Asian Democracy Review Vol 1 2012

AsianDemocracyReviewVOLUME 1 · 2012

VOLUME 1 · 2012Asian Democracy Review

VOLUME 1 ASIAN DEMOCRACY REVIEW 2012

1 Editor�s NoteHeeyeon Cho

A R T I C L E SA R T I C L E SA R T I C L E SA R T I C L E SA R T I C L E S

4 Democratization as De-monopolization and its DifferentTrajectories: No Democratic Consolidation withoutDe-monopolizationHeeyeon Cho

36 The Asian Democracy Index: A GuideThe Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index

COUNTRY REPORTSCOUNTRY REPORTSCOUNTRY REPORTSCOUNTRY REPORTSCOUNTRY REPORTS

88 Democracy Index in South Korea, 2011Hyungchul Kim, Junghoon Kim, Heeyeon Cho, Hyunyun Cho,Seoungwon Lee, Yooseok Oh, Dongchoon Kim, Kyungtae Park,Youngpyo Seo, Sangchul Yoon, Kyunghee Choi

108 (De)Monopolization of Democracy in Indonesia?The Indonesian Report on the Asian Democracy Index 2011Anton Pradjasto, Irwansyah, Dirga Ardiansa, Roichatul Aswidah,Sri Budi Eko Wardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, Yolanda Panjaitan

134 The CADI Asian Democracy Index:2011 Country Report �The PhilippinesMiguel Paolo P. Reyes, Clarinda Lusterio Berja,Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Socrates

RESEARCH NOTERESEARCH NOTERESEARCH NOTERESEARCH NOTERESEARCH NOTE

182 Rating Philippine Democratization:A Review of Democratization MetricsMiguel Paolo P. Reyes

R E V I E W SR E V I E W SR E V I E W SR E V I E W SR E V I E W S

199 Reviews of the 2011 Country Reports and Preliminary Comments onthe Conduct of the 2012 Asian Democracy Index Survey

Felipe B. Miranda � Bonojit Hussain � Temario C. Rivera �Edna Estifania A. Co � Malaya C. Ronas

Asian

Democracy

EDITORIAL BOARD

Andrew Aeria (Associate Professor, University of Malaysia Sarawak) · Maria Ela L.

Atienza (Director, University of the Philippines Third World Studies Center) ·

Amrapali Basumatary (Assistant Professor, University of Delhi Kirori Mal College) ·

Clarinda Lusterio Berja (Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines-Manila)

· Dongchoon Kim (Director, Democracy and Social Movements Institute, Sungkonghoe

University) · Bonojit Hussain (New Socialist Initiative-Delhi Chapter) · Anton

Pradjasto (Executive Director, Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies

Indonesia) · Sri Budi Eko Wardani (Director, University of Indonesia Center for

Political Studies) · Tan Seng Keat (Research Manager, Merdeka Centre for Opinion

Research)

EDITOR

Heeyeon Cho

MANAGING EDITORS

Seoungwon Lee

Miguel Paolo P. Reyes

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTSElinor May K. Cruz · Emerald O. Flaviano · Enrico V. Gloria

Ferth Vandensteen L. Manaysay · Erika M. Rey-Saturay ·Zuraida Mae C. Villanueva · Patcharapoom Yookasem

EDITORIAL CONSULTANT

Joel F. Ariate, Jr.

Asian Democracy Review (ISSN 2244-5633) is the annual journal of the Consortium

for the Asian Democracy Index, a network of research institutes and independent researchers

working on the development of the Asian Democracy Index. Apart from the yearly country

reports on the conduct of Asian Democracy Index surveys, the journal publishes scholarly

papers on democracy and democratization processes in Asia.

Review

1 Editor’s NoteHeeyeon Cho

ARTICLES

4 Democratization as De-monopolization and its DifferentTrajectories: No Democratic Consolidation withoutDe-monopolizationHeeyeon Cho

36 The Asian Democracy Index: A Guide

The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index

COUNTRY REPORTS

88 Democracy Index in South Korea, 2011Hyungchul Kim, Junghoon Kim, Heeyeon Cho, Hyunyun Cho,Seoungwon Lee, Yooseok Oh, Dongchoon Kim, Kyungtae Park,Youngpyo Seo, Sangchul Yoon, Kyunghee Choi

108 (De)Monopolization of Democracy in Indonesia?The Indonesian Report on the Asian Democracy Index 2011

Anton Pradjasto, Irwansyah, Dirga Ardiansa, Roichatul Aswidah,Sri Budi EkoWardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, Yolanda Panjaitan

134 The CADI Asian Democracy Index:

2011 Country Report – The Philippines

Miguel Paolo P. Reyes, Clarinda Lusterio Berja,Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Socrates

RESEARCH NOTE

182 Rating Philippine Democratization:

A Review of Democratization Metrics

Miguel Paolo P. Reyes

REVIEWS

199 Reviews of the 2011 Country Reports and Preliminary Comments on

the Conduct of the 2012 Asian Democracy Index Survey

Felipe B. Miranda • Bonojit Hussain • Temario C. Rivera •

Edna Estifania A. Co • Malaya C. Ronas

Asian Democracy ReviewVOLUME 1 · 2012

Toward a New Critical Survey of the “Quality”of DemocracyHEEYEON CHO

Since the 1980s, many Asian countries have gone through a political transitiontoward democracy. With distorted legacies of colonialism, the Cold War anddictatorship piled up, civil and grassroots movements have focused onovercoming dictatorship and securing and proliferating democracy andhuman rights. However, democratization and human rights improvementhave shown fluctuations in light of new circumstances: the impact of neoliberalglobalization, the growth of capital and market in each country, and thenegative consequences of the war on terrorism after 9/11, among others.

The “third wave of democratization” has swept countries of the ThirdWorld and moved forward and backward alternately since the 1980s,transforming dictatorships into postdictatorial democracies. According tothe traditional theories of “Transitology” (theory of democratic transition)and “Consolidology” (theory of democratic consolidation), there are severalknown “Valleys of Tears.” The first is a restoration of free elections, whichfeature uncertainty, indeterminacy and contingency. As Juan J. Linz pointedout, the process of democratization has a bottleneck wherein the “democraticgame” becomes the “only game in town.” The transition of power takes placeat the second bottleneck known as “elections.” When free elections anddemocratic institutions take root, leading to the transition of power, we cansay the society enters the phase of democratic consolidation. A lot of scholarsbelieve that the conduct of free elections a second time can be translated asconsolidation of democracy or an election system being settled and stabilizedin the form of competition among various sociopolitical groups. For suchscholars, the transition of power within the framework of electoral democracycan thus be understood as democratic consolidation.

With democratization of many postdictatorships in the Third World ontrack, the theories of democratic transition and democratic consolidationhave become a high-profile research field in the United States. As a result,diverse research achievements have been made and accumulated so far in that

____________________________________________________________Heeyeon Cho is director of the Center for Globalization Studies, The Democracy and SocialMovements Institute and dean of the NGO Graduate School, Sungkonghoe University.

ASIAN DEMOCRACY REVIEW Vol. 1 (2012): 1-3 ISSN 2244-5633

2 EDITOR’S NOTEfield. Some scholars are trying to conduct research about countries that arein the process of democratic transition, undergoing the “postconsolidation”process, or are riding the “fourth wave of democratization.”

However, such research activities have been sluggish since the theory ofdemocratic consolidation. I personally attribute some critical activities to thefact that “consolidology” looks at the post-transition process from theviewpoint of consolidation. “Democratic consolidation” discussed inconsolidology refers to the settlement and stabilization of democraticinstitutions that have been introduced through democratic transition. Thatis, democratic consolidation means stabilization, routinization,institutionalization, and legitimation of politically related activities. This, ofcourse, includes conventional dimensions as well as institutional ones. Inreality, however, many forms of democracy after the transition fromdictatorship have encountered conflict situations where they cannot berecognized as a “stabilized democracy.” There should have been research onthe “post-consolidation” process as a follow-up to the study of consolidation.However, such research cannot move forward since the democratizationprocess goes through continuous instability and seems to be stabilized, andthen turns around again, sometimes showing a reversion to dictatorship. Thatis, an “unconsolidated” reality itself remains a significant challenge to thetheory of democratic consolidation, preventing further research.

We can say that our study on the quality of democracy should start witha critique of existing studies of democratic transition and consolidation. Oneof the main goals of democratization is said to be the realization of the fairrule of majority, because a former dictatorship has been regarded as a regimewherein minor authoritarian figures, groups, and forces have ruled themajority against their will. In this sense, democratization meant to theordinary people the realization of “fair majority rule” in accordance withtheir preferences and opinions via a free election

However, the kind of democracy realized in this way is not an ideal one.On the contrary, real democracy works in such a way as to exclude the majorityin the social and economic sense, while it argues to work in accordance withthe majority will. In reality, the former power elites keep their monopolisticposition under a so-called democratic regime while the majority and diverseminorities are excluded from the new democratic regime. In a sense, the newdemocracy becomes a “problem,” as remnants of the former dictatorshipcontinue to be “problems.”

Having said that, a critical version of a survey of the quality of democracyshould try to capture the new problems of a new democracy, including thecontinuation of the monopoly of the former powers under a “formally

3CHOdemocratic” regime and the substantial exclusion of voices and interests ofsubalterns and diverse minorities.

In this regard, our research is aimed at analyzing and describing newproblems and limitation of the new democracies in Asia, while accepting itin comparison to the former dictatorships.

This volume is the inaugural issue of Asian Democracy Review. Weenvision that the succeeding issues will include new critical studies trying togo over the horizon of the existing literature.

The main content of this volume includes the research output of themembers of the research network called the Consortium for the AsianDemocracy Index (CADI) that conducted a pilot test of the Asian DemocracyIndex (ADI) survey in 2011, which includes the Democracy and SocialMovements Institute of Sungkonghoe University in South Korea, theIndonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS)and the Centre for Political Studies (PUSKAPOL) of the Department ofPolitical Science, Universitas Indonesia, and the University of the PhilippinesThird World Studies Center. We could not compare the national indices fullyin this volume. However, the quantitative and qualitative data in this volumeis still quite valuable, reflecting the state of the three countries in terms ofautonomy and competition as a part of democratic liberalization processesand pluralization and solidarity as a part of democratic equalization.

This volume also contains a theoretical paper related to the indexframework and an edited version of the ADI Guidebook. Also included arecommentaries on the 2011 country reports, the preliminary results of the2012 survey (the reports of which are still being completed; a team from theUniversity of Malaysia Sarawak also conducted a survey this year along withthe aforementioned members of CADI), and the ADI project in general.These commentaries were delivered in the 2012 Asian Democracy IndexConference, which was held on August 30-31. 2012, at the University of thePhilippines-Diliman.

As mentioned, we plan to include other research outputs done outside ofour network in future issues. We hope that critical scholars who have a similarorientation to ours, i.e., scholars who anticipate the progressive developmentof democracy in Asia for more minorities to enjoy more freedom andsocioeconomic equality, will contribute to this journal. Future issues willalso include the results of other national surveys and comparisons of nationalsurvey outputs.

We are very happy to share our research results with many scholarsconcerned in the progressive development of democracies in Asia and expectcomments and attention from them.

Democratization as De-monopolization andIts Different Trajectories:No Democratic Consolidation withoutDe-monopolizationHEEYEON CHO

IntroductionThis paper aims to construct an alternative theoretical framework to analyzethe complex conflict and crisis in the process of so-called democraticconsolidation or postconsolidation.

Conflicts and crises are witnessed in most of the “success” cases ofdemocratic transition such as in Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand. Thesecountries, regarded as having gone through democratic transition anddemocratic consolidation, experience diverse kinds of conflicts and crises.Thailand went into a “reverse wave of democratization” with the militarycoup d’etat in September 2006. There was also a breakdown in the ChenSuiben government in Taiwan. The Roh Moo-Hyun government in SouthKorea enjoyed only ten percent of support from its people in the last stage ofits rule. Given that the process of democratic consolidation was hailed as asuccess in all these three countries, these developments provide a theoreticaland empirical challenge to the existing consolidation discourse, whichregarded such developments as temporary counterflows to democratization.

This also raises another question: Is it possible to go beyond Westerntheories of democratic transition or consolidation in an alternative theorizationusing experiences of democratization in many Asian countries? Where canthese be found? This paper explains the character of the complex conflict andcrisis in the process of transition to democracy, consolidation, andpostconsolidation. The cases of South Korea and other Asian countries willbe used to propose a new analytical frame. Particularly, this paper seeks tocreate a new frame to explain the dynamics in the progress of “democracy after

____________________________________________________________Heeyeon Cho is director of the Center for Globalization Studies, The Democracy and SocialMovements Institute and dean of the NGO Graduate School, Sungkonghoe University.


5CHOdemocratization” (Choi 2005) that is easily missed in existing theories on“democracy transition” and “democracy consolidation.”

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) divide the process of transition toliberalization, democratization, and socialization in the late 1980s. Most ofthe succeeding analyses on democratic transition focused on liberalizationand democratization, and the diversity of transition experiences. The meaningof socialization has been left ambiguous and overlooked in terms of itsrelation with transition and consolidation. Adopting a perspective of “radicaldemocracy” that differs from O’Donnell and Schimitter’s, this paper shedsnew light on the concept of socialization/de-monopolization, positing thatthere is no consolidation without socialization.

In this paper, the postcolonialist perspective to the study ofdemocratization of the Third World will be applied, using the experiencesof Korea and other Asian countries, rather than existing Western theories ofdemocratic transition and consolidation.

A dictatorial regime is defined as a specific combination of politicalmonopoly and economic-social monopoly rather than a system of politicaloppression. Based on this, the weaknesses of the existing theories of democratictransition and consolidation will be discussed and an alternative theorizationof democratic transition will be proposed.

Theoretical Background and Reevaluation of ExistingStudies

Defining the Period of “Postdemocratic” TransitionHow can the period of “democracy after democratization” be defined? Therecan be a gamut of periods such as democratic transition, postdemocratictransition, consolidation, and postconsolidation. The concept of“postdemocratic transition” will be used in this paper.

Existing democratic transition and consolidation theories have usuallyassumed three phases: liberalization where oppressive authoritarian measuresare weakened or abolished, and primary steps for opening up are taken tobring in democracy; “democratic transition” in its narrow sense where ademocratic system, including free elections, is introduced and practiced; andconsolidation where free elections and democratic institutions are established.“Democratic transition” in this context means the period after democraticinstitutions, including free elections, are effected and through such a process,competition in democratic institutions is accepted as irreversible by allpolitical actors.

6 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESIf we take the Schumpeterian minimalist definition, the process of

democratic transition means the in-setting process of electoral democracywith fairness, competitiveness, and regularity guaranteed.1 The problem ishow to empirically separate the so-called consolidation from democratictransition. There are a variety of middle zones between the two and there arevarious means to identify the empirical standards for consolidation.Huntington (1991), for one, emphasizes regularity, which means free electionsmust take place twice in a row. Based on this definition, consolidation in SouthKorea took place in 1992. Many Asian countries other than South Korea havewitnessed a streak of free elections at least twice. According to Gunther et al.(1995), the period of consolidation is the time when an alternation in powerbetween formal rivals takes place. For South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan,the period of consolidation should fall between 1992 and 1997. The givenstandards so far tell us that South Korea and Taiwan have gone through aperiod of consolidation or stabilization. If consolidation means settlementor stabilization of democracy, it also means that these countries are sufferingchronic conflict and crisis even after consolidation. In this paper, the periodafter the introduction of democratic institutions will be considered as“postdemocratic transition” and be taken to be a reference point for analyzingcases of democratization in Asia including that of South Korea. Thispostdemocratic transition thus includes the periods of consolidation andpostconsolidation.

The Discourse of Democratic Transition, ContemporaryTheories of Consolidation and Some New InsightsThe discourse of democratic transition and consolidation explains the “thirdwave of democratization” in many different ways.2 Analyses have beenbroadened by Linz and Stepan (1978), and O’Donnell, Schmitter, andWhitehead (1986a, 1986b, and 1986c), who expanded analysis on the area ofcomparative study of democratic transition. Huntington (1991) provides anoverall picture of democratic transition while Przeworski (1991) presents thedynamism of democratic transition combining structure and behavior.Studies focusing on rehabilitation and conversion were developed intostudies on “consolidation,” which deal with the complex process afterdemocratic transition. Since Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela (1992)who wrote about controversial issues of consolidation, there have been amplestudies on consolidation, which include Gunther et al. (1995); and Diamondet al. (1999). Studies on postdemocratic transition or postconsolidation were

7CHOdone by Diamond (1999), who discusses the “fourth wave of democratization,”3

and by Linz and Stepan (1996).4

Most American and Western analyses have contributed to understandingthe formal and procedural aspects of the democratic transition process fromauthoritarianism to democracy. They have also shown the limits andweaknesses in explaining the nature and factors of many “yet-to-beconsolidated” or of “non-consolidated” cases with recurrent conflicts andcrises. If democratic consolidation is verified by the “settling down” ofelections, such that the “‘democratic game’ has become the ‘only game intown’” (Linz 1990,156), how can conflicts and crises become recurrent andchronic even after such a period? What are the nature and factors afterconsolidation and post-consolidation?

From this perspective, some views of established studies on the natureof consolidation and on consolidation itself can be categorized as follows.First, there is a view wherein consolidation is limited to “institutionalconsolidation” such as elections and not any broad institutionalization. Inthis sense, Linz and Stepan (1996) think there should be institutionalconsolidation in civil society, political society, economic society, the rule oflaw, and the state apparatus. Gunther et al. (1995) count the following as“indices of institutionalization”: the power alternation among competinggroups, broad support and stabilization during severe economic crisis,successful control and punishment for insurgents in a limited area, systemicstabilization during a rapid and radical restructuring of the political partysystem, and the absence of politically relevant anarchic parties or socialmovements. Such conceptualization of consolidation is limited to basicinstitutional consolidation such as elections and does not include the broaderinstitutional sector.5 In this paper, this view is termed as an “institution-centered” mindset, which is commonly adopted in related studies.

This institution-centered approach falls short of explaining the SouthKorean experience. South Korean society is facing worse conflicts even afterhigh-level institutionalization—evidenced, for example, by the creation ofthe National Human Rights Commission—has been achieved. Thus, itbrings to fore the task of finding a new analytical concept for explaining thestructure and dynamism of consolidation, or of “democracy afterdemocratization,” with the South Korean democratic transition as reference.

This institution-centered view is based on the premise of Westerndemocracy wherein the range and level of democratic institutionalizationhave already been broadened. The debates between O’Donnell (1996a;1996b) and Gunther et al. (1996) and between Carothers (2002a; 2002b) andO’Donnell (2002) have shown a multi-linear system going only toward

8 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESWestern democracy, even though they take into account the complicateddynamics of various types of democratic transition. This is why it is necessaryto come up with a new frame for analyzing democracy and democratization.Another problem comes up when the question of whether or not the Leftregime in Latin America is one of the “yet-to-be consolidated” phenomena.The dynamics of such democratization is missed out in the existingconsolidation literature.

Second, some views attribute the delay of consolidation to the persistenceof nonconsolidation factors and the increasing gap between the formal andinformal dimensions (political culture and favoritism, for example) invarious sectors. Gunther et al. (1995) take the matter of consolidation to be“institutional expansion,” particularly that of formal institutionalization,and tried to introduce an informal dimension or the issue of “quality” ofdemocracy. For instance, they try to find the factors for the gap betweenformal rules and actual practice (involvement in corruption, etc.), the lack ofhorizontal accountability found in state agencies or people in charge, and thedelegative trend in politics. Their analysis can be considered as an effort toapply, beyond quantitative and institutional aspects, qualitative aspects of theprocess of consolidation. It has merit in looking into the gap betweendemocracy in developed countries and in developing countries as aquantitative, not a categorical, difference. Their analysis thus seeks to find the“qualitative aspects” of democracy that deters consolidation in the dimensionof informal culture, which have limits. The particularism discussed byO’Donnell (1996a) appears both in old authoritarian regimes and in newborndemocracies, which indicates that it is not necessarily a reasonable explanationfor nonconsolidation.

Third, there is a point of view that sees compromise between moderategroups (extreme groups excluded) as the core aspect of consolidation. Thisis a “pact”-centered view, which has also been an issue in the democratictransition discourse. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski(1991) point out that in a conflict situation surrounding the conversion todemocracy, the pact between the ruling elite and the opposition elite is veryimportant, igniting debates. Some have even expressed the opinion that ademobilization of the masses, including the destitute, is needed in apostdemocratic transition where a compromise between the elites are crucialfor democratic consolidation, while strategic mobilization of the masses isneeded in the early phase of democratic transition (Hipsher 1996).

The study by Gunther et al. (1995) also discusses on these kinds ofchanges in the political situation. In their analysis of five indices ofinstitutionalization (successful control and punishment for insurgents, absence

9CHOof politically relevant anarchic parties or social movement, etc.), they showa similar view that the exclusion of extreme resistance and the compromiseamong mainstream groups are the basis for consolidation (Gunther et al.1995). In this context, the resistance of minority groups, such as in the Acehcase in the democratization process of Indonesia or the southern minorityethnic groups of Thailand, is regarded as having to be controlled andmanaged. Compromise is reached between the old political group and thenew one, while other sociopolitical groups, including local resistance groups,are considered as mere “guests,” not the subject of the consolidation.

But it would be very difficult to elicit the complicated process ofconsolidation if it is simplified as a matter of contending elite groups,although power alternation by diversified and competing political groupsand nonconfrontational coexistence are important. This could be seen as an“elite-centered” viewpoint. In the process of democratic transition, thestrategic behavior of political elites, whether from the ruling or oppositionside, is the only important thing. Thus, related studies have overwhelminglyfocused on the elites’ actions and roles, and even under some limits, suchstudies have their merits. But the masses can sometimes set the limits in whichthe elite can move; mass action or mobilization interacts with those of theelites, and in some full-fledged conjuncture, the demobilization of the masseseven changes the extent of compromise between ruling and opposition elitesin a democratic space (Gunther et al. 1995). In the processes of consolidationand postconsolidation, the masses (viewed as an organizing actor in the socialmovement or civil society in a broad sense, and diverse sub-subjects withinthe movement) are considered an independent variable.

Fourth, there is a viewpoint wherein the absence of consolidation is amatter of “power” of dominant political groups in a dictatorial regime.Carothers (2002a) points to the absence of political pluralism including acontinued dominant party system. He says that the existing democratictransition discourse is built upon the following wrong premises: a) allnations, once out of dictatorship, should be considered a nation in democratictransition; b) democratization has a tendency to progress in phases; c)election is the same as democracy; d) the conditions of states under transition(economic level, political history, institutional heritage, socioculturaltradition, and other “structural” traits) cannot be deciding factors in openingor influencing the outcome of the democratic transition process; and e) thedemocratic transition is being implemented on the condition of a consistentstate (2002a). He points out that most of the countries under democratictransition are in a gray area where they are “neither dictatorship nor democracy”and they are not headed toward democratic transition in an orderly fashion,

10 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESrevealing diverse systems (Carothers 2002a). These states have similarcharacteristics, such as as feckless pluralism and the continuation of dominant-power politics.

In the case of South Korea, the country experienced worsening crisis eventen years after the dominant political party system was dissolved. Thedemocratic governments of Taiwan and Thailand are fraught with the samekinds of problems.

In this sense, as pointed out in the compromise-centered viewpoint,politics between institutional and political professional groups, or the powerissue between them, cannot fully explain the complicated nature ofconsolidation and postconsolidation. Power between political groups is notonly a purely political phenomenon but is also closely related to socioeconomicpower because in the political arena, a specific “political” group is situatedin specific socioeconomic interests. Thus, democratic transition cannot bebrought about only in the political dimension—politics should be treated aspower relations, and power as a matter of society in a broader sense.

This paper will try to devise an approach with which democracy is notseen narrowly only as a political matter or a matter of political power but assomething with relation to state and society in its broad sense. There is a needfor a new viewpoint of democracy, which should be society centered. Thispaper, to restructure the frame to analyze consolidation and postconsolidationbeyond the institution-centered and politics-centered perspectives, will tryto structure a society-centered frame that focuses on the social character ofpower and the historical and structural character of democracy.

Reexamination of Discourses on Democracy:The Relation between Democratic Transition and

Democracy TheoriesAny analyses on democratic transition or consolidation include specificdefinitions and regulations of democracy. Any alternative theorization to thedominant theories on democratic transition must thus include an alternativedefinition and regulation of democracy. This can be done by examining threedimensions of democracy: dispersion of power, democracy as a formation outof various social and class struggles, and democracy as being “society-centric.” Dispersion of Power as Core of DemocracyProposition 1: The rational core of democracy is not just elections, the ruleof law, or the guarantee of basic human rights, as assumed by formal theories

11CHOof democracy. But, more importantly, it is power sharing or the dispersion ofpowers.

Currently, the regulation of democracy implicated in democratictransition or consolidation discourse can be categorized as follows. First, thekernel of democracy is the election. A fair and regular election is presumedas the core facet of democracy. The second is the rule of law. This means thatlaws established in the democratization process are equally and fairly appliedto individuals of the democratic community, that inconsistency in law andpractice is minimized, and that the democratic rule of law is established(O’Donnell 1996a and 2002). The third is human rights. The human rightsperspective puts forward the quality of democracy (Vargas et al. [2004] canbe a good example). There is another view that puts human rights in the center(UNDP 2004) where Marshall’s (1964) concept of expansion of civilrights—from civil rights and political rights to social rights—is used, anddivides citizens’ rights into rights of political, civil, and social citizenship. Italso empirically observes how much such expansion was implemented duringthe democratic transition process.

This regulation, although it holds the rational kernel of democracy, stillignores another important democratic core to elucidate the complex of post-democratic transition. With regard to this, this paper will focus on powerdivergence and dispersion of powers. The dispersion of powers as the corecomponent of democracy was devised by early modern political thinkers. Forthem, the dispersion of powers guarantees the freedom and rights of thepeople, the ruling principle that separates state power into legislature,executive, and judiciary branches and puts these three under three separatestate institutions, so that no individual or group has more power than is neededfor their proper function and so that there is balance among powers.

This dispersion of powers has been understood to be an institutionalprinciple of two or three branches of power, or as a passive protection toprotect the freedom and rights of individuals from infringement. Thisdispersion should be given a more positive and active reinterpretation. Thedispersion of powers as the core of democracy can be regarded as an activeprinciple to counter power concentration and monopolization, and proposeits dispersion and de-monopolization. In this perspective, democratictransition should not only be the establishment of regular elections but theprocess of a specific power de-monopolization. The process should be thecontents of the “socialization” that O’Donnell and Schimitter (1986) said.

When discussing the dispersion of powers, power does not only meanpolitical power. It also refers to economic and social powers. In this sense,the target for power divergence should also include the Marxist concept of

12 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESeconomic power and, beyond that, social power. The power divergence andsharing consistent with Dahl’s (1989) concept of polyarchy should not be seenonly as “power sharing among elites,” particularly “political power sharing.”The relations should be discussed in a broader sense with the followingmatching relations: a) the monopoly of political power (political monopoly)versus sharing and divergence of political power; b) monopoly of economicpower (economic monopoly) versus sharing and divergence of economicpower (equality); c) monopoly of social power in a broad sense (socialmonopoly) versus sharing and divergence of social power (pluralism).Democracy as a Formation out of Various Social and ClassStrugglesProposition 2: Democracy is not a political system but a historical formationthat continuously recreates itself out of various social and class struggles.

If Proposition 1 discusses the statics of democracy, Proposition 2 dealswith its dynamics. In this perspective, democracy is not a political system buta historical formation that continuously recreates itself out of the process ofvarious social and class struggles. Democracy is defined as having freeelections, parliamentary democracy, and checks and balances such as threeco-equal branches of government as its institutional assets, and its contentsand quality are in a relative and changing system ruled by the social- and class-struggle relations of various social groups. The combination of political andsocioeconomic monopolies was previously mentioned, and there are multilevelsocial and class struggles within the combination.

Democracy based upon the esprit of the “self-rule of people” is aninstitution in which all members of a given polity can equally participate inthe process of social and political decision making in the society. If politicsis defined as related to how resources and rules are distributed, produced andestablished, democracy means an institution where people (the subject andobject of politics) are directly involved.

Democracy constitutes the institutional format of politics since moderntimes, and modern politics carried out in the institutional format of democracyhas various qualities. There is a “minimalist” perspective of democracyincluding Shumpeter’s (1943). There is also another perspective in whichdemocracy should be expanded and “maximized.” The former definition ofdemocracy is simply the exisence of free elections, free press, and a generalvote. In the latter definition of democracy, the “procedural” ideal of people’sself rule and the people’s social demand are realized. In this sense, democracy

13CHOis the arena in which diverse social forces compete, and a particular qualityof democracy at a particular time is decided by the outcome of these struggles.

In short, democracy at a particular time exists according to the way itincludes a relation of politics and society at a particular level. It is continuouslyreproduced according to the process of the social and class struggles, and tothe level at which civil society and the people become the subject.Beyond “Institutional Politics Centrism” toward “SocietyCentrism”Proposition 3: Democracy should not be regarded as a political phenomenonbut a relational phenomenon of politics and society. Politics in a democracyshould allow formerly excluded diverse political groups in a dictatorialregime to re-emerge

Democracy should not be regarded as institution-centric, as thedemocratic transition and consolidation discourse does, but as a “relationbetween politics and society” or “(institutional) politics and social(movement).” Politics is ignited by “social” change and represents it, so inconflicts surrounding democratic transition or consolidation, attentionshould be given to society or the relation of politics and society first, ratherthan politics itself.

Theoretically, in the American tradition of pluralist politics, the massesare identified as consumers of political goods, or the active masses areidentified as outside engagers who push their political and economic interestsforward via collective pressure. This viewpoint makes the border betweenpolitics and society absolute and marginalizes the masses, who are the subjectof politics, to become mere consumers of politics.

Politics is incessantly redefined in its relation with society, and theterritory of politics and non-politics are variable according to social dynamics.Society is not the object that politics must represent, but an independentvariable that changes politics. In this sense, after democratic transition, thenewly rehabilitated politics is defined by conflict and crisis where particularpolitical groups (anti-dictatorial political groups, for example) seek tochange the contents and territory (the borders) of politics and society, not onlyto restore institutional politics.

A particularly structured politics under a dictatorial regime, in which themasses have accustomed themselves to a particular political environment,faces crisis as the oppositional awakening of civil society and the masses asthe subjects rises up. When this occurs, there appears to be a widening gapbetween (existing dictatorial) politics and (oppositionally activated) civilsociety as civil society gets into a 1process of restructuring the established

14 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESpolitics. This is the kernel of the democratic transition discourse. In thisprocess, activities defined as non-political in the previous dictatorial regimebecome internalized and integrated. Through this kind of restructuring ofpolitics, the consent of the masses is becomes based on new democraticpolitics. This process is not procedure dependent as it does not predeterminethe outcome of the change. The dynamic interactions between dominanceand resistance, institutional politics and social movements, politics andsociety, and politics and civil society determines its outcome as it is an “open”process.

The “political” is not singular but plural and exists in diverse forms, withinstitutional poli tics as just one of them. The democratic transition processfrom dictatorship is where the plural political that was oppressed under thedominant political during dictatorship expresses itself. The once monopolizedboundaries of “the politic” are restructured with the outcome of a new socialself-organizing. In this process the diverse and repressed sub-subjects returnto the political arena and “the political” they express is represented ininstitutional politics. The democratic transition or consolidation discoursebasically sees institutional politics as fixed while ignoring the change in theformation of the politic and narrowly focusing on the re-emergence andinternalization of political groups that were banned during dictatorship. Inother words, these discourses only focus on the expansion of institutionalpolitics and not on the “reformation of politics.” This is why democraticpolitics should be regarded as a transition toward a plural politics.

Under dictatorship, institutional politics is oppressed, and in the arenaof institutional politics only a top-down-controlled politics is permitted.This politics is combined with a particular socioeconomic relation.Dictatorship means a particular political monopoly combined with a particularsocioeconomic monopoly. This means that dictatorship does not only meanthe exclusion of other political forces running a monolithic political system,but also the creation and reproduction of a particular socioeconomicmonopoly. This reproduction keeps the demands of the diverse socioeconomicsub-subjects from joining the political arena and becoming representativesas political subjects.

In the process of democratic transition as formal democracy isrehabilitated, diverse politics, including one which was in control and underrepression, comes back and forms into a struggle. In a democracy there is alsoa struggle around the contents and boundaries of politics. There will be asurge of diverse social politics beyond the limits of the expanded institutionalpolitics, during which various oppressed social sub-subjects appear, to make

15CHOdemocracy an arena of struggle for plural politics in the process of democratictransition.

The process of rehabilitation and consolidation of democracy does notonly mean a process in which the once oppressed and excluded political forcesre-emerge in institutional politics and engage in a struggle with past dictatorialpolitical forces. It also means that diverse socioeconomic sub-subjectsparticipate in institutional politics bringing changes to the nature andboundaries of politics, as well as the contents and boundaries of democracy.

Unless there is a multi-level restructuring of politics that representssociety, there can be no consolidation of democracy. In this process, diversesocioeconomic sub-subjects that were excluded from the political arena andtheir demands and interests are integrated in the agenda of institutionalpolitics, which we could call advanced socialization. This should be themeaning of socialization of democracy.6

An Alternative Theorization of Post-transitionLet us discuss then, based upon this reformulation of democracy discourse,how the alternative theorization of the discourse on democratic transition andconsolidation should be developed.

Formal and Substantial Formation of DemocracyProposition 4: The transition from dictatorship to democracy can be dividedinto the formal formation of democracy (introduction of democraticinstitutions) and the substantial formation of democracy (social formation ofdemocracy).

We have seen the problems inherent in unilinear or multi-linearviewpoints. Through the transitional course of uni- and multi-linear transitionto democracy, Western society is regarded to be at a high level of democracyand non-Western and newly born democratic societies as at a low level ofdemocracy. This is, as a matter of fact, only a particular viewpoint of politicalmodernization.

Democracy can be divided into formal and substantial formations ofdemocracy. The formal formation means a particular fluctuation fromdemocratic transition and consolidation, while the substantial formation isthe fluctuation after a period of consolidation. The former is the process inwhich democratic institutions, including elections, are introduced; the latteris the process in which a formation of the substantial contents of democracy(through class and social struggle) in the frame of the introduced democracy

16 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESis established. It is important to note that there is no difference betweenwestern and nonwestern democracies, and between the developed anddeveloping countries under a substantial formation of democracy. All societiesare continually struggling around this formation of substantial democracyand struggle.

If democratic transition is a struggle for the introduction or initialestablishment of democracy, consolidation is not only the establishment ofdemocracy, but also a process of social reformation in the political frame ofdemocracy. This social formation of democracy continues in every society,and there can be no difference of quality between Western and non-Westerndemocracies, and between developed and developing countries.

Democracy does not develop from a backward state to an advanced statefollowing a linear path. It is rather a social formation process with itsqualitative contents determined by the relationships between dominance andresistance, state and civil society, dominant groups and sub-subjectivegroups.

