizing

process, they did not necessarily become states of and for their respective titular national

58

Data was provided by the Sebat educational institution in February 2005

32

groups”59

. Therefore, part a) of the Hypothesis 2 (“the non-state schools will not be

tolerated by a nationalizing state if they are perceived to produce a kind of graduates,

whose loyalties are turned towards outside/broader identities more than towards the

national identity”) does not apply here, because there is still a lot of ambiguity regarding

what comprises a genuinely Kyrgyz identity. As for the Uzbekistan case, there is

convincing evidence supporting the idea that Hypothesis 1 is true for the case of Gűlen

schools in Uzbekistan.

At the same time, the schools might be engaged in the process of formulation of the

Kyrgyz national identity, as the Gűlen movement has voluntarily assumed the duty to

make a contribution to the nationalizing project. Hakan Yavuz writes:

When I asked a student from Kizilkiya High School in Kyrgyzstan what the main difference was

between private Turkish high schools and the public schools, he responded by saying that ‘we [in the

private schools] are more patriotic and nationalist than they are.” In this interview with the student, one

can clearly see the social conservatism and patriotic nationalism among the student body60

.

Finally, the Gűlen schools in Kyrgyzstan are well received due to the fact that they

were not connected or perceived to be associated with the opposition forces challenging

the regime of the day, as was the case in Uzbekistan. Thus, the part b) of the Hypothesis

2, which reads “the non-state schools will not be tolerated by a nationalizing state if they

are perceived to produce a kind of graduates, whose loyalties are turned towards the

identities associated with or promoted by the opposition forces, challenging the current

regime” seems to be valid in both cases.

59

Bremmer, Ian, “Post-Soviet Nationalities Theory: past, present, and future” in Bremmer, Ian and Taras,

Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1997), 3. 60

Yavuz, Hakan, “The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.).

Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement ( Syracuse University Press, 2003), 40.

33

Part V: Conclusions

The post-Soviet Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were confronted

by the challenge of consolidation of national identities of their own that would justify and

strengthen the existence of the respective nation-states. In their pursuit of the new

national self-consciousness both states have engaged in what Annette Bohr calles

“nationalizing policies and practices” and have become what Rogers Brubaker terms

“nationalizing states.” The politics of nationalization, as Brubaker writes, is informed by

the ideas that the titular nationality is the one and only legitimate owner of the polity, but,

which despite this fact has been deprived of the privileges that should follow from this

status. On the basis of such ideas state and non-state political actors alike form formal

and informal strategies, policies and practices that are aimed to establish the titular nations

as the primus inter pares in their polities. Consolidation of the state control over the

school education system became one of the policies in the cultural nationalization projects

in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In this paper we have looked at how the state and the

non-state actors interact in the framework of the nationalizing processes in these states.

The non-state actor in this case was the Gűlen movement, which runs a network of

educational institutions in Turkey and all over the world. The movement is a

transnational civil society organization, which attaches a great ideological significance to

its educational activities. Although there are similar schools all over the globe, the

Central Asian region receives special attention of the movement due to the historical,

cultural and ethnic links that exist between the Turkish and the Central Asians. It is

argued here that the Gűlen schools in Central Asia have adopted practices that were

informed by the ideas of the nationalization. These policies were combined with the

mission of Turkification and Islamization that were perceived as embraced by the national

identity.

34

The differences in the degree and nature of nationalization in Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan explain the differing responses of the states to the Gűlen schools activities.

Uzbekistan is a state with a strongly articulated national independence ideology and

positioning itself as a self-sufficient regional leader. Its demographic composition and the

authoritarian leadership allow it to pursue the politics of nationalization without giving

rise to much controversy among its population. Therefore, she could afford not to tolerate

the activities of the Turkish schools. The schools were viewed by the state as associated

with the identities of Turkism and Islamism promoted by the opposition forces and thus

rejected as threatening to the national security.

Kyrgyzstan has less a thoroughly articulated national ideology. Due to its

demographic composition, its dependent status in the region, to the fact that there is much

lesser degree of resentment to the Soviet past and a more open political system compared

to Uzbekistan, there is still a lot of ambiguity surrounding the notion of Kyrgyz national

identity and national ideology. Consequently, given a more subtle nature of the

nationalization politics in Kyrgyzstan, the schools are not perceived as a threat to a

genuine local Kyrgyz identity. Neither does the government perceive the schools as

connected ideologically to the opposition forces. Therefore, the schools are flourishing in

the country and their number and prestige are growing.

