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Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13
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Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

Mar 28, 2015

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Page 1: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

Assessing competition in hospital mergers

Alistair Lindsay30.9.13

Page 2: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

Topics

• The landscape Who looks at what? What does Monitor do?

• Features of NHS hospital mergers at OFT/CC

Page 3: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

THE LANDSCAPE

Page 4: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

1.1 NHS hospital mergers

• OFT/CC have jurisdiction if: 2+ enterprises cease to be distinct; and either

target’s UK turnover >£70m; or combined share of supply 25%+

• Health & Social Care Act 2012, s. 79 enterprises cease to be distinct if:(a) activities of 2+ foundation trusts

cease to be distinct; or(b) activities of 1+ foundation trusts and

1+ other businesses cease to be distinct

Page 5: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

1.2 Scope of s. 79

• OFT/CC consider: FT / FT merger FT / trust merger Trust acquisition of activities of FT FT / third party JV

e.g. proposed UCLH/RFL/TDL pathology JV

• May catch: reconfigurations (see Bristol, CCP) transfers or pooling of assets, hosting,

management alliances, franchising etc.

Page 6: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

1.3 Monitor advises OFT

• HSCA, s. 79: Monitor must advise OFT on: the effect of the matter on customer

benefits for NHS patients such other matters as Monitor considers

appropriate• Issues:

Impact on timetable? Are parties obliged to run a benefits case? “Advice” not binding; when would OFT depart? How does the CC assess benefits? What other matters will Monitor advise on?

Page 7: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

1.4 The literature

• Monitor briefing notes: Trust & FT mergers: 22/3/13 Pathology reconfigurations: 3/6/13 (Draft) merger benefits: 27/3/13

• Cases: Poole/Bournemouth (OFT, CC PFs) UCLH/RF neurosurgery (OFT) SSP/22 GP practices (OFT FNTQ) ULCH/RF/TDL: pending

Page 8: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

2.1 Monitor reviews:

• Trust / trust mergers Advises NHS Trust Development Authority If Monitor advises TDA to prohibit, TDA may still

allow transaction on public interest grounds• Lots of precedents:

Some involving complex behavioural remedies, e.g. Barts

NB Bristol (20.9.13): a brake on reconfiguration• Reason for Monitor/OFT split: no transfer of control• Issues:

Are there material differences of approach between OFT/CC and Monitor/TDA?

Should there be?

Page 9: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

3.1 Private hospital mergers

• OFT / CC review E.g. General Healthcare /

Covenant Healthcare HCA / London Heart Hospital

• Also: read across from Private Healthcare market inquiry

Page 10: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

THE FEATURES

Page 11: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.1 Nicholson challenge

• £20bn savings over 2011-14• … whilst pressure to improve

quality, esp. 24/7 consultant cover• Providers see mergers as source of

savings (single rotas etc.)• But evidence on success of mergers

is equivocal• Carter Review (2008): pathology too

fragmented

Page 12: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.2 Not for profit

• Doesn’t preclude competition• But affects competition:

For profits focus on returns to owners and therefore aim to provide good quality goods/services

FTs focus on patient care but are required to (at least) break-even

Page 13: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.3 Highly regulated

• Minimum standards (CQC etc) and incentives to raise standards (CQUIN)

• What role for competition? Complex but crucial issue

• Gvt policy of promoting choice and rewarding success (PbR, AQP)

• CC ascribed significant role to competition in driving patient outcomes Patients/GPs have and exercise choice Quality affects choice

Page 14: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.4 Product market

• No price to patients for NHS work, so SSNIP applied to small but significant decline in quality

• Demand-side: generally no scope to substitute between procedures

• Supply-side: clinicians generally switch between procedures within a specialism Although trend is towards sub-specialism

• Starting point = define by specialism Split elective / non-elective Split outpatient / inpatient Community-only services considered separately

• Private = separate

Page 15: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.5 Geographic market

• Catchment data as starting point 80% plus sensitivity testing Reflects preferences at current quality

• What would happen if quality fell by a small but significant amount? Evidence-driven: may vary by

area/hospital/specialism

Page 16: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.6 Competitive effects

• Elective and maternity: Mainly competition in the market:

what options does the patient have? Also potential competition & competition for market

• Other non-elective: Mainly competition for the market

Emergency services 30% marginal tariff rate Will commissioners organise tenders and will

these suppliers bid against one another? Cf. Bristol (CCP) incentive to maintain/improve

quality as commissioners could change• Specialised services: could be competition in the market

or for the market

Page 17: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.7 Poole/Bournemouth: closest competitors

Page 18: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.8 Poole/Bournemouth: other features

• Existing cooperation NHS duty of “integration” Shared consultants

But hospitals compete on other parameters e.g. cleanliness

And can compete using the bought-in consultant

• Complementarity argument CC reviewed marketing to GPs

Page 19: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.9 Poole/Bournemouth:PFs• “2 to 1” is a problem

20 elective inpatient 36 outpatient Maternity Private cardiology

• Even with strong commissioner support• No concerns about:

Other non-elective (unlikely to be bidding against one another)

Community (largely no overlap) Other private (many rivals)

Page 20: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.10 How much competition do you need?

• What about “3 to 2”? Not enough for supermarkets, LBOs etc. But does extensive regulation / residual role for

competition cash out here?

• Small catchments mean: (often) few if any rivals in overlaps What about near rivals outside

catchment?• What about nearest neighbours but

catchments don’t overlap?

Page 21: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.11 Exiting firm

• Hospitals providing essential services will not be allowed to exit Instead, new management or, in extreme,

special administrator (e.g. South London)• So exiting firm very hard to show• How do you deal (quickly) with takeovers of failing

hospitals? Superior management as a customer benefit

(cf. Northumbria, CCP)? Is a transfer by a TSA subject to merger control

(cf. South London)?

Page 22: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.12 Benefits & remedies

Page 23: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.13 Patient benefits

• Issues: Merger specificity Likelihood

Reconfiguration obligations Incentive to deliver if not profitable?

Timely

Page 24: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

4.14 Remedies

• Monitor has accepted behavioural remedies

• CC in Poole remedies notice said nothing short of prohibition would be effective

Page 25: Assessing competition in hospital mergers Alistair Lindsay 30.9.13.

Thank You

For more informationwww.monckton.com