Historically, the West sees democracy as a structurally moving processdetermined by the correlation of dominance and resistance, and dominantgroups and sub-subjects. It was not, in any sense, realized through the way inwhich its fixed contents were predetermined and then implemented. Theobjects and range of suffrage and eligibility for election, for instance, haveconstantly been changed. The majority of women have not been able to enjoyboth even after the 1789 French Revolution, and were only able to take partin both since 1944.

The cognitive gap between the model of Western democratic transition,which has been developed for hundreds of years, and non-Western society’sdemocratic transition and consolidation since 1980s should be interrogated.In European democratization, the process in which the late nineteenthcentury’s mercantilist dictatorship has improved into democracy covers 200to 300 years. According to Huntington (1991), the “first wave” began in the1820s and this, through the experience of fascism, meets with a new wave nearthe end of the World War II. Western society has not only experienced thisbig reverse wave but also other small reverse waves till the present democracywas established. In France, it took more than 150 years after the Revolutionto establish its present democratic system. They had to go throughRepublicanism and monarchy alternately until after World War II. Thishistorical background demonstrates that it is not proper to define non-Western society as undemocratic giving it only a short period ofdemocratization process. In this sense, democratic transition and consolidationis not an introduction of a new fixed institution, but a process of determining

17CHO

the constitutive contents of the democratic institution, or of creatingdemocratic social formation.

Substantial Formation of Democracy: Combination andArrangement of Political Monopoly and SocioeconomicMonopoly7

Proposition 5: The substantial constitution of democracy is determined byhow political monopoly and socioeconomic monopoly are combined.

Dictatorship is a particular combination of political and socioeconomicmonopoly—as you see in the figure 1—and the conversion to democracy isa process in which a particular political and socioeconomic de-monopolizationtakes place interactively.

In economics, monopoly means a persistent market or industry situationwhere there is only one provider of a product or service, usually a dominantfirm or enterprise without competitors entering its market or industry. Thisnotion of economic monopoly can be expanded to contemplate political ordemocratic phenomena. In this context, political monopoly means a persistentsituation wherein only one individual or political group has command overpolitical resources (particularly state power or political power in general),

18 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESdominating in such a way that there can be no competitors. Other thanpolitical monopoly, there can be a social monopoly, which is a persistentsituation wherein only one individual or political group has command ofsocial resources and dominates in such a way there can be no competitors.

It should be noted that these economic, political, and social monopoliesare reproduced in a certain combination. Economic monopoly exists incombination with particular political and social monopolies. Politicalmonopoly does not only mean a particular individual or group monopolizespolitical resources but also has a monopolistic status over socioeconomicresources. Social monopoly does not only mean a situation in which oneindividual or group dominantly controls diverse social resources (prestige orrespect) but also a situation in which political and economic powers areunequally distributed along the boundaries of society’s diverse socialdemarcation line.8 A particular social group (based ethnicity, sex, religion,locality) that monopolizes (or occupies) a particular social demarcation linecontrols political and economic powers. For example, a dominant group inan ethnic demarcation line exists as a group with monopolized political oreconomic power, in which the difference at the social demarcation lines existsas discrimination.

Dictatorship usually means political monopoly, which exists incombination with a particular socioeconomic monopoly. In this paper,dictatorship (whether or not in the sense of “state corporatism”) is a regimecombining particular political and socioeconomic monopolies, anddemocratization is a process of their destruction, rearrangement, andreformation. Democratic transition is the process in which a political form—dictatorship—is changed into another form—democracy—and at the sametime, a conflictual process focused on the reformation of the politicalmonopoly structure and the reformation and rearrangement of thesocioeconomic monopoly that has been fixed under a dictatorship.

Everyday crisis ensues from the increasing gap between the entrenchedinterests and newly-created demands in civil society. Democratic conversionreproduces and strengthens this instability. If multi-level monopolies installedby the old regime are not dismantled, constant crisis and instability afterdemocratic conversion results. This means deep conservatism remains deepseated in the political, economic, and social order of society. This trend ofpersistence of the old monopoly in a transformed form is strengthened by theinternational conditions of neoliberal globalization. The problem is in theprocess of resisting dictatorship because there is no unifying manner ofresistance among the diverse sub-subjects since the awakening of civil societyas an outcome of democratization. The “maximized demand” in the name ofdemocracy thrives and this crosses against the “minimalist” reality, which

19CHOeventually comes out as crisis-ridden and unstable “democracy” afterdemocratization.

The Activation of Civil Society and Self-empowered Subjectivationof People, the Drivers of Democratic Transition, andConsolidation and PostconsolidationProposition 6: An activated civil society and self-empowered subjectivationof the people are the fundamental drivers of democratic transition anddemocratic consolidation and postconsolidation. If under a dictatorialregime there is oppositional activation of civil society, under the democratictransition process there emerges self-empowered activation of civil society.The success of democratic transition depends on this political andsocioeconomic reform of the former establishment, which corresponds withchanges in the civil society and the peoplehood.

What causes instability in democratic transition and consolidation is thenewly activated civil society and the people rising as a subject. Civil societyand the social movements that make them cohere is the key to the destructionof the authoritarian regime and ushering democratic transition, consolidation,and postconsolidation. At the individual level, this activation is a process of“making the people a subject.”

As seen in figure 2, the dismantlement of political monopoly that hasbeen particularly structured under the dictatorship is caused by the oppositionalactivation of civil society. This oppositionally activated civil society can beorganizationally expressed through a social movement. The rise ofnongovernmental organizations as an influential decision maker in politicsin the democratic transition of Korea is a good example of such a development.

Dictatorship is a regime in which people’s self-empowered subjectivationin the political, economic, and social arenas is oppressed, and the conflicts andchallenges from these dimensions are excluded. Against this oppression, theoppositional activation of civil society is advanced, and as an outcome of thisactivation (for example, the People’s Struggle for Democracy on June 10,1987 in South Korea), democratic transition from dictatorship brings aboutthe rehabilitation of formal democracy. If this process is called democratictransition, then postdemocratic transition is the process in which conflicts indiverse dimensions in the rehabilitated formal democracy emerge. Thechange of civil society in a formal democracy is a self-empowered activationof civil society, whereby diverse sub-subjects become self-empowered in theformal rehabilitated democracy. And in a given civil and political space, civilsociety express their demands and interests and organize various kinds of

20 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIES

collective actions to realize these. Through self-empowered subjectificationof the people and activation of the civil society—where various collective andsubjective actions take place with each organized class and group to realizetheir demands and interests—the people, a diverse social sub-subject, gothrough a change where they critically recognize their identity that was givenunder the dictatorship. This recognition brings them together to resistagainst monopolies in the political, economic, and social dimensions ofdemocracy, and to eventually remove these from rehabilitated formaldemocracy. This is how conflicts melt and change monopolies.

Under postdemocratic transition, there appears multi-level conflictsaround these dimensions, thus, for the social settlement of democracy beyondconsolidation to be realized, the gap between the activated civil society andpolitics and the state, or the subjectivated people (and the social movementas its organized expression) and politics, must be overcome at a certain level,and that level should be conceptualized and developed as an index.

Conflicts arise when the first instance of power alternation takes place,and there is a struggle afterward around the established monopolies in theeconomic and social dimensions in the name of democracy. It is not necessaryto suppose that civil society is activated and in the postdemocratic transition

21CHOprocess subjectivated as if on a fixed timeline. In fact, democratic transitionand postdemocratic transition are processes of struggle against hegemony bycivil society. If the early stage of democratic transition is the time when theprogressive hegemony of civil society works well, postdemocratic transitionis the time when new problems rise as the old ones disappear, diverse problemsthat may be different for each country. It is possible for civil society to turnback to conservatism, or to a variety of vicissitudes. Under postdemocratictransition, the strategic practices of conservative and progressive forces havean nfluence on the direction and continuation of the process. This is theenvironment where, with the subjectivation of civil society, there appears amulti-level divergence of civil society. As in the cases of South Korea andTaiwan, the once oppositional political force becomes the ruling power, andthere are a number of problems with their rule, problems which eventuallygive rise again to pro-dictatorship or conservative forces. This can be calledthe “activation of the conservative” (Cho 2005). Paradoxically, this meanscivil society is changed into a competing arena for hegemony. Important isthe outcome of the struggle for “hegemony in civil society;” when hegemonygoes to the conservative force in multi-pronged civil society, there can be areversion of the postdemocratic transition.9

It is interesting that the bigger the gap between the state and (civil)society, the more “activated” civil society becomes against the state. However,the better the democratization of the state proceeds, the less civil society ismobilized toward one single direction, and the more it is diversified in termsof political orientation. Choi (2005) calls this process a change from “stateversus civil society” to “civil society versus civil society.”

The "Substantial Formation of Democracy" underPostdemocratic Transition is the Conflict around the Political,Economic, and Social "Limits" of Democracy

Proposition 7: The political limit of democracy is the extent to which thepolitical monopoly constituted under a dictatorship is de-monopolizedduring democratic transition. Likewise, the economic limit of democracy isthe extent to which the economic monopolies are de-monopolized, and thesocial limit of democracy is the extent to which social monopoly is de-monopolized.

In the democratic transition process from dictatorship, there are multi-level conflicts and struggles. As previously mentioned, under democratictransition, the conflict around the rearrangement of the political, economic,and social monopolies that were established under the dictatorship appears.


The problem is with the range and nature of the rearrangement. Politicalmonopoly means the political exclusion and oppression of diverse socialgroups under dictatorship, and political de-monopolization means thatdiverse social groups are represented and guaranteed participation.Democratization in any form involves de-monopolization. But the level ofde-monopolization varies depending on the dynamics of each country. Thislevel of de-monopolization constitutes the political limit of democracy,which again determines the substantiveness of democracy being institutedduring a democratic transition. Diverse forces in civil society have conflictsaround the set limit. The struggle of the progressives is an important factorthat decides the “conservative limit” of democracy, or the “progressive limit”of democracy for the progressives. For example, in 2004 in South Korea, therewas a struggle of the conservatives under the Roh Moo-Hyun administrationin the form of a campaign for the preservation of the National Security Law,which was against the expansion of the political limit, and the progressivestruggle in the form of the anti-impeachment movement, which was againstthe retrenchment of the political limit. The form of such limits depends onthe level of the development of democracy in each society.

23CHOTrajectories of De-monopolization

As mentioned earlier, democratization is a multilayered de-monopolizationprocess. This paper argues that how de-monopolization proceeds explainsthe reason for political instability and crisis under postdemocratization. Forconvenience, political monopoly and economic and social monopoly will betackled separately to explain democratic instability and the crisis underpostdemocratization.

Figure 3 shows that the democratic consolidation process involves acomplex interaction of various factors: types of political de-monopolization,the constraining effects of neoliberal globalization and the mode of itsinternalization, a conflict between former monopolistic forces and subalterns,and the consequences of economic and social de-monopolization as a resultof multilayered competition.Characteristics of Political De-monopolization:Neo-oligarchy and Post-oligarchy10One factor with various consequences in the overall democratization porcessis how political de-monopolization is achieved, that is to say, how extensivevested rights of former monopolistic forces break up and change. Basically,democratization is the restoration of democratic politics. Dictatorship hasundermined the space for democratic politics where various social demandsand interests can be represented and expressed. Once a dictatorship collapsesand democratization begins, the mechanism of electoral politics works andparty politics recovers. Therefore, democratic politics itself becomes a spacefor competition among various forces. The characteristics of political de-monopolization define the qualitative characteristics of this democraticspace.

To demonstrate the characteristics and progress of political de-monopolization, it may be divided into two categories: neo-oligarchy andpost-oligarchy. Neo-oligarchic democracy refers to the situation whereformer ruling forces maintain their monopolistic status even afterdemocratization. Post-oligarchic democracy refers to the situation where themonopolistic status of previous ruling forces constantly weakens, and arelatively pluralistic competition between monopolistic conservatives andanti-monopolistic liberals takes place. Of course, this is just an ideal-typeclassification and is not necessarily realistic.

In a neo-oligarchy category, political monopoly or vested rights structuredoes not break up widely and former monopolists’ institutional or non-institutional force never weakens. In post-oligarchy, however, the existing

24 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESpolitical monopoly breaks up constantly and pluralistic competition takesroot politically on a national scale. In the former case, the suppressive stateapparatus such as the military, controlled by former monopolistic forces,would frequently face violent responses from resisters. It is exemplified in thepersistence of politically motivated massacres in the Philippines and theviolent crackdown on ethnic minorities in Indonesia and Thailand. Inresponse, the general public naturally tries to resist such suppression violently,sometimes successfully. However, the resistance seldom leads to organizedsocial movements. In the Philippines, leftists exerted significant influence inthe antidictatorship movement. In the democratic transition process, however,the split between those involved in democratization and leftist outsidersprevented postdemocracy socioeconomic reform from taking effect. Thesame goes for other Southeast Asian countries including Thailand andIndonesia. As Encarnacion Tadem (2008) points out, democracy in thePhilippines remains an “elite democracy” even after democratization. Hadiz(2008) believes that Indonesia’s decentralization, which is relatively strongerthan its other Asian counterparts, has actually strengthened monopolizationof power at the regional level.

According to the human rights group Karapatan, (Tupas et al. 2007, 17,in Encarnacion Tadem 2008, 148), by March 15 2007, over 800 leftistactivists were killed by the military under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoadministration. In 2004, Munir Said Thalib a leading Indonesian humanrights lawyer of the civil organization, Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang danKorban Tindak Kekerasan (the Commission for "the Disappeared" andVictims of Violence, or KontraS), was murdered by a former pilot on boarda plane (Wikipedia contributors n.d.). These killings show that the suppressionby former state apparatuses of social activists still persists.

On the other hand, in the post-oligarchy category, the former suppressivestate apparatus and political monopoly go through relatively extensivedissolution and weakening. In addition, former monopolistic forces in thestate apparatus and antidictatorship activists coexist, resulting in diversifiedgroups within state institutions. South Korea and Taiwan may be classifiedunder this category.Economic and Social De-monopolizationUnder such distinctive conditions of political de-monopolization, economicand social de-monopolization proceeds. Democratic instability and crisisduring postdemocratization depend on how economic and social de-monopolization proceeds. This involves various interacting factors, among

25CHOwhich competition between former monopolistic forces and subalterns is themost important. On one hand, former monopolistic forces try to support andsafeguard their vested rights within the democratic space derived frompolitical de-monopolization. On the other hand, subalterns strive to achievetheir demands and interests through a more open struggle. Conflict duringdemocratic transition should not be regarded as being just that amongpolitical elites. Rather, it is a process involving complex social conflict. Oncedemocratization begins, existing oppression weakens, prompting variouspolitical and social forces to appear in the democratic space and defy change.Under political de-monopolization, fierce conflict over economic and socialde-monopolization unfolds in the form of crisis—not the stabilizationthought to occur during democratic consolidation—which is due to fiercecompetition between monopolistic forces and subalterns.

Other factors affecting democratization are the effects of neoliberalglobalization and the mode of its internalization. First of all, neoliberalglobalization marginalizes the demands and interests of subalterns in theircompetition with former monopolistic forces. How a similar condition ofneoliberal globalization is interpreted varies depending on the historical andcultural conditions of each society. For example, South Korea is a very pro-American country and has accepted a Western-style of modernization sincethe industrialization era of development dictatorship. In this regard, thecountry has shown a striking tendency to actively imitate and embraceWestern-centric neoliberal model. As a result, with the effects of neoliberalglobalization, Washington Consensus policies including trade liberalization,deregulation, commercialization and privatization are predominant andaccepted. This has something to do with the fact that South Korea iscategorized as a post-oligarchy and is located in Northeast Asia, a regioncharacterized by conflicts during the Cold War. South Korea completelyinternalizes neoliberal policies which prioritize trade liberalization andrestructuring for market autonomy since dominant capital groups seekingglobal capital accumulation enjoy hegemony in the capital market. On theother hand, other Asian nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia andThailand see strong conflicts between anti- and pro-American sentiments ineach country. For Southeast Asia, which is relatively less pro-American thanEast Asia, American neoliberalism supremacy is relatively weak, except inthe case of the Philippines whose economic policies clearly demonstrate atendency to lean toward the US’s neoliberal policies.

Therefore, tensions result from the internal acceptance of the neoliberalglobalization model. Several governments in the democratic transitionprocess, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, embrace and

26 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESimplement a wide range of neoliberal policies only to bring about destructiveconsequences. As a result, the anti-neoliberal sentiment of the public in thesecountries has proliferated. However, such public discontent does not turninto more ideologically based anti-neoliberalism or socioeconomicliberalism. In such cases, an organized social movement fails to develop suchsentiment into a hegemonic struggle and fails to become decentralized.

With such factors interacting among each other, a practical result ofeconomic and social de-monopolization is the determination of politicaluncertainty and crisis in the democratic consolidation process. This isbecause democratization brings about class conflict issues that have beensuppressed under the dictatorship, an example of economic de-monopolization, and racial conflict issues, an example of social de-monopolization. This is also because instability and crisis duringpostdemocratization are dependent on whether newly democratized politicalgroups embrace such tension and conflict into its democratic institutions,meeting demands of subalterns and resolving their discontent.

When it comes to economic de-monopolization, which is the extent towhich economic monopolization established under the dictatorship goesthrough disintegration, the extent of economic liberalization is important.And the degree to which economic and social de-monopolization progressesduring democratization–the extent of equalization–is important as well. Thepractical aspects of economic and social de-monopolization can be dividedinto two categories: pluralistic and monopolistic. Specifically, economic de-monopolization can be divided into an economically plural category and aneconomically monopolistic one. Likewise, social de-monopolization can becategorized as socially pluralistic and socially monopolistic.

First of all, the economically monopolistic category does not see muchchange in the status of former economically monopolistic forces, many ofwhom are related to dictators, thus enjoyed economic privilege under adictatorship. Those forces bolster their monopolistic status and evenstrengthen their financial footing into a new level after democratization.Currently, the top fifteen families in the Philippines own about fifty percentof its national wealth. In some cases, monopolistic entities change hands. Ingeneral, however, former monopolistic forces remain intact, which naturallyundermines the improvement in economic conditions of the public. Therehave been certain achievements such as a decline in the number of peopleliving on less than one U.S. dollar a day. However, there is little improvementin terms of relative poverty or economic polarization.

Next is the economically plural category. In terms of politics, economicpluralism is more likely to exist in post-oligarchic society rather than in a neo-

27CHOoligarchic one. After democratization, a partial relaxation of former economicmonopoly might bring about a change in corporate rankings or the emergenceof new capitalists in new industrial fields. The prime example is the promotionof venture industry led by the South Korean government. But economicallymonopolistic conditions remain intact even in South Korea, which we havesaid to be in the course of political post-oligarchy. Also, an anti-dictatorialgovernment with reform liberalism faces the new trend toward economicinequality while wholly accepting neoliberal policies. However, Taiwan hasa lower level of economic concentration than South Korea because itsdevelopment dictatorship brought about relatively higher percentage ofsmall and medium enterprises and lower domination of monopolistic bodies.Taiwan also has recently seen its state-owned enterprises being privatized andtaken over by business groups to become conglomerates. Also, the emergenceof new monopolistic bodies in the fledgling information technology industrycaused stronger economic concentration in Taiwan compared to itsdevelopment dictatorship period. While economic inequality in the nationintensifies, political democracy-related issues such as the President’sinvolvement in a corruption scandal attracted national attention, whicheffectively marginalizes the issue of economic inequality.

Now, let us discuss social de-monopolization. This can be divided intosocially plural and socially monopolistic categories. In the former case, theconstant progress of de-monopolization eased existing social monopoly,leading to a pluralistic situation. In the latter case, the hegemony of dominatingsocial forces persists.

In the aftermath of democratization, demands and resistance of subalternserupt against social monopoly which has been specifically established underdevelopment dictatorship. For instance, Thailand and the Philippines sawethnic minority conflicts regarding racial and religious issues. Other examplesinclude regional tensions in South Korea and racial conflicts in Taiwan aswell. When the exclusion of ethnic minorities persists in a democratic space,cracks of social division may manifest in the form of a separatist movement.What is crucial is whether or not democratization embraces demands andinterests from such separatist movements into the democratic space, resolvingthem without violence. In that respect, Indonesia’s Aceh province is a typicalsuccess story, in that the Helsinki Agreement helped legitimize Aceh’sseparatist rebels, prompting them to compete within political institutions andpaving the way for decentralization. On the other hand, the Special Regionof Papua suffered fiercer separatist conflicts over minority resistance. Bothof these patterns coexist in Indonesia. In the Philippines, the vicious cycle ofviolent crackdown and armed resistance continues to be unresolved, and may


have worsened. Thailand was also struck by religious and racial conflicts inthe south, suffering from the vicious cycle of violent suppression and resistanceunder the Thaksin government.

On the other hand, both Taiwan and South Korea experienced thedevelopment of major social cleavages, such as racial conflicts and regionalconflicts, becoming incorporated into the internal systemic conflicts. Thatis, political parties representing racial minorities in Taiwan and regionalgroups in South Korea each came to power. In particular, Taiwan’sindependence issue has taken on a new dimension. Though still conflictual,confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties, and between theMainlanders and native Taiwanese, as well as issues regarding the TaiwanStrait and independence are no longer considered to be along a singlecleavage. In this respect, Taiwan and South Korea may be categorized associally plural, considering that the dominant social cleavage under adictatorship successfully developed into internal tensions within theirrespective systems.

Diverse Routes of DemocratizationIn sum, the route to democratization differs depending on various factors:characteristics of political de-monopolization under the international impact

29CHOof neoliberal globalization; competition between former monopolistic forcesand subalterns under a new democratic space; and economic and social de-monopolization–the extent to which demands and interests of subalterns areaccepted–as a consequence of such competition.

In classifying the various routes to democratization, figure 4 showschronic conflict, reverse wave, de-railing and non-hostile coexistence. Themost idealistic route might be non-hostile coexistence, where various politicalforces (e.g., dictatorial monopolistic forces, antidictatorial moderate liberalforces, and radical progressive forces) are engaged in pluralistic competition,and animosities between them are alleviated so that they can coexist to somedegree. Yet, stabilized democracy is achievable not by the coexistence ofpolitical forces, but by the disintegration of social and economic monopoly,or the achievment of alevel of equalization that is acceptable to subalterns, andby political de-monopolization which facilitates such equalization.

In reality, however, most transition routes constitute a chronic conflict.This route operates under a complex, multi-layered interaction of political,economic, and social de-monopolization, and conflicts persist, movingforward and backward alternately without being entrenched. Conflicts betweenpolitical forces turn hostile and their political competition is propelledtoward excluding the demands of socioeconomic subalterns rather thanreflecting the transformation of social and economic monopolies.Consequently, the gap between the new “democratic” politics and societywidens, which causes chronic conflicts. That is, the stagnantion of thesocialization of democracy prevents socioeconomic causes of conflicts frombeing removed, thus the democratization process features chronic conflict.

From a strategic perspective, with conflicts and crises being inevitableduring democratization, whoever monopolizes the demands of the public inan expanded democratic space determines the route. Therefore, diversepolitical changes are likely. The same goes for chronic conflict. That is, evenif a democratic government led by moderate liberal forces takes office, it willend up facing a chronic socioeconomic crisis. Such a government could turninto various forms such as a neo-conservative government which has previouslybeen ruled by dictatorial conservatives, a moderate liberal government whichreturns to power through innovation, or a radical government comprised ofsocioeconomic forces (e.g., a leftist government in South America). However,an emergence of a neo-conservative government may lead to more radicalneoliberal policies and is more likely to face another chronic conflict. Areverse wave is a radical case of this. An example would be the case of Thailandwhich suffered a coup d’etat in September 2006 before its democratization

30 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESgot back on track. The coup was a case involving chronic conflict, reversewave, and de-railing.

This process is illustrated by figure 4. Depending on the category,political de-monopolization has an impact. Conflicts between formermonopolistic forces and subalterns take shape in both institutional and non-institutional space. As a result, social and economic monopolies break downextensively and vested rights of former monopolistic forces disintegrate. Theextent to which demands of subalterns are met will determine the route todemocratization. The democratization process in Asia shows that such routecould be divided into non-hostile coexistence, chronic conflict, reverse-wave,and de-railing.

Conclusion: For "Socialization of Democracy"The consolidation of democracy becomes possible only when thedemocratization of political and socioeconomic monopoly has occured tosuch an extent that socioeconomic sub-subjects are accepted in the processof democratization. Through this multilevel de-monopolization the“socialization of democracy” can be achieved, and diverse forces can “coexistin non-confrontation” and the social settlement of democracy is possible.

Many Asian countries show us a variety of levels of activation of civilsociety and the people’s sector according to correlations of political, economic,and social de-monopolization. They present cases in which the electoraldemocracy they achieved through democratic transition as a political struggledoes not provide any disorganization or change of economic and socialmonopolies, and as a result, democracy changes into a new kind of monopoly.Furthermore, there are only rare cases in which diverse sub-subjects enter thepolitical arena, thus the socialization of democracy opens the era of“multipolitics.” These countries present complicated cases in which there iscontinuous conflict and crisis, and sometimes reversion to the conservativecourse even after democratic transition. This complexity is the empiricalphenomena that tell us “there is no democracy without socialization” or that“there is no consolidation without socialization,” and “there is democraticconsolidation without de-monopolization of the existing monopolies.”11

Notes1. Schumpeter (1943) said “a democratic method is an institutional device with which

the individual achieves power to decide through a competitive struggle to get thesupport of the mass” (269).

31CHO2. Huntington (1991) picked as the first wave of democratization the democratic

dynamics being on the rise for a century beginning in 1828, which centered on malesuffrage expansion. The second wave is when thirty-five sovereign states were establishedafter World War II with the victory of the Allies. The third one is the wave ofdemocratization in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Asia since the 1970s.These waves each had counterwaves (e.g., fascism in the 1930s, the rise of dictatorshipsin the 1960s and 1970s), and the new democratizing wave runs back against acounterwave.

3. On consolidation of democracy, Diamond (1999) differentiated rules on one handand belief and action on the other, as well as the elite and the mass. He also said thatfor consolidation to occur, there must be democratic deepening, politicalinstitutionalization, and regime performance (1999, 74). For regime performance,there are economic and political performances such as continuation of effectivegovernment for political institutionalization (1999, 93); and there are strengtheningof institutions of governance including the bureaucracy, the legislature, and party andelectoral systems. For the deepening of democracy, there is the need for divergence ofpowers, a weakening of military influences and functions, and re-establishment of thecivil-military relation based on democracy (1999, 114).

4. Linz and Stepan (1996) take as the formation of the state and nationhood asindependent variables determining consolidation, government before democratizationbeing among the macro variables, and action variables and chance factors being non-macro variables. In addition, they refer to a dynamic civil society, a relativelyautonomous political society, the rule of law, a state which is capable of running aneffective bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society including a capitalmarket as the variables to confirm consolidation of democracy. Using these variables,they analyzed fourteen countries in Latin America and Southern Europe.

5. Gunther et al. (1995) define consolidation on phenomenal aspects such as“marginalization of extreme groups” or “absence of anti-regime party.” Definingconsolidation in this paper is based on where the dissolution of the the socioeconomicmonopoly on which those extreme and anti-regime groups are based.

6. The conflict and crisis in postdemocratic transition happen because the “from-the-bottom” initiatives from civil society, the people’s sector, and social movementsde-monopolize political, economic, social monopolies to “socialize” democracy.Socialization is a polysemic notion. Skocpol (1979) differentiates social revolutionfrom political revolution. The socialization of the means of production is an oldMarxist proposition, which holds that the situation in which material goods and meansof production are not monopolized by one group but shared. If we use the term“socialization of democracy,” it means the process in which democratic politics is notmonopolized by particular political groups (usually pluralist political groups inpolyarchic system) but shared by diverse social sub-subjects excluded from institutionalpolitics (these are the social political subjects different from pluralist political subject).This basically depends upon whether politics functions in the direction of diversesocial sub-subjects and social demand in a broad sense, and not a part of reproductionof dominance. The former is the “nationalization of politics,” while the latter is“socialization of politics.” For further clarification, refer to Cho (2006).

7. The notion of de-monopolization and its contents can be diversified to contemplateequality, decentralization, pluralism, market, etc. As previously mentioned, politicalmonopoly is whether a particular individual or group monopolizes political resources;

32 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIESeconomic monopoly exists when a particular individual or group enjoys monopolisticeconomic resources. Social monopoly includes, in a broad sense, economic monopoly.In a narrow sense, it is a situation in which the access to political and economicresources is blocked along diverse social demarcation lines (ethnicity, religion, etc.),or social discrimination is structured according to particular social demarcation lines.The correspondence of political monopoly is power divergence; of economic monopoly,equality; and social monopoly, pluralism.

8. In a general perspective the division of Korea can be seen as similar to those seen inany society according to particular demarcation lines. Division is a situation in whichconflicts in the boundary of social demarcation lines are put under confrontation, thusin such a situation there is a social demarcation line fixated into a confrontationalrelation. In Korea, this is combined with ideological confrontation and the regionaldivision into South and North Korea.

9. Thailand provides a good example of this case. In the anti-Thaksin struggle,progressive civil society had initiative in the beginning. But with time and with thejoining of Thaksin government defectors, including Sonthi, with the royalists, thespace for a military coup was created. The anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance forDemocracy (PAD) came to have a strong conservative force in it. In the anti-Thaksincivil society movement, the anti-Thaksin political factors were combined with anti-Thaksin social factors. The conservative force based largely upon the anti-Thaksinmovement called upon the King to solve the crisis of the democratic government, andthis provided a good excuse for the coup by the royalist military. This means that thereversion of democracy can either be stopped or not, depending on several factors,among which are the following: level of civil society hegemony, capability of the oldsocial force in engaging with civil society, degree of popular foundation, capability ofcivil society movement, the mass-mobilizing ability of civil society. In brief, democracyis determined by the formation and configuration of civil society in the process ofdemocratization.

10. For more information, refer to Cho (2008).11. Text by the author translated from Korean into English by Rebecca Kim.

ReferencesCarothers, Thomas. 2002a. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy

13 (1): 5-21.———. 2002b. “A Reply to My Critics.” Journal of Democracy 13 (3): 33-8.Cho, Heeyeon. 2008. “Democratization in Asia: Oligarchic Democracy and Democratic

Oligarchy.” In States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and AsianDemocratization, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park.Chinnai: Earthworm Books.

———. 2006. “Universality within us.” In Universality Within Us. Seoul: Hanul.———. 2005. “‘1987 Regime’ and Transitional Crisis of the Democratic Reform

Movement in Korea.” Citizen and the World No. 8, November.Choi, Jang-Jip. 2005. Democracy after Democratization–The Conservative Origin of

Korean Democracy and Its Crisis. Seoul: Humanitas.Dahl, Robert. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University

Press.

33CHODiamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press.Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1999.

Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. Boulder, Colorado: LynneRienner Publishers.

Encarnacion Tadem, Teresa S. 2008. “The Perennial Drift to the Right: Transitioning toDemocracy in the Philippines.” In States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies andAsian Democratization, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and EunhongPark. Chennai: Earthworm Books.

Gunther, Richard, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds. 1995. ThePolitics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective.Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

———.1996. “O’Donnell’s ‘Illusions’: A Rejoinder”. Journal of Democracy 7 (4): 151-9.

Hadiz, Vedi Renandi. 2008. “A Political Sociology of Institutional Change: Local Powerin Indonesia.” In States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and AsianDemocratization, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park.Chennai: Earthworm Books.

Hipsher, Patricia. 1996. “Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movementsin Chile and Spain.” Comparative Politics 28 (3): 273-297.

Hungtington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the TwentiethCentury. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Linz, Juan J. 1990. “Transitions to Democracy.” Washington Quartely No. 13 (3): 143-164.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, eds. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———.1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,South America, and Post-Communist Europe Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress.

Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in ComparativePerspective. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press.

Marshall , Thomas Humphrey. 1964. “Citizenship and Social Class.” In Class, Citizenship,and Social Development. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1996a. “Illusions about Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 7(2): 34-51.

———. 1996b. “Illusions and Conceptual Flaws.” Journal of Democracy 7 (4): 160-180.———. 2002. “In Partial Defense of an Evanescent ‘Paradigm.’” Journal of Democracy

13 (3): 6-12.O'Donnell, Guillermo, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Lazzetta eds. 2004. the

Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre DamePress.

O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from AuthoritarianRule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: TheJohns Hopkins University Press.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. .1986a.Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 1.

———.1986b. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 2.

34 DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS TRAJECTORIES———.1986c. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 3.Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: The Political and Economical

Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.Przeworski, A. et al. 1995. Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, London: George

Allen and Unwin.Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,

Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Democracy in Latin America:

Towards Citizens’ Democracy. New York: UNDP.Wikipedia contributors. n.d. "Munir Said Thalib." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munir_Said_Thalib.

36 ADI GUIDEBOOK

The Asian Democracy Index:A Guide

THE CONSORTIUM FOR THE ASIAN DEMOCRACY INDEX

The following is an edited version of the guidebook utilized by the Consortium for the AsianDemocracy Index for the conduct of the 2011 pilot test of the ADI instruments and the 2012survey cycle. The document was originally drafted by the South Korean country team basedlargely on texts published by Dr. Heeyeon Cho, with substantial alterations made afterworkshops conducted in 2010 and 2011 with other country teams. Changes from the post-pilot test version of the guidebook were kept to a minimum—largely grammatical and stylisticin nature—to make sure that the following text still closely approximates the originalguidebook. A revised version of the guidebook will be printed in subsequent issues of thisjournal each time a fundamental change in the ADI framework or methodology is made priorto an ADI survey cycle.

OverviewThis guidebook serves as an introduction to the Asian Democracy Index(ADI). It explains the ADI’s theoretical framework, the structure of the indexsystem, its evaluation methods, and its utilizations. In addition, it alsoattempts to show how the ADI could become a comprehensive approach todemocracy assessment through an index, consequently showing how the ADIcan become an international benchmark.

The ADI was not designed to be used for establishing a solely Asianmodel of democracy. The index is a framework to compare and discoverdemocratic characteristics of Asian countries. It is designed to understandthe quality of Asian democracy today. The ADI is useful in presenting thecurrent status of democratization in Asian countries; it is not a tool forproposing an exemplary democratic model or to rank the different democraticcharacteristics of the countries studied.

This guidebook consists of three parts: theoretical perspective, the ADIstructure, and the conduct of the ADI survey and analysis of data.

____________________________________________________________The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index (CADI) is a network of research institutesand independent researchers working on the development of a new Asian Democracy Index.Since its formation in 2011, CADI members have been conducting annual perceptionsurveys of various local experts on politics, economics, and civil society to examine the stateof democratization in the said experts' countries.