Thus, it can be concluded that the nationalizing policies in the sphere of school

education adopted by the non-state actors will be denied by the state:

1) if they come from an outside power that is perceived by the regime of the day as

having imperialistic intentions;

2) if the state has a strongly articulated national ideology and the non-state

educational institutions are believed to produce graduates, whose loyalties are

turned more toward supra-national identities; or those identities that the state

associates with the opposition forces.

35

Bibliography:

Books:

Agai, Bekim. 2003. “Towards an Islamic Ethic of Education. Fethullah Gűlen and the

Activities of His Movement in the Field of Education”, in Yavuz, Hakan and Voll, John

(ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement. Syracuse University

Press.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. 1989. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and

Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park, London, New Dehli: Sage Publications.

Chapter XI, “Political Socialization”

Anderson, Benedict. 1936-. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread

of Nationalism. –rev. and extended ed. 1991. London, New York: Verso.

Ashin, G.K., Kravchenko, S.A. and Lozanskiy, E.D. 2001. Sociologiia politiki.

Sravnitel’niy analiz rossiiskih i amerikanskih politicheskih realii. Moskva: Ekzamen.

Berg, Bruce L. 2000. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 4th

edition.

Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Berna, Turam. 2003. “National Loyalties and International Undertakings”, in Yavuz,

Hakan and Voll, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement.

Syracuse University Press.

Bohr, Annette. 1998. “The Central Asian States as Nationalizing Regimes” in Smith,

Graham at al (eds.), Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of

National Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bremmer, Ian. 1997. “Post-Soviet Nationalities Theory: past, present, and future” in

Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet

Nations. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brint, Steven. 1997. Schools and Societies. Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli: Pine

Forge Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in

the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cookson , Peter W. and Hodges, Caroline. 1985. Preparing for Power: America's Elite

Boarding Schools. .New York : Persell Basic Books.

36

Esposito, John L. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford

University Press. (Questia Media America Database, Inc www.questia.com. Accessed on

Sept 16 2004)

Fraser, Lidley. 1957. Ch. 10 “Propaganda, Education and Writing of History”, in

Propaganda. London: Oxford University Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University

Press

Gleason, Gregory. 1997 “Uzbekistan: the Politics of National Independence” in Bremmer,

Ian and Taras, Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations.

New York: Cambridge University Press.

Howe, Marvine. 2000. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival. Boulder,

CO: Westview Press. (Questia Media America Database, Inc www.questia.com.

Accessed on Sept 16 2004).

Huskey, Eugene. 1997. “Kyrgyzstan: the politics of Demographic and Economic

Frustration” in Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray (ed.). New States, New Politics: Building the

Post Soviet Nations. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jowett, Garth S. and O’Donnell, Victoria. 1992. Propaganda and Persuasion, 2nd

edition.

Newbury Park, London, New Dehli: Sage Publications.

Kolsto, Pal. 1999. Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An

Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Questia Media

America Database, Inc www.questia.com. Accessed on Feb 10 2005)

Kosebalaban, Hasan, “The Making of Enemy and Friend: Fethullah Gűlen’s National-

Security Identity”, in Yavuz, Hakan and Voll, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular

State, The Gűlen Movement. Syracuse University Press.

Kramer, Heinz. 2000. A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United

States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Chapter 5, “The Revival of Political

Islam”

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Search for a Middle Way between Modernity

and Muslim Tradition” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the

Secular State, The Gűlen Movement. Syracuse University Press.

37

Landau, Jacob M. 1995. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Bloomington

and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Chapters 1 and 7

Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. (year?) Problems of Democratic Transition and

Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore

and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Lowe, Robert. 2003. “Nation Building and Identity in the Kyrgyz Republic” in in Everett-

Heath, Tom (ed.). Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, London, New York: Routledge

Curzon.

Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapter 5, “Nationalism

and Cultural Pluralism”

Ozdalga, Elizabeth. 2003. “Following in the Footsteps of Fethullah Gűlen: Three Women

Teachers Tell their Stories” in Yavuz, Hakan and Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and

the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement. Syracuse University Press.