ASIAN DEMOCRACY REVIEW Vol. 1 (2012):36-87 ISSN 2244-5633

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The first part examines the theoretical basis on which the AsianDemocracy Index as a comparison and discovery framework was developed.In order to overcome the limitations of existing democracy indices and toobjectively evaluate the quality of democracy that each country hasimplemented, we believe that there is a need to develop a new perspective ondemocracy. Thus, we defined a perspective that is in consonance with “post-monopoly democratic theory,” as discussed in Cho (2008). This perspectiveviews democracy as a continuing process of breaking away from power andresource monopolies, and democratization as the dissolution of monopolycomplexes.

The second part explains the principles and fields that comprise theindices developed based on the above theoretical framework. The two coreprinciples, liberalization and equalization, serve as barometers to evaluatethree fields of democratization: politics, economy, and civil society. Whenthe two principles and three fields cross each other, six different units aregenerated—political liberalization, political equalization, economicliberalization, economic equalization, civil society liberalization, and civilsociety equalization. Each unit has unique characteristics and shows thelimitations and potentials of other units. These units can be further brokendown into fifty-seven evaluation indicators.

The last section explains the project’s methodology. An ADI countryteam conducts a survey of experts with varying ideological leanings andaffiliations in the three fields of democratization. Then, each index wasexamined for its utilization. This examination is undertaken by CADI-member survey managers in each country. To ensure a measure of objectivityin the evaluation of each index, supplementary subjective and objectiveindices are obtained for purposes of comparison with ADI indices. Each localsurvey team then drafts a report on the country’s democracy based on thefindings of their local ADI survey and other existing index surveys. Theseevaluation methods allow ADI researchers to focus on the uniquecharacteristics of each country and help overcome the subjective nature of theADI evaluation index.

Theoretical Perspective

ProblematizationSince the third wave of democratization, democracy has been accepted as acommonsensical objective of states in most parts of the world. Unfortunately,this commonsensical objective tends not to be realized as an actual social

38 ADI GUIDEBOOK

norm in many countries. In addition, the gale of neoliberal globalization hasprevented democracy from becoming a trustworthy and consolidatedinstitution in countries that have experienced post-authoritarian transition.That the development of democracy became identified with the proliferationof neoliberalism imperiled its status as the great modern aspiration.Transnational capital-led globalization in the name of neoliberalism changedthe basic value of democracy from humanity to capital, eroding the people’strust in democratic institutions. Under the global gale of neoliberalism,processes of democratization could not but abort the improvement of thequality of life in most of the world’s democratic societies.

As Guillermo O’Donnell points out, while the third wave ofdemocratization showed only “transition from authoritarianism,” it did notinvolve “transition to democracy,” nor “consolidation to better democracy.”Thus, many scholars had to turn their eyes to various gray zones and had toquestion what democracy really is. Now, scholars of democracy focus on the“quality of democracy,” asking, “What kind of democracy will guarantee agood quality of life?”

Asian scholars of democracy have certainly been following that trend.Since the mid-1980s, democratization processes in Asian countries havebeen characterized by varying trajectories. Some countries like South Koreaand Taiwan are evaluated as countries that have achieved the level ofprocedural democracy and entered the era of democratic consolidation.Some countries in Southeast Asia like Thailand have been said to haveexperienced a backsliding of democracy. In some Asian countries that havegone beyond the transitory moment between authoritarianism and post-authoritarianism, electoral democracy is still threatened. Some countries’practice of electoral democracy clash with some principles of politicaldemocracy, i.e., participation, representation, and accountability. In somecountries, democratization does not include actual improvement of thepeople’s quality of life. Our research problem starts from this dynamic grayzone of reality.

The reality of democracy in Asia gives us some critical lessons. First,“transition from authoritarianism” does not guarantee “transition todemocracy.” Second, “transition to democracy”, i.e., “achievement of electoraldemocracy” does not involve “realization of representative democracy.”Third, “transition to substantive democracy,” i.e., “socialization” does notdirectly follow “transition to democracy.”

These facts lead us to reflect on mainstream democratization theoriesand the concept of democracy itself. To understand and analyze newphenomena of democratization, we need to start from the re-examination of

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the very concept of democracy. In addition, we are required to produce a newintellectual frame to explain new phenomena and realities of democracy inthe contemporary Asian complexity.

Democratization as De-monopolizationWe define democracy as a process of “de-monopolization.” This perspectiveinvolves three key conceptions. First, democracy basically means rule by thepeople. As most liberalists presuppose, it requires the equal and fair distributionof power and resources in a community. In this sense, democracy can bedefined as a certain situation in which all power and resources are beingdistributed to all members of a community. However, it is difficult to realizesuch an ideal situation. Thus, we try to define democracy as a continuingprocess toward an ideal—that is, a process of de-monopolization that aimedat achieving a condition wherein all power and resources in a particular stateare being fairly distributed.

Second, we argue that democracy is not simply a political system, but arelational formation. In a country, the quality of democracy is determined notonly within a political field, but also through the relations of various forcesin the multi-layered fields of politics, economy, and civil society. Thus,democracy should be considered as something more than electoral andprocedural democracy.

Third, we also understand democracy not as a fixed or unchangeablesystem, but as a historical formation. As mentioned above, democracy is acontinuing process, thus it is a historically produced formation. It has variousforms at different times and in different spaces. It means that democracy canbe understood as a consequential form of particular political, economic, andsocial struggles. Therefore, to experience the reality of democracy, we shouldrecognize the particularity of democracy in a particular country or community.

In view of democracy as a continuing process of de-monopolization, ademarcating line between dictatorship and democratic leadership is neededto evaluate the democracies we are experiencing today. Thus, while seeing adictatorship as a monopoly-complex composed of political, economic andsocial monopoly, in which a specific group monopolizes the political,economic and social power, we understand democratization as thedisintegration of the aforesaid monopoly-complex.

This understanding of democracy involves two characteristics ofdemocratization. One is the disintegration of a monopoly-complex’, whichis divided into three self-legislating fields: politics, economy and civilsociety. The other is the change of the relations of power within each field,

40 ADI GUIDEBOOK

that is, the disintegration of a monopoly. Traditional theories ofdemocratization generally focus on the former one, which implies two stagesof monopoly disintegration: the first one is to disintegrate a political monopolyover fields, and the second one is to disintegrate only the political monopolyitself. The first one can be explained as a process of “liberalization,”highlighting “civil rights” (in O’Donnell’s terms) while the second hingesits concept of “democratization” on the importance of vertical accountability.

Our definition of a dictatorship as a monopoly-complex composed ofpolitical, economic, and social monopoly gives us a broad perspective tovarious important things that traditional conceptions of political democracyhave not detected.

First of all, the concept of a monopoly-complex leads us to recognizesomething more than electoral and procedural consequences of democracyby questioning the limits of both vertical and horizontal accountability in thepolitical field (e.g., the nature of a junta). Second, it guides us to understanda mechanism of state domination and management over economy and civilsociety. For example, some problems related to the government-led economyand pro-government organizations, which are under the strong influences ofcertain traditional cultural values and ideas, cannot be solved by the institutionof electoral or procedural democracy. In short, the concept of the monopoly-complex helps us analyze mechanisms of some undemocratic happeningsunder certain procedural democratic moments.

In the Third World, the transition from the dictatorship to democracycan be identified with a particular form of transition from a pre-modernityto modernity. By looking at the transition from pre-modernity to modernityas involving a process of division from a single society to a pluralized society,a dictatorship can be construed as a force preventing a society from thedivision into the different fields of state, economy, and civil society. In thissense, democratization can be understood as a process of realization ofmodernization or dissolution of “the contemporaneity of theuncontemporary.”

From this perspective, we believe that the transition to democracy beginswith the disintegration of a specific monopoly complex. Of course, we agreethat the disintegration of political monopoly and achievement of proceduraldemocracy is a good index to evaluate a certain level of democratization ina country. However, such an index is not enough to evaluate all phenomenaand values that the concept of democratization implies and requires. Insofaras monopolies in other fields remain intact, the political monopoly wouldregain momentum, or oligarchic forces would be strengthened in each field.For example, some Asian countries experienced anti-democratic backsliding,

41CADI

including the increasing economic inequality and a return to authoritarianism(political monopoly), even after they have entered the transitory moment topost-authoritarianism. To interpret and analyze these anti-democraticphenomena, we need more robust indices. Therefore, it is important to notetwo things together. First, democratization is to be understood as a longprocess of de-monopolization. Second, we have to analyze relational dynamicswithin and between the multiple fields of politics, economy, and civil society.

Asian DemocracyAs discussed above, dictatorship is defined as a monopoly-complex whichcombined all monopolies in political, economic, and social fields, anddemocratization is a multi-layered de-monopolization process. Put differently,democratization is not only the disintegration process of the monopoly-complex but also de-monopolization in the aforementioned fields. EachAsian country has followed different paths toward the “multi-layereddemonopolization” of the national monopoly-complex, which is constitutedby de-monopolization in each field. The concrete pattern of democratizationhas been shaped by the power relationship in each country. However, it is alsotrue that “neoliberal globalization,” which was culminated in the Southeastand East Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, strongly affected thedemocratization process. Despite cross-national variances, “neoliberalglobalization,” in general, has constrained the multi-layered de-monopolization by strengthening the power of socioeconomic oligarchicforces in each country.

Although neoliberal globalization constrained the democratization ofAsian countries, the mode of its internalization was so specific to eachcountry. The national diversity was a consequence of the interplay of the modeof the internalization of globalization and various internal factors, such as theconcrete modality of the disintegration of monopoly-complexes and its sub-processes, the conflicts and differentiation of ruling forces and subalterns,and the relationship between political forces in the newly created contentioussphere of democracy.

We identified two types of democracy in Asia by studying the complexinterplay of the abovementioned variables in South Korea, Taiwan, thePhilippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. In Asia, political de-monopolizationcan generally be categorized into either neo-oligarchy or post-oligarchy.

The terms “neo-oligarchy” and “post-oligarchy” demonstrate thecharacteristics and progress of political de-monopolization. Neo-oligarchicdemocracy refers to a democratization process where former monopolistic

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forces maintain their monopolistic status even after democratization. Post-oligarchic democracy refers to a democratization process where themonopolistic status of oligarchies constantly weaken and relatively“pluralistic” competition between monopolistic conservatives and anti-monopolistic liberals takes place. Of course, this is an ideal-type classificationand is not necessarily realistic.

In a neo-oligarchy, political monopoly or the vested rights structure doesnot break up widely and former monopolists’ institutional or non-institutionalforce never weakens. In post-oligarchy, however, the existing politicalmonopoly breaks up continuously and pluralistic competition takes rootnationally and politically. Thus, they are distinguished mainly by the degreeof the disintegration of the monopoly-complex and, especially, of the politicalmonopoly. Whereas neo-oligarchy shows the lower degree of disintegration,post-oligarchy shows an elaborated division of labor not only within thepolitical field but also between oligarchic forces in each field. For example,in South Korea and Taiwan, we saw the differentiation of the state and civilsociety and the separation of politics from the economy. In these cases, formermonopolistic forces in the state apparatus and anti-dictatorship activistscoexisted, resulting in diversified groups within state institutions.

In summary, the difference between neo-oligarchy and post-oligarchyis the difference between transformative reconfiguration and disintegrativereconfiguration. Nevertheless, they are still oligarchy as the previousmonopoly was not completely disintegrated but reconfigured. Not only inThailand and the Philippines but also in South Korea and Taiwan are theprevious monopoly-complexes enjoying the disproportionate sway over thepolitical field and the whole society. Table 1 summarizes the characters ofeach type.

The Asian Democracy Index

The ADI PerspectiveDrawing from the theoretical expositions above, our examination of Asiandemocracy via our Asian Democracy Index is performed following a particularsequence: principlessubprinciplesattributesindicators. The twoprinciples, liberalization and equalization, imply the perspectives and valuesthat each index signifies. They are both signposts that determine the limitsof the signification of each index. As was discussed above, the conceptualstarting point of the research on the Asian Democracy Index is“democratization as the de-monopolization.” It underlines a relational and

44 ADI GUIDEBOOK

historical approach on the understanding of democracy. In other words,democracy can be practically recognized as a relational formation of complexconflicts of different fields of politics, economy and civil society as well as ahistorical formation which has a path dependency in a certain society.

We try to articulate an idea of “civil society” in the context of ourconception of democracy and democratization for our Asian DemocracyIndex. With this idea of “civil society,” we can see some aspects ofdemocratization that other democracy indicators have missed.

Firstly, it helps us restore the role of “the agent” alongside the impact ofa system or a structure in a democracy index. Whereas the third wave ofdemocratization resulted in “the resurrection of a civil society,” most researcheson democracy tend to miss the role of the agent. They are generally based ona dichotomy of structure/consciousness, and biased to put importance to therole of consciousness. Here, it is important to remind that O’Donnellintroduced into the theory of democracy the concept of “modern individuals,”which originally emerged in the French Declaration of Rights of Man andCitizen and in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Thisconcept recognizes the modern identity of human beings, as beings that haveirrevocable rights and responsibilities. This also a crucial premise that servesas the basis for identifying all humans as democratic agents in theory. Torestore the role of the agent signifies the need to evaluate people’s ability toachieve access to necessary resources. This evaluation involves the examinationof various aspects of civil society: from the level of basic human developmentto people’s influence over the state.

Secondly, it extends a view on “analytical objects” so that we can see moreclearly the relational characteristics of democracy. Other theories mainlytake a political field as their analytical object. Due to this, they have failed toinvestigate some critical facts—theoretically claimed by neo-pluralists andnew left groups—that show how the deepening of inequality in the fields ofeconomy and civil society are threatening democracy. The introduction of theidea of civil society based on democratization as de-monopolization will leadus to understand the abnormal phenomena of the anti-democratic backslidingsof democracy in the condition of a fully developed procedural democraticsystem, and to find solutions to such regressions.

Principles and Intermediating ValuesFrom the perspective above, we suggest that the two ideas of liberalizationand equalization be seen as the core principles of democracy. Liberalizationis a process to restore the autonomy of each field of a society by de-integrating

45CADI

the monopoly-complex, and to realize self-legislation. Thus, liberalizationis a principle used to measure the level of liberalization from monopoly andregulation over certain fields. In this sense, it is a principle to measure howmonopoly of resources is de-integrated in a procedural level.

In the process of democratization, each field can restore its own autonomyfrom the domination of the monopoly-complex. It is identified withO’Donnell’s notion of liberalization, Freedom House’s idea of the citizenliberty, and the concept of civil rights in the theory of citizenship. The levelof liberalization can enhance when each field obtains its own criteria for self-evaluation as well as its autonomy. Thus, liberalization is divided into twosubsidiary categories of autonomy and ability of competition/accountability.

The process of democratization involves the transformation in therelations of power in each field of politics, economy, and civil society. We callthis transformation of relations equalization. The degree of equalizationshows how much the quality of democracy has developed. It is a principle usedto evaluate how much agents achieve in terms of gaining actual resourceswithin a certain system. That is, it is the actual degree of resource access.Equalization is also divided into two subsidiary categories: pluralization andsolidarity/consequential equality. The former shows the actual status ofmonopoly over resources while the latter pertains to the available means tode-integrate the monopoly of resources.

The two core principles of liberalization and equalization reveal theconditions and the consequences of democratization. Both principles areused to recognize causes of anti-democratic backsliding and the necessaryconditions for better democratization.

Examining specific mechanisms of liberalization and equalization in thethree interacting fields of politics, economy, and civil society, our AsianDemocracy Index aims to give a relatively clearer and more concrete pictureof the complex dynamics of democratization in Asia. However, as mentionedearlier, the ADI is not limited to examining democratization on the basis oftwo principles. Whereas the core principles are concerned with overallinformation about each country’s democracy, the subprinciples deal withmore specific democracy information per country. Autonomy deals withindependence from the government, competition with the state of the self-reference system, equality with the degree of equality in terms of resourceallocation, and solidarity with the degree of mitigation of income disparity.

The Asian Democracy Index also enables the analysis of each field basedon civil society theory so that it can help in understanding the potentials andlimitations of each country’s democracy. The indices consisting ofcombinations of the three fields of politics, economy, and civil society help

46 ADI GUIDEBOOK

in describing how balanced a country’s democracy is and what constrains acountry’s democracy from evolving. For example, if a country’s politicaldemocracy index is high but its economic democracy index is low, thecountry’s political democracy is institutionally well-established but likely toface limitations in practice. If a country’s civil society democracy index ishigh, this country is likely to further develop its democracy even if the politicaland economic index are currently low. Taking such an approach to analyzedemocracy may uncover different aspects of democratization that previousstudies have failed to address. Thus, it is hoped that the ADI can help explaineach country’s democracy more specifically and thereby help a country’sdemocracy scholars undertake more relational and multilevel analyses.

The Asian Democracy Index can be enriched by combining the aforesaidcore principle and field analyses. When political, economic, and civil societyfields meet the two core principles and their four subprinciples, twelve sub-units can be obtained, all of which have the potential to contribute to theanalysis of the potentials and limitations of a country’s democracy.

Attributes and IndicatorsAs stated above, the Asian Democracy Index consists of three fields, two coreprinciples, and four subprinciples. It can thus be divided into six subsectionsby core principles, or twelve subsections by subprinciples.

Table 2: Asian Democracy Index Fields, Principles, and Subprinciples Core Principle

Liberalization Equalization Subsidiary Subsidiary Field Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity Politics

Attributes 4 6 4 4 Indicators 4 6 4 5

Economy Attributes 3 4 5 4 Indicators 4 4 5 7

Civil Society Attributes 4 4 4 3 Indicators 7 4 4 3

47CADIThe Asian Democracy Index is comprised of forty nine attributes and

fifty seven indicators. To be specific, the political field consists of eighteenattributes and nineteen indicators, the economic field of sixteen attributes andtwenty indicators, and the civil society field of fifteen attributes and eighteenindicators.

Reclassifying the attributes and indicators into subsections by coreprinciples, political liberalization is measured by ten attributes and tenindicators, while political equalization is made up of eight attributes and nineindicators; economic liberalization is measured by seven attributes and eightindicators, while economic equalization is comprised of nine attributes andtwelve indicators; and civil society liberalization is measured by eightattributes and eleven indicators, while civil society equalization is made upof seven attributes and seven indicators. The attributes and indicators can alsobe divided according to subprinciples, as presented in table 2.

What follows is a detailed discussion of the attributes and indicators�phrased as the questions that appear in the ADI questionnaires�arrangedby field subprinciple. PoliticsThe political field consists of eighteen attributes and nineteen indicators.Political liberalization is comprised of ten attributes and ten indicators, whilepolitical equalization has eight attributes and nine indicators. To be morespecific, political autonomy is made up of four attributes and four indicators,competition of six attributes and six indicators, pluralization of four attributesand four indicators, and solidarity of four attributes and five indicators.

AutonomyThe subprinciple of political autonomy is a criterion to measure howindependent citizens are from the government or political groups. It is usedto evaluate how well citizens� rights are protected. This field subprinciple iscomprised of four attributes: the degree of state violence, the degree of civilliberties, the degree of freedom to organize political groups and undertakepolitical action, and the degree of freedom for political opposition.

The level of the performance of state violenceSignificance

Violence by the state threatens its current and potential citizens. This is a keyindicator of democracy. Violence reduces democratic civic action by its

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citizens and suppresses democratic citizen action, leading to dictatorialregression.

*QuestionHow well do you think the citizens are protected from the violence

wielded by government agencies in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of violence initiated by

government agencies. When you answer this question, please considerwhether law enforcement agencies (i.e., the police, military, and intelligenceagencies) inspect, monitor and control citizens; or illegally detain, imprisonand torture citizens. You may as well refer to the number of the prisoners ofconscience, the number of people detained due to protests, and the numberof political terrorism cases conducted by the government’s state apparatuses.

Civil rightsSignificance

Protecting civil liberties is a core indicator of modern society and a startingpoint of democracy. When individuals, groups, and communities alike areallowed to freely think and express and share their ideas with other citizens,it can be said that a true foundation for democracy has been established.

*QuestionHow well do you think the citizens’ freedom is protected in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the status of citizens’ freedoms and

civil rights. When you answer this question, please consider whether freedomof assembly, protest, religion, conscience, travel, housing and job selection,among others, is protected. When such “freedoms” are institutionally protectedand actually guaranteed, that is the ideal condition.

Freedom to organize and act in political groupsSignificance

In order for a country to transition from an authoritarian regime to ademocracy, rights to political organization and activities must be guaranteed.When diverse political groups present political alternatives and policies inopposition to authoritarianism and monopolistic political power, democracycan replace the authoritarian regime. Furthermore, in order to develop andfirmly establish a true democracy, not merely escaping from authoritarianism,freedom for political organization and action must be fully guaranteed.

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*QuestionHow much do you think the freedom of assembly and activities of

political groups (parties and quasi-political organizations) are protected inyour country?

*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the status of freedom of assembly,

which is a key condition in securing political rights. When you answer thisquestion, please consider whether citizens are free to organize politicalparties or quasi-political groups and whether such organizations areautonomous and independent enough to participate in the politicaldecisionmaking processes. When such freedom is institutionally protectedand actually guaranteed, that may be an ideal condition. Quasi-politicalgroups or organizations in this question refer to political organizationsgenerally acknowledged by the citizens under a democratic society, notdefined by a current law.

Permission for political oppositionSignificance

Democracy is advanced further by expanding openness and plurality withinthe regime by permitting political opposition for anti-system/anti-rulingideologies. In an anti-democratic system, the ruling forces suppress oppositionto them and the system wherein they are dominant, thereby maintaining anti-democratic rigidity. Therefore, permitting ideological and politicalopposition allows democratization or the further development ofdemocratization.

*QuestionHow much do you think are government opposition movements or

governing groups and the governing ideology are allowed in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure if the existence of political opposition

movements is guaranteed in your country. Such political opposition may beantigovernment and/or anti-regime. When you answer this question, pleaseexamine whether there is any censorship system or legislation that restrictscitizens’ freedom of ideology. You are also advised to consider not only theexistence of a system, but also its implementation. The governing groups orideology refer to those in the political power, constitutional ideology, and theeconomic power in your country.

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CompetitionThe field subprinciple of political competition refers to how well politicalcompetition is implemented. In other words, politics should be able toestablish a self-reference system. Competition is measured by looking at sixattributes: expansion of universal suffrage, state efficiency, existence of non-elected supreme power, the rule of law, fair and competitive elections, andtransparency.

The expansion of the universal suffrageSignificance

Suffrage is a basic right of citizens in a democratic society. This is the rightto elect political representatives and monitor them. Only when institutionsfully guarantee universal suffrage can elections be said to be democratic,thereby allowing citizens to establish a self-reference system.

*QuestionHow well do you think suffrage of the citizens is protected in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure whether suffrage or political

franchise is actually guaranteed. When you answer this question, pleaseexamine whether voters can elect their representatives (heads of state andlegislators) based on their free will, and whether there is any formal or actuallimitations to the rights. You are advised to consider any limitation to suffragebased on the voter’s age, religion, gender, ideology, race, and/or class, as wellas any virtual restrictions that go against the law in your country.

Efficiency of the stateSignificance

In order to firmly establish democracy, the government should not only belegitimate but also efficient. If a government overly relies on force or is tooinefficient, citizens cannot trust the government, leading to distrust indemocracy itself.

*QuestionHow well do you think all government agencies implement government

policies in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of government efficiency;

that is, its ability for political implementation and policy execution. Whenyou answer this question, please examine whether government agencies are

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running efficiently and consistently, and government policies are effectivelyoperated. You are also advised to consider how much the public trustgovernment agencies and policies.

The presence of the non-elected hereditary power SignificanceThe existence of a realistic, systemic non-electoral supreme power distortsrights to sovereignty and political representation and shakes democracy to itsroots. It also allows the continuation of existing authoritarian systems, whichdeals a severe blow to the development of democracy.

*QuestionHow much do you think non-elected groups account for the political

power in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine whether there are non-elected

power groups in your country, such as politically powerful and/or wealthyfamilies, influential religious or military groups, and other powerful socialclasses, and how much control they exercise over the government. When youanswer this question, please examine whether your government system andthe parliament/legislature are subject to a monarchy, hereditary system and/or junta. Even if non-elected political groups are not institutionally recognized,you are advised to carefully examine whether there is any supreme politicalbody based on family heritage or military power.

The rule of lawSignificance

Realization of rule of law and state-level righting of historical distortioncontrol the denial of the state itself or use of the state for personal purposes.In the absence of regulations against denying rule of law—making democracya system—stabilizing and strengthening democracy will be difficult.

*QuestionHow well do you think the rule of law is established in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine whether your government rules by

law and if the law is fairly executed. When you answer this question, pleaseexamine whether the country is governed by law, and whether all citizens areequal before the law. In addition, you are also advised to consider whether thejudicial branch is independent, and whether there is any independentevaluating body that examines the constitutionality of juridical judgment.

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Electoral fairnessSignificance

Fair elections are the most rational method of confirming the political willof the people. However, realistic competition might not exist as fair electionsare always threatened by the ruling powers. In spite of their formal fairness,the political party system itself may not reflect the political representation ofthe citizens.

*QuestionHow fairly do you think elections are conducted in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the fairness of elections. When you

answer this question, please examine whether there is a fair law governingelections; whether citizens are equally granted voting opportunities; whetherelection and ballot count procedures are fairly performed; whether there isan independent body governing elections (e.g., The National ElectionCommission of Korea); and whether a fair election system exists and supportsfair elections. In addition, you are also advised to consider whether or not faircompetition between political parties is actually guaranteed, not only statedby law.

TransparencySignificance

Transparency in the use of state power limits the intervention of privateinterests. It is therefore an indicator that enables the fair execution ofdemocratic institutions including elections.

*QuestionHow transparent do you think the operations of government agencies are

in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure whether operations of government

agencies are transparent without corruption. When you answer this question,please examine whether government bodies operate open and transparenthiring processes; whether there is any hiring practice based on beneficiary-sponsor relationship; and whether their budget execution is transparent. Inaddition, you are also advised to examine whether sufficient information onlegislative, administrative, and judicial bodies are disclosed; whether thereare laws and regulations that dictate reasonable and transparent administrativeprocedures; and whether there are systems like an anti-corruption commission.

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PluralizationPolitical pluralization shows how evenly political power is distributed. Evenif democratic institutions and procedures are well established, democracycannot operate as designed if political power is dominated by one individualor certain groups. Equal distribution of political power is measured by fourattributes: independence, check and balance between state power apparatuses,power distribution in the parliament, political representation, anddemocratization of government bodies.

Independence and checks and balances among state power apparatusesSignificance

This index shows how checks and balances between power apparatuses aremaintained. Checks and balances means horizontal responsibilities, one ofthe core features of democracy. In a democratic country, state power ischecked not only vertically (from the bottom) but also horizontally, so thatthe government can prevent certain power groups from dominating politicalpower or reigning over it, ultimately to protect its citizens’ rights.

*QuestionHow well do you think government agencies maintain checks and

balances?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure horizontal responsibilities and/or

checks and balances among government agencies. When you answer thisquestion, please examine whether the legislative, executive, and judicialbranches of the government are independent from each other and maintaincheck and balance; whether local governments are autonomous andindependent from the central government, and vice versa; whether there aresupervisory bodies that monitor major government agencies and theiractivities and their independence is well secured; and whether citizens’activities are monitored and controlled by any government bodies.

Dispersion of political power in the parliamentSignificanceDispersion of political power and democratic operation within the

parliament prevents a democratic government from becoming a puppetorganization. If in the parliament the majority bloc makes decisions in totaldisregard of the minority parties, representativeness in parliament will be inname only. If that majority sides also with the wielder of executive power, thenparliament will have failed to check the executive. Therefore, dispersion of

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Table 3: ADI Political Field Components

Politics (Liberalization)

Attribute Question

Autonomy

The level of the performance of state violence

1. How well do you think the citizens are protected from the violence wielded by government agencies in your country?

Civil rights

2. How well do you think the citizens’ freedom is protected in your country?

Freedom to organize and act in political groups

3. How much do you think the freedom of assembly and activities of political groups (parties and quasi-political organizations) are protected in your country?

Permission for political opposition

4. How much do you think are government opposition movements or governing groups and the governing ideology are allowed in your country?

Competition

The expansion of the universal suffrage

5. How well do you think suffrage of the citizens is protected in your country?

Efficiency of the state

6. How well do you think all government agencies implement government policies in your country?

The presence of the non-elected hereditary power

7. How much do you think non-elected groups account for the political power in your country?

The rule of law 8. How well do you think the rule of law is established in your country?

Electoral fairness 9. How fairly do you think elections are conducted in your country?

Transparency

10. How transparent do you think the operations of government agencies are in your country?

. . . . . . . . . . . .

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Table 3 (continued)

Politics (Equalization)

Pluralization

Independence and checks and balances among state power apparatuses

1. How well do you think government agencies maintain checks and balances?

Dispersion of political power in the parliament

2. How well do you think power within the legislature is distributed in your country?

Political representation

3. How well do you think the parliament or the legislature represents various social groups in your country?

Democratization of state institutions

4. How fairly and rationally do you think the programs and policies government agencies are being implemented in your country?

Solidarity

Participation system and degree of participation

5. How actively do you think citizens are participating in elections and other political decision-making processes in your country?

Affirmative action

6. How well do you think affirmative actions are established and implemented in your country?

The public credibility of the current democratic institution

7. How much do you think the public trusts the government?

8. How much do you think the public trusts the parliament/legislature?

The public credibility of a democratic institution and the public attitude to democratic participation

9. How much do you think the public trusts democracy?

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power in the parliament is necessary to make possible checks and balancesamong state power apparatuses.

*QuestionHow well do you think the power within the legislature is distributed in

your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine whether the parliament or the

legislature is democratically operating. When you answer this question,please consider whether parliamentary schedules and other operations arecarried out based on the consensus of all parties, and whether minority parties’opinions are well embraced in the course of parliamentary operation (assemblyschedule, legislation voting, and filibuster system). You may also considerwhether minority parties are supported by the government, such as in the formof subsidies.

Political representationSignificance

Political representation is regarded as one of the most important principlesof democracy. All social powers are given the opportunity to gain powerthrough fair elections. Thus, this index focuses on whether or not the politicalrepresentation of minority groups are sufficiently realized. Such representationopens the likelihood of democratically reflecting social changes in thepolitical system.

*QuestionHow well do you think the parliament or the legislature represents

various social groups in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine if various social groups are well-

represented in the legislature. When you answer this question, please examineif certain political groups are overrepresented in the legislature despite fairand free elections; afterwards, you may examine if political, cultural, class,and racial minorities, including women, are fully guaranteed participation inpolitics. You may also refer to the ratio of parliamentary seats for eachpolitical party. If political parties are not solid bases of identity in yourcountry, then please describe your particular representative relations in the“comments” section.

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Democratization of state institutionsSignificance

The state institutions must not only be democratic in their operation, but alsoopen to public monitoring and criticism. If government bodies do notdemocratically operate in terms of decision making processes or humanrights policies, or if they are not properly monitored, citizens bear theconsequences. In addition, if the priorities of state bodies are based on theirconvenience or vested interests, this can produce enormous administrativelosses, undermine public interest, and even cause social conflict.

*QuestionHow fairly and rationally do you think the programs and policies of

government agencies are being implemented in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine how democratically government

agencies implement their policies. When you evaluate the degree ofdemocratization, please consider two different aspects simultaneously. First,please examine if the decision making processes of these agencies are fair andrational. Then, please examine if they practice good governance, such aslistening to public opinion through committee and public hearings, andsharing information and power in the course of the process.

SolidarityAssessment of solidarity in the political field involves looking into whetheror not citizens are willing to challenge power disparity and whether or not anyinstitutional measures are implemented to address political powerdistribution. There must be institutional systems that allow citizens to voicetheir opinions, and citizens themselves must have awareness of such systems.This field subprinciple is measured by looking at four attributes: institutionalmeasures for and the degree of citizens’ participation, affirmative actions,public confidence in the existing democracy, and public confidence indemocracy and democratic values.

Participation system and degree of participationSignificance

Participation is citizens’ fundamental right to deliver their opinions, andthereby one of the core principles of democracy. Unlimited participation andpublic awareness of active participation are the most powerful weapons ofdemocracy to control unequal distribution of political power. The existenceof institutions and apparatuses where the citizens can directly participate in

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major decision-making in state affairs and realistic participation, and theensuring of democratic participation by the citizens even during non-electionperiods will prevent democracy from degrading into elite democracy.

*QuestionHow actively do you think citizens are participating in elections and

other political decision making processes in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure public awareness of political

participation. When you answer this question, you may first examine variousindices that involve election turnouts. You may consider supplementarysystems to help the citizens’ political participation in the decisionmakingprocesses, such as public hearings and petitions; and other democraticsystems like recall and initiative by the public and the referendum.

Affirmative actionSignificance

The existence of 1) institutional supplement to providing opportunity andachievements to make up for lack of power of the socially marginalized and2) social minorities’ political rights as equity in political institutions and faircompetition are insufficient to ensure political rights and representation.Affirmative actions refer not only to quota systems, but also to practicalsupport through which citizens, particularly socially disadvantaged people,can continuously participate in political activities. For example, if women ordisabled people are not provided with adequate support such as child care andaccess to physical mobility and other forms of medical support, the quotasystem becomes useless. Such practical aspects should be considered by a civilsociety.

*QuestionHow well do you think affirmative actions are established and

implemented in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine if there are systems that represent

the political rights of minorities, and, if there is any, how well these systemsoperate. When you answer this question, please examine if reserved seats forwomen and people with disabilities in the political system are available; andif any, how well such quotas are observed.

The public credibility of the current democratic institutionSignificanceDemocracy develops on the credibility of democratic values among a

wide variety of political participants. Furthermore, democracy develops

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when each citizen is highly committed to participating in the democraticprocesses based on the political effectiveness of the democratic system itself.Therefore, evaluation of the people’s trust in a country’s democracy showshow strong and how promising its democracy is. Thus, what is measured bythis index is public trust in the government and the parliament.

*QuestionHow much do you think the public trusts the government?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure public confidence or trust towards

the government. When you assess the confidence level, please examine howmuch citizens trust the incumbent (both local and national) governmentpronouncements or policies. In authoritarian countries, distrust in thegovernment may be regarded as a potential for democratization, while indemocratic countries, such distrust may result in political apathy andskepticism about the notion of “democracy” itself.

*QuestionHow much do you think does the public trust the parliament/legislature?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure public confidence or trust in the

parliament/legislature. When you answer this question, please consider howthe citizens view the political circle in the parliament and politicians; to bespecific, whether citizens regard the politics as efficient and fair and if citizenssee politicians as public servants or as persons belonging to a privilegedgroup. You may also examine whether citizens think the parliament/legislatureis an efficient organization or a privileged body.

The public credibility of a democratic institution and the public attitude todemocratic participation

SignificanceConfidence in democracy is affected by both the current democratic situationof a country and the nation’s mindset as a democracy as it is established by thecountry’s history. If a nation is historically well aware of democracy, thecountry’s democratic future can be said to be promising even if the nation iscurrently dissatisfied with its democratic situation. Inversely, if democracyhas not been at the center of public discussion in a country’s history, thatcountry’s democracy may fall into a crisis even if the current situation issatisfactory. Therefore, public confidence in democratic institutions andvalues is critical to predict the future of democracy in a country.

*QuestionHow much do you think the public trusts democracy?

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*DescriptionThis question is designed to examine public trust in democracy. In other

words, this question asks about public awareness of democracy, not of thedemocratic status of the country. You are advised to consider whether citizensregard democracy as the most desirable and efficient political value anddecision making system, and whether they trust the democratic value andsystem.

EconomyThe economic field consists of sixteen attributes and twenty indicators.Economic liberalization is comprised of seven attributes and eight indicatorswhile equalization has nine attributes and twelve indicators. Further dividingthe principles into field subprinciples, autonomy is made up of three attributesand four indicators, competition of four attributes and four indicators,pluralization of five attributes and five indicators, and equality of fourattributes and seven indicators.

Autonomy

Economic autonomy refers to the existence of institutions that guarantee freeeconomic activities of economic entities, i.e., free from undue interference.Economic autonomy is measured by three attributes: freedom from politicalpower, protection of labor rights, and external autonomy for policy-making.

Freedom/autonomy of economic activities without political interventionSignificance

Economic freedom from political power means social differentiation, whichis a starting point of modern democracy. When state power directly intervenesto create a monopoly through state-owned companies, it limits fair competitionamong companies, exacerbating unfair economic structures. Theseundesirable economic interventions by the government, known as government-led economy and the “cozy relationship” between politics and business, causepolitical and economic corruption. It becomes an obstacle to democratizationof society that is based on autonomous and fair competition.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think the political power/elite have on the

operation of private companies in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how independent economic

activities are from the politically powerful. When you answer this question,

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please consider how much the government influences, directly or indirectly,the operations of private companies (i.e., a condition of state-controlledeconomy), and how close the ties are between politicians and/or bureaucratsand members of private companies (consider if there exists a cozy/united/solerelations between politics and business).

Protection of basic labor rightsSignificance

Protection of labor rights means laborers, the weak in a capitalist society, areguaranteed the basic conditions where they can act as free economic entities.

When basic labor rights are not institutionalized, the state neglects tocorrect companies’ exploitation of workers and infringes on their humanrights. It also makes difficult the transparent and democratic management ofcompanies. Even when basic labor rights are institutionalized, government-led economies and the “cozy relationship” between politics and business useoutside political ideologies to limit basic labor rights in order to protectcompanies’ interests.

With respect to the protection of labor rights, it should be noted thatforced labor and/or child labor problems still exist in many countries. Theseare forms of labor that are anti-humanitarian and anti-democratic, destroyinghuman dignity and oppressing the will and happiness of the individual.Institutionalized bans and social agreements on forced labor and child laborare necessary elements for the democratization of society.

*QuestionHow well do you think are labor rights established in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well labor rights are

institutionalized and protected by law and are actually guaranteed in yourcountry. When you answer this question, please consider if the three primarylabor rights (freedoms of union organizing, collective bargaining, andcollective action) are legally protected, and if the labor rights of certaingroups (public officials, teachers, soldiers, etc.) are limited or restricted bylaw.

*QuestionHow well do you think is the prohibition of forced labor and child labor

observed in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well forced labor and child

labor are legally prohibited and whether or not the prohibitions are actuallyguaranteed. When you answer this question, please consider if there is any law

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that prohibits forced labor and child labor; if the government signed anyinternational convention/treaty of the International Labor Organization, theUnited Nations, and other significant organizations; and if, despite legalprohibitions, there are any recent cases in your country of forced labor andchild labor.

Autonomy of the decision making process for the formation of internationalpolitical economy policy

SignificanceA nation’s autonomy is partly based on the autonomy of economic policies.High rates of sovereign debt and subordination to the order of internationaldivision of labor, and poor ability to use technology and capital bring aboutnot only external subordination of the economy, but they also weaken thepolitical autonomy in terms of deciding national policies and budgeting. Thismeans a weakening of a nation’s own democratic justification ability due tolimits posed by external forces on its authority, even if its authority has beendemocratically approved. Therefore, for the government to protect politicalautonomy, and thus democratic decision-making and execution, from externalforces, it is highly important to weaken the level of economic subordination.

*QuestionHow independent do you think decision-making processes of the central

government is from foreign countries and/or foreign capital in your country? *Description

This question is designed to measure how independent the government’spolicymaking processes are from foreign capital and states. When you answerthis question, please consider if the government’s policymaking processes areindependent, and if key industries, including backbone industries, are mainlydominated by domestic capital. You must consider the ratio of foreign aid anddebts to the government budget, and the ratio of foreign capital to the totalcapital of key industries/cultural industries. You may also examine if importantgovernment economic decisions have ever been altered or discouraged byforeign capital.

CompetitionIn order for an economy to be democratized, the economic sector must beindependent from the government or the governing power, while the sectoritself establishes transparent and fair principles. Competition is a criteria thatshows the economy is truly independent from the government and has its ownrules. Competition is measured by four attributes: economic transparency,

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fairness of the economy, government responsibilities, and corporateresponsibilities.

Economic transparencySignificanceEconomic transparency concerns the institutional prevention of

corruption, tax evasion, and other unfair transactions, and is thereby concernedwith the promotion of economic predictability, which guarantees stablereproduction and fairness of the economy, and ultimately to nationaldevelopment. If corporate governance and financial structures are nottransparent, it becomes difficult to predict corporate stability and growth,thus increasing economic risks and undermining the interest of minorityshareholders. In addition, opaque management may be associated with taxevasion, slash funds, and the “cozy relationship” between politics and business,facilitated by illegal political funds. These can create political and economicinstability. To improve economic transparency beyond corporatetransparency, financial transparency of society overall—involving, say, areal-name system in the financial and real estate market, and protectionsystems for minority shareholders—must be improved.

*QuestionHow transparent do you think corporate operations are in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure transparency of the economic

system. When you answer this question, please consider if the corporatemanagement and financial information of the private sector is transparentlydisclosed. In addition, you must consider if there are securities exchangemarkets, a real-name financial and real-estate transaction system, and aminority shareholder protection system.

Economic fairnessSignificance

Economic fairness is an index to assess whether or not there are well-established institutions that guarantee fair competition. As market economyevolves, it is likely to create monopolies or oligopolies, rather than perfectcompetition. If a monopoly or oligopoly does appear in the market, it givesrise to economic polarization and undermines market efficiency, andconcurrently invites social polarization and undermines public wealth aswell, all of which leads to public distrust in democracy.

*QuestionHow fair do you think the competition among companies is in your

country?

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*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure fairness of economic activities.

When you answer this question, please consider if there are laws andregulations that prevent monopoly and oligopoly, and encourage faircompetition between companies; and whether such laws and regulations areactually effective. For example, you must consider if there are monitoring andsupervisory bodies, such as the Fair Trade Commission of Korea; and if so,whether such bodies are operating effectively; and whether the relationsbetween large companies and SMEs are not lopsided.

Government’s accountabilitySignificance

Government responsibilities to laborers mean establishing and maintainingaffirmative actions to protect labor rights. This means not only establishinginstitutions, but also maintaining a fair attitude and policies toward bothcorporations and laborers. In addition, governments should implement andoperate responsible policies so that laborers—the economicallydisadvantaged in society—can carry out their economic activities in a stableenvironment. To this end, governments must implement institutions forneutral and fair arbitration in case of management-labor disputes.Furthermore, governments must try to minimize, or remove if possible,discrimination against part-time workers, and to protect rights of part-timeworkers and the unemployed.

*QuestionHow much effort do you think the government is exerting to protect and

guarantee labor rights in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure if the government is doing its best

to protect relatively vulnerable parties, i.e., laborers. When you answer thisquestion, please consider if government agencies that represent labor rightsand mediating bodies, systems, and procedures are present. You must alsoassess how effectively such bodies, systems, and procedures protect laborrights.

Corporate accountabilitySignificance

This index is used to assess whether or not corporations protect labor rightsin fact. Even if labor rights are institutionally protected, many workers’ rightsare actually violated in the work field. In particular, in the globalized worldwhere neoliberalism is the dominant ideology, corporations tend to violate

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labor rights in the name of corporate competitiveness. Not only internalcorporate affairs such as surveillance on workers and sweatshop workingconditions, but also social issues like the growing number of part-timeworkers and lay-offs signify deteriorating labor conditions.

*QuestionHow well do you think private companies protect / guarantee labor rights

in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well private companies protect

labor rights. When you answer this question, please consider if privatecompanies are doing their best to abide by relevant laws and regulations. Inaddition, you must consider if they try to protect workers’ health and rights.To this end, you may also examine the rate of industrial accidents/disastersand the number of labor disputes.

PluralizationEconomic pluralization means fair distribution of economic resourcesleading to both economic and socio-political democratization. Therefore,severe economic inequality aggravates political inequality, which maydemolish the foundation for democracy. Economic equalization is measuredby five attributes: economic monopoly, regional disparity, income inequality,asset disparity, and employment inequality.

Economic monopolySignificanceEconomic monopoly is an index to measure the degree of fair distribution

of economic resources among different groups. Market economy is premisedon fair competition in theory, but is actually vulnerable to distortion due tostate intervention or dominant economic powers. If certain groups dominatethe market, fair competition is impossible; unfair competition only makes therich richer and the poor poorer.

*QuestionHow much do you think the economy is dominated by certain groups in

your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure monopoly of the economy by

certain groups. When you answer this question, please consider if certainfamilies, races, or groups monopolize the economic wealth of the country ordominate economic activities. For example, under a dictatorship, powerful

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Table 4: ADI Economic Field Components

Economy (Liberalization)

Attribute Question

Autonomy

Freedom/autonomy of economic activities without political intervention

1. How much influence do you think the political power/elite have on the operation of private companies in your country?

Protection of basic labor rights

2. How well do you think labor rights are established in your country?

3. How well do you think the prohibition of forced labor and child labor is observed in your country?

Autonomy of the decision making process for the formation of international political economy policy

4. How independent do you think the decision-making processes of the central government is from foreign countries and/or foreign capital in your country?

Competition

Economic transparency

5. How transparent do you think corporate operations are in your country?

Economic fairness 6. How fair do you think the competition among companies is in your country?

Government’s accountability

7. How much effort do you think the government is exerting to protect and guarantee labor rights in your country?

Corporate accountability

8. How well do you think private companies protect/guarantee labor rights in your country?

. . . . . . . . . . . .

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Table 4 (continued)

Economy (Equalization)

Pluralization

Economic monopoly

1. How much do you think the economy is dominated by certain groups in your country?

Regional inequality 2. How serious do you think the economic disparities/inequalities are between regions in your country?

Inequality of income

3. How serious do you think the income disparity is in your country?

Inequality of asset 4. How serious do you think the asset disparity is in your country?

Inequality of employment

5. How serious do you think discrimination is in the labor market in your country?

Solidarity

The social security system

6. How well do you think support systems for the poor are working in your country?

7. How well do you think the social insurance programs are operated in your country?

The activity of trade unions

8. How well organized do you think labor unions are in your country?

9. How much influence do you think labor unions have on the policies of the central government in your country?

10. How much do you think labor unions participate in the management process in your country?

Corporate watch 11. How well do you think public monitoring is carried out on the corporate activities in your country?

Awareness of reducing inequality

12. How enthusiastic do you think is the general public in reducing the economic inequality in your country?

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politicians and their families occupy key economic interests. Even indemocratic societies, economic wealth and activities may be largely influencedby a few conglomerates.

Regional inequalitySignificance

Economic inequality is herein presented as a form of regional disparity,particularly in countries where many different ethnic groups live together oruneven development strategies have been implemented. In particular, manyAsian nations have not secured national unity as they are still weighed downby a wide variety of regional disputes. In addition, low development andunequal development in such nations manifest in a severe gap in incomebetween urban and rural residents. This results in regional disputes, e.g., viathe exacerbation of regional sentiment, creating social friction. This resultsin massive costs from social conflict, which have serious negative effects onthe development of democracy.

*QuestionHow serious do you think the economic disparities/inequality are

between regions in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure regional disparities in the economy,

i.e., disparities in the economic development between regions. When youanswer this question, please consider the gross regional domestic product(GRDP), population concentration, Gini coefficient of each region, averageincomes, and employment rates.

Inequality of incomeSignificance

This index looks into the gap between the haves and have-nots. Incomeinequality in Asia is not merely caused by inequality of assets or income. Thisindex contemplates a wide variety of factors affecting inequality, includingincome groups, ethnic groups, education, religions, regions, and gender.

*QuestionHow serious do you think the income disparity is in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure income disparities. When you

answer this question, please consider Gini coefficient, income quintiles,poverty rates, income gaps according to education levels, and gender incomegap.

69CADI

Inequality of assetsSignificance

Asset disparity is one of the greatest risk factors in modern society as itreinforces wealth inheritance, and not wealth creation according one’sability. In Western countries, financial assets are the source of asset disparity,while in Asian countries, it is mostly land and real estate. Severe poverty andurbanization have caused inequality in housing, which also causes enormoussocial disputes. Thus, this index focuses on inequality in land and housing.

*QuestionHow serious do you think the asset disparity is in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure asset disparities. Asset disparities

include disparities in both financial and non-financial assets. In Asia, assetdisparities appear as disparities in real estate, housing, and land ownership.When you answer this question, please consider home ownership rates, landownership concentration, and real-estate price disparities by region.

Inequality of employmentSignificance

The right to work is one of the most basic rights in a democratic society.Despite systematic ensuring of this right, the reality is that often many peopledo not have this right even in so-called democracies. The right to work is thusan important indicator in evaluating the stability of democracy. In Asia,cronyism, nepotism, and patriarchal practices still persist. Such practiceshave given rise to widespread inequality in employment in Asian countries.Thus, the question below must be answered by taking into account inequalityamong classes, ethnic groups, education level, religions, regions, and genders.

*QuestionHow serious do you think discrimination is in the labor market in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure inequality and/or discrimination

in the labor market. In Asia, there are still regional ties, and sponsorship andpatriarchal practices, which lead to various forms of employmentdiscrimination. When you answer this question, please consider inequalitybetween or discrimination based on social classes, educational backgrounds,religions, regions, and genders. You must examine unemployment rates,youth unemployment rates, unemployment rates by gender/educationalbackground, and the ratio of regular to irregular workers.

70 ADI GUIDEBOOK

SolidarityIn order to realize the premise of democratic tradition that “political poweris distributed fairly among members of society,” equal economic power, oreconomic democracy is necessary, as Robert A. Dahl insisted. However, assubstantial inequality appears in reality, equal economic opportunitiescannot be guaranteed. Thus, the economic solidarity subprinciple measureshow the aforedescribed inequality is institutionally addressed, and how awarea society is of inequality issues. To this end, economic solidarity has fourattributes: social security systems, labor union activities, corporatesurveillance, and awareness of inequality alleviation.

The social security systemSignificance

A social security system is a fundamental feature of a democratic society.Social security systems can alleviate overly unequal incomes and protect thesocial rights of citizens, thus strengthening democracy. Social securitysystems are classified into public aid and social insurance. Social insuranceis for those who work, while public aid is a social security system for all citizensto ensure minimum cost of living. Public assistance and social insurancesystems differ from country to country. Thus, they must be evaluated accordingto different situations of each country.

*QuestionHow well do you think support systems for the poor work in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure if public assistance programs

within the social welfare system are well established and operating in yourcountry. When you answer this question, please consider the existence andoperation of the minimum wage and basic life support laws, and governmentsupport out of social insurance programs for low-income families. Publicassistance programs largely differ from country to country. Some countrieshave dedicated laws and regulations that define basic life support andassistance, while others include such support in social insurance programs.

*QuestionHow well do you think the social insurance programs are operated in

your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well social insurance programs

within the social welfare system are operated in your country. Although social

71CADI

insurance programs may differ from country to country, they refer tounemployment benefits, national pension programs, national health insurance,and unemployment insurance in this question. This question asks whethersuch insurance programs are well established and operated. When you answerthis question, please consider the ratio of social welfare expenditure to grossdomestic product (GDP) (or the government budget), income redistributionrates, and the operation of national pension system/national health insurance/unemployment insurance.

The activity of trade unionsSignificance

The right to organize labor unions is a basic right for the economicallyvulnerable. However, even if such rights are ensured, the effectiveness oflabor unions may differ for each nation. There may be differences in the extentof organization in each nation; some unions may be state-run and not speakfor the benefit of the union members. The political influence and powerdynamics in corporations of labor unions thus differ country by country. Inorder to measure labor union activities in a particular country, theirorganization level, political influence, and in-corporate influence must beexamined together.

*QuestionHow well organized do you think labor unions are in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure if labor unions are commonly

organized, and if such unions are respected and trusted by their members.When you answer this question, please consider the rate of labor unionorganization, the type of labor unions (by industry or company), theimplementation of collective agreements, and members’ confidence in theunions.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think labor unions have on the policies of

the central government in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure political influence of labor unions.

When you answer this question, please consider whether labor unions arerespected and trusted by the public; if there is a political party that representsthe interests of labor unions; if there is an organization that coordinatesinterests of labor-management-government; if there is an umbrellaorganization that supports labor unions; and whether such umbrellaorganization has influence on central government policies.

72 ADI GUIDEBOOK*QuestionHow much do you think labor unions participate in the management

process in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of labor unions�

participation in the corporate management. When you answer this question,please examine labor unions� monitoring of and participation in corporatemanagement. In order words, you may as well consider if there are labor-management co-decision making systems; and if labor unions participate inthe board of directors� meeting.

Corporate watchSignificanceEmphasis on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a global trend.

CSR is ideally implemented by companies in cooperation with suitablecorporate watchdogs headed by consumers. Corporate accountability will behigher when consumers participate in diverse corporate watch activities.

*QuestionHow well do you think public monitoring is carried out on the corporate

activities in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how much the general public is

involved in monitoring corporate activities and its consequences, includingconsumer rights violation and environmental problems. When you answerthis question, please examine if there are consumer and environment groups.Assess how effective their activities are, how well consumer protection lawsare operating, and how proactively the general public are involved in themonitoring process.

Awareness of reducing inequalitySignificanceMore important than social systems designed to alleviate inequality is

public solidarity against inequality. Such solidarity is a core factor that drivesthe institutionalization or legalization of measures to reinforce equalitythrough overcoming social conflict. The more proactive citizens are in easinginequality, the higher will be the acceptance of systems to alleviate inequality.

*QuestionHow enthusiastic do you think the general public is about improving the

economic inequality in your country?

73CADI*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure public awareness of addressing

economic disparities. In some cases, such awareness can be represented byactive efforts, such as trying to change social systems, and by individualefforts, such as donations or voluntary activities. This question asks aboutpublic opinion and actions meant to address economic inequality.Civil SocietyThe civil society field consists of fifteen attributes and eighteen indicators.Civil society liberalization is comprised of eight attributes and elevenindicators, while civil society equalization is made up of seven attributes andeight indicators. In the subprinciple level, civil society autonomy is made upof four attributes and seven indicators, civil society competition of fourattributes and four indicators, civil society pluralization of four attributes andfour indicators, and civil society solidarity of three attributes and threeindicators.

AutonomyAccording to the civil society approach, forming an independent civil societyfrom the government and economy is a starting point of forming a modernsociety, and concurrently a starting point of modern liberal democracy. Anautonomous civil society is free from both the government and economicforces, and its citizens have the ability to execute such autonomy. Consideringthe stipulations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, democracyis not possible without the ability to choose. Accordingly, autonomy ismeasured by looking at four attributes: autonomy from the government,autonomy from the market, autonomy of the member of the society, andtolerance.

Autonomy of society from state interventionSignificance

If civil society is autonomous from the government, then citizens� privacy isprotected from state intervention. Autonomy from state intervention can thusbe viewed from two different perspectives: 1) individual privacy protectionincluding freedom of expression and freedom of cultural activities, and 2)protection of autonomous citizen bodies from state intervention or control.

74 ADI GUIDEBOOK*QuestionHow free do you think citizens� social activities are from government

interference in your country?*DescriptionWhen you answer this question, please consider media freedom (e.g., the

existence of regulation bodies, direct/indirect pressures on the media, etc.),cultural freedom (e.g., the degree of censorship on art and creative works,etc.), and similar factors.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think government organizations have on

society in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of government control

on society. The government organizations in this question refer to pro-government organizations that are supported by the government. When youanswer this question, please consider the number of government-supportednongovernmental organizations, their influence, their privileges (financialsupport by the government and nature of ties with government/governmentagencies), and similar factors.

Autonomy of society from the marketSignificance

Civil society�s autonomy is continuously violated by the government andeconomic forces. This is well presented by Jürgen Habermas�s notion of the�colonization of the lifeworld.�However, with the trend of neoliberalglobalization, the market has become more powerful and more influentialthan governments. Neoliberalism expanded the entire market economy.Services that had been in the public sector (education, electricity,transportation, etc.) and practices (funerals, marriages etc.) that had belongedto the communities (regional or family) are witnessing rapidcommercialization. These social conditions are making companies orcommodities out of civic groups. Raising funds from private companiesrather than from civil organizations has become some civic groups� mostimportant activity. Thus, the question below is about the influence of themarket on civil society.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think private companies have on society in

your country?

75CADI*DescriptionWhen you answer this question, please consider how free the media is

from private companies. In addition, you must consider if NGOs�independence from private companies are socially and institutionallyguaranteed.

Autonomy of social memberSignificance

As stated before, in order for civil society to be independent, its citizens mustbe independent. In order to become independent citizens, their basic needs(e.g., food, clothing, housing, health care) must be met. They must beguaranteed sufficient education opportunities. The international communityagrees that such basic necessities must be universally satisfied regardless ofincome and asset level as stipulated in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights). Yet democratization at times fails to ensure that citizens will havethese basic necessities by exacerbating rather than healing socialbipolarization. In order for citizens to have autonomy, they must be equippedwith capabilities to meet their basic needs. To have these capabilities, theymust be educated; education is an institution needed to guarantee equalopportunities, a fundamental principle of democracy.

*QuestionHow much do you think citizens� basic needs are met in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well citizens� basic needs (e.g.,

food, clothing, shelter, hygiene, and sanitation) are satisfied. When youanswer this question, please consider poverty rates, death rates (infantmortality rates and life expectancy), housing ownership rates, homelessnessrates, disease rates, water treatment and supply facilities (for clean water andsanitation), malnutrition/undernourishment indexes, and other factors.

*QuestionAside from the basic needs stated in a prior question, how much do you

think special care is provided for vulnerable people or minorities, such aschildren, women, people with disabilities, and immigrants in your country?

*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the quality of care provided to

vulnerable people and/or social minorities in your country. When you answerthis question, please consider the conditions stipulated in the Declaration ofthe Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW), the International Plan of

76 ADI GUIDEBOOKAction on Ageing, and the International Convention on the Protection of theRights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

*QuestionHow much do you think citizens are provided with education

opportunities in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of human development

in your country. When you answer this question, please consider the HumanDevelopment Index released by the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP).

ToleranceSignificance

Even after formal democratization, certain ideologies, religious principles,cultures, ethnic groups, races, etc. may not be tolerated by society. There areeven occasions when such groups are politically oppressed. Thus, the questionbelow is concerned with mutual prejudice and tolerance.

*QuestionHow much do you think citizens respect different cultures, religions,

languages, races, nations, and ideas in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure social tolerance in your country.

When you answer this question, please consider the degree of societaltolerance toward different values, citizens� awareness of human rights, thenature of competition (violent vs. tolerant) between different groups, and thepolitical activities of interest groups.

Competition

Competition in civil society means a self-reference system of the society. Asis well known, the core value of civil society is voluntary association. Civilsociety organizations influence the formation of citizens� identity,consequently moulding their opinions and mindsets. Social movementsbring social issues to the center of public discussion, and thereby contributeto democratization of the state, the economy, and civil society. Civil societycompetition is evaluated using four attributes: the capabilities, publicness,transparency, and diversity of voluntary associations.

77CADICapability of voluntary associations

SignificanceThis index is concerned with how well-organized voluntary organizationsare, as the capability of civil society and NGOs for associatiom can bemeasured by their capability to reproduce, their ability to stay organized,their available resources, and their influence and credibility among thepublic.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think NGOs have on society in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the functionality of NGOs. When

you answer this question, please consider the number of NGOs and theirmembers, human resources, public support and trust, financial self-sufficiency,existence of laws that support NGOs, existence of umbrella organizationsand, if applicable, their effectiveness in achieving their aims.

Public good of voluntary associationsSignificance

Autonomous organizations have both positive and negative impacts ondemocracy. Such organizations may create negative social identities, such asregionalism or paternalism, or may represent certain interest groups.Therefore, as much as the number of such organizations is important, theirquality has even more value. In order for such organizations to have positiveinfluences on democracy, they must internally form a democratic identity,and externally represent public interest. The internal characteristics can beinterpreted as transparency, and the external one as publicness. Publicnesscan only be realized when those organizations pursue public interest, refusingto represent only regional interests or their own interests.

*QuestionHow well do you think NGOs represent public interest in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the public nature of NGOs.

Although NGOs pursue the public interest, they may also have the nature ofinterest groups. In Asia, some NGOs are virtually serving as a sponsor fora certain interest group or privileged organization, due largely to old-fashioned relationship and archaic practices. When you answer this question,please consider the ratio of public interest groups to narrow/specific interestgroups.

78 ADI GUIDEBOOKTransparency of voluntary associations

SignificanceIn order for voluntary association to secure publicness, they must betransparent. As stated before, only when such organizations are free fromnegative identities arising from regionalism, authoritarianism, or paternalismcan they create positive internal effects that can help in the formation of ademocratic identity. The transparency considered by this index thus meanscivil society organizational democracy.

*QuestionDo you think NGOs are democratically operating in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of democratic operation

and transparency of NGOs. When you answer this question, please considerNGOs� transparency of organizational operation, their internal adherenceto the principles of gender equality, and mutual respect among NGOs. Inaddition, you are advised to consider if practices associated with traditionalpolitical groups persist within NGOs, such as having an organizationalhierarchy or having a highly regionalist orientation.

Diversity of voluntary associationsSignificance

Civil society is a venue where different values and interests meet each other.However, according to the situations that each country faces, voluntaryassociations may be tendentiously developed. In other words, NGOsrepresenting certain values or certain regions may overly prosper, inevitablyresulting in the exclusion of other values or opinions. For example, in someAsian countries, foreign support from the West is oftentimes driven by one-sided development agendas, which have led to skewed civil society development.Thus, this index looks into how different values of civil society are expressedthrough voluntary association.

*QuestionDo you think NGOs adequately represent different values and demands

of society in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the diversity of NGOs. When you

answer this question, please consider the following factors: whether or notNGOs are concentrated in only a handful of fields (e.g., human rights andenvironmental issues) and only within a handful of regions (e.g., large cities,or the capital cities and its vicinity). You must consider the diversity of NGOvalues, representativeness of NGO leaders and members, and the country-wide distribution of NGOs.

79CADIPluralization

Civil society pluralization has four attributes: inequality of public spheres,inequality of information, inequality of culture, and inequality of power.

Inequality of public spheresSignificance

The media should be a mechanism for forming an equal consensus to ensurediversity in public discourse and the public good. This is because the mediais the venue for free debate, an instrument of opinion formation.

*QuestionDo you think the media is fair and just in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the level of inequality in the public

discourse. When you answer this question, please consider the ownership andgovernance of media companies and the degree of monopoly they have in thepublic discourse. You must consider if the media is controlled by or dependenton certain groups (religious, interest, or ideological).

Inequality of informationSignificance

This index focuses on information gaps. In any country, an active civilsociety�s effetiveness can be determined by the degree of information accessof the citizens. The information technology (IT) revolution had enormouspotential to assist in democratic development. However, it also generatedinformation gaps, further excluding those without access to IT. Informationgaps not only limit the possibilities of citizens to develop their capabilities,but also create social conflicts.

*QuestionHow wide do you think the information gap among citizens is in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how equal the opportunities to

access information are in your country. When you answer this question, pleaseconsider the degree of access citizens in general have to conventional media,such as newspapers and television. More importantly, you must consider thedegree of personal computer and information technology device ownershipand internet penetration rates.

80 ADI GUIDEBOOKTable 5: ADI Civil Society Field Components

Civil Society (Liberalization)

Attribute Question

Autonomy

Autonomy of society from state intervention

1. How free do you think citizens� social activities are from government interference in your country?

2. How much influence do you think government organizations have on society in your country?

Autonomy of society from the market

3. How much influence do you think private companies have on society in your country?

Autonomy of social members (basic needs and basic human development level)

4. How much do you think citizens� basic needs are met in your country?

5. Aside from the basic needs stated in question no. 4, how much do you think special care is provided for vulnerable people or minorities, such as children, women, people with disabilities, and immigrants in your country?

6. How much do you think citizens are provided with education opportunities in your country?

Tolerance 7. How much do you think citizens respect different cultures, religions, languages, races, nations, and ideas in your country?

Competition

Capability of voluntary association

8. How much influence do you think NGOs have on society in your country?

Public good of voluntary association

9. How well do you think NGOs represent public interest in your country?

Transparency of voluntary associations

10. Do you think NGOs are democratically operating in your country?

Diversity of voluntary associations

11. Do you think NGOs adequately represent different values and demands of society in your country?

. . . . . . . . . . . .

81CADI

Inequality of cultureSignificanceCultural inequality means cultural gaps. At the individual level, such

inequality limits citizens� cultural potentials and rights to enjoy culture. Atthe social level, as cultural inequality gets more serious, it may produce acultural hierarchy, a form of symbolic violence that limits communicationamong citizens. This not only triggers social conflicts, but also underminesnational unification and democratic development.

Table 5 (continued)

Civil Society (Equalization)

Pluralization

Inequality of public spheres

1. Do you think the media is fair and just in your country?

Inequality of culture and information

2. How wide do you think the information gap among citizens is in your country?

Inequality of culture

3. Do you think citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and activities in your country?

Inequality of power 4. How equally do you think power is distributed among people in your country?

Solidarity

Institutional guarantee of diversity and affirmative actions

5. Do you think affirmative actions are well established and operated in your country?

Participation and support of social groups

6. How actively do you think citizens are participating in NGO activities in your country?

Governance of the state and civil society

7. How much influence do you think NGOs have on government�s policymaking processes in your country?

82 ADI GUIDEBOOK*QuestionDo you think citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and activities

in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how equal the opportunities to

access cultural facilities and activities are. When you answer this question,please consider the opportunities given to citizens to access theaters, sportingevents, and other cultural facilities and activities. You are also advised toconsider if there is a cultural education system for the general public.Inequality of power

SignificanceCivil society is not comprised of homogeneous individuals with the samedegree of social power and awareness. It is a venue where people or groupswith different values collide. Therefore, civil society itself and public opinioncan be controlled by certain groups or dominated by certain values. Chancesof such domination occuring are higher if elite groups like the media,academia, and cultural circles are too closely associated with each other. Ifcivil society is monopolized by a certain powerful group, communicationamong citizens will be distorted and democracy will regress.

*QuestionHow equally do you think power is distributed among people in your

country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure the degree of inequality among

groups in your country�s society. This question asks whether different circles,such as media, academe, and cultural and religious societies are influencedto a great extent by certain groups. When you answer this question, pleaseconsider if a small number of elites monopolize a wide range of fields insociety.

SolidarityThe solidarity of civil society can be used to predict the future of the country'sdemocratization. As seen in every country�s democratic developmentexperience, when civil society is activated, democratization moves forward.Thus, civil society solidarity is a subprinciple that considers how well civilsociety is activated. This subprinciple is comprised of three attributes:institutions and affirmative actions to protect diversity, awareness and activitiesof social participation, and governance of the state and of civil society.

83CADIInstitutional guarantee of diversity and affirmative actions

SignificanceThe citizens comprising civil society are diverse. Therefore, the existence ofinstitutions that protect diversity and social minorities help in thecharacterization of society as democratic. Even if equality is ideologicallysupported and laws ensure equal opportunities, there are times whendiscrimination persists due to structural barriers. This imbalance in availableopportunities is sometimes corrected by the introduction of affirmativeactions.

*QuestionDo you think affirmative actions are well established and operated in

your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure how well affirmative actions are

implemented and operated. When you answer this question, please considerhuman rights protection conditions for women, people with disabilities,lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgenders, immigrants, and conscientiousobjectors to military service.

Participation and support of social groupsSignificance

To energize civil society, the participation and support of individual citizensare necessary. They may participate as activists or as supporters in particularcampaigns. Generally, they provide financial support by paying dues asmembers of NGOs/voluntary associations. The question below thus focuseson the above aspects of citizens� participation.

*QuestionHow actively do you think citizens are participating in NGO activities

in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure citizens� awareness of and

participation in NGO activities. When you answer this question, pleaseconsider citizens� membership rates in NGOs, participation in volunteeractivities organized by NGOs, and donations to NGOs.

Governance of the state and of civil societySignificance

When the opinions of civil society are embraced by the government andrealized in the form of laws or policies, democracy can create a virtuous circle.

84 ADI GUIDEBOOKIn the past, elections and political parties played important roles in this circle.However, political governance has become more important as it enablescitizens to continuously and actively participate in political activities. Suchgovernance has drawn much scholarly and civil society attention as it activatescitizens� participation, helps overcome bureaucracy and elitism, and preventssocial conflicts.

*QuestionHow much influence do you think NGOs have on government�s

policymaking processes in your country?*DescriptionThis question is designed to measure civil society�s influence in

governance in your country. When you answer this question, please considerif good governance systems, such as commissions and public hearing sessions,are present and, if present, how effective are these systems operating.

Conduct of the Survey and Analysis

The Object of the SurveyThe Asian Democracy Index was developed based on the survey of expertgroups of each country. The best way to evaluate democracy of a country maybe conducting surveys of citizens and experts grouped together, although itmay vary according to the characteristics of different indicators. Through thismethod, the Latin America Democracy Survey conducted by the UNDPdelivered remarkable outcomes. However, such parallel surveys requireenormous amounts of time and large budgets. Due to such constraints, manystudies opt for only one of the two, i.e. either the citizens or the experts. TheWorld Values Survey and East Asia Barometer studies are representative ofmost citizen surveys, while the Freedom House and Economist IntelligenceUnit studies are representative of most expert surveys.

The Asian Democracy Index was based on expert group surveys mainlyfor the following reasons. First, as the composition of the indicatorsdemonstrates, this index includes a technical content with which ordinarycitizens may not be familiar. If respondents are not well aware of the content,the result can be distorted. Therefore, this study chose to undertake expertsurveys. The second reason is time and budget constraints. Conductingsurveys in all Asian countries is inevitably subject to substantial constraints.Therefore, the expert survey was a reasonable choice for this study.

85CADIWhen limiting the subject to expert groups, securing objectivity is the

most important issue. In the course of sampling, systematic errors are likelyincluded. In addition, if experts are not specialized in the survey topic, theycan be unfamiliar with the questions, either. In this case, expert surveys maydeliver not much different outcomes from those of ordinary citizens.