Roy, Olivier. 2000. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. London and New

York: I.B. Taurus Publishers.

Segars, Andrews. 2003. “Nation-Building in Turkey and Uzbekistan. The use of language

and history in the creation of national identity” in Everett-Heath, Tom (ed.). Central Asia:

Aspects of Transition. London, New York: Routledge Curzon.

Yavuz, Hakan. 2003. “The Gűlen Movement: The Turkish Puritans” in Yavuz, Hakan and

Esposito, John (ed.). Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gűlen Movement. Syracuse

University Press.

Winrow, Gareth M. 1995. “Turkey and Former Soviet Central Asia: A Turkic Culture

Area in the Making?”, in Warikoo, K (ed.). Central Asia: Emerging New Order. Har-

Anand Publications.

Journals:

Aras, Bulent and Caha, Omer. 2000. “Fethullah Gűlen and His Liberal “Turkish Islam”

Movement”. Middle East Review of International Affairs 4 (4) [online]. Available at:

http://meria.idc.il/journal/2000/issue 4/jv4n4a4.html [accessed Sept 19 2004].

Aydin, Mustafa. 2004. “Foucalt’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and Caucasus”.

Turkish Studies 5 (2):1-22

38

Balci, Bayram. 2002. “Central Asia: Fethullah Gűlen’s missionary schools”. Religioscope

(posted 11 Apr 2002)

Balci, Bayram. 2003. “Fethullah Gűlen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their

Role in Spreading of Turkism and Islam”. Religion, State & Society 31 (2): 151-177

(Found on EBSCO database on Sept 2, 2004

Brubaker, Rogers. 1995. “National Minorities, nationalizing states, and external national

homelands in the new Europe”. Daedalus Spring 1995. (Accessed on the

www.findarticles.com on Jan 30, 2005)

Buerkle, Karen and Guseva, Alya. 2002. “What do you know, who do you know? School

as a site for the Production of Social Capital and its Effects on income attainment in

Poland and the Czech Republic”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology (issue?

Pages?).

Cookson, Peter W. and Hodges Persell, Caroline. 1986. “The Price of Privilege; Elite Prep

Schools Demand Conformity as the Rite of Passage into the Upper Class”. Psychology

Today 20: 30-. (Questia Media America Database, Inc www.questia.com. Accessed on

Oct 7 2004)

Demir, Cennet Engin, Balci, Ayse and Akkok Fusun. 2000. “The Role of Turkish Schools

in the Educational System and Social Transformation of Central Asian Countries: the case

of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.” Central Asian Survey 19(1): 141-155.

Dukenbaev, Askat and Hansen, William W. 2003. “Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan”

Norgaard, Ole & Johannsen, Lars (Ed.) Demstar Research Report No. 16 Published at

www.demstar.dk Accessed on Jan 25 2005

Grunig, James E. 1993. “Public Relations and International Affairs: Effects, Ethics and

Responsibility”. Journal of International Affairs 47 (1): 137-162 (Questia Media America

Database, Inc www.questia.com. Accessed on Oct 10 2004).

Hepburn, Mary A., Niemi, Richard G. 1995. “The Rebirth of Political Socialization”.

Perspectives on Political Science 24 (1): 7-. (Questia Media America Database, Inc

www.questia.com. Accessed on Oct 25 2004).

Kirimli, Meryem. 1997. “Uzbekistan in the New World Order”. Central Asian Survey

16(1): 53-64.

39

Kristianasen, Wendy. 1997. “New Faces of Islam”. Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1997

(Found on EBSCO database on Sept 19 2004).

Lindsay, Beverly. 1987. “Developing and Evaluating an Educational Program Designed

for Public Diplomacy: The Teacher-Text-Technology Program”. The Journal of Negro

Education 56 (3): 390-406 (JSTOR database of scholarly journals – http://www.jstor.org/.

Accessed on Sept 15 2004).

Sutton, Mary-Jean. 2003. “Re-examining Total Institutions: a case study from

Queensland”. Archeology in Oceania 38 (2): 78-89 (Found on EBSCO database on Oct 5

2004).