Therefore, in order to secure objectivity and specialty, this study chosetwo methods. First, in deciding the sample group, ideological criteria wereapplied. In other words, according to each country�s situation, expert groupswere given choices of conservative, central, and progressive groups, or pro-government, neutral, and anti-government groups, and then let them evaluatetheir tendency by themselves. This strategy is to secure objectivity by lettingthem express their political color. Then, different evaluation groups wereadopted for different analyses. In other words, each of political, economic,and civil society fields was evaluated by different expert groups.

Based on this strategy, nine expert groups are needed. Each group makeindependent evaluations on different topics, and finally representatives incharge of each country�s survey collect the survey results. Such compositionof evaluation groups is an effort to secure objectivity and specialty, as well asto enable diverse analyses on each country�s report.Survey MethodologyThe expert survey utilizes a two-part questionnaire. First, the questionnaireswere developed based on the 11-point scale to quantify the result. Consideringthat the respondents are experts, the 11-point scale was utilized as they areexpected to provide more precise answers. Another section is composed ofquestions that ask respondents� opinions. This qualitative part was designedto complement the quantified answers by adding the rationales of the answers.This survey is expected to gather sufficient information about each country'sdemocracy.

Survey representatives of each country will collect subjective and objectiveindex that can be analyzed along with the surveys so that the limitations of thesurvey method can be complemented. This is an attempt to more objectivelypresent the potentials and limitations of each country�s democracy.

Individual surveys were conducted. According to the situations that eachcountry faces, e-mail surveys or individual interviews may be utilized. Inaddition, for more objective and in-depth analyses, FGIs or othersupplementary methods can also be adopted.

86 ADI GUIDEBOOKSurvey Analysis

In conformity with the composition of the survey questionnaires, analyseswere conducted in two different ways. First, each question was evaluated.Scores of each question were determined by the average that respondentsprovided. Therefore, survey representatives in each country must establish adatabase of the scores for each questionnaire. Problems can arise when theexperts of three different groups give extremely different scores. In such cases,each survey organization was allowed to select a score according to theircriteria. However, when the difference is too great to reconcile, reevaluationof the question may be asked of the experts.

The next stage is to analyze respondents� comments. As mentionedbefore, the comments help to overcome limitations of quantitative evaluationas these rationales help the ADI analysts to better understand the specificmeanings of each rating. In this stage of analysis, the survey representativesof each country adopt other objective and subjective index that they havegathered in order to enrich their analysis.

As previously mentioned, when the analysis of the individual questionsare completed, the individual indicators are combined into morecomprehensive indices. As seen in the composition of the indices, the AsianDemocracy Index allows for the consideration of different indices accordingto different fields, and those indices can more specifically express theconditions of democratization of each country. By dividing the indices byprinciple, the liberalization and equalization indices can be obtained. Theliberalization index evaluates whether each field is independent, and if theyhave established their own self-reference system. A high liberalization indexrepresents that the country has established institutional and proceduraldemocracy to some extent. The equalization index shows whether power isevenly distributed in each field. A high equalization index means that thecountry has established a strong democratic foundation and has great potentialto democritize further. By comparing the liberalization index and theequalization index, or by obtaining index of subprinciples, such as autonomy,competition, pluralization, and solidarity, it is possible to understandlimitations and potentials of a country�s democracy.

As mentioned, the ADI contemplates three different fields: politics,economy, and civil society. Accordingly, political democracy index, economicdemocracy index, and civil society democracy index can be created. Comparingthese indices may provide insight into the strengths and weaknesses of eachcountry�s democracy. For example, if a country has a high political democracyindex but low economic democracy index, the country has a weak democratic

87CADIfoundation. If a country has a low political democracy index but a high civilsociety democracy index, the country has a great potential to further developits democracy.

The Asian Democracy Index can create a wide range of indicatorsbeyond principles or fields. For example, by combining the minority protectionindex of the political field and the minority protection index of the civil societyfield, a minority protection index of a country can be formed. Similarly,combining the participation indices of each field can establish a country�soverall participation index. Such computations can help fully express acountry�s democracy.

In summary, the Asian Democracy Index enables wide-ranging analyses.By adding qualitative information obtained from comments, and utilizingother subjective and objective index, it will be possible to conduct moreobjective and in-depth analyses on each country�s democratic condition.

ReferenceCho, Heeyeon. 2008. �Democratization in Asia: Oligarchic Democracy and Democratic

Oligarchy.� In States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and AsianDemocratization, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eun-hong Park.Chinnai: Earthworm Books.

88 SOUTH KOREA COUNTRY REPORT 2011

Democracy Index in South Korea, 2011

HYUNGCHUL KIM, JUNGHOON KIM, HEEYEON CHO,HYUNYUN CHO, SEOUNGWON LEE, YOOSEOK OH,

DONGCHOON KIM, KYUNGTAE PARK, YOUNGPYO SEO,SANGCHUL YOON, KYUNGHEE CHOI

Objectives of the ResearchThis study aims to assess the quality of democracy in South Korea throughthe Asian Democracy Index (ADI). The ADI is a framework for comparingdifferent democratic qualities in Asia in line with the view that earlier indicesby Western societies, along with their respective frameworks, hardly reflectthe reality in Asia.

This survey forms part of the ADI pilot test. While as a pilot survey, itis expected to be largely exploratory in nature—investigating the variouscharacteristics of democracy in South Korea—it can also be a means by whichto identify problems in the parameters, the methods of the research, and theanalysis of the ADI. Thus, the pilot survey conducted contributes to furtheringthe methodological refinement of the ADI.

Previous Evaluations of Democracy in Korea in 2011The democratic movement in South Korea in June 1987 brought about atransition from an authoritarian to a democratic system of government.Afterwards, South Korean democracy has been evaluated by both internationaland domestic experts as having successfully established democratic processes(Diamond and Kim 2000; Park 1998). Since the first presidential electionsheld in December 1987 under the amended constitution of the Sixth Republicof South Korea, there have been five presidential elections and seven National

____________________________________________________________Hyungchul Kim, Junghoon Kim, Heeyeon Cho, Hyunyun Cho, Yooseok Oh, DongchoonKim, and Kyungtae Park are all from the Democracy and Social Movements Institute ofSungkonghoe University, South Korea. Seoungwon Lee is Research Professor at SogangGlobal Korean Study Initiative in Sogang University. Youngpyo Seo is Assistant Professorof the Department of Sociology in Jeju National University. Kyunghee Choi is a researchassociate of the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sangchul Yoon is Professor ofthe Department of Sociology in Hanshin University.


8 9KIM, KIM, CHO, AND OTHERS

Assembly elections, all of which were conducted fairly and freely. Peacefulregime change has been witnessed twice in the country. Further, the persistenceof South Korea’s democracy in the face of the unprecedented economic crisisin late 1997 is a manifestation of its level of institutionalization.

Assessments of world-renowned institutions measuring the level ofdemocracy in various countries support the view that South Korean democracyis indeed institutionalized. Freedom House1, a U.S.-based privateorganization, has classified South Korea as “Free”2 from 1988 to 2011 (Shinand Chu, 2004; Gunaratne 1999).

UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), in its investigation ofthe level of democracy of 167 nations worldwide, classified South Koreandemocracy as one of the “full democracies” for having earned more than eightpoints on average from 2010 to 2011.3 However, the South Korean democracyscore went down from 8.11 in 2010 (20th out of 167 nations) to 8.06 (22ndout of 167 nations). A closer examination of the score in each categorysurveyed in 2011 indicates that the electoral procedure and plurality measurescored the highest point (9.17), followed by the degree of civil liberties (8.82),the function of government (7.86), and the political culture (7.5). The degreeof political participation item scored the lowest at 7.22.

In spite of the abovementioned positive ratings, several anti-democraticactions by the South Korean government have been reflected in severalcountry surveys and rankings. In particular, South Korean democracy sincethe Lee Myung-bak presidency in 2007 has been evaluated as having set back

Table 1: Evaluation of South Korea’s Democracy by Freedom House (2001-2011) Year Political Right Civil Liberty Category 2002 2 2 F 2003 2 2 F 2004 1 2 F 2005 1 2 F 2006 1 2 F 2007 1 2 F 2008 1 2 F 2009 1 2 F 2010 1 2 F 2011 1 2 F Sources: Freedom House 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a.


democratization in the country by ten years (Scholars-Academia Consortium2009; Scholars-Academia Consortium 2010). This low evaluation is due tothe Lee government’s curtailment of various democratic rights and unpopularpolicy leanings, including the lifting of the ban on US beef imports, theanomalous “4 Major Rivers Project,” and the ratification of the US-KoreaFree Trade Agreement. The regime’s attempt to curtail freedom of expressionand assembly by suppressing demonstrations and implementing enforcedimprisonment was met with strong resistance from the people. The Leeadministration is also said to have utilized government organizations such asthe South Korea Communications Standards Commission to (SKCSC)increase censorship and infringe on the South Korean population’s freedomof expression in the internet and via short message service.

Figure 1: A compilation of evaluations of the Press Freedom Index in South Korea from 2002 to 2011. The diamond series represents the changes in South Korea’s ranking of democracies by Freedom House, while the square series represents the changes in the actual score in the Index.

Sources: Freedom House 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a; Reporters Without Borders 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012.


The abovementioned acts of infringement of freedom of expression havebeen reported and commented on by international organizations. ReportersWithout Borders, an organization established in 1985 to enhance freedomof the press worldwide has been releasing annually a Worldwide PressFreedom Index4 since 2002. It is found that the Press Freedom Index in SouthKorea has been on the rise since the inauguration of the Lee government. Thismeans that under the Lee administration, freedom of the press is not securedbut infringed.

The Internet Enemies Report 2012 classified South Korea as a countryunder internet surveillance, which means that the government censors onlinecontent with explicit political overtones (Reporters Without Borders 2012).South Korea has been dishonorably stigmatized by Reporters WithoutBorders as one of the countries which censor the internet for four years insuccession since 2009. The reports have noted an upsurge in online contentdeleted by the SKCSC. Such cases rose from 1,500 in 2009 to 80,499 casesin 2010 (Reporters Without Borders 2011). The number of investigationsconducted by the government on internet content rapidly increased from 58before 2009 to 91 in 2010 and 150 in August 2011. Such phenomena oflimiting the freedom of the press and expression in South Korea implies thateven such basic civil rights are not secured in the country, as said in the pressof the US with regard to the imprisonment of Chung Bong-ju, who co-hostedthe “podcast” “I’m a Petty-Minded Creep.”5

Moreover, South Korea ranked 39th among 180 nations in the CorruptionPerceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI), with its CPIscore decreasing (reflecting an increase in corruption based on data fromvarious surveys), earning 5.5 points in 2009 and 5.4 points in 2010(Transparency International 2009a; Transparency International 2010). Itfurther slid down in ranking in 2011, when it ranked 43rd among 182 nationswith 5.4 points (Transparency International 2011a). TI’s Global CorruptionBarometer 2010/2011 shows that 32 percent of the public perceived anincrease in the degree of corruption over the last three years while 42 percentdid not (Transparency International 2011b). These findings show that thepeople feel corruption has been rising since the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as South Korean president. A survey question on public perception of thegovernment’s effectiveness in battling corruption showed a slight increase inthose who think that government measures against corruption were effectivein 2010-2011 (Transparency International 2011b). But the values are stillsimilar with those in the 2007 survey (Transparency International 2007). Inaddition, the 2009 survey results showed the highest number of people whothink that the government’s anti-corruption measures are ineffective


(Transparency International 2009b). These patterns of responses suggestthat the efforts of the Lee Myung-bak government to address corruption areless effective than those of the Roh Mu-hyun government.

What has been examined so far is relevant to the procedural definitionof democracy in South Korea, so these indices may not reflect the ideal of de-monopolization of power and resources, which would define a substantiveSouth Korean democracy. Recently, researchers on democracy have hadmuch interest in inequality6. As neoliberal globalization consolidated andmost of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) member nations show the widening gap in income between theupper class and the lower class. Since the late 1980s, the global Ginicoefficient, the index for income inequality, has been on the rise and thisdifference in income has economic, social, and political consequences (Jung2011, 106) Issues that have been found to be the cause of the worsening socialand economic polarization in the country. in South Korea since 1997 includedeepening poverty, a shrinking middle class, and the ever-increasing incomeshare and influence of the upper class.

However, these democracy indices have failed to measure democracy asit is characterized by social and economic equality. Therefore, this studyintends to assess South Korea’s democracy by measuring expert evaluationabout socioeconomic and political equality.

Figure 2: Freedom Index and Equality Index by Area


Survey Method

The System and Organization of the Asian DemocracyIndex

The survey was implemented in accordance with the framework explained inthe Asian Democracy Index Guidebook.

The Method and the Target of Survey

The Selection of the Survey Target

One of the challenges an expert survey presents is how to ensure objectivity.In the process of sampling a group of experts as respondents, systematicdistortions are very likely. Given the fact that experts do have gaps in theirspecialist knowledge, it is highly probable that their answers may be nodifferent from citizen respondents.

To secure objectivity and rigor, the survey first employed an ideologicalstandard in selecting experts. In other words, according to the situation ineach country, groups of experts are categorized into pro-government/conservative, moderate, and anti-government/progressive groups. Eachgroup is mutually exclusive to allow for their autonomous evaluations. Thisis a strategy for securing the objectivity of the study as it reveals the biases inadvance. Experts from the different groups are further divided to assess threedifferent areas where they have specialist knowledge, namely: politics,economy, and civil society.

A total of twenty-seven experts, composed of scholars and activists, weresurveyed. Nine experts are assigned to each area. Each of these groups of nineare comprised of three conservatives, three moderates, and three progressives.Most of the experts assigned to tackle politics and economy are researchersand professors while most of those assigned to answer questions regardingcivil society were activists.

Table 2: The Mean Values of Subprinciples by Area Liberalization Equalization Autonomy Competition Plurality Solidarity Politics 6.86 6.53 4.89 5.36 Economy 5.19 3.72 3.76 3.71 Civil Society 5.30 5.78 4.69 3.59


Survey Duration and MethodThe survey was conducted from early June to late July of 2012. The surveymethod was mostly via e-mail with only one case being a face-to-face survey.The responses were then coded. In case of unanswered items or exceptionalresponses, a follow-up survey was carried out.

The Results of the SurveySurvey data reveals a Democracy Index score of 4.93 for South Korea, lowerthan the median score of five on a 10-point scale. Although this score canhardly affirm the scores in international democracy indices, it still shows thatSouth Korea still has a long way to go before it achieves the ideal of a de-monopolized democracy, disproving the observation that South Korea’sdemocracy has advanced substantially in a relatively short period of time.With the further itemized comparison of democracy indices via an examinationof the liberalization indices and the equalization indices by area, it can be saidthat political democracy in South Korea is relatively well developed with 5.85points while economic and civil society democracy were relativelyunderdeveloped, having been evaluated with 4.10 and 4.84 points, respectively.

Also, it is found that in all the three areas, the liberalization index (5.53points average) garnered higher scores than the equalization index (4.33points average). This means that the realization of socioeconomic andpolitical equalization in South Korea is delayed. Moreover, in the area ofpolitics, the liberalization index earned the highest evaluation with 6.60points. It can thus be interpreted that autonomy and competition are securedfairly well in South Korean politics.

On the other hand, the equalization index in the area of economy earnedthe lowest evaluation at 3.74 points. This means that the South Koreaneconomy is defined by inequality, monopolization of wealth, and the failure

Table 3: The Level of South Korea’s Democracy Categorized by Political Tendency Aspect/Area Politics Economy Civil society Right 6.49 5.64 5.65 5.90 Moderate 5.93 3.58 4.7 4.69 Left 5.21 2.83 4.59 4.13 Right-Left Deviation

1.42 2.82 1.06 1.76


of economic redistribution. Lastly, in the civil society area, the civil societyindex was measured with a score of 5.54 points, above the average 5.0 on the10-point scale. However, the civil society equalization index was assessedwith a low score of 4.14. This means that while civil society in South Koreahas well-secured autonomy and competition, unequal power relations insociety still persist.

Table 2 shows the mean values of the attributes which constitute theprinciples by area. As shown in the scores of constituents in each area,autonomy, a constituent the principle of liberalization, earned the highestscore. Competition earned the highest score in the areas of politics and civilsociety, but not in the area of economy. This was due to the low evaluation intransparency and fairness of corporate management and liabilities ofgovernment and business. That is, even after the democratization, they stillengage in the authoritative practices in the past while the democratic rules formanagement are ignored and unhealthy links between business and politicsare maintained.

Second, both plurality and solidarity, which constitute equalization,earned lower evaluations than the average, except for solidarity in the area ofpolitics. In particular, plurality and solidarity in the economy recorded 3.76and 3.71 points, respectively. This may mean that the strengthening ofneoliberal policies of the Lee Myung-bak government is causing the worseningeconomic inequality in South Korea (Scholars-Academia Consortium,2010). Also, within the economic structure where the association of tradeunion and the participation in the decision-making process of the governmentand the management are limited, the decline in economic equality becomesremarkable.

One of the more intriguing results for political equalization is thatpluralization was given a rating below 5.0 points, unlike other constituentsin the area of politics. This is due to the fact that power dispersion in theNational Assembly, political representativeness, and democratization of

Table 4. Comparison of the Constituents in the Area of Politics Categorized by the Political Tendencies Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity

Right 8.25 6.93 5.33 5.80 Moderate 6.67 6.53 4.78 5.73 Left 5.67 6.13 4.56 4.53 Right-Left Deviation

2.58 0.80 0.78 1.27


national organizations earned low points. Also of note is the fact thatsolidarity received the lowest point (3.53) in the area of civil society. That is,it is assessed that the institutions and policies for preserving the rights ofmarginalized sectors of society, the degree of participation of citizens inNGOs, and the influences of NGOs in the decision-making process of thegovernment require much improvement in South Korea. This means that inthe democratization process, the monopolization of power into only a handfulof members of society still persists. Civil society in South Korea is deficientin tolerance for minorities and is criticized for having a “civil rights movementwithout citizens.” As has been earlier indicated, this is due to the lack ofparticipation of citizens.

The Political Tendency and the Evaluation ofSouth Korea’s Democracy

The respondents’ assessments on each area were analyzed depending on theirpolitical tendencies. The average score of the conservative respondents was5.9 points. The average of the progressive respondents was 4.13 points, thusthe deviation between both sides being 1.76 points. This shows that theconservative respondents evaluate South Korea’s political democracy morehighly.

The Area of PoliticsA comparison of autonomy, competition, pluralization, and solidaritymeasures in politics is shown in table 4.

Among the four subprinciples, autonomy and competition earned thehigher scores, while pluralization and solidarity earned low scores. The factthat the ratings for autonomy and competition are higher than the ratings forthe other two subprinciples shows that Dahl’s (1998 and 1971) concept ofdemocracy (polyarchy) is being established. However, autonomy has asubstantial deviation (2.58) between the values of the conservative and theprogressive respondents. The reason is that compared with the itemsconstituting autonomy, there is a big discrepancy between the progressives’and the conservatives’ opinions about whether civil liberties are secured(deviation : 3.67 points), whether there is violence in the country (deviation:3.00 points), and whether political opposition/challenge is allowed (deviation:2.00 points).

Competition and pluralisation have very homogenous evaluations.Among the items, the expansion of suffrage (8.22 points), the fairness ofelection/competition (7.78 points), and the delegation of power by election


(7.0 points) earned high scores. It shows that electoral democracy is wellestablished in South Korea. However the evaluation of the efficiency of thegovernment (4.33 points) was low, which shows that governmentresponsiveness to people’s demands with regard to governmental organizationsand policies is poor (supported by Scholars-Academia Consortium 2009 and2010).

Pluralization is a constituent with the least deviation (0.78 points)between political tendencies, which shows the homogeneity of opinionsacross respondents of differing political ideologies. The fact that pluralizationis the weakest means that there are still some politically excluded groups andthat the imperatives of checks and balances between power structures areunobserved due to a concentration of power, as this among the indicescomprising this subprinciple are political representativeness (4.78 points),democratic accountability (5.11 points), and the power dispersion within theNational Assembly (4.78 points).

The items which compose solidarity examine the institutionalization ofparticipation, the implementation and efficacy of affirmative action measuresfor marginalized sectors of society, popular trust in values, and democraticinstitutions. In this regard, the respondents showed high evaluations on theinstitutionalization of participation (7.0 points) and popular trust in valuesand institutions of democracy (7.33 points) while affirmative action measures

Figure 3: The distribution map of responses by political tendency in the area of politics. Cross: average; diamond: conservative; circle: moderate; triangle: progressive.


(4.33 points) for marginalized sectors of society and trust in the presentgovernment (4.0 points) and in the National Assembly (4.11 points) earnedlow evaluations. This indicates that there is severe political distrust andexclusivist politics in South Korea.

In sum, South Korea’s democracy fulfils the criteria for a politicaldemocracy in which political participation and expansion and electoralcompetition take place on the basis of the definition provided by Dahl (1998and 1971). However, it shows that South Korean democracy has weakpolitical representation and government accountability. This type ofdemocracy is deficient in responsiveness, which exacerbates political distrust.

The Area of EconomyAccording to the survey results, the area of economy earned the lowest score.Democracy Index in the area of economy was 4.10 with deviation betweendemocracy indices dependent on differing political tendencies. That is, theaverage score of the conservative respondents was 5.64 points while theaverage score of the progressive respondents was 2.83, the lowest.

Table 5 summarizes the comparison between autonomy, competition,plurality, and solidarity in the area of economy according to politicaltendencies. As the characteristic of each constituent is examined, liberalizationearned higher evaluations than equalization. The reason behind the highevaluation of the degree of liberalization can be attributed to the autonomyamong the elements which constitute liberalization. Only autonomy earnedmore than 5 points (5.19 points), unlike the other constituents.

Such evaluations are due to the perception that business is independentof government (4.78 points), that the prevention of compulsory labor andchild labor is well secured (5.78 points), and that there is a high degree ofautonomy of the national government from foreign capital (5.89 points).However, there is a substantial deviation (2.42 points) in the responses of therespondents when divided according to their political tendencies. The itemwith the biggest deviation is related to the assurance of labor rights. Theaverage score for the conservative respondents is 7.33 points while those of

Table 5: Comparison between the Constituents in the Area of Economy Categorized by Political Tendencies Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity Right 6.17 6.08 5.10 5.48 Moderate 5.67 3.00 3.13 3.05 Left 3.75 2.08 3.13 2.50


the progressive respondents is 2.33 points—a deviation by 5 points. Also, inthe item which examines autonomy from foreign interests, the median scorefor the conservatives is 7 points while that of the progressives is 3.67 points—a deviation of 3.33 points.

Political competition earned 3.72 points on average. It has the biggestdeviation (4.0 points) according to the political tendencies among the 4constituents. The conservative respondents evaluate high competition in thearea of economy, while the progressives consider it as being the lowest in thesame area. The biggest deviation in responses of conservatives and progressivesamong the items which constitute competition can be found in the itemrelated to the accountability of the government for upholding of labor rights.For that item, conservatives gave 7.0 points on average while the progressivesgave 1.67 on average—a deviation of 5.33 points. For the other items, therewere deviations which range from 3.33 points to 3.67 points.

Next, we examine economic pluralization and solidarity, the constituentsof economic equalization. Pluralization earned 3.76 points, with a relativelylow deviation between the conservatives and the progressives. The item abouteconomic inequality between regions obtained the highest score (4.67points) among the items which constitute pluralization. The item with thelowest score (3.0 points) was the item concerned with the inequality of assets.That item earned the lowest evaluation regardless of political tendencies,with a deviation of only 0.67 points. The primary reason behind the low level

Figure 4. The distribution map of responses in the area of economy by political tendency. Cross: average; square: moderate; triangle: progressive; diamond: conservative.


of pluralization of the economy is the monopolization of economic interestsby some particular groups or forces, which obtained a rating of3.13 points.

As the rapid modernization in South Korea accelerates, chaebols(conglomerates) or large companies are still in existence, perpetuating theirlong-standing monopoly of economic interests in the country. The evaluationof plurality in the survey shows the excessive dominance of chaebols over theeconomy, which have recently resurfaced, and the inequality of assets. Sucha situation indicates the direction of the solution to economic inequality inSouth Korea.

Lastly, economic solidarity obtained quite a low evaluation (3.71 points).The item with the lowest evaluation in the area of economy is the participationof labor in management. Also, since the organization of labor unions earneda low evaluation, a very low evaluation was given to the item on movementsof labor unions (the average of items 16, 17, and 18 under economy). Thisshows that contrary to public appearance, labor unions in South Korea are notwell organized nor do they have a strong influence on government andbusiness.

The difference between the ratings of respondents according to politicaltendencies under economic solidarity was the second biggest, exceeded onlyby the deviation in economic competition. This is because the conservativerespondents evaluated solidarity as being relatively high (5.48 points) but theprogressive respondents assessed it as being weak (2.50 points). The itemwith the biggest deviation among the items in solidarity is related to theinfluences of labor unions on the decision-making processes of the nationalgovernment. Regarding this item, the conservatives gave an average 7.33points while the progressives gave an average 1.5 points. Meanwhile, the itemwith the least deviation between political tendencies is related to the sentimentof citizens with regards to economic inequality—a deviation by 1.0 point.The item with the second smallest deviation is on the item on the enforcementof the social security system. Although this item shows a higher score (4.89

Table 6: The Comparison of Constituents in the Area of Economy Categorized by Political Tendency Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity Right 7.00 4.75 5.17 4.33 Moderate 4.90 6.08 3.92 3.44 Left 4.00 6.50 4.92 3.00 Right-Left Deviation

3.00 -1.75 0.25 1.33

101KIM, KIM, CHO, AND OTHERS

points) than other items, the deviation between the conservatives and theprogressives is 3.67 points. This may reflect the expectation of each tendencyon government welfare spending.

The Area of Civil Society

In the area of civil society, autonomy and competition of citizens earned arelatively high score whereas the evaluation on plurality and solidarity wasrelatively low. In the subprinciple of civil society solidarity, the itemsconcerned with institutions and affirmative action measures which guaranteeplurality earned the lowest evaluation. This seems to reflect the fact that thereis still a lack of institutions for protecting the interests of the sociallymarginalized in South Korea.

The element earning the highest evaluation in the area of civil society wascompetition, one of the items in liberalization. The items under competitionwere influence, publicness, transparency, and plurality of an association. Theevaluations of these items by the moderate respondents (6.08 points) and theprogressive respondents (6.50 points) were higher than those by theconservative respondents (4.75 points). This may be the result of theproliferation of voluntary associations as well as the participation of civilsociety organizations in policy-making processes. Also, it can be said thatthese associations have made efforts to acquire credibility and the participationof citizens through moral uprightness and transparency.

In the evaluation of autonomy in civil society, the deviation between theconservatives and the progressives becomes significant. The items withexceptionally big differences are the ones related to the fulfilment of basicneeds and the autonomy of civil society from the state. First, the conservativesgave 8.33 points on average for the fulfillment of basic needs item, while theprogressives gave it 3.33 points on average, resulting in a difference of 5.0points. Also, there was a difference of 4.33 points between the conservativesand the progressives with regard to the autonomy of civil society from thestate. It shows that there is a big discrepancy in opinion between the twogroups about the autonomy of citizens.

Second, the examination of the characteristics of items in equalizationindicates that plurality in the area of civil society is 4.69 points, which requiressome improvement. The items for measuring plurality are related to theequality in power distribution in the press, information, culture, and civilsociety. The difference of evaluations under the plurality item according todifferent political tendencies is typically not substantial, except for the item(3.33 points) related to equality in power distribution in the civil society. The


equality of information item earned the highest evaluation score at 7.11points. This can be an indicator that South Korea has progressed rapidly ininformation technology.

On the other hand, equality of the press is the item with the lowestevaluation at 2.44 points. This evaluation is well reflected in FreedomHouse’s Press Freedom Index (PFI) for South Korea. South Korea had beenclassified as a free country with secure press freedom from 1988 to 2009(Freedom House 2012). However, in 2010, it was classified as a partially freecountry in terms of press freedom (Freedom House 2012).7 South Korea’sPress Freedom score was 30 points from 2006 to 2009; the score increasedto 32 points in 2010 and remained the same in 2011 (Freedom House 2012).As mentioned earlier in this report, possible reasons behind this increase arethe Lee Myung-bak government’s influence on the press, the increase ofcensorship by governmental organs, and the governmental intervention in themanagement of the major broadcast media stations (Freedom House 2011a,7).

Lastly, the evaluation of solidarity in the area of civil society has thelowest score among the three constituents in the degrees of democracy. Thisis due to the lack of affirmative action measures for the marginalized sectorsin society, the low rate of citizen participation in the NGO movements, and

Figure 5: South Korea’s Press Freedom Index from 1993-2011 by Freedom House. Source: Freedom House 2012.


the low influence of NGOs in the decision-making process of the government.Apparently, voluntary associations have proliferated in South Korea, but stillhave considerable limitations in their capacity to have any impact on SouthKorean society and politics. Civil rights movements have suffered from a lackof citizen participation and the representation of civil society interests havenot been institutionalized.

The solidarity items that polarized conservatives and progressives arerelated to civil society influences on the decision-making processes of thegovernment. Conservatives gave 5 points while progressives gave 1.67points, resulting to a difference by 3.33 points. Evidently, the progressiverespondents perceived that civil society articulations are not well deliveredand their interests not reflected under the rule of the conservative government.

Discussion/EvaluationIn sum, the characteristics of South Korea’s democracy in 2011 are as followsFirst, the procedural type of democracy is found to be established in SouthKorea, with the principle of liberalization being highly evaluated but with theprinciple of equalization being poorly evaluated. South Korea, therefore, hasa long way to go yet for its development of a substantive democracy. Second,the large deviation of scores among conservative and progressive respondentsimplies that South Korea’s democracy is experiencing the institutionalization

Figure 6: The distribution map of responses in political tendency for the area of society and economy. Cross: average; diamond: conservative; square: moderate; triangle: progressive.


of political democracy. On the other hand, democratic procedures and normshave not been internalized nor have been habituated in the civil society andeconomic spheres. Particularly, the conventional authoritative practicessuch as rent-seeking, the illegal and arbitrary use of power, and deficiency ofresponsibilities are still entrenched in South Korean society. Lastly, SouthKorean democracy appears to exhibit characteristics of “restricted democracy”in that the idea that “democratic procedures and norms as the only gameavailable under the given political, social and economic conditions”(Przeworski 1991, 26; Linz and Stepan 1996) is not recognized. Also, in eacharea, there are still restrictions on the participation in decision-making anddemocratic control by the citizens.8

This survey enabled us to understand the merits and the weaknesses ofan Asian Democracy Index as currently designed. The CADI ADI iscommendable in its demand to understand realities in each country byexamining the country’s democracy and complex manner. Relevantobservations based on democratic realities by areas and by principles can shedlight on the strengths and weaknesses, the possibilities and limitations of anAsian democracy.

This survey also brought to attention some commonly sharedcharacteristics of democracy in Asia. For example, though the democraticexercise of free and fair elections are carried out regularly, economicinequality is an enduring problem. The Asian Democracy Index thus issignificant for a generalization of the characteristics of an Asian democracyby its accumulation of empirical data.

Nevertheless, there are many lessons for further study. First, there is thedifficulty in comparing democratic realities of countries with one another.Although the respondents are experts, it seems that they would have muchdifficulty in making an international comparison and assessment whileovercoming the regional limitations of their respective countries. There is aneed to consider how to use the internationally comparable objective indiceswhich have been previously collected.

Second, there is a problem of how to tackle the huge difference betweenthe scores of respondents. Trivial errors such as those incurred in designingthe questionnaire or the errors in responses can be resolved by way ofsupplemental surveys. However, there will be still an issue in significantly bigdifference in scores between respondents. The score distribution suggests thegap from some ideological differences to some extent, but since expected, thisresult would not be a significant issue. Nevertheless, for some researchsubjects, too much difference in the scores are sometimes found especially insome of the questions. Regarding this issue, it seems that new considerations


should be taken into account in the survey method using the Delphi surveytechnique, for instance.

Notes1. Freedom House assesses the two dimensions of political right and civil liberty on a 7-

point scale (2011b). The average score of these two dimensions can be the standardwith which to measure the degree of freedom in each country (Freedom House2011b).

2. Averaged pairs of political rights and civil liberties scores determine statuses of “NotFree,” “Partly Free,” and “Free” (Freedom House 2011b).

3. EIU’s index of democracy is the average of the five category indices on electoralprocess and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; politicalparticipation; and political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).

4. The value of the PFI ranges from 0 to 100 points. As the Press Freedom Index getscloser to 0, freedom of the press becomes better secured; as the index increases,freedom of the press will be more infringed (Reporters Without Borders 2011a).

5. This can also be translated into “I’m a Smart-Ass.”6. See, for example, Beramendi and Anderson (2008); Fukuyama, Diamond, and

Plattner (2012).7. Freedom House classifies the degrees of press freedom into three categories. The

score of free countries ranges from 0 to 30; the score of partially free countries is from31 to 60; the score of non-free countries is from 61 to 100 (Karlekar 2011).

8. In other words, a limited democracy in the area of political representation by theexclusion of major groups, the significant decrease in responsiveness of the government,and the restrictions on the freedom of association and expression, even though a fairelection of the representatives by universal suffrage is held and the imperatives ofgovernment accountability, such as that for the National Assembly, are mostly fulfilled(Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 92).

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(De)Monopolization of Democracy in

Indonesia?

The Indonesian Report on the

Asian Democracy Index 2011

ANTON PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, DIRGA ARDIANSA,

ROICHATUL ASWIDAH, SRI BUDI EKO WARDANI,

WAWAN ICHWANUDDIN, YOLANDA PANJAITAN

Background

The democratization process has been going on in Indonesia for thirteen

years, following the departure of the late President Soeharto in 1998. The

dynamics, characteristics, performance, and future of democracy in Indonesia

have been a subject of research for many political scientists (Aspinall and

Mietzner 2010).1 Indonesia is not only considered the third largest democratic

country in the world after the United States and India, but it is also recognized

as the largest democratic Muslim country in the world (Bayuni 2011). It is

therefore pertinent to pay attention to democratization in Indonesia.

Research on Indonesian democracy has led to various assessments.

Larry Diamond (2010, 35-46), in his comparison of the democracy

movements in Indonesia with those in five other Asian countries,2 concluded

that both the quality of, and public support for, Indonesian democracy have

progressed more rapidly than in the other countries studied (Diamond 2010,

46). Relatedly, Liddle and Mujani said that Indonesia had essentially been

consolidated based on the three dimensions developed by Linz and Stepan,

namely: parameters of behavior, attitude and level of constitutional

commitment (quoted in Diamond 2010)3. However, Diamond (2010) noted

that Indonesian democracy could regress. Various sociopolitical phenomena

offer indications that support this possibility. Worth mentioning are the level

of political violence and the lack of clarity on the extent to which Islamic

____________________________________________________________

Anton Pradjasto and Roichatul Aswidah are from the Indonesian Center for Democracy andHuman Rights Studies (DEMOS). Irwansyah, Dirga Ardiansa, Sri Budi Eko Wardani,Wawan Ichwanuddin, and Yolanda Panjaitan are from the Center for Political Studies(PUSKAPOL), Department of Political Science, Universitas Indonesia.


109PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSparties and movements that favor a Sharia state will fully accept constitutionalcommitment. He further explained the critical points of concern, specificallythe behavior, attitude, and constitutional commitment of the key elite, whoretain the capacity to weaken or reverse Indonesian democracy.

Despite these, Diamond (2010) is still one of the political experts who seeIndonesian democracy through rose-tinted glasses as there are experts whohold more pessimistic views. According to Aspinall (quoted in Aspinall andMietzner 2010, 1-2), expert opinion on Indonesian democracy was dividedinto two opposing camps. On the one hand, some experts see an effectivelyconsolidated Indonesian democracy relative to other countries, while the othercamp says that Indonesian democracy is merely artificial, wherein the corepower structure has not changed and the oligarchy of the New Order eracontinues to exploit the country for its own interests.4 Diamond (2010, 1-2)however added another group of experts that believes that Indonesiandemocracy has progressed but has been marred by the weight of corruptionissues and weak law enforcement.

Amid these expert opinions, several institutions have published theirown assessments of democracy in Indonesia. Freedom House (2011) ratedIndonesia as a fully free country (“free”) with a higher score for political rightsthan for civil rights.5 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010) rankedIndonesia sixtieth in the category of “flawed democracy” states, with a totalscore of 6.53 on a scale of 1-10. The Indonesian Centre for Democracy andHuman Rights Studies (DEMOS) conducted national surveys in 2003/4and 2007 that produced average indices for Indonesian democracy of 37 and47, respectively on a scale of 100.6 While the score has somewhat increased,it could be said that with a score of 47 on a scale of 100, Indonesian democracyis still far from what is desired. The DEMOS assessment was based on fourimportant forces in a democracy: 1) legal and rights; 2) political representation;3) democratic and accountable governance; and 4) citizen participation andinvolvement.

The Indonesian government has also developed its own IndonesianDemocracy Index (IDI), which gave a score of 67.30 to Indonesian democracyon a scale of 1-100.7 The IDI was developed as a measuring tool to assessprogress in Indonesian democracy based on its own circumstances (UNDP2011). However, the IDI is based on only three aspects—civil freedom,political rights, and democratic institutions—implying a “thin” concept ofdemocracy. It does not include, as noted by Indonesian Survey InstituteDirector for Public Affairs Burhanuddin Muhtadi (n.d.), important aspectssuch as political culture. Therefore, it is difficult for the IDI to depict acomplete picture of Indonesian democracy. What is needed is a measurement

110 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011that conforms to Indonesia’s circumstances to capture critical issues specificto Indonesian democracy.

It is apparent that Indonesia has similar experiences with otherdemocracies in Asia. Some countries, including South Korea and Taiwan, areconsidered as countries that have achieved procedural democracy and haveentered a consolidation era. However, some countries in South Asia, as wellas Thailand, have regressed. In addition, several countries in Asia havealready passed the point of transition from authoritarianism, yet electoraldemocracy is still threatened. The said countries already have proceduraldemocracy but lack fundamental democratic principles such as participation,representation and accountability. Furthermore, democratization of severalcountries in Asia has not led to improvements to the quality of life of thepeople (DASMI 2010). Asia provides a lesson that transition fromauthoritarianism does not always lead to a transition to democracy; that theachievement of electoral democracy does not always create representation;and that the transition to substantive democracy does not always occurfollowing a transition to democracy (DASMI 2010).

This research begins with the perspective that developing democracy inAsia requires a new framework for assessing democracy to explain thecomplexities of democratization in Asia. The development of the AsianDemocracy Index is based on a redefinition of democracy by making the de-monopolization of the process and institutions, occurring in the political,economic, and social arenas, the key to transition to democracy. Democracyhere has two principles: liberalization and equalization. Liberalization is usedto measure the extent to which different sectors achieve independence andautonomy from the old authoritarian political power and then be able todetermine their own priorities. This really depends on the extent of thedisintegration of the old forces of monopoly. Meanwhile, equalization is usedto measure the extent to which minority and even subaltern groups cansubstantially acquire access to resources in various sectors and enjoy equalaccess to resources and power. Equalization is therefore a process oftransformation of power in each arena, namely politics, the economy, and civilsociety (DASMI 2010).

The development of Indonesian democracy requires measurements thatcan capture its complexity. It is hoped that the Asian Democracy Index canbecome an alternative tool to evaluate and assess Indonesian democracy. Inthis way, critical issues in Indonesian democracy can be revealed and steps canbe taken to continually improve democracy in Indonesia.

111PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSGeneral Method

Measurement and Assessment ProcessThe data for the Asian Democracy Index were derived from face-to-faceinterviews with individuals considered as experts using survey questionnaires.Each expert was asked for their assessment on a number of questions, specificto their respective expertise. Descriptive statistics through central tendencies(mean, median, and mode) and cross tabulation have been applied to thecollated scores.

The selection of experts was based on three criteria: 1) the area ofexpertise: economics, politics, or civil society; 2) view towards the government:pro-government, moderate, and anti-government; 3) role in society: academic,practitioner, or politician.

Secondary data, such as internet surveys and the number of human rightscovenants ratified by the Indonesian government on the state of human rightsprotection in terms of civil liberties, labor rights, etc., were also collected, assupporting information on the survey questions.

Experts’ ProfilesDEMOS and the Center for Political Studies, Department of PoliticalScience Universitas Indonesia (PUSKAPOL UI) gathered the data between18 July and 25 August 2011. Those considered “experts” were individualswho possess knowledge and expertise on the subject area, either because theywork in that area (e.g., as a member of parliament in the political arena, a non-governmental organization [NGO] activist in the civil society arena, or abusiness person in the economics arena) or are academics and researcherswho focus on that area. A total of twenty-seven experts were interviewed.

Difficulties during SurveyThe first difficulty experienced during the survey was in locating the expertswithin the stipulated spectrum of political positions, i.e., pro-government,moderate, or anti-government. In truth, this classification had alreadyundergone changes since the initial design, when it was formerly based on anideological spectrum (liberal, moderate, conservative). It is difficult toidentify the political ideology of experts and public figures in Indonesia. Thiscan be seen as a continuation of the socio-political situation, which hadundergone de-ideologization and de-politicization during the thirty-two-year rule of Soeharto. Political ideology is not articulated directly and openlyby either political parties or public figures.

112 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011These days, hardline fundamentalist Islamic groups are finding the

courage to openly express their political ideologies. It was difficult to locatethe position represented by these groups, whether pro- or anti-government,because, on the one hand, they hold a political view that rejects secular politics,including the concept of democracy; while on the other, they are largely leftalone by the government.

The opposite is true for economists, whose ideology is much easier todetermine and consequently their positions toward the market and stateintervention in economic affairs. In fact, almost none of the economists inIndonesia openly propagate ideological support for the market economy. Asfor their position in terms of supporting or opposing the government, theirdifferences are not particularly striking. It is actually easiest to differentiatethem based on whether or not they are involved with, or work for, thegovernment.

We held in-depth discussions to make qualitative assessments of eachexpert, which examined the track record of their statements. These assessmentswere interpretative and could be improved in future studies. So far, the basesfor choosing the experts were considered accurate. It also confirmed that in thedemocracy setting in Indonesia, people rarely refer to ideologies when makingpolitical choices. Pro- and anti-government positions are also flexible duringthe current transition period, as evidenced by the present dispensation—acoalition of various groups that do not share the same political ideology.

Over the last few years, the government has been unpopular as aconsequence of various corruption scandals, thus making it easier to see whoamong the experts are pro-, anti-government, or in between. This explains ourmethodological decision to revise the ideological spectrum of expert informantsto reflect their degree of support, or lack of it, for the government.

The availability of experts for meetings also proved to be a difficulty.Most of them are busy people. This led to difficulties in arranging interviewschedules, which was the biggest obstacle we faced in gathering data. It wasalso difficult for several experts to spare the time to answer the questions ontheir own and return the questionnaire by email. The interview method waschosen (with three exceptions, who were contacted via internet survey). As aresult, it took longer to conduct the interviews than had been planned, i.e., amonth instead of two weeks.

113PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERS

Experts’ Comments on the Survey Questions

A number of experts felt that several of the questions were too broad, makingit difficult to capture the complex dimensions of democracy in Indonesia andgive scores. Two illustrative examples follow:

· Several civil society experts had difficulty in scoring the influenceprivate companies have on society, since the media is heavilyinfluenced by companies, while NGOs are not. Thus, theydifferentiated the two prior to giving the score.

· Several experts found it difficult to answer questions on affirmativeaction and special care. Affirmative action and special care forwomen are considered quite good, while affirmative action andspecial care for other groups are considered very poor.

Research FindingsThis research resulted in an index based on expert assessments on the areasof 1.) politics, 2.) the economy, and 3.) civil society. Expert assessments werefurther broken down into categories of experts, namely pro-government,moderate, and anti-government. Table 1 shows the Indonesian index fromthe categories of experts in each of the three areas.

On the average, the Indonesian index was 4.9, when measured on a scaleof 0 to 10. Viewed by area, the Indonesian politics index was highest with 5.5,while the Indonesian economy index was lowest with 4.24.

We should add that those in the pro-government and moderate categoriesdid not greatly differ in their assessments, with respective scores of 5.35 and5.04. A more substantial difference was noted for those in the anti-governmentcategory, with a score of 4.44.

Table 1: Indonesian Index by Area and Categories of Experts Categories of Experts

Area Total Politics Economy Civil Society

Pro-government 5.91 4.93 5.2 5.35 Moderate 5.04 4.4 5.69 5.04 Anti-government 5.56 3.38 4.37 4.44 Overall Average 5.50 4.24 5.09 4.9

114 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011

Indonesian Index in Terms of Four Democracy VariablesIn this research, the concept of democracy was broken down into two coreprinciples: liberalization and equalization. The liberalization principle wasfurther broken down into two variables: autonomy and competition, while theequalization principle was also broken down into two variables: pluralizationand solidarity. These principles and their corresponding variables were thenanalyzed in each of the three areas: politics, the economy, and civil society.

The Indonesian index for the political sphere based on the four democracyvariables is provided in table 2.

Overall, the assessment of autonomy in the political sphere scored thehighest, with a score of 6.86. Pro-government, moderate, and anti-governmentexperts all gave autonomy in the Indonesian political sphere the highest score.Pro-government experts gave higher scores than the moderate and anti-government groups across all four variables. However, the high score forautonomy in the political sphere did not draw a parallel score for competition,

Table 2: Indonesian Politics Index in Terms of Four Democracy Variables Categories of Experts

Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity

Pro-government 7.33 5.67 5.58 4.93 Moderate 6.00 4.72 5.08 4.60 Anti-government 7.25 5.11 5.50 4.80 Total 6.86 5.17 5.39 4.78

Table 3: Indonesian Economy Index in Terms of Four Democracy Variables Categories of Experts




which was much lower (5.17). Pluralization in the political sphere scored5.39, while solidarity scored 4.78.

The Indonesian index for the economic sphere based on the fourdemocracy variables is provided in table 3.

The Indonesian economy index results showed that autonomy andcompetition are in a better position than solidarity. Pluralization was in theworst position in the economic sphere. Autonomy and competition scoreswere in the middle range.

Pluralization scored very low across all the categories of experts, with anindex score of 3.09. Experts in the pro-government category tended to ratepluralization higher compared to those in the moderate and anti-governmentcategories, which both gave lower scores for pluralization in the Indonesianeconomy. Solidarity scored 4.24, signaling a less than harmonious conditionin the economic sphere.

The Indonesian index for the civil society sphere based on the fourdemocracy variables is provided in table 4.

The Indonesian civil society index presented an interesting situation.Competition scored higher than the other variables. Under the principle ofliberalization for civil society, autonomy scored lower than competition (4.46compared to 6.44). While under the principle of equalization, solidarityscored better than pluralization (5.41 compared to 4.08).

Table 4: Indonesian Civil Society Index in Terms of Four Democracy Variables Categories of Experts



116 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011

Indonesian Index from the Perspective of the Principles ofLiberalization and EqualizationThe three Indonesian index areas (politics, the economy, and civil society)and four democracy variables (autonomy, competition, pluralization, andsolidarity) have been consolidated in table 5 as shown below.

Finally, table 6 shows that the total score for the liberalization principle(5.48) is higher than the equalization principle (4.50). This table also showsthat Indonesia’s overall index score for 2011 is quite modest at 4.99.

Interpretation and AnalysisThe research findings illustrate that Indonesia still has a lot of homework todo to advance its democracy. This part contains our interpretation of theresearch findings. In this way, we can trace what conditions need to beimproved so that Indonesian democracy can become better.

Table 5: Indonesian Index in Terms of Four Democracy Variables Area Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity Politics 6.86 5.17 5.39 4.78 Economy 5.00 4.92 3.09 4.24 Civil Society 4.46 6.44 4.08 5.41 Total 5.44 5.51 4.19 4.81

Table 6: Indonesian Democracy Index 2011 Area Liberalization

Equalization

Index on Indonesian Democracy

Politics 6.01 5.08 Economy 4.96 3.66 Civil Society 5.45 4.75 Total 5.48 4.50 4.99

117PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSAnalysis of Four Democracy Variables

Autonomy VariableAutonomy has the highest index score in the political sphere. The data showthat autonomy has a higher index score in the political sphere than in theeconomic and civil society spheres. The autonomy index scored 6.86 in thepolitical sphere, 5.0 in the economic sphere, and the lowest in civil society with4.46.

Most of the experts stated that the level of state violence has substantiallydecreased compared to the New Order era. The freedom to establish politicalorganizations and to protest through demonstrations or other means is ratedas having improved when compared with the New Order era. In addition,civil rights were said to be better protected. The right to religious freedom isnotable because of the Ahmadiyah case. The violence that engulfed Ahmadiyahand the government’s poor handling of the case bear significance for theautonomy score.

Moreover, data show that autonomy in the economic sphere was lowercompared to autonomy in the political sphere. Most of the experts stated thatthere is a mutually beneficial relationship between political and economicactors. This causes distortion in some government regulations to benefitcertain parties. Labor protection remains poor because of frequent outsourcingpractices and salaries not in line with needs. There are still plenty of companies,especially in the informal sector, which employ children despite the existenceof regulation on the minimum age for workers. In addition, the presence ofinternational financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and WorldBank) still has a dominant influence on government policy.

Civil society autonomy appears to be the worst, with an index score of4.46. Although there is now freedom for the public to assemble and establishorganizations, the legal infrastructure has not yet incorporated the democracyparadigm. Several policies are considered as limiting freedom of expression,for instance, the Law on Electronic Information and Transactions, the Lawon Pornography and Pornographic Acts, and the Bill on State Intelligenceand Secrets. In addition, most experts stated that private businesses have avery strong influence on the mass media. While there has been improvementin meeting basic education needs, provisions for other needs like electricity,water, food, health, social security, etc. are still far from what they should be.

118 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011Competition Variable

Competition in the area of civil society (6.44) is higher than in the economic(4.92) and political (5.17) spheres. Competition is part of liberalization, whichmeasures tolerance/inclusivity, capability and visibility, transparency, anddiversity of voluntary associations.

Experts generally agreed that the presence of civil society organizations(CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia was verygood, representing both a range of societal values and the public interest.Compared to political parties and the private sector, NGOs are consideredmore open and transparent.

In terms of tolerance, experts stated that there is a very large number andvariety of NGOs and CSOs in Indonesia. Nevertheless, not all CSOs reflectvalues of tolerance. Some CSOs express the opposite. The variety of NGOscan be seen from the presence of some groups that campaign for human rights,pluralism, and tolerance, and other groups that are anti-pluralism and anti-tolerance. Yet the number of those organizations is considered small. Thus,experts are of the view that this strand of NGOs still reflects the variety ofsocietal interests. It could be said that NGOs in Indonesia are reasonablyrepresentative of all societal groups.

The number of CSOs has shot up since Soeharto’s fall in 1998. In thepost-Soeharto era, public freedom has opened up and has provided theopportunity for various groups to establish organizations. Data from Indonesia’sMinistry of Home Affairs show that the number of CSOs in 2005 was around3,000. In 2010, that number increased to 9,000. This large number clearlyreflects societal values and needs.

In terms of transparency, Indonesian NGOs are considered to haveprogressed far more than political parties. Many NGOs have now begun tooperate transparently. They share information with the public, including theirfinancial reports. Political parties have not yet done this. Several NGOs havealso begun to manage regeneration and succession in a democratic manner.

Moreover, competition in the political sphere has an index score of 5.17,while competition in the economic sphere has an index score of 4.92. Oneaspect that is still poor in both political and economic practice is that neitheris transparent. Experts assessed that these two areas display relations that aremutually beneficial for their respective interests, while shutting out the public.Experts rated transparency as poor in the economic sphere. Although companieshave gone public and created financial transparency, many money practicesare not revealed. Examples of said practices are corporate taxation andcompany ownership, which can be entrenched in multiple layers, making itdifficult to determine the true owner.

119PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSOn the issue of competition among companies in Indonesia, experts

stated that many companies still receive special treatment through “moneygames” with the government. The bigger the company, the more of thecompetition is closed, making it unfair. The Indonesian Business CompetitionSupervisory Commission (KPPU) was established during the reform era tooversee business competition. However, the KPPU lacks the necessaryresources and capacity to effectively do so.

Pluralization VariablePluralization is lowest in the economic sphere but across all spheres,pluralization maintained low index scores. In the economic sphere, thepluralization index score is 3.09, with 5.39 in the political sphere and 4.08 incivil society. In the economic sphere, it is a fact that conglomerates controleconomic activities. Experts stated that foreign conglomerates are far moredominant than local conglomerates. Sectors controlled by foreign conglomeratesinclude the following: oil and gas, palm oil, coal, and banking, among others(Gie 1990; Winters 2011).

Various regulations issued by the government provide broad opportunitiesfor foreign investors to control economic activities. Foreign investors can leaseland for ninety years for their businesses. Foreign investors are also permittedto share ownership of up to 99 percent in a bank in Indonesia. Severalgovernment regulations also permit foreign investors to invest in the retailbusiness. As a result, foreign investors control many important sectors thatprop up the Indonesian economy. Control of assets by conglomerates,especially by foreign investors, has caused extraordinary disparities inrevenues.

Pluralization in civil society has a low index score, although it is somewhathigher than pluralization in the economic sphere. This is because the massmedia is still not free from the business and political interests of its owners.Electronic media do not offer quality programs to the public. Inequality ofaccess to information is still high, where the internet is monopolized by theeducated and access to libraries is considered poor. There are limitedopportunities for those who wish to engage in cultural activities.

Pluralization index score was highest in the political sphere. During thereform era, institutions have been established to improve the quality ofhorizontal accountability, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission(KPK), Indonesian Broadcast Commission (KPI), and the National HumanRights Commission (Komnas HAM). However, ensuring a bettermechanism of checks and balances demands integrity from the people withinthese institutions. The same applies to parliament. While parliament is seen

120 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011as quite representative, it is noted that not all members of parliament carryout their functions optimally.

Solidarity VariableSolidarity is lowest in the economic sphere. Solidarity has a lower index scorein the economic (4.24) than in the political sphere (4.78) and in the civilsociety (5.41) spheres. There are various factors contributing to the lowsolidarity index in the economic sphere, including business activities that donot provide social security and the continued absence of labor union activities.Labor is insufficiently organized and the labor movement fragmented, makingit unable to direct its power to enforce compliance of management with theworkers’ right to adequate social security. The ambition of labor groups tobe involved in companies’ decision-making practices is still far from realized.Workers do not have the opportunity to hold shares in the company, so thereare no opportunities to attend important company meetings. Furthermore,labor still has minimal power to influence policy-making by the government.

In addition, public participation, whether through consumer groups orenvironmental groups, is still weak. People are basically unenthusiastic aboutparticipating in reducing imbalances. Several religious organizations doengage in activities for economic empowerment, but have yet to achievepolicy change.

The solidarity index score in the political sphere is also low. Experts statedthat although people appear to be active in general elections, they do notparticipate in policymaking. Affirmative action for women in the politicalsphere is seen as adequate, with 30 percent of parliament dedicated for femalecandidates, but there are problems in its execution. Public trust in thegovernment is low because of various corruption cases that have yet to besettled. Public trust in parliament is also low. Despite all of these, the publicstill appears to have faith in democracy.

The solidarity index score is the highest in civil society. While there isno affirmative action taken by the government for the disabled, elderly, andother minority groups, affirmative action for women’s group and the educationsector has already taken place. Public involvement in NGO activities isconsidered low but is already on the rise. CSOs are considered quite influentialin the government’s policy-making process, but it depends on which issuesthey are working on. Anti-corruption NGOs are currently considered to havea very strong influence on policy making, compared to NGOs working onother issues.


Analysis of Main Principles of Democracy: Liberalizationand EqualizationThe equalization index is lowest in the economic sphere while liberalizationis highest in the political sphere. The data show that equalization has a lowerindex score in the economic sphere (3.66) than in the political sphere (5.08)and in civil society (4.75). The low score for equalization in the economicsphere appears to be the result of a very low pluralization score (3.09) as wellas a low solidarity score (4.24).

Monopoly is still considered to occur in the economic sphere, with certaingroups still in control of the economy. Inequality of assets is also morepervasive in this era of democracy than in the previous era. Lower-classcontrol over land has declined over time. Income equality has not beenachieved. Twenty percent of the population with the highest income controlan increasingly large share of national income from year to year; while fortypercent of the population with the lowest income control a decreasing share.Furthermore, economic inequality among regions is still a very seriousconcern. The economic pie was expected to be (re)distributed once regionalautonomy was introduced. However, the lower classes have not been giventheir share of the economic pie. The welfare of the people has been lost,especially in those regions that remain left behind, e.g. eastern part ofIndonesia.

Equalization has been used to measure the extent to which minority andsubaltern groups have obtained access to resources in various sectors and beenable to enjoy equality of access to resources and power. Equalization istherefore a process involving transformation of power in each sector, namelypolitics, the economy, and civil society. The resulting index shows thatequalization has shown no meaningful progress in the economic sphere noris there equality of access to economic resources.

Table 7: Forbes 40 Wealthiest Citizens Country Total wealth

(USD billions)

Average wealth (USD billions)

Total wealth as % of GDP

Wealth concentration index

Indonesia 71.3 1.78 10.3 6.22 Thailand 36.5 0.91 11.7 1.95 Malaysia 51.3 1.28 23.4 1.65 Singapore 45.7 1.14 21.0 0.25 Source: Winters (2011).

122 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011The data of the Forbes Magazine (quoted in Winters 2011) show that

concentration of wealth in Indonesia has a very high index score comparedto other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.Winters (2011) stated that the concentration of wealth in Indonesia is threetimes that in Thailand, almost four times that in Malaysia, and twenty timesthat in Singapore.

Liberalization also has the lowest index score in the economic sphere(4.96), compared with the liberalization scores in civil society (5.45) and in thepolitical sphere (6.01). Liberalization is used to measure the extent to whichthe different sectors have achieved independence and autonomy from the oldauthoritarian political forces and have been able to stipulate their owninterests. This very much depends on the degree of disintegration of the oldmonopoly forces. Since the liberalization score is lower for the economicsphere than for the other spheres, this may explain the similarly low equalizationscore for the economic sphere. Existing democracies are not particularlysuccessful in undertaking economic liberalization when the economy is stillnot autonomous, especially from politics. There is a mutually beneficialrelationship among political and economic elites that is far from transparent.Failure of economic sector liberalization constrains equalization in the economicsector. The low index scores of the economic sphere for both the liberalizationand equalization principles show that Indonesian democracy faces big problemsin the economy.

Moreover, data show that the two main principles of democracy—liberalization and equalization—have low index scores. However, the principleof equalization has a lower index score (4.50) than liberalization (5.48). Theseindex scores for Indonesia for the main principles of democracy are notsatisfactory. From these two figures it can be said that Indonesian democracyis positioned in the middle, containing the threat that it could suffer a setbackat any time.

The data also show that both variables derived from the principle ofequalization have low scores. The total pluralization index score is lowest(4.19) across all variables. Meanwhile, the total solidarity score is the nextlowest (4.81).

In all three areas, the liberalization index score is higher than theequalization index score. Liberalization is ongoing in the political sphere. Thesame is true in civil society, notwithstanding the powerful influence of privatecompanies on the mass media. This creates an imbalance in public discourse.

123PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSAnalysis of the Indonesian Democracy Index

The index is lower in the economics sphere than in the politics and civilsociety spheres. The economy index has a lower score (4.24) than the politicsindex (5.5) or the civil society index (5.09). This is chiefly due to the influenceof the equalization index for the economy, which scores well below theaverage (3.66).

These data indicate that the democratization process in Indonesia is notyet able to overcome monopolization of political, social, and, especially,economic resources. Concentration of economic resources and access to suchresources by the dominant few continues. Several experts stated that a fewforeign conglomerates and economic powers dominate economic activities.They particularly control extractive industries that are capital-intensive.This unequal access to economic resources in turn creates income inequality.Meanwhile, decentralization—whose agenda is not to centralize sources ofpower at the center—has not been sufficiently successful in overcomingeconomic disparities among regions.

This inequality is increasing because Indonesia does not have a socialsecurity system that can be used for disintegration of this monopoly, i.e., to de-monopolize centralized sources of economic power. Although labor unionactivities and numbers are now “thicker,” this is not sufficient to build up realstrength. There is also an extremely low level of concern for monitoringbusiness performance.

This low index score for the economic sphere can also be attributed toweak regulations on de-monopolizing control over economic resources.Experts considered the quality of liberalization—in the sense of being freefrom monopoly—as moderate (4.96).

De-monopolization efforts in the democracy process have been insufficientfrom a political perspective. After more than a decade since the fall ofauthoritarian governance, it appears that political and social liberalization hasnot had substantial influence on de-monopolization of the sources of economicpower. This research shows that there has been liberalization in the politicalsphere—and this fact is generally accepted by supporters, opponents, andmoderates.

Perhaps we should not rush to say that the continued strength ofmonopolistic systems in the economic sphere has caused the quality ofliberalization and equalization in the political and social spheres to be less thanoptimal. In other words, the failure of economic de-monopolization hasimplications for the quality of de-monopolization achieved in the political

124 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011and social spheres. We find this in several comments from experts, whoemphasized the hard power of business to influence politics and civil society.

Public spaces, including the media, are heavily controlled by economicpower pointing to a serious information gap. Media ownership by certaingroups is a reflection of unequal access to and distribution of information.Media owners decide what the public should be informed about. The sameapplies to the media owners’ effect on the public’s access cultural activities andfacilities. There have been many art groups that have been unable to continuecultural expression. Moreover, public space in its physical sense is full ofshopping malls and gas stations, which are more representative of businessinterests. The implication is a loss of citizenry. When the power of theeconomy is so huge, we no longer have citizens, but consumers. This researchshows that while there has been affirmation in the political sphere, particularlyfor women, this has not been applied to civil society empowerment. And thelevel of citizen participation, whether in the domains of politics or civilsociety, is still low.Why is Indonesia’s Index Score Still Low?The Indonesian democracy index is below the “average” figure (4.99)illustrating that “de-monopolization” is not even halfway there. There aremany items on the agenda that still need to be formulated and implementedfor this to occur. But to say “halfway there” has little meaning unless we godeeper to identify the pertinent parts that are deficient.

The poor quality of de-monopolization is primarily influenced by theprinciple of equalization, or, more specifically, equalization in the economicsector. If we look at it from the perspective of pluralization, we find that poorequalization occurs in the economy (3.09) and in civil society (4.08).Furthermore, if we look at it from the perspective of solidarity, politics (4.78)and the economy (4.24) are the main influences on the poor quality of thisindex.

Meanwhile, we found that the principle of liberalization—the process ofrestoring autonomy—scored above the “average” (5.44 for autonomy and5.51 for competition or 5.48 overall). This especially applies to liberalizationin the political sphere (6.86 for autonomy and 5.17 for competition). Freedomfrom monopoly or liberalization from monopoly in the political sphere is above“average,” but this does not apply to the economic and civil society spheres.

What significance should we place on this? Liberalization weighsheavier (5.48) than equalization (4.50). However, the scope of liberalizationis neither broad nor deep. Liberalization is still very limited in the political

125PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSsphere, and even more limited in civil society. This suggests that the formalpolitical instruments and procedures now are potentially available for themajority of the population for de-monopolization of power. The old forcesthat used to be the backbone of the Suharto’s regime no longer easilydominates the scene of Indonesian politics. Socio-political power has begunto be dispersed among various groups. At the community level, inclusivity ofculture, religion, language and racial/ethnic groups, and plurality of ideas areall valued. Only a few minority groups reject such inclusivity. But civil societyis not necessarily sufficiently autonomous from various other powers,especially economic ones.

But this political opportunity is not accompanied by significanttransformation in power relationships, especially in the economic sector (3.66)and civil society (4.75). In the political sphere, this transformation has beenmediocre (only 0.8 above the average).

It is interesting to note that two antagonistic groups—pro-governmentand anti-government—both highly rate the success of developing “autonomy.”On autonomy in the political sphere, both pro- and anti-government expertsmade similar assessments (7.33 and 7.25, respectively) about the democracyprocess in Indonesia.

Pro-government experts do not always see the democratization process ashaving succeeded in the de-monopolization of sources of power. We only seede-monopolization achieving a high score (7.33) in the area of group autonomy.This may illustrate a tendency for pro-government experts to give importanceto “a minimalist state role.”

The same is true in the realm of civil society, which stresses “freedomfrom state control.” Not only have civil society groups mushroomed (density),their activities have also increased (vibrant). Meanwhile, anti-governmentexperts in other sectors gave a score of “moderate.”

Nearly all experts share the view that almost no de-monopolization hasoccurred in the economic sector. One minor point should be made here.Experts who were pro-government (5.42 for autonomy and 6.0 for competition)and moderate (5.75 for autonomy and 5.50 for competition) gave “moderate”scores for liberalization in the economic sector. Economic liberalization hasyet to occur in the view of anti-government experts. All groups agreed thatthere has not been significant de-monopolization, which is primarily due tothe low level of equalization.

Moderate and pro-government groups gave high scores for competitionin civil society. Both groups consider the important contribution civil societycan make in de-monopolization. However, those in the anti-government

126 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011group have a more negative view of de-monopolization in civil society,particularly in relation to accountability.

In the case of pluralization in civil society, the anti-government groupfound low equality of access to social resources such as information andculture. Anti-government informants still considered knowledge, information,and development of cultural values to be dominated by certain powers.

ConclusionsIndonesia’s score for the Asian Democracy Index is 4.99, on a scale of 0-10.This score shows that Indonesian democracy is still problematic despitethirteen years of post-authoritarianism transition. This provides a sternwarning about the state of democracy in Indonesia, compared with severalother democracy indices, which gave Indonesia a score higher than 5.

The index score indicates that developments and achievements are outof balance with the concept of propping up democracy on the ongoing processof transition. Indonesian democracy has been propped up by significantliberalization of politics, but this has been accompanied by low equalization inthe economic sphere. Economic equalization is the lowest among all componentsof the index score. Moreover, the role of civil society is classified as mediocre,lacking a significant role in animating democratic change. Liberalization andequalization are categorized as poor in the area of civil society.

The index findings from this research appear to confirm various criticismsby experts regarding the oligarchy phenomenon—a serious issue thatIndonesian democracy now faces. Various important resources in social andeconomic relations are managed in a way that is closely connected to the oldpower of the elite, who in turn has enjoyed monopoly since the authoritarianera. In the political sphere, there have been many institutional and proceduraldevelopments that have opened up new space for autonomy in formal politicalcontests such as national and local elections. While many new faces havearrived at the political scene, this does not mean that these newcomers arecompletely free from the political power of the oligarchy. To be involved inpolitics require substantial funds. The alternatives coming from civil societyare not numerous enough and do not have a significant influence on thepolitical arena.

It appears that the increased de-monopolization occurring in the politicalarena is not yet able to promote de-monopolization in the economic and civilsociety spheres. A high degree of liberalization is only possible if there is asubstantial change to the prevailing monopoly power of the elite. New forcesmust be able to engage in change in order for a significant level of democracy

127PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSto emerge. It appears that the transformational capacity to pass throughmonopoly barriers is significant. Continued weakness in transformationalcapacity will lead to an inability to maximize opportunities that have arisenin the political and civil society spheres for democratization, tending towardsautonomy and the ability to introduce new rules and procedures.

We should therefore be strongly critical of the conclusion made byvarious prior research that Indonesian democracy had been consolidated.Consolidation in the economic and civil society spheres should begin to beseen as closely connected with political democracy, which has experienced awealth of change over the last thirteen years. The powers that have monopolizedthe economic sphere are still substantial barriers to improving the quality ofdemocracy in Indonesia. Monopolies are still extremely strong in the economicsector and have been carried into the political and civil society spheres.

RecommendationsThe Asia Democracy Index can become a gateway for a more detailed reviewof the analysis of the transition to democracy, especially in the context ofIndonesia. Starting with the methods developed in this research, it is apparentthat further research can be developed that emphasizes investigation andmapping of how monopolies over resources and power in the political,economic, and civil society spheres can become substantial obstacles to thequality of democracy.

An important note to the democratization agenda in the future is theimportance of looking at the relations between these three sectors in influencingthe overall democracy index score. The good news is that, based on the portraitof de-monopolization in the political sphere, which has been able to achievea significant degree of liberalization, we should continue to advocate this as afactor in the transformation that permits liberalization and equalization in theother sectors. A transition to democracy that focuses on liberalization ofpolitics must be advocated further, especially by promoting opportunities inthe political sphere and the role of civil society in embarking on de-monopolization efforts in the economic sector, which are becoming anincreasing challenge for the future of Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

Notes1. See Diamond (2010, 25).2. He compared Indonesia with Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Mongolia.3. Diamond (2010) and Liddle and Mujani (quoted in Diamond 2010) concluded that

Indonesian democracy is essentially consolidated based on the argument that: a) on

128 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2011behavior, no political group is currently threatening to remove democracy or leave thestate of Indonesia; b) on attitude, there is relatively substantial support for democracyas the best form of government; c) on the level of constitutional commitment, keypolitical and social actors are committed to resolving disputes and pursuing theirinterests through a constitutional process, i.e., in a non-violent way.

4. Aspinall (quoted in Aspinall and Mietzner 2010) quoted several experts, namelyRobinson and Hadiz and Boudreau, who say that Indonesian democracy is onlyartificial. He also quotes Ramage and MacIntre who say that Indonesian democracyas having been consolidated. Finally, he places Davidson and himself at the middle.