Virtanen, Ozlem Eraydin. (Date?). “Language Policy and International Relations –

Central Asian Experience”. Paper presented at the Linguapax International Congress.

http://www.linguapax.org/congres/taller/taller3/article17_ang.html. Accessed on Oct 7

2004.

Yavuz, Hakan. 2000. “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere”. Journal of International

Affairs 54 (1): 21-. (Questia Media America Database, Inc www.questia.com. Accessed

on Sept 16 2004).

Internet:

Fethullah Gűlen’s Web site: http://www.fethullahgulen.org Last update: 07.16.2004.

“Sebat” Educational Institution’s Web site: http://sebat.edu.kg Date last modified:

05/02/2004. Accessed on Oct 6 2004.

Public Diplomacy Web site: http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/ Updated: Oct 4 2003.

Accessed on Aug 24 2004.

Legislative Acts:

Decree # 178 of the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of

Uzbekistan “On the Measures on Realization of the Agreements between the Republic of

Uzbekistan and Turkish Republic in the Sphere of Cadres Preparation” 07.04.1992

Decree # 255 of the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of

Uzbekistan “On the Measures on Organization and Development of the Activities of

Uzbek-Turkish high schools” 22.05.1993

Law #464-I of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On Education” 29.08.1997

40

National Program of the cadres preparation (based in the Law # 464-I “On Education”

29.08.1997)

Decree # 435 of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic “On support of the state

programs in the sphere of education conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic with participation

of Turkish Republic” 14.08.2001

Decree # 446 of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic “On realization of the Decree of

the President of Kyrgyz Republic on establishing the private-state men’s lyceum in the

city of Bishkek” 08.09.1992

Law # 92 of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Education” 30.04.2003

Conception of the Development of Education, Science and Culture of the Kyrgyz

Republic endorsed by the Decree #487 of the Government of the KR from 23d of July

1998

Conception of the Development of Education in the Kyrgyz Republic till 2010 endorsed

by the Decree # 259 of the Government of the KR from 29th

of April 2002

State Educational Standard of School Education of the Kyrgyz Republic (approved by the

decree #554 of the Government of the KR of 23.07.2004)

41

Appendices Appendix I

Interview with a graduate (Kyrgyzstan) 25/02/2005

Age: 22

Gender: Male

Education level: university junior

Q: Which school did you graduate from?

A: Osh Kyrgyz-Turkish Lyceum for Boys “Sema” (“Which means ‘blue sky’ in Turkish”)

Q: Which year did you graduate?

A: In 2000

Q: How many people were in your graduating class?

A: Let me think… There were 21 graduates that year.

Q: And how many years did you spend in the lyceum?

A: I studied in the lyceum for five years

Q: When you just entered the school how did the adaptation go?

A: It was very hard for me to adapt. First of all, I did not speak Turkish, Kyrgyz and

English languages that were used for instruction in the schools. I grew up and lived in an

Uzbek mahalla, so I could speak Uzbek, Tatar and Russian. There were only two of us, the

“ginger heads”, in the class. There we could feel a cultural subordination of a kind. So

it was very hard for me to adjust especially during the first semester at the school. In fact,

I escaped from the school after the first quarter (“chetvert”), but my parents brought me

back, because it was too late to transfer me to some other school, so I had to wait at least

till the end of the academic year for me to leave the school. But after a year, I got used to

the school and I did not drop out. I never regretted that I went to the school afterwards.

It was a good experience for me. While in the school I learnt to tell the good from the

evil, I became more independent. I became more detached from my family and learned

how to understand/ read people better.

The school increased my life opportunities. The chances to enter a university, to go to

Turkey for study or work. I applied to the Turkish universities. I passed the exams but

decided not to go. Your know, when you are told throughout five years that Turkey is the

best you start to believe it. I passed the exams for grant to study at a Turkish university.

Sebat organized such exams in the Osh State University. You had to sit tests on English,

Turkish and a subject test. I applied to Finance and Leather engineering. So after my

first year at the university I was accepted but then I sat there and thought what I would do

with a Turkish diploma here, in Kyrgyzstan. And I decided against it.

42

Q: What languages were the classes in the schools conducted in?

A: When we just entered, we were separated into the groups according to the language of

instruction. So, if you went to a Russian school before lyceum you would be placed in a

Russian group where they put strong emphasis on learning Kyrgyz. And vice versa, the

students from Kyrgyz schools were in the other group and they were learning Russian

intensively. The classes were mainly in Kyrgyz. The hard sciences were taught in

English, but if you could not understand a teacher would explain again in Turkish after

class. If you still don’t get it, it’s your problem! After the lyceum, I had problems with

terminology. I did not know for example many math or physics terms in Russian.

Q: Why did you want to enter the lyceum in the first place? What was your motivation?

A: Actually, when I applied, I thought it was a club (“krujok”) of a kind. I sat the exam

and I passed 11th

out of total pull of applicants of 600. There were three of us from my

previous school. So all decided to transfer together. My mother also said I should try. At

first (during my years in the 7th

and 8th

grades) I would be beaten by my classmates.

There was a discrimination of lower graders by the higher graders and also regionalism.

The guys would gang up according to the places they came from.

When I went to lyceum, they were different. Now they are oriented to making profit, while

at our times there was a harsh competition to enter them and the instruction was free.

There was a system of rewards for good students. There were scholarships for excellent

students. But gradually, the schools became commercial and there was still huge

competition to enter them.

Q: Do you keep in touch with your classmates?

A: Yes, we have a yahoo group and we keep in touch via email. When I lived in Osh we

would meet each summer.

Q: What do your classmates do now?

A: Around 30 percent of them have already graduated. Some 50 percent will be

graduating shortly. I know that one guy from my class never went to university. He went

to Russia to earn money. But generally, graduates go to universities. When you finish a

lyceum. You are guaranteed admission to at least two universities: Manas and Ataturk

Universities. Mainly the lyceums’ graduates go to either one.

Q: How do you think the Turkish schools differ from ordinary state schools?

A: They are different in that moral upbringing (vospitanie) within these schools is on the

superior level. They say, they make you convert to Islam or to observe the rules. This is

all not true. Our tutors (vospitateli) were like our friends. We would have meetings/get-

together (toplanti) where we would drink tea and eat sweets and they would tell us to be

good, to respect our parents, not to drink or smoke. It was only thanks to them that I read

some books. They encouraged reading. They would hold competitions on who reads the

most number of pages. The winners would receive prizes.

Q: Tell me more about those get-togethers (toplanti/sohbet). What kind of issues were

discussed there?

43

A: They read us morals (moralized). We would discuss moral and religious issues, but

they would not propagate for Islam. They would take a comparative approach (talk about

different religions). And mostly they would talk about common things: that we should

study hard, not drink or smoke. There were norms, rules and laws within the school. We

were under strict discipline. Everyone was to come on time, not escape from the school.

But we would still run away through the window. Yes, the discipline was harsh. They

would make us study during the etude hours. You were made read for hours by the tutors.

But in the 11th

grade we started to study hard on our own will. We would stay up all night

studying. So by the end we ourselves strove to study. We also were competing with other

lyceums. We studied for the Genel Deneme exam and our schools was always the best.

We even had a strategy. The more successful students (strong students) would sit at the

same desk with the weaker ones, so that the less successful could perform better.

Q: So they would not teach you namaz for instance?

A: No, but there was a namazhona for those who wanted to perform their prayers.

You know people say stuff about the Turkish schools, like the students and the teachers

are gay there, like they are monasteries and stuff, but we were just normal guys. We knew

how to work the system. We would run away and drink and have fun with girls. We

would sleep under the beds so that when a tutor enters a dorm in the morning to wake us

up, it seemed like everyone is already up and working hard in the classroom. This way I

could skip morning classes and get enough sleep. Also we were friends with cooks and

guards, so we always had enough food and could get out of the school when we needed.

But the food was good anyways, especially after they increased the tuition fees.

44

Appendix II

Interview with a graduate (Uzbekistan)

20/02/2005

Age: 23

Gender: Male

Level of education: BA, LLM and MA

Q: Which schools did you graduate from? Year of graduation?

A: Tashkent Uzbek-Turkish Boys’ High School, 1998

Q: How many people were there in your class? How many graduated the same year?

A: We were about 27 in one class, about 50 students graduated the same year.

Q: How many years did you spend in the Turkish lyceum?