5. In Freedom House’s 2011 assessment of freedom in the world, Indonesia receivedscores of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil rights on a scale of 1-7, where 1 is the mostfree and 7 is the least free.

6. See DEMOS (n.d., 19-21). The four key tools of democracy contain thirty-twodemocracy tools.

7. The Indonesian Democracy Index was developed by Bappenas together with severalexperts. This index has three variables: Civil Rights, Political Rights and DemocracyInstitutes. See UNDP (2011).

ReferencesAlisyahbana, Armida S. 2011. Foreword. In Measuring Democracy in Indonesia:

Indonesian Democracy Index 2009. Published by UNDP. Indonesia: UNDP.Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner. 2010. “Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia:

An Overview.” In Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds., Problems ofDemocratisation in Indonesia; Elections, Institutions and Society, 1-20. Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Bayuni, Endy M. 2011. “Indonesia Risks Downgrade of its Democratic Rating.” TheJakarta Post. Accessed August 22, 2011. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/08/20/indonesia-risks-downgrade-its-democratic-rating.html.

DASMI (Democracy and Social Movements Institute). 2010. The Asian DemocracyIndex: A Short Guide. Presentation at the 2010 Seoul Democracy Index Forum andWorkshop, Sungkonghoe University, Seoul, Korea, October 14-15.

Diamond, Larry. 2010. Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy. In Edward Aspinall andMarcus Mietzner, eds., Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia; Elections, Institutionsand Society, 53-74. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Economist Intelligence Unit. 2010. Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat.Accessed August 22, 2011. http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf.

Freedom House. 2011. Freedom in the World 2011. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2011.

Gie, Kwik Kian. 1990. Konglomerat Indonesia: Permasalahan dan Sepak Terjangnya(Indonesian Conglomerates: Problems and Dynamics). Jakarta: Sinar Harapan.

DEMOS (Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies). n.d. SatuDekade Reformasi: Maju dan Mundurnya Demokrasi di Indonesia–RingkasanEksekutif dan Laporan Awal Survei Nasional Kedua: Masalah dan Pilihan Demokrasidi Indonesia (2007-2008) (A Decade of Reform: Advances and Setbacks in Democracyin Indonesia–Executive Summary and Preliminary Report on Second National Surveyon Issues and Choices for Democracy in Indonesia [2007-2008]). Jakarta: DEMOS.

129PRADJASTO, IRWANSYAH, ARDIANSA, AND OTHERSMuhtadi, Burhanuddin. n.d. Unpublished notes. Presented at “Democracy and Its

Measurements: A Problem,” organized by the Indonesian Community for Democracy(Komunitas Indonesia untuk Demokrasi/KID), Jakarta, Indonesia, August 9, 2011.

UNDP (United Nations Development Program). 2011. Measuring Democracy inIndonesia: Indonesian Democracy Index 2009. Indonesia: UNDP.

Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. The Threat of Oligarchy and the Future of Indonesian Politics.Presentation at a discussion organized by the Society for Democracy Education(Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi), Jakarta, Indonesia, June 1.

The CADI Asian Democracy Index:2011 Country Report – The Philippines

MIGUEL PAOLO P. REYES, CLARINDA LUSTERIO BERJA,MA. CELINE ANASTASIA P. SOCRATES

IntroductionShortly after it was approached by the Democracy and Social MovementsInstitute (DaSMI) of Sungkonghoe University in August 2010 to conductthe Asian Democracy Index (ADI) project in the Philippines, the Universityof the Philippines Third World Studies Center (TWSC) found itself—inkeeping with its orientation as a critical social science research center—questioning the fundamentals of the ADI initiative. What exactly was“Asian” democracy? With the project’s quantitative-qualitative approach tomeasuring Asian democracy, how would consolidation/aggregation issuescropping up from the diversity of data be addressed? How was this ADIdifferent from similarly named democracy indices?1

These issues were tackled in discussions over the next few months untilJune 2011, bringing the ADI project closer to what it aims to be—a meansof comprehending, thereafter prognosticating the state of Asiandemocratization. The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index (CADI)defines democratization as a process of politico-socioeconomic de-monopolization that unfolded following the collapse of an oligarchicauthoritarian regime (CADI 2011, 6-8). The TWSC also saw the ADIproject as yet another endeavor consistent with its long engagement in thestudy of democratic governance. Moreover, the research team for the pilottesting of the ADI—also the authors of this text—took a liking to the thought

____________________________________________________________Miguel Paolo P. Reyes is a university research associate at the Third World Studies Center,College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman. ClarindaLusterio Berja is an assistant professor at the Political Science Program of the College of Artsand Sciences, University of the Philippines-Manila. Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Socrates isa teaching associate at the Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences andPhilosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman.


135REYES, BERJA, SOCRATES

of participating in a project that seeks to analyze our progress towards

democracy from the perspective of “insiders”—similar to one of the aims of

other evaluations of democracy in Asia. The ADI, however, adopted a

different evaluative system, and does not claim to be a(nother) means of

ranking democracies. We believe that the ADI can eventually become a

reliable tool for describing how our country is progressing towards democracy.

Democratization in the Philippines in Brief

Before we delve into a discussion of the first ADI survey in TWSC’s home

country, a brief history lesson is necessary. The Philippines is often touted as

the first democracy in Asia, a claim given credence by the fact that it was one

of the first Asian nations to have democratically elected government officials.

The word “democracy” has, since those early days of diffusion of political

power, been bandied about by Filipinos either as a characterization of the

nation or as an ideal yet to be achieved. According to the country’s current

(1987) constitution, the Philippines is a “democratic and republican state

[wherein sovereignty] resides in the people and all government authority

emanates from them” (Section 1, Article II). The overt affirmation that it is

a democratic state, further elaborated by the succeeding statement that the

Philippine sovereign is the Philippine citizenry, serves as an expression of a

fervent desire to democratize despite the numerous obstacles that have faced

Filipino democrats. According to Nolledo, “[as] a democratic State, the

Government must not be authoritarian, thus manifesting the people’s desire

to be freed from dictatorship” (1992, 6). That affirmation is the product of

a national trauma, as will be explained further.

The Philippines was formally declared independent from the United

States of America (U.S.) in 1946, ending the nation’s centuries-long existence

under the rule of foreign sovereigns—over 300 years under Spain, over forty

years under U.S. rule, as well as a little in excess of two years under Japan

during the Second World War. The country thereafter followed the U.S.

model; popular elections were the means through which the sovereign

Philippine citizenry elevated their members to seats in the legislature or to

non-appointive executive positions. The country’s 1935 Constitution, which

was in force during the first few decades of the country’s existence as a

sovereign nation-state, stated that the Philippines is a “republican state”

(Section 1, Article II).

Come 1972, as the conclusion of his second elected term in office drew

near, the country’s sixth post-liberation chief executive, President Ferdinand

Marcos, placed the entire nation under martial law, ostensibly in response to

136 PHILIPPINE COUNTRY REPORT 2011

“[national] decline and demoralization, social and economic deterioration,

[and] anarchy and rebellion”—catastrophes allegedly brought about by

members of the country’s communist party (Marcos 1977, 154). In 1973, a

hurriedly (and undemocratically) ratified constitution granting Marcos a

legal basis for indefinitely ruling over the country as dictator came into force.

Again, Section 1, Article II of this constitution referred to the Philippines as

a “republican state” only.

Marcos’s authoritarian regime would last for fourteen years, during

which he took control of public utilities, the media, and numerous other

businesses and industries. Numerous human rights violations—typically

against Marcos’s opponents, committed by members of the armed forces—

were committed during the Marcos dictatorship. Corruption was also

extensive during the martial law regime, with Marcos uninhibitedly dipping

his hands into the government treasury to finance his and his wife’s luxurious

lifestyle. He was overthrown a few years after the assassination of key

opposition figure Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. in 1983; with the

February 1986 uprising—known as the “People Power” or “EDSA”2

Revolution—began the continuing process of (re)democratization in the

country.

After the 1986 revolution, Marcos fled the Philippines and became an

exile in the nation that once backed him as an enemy of the Third World

communist tide—the U.S. Corazon Aquino subsequently took the reins of

government. Aquino was Ninoy Aquino’s widow, and, according to one

election watchdog, the winner of the presidency in the 1986 “Snap” Election

called by Marcos when the legitimacy of his regime began to speedily

crumble. Under her administration, the 1973 Constitution was succeeded by

the popular referendum-ratified 1987 “People’s” Constitution. The latter

constitution contains numerous safeguards to ensure that a Marcos-like

regime never recurs; it is but natural that such a decidedly anti-authoritarian

constitution states that the Philippines is both a republican and democratic

state in its declaration of state principles and policies.

Aquino’s administration was followed by two democratically elected

administrations, namely, those of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) and Joseph

Estrada (1998-2001). Ramos was a former military officer and an Aquino

ally; the populist Estrada was a former movie actor affiliated with Marcos.

Ramos built upon the gains of Aquino; Estrada shared Marcos’s fondness for

self-enrichment. Due to allegations of massive corruption, Estrada was

ousted in an uprising that has been dubbed by mainstream media as “EDSA

2.” There are still debates among scholars on whether Estrada’s ouster was

indeed the result of a popular uprising, or whether it was primarily a takeover


a few months after “EDSA 2” as a result of Estrada’s arrest for plundering thenation’s coffers. That last “EDSA revolt,” a movement by Estrada’s supporters,was unsuccessful, in that neither was Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s governmentoverthrown nor was Estrada released from detention.

After one term as Estrada’s successor by default, Arroyo was given sixmore years in the presidency via the 2004 General Elections. Within her morethan nine years in office, there were attempts by certain members of themilitary to oust her, but all were unsuccessful. Allegations of corruption andelection fraud were also insufficient to unseat President Arroyo, who was fondof using her police powers to impose “states of rebellion/emergency” tocombat or keep at bay her more vocal detractors.

Constitutionally barred from seeking another term, Arroyo steppeddown in 2010, giving way to Senator Benigno Aquino III, the son of formerPresident and recently deceased Corazon Aquino and former Sen. NinoyAquino. By positioning himself as a leader who will lead his countrymendown the “straight path” (matuwid na daan) towards democracy, supposedlyfollowing in the footsteps of his venerated mother and father, Aquino won asignificant majority of votes over his opponents in the 2010 General Elections.The current President Aquino is largely engaging his people in finding waysto “clean up” the government, as well as in helping him deliver on hiscampaign promise to jail Arroyo for her alleged wrongdoings.

It is in this milieu that in-house and affiliate researchers of TWSCconducted an ADI survey, in accordance with the following methodology.

Data and Methods

Sampling of RespondentsThe TWSC generated a long list of experts (which serves as the samplingframe of the survey3) in three fields of expertise, namely, politics, economy,and civil society. The list includes experts from the academe;nongovernmental/civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs); and the privatesector, members of which are not affiliated with the government or anyacademic institution, nor are primarily affiliated with NGOs/CSOs. Theexperts were categorized according to their ideological leanings. They weredesignated by members of the research team as either “(extreme) left-leftleaning” (L-LL) or “(extreme) right-right leaning” (R-RL). The originalideological delineations proposed by the project initiators—i.e., liberal,moderate, and conservative—were found to be inapplicable to the Philippines,given that primary self-identification using these labels is largely unheard of


in the country, while one often hears of the left and the right battling in variousarenas of Philippine society.

In classifying whether a respondent is L-LL or R-RL, the research teammade the following assumptions: 1) those who are known (by their reputations,publications, etc.) to exhibit critical or dissenting opinions against thePhilippine government and its policies, and are at the same time avowedlysupportive of “socialist” socioeconomic policies are left-left leaning; 2)those who have worked for the Philippine government, either in thebureaucracy or as consultants, and/or subscribe to the government’s“neoliberal” socioeconomic policies are right-right leaning. We have yet toencounter anyone who can rightly be called an expert informant who is largelycritical of the Philippine government (not just a certain administration) yetdoes not prefer socialist (or “socialist,” e.g., welfare state-style expenditures)alternatives to neoliberalism; meanwhile, the few experts who can be classifiedas belonging to the extreme right are more critical of specific administrationsthan the Philippine government after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship.However, there exists the possibility that there are experts who were notconsidered by the research team who fail to fall under the categories described.In any case, the categorization primarily serves, as per the ADI guidebook,to “secure objectivity” (CADI 2011, 36); experts also include people who areformer self-designated Marxists, who are now pushing for non-socialist (onecan daresay “neoliberal”) economic reforms, and left-left leaning journalists.

A sample of twenty-seven experts was chosen from a long list to answerthe survey instrument using stratified multistage purposive sampling. Tocome up with this sample, the long list of potential respondents was firstdivided into three groups based on the three institutional affiliation categories.Next, experts were classified according to their field of expertise. Thus, nine

Table 1: Respondent Profile Field Affiliation NO. of L-LL NO. of R-RL Politics Academe 0 3 NGO/CSO 0 3 Private Sector 3 0 Economy Academe 0 3 NGO/CSO 3 0 Private Sector 0 3 Civil Society Academe 3 0 NGO/CSO 3 0 Private Sector 2 1


groups/sectors of experts were formed (e.g., political experts from theacademe, economic experts from NGOs/CSOs, and so on). Lastly, theideological affiliation of the experts was assigned by the research team. Thecomplete respondent profile according to field of expertise, institutionalaffiliation, and ideological leanings can be found in table 1.

While the Philippine researchers wanted each sector to have a 2-1 or 1-2 mix of L-LL and R-RL respondents, such an ideal mix proved untenable,as 1) some of the field-specific sectors were not found to have any prominentmembers who belonged to one ideological leaning (the right-right leaningindividual primarily identified with NGOs/CSOs is a rare breed; the left-leftleaning economist in the academe is equally difficult to find), or 2) individualswho would have made a field-specific sector more diverse refused orconstructively declined to participate in the survey.

Geographic CoverageThe survey includes experts nationwide. Specifically, it includes experts fromthe country’s major island groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Manila,the capital of the country and the seat of the national government, is locatedin Luzon. Taking into consideration the possibility of differences in citizens’perception of democratization depending on their distance from the capital,the research team decided to ensure that at least two experts in each of the fieldsof expertise were rooted in and were strongly identified with localities inVisayas and Mindanao.

Data CollectionSelf-administered questionnaires—one for each of the fields of expertise—developed by DaSMI were the study instruments, as constraints in distance,time, and resources made it difficult for the researchers to conduct face-to-face interviews. The phrasing of the questions and explanatory notes in thequestionnaire were revised to be more easily appreciated by Filipinos. Thequestionnaires were either emailed to the target respondents or were handedto them personally. The experts were given a week to inform TWSC of theirwillingness to participate in the survey. This gave TWSC sufficient time toquickly select other experts from the long list in case some experts in the shortlist refused to take part in the survey. Those who agreed to participate weregiven one week to return the accomplished instrument given to them.

All experts were asked to indicate their responses to questions in thesurvey instruments using a scale of 0-10. Their ratings may describe theirlevel of satisfaction/dissatisfaction about a certain situation, or their estimate


of a level of influence and control, among others. They were also asked to giveexplanatory comments to their ratings as they saw fit.

To ensure a modicum of objectivity among the respondents, in many ofthe explanatory notes to survey questions, the experts were advised to refer tointernational development indicators, notably the United NationsDevelopment Program’s Human Development Index,4 to assist them ingiving their ratings.

Schedule of Data Collection and AnalysisIn early June 2011, gathering of resources for the study’s review of relatedliterature started, concurrent with the initiation of the finalized surveyinstruments’ “localization.” Both these preparatory activities ended in lateJuly 2011. Members of the project staff agreed on the grouped long list ofexpert informants in late July 2011. Data collection began in early August2011 and ended in late September 2011. Processing the data took place fromlate September 2011 to mid-November 2011.

Difficulties in Data Collection Over 70 invitations to potential respondents were sent out. The refusal ratewas 64 percent. Some invitees either declined to participate in the project ordid not reply to our invitations despite constant follow-ups. While most ofthose who agreed to take part in the project returned their filled outquestionnaires immediately, some pushed their deadlines or decided to dropout of the project. The difficulty in gathering responses is largely attributableto the frequent holidays during the data collection period. Some of theseholidays were calendared beforehand, while the others were due to successivetyphoons. The fact that it was “midterm season” also made it difficult for someof the members of the academe with teaching duties to comply with the one-week deadline.

Analytical MethodAccording to CADI, there are two primary principles of democracy:liberalization, which refers to how a “monopoly of resources is de-integratedin the procedural level,” or the level of autonomy achieved from the monopolycomplex (CADI 2011, 11); and equalization, the principle that concerns theevaluation of how well agents are moving towards achieving socially justresource distribution (CADI 2011, 11). Liberalization is broken down intothe subprinciples autonomy and competition, while equalization is broken


down into the subprinciples pluralization and solidarity. The subprinciplesare further explained in the results and analysis sections of this text.

In accordance with the theoretical frame stated above, the country ADIwill be obtained by determining the mean of the mean scores for theliberalization principle and the equalization principle. The score for theliberalization principle is the mean of the across-the-fields mean scores forthe autonomy and competition subprinciples, while the score for theequalization principle is the mean of the across-the-fields mean scores for thepluralization and solidarity subprinciples. The field democracy indices,which are obtained by getting the across-the-subprinciples mean scoresunder each field, will also be computed. Lastly, the liberalization andequalization scores for each field will be obtained. The latter are calculatedby getting the average of (field autonomy + field competition) and (fieldpluralization + field solidarity) for each field. Further information about theabove relationships between the principles, subprinciples, and the fields ofexpertise and the number of items/indicators and indices/questions per fieldand per principle can be found in The CADI ADI Guidebook (CADI 2011).

The analysis of the numerical ratings is coupled with a thematic analysisof the comments given by the experts. Some of the comments were ratingjustifications using objective measures. Others were explanatory commentsdrawn from the experts’ personal experiences/knowledge. As stated in theguidebook, these comments help to “[overcome] the limitations of quantitative[evaluation,] as the [comments as] rationales [will] help [the analysts to]better understand the specific meanings of each answer and conditions of eachcountry” (CADI 2011, 37).

Results of the 2011 CADI ADI Survey in the Philippines

Indices of DemocracyTable 2 summarizes the estimates derived from the results of the 2011 CADIADI survey in the Philippines.

The succeeding discussion describes in detail the ratings and theexplanatory comments of the respondents per item.

Autonomy in PoliticsThe political autonomy subprinciple measures “how independent citizensare from government or political groups.” (CADI 2011, 13). It includes thefollowing: “degree of state violence [Q1], [civil liberties] [Q2], freedom


to organize political groups and undertake political action [Q3], and thedegree of freedom for political opposition [Q4]” (CADI 2011, 13).

In table 3, Q1 yielded the lowest mean score for autonomy (5.9).Although many experts believe that the incidence of violence is diminishing,there is nevertheless a consensus among respondents that extrajudicialkillings still present a significant problem, differing in extent in the variousregions of the archipelago. According to two respondents, one specificlocation where there is a high incidence of extrajudicial killings is Mindanao,wherein, according to the aforementioned experts, there is a laxity in the ruleof law. A specific instance that would demonstrate this, as related by oneexpert, is the 2009 Maguindanao massacre, which involved the killing ofjournalists and civilians as they accompanied the family of a local politicianin filing for a certificate of candidacy in the 2010 elections. The crime isattributed to the Ampatuans, a powerful political family in Maguindanao.

The comments given by majority of the respondents in their response toQ2 reflect their perception that there is a considerable degree of civicfreedom in the country; indeed, the scores for this item range from 5 to 9, withthe mean score at a relatively high 7.6. However, there is also consensus thatthe grant and protection of civic freedoms can still be improved. Onerespondent pointed out the absence of an official recognition of the “right toshelter.” Another respondent highlighted the need for the government toimprove its responsiveness to the demands of the citizenry.

While one respondent pointed out the possible constraint on “freedomof assembly” posed by the necessity of acquiring permits from localgovernments in order to conduct rallies, all the respondents gave high scoresfor Q3 (range: 6 to 9, mean: 8.0). One respondent even remarked thatFilipinos enjoy “too much freedom.” Much cynicism, however, was expressedby the respondents as regards the quality of political groups formed. This islargely because of the unseemly vested interests of many of those who formor head these groups.

Table 3: Item Scores for Autonomy in Politics

Politics Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Q1 5.9 6.0 4.0 8.0 Q2 7.6 8.0 5.0 9.0 Q3 8.0 8.0 6.0 9.0

Q4 8.0 8.0 7.0 10.0

Autonomy 7.4


Q4 likewise received high scores from all respondents. No score lowerthan 7 were given. One respondent even gave a score of 10, indicating that shebelieves that the degree of freedom for political opposition in the Philippinesis very high. There is a consensus that opposition is generally allowed in lawand in fact. However, the existence of militant opposition groups has createdoccasions for the government to resort to violence in order to regulate thesegroups. Moreover, one respondent observed that the existence of a radicalopposition has had the effect of polarizing sides and reducing the publicsphere for debate. One respondent also highlighted the role of money in thelack of party loyalty in congress.

Competition in PoliticsPolitical competition, a measure of the ability of the a country’s politicalsystem to “establish a self-reference system” (CADI 2011, 15), is measuredin table 4 in terms of “expansion of universal suffrage [Q5], state efficiency[Q6], existence of non-elected supreme power [Q7], the rule of law [Q8],fair and competitive elections [Q9], and transparency [Q10]” (CADI2011, 15).

The mean score is highest in Q5. The respondents agree that there areno formal limitations to suffrage. However, there is dissatisfaction among therespondents on the extent of citizen participation, particularly because ofissues such as “warlordism,” an apathetic citizenry, vote-buying, and theinefficiency of the country’s election system.

Another indicator of competition is the efficiency in implementinggovernment policies (Q6). This was given a relatively low mean score of 4.7.In the survey, the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the inefficientbureaucracy and the existence of corruption within government. However,one respondent was optimistic about the possibility of improvements in thisarea in the future, especially considering the role played by a “vigilant and freemedia” and a “climate for redressing and reporting wrongs.”

When asked about the extent of political power of nonelected groups(Q7), the respondents gave an average score of 3.7, representing highinfluence of nonelected groups on elected officials.5 Although one respondentasserted there is low influence among lobby groups, the rest had a consensusthat there are several non-elected actors who are able to permeate governmentthrough electoral funding of their candidates. One respondent refers to themas “big business, big religion, big media.” Religious groups such as theRoman Catholic Church, El Shaddai (a charismatic movement within theRoman Catholic Church), and the Iglesia ni Cristo sect influence government


to the extent that they are able to influence their constituents’ electoralchoices.

When asked whether “rule of law” is established in the country, therespondents likewise gave a relatively low rating (4.8). Although there is onerespondent who gave an unexplained numerical rating of 9, the rest of therespondents agree on the perception that the powerful elite are exempted fromthe rule of law. This is aggravated by the existence of extensive corruption inthe judiciary.

In terms of having fair elections in the Philippines, the respondents gavea moderate rating (5.4). Two respondents had positive things to say aboutPhilippine electoral laws, with one characterizing them as “excellent” and theother as “voluminous.” All respondents believed that these laws are poorlyimplemented, decrying the role of powerful elites in influencing the selectionof candidates. Other negative aspects of Philippine elections mentioned bythe respondents include the weak political party system, electoral fraud, andthe lack of transparency in the Commission on Elections. One respondentdescribed a bright spot in all that negativity, highlighting the increase inelection efficiency resulting from the use of precinct count optical scanmachines in the 2010 General Elections—a first in Philippine electionhistory.

Generally, the political experts do not think there is transparency ofoperations of government agencies. In this aspect, numerical ratings rangefrom 2 to 6, with a mean of 4.2. There is a general dissatisfaction among therespondents with regard to the inefficient bureaucracy, particularly in relationto the lack of transparency due to the absence of a “freedom of information”law. Government operations were also considered as “graft-ridden.” Theexamples given by one respondent are the NBN-ZTE deal (a contract

Table 4: Item Scores for Political Competition


Q5 6.9 7.0 4.0 9.0 Q6 4.7 5.0 2.0 7.0 Q7 3.7 3.0 1.0 9.0 Q8 4.8 5.0 3.0 9.0

Q9 5.4 5.0 4.0 8.0 Q10 4.2 4.0 2.0 6.0

Competition 5.0


between the Philippines and a telecommunications company from China),the Fertilizer Scam, and the helicopters bought during the administration ofPresident Arroyo.

Pluralization in Politics“Political pluralization shows how evenly political power is distributed”(CADI 2011, 17). In table 5, it is measured by four items: “independenceand check and balance between state power apparatuses [Q11], powerdistribution in the parliament [or congress (Q12)], political representation[Q13], and democratization of government bodies [Q14]” (CADI 2011,17).

The mean score for Q11—which is concerned with the maintenance ofchecks and balances in government—is 5.3. Although the respondents agreeon the existence of legal checks and balances among the three branches ofgovernment (executive, legislative, and judiciary), the respondents also agreethat checks and balances are ineffective because the executive exercisescontrol/influence over the legislative branch. The judiciary was characterizedas “subservient” and “polarized” at times. One respondent noted the lack ofsynergy between the legislature and the judiciary.

The same observations were reported in terms of equal distribution ofpower within the legislature (Q12’s concern) where the mean score is 5.2.Although two respondents find no problem with the distribution of power inthe legislature, the rest of the experts who gave comments highlighted theabsence of party subsidies and the absence of a formal party system, which hasresulted in the dependence of members of the House of Representatives ona funding system referred to as “pork barrel,” which these officials acquire byshifting allegiances to the party in power.

The mean score for Q13, which deals with representation of varioussocial groups in the legislature, is only 4.8, with scores ranging from 3 to 7.

Table 5: Item Scores for Political Plurality Politics Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Q11 5.3 5.0 4.0 7.0

Q12 5.2 4.0 3.0 10.0

Q13 4.8 5.0 3.0 7.0

Q14 5.0 5.0 3.0 6.0

Pluralization 5.1


In the survey, the respondents agree on the lack of representation in thelegislature, which is vastly dominated by the political elite from variousdistricts in the country. The party-list system is perceived by the respondentsas ineffective in representing various sectors in society because it is dominatedby special interest groups.

The collective score for the item on fairness and rationality of governmentagencies in implementing policies (Q14) is also fairly low (5.0). While about42 percent of the respondents commented positively on this matter, theexperts all agree that not all institutions conduct fair implementation ofpolicies. About 14 percent of the respondents observed that policies ofnational scope are fairly implemented, but much improvement is needed withregard to the implementation of local policies. Another respondent observed,“regulatory capture is prevalent.” Lastly, about 28 percent of the respondentscommented on the inefficiency of public hearings in terms of integrating theinput of the citizens into the actual policies.

Solidarity in PoliticsSolidarity in the political field refers to the willingness of citizens to challengepower disparity and the implementation of institutional measures thataddress political power distribution (CADI 2011, 19). In table 6, it ismeasured using four items: “institutional measures for and the degree of[citizens’] participation [Q15], affirmative actions [Q16], public confidencein the existing democracy [Q17], and public confidence in democracy anddemocratic values [Q18]” (CADI 2011, 19).

The experts gave a collective score of 7.3 for Question 15, which is oncitizen’s participation in political decision-making. There is consensus

Table 6: Item Scores for Political Solidarity


Q15 7.3 7.0 5.0 9.0 Q16 5.4 5.0 2.0 8.0

Q17 6.4 6.0 4.0 9.0 Q18 4.8 5.0 3.0 7.0

Q19 8.0 8.0 6.0 9.0

Solidarity 6.4


among the respondents that there is a high degree of public awareness andvoters’ turnout during elections. However, public participation in decision-making is still limited to elections.

When asked how well they think affirmative action programs areestablished and implemented (Q16), scores given were from 2 to 8, with theaverage score being 5.4. According to the respondents, there are legalprovisions that forward the protection of women, children, and persons withdisabilities, though one respondent asserted that no special laws exist for thesecitizens.

In Q17, which concerns public trust in the government (understood torefer either to trust in the executive or the current administration), the meanscore is 6.4 (range: 4 to 9). Although one respondent asserted that there is ahigh degree of cynicism towards government, the rest have observed thatpublic trust towards the present administration is greater relative to publictrust towards the previous one.

In the item concerning public trust in the legislature (Q18), the scoresvaried from 3 to 7, yielding an average score of 4.8. As can be gleaned fromthe data, the perceptions of respondents differ on this matter. One respondentstated that the current congress enjoys a positive trust rating. Anotherrespondent observed that this trust is mixed with reservations. The restcommented that the citizens see Congress as corrupt.

Lastly, the data reveals that there is high public trust in democracy. Whenasked “How much do you think the public trusts democracy?” (in Q19), thescores range from 6 to 9. The mean score is 8, indicating that the respondentsare in agreement that the citizenry at large still prefers democracy over otherpolitical systems despite its flaws. Two respondents noted that the traumabrought about by living under a dictatorial regime (under President Marcos)has made democracy the ideal political system for the majority of Filipinos.

Autonomy in EconomyEconomic autonomy refers to the existence of institutions that protecteconomic entities from undue interference (CADI 2011, 21). In table 7, itis measured using three items: “freedom for political power [Q1], protectionof labor rights [Q2 and Q3], and external autonomy for policy making[Q4]” (CADI 2011, 21).

When asked how much influence the government or political elites haveon the operation of private companies (Q1), the ratings given were low (highinfluence) to moderate (range: 2 to 5) with an average score of 3.7.6 Surveyrespondents explained that in the Philippines, politicians/bureaucrats andprivate companies are closely tied. However, it was pointed out that it is more


likely that private companies influence government or the political elites, andnot the other way around. They added, “[political] activities are not completelyindependent from the economically powerful and big private interestssystematically influence policy-making in their interest.”It was also mentionedthat some of the political elite ascended to their positions because they ownand control land holdings/land resources, large-scale business assets, other(valuable) properties, and other (major) financial resources. It was observedthat those in the upper economic tier enter politics and eventually influencepolicies.

The respondents were also asked if they think labor rights are guaranteedin the country. The question, Q2, is designed to measure how well labor rightsare institutionalized and legally guaranteed. It considers, as stated in theexplanatory note in the questionnaire, the protection of three primary laborrights—freedom of union organizing, collective bargaining, and collectiveaction—and whether law restricts labor rights of public officials, teachersand soldiers. To this question the experts responded by providing ratings thatrange from 3 to 9.The average rating is 5.8. Only one expert gave a high ratingof 9 points in this item, arguing that “Philippine laws fully guarantee laborrights, both for workers in the private and public sectors.” Other expertsexplained that while labor laws that protect the workers do exist, there alsoexist means to circumvent the law. In fact, given the “exiting” law, it wouldbe difficult for an employer to terminate the services or layoff regular workers.This is the reason there is a “proliferation of non-regular workers” or“contractualization” in the Philippines. Further, it was expounded, “therights are very much written-up in [law, but they are] very much subvertedin practice with ‘invisible’ but systematic union-busting and trade unionrepression.” Moreover, a respondent related how national figures indicatelow and decreasing levels of union organizing, collective bargainingagreements, and collective action, which correlate with the last decade or so

Table 7: Item Scores for Economic Autonomy

Economy Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Q1 3.7 3.0 2.0 5.0 Q2 5.8 6.0 3.0 9.0 Q3 5.9 6.0 4.0 8.0

Q4 4.9 4.0 2.0 8.0

Autonomy 5.1


of systematic state-sponsored human rights violations and political repression.Thus, there is a collective agreement that while the country has good laborlaws, implementation is limited, and, according to one expert, “has becomepractically [useless,]especially in the industrial regions and industrial-technology parks where contractualization, and even outsourcing, havebecome [the norm].”

The succeeding question, Q3, refers to protection of workers againstforced labor and child labor. It also considers the government’s commitmentto international labor conventions. The respondents gave an average ratingof 5.9 (range: 4 to 8) to prohibition of forced and child labor in thePhilippines, where both forced and child labor are legally prohibited.Unfortunately, as the survey respondents have indicated, implementation islimited to the urban areas; as one respondent stated, in the rural areas, thereare documented cases of abuses in the agricultural-business sector wheremany rural landless workers and children are employed to undertake cropmaintenance and heavy harvesting activities (i.e., banana, sugar, pineapples,palm oil/ oil palm, coconut) in plantations. Another respondent added thatthe guarantee of protection of workers from forced labor and child laborcomes less from the government per se and more from the norms of society.

The survey also looked into how the government policymaking processis independent from foreign capital and states. Q4 probed into key Philippineindustries, surfacing whether or not they are dominated by domestic capital.The range of ratings provided in this item is very wide, with a minimum scoreof 2 and a maximum score of 8. The mean score is 4.9. Those that gave a lowscore explained that “[government] has never been ‘independent’ frommainly U.S. capital and business systems.” Further, another respondentdescribed the Philippines as being “more independent of foreign interventionbut less independent of ideologies that adhere to finance [capitalism,] i.e.,policy makers and ‘experts’ independently adhere [to] and boxed into

Table 8: Item Scores for Economic Competition


Q5 4.4 4.0 3.0 7.0 Q6 4.3 4.0 3.0 8.0 Q7 5.2 5.0 3.0 8.0

Q8 4.6 5.0 2.0 7.0

Competition 4.6


neoclassical ideology.” It was also pointed out that “[in] a country withlimited resources, foreign capital as a funding source is part of policy[decisions; government] uses foreign capital to build needed infrastructureand expand social services.”

Competition in EconomyEconomic competition refers to the condition where the economic sector is“independent from government or the governing power,” while it “establishestransparent and fair principles” (CADI 2011, 23). In table 8, it is measuredin terms of the following: “economic transparency [Q5], fairness of theeconomy [Q6], government responsibilities [Q7], and corporateresponsibilities [Q8]” (CADI 2011, 23).

The survey respondents provided low to moderate rating to transparencyof corporate operations (range is from 3 to 7), the subject of Q5. The meanrating is 4.4. According to one of the respondents, “[corporate] transparencyis too limited.” Another respondent noted that it is difficult to give facts unlessit is gathered through research. Another respondent observed: “[corporate]governance in terms of protecting insiders [i.e., the main family owners] isalmost perfect but it is weak in terms of protecting outsiders [i.e., smallinvestors].” Lastly, a respondent mentioned that there is a strong move ofNGOs to improve governance in the private sector.

Responses to the question about fair competition between companies(Q6) revealed varied scores that ranged from 3 to 8. One respondent arguedthat there is no competitive law and that oligarchy characterizes manystrategic sectors. To add, another respondent mentioned that only the “bigfour is representing the oil industry” namely: Shell, Petron, Caltex, andMobil.Another respondent also pointed out the lack of detailed informationon how the regulatory and supervisory bodies perform their tasks in ensuringfree competition among private companies.

In terms of government effort to protect and guarantee labor rights,probed by Q7, a wide variation of scores is likewise observed. This isexplained by the high rating provided by one respondent who justified his highrating by citing the existence of the National Tripartite Industrial Councilfor labor protection and welfare in the Philippines. On the other hand, it waspointed out that laws that protect workers exist but there are also loopholesin the law. As mentioned earlier, there is increasing proliferation of non-regular/contractual workers who are not protected by provisions of the law.There is also a perception that the government exerts low effort in makingsure that labor rights are protected. There is also an observation that the


government is more interested in the so-called public and private setups,which could only lead to government entities giving up their tasks and rolesto private companies that have only a low interest in the labor sector’s needsand requirements.