A: 3 years

Q: Why did you want to attend a Turkish lyceum?

A: I wanted to obtain the best available education

Q: When you just enrolled did you have any problems adapting/adjusting to the new

environment?

A: Not at all. Perhaps, this is because of my adaptation skills.

Q: What was the language(s) of instruction? What was the language(s) of communication

outside of classroom?

A: The languages of instruction were English and Turkish. Uzbek was the main language

of communication outside the classroom.

Q: How were the Turkish lyceums different from the ordinary state schools in your

opinion?

A: They were different in many aspects: the student body which was mainly one-sex, the

methodology of teaching was based on something very different approach than in other

secondary schools, the grading system was totally different. Generally it was a new

approach of teaching subjects. We used to stay in the dormitory during the whole week

and were allowed to go home only for weekends. We had pre-class reading hours, so-

called “etudes”, which were mainly early in the morning and late in the evening before

and after the classes. The courses were very intensive. Other things like providing free

meal and uniform clothing were different from other schools.

Q: Do you think that your experiences in the lise made you different from other schools’

graduates in Uzbekistan? If yes, how?

A: I would not put the emphasis on the difference because many might understand it

negatively. Of course a student educated in an environment different than other schools

will certainly be different from those graduates of ordinary secondary schools. One

difference can be that I knew fluently at least three languages Uzbek, English and Turkish

when I graduated.

Q: Do you keep in touch with your classmates? With your teachers? If yes, how often?

45

A: I used to keep in touch for several years after graduating but now I do not.

Q: How many percent of your classmates (approximately) went to university? Do you

know what they are doing now?

A: 100 % of my classmates entered different universities just after the graduation or a

year later. Most of them have jobs now, and some of them are abroad.

Q: Did you have good relations with your teachers?

A: Yes, I had good relations with my teachers.

Q: Did you take part in sohbets with your Turkish teachers? What kind of topics were

discusses there?

A: I did not take part in such “sohbets”, but we frequently used to drink tea all together

and talk about ordinary things in life like football, future plans, recent achievements and

etc. frankly, I do not know what is “sohbet”. According to dictionary it means just a

conversation, doesn’t it?

Q: Did you ever feel peer pressure to behave in a certain way while in the school? If yes,

How? Give an example?

A: Yes, I felt. For example always wearing a tie, being always very neat, keeping my

shoes shining, and other hygiene requirements.

Q: What opinion are you of your Turkish teachers? What do you think was their

motivation to come to teach in Uzbekistan?

A: I think my teachers were great people. They came from far away to teach us and give

some knowledge. And I am sure they did their job very, very sincerely. I still sometimes do

not understand how a person could be so sincere, no matter what goal he has. They were

very devoted for their job. I think that was their main aim to come to Uzbekistan i.e. to

give better knowledge so that in the future we could become excellent specialists to serve

our country and to maintain its independence and prosperity.

Q: When was your school closed? Were you given any reasons? Why do you think was

the school closed?

A: My school was closed in 2000, I guess. Government gave no official explanation for

this. I think this is because nobody asked fro explanation for some reasons that I do not

know, and I think the schools were closed just based on very subjective considerations of

the ruling political elite. They made of it a political issue, which I don’t agree with. I do

not see any difference between such educational programs provided by other countries to

Uzbekistan, be it Turkey, the US, the UK, Germany or Japan. All have some goal in mind.

Then, the problem is whether those goals suit the interests of ruling political elite or not.

46

Appendix III

Interview with teacher in Kyrgyzstan

03/02/2005

Q: How many years have you been teaching in Kyrgyzstan?

A: I have been teaching for eight years already.

Q: What was your motivation for coming to teach here?

A: You know, our ancestors came to Anatoliya from this region, Central Asia. So we

have common roots. After the Soviet Union collapsed we decided to come and establish

educational institutions here to help our brothers.

Q: Do you keep in touch with your students after they graduate?

A: yes, we do keep in touch, if they wish to. They come and visit us at the schools.

Sometimes we can give them a good advice or employment.

Q: What do they usually do in life?

A: 15 of my students go to AUCA. There are many more though other graduates of

Turkish schools who go there. Our students are very successful in entering the

universities upon graduation.

Q: How do you see an ideal graduate of your schools?

A: An ideal graduate? Let him just be a good person and serve people around him, his

family, his people/nation, his Motherland. You see, Education (egitim) and Good

Upbringing (terbiye) are like the two wings of a bird. Both are essential to bring up a

good human being. We teach our students simple things: not using alcohol or drugs,

respecting their parents, being useful to other people.

Q: What is the mission of the Turkish schools and how are they different from ordinary

state schools?

A: Why we came here? You know we have schools not only here in Central Asia, but in

other parts of the world. I am going back to Turkey this summer. We don’t come here to

stay, you know. Now we already have many local teachers recruited from among our

graduates, who had gone to Manas or Ataturk universities. If they are good, we hire them

as teachers for our schools. As soon as we are not needed here, we will leave. We will

move on and open and develop schools where they are needed more. We don’t earn high

salaries here, just ordinary salaries that teachers in Turkey would get. We are here to

help our brothers.

Q: Why do you think the schools were closed in Uzbekistan?

A: I don’t have any idea. There must had been some disagreements with the government.

May be your president…what’s his name? Karimov? May be Karimov did not like the

schools and they were closed down. If they tell us here that we should leave, we will

leave immediately. There is no question about it.

47

Appendix IV

Interview with Sebat representative

05/02/2005

Q: How many lyceums run by Sebat are there in Kyrgyzstan? How many students are

currently studying there?

A: There are 14 normal schools (Lyceums) in Kyrgyzstan. Besides, there is a British

style international school “Silk Road” , in which all the classes are taught in English

from 1st to 11

th grade. Also there is a university (Ataturk-Alatoo) and a language center,

in which there are courses on English, Turkish, Russian and Kyrgyz and computer. Also

we have dormitories for university students: two in Bishkek and one in Osh. Totally there

are 21 educational institutions. Overall 5100 students attend our institutions. There are

150 Turkish teachers working in the schools (with the university the number is somewhere

around 190 teachers). Overall we have 250 faculty members on all of the institutions.

Q: How many percent of your graduates enter universities in Kyrgyzstan or Turkey?

A: I don’t remember exactly. Let me give you a brochure, in which all the numbers are

given. If I say approximately now, I might be wrong.

Q: Do you keep in touch with the graduates? What do they do?

A: With those graduates who are currently studying in Turkey we stay in touch because

their parents come to us asking to find out about their children. We help the families

communicate and find those students from whom they have not heard for several months.

We ask a friend there, say in Istanbul to help us, so we serve like a bridge between them

and their families. But we also have students studying in various places: Russia, Europe,

America, some are even in Japan, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Egypt, with those it is hard to

stay in touch, of course. Only if via email…

Q: How about those who are still in Kyrgyzstan?

A: Oh, the graduates naturally stay in touch during the first couple of years especially.

After some time they don’t come to visit that often. But when they come they do so

because they want to. Each year we organize a get-together (a reunion) for our

graduates on the 25th

of August. People come and meet each other and former

classmates. We cook pilaf and people communicate.

Q: Where do the graduates usually work?

A: You mean after graduating from university? Well, in all kind of places. For example,

those who graduated say from computer science department of the Ataturk-Alatoo

university work in the field of computers and so on. Many find jobs with Turkish and

other foreign companies. Out of those who went to university in Turkey some part works

there. Some work for the government. Mostly our graduates do some kind of

administrative office work. But it is very hard to find a job in Kyrgyzstan…

Q: What is the educational philosophy of the schools? What is their mission/goal?

48

A: There are schools like ours not only in Kyrgyzstan. They are found all over the world

and the only philosophy that they believe in is that there is a great need of a well-bred

person (Ahlakli insan problemi) in this world, which is only solved by educating people.

When people are not given proper education we observe such things as terrorism and

poverty. For example, I think, that what happened in America was because of the lack of

education. We see a great need in love as well. So in our educational institutions we try

to give people not only knowledge not only feed them some information about math,

physics and chemistry, but also give them some love. Teach them to tell evil from the

good. We need to achieve a balance between love and education that are given to students

in the schools.

Q: How are the Turkish schools different from the ordinary state schools?

A: First of all, there are some differences in program, in the textbooks. For instance, in

ordinary schools they teach math 5 hours per week while in our schools it’s taught for 6

hours. So our program is more intensive in a way. But the main key difference is not in

the program but in the cadres’ approach and the attitude of the teachers who work in our

schools. They are so deeply dedicated to the work they do, they work so hard and with

such enthusiasm that the success of our students is their achievement for the most part.

They work not for money, but for the idea, they really want to give some things to their

students. Our teachers are mostly young or middle aged and they all work with all their

hearts. Take for example, the schools established here directly in cooperation between

Turkish and Kyrgyz governments. They have similar conditions, higher level of the

teachers’ qualifications, similar programs. Why then are they not successful in the school

Olympiads? They never win prize places in such competitions. Why? Because those

people do not work with their hearts. They are not as dedicated to their service as our

teachers.

Q: How is the education plan developed? How do you cooperate with the state/ Ministry

of Education?

A: Our entire program is developed in the closest cooperation and in coordination with

the Kyrgyz Ministry of Education. We have to go through regular procedures of

licensing, attestations, commissions. We always work with the local authorities in the

Ministry of education and never with the Turkish side.

Q: What languages are the classes held in? What is the proportion of the use of different

languages?

A: All our students are proficient in at least four languages. All the science classes

(Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Chemistry and such) are taught in English. In addition

there are classes on English language. All other courses are taught either in Kyrgyz or in

Russian according to the students’ first languages. Turkish is only taught as a second

foreign language.

Q: What should/ do you want a graduate of your schools to be like? How do you see an

ideal graduate?

A: We would like our graduate just to be a useful person (faydali insan). For his family,

his nation, for the humankind.

49

Q: In your opinion, are your schools successful in achieving this ideal?

A: We do not have an objective of achieving a 100% success in our undertakings.

Whether the schools are successful or not will become clear in 50 or 100 years’ time. In

fact, there is not clear measure as to the degree of success of the schools. We will not

make each student the way we want but we still love them all. The more the better, but we

try to give our students knowledge and make them good people as well.

Q: In Central Asia increasingly many people do not think it important to educate women.

What is your opinion on this issue?

A: I think it is very important to educate women. Even more important than to educate

men. Why? Because when a girl becomes a mother she must be educated in order to be

able to bring her children up as good people. A child between ages one to seven is very

receptive to the influence from the mother. It is at this age period that a personality,

character are formed. Therefore, it is vital that a mother is educated and enlightened so

that she teaches her children well.

50

Appendix V

“Sebat” schools in Kyrgyzstan (2004)

School name Gender # Students Location Year opened

1 “Chyngyz Aytmatov” male 520 Bishkek 1992

2 “H. Karasaev” male 369 Issyk-Kul 1992

3 “Sema” male 341 Osh 1992

4 “Aichurok” female 336 Bishkek 1993

5 “H Sabakojoev” male 220 Naryn 1993

6 “Kurmanbek Baatyr” male 362 Jalal-Abad 1993

7 “Semetei” Male 240 Kadamjay 1993

8 “”Sebat male 302 Tokmok 1994

9 “Sebat” male 216 Kyzyl-Kiya 1994

10 “Sebat” female 224 Jalal-Abad 1995

11 “Sebat” female 285 Osh 1998

12 “Meerim-Sebat” female 182 Talas 2002

13 “Sebat” female 54 Issyk-Kul 2004

14 “Sebat” male 76 Talas 2004

Total number of students 3727

“Silm” Schools in Uzbekistan (2000)

# Location Region

1 Tahiatash Karakalpakstan Republic

2 Andijan Andijan region

3 Gulistan kolkhoz (Gijduvan) Buhkara region

4 Vobkent Bukhara region

5 Jizzakh Jizzakh region

6 Karshi Kashkadarya region

7 Navoi Navoi region

8 Turakurgan Namangan region

9 Gulobod (pos) Samarkand region

10 Angor (rayon) Surkhandarya region

11 Yangiyor Syrdarya region

12 Tashkent (Economy) Tashkent city

13 Tashkent (Girl’s) Tashkent city

14 Tashkent (Boy’s) Tashkent city

15 Angren Tashkent region

16 Fergana Ferhgana region

17 Kokand Ferghana region

18 Hanka Khorezm region

Total number of students 3,334