In Q8, concerning the compliance of private corporations with laborlaws, the divergence of ratings is evident, with scores ranging from 2 to 7. Arespondent argued that “[private] companies, by [their] very nature and rolein the capital-inclined social [systems,] will never work to protect laborrights. Further, it was mentioned, “there are some companies [that] out ofsheer social responsibility take care of their workers, but there are others thatexplicitly exploit [their workers] within bounds of the law.” Anotherrespondent observed differences in compliance to law by size of the company.He argued that “[small] and medium-sized companies are not as strict inabiding by relevant laws and regulations.”

Pluralization in EconomyEconomic pluralization refers to the “fair distribution of economic resourcesleading to both economic and socio-political democratization” (CADI2011, 25). In table 9, the following items measure it: “economic monopoly[Q9], regional disparity [Q10], income inequality [Q11], asset disparity[Q12], and employment inequality [Q13]” (CADI 2011, 25)7.

The respondents seem to agree that dominant groups monopolize theeconomy. The mean score for Q9 is 2.6.8 It was argued that “[historically,the Philippine economy is] very much monopolized by dominant groups inthe Philippines.” Another respondent said that in the Philippines, “mostlarge industries have concentrated market power.” Another respondentadded that competition in the economy only exists among the tycoons.

Table 9: Item Scores for Economic Pluralization


Q9 2.6 2.0 1.0 6.0 Q10 1.9 2.5 0.0 3.0

Q11 1.6 2.0 0.0 3.0 Q12 1.8 1.0 0.0 4.0

Q13 5.0 6.0 0.0 8.0

Pluralization 2.6


Economic disparities among the regions of the country undeniably exist.This is evidenced by the ratings for the item on regional inequality (Q10);the range for ratings in this item is 0 to 3. One observation was that “economicdisparity is reinforced by government’s spending on urbanized regions andalmost neglect of other regions.” Here, the Cotabato provinces in Mindanaowere cited as examples.

Similarly, ratings given on income disparity (Q11; range: 0 to 3 points)are consistent where it is perceived as a serious concern. As one respondentpointed out, this observation is consistent with official statistics that revealthat the Gini coefficient of the Philippines remains at about 0.44.

Like income disparity, asset disparity is also perceived as serious. Datareveals ratings for Q12 ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating that assetdisparity is a very serious problem. One respondent mentioned the case ofMetro Manila, where there is a large and increasing number of informalsettlers (i.e., squatters, illegal occupants). On the other hand, rural areas arealso confronted with land problems. It was argued that agrarian reform andland distribution is almost a total failure. According to one respondent,“around 70 [percent] of the original leaseholders under the program,starting with Marcos’s [Presidential Declaration] 717, has reverted tosharecropping and abandonment of their agricultural lands, which lead to theemergence of a new rural elite sector.”

When asked about the gravity of discrimination in the labor market(Q13), responses were varied. The ratings given had a wide range, with 0 asthe minimum and 8 as the maximum. One respondent mentioned that in thePhilippines, there is a great deal of social mobility because of high rates ofliteracy. Despite this, it was observed by one respondent (an expert from

Table 10: Item Scores on Economic Solidarity


Q14 4.6 4.0 3.0 10.0

Q15 4.6 4.0 2.0 7.0 Q16 4.8 4.0 2.0 8.0 Q17 4.9 5.0 3.0 8.0

Q18 3.7 3.0 2.0 8.0 Q19 4.9 6.0 1.0 10.0 Q20 6.3 6.0 3.0 9.0

Solidarity 4.8


Mindanao) that there are still “discrimination when it comes to hiring ofMuslims, and some other religious [groups,] although this is not comparableto racial discrimination in countries such as Australia, Japan, and even USand Europe.”

Solidarity in EconomyEconomic solidarity refers to how inequality in economic power is intensifiedby the lack of political power among members of society and government’sinability to guarantee equal opportunities (CADI 2011, 27). In table 10, itis measured by four items: “social security [Q14 and Q15], labor unionactivities [Q16, Q17, and Q18], corporate surveillance [Q19], and awarenessof inequality alleviation [Q20]” (CADI 2011, 27).

Differences in perception on whether support systems for the poor areworking in the country (the concern of Q14) were observed. Scores givenranged from 3 to 10. Currently, there is a national conditional cash transfer(CCT) program for the poor, which is part of a more comprehensive socialwelfare program for those living below the poverty line. Pertaining to thisprogram, there is concern about its coverage and period of implementation.One respondent commented: “The [conditional cash transfer program] islarge [in scale] but apparently only temporary.” Another respondentmentioned, “There are stories of success.” However, one respondent arguedthat “[social] insurance is still practically non-existent for the poor.”Consistently, another one commented, “Not much. All are only advertisementsof government agencies, but really [unessential, with] lots of flaws. Localpoliticians controlling [local government units] also control implementationof programs [to the] benefit [of] their supporters.”

When asked how well social insurance programs operate in the country(Q15), they gave low to high scores, ranging from 2 to 7 points, with a meanscore of 4.7. It was pointed out that “the most important provider of socialinsurance in the country is family and that government programs provideminimal relief to households.” Moreover, another respondent argued that“the health insurance coverage as reported by the national health insurancesystem is grossly overstated and belied by national household surveys.”Another respondent pointed out the lack of data to assess whether the socialinsurance programs are doing well. Lastly, an expert indicated the need toimprove targeting of beneficiaries to improve the social insurance program.

The answers to Q16 reveal that there are contending views whether laborunions are well organized. The wide range of ratings, 2 to 8 points, shows this.One respondent mentioned that while they are diminishing in number as awhole, the labor unions that exist are well organized. Another respondent


stated that labor union membership (likely on the average) is only 30 percent.On the other hand, another respondent perceives labor unions to bedisorganized.

Q17, which asked about the influence labor unions have on policies ofthe central government, yielded diverse ratings from the respondents, rangingfrom 3 to 8 points but overall indicating a low level of influence (the meanscore is 4.9). According to one respondent, there is “very little influence (oflabor unions on government policy). Politically inclined labor leaders tendto gain [in] other directions, and do not serve labor organizations’ needs.”It is also worthwhile to note that the level of influence is perceived by at leastone expert as being manifested by the party-list representation in congressthrough the party-list system. Despite this, labor outcomes remain poor. Toadd, labor unions are also represented “in tripartite.”

The experts were also asked Q18: “How much do labor unions participatein the management process in your country?” This question “is designed tomeasure the degree of labor unions’ participation in [corporate] management”(CADI 2011, 28). It incorporates “labor unions’ monitoring of andparticipation in corporate management, including labor-management co-decisionmaking systems [and participation] in the board of directors’meeting” (CADI 2011, 28).The range of ratings given to this item is 2 to 8,indicating a high variance of perception. It is worthwhile to note onecomment that aside from labor unions, there are also labor-managementcouncils in many enterprises to allow participation in corporate management.However, this is only true in the case of some large companies and rarely inmedium- and small-scale industries.

The next question, Q19, is “designed to measure how much the generalpublic is involved in monitoring corporate activities, and its consequences,including consumer rights violation and [environmental] problems” (CADI2011, 28). It deals with “consumer and environment groups and [theassessment of] how effective their activities are, how well consumer protectionlaws are operating, and how proactively the general public are involved in themonitoring process” (CADI 2011, 28).The respondents disagree on howwell public monitoring on corporate activities is being carried out. They gavelow to high scores (range: 1 to 10). Respondents highlighted the active roleof media and consumer unions in monitoring corporate activities. Anotherrespondent pointed out that monitoring of activities of corporations seem tobe available, particularly through the stock exchanges and the Securities andExchange Commission.

The last question on the Philippine economy probed into the enthusiasmof the general public in improving economic inequality in the country. It aims


to capture “public awareness in addressing economic disparities” (CADI2011, 29). “In some cases, such awareness can be represented by active efforts,such as trying to change social systems, and by individual efforts, such asdonations or voluntary activities. It also includes public opinions and actionsabout economic inequality” (CADI 2011, 29).In this item, the respondentsgave low to high ratings ranging from 3 to 9 points. While one respondentgave an unexplained “3,” the other survey respondents mentioned theabundance of corporate social responsibility programs carried out incommunities by large companies and NGO/CSO efforts to lobby for waysto resolve economic inequality in the country.

Autonomy in Civil SocietyCivil society autonomy concerns the freedom of civil society from thegovernment and economy, as well as the ability of citizens to execute suchautonomy (CADI 2011, 29). In table 11, it is measured by four items:“autonomy from [the] government [Q1 and Q2], autonomy from [the]market (Q3), autonomy of the [members] of the society [Q4, Q5, and Q6]and tolerance [Q7]” (CADI 2011, 29).

Q1 under civil society autonomy sought the experts’ opinion on the levelof government interference in citizens’ social activities. The experts gavescores ranging from 3 to 9, with 3 being the only low score given. Therespondents agreed that the government interferes with citizens’ socialactivities through illegal or monopolistic activities, such as media killingsand media control, sustaining what one respondent referred to as the “cultureof impunity.” One respondent, a labor leader, bewailed how the current labor

Table 11: Item Scores for Civil Society Autonomy

Civil Society Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Q1 6.4 7.0 3.0 9.0 Q2 4.5 4.5 0.0 9.0

Q3 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 Q4 3.8 4.0 1.0 5.0

Q5 4.0 4.0 1.0 6.0 Q6 4.6 4.0 1.0 9.0

Q7 5.8 5.0 3.0 8.0

Autonomy 5.6


code, a legacy of the Marcos dictatorship, unduly restricts laborers’ freedomto organize.

Q2 concerns the influence of government-supported NGOs on society.The question was apparently unclear, as some of the experts were unable todetermine what was meant by “government-supported nongovernmentalorganizations”—that, or their response was possibly influenced by a strongbelief in the supposed state-civil society divide. Many of the comments,however, seemed insistent on showing that this divide is either nonexistent,or has been tainted by government co-optation, particularly during theArroyo administration. Scores from 0 to 9 were given; 9, representing lowinfluence, came from a left-left leaning academic, while the 0, representinghigh influence, came from a right-right leaning member of the private sector,the sole R-RL respondent in the civil society field.9

The third question deals with the influence of private companies onsociety, tying up social activities with the activities of major economic powerholders. Low scores were given across the board, ranging from 0 to 2, showingthat the respondents believe that private companies have a very high degreeof influence on society.10 One respondent believed that “corporations, thoughdivided [into] various factions, dominate the agenda setting in the country;”another opined that private sector companies “have significant politicalleverage in the country due to their contribution to the national economy.”As with the first question, many of the respondents cited the strong influenceof power holders (herein large business conglomerates) on the ideallyindependent media.

The experts were then asked, “How well do you think citizens’ basicneeds are met in your country?” Low to moderate ratings were given, rangingfrom 1 to 5. Some of the respondents backed up their ratings with statistics,primarily the country’s poverty incidence. Some respondents also noted thatthe government tries to address problems such as poverty using palliativemeasures, failing to address the structural deficiencies underlying suchproblems.

Question 5, asking the respondents to rate the government’s ability tomeet the needs of vulnerable people, elicited responses similar to the above.The ratings given were from 1 to 6. The experts believed that women andchildren continued to be particularly lacking in the care they require. Oneexpert stated that senior citizen care is improving, while another gave theopinion that economic class stratification within disadvantaged groupsdetermines the level of care received. The existence of legal frameworks forthe care of vulnerable people was cited by some experts alongside the poorimplementation of such laws.


Q6 dealt with the sufficiency of educational opportunities given tocitizens. The ratings for this item were divergent, ranging from 1 to 9.Thehighest rating came from an L-LL categorized member of an NGO, whochampioned the Philippine public education system’s unrestrictive entrymechanisms; this expert, though, like many of the respondents, was dissatisfiedwith the quality of education in the country. One respondent who gave a lowrating linked the failure of the government to provide other necessities tocitizens to the ineffectiveness of educational opportunities in the country;according to him “what’s the use of sending children to school if they don’thave anything to eat?”

The last civil society autonomy question was about the level of respector tolerance among various social/political/cultural groups. Most of theratings were moderate, ranging from 3 to 8. For the majority of the respondents,the most prominent evidence of prejudice between groups in the Philippinesis the Christian–Muslim/indigenous peoples divide. One respondent alsocited the lack of tolerance of the military for affiliates of the Communist Partyof the Philippines, evoking the “commie scare” mentality of the Philippinesoldiery.

Competition in Civil SocietyCompetition in civil society refers to the “self-reference system [of] society,”i.e., voluntary association matters (CADI 2011, 31). Civil society competitionis concerned with how “[social] movements bring social issues to the centerof public discussion, and thereby contributes to democratization of the state,the economy and the civil society” (CADI 2011, 31). In table 12, this field-specific subprinciple is evaluated through four items: “capabilities [ofvoluntary association (Q8)], publicness [of voluntary association (Q9)],transparency [of voluntary associations (Q10)], and diversity [of voluntaryassociation (Q11)]” (CADI 2011, 31).

Table 12: Item Scores for Civil Society Competition


Q8 6.6 7.0 5.0 8.0 Q9 6.4 7.0 5.0 8.0 Q10 7.0 7.0 5.0 10.0

Q11 7.4 7.0 5.0 9.0

Competition 6.9


Q8 was the first of successive questions about NGOs. It asked the expertsto rate the level of influence of NGOs in society. Scores given were from 5to 8, with majority giving a rating of 7. The highest rating came from anindividual with knowledge of specific NGO-government engagements; forhim, NGO influence on society is largely dependent on NGO-governmentcooperation. This view is echoed by two other experts, one of whom believedthat NGOs have been deliberately maneuvering to become part of thegovernment to push for their advocacies. The rest seem to engage ingovernment-NGO exclusivity, implying that NGOs are providing servicesindependently from the government (thus, as some experts noted, they oftenface fund insufficiency issues).

The ninth question in the civil society survey asked the experts to rate thelevel of NGOs’ ability to represent varying public interests in society. Theexperts gave ratings ranging from 5 to 8 in this item. Some respondents viewedNGOs’ ability to promote the interests of marginalized groups positively,while one expert saw this as evidence that many NGOs are representing“narrow views” of public interest “invisible to the radar screen of governmentpolicymaking;” another expert went so far as to say that NGOs largelyrepresent “the concerns and anxieties of the middle and educated class.”While the others viewed NGO representativeness more positively than thelatter two, some noted that a good number of NGOs are ironically in theNGO “business” solely for profit or to push for the interest of private entities.

Q10 asked, “Do you think NGOs are democratically operating in yourcountry?” Most of the experts answered in the positive, with ratings rangingfrom 5 to 10, though many expressed misgivings about the way some NGOsform “exclusive” informal tactical alliances, have a “cult-like” followingcentered on their founders, or are answerable only to their benefactors—giving an “undemocratic” quality to such organizations. Interestingly, tworespondents noted that while NGOs have a high degree of gender sensitivity,there is a lack of gender equality among many of them.

Table 13: Item Scores for Civil Society Pluralization


Q12 5.8 7.0 2.0 8.0 Q13 6.0 6.0 4.0 8.0 Q14 4.8 5.0 1.0 7.0

Q15 3.4 4.0 1.0 8.0

Pluralization 5.0


The last question in this category sought the experts’ opinion on theadequacy of NGOs’ representation of different values and demands ofsociety. Majority of the ratings were in the 7 to 9 range—5 was the lowestrating and 9 the highest. The expert who gave the lowest rating noted thatNGOs are largely urban-based, largely confined to advocating broad civiland economic rights, lacking commitment in pushing for more specific,“third-generation” rights. Many of his concerns were reiterated by those whogave higher ratings (one respondent stated that the leadership of NGOs tendto be “bourgeois intellectual”), but nonetheless gave their higher ratingsbecause of their belief in NGO diversity in the country.

Pluralization in Civil SocietyIn table 13, civil society pluralization consists of four items: “inequality ofpublic spheres [Q12], inequality of information [Q13], inequality ofculture [Q14], and inequality of power [Q15]” (CADI 2011, 33).

The first question in this category was concerned with media-societyrelations. Q12, which queried the level of media fairness, elicited ratingsranging from 2 to 8, with the lowest rating coming from a member of an NGObased in Mindanao; her reason for giving a low score is the limitedunderstanding of mainstream media of regional (e.g., Mindanaoan) matters.Most of the other respondents gave a higher rating because they believed thatthe media was generally fair, even if they are influenced by the interests of theoligarchic companies or religious groups that own them. The most optimisticexpert stated that the “intense competition” among media helps ensure thatmedia remains fair in the Philippines.

Q13 sought the experts’ opinions on the wideness of the information gapin the Philippines. Answers ranged from 4 (wide) to 8 (narrow).11 Some ofthe experts opined that while the infrastructure and technology are available,the quality of the information that usually reaches the “masses” is suspect.Others note that there is a wide “digital divide,” with low internet penetration

Table 14: Item Scores for Civil Society Solidarity


Q16 4.4 4.0 0 8.0 Q17 5.9 5.0 4.0 10.0

Q18 5.9 7.0 4.0 8.0

Solidarity 5.4


in most areas; as some experts noted, information dissemination in the ruralareas is still largely done through radio. One expert noted that access toinformation is not a “bread and butter concern” for most Filipinos.

Question 14 revealed no clear consensus among experts concerning theequality of citizens’ access to cultural activities; ratings here were from 4 to7. There is implicitly a consensus that all Filipinos have access to cheap,popular (“low”) culture, while few can afford to have access to “high” cultureactivities. Some experts made note of the lack of cultural education in thePhilippines.

The last question in this category asked, “How equally do you thinkpower is distributed among the people in your country?” While most expertsgave answers ranging from 1 to 5, one expert was an outlier, giving a ratingof 8. This expert (the sole R-RL one) fully trusted NGO/CSOs’ ability todiffuse power, in contrast to the two experts who gave a rating of 1 and believedthat the politico-economic and religious elites still have a firm grip on powerin the country. The rest of the experts echoed the claims of the latter two.

Solidarity in Civil SocietyCivil society solidarity “is a criterion that directly measures how active thecivil society is” (CADI 2011, 35). In table 14, it includes three items:“institutions and affirmative action to protect diversity [Q16], awarenessand activities of social participation [Q17], and governance of the governmentand civil society [Q18]” (CADI 2011, 35).

The sixteenth question concerned how well affirmative action programsare in the Philippines. One set of respondents gave low-low moderate ratings,while others gave a rating of 8. One respondent gave a rating of 0, stating thathe is unaware of any such programs currently being implemented by thegovernment. Others noted that such programs have either only recentlybegun implementation, or never saw successful implementation. Those whogave high ratings cited improvements in addressing the needs of indigenousgroups as evidence of successful affirmative action programs, as well as thediminishing bias against LGBTs (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenderedindividuals).

The seventeenth question wanted to get the experts’ opinions on howactively citizens are participating in NGO activities. Most of the answerswere in the low-low moderate range, with 4 being the lowest rating. Twooutliers gave high ratings, with one giving a 10 rating without an explanatorycomment. The other high-rater, an expert from the private sector, cited thehigh number of friends he has who are engaging in civil society work as proof


of high citizen participation in NGO initiatives. Others were less thanconvinced of broad support from the citizenry of NGO activities, despitesome experts’ claims of high awareness of NGO activities among membersof Philippine society.

The final question of the survey was about the level of influence thatNGOs have on government policymaking in the Philippines. Four expertsanswered with either a 4 or a 5, while the others answered with a 7 or 8 (theR-RL expert gave the highest rating). The line is drawn largely on theeffectiveness of existing NGO consultation processes, as well as restrictionson street parliamentary actions. Those who gave a high rating lauded the trackrecord of NGOs in influencing the government either using formalconsultation processes or joining the government (as appointed or electedofficials), while those who gave a low rating viewed NGOs as having a weakvoice in government, usually being compelled to take to the streets orotherwise show a “critical level of unity on very specific issues.”

Analysis

Interpretation of Principle and Field Democracy IndicesThe overall score of 5.2 suggests a moderate level of democratization,suggesting that much needs to be done for further democratization in thecountry. Analyzing the multilevel breakdown of this overall score will showwhy this is so, and what can be done about it.

With a liberalization democracy index of 5.6 and an equalizationdemocracy index of 4.8, it can be said that in the Philippines, actual de-monopolization and improving the means to stymie “re-monopolization”are advancing at a faster pace, or are making more significant strides, than theelimination of inequality and improving measures to eradicate poverty. Therelationship between the two principles in the Philippine context—theanswer to the questions “which is holding the other back?” or “which ispulling the other forward?”—can only be definitively answered after severalsurvey rounds have been conducted. At present, hypothetical answers to thesekey questions can be drawn up after going to the level of the subprinciples,thereafter focusing on the field democracy indices.

According to the CADI Guidebook, generally speaking, “autonomystands for independence [of sectors of society] from the government,competition for the level of the self-reference [i.e., transparency andaccountability] system, equality for the degree of equal resource allocations,


and solidarity for the degree of mitigation of income [and asset] disparity”(CADI 2011, 12). These principles are clearly rooted in the realities of mostdemocracies in Asia (or even in the rest of the world). In a democracy, allsectors of society have some degree of freedom from government interference,which necessitates a regulation system involving the entire society. Theabsence of such a system would result in power being consolidated in thehands of nongovernmental elites. Also, in most democracies in Asia, thereexists a wide gap between the wealthy and the poor, a gap that can only beeliminated by coordinated efforts of all the members of a society worthy ofthe appellation “democratic,” if one takes into account that equality is one ofthe democratic ideals dating back to the French Revolution.

How then should the sub-principle scores from the subject survey beanalyzed? One can surmise, taking the immediately preceding paragraphinto account, the following broad conclusions based on the results of the firstADI survey in the country: 1) while measures—legal or otherwise—toassure the continuation of democratization in the political, economic, andcivil society fields exist, the implementation of these measures is poor ornegligible; 2) government corruption and other abuses of power are checkedin principle both by governmental and nongovernmental bodies, but suchabuses persist because these monitoring mechanisms are poorly implemented,

Figure 1: Political Autonomy

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especially at the local government level;3) there is also a dearth of legislationand other means to ensure transparency and accountability amongnongovernmental power holders; 4) coordination among the means andagents to address inequality in power and resource distribution in all theaforementioned areas of society is lacking.

Taking all of the above into account, one can validly conclude that thereis a lack of significant united opposition to multi-field monopolization in thecountry, even if monopolies are anathema according to the law and popularbelief. The doors to successful sustainable de-monopolization are open—widely so right after the Marcos dictatorship was toppled—but the few whostruggle to keep them open are barely able, if at all, to combat those who wouldrather keep the status quo.

We can thus assume that the chief obstacles to Philippine democratizationcan be found by examining the field competition and field solidarity scores,as the former deals with different kinds of checks and balances, and the latterwith the coordination of de-monopolization efforts. Judging from the surveyresults, the betterment of the country’s autonomy democracy index is,presumably, a lesser concern, though only by a small margin. The Philippinepluralization democracy index, meanwhile, will most likely increase when

Figure 2: Political Competition

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the scores for all the other subprinciples go up. The remaining paragraphsof this analysis will test the preceding presuppositions.

Going back to the country’s overall democracy index, the 5.2 score issomewhat consistent with the adjectival ratings given to the Philippines byFreedom House (“partly free”) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (“flaweddemocracy”). However, recall that economic democratization is hardly aconcern of the aforementioned democracy/freedom indices. If theconventional way of measuring democracy is followed, i.e., if the economyindices are taken out, the democracy index of the Philippines would slightlyincrease. Considering only the scores for the political subprinciples and thescores for the civil society subprinciples, the Philippine overall democracyindex becomes 5.6. In contrast, pairing the economic subprinciple scoreswith the subprinciple scores of either of the two other fields would furtherlower the country’s current low moderate democracy index. Are the barriersto further democratization in the Philippines thus largely in the economicfield?

Looking now at the liberalization and equalization scores, the slightdifference between political liberalization and political equalization (a mere0.4), suggests that liberalization and equalization in the political field are

Figure 3: Political Pluralization

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proceeding at about the same pace. With a 5.6 civil society liberalizationscore and a 5.0 civil society equalization score, it can be asserted that in thePhilippines, civil society has less politico-socioeconomic influence than itshould have, given the conditions of society that make them, on paper,essential to continued democratization. The 3.7 economic equalization scoremakes economic liberalization, rated at 4.9, appear even more insufficientthan it already is. However, is the blame for the low economic equalizationscore squarely on the inadequacy of economic liberalization efforts? Accordingto the CADI Guidebook,

[if] a country’s political democracy index is high but its economicdemocracy index is low, the country’s political democracy isinstitutionally well established but likely to face limitations in[practice; if] a country’s civil society democracy index is high, thiscountry is likely to develop its democracy even if the political andeconomic indices are currently low. (CADI 2011, 12)

Extrapolating from these interpretative guidelines, we can surmise thatthe Philippines’s political democracy is procedurally secure (i.e., functional),and its civil society is vibrant (though uncoordinated, among otherdeficiencies), but both are restricted because of limited (and circumventable)

Figure 4: Political Solidarity

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means of monitoring the activities of economic elites in the country, aweakness exacerbated by a low level of economic solidarity (rating: 4.8). Thelatter suggests that pushing for economic equality is relatively unaddressedby civil society in conjunction with the citizenry at large; going over topolitical solidarity and civil society solidarity, which have ratings of 6.4 and5.4, respectively, this assertion appears validated. The concern for closing thegap between the wealthy and the poor seems to belong to a vocal few;clamoring for democracy sans economic democratization seems to be a farmore popular activity among the populace. In other words, the commitmentof Philippine civil society as a whole to “third generation” civil societyadvocacies (such as environmental conservation/restoration) cannot beassailed as lacking, but the decline in influence of economic equalizationadvocates such as labor unions signals the need to reinvigorate “classic” civilsociety movements.

There is a homologous situation in the political field, where there is alsoa high degree of autonomy, but a low level of competition and pluralization;again, while diversity is guaranteed, those who benefit from this allegedatmosphere of competition are the established elites (which are apparentlynumerous enough to allow for a semblance of genuine democratic political

Figure 5: Economic Autonomy

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competition to exist). A different situation can be found in the civil societyfield, wherein the highest democracy index is that of competition. Thecomments show that this relatively high score is attributable to the belief ofmajority of the experts that NGOs/CSOs are generally influential,democratically operating, and are able to deal with numerous issues concerningvarious groups in society. However, their ability to exercise whatever influencethey have is limited by the “exclusive” nature of many NGOs/CSOs (a threatto their relevance to society at large, as well as the possibility of meaningfulcivil society-government collaboration) and their lack of resources to effectmajor changes to their target areas. The information gap and insufficiencyof educational opportunities can be correlated to the low actual influence ofNGOs/CSOs; lacking a platform to express their views (as provided by theInternet, which few people outside urban areas have access to) and a sufficientlyeducated audience, NGOs/CSOs are unlikely to enable more people tobecome agents of societal progress anytime soon.

In summary, based on the above analysis, democratization in the economicfield must be prioritized (over, say, ensuring civic freedoms and improvingcivil society diversity) if any further major advances in wide-scaledemocratization can be hoped to be achieved. Economic control monopolizers,

Figure 6: Economic Competition

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both local and foreign, abound in the Philippines, influencing everythingfrom politics to the media. Disentangling these economic elites from thepolitical field would increase genuine political competitiveness, givinggreater legitimacy to the electoral system. A more cohesive civil society mustremain distant from monopolistic companies (and similar entities), butwould benefit from more direct engagements with the government, as wellas the citizenry at large; it would be a depressing irony if NGOs/CSOs hada monopoly on socially transformative initiatives.

One might think that the above interpretation is undone by the diversityof responses resulting from the ideological diversity of the experts, inaccordance with the expectation that the L-LL and R-RL respondents willhave diametrically opposing opinions on numerous issues concerningdemocratization. This disparagement is rooted in the belief that the aboveinterpretation is only valid if there is a consensus among the respondents,which is hypothetically improbable among L-LL and R-RL individuals. Aswill be shown in the discussion of divergences in expert responses below, innumerous instances, the respondents did seem to let their ideological colorsfly, so to speak. The following discussion will also show whether or notideological leanings appear to be significant factors in determining theopinions of the respondents most of the time.

Figure 7: Economic Pluralization

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Let us first consider figures 1-4, showing the differences in ratings givenby the experts in politics.

The most frequent outlier is an R-RL NGO/CSO member (givingscores higher or lower than all other respondents in 31.6 percent of all thequestions), followed by an R-RL member of the academe (giving scoreshigher than all other respondents in 26.3 percent of all the questions). Thedeviant answers of the former expert are dispersed across the four subprinciples,while the latter expert gave no exceptional scores in response to the questionsunder political autonomy. In only one question did the L-LL respondentsappear to rate as a bloc—Q16, which is concerned with the implementationof affirmative action programs. There appears to be consensus among therespondents in Q3 (existence of freedom of assembly), Q4 (freedom ofopposition to the government), and Q19 (citizen’s preference for democracyas a political system).

Figures 5-8 call attention to the differences in the scores of the economicexperts.

A notable outlier among the economy respondents is R5, an L-LLNGO/CSO member. In 20 percent of the questions, she gave higher or lowerratings than all other economic experts. In two of the questions (Q9 and Q11),

Figure 8: Economic Solidarity

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the L-LL experts (all NGO/CSO members) seemed to have given very lowscores as a bloc apart from the R-RL experts; however, ratings for Q9 to Q12,all under economic pluralization, are generally low. R8 and R9, both R-RLmembers of the private sector, are also outliers in numerous items. R8 gavescores lower than all other respondents in 10 percent of the questions in theeconomy survey, while R9 gave lower scores than all the other economicexperts 20 percent of the time. It is worth mentioning that both theserespondents who presently fit perfectly under the R-RL category, were oncestrongly identified with socialists/Marxists.

Lastly, figures 9-12 show the divergences in the ratings given by theexperts in Philippine civil society.

As mentioned in the survey results section of this text, one outlier amongthe civil society experts is the sole respondent labeled R-RL, a member of theprivate sector, who gave scores higher than all other respondents in 22.2percent of all the questions. He gave one outlying score for one questionunder civil society autonomy and civil society competition, and scored higherthan all other respondents in two questions under civil society pluralization.Another notable outlier is R1, an L-LL expert from the academe, who gavevery low scores in four questions and a very high score in one question (fourout of five of which were under civil society autonomy), in stark contrast to

Figure 9: Civil Society Autonomy

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the ratings given by the rest of the respondents. R4, an L-LL-classified civilsociety expert from an NGO/CSO, is also worth noting for giving higherscores than all the other respondents in four items, two of which (Q6 andQ18) have something to do with the government’s ability to address the needsof society. Given her explanatory comments, it is possible that she has beenmiscategorized as L-LL. Consensus was seemingly reached by the respondentsin one item: all respondents gave high scores in Q3, which indicated theircollective belief that private companies have a high degree of influence inPhilippine society.

Thus, ideological leanings appear to significantly influence ratings inonly a few instances, notably among experts in the economic field and expertsin civil society. It appears to be no more influential than a respondent’sinstitutional affiliation or geographic background. R1 in the political field(an R-RL in the academe) is an outlier in a number of questions concerninggovernment effectiveness. R1 was once in the government bureaucracy.Those from election watchdogs and private survey groups (a mix of R-RLand L-LL) seem to equate public trust of the government with public trustof the chief executive, basing their opinion on data obtained from local publicopinion surveys, thus resulting in similar scores in response to questionsconcerning the said topics. Geographic background brought forth regional

Figure 10: Civil Society Competition

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concerns and perspectives, but by their nature as experts on nationwide issues,the non-Luzon respondents never exclusively dwelled on regional concerns;the Mindanaoans were able to highlight Mindanaoan issues, but in only oneinstance was a respondent’s roots in Southern Philippines a major factor inshaping that respondent’s opinion on a certain matter (R6 on Q12 in civilsociety).

The criticism that the results do not show L-LL and R-RL consensus—ideal in a specialist survey such as this—is thus valid, but unlessrepresentativeness of respondents according to ideological leanings can beachieved, any validation of the data gathered for this study cannot focuslargely on bridging ideological divides. This is supported by the results oftests of significance, which give support to the existence of the left-rightdivide. Table 15 summarizes the mean scores in the four sub-principles bypolitical leaning. The right leaning experts gave higher scores than the leftleaning experts in the subprinciples autonomy, pluralism, and solidarity. Itis only in competition that scores were reversed, although difference is small.When t-test of significance was conducted, of the 4 subprinciples of democracy,only autonomy is significant.

Table 16 summarizes the mean scores in the four subprinciples by sector.The political sector obtained the highest score in autonomy. Data reveal that

Figure 11: Civil Society Pluralization

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political sector gained the highest scores in all subprinciples except incompetition. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test forsignificance of differences in mean scores by sector. Based on the ANOVAtest, only the differences in solidarity scores were not significant.

Even if the methodology followed did not provide for a means to arriveat expert consensus, the findings of the pilot test herein discussed cannot bedismissed as worthless. Yes, because of the variances in responses due to thediversity of respondents, most mean scores in all of the survey queries fall nearthe median of a 0 to 10 scale. However, the qualitative data gathered allowsthe researchers to identify key areas of contention due to divergent perceptions.In addition, the identification of economic democratization as requiring themost attention is greatly strengthened by the fact that scores for certain indicesin this field are notably lower than the median in a 0 to 10 scale. The same canbe said about conclusions drawn from items wherein the scores are significantlyhigher than the median of the 0 to 10 scale (e.g., item Q19 in the politicssurvey, on public trust of democracy).

Figure 12: Civil Society Solidarity

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Concluding Thoughts

Moving ForwardThe authors are eager to continue conducting ADI surveys in the Philippinesthroughout the ADI project’s projected four-year run. In 2012, with theimplementation of programs designed to better the lives of those belongingto the lower socioeconomic classes (such as the CCT program), thecontinuation of the anti-corruption campaigns of the Aquino administration,the growing credibility and readership of online news sources, and thepossibility of key pieces of legislation such as the Freedom of Informationbill becoming law within the year, it is expected that some facets of nationaldemocratization will appear to have become better in the eyes of many experts.However, with the increasing concentration of economic power in fewerlarge corporations, the unlikelihood of the “retirement” of certain lawsthought of as being restrictive to the exercise of certain civil rights, the onsetof political violence as the 2013 Midterm Elections draw near, and thedecreasing public trust in the judiciary in light of the impeachment complaintsagainst certain justices of the Supreme Court, it is likely that many experts willconsider a number of hindrances to national democratization to have worsened.In any case, comparing the 2011 survey results with the 2012 survey resultsshould better show where the country’s democrats must focus their attentionto ensure that the country stays on the path towards democracy.

Table 15. Mean Scores in Subprinciples by Political Leaning

Political leaning

N Mean Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Sig. (2-tailed)

Autonomy Right 13 6.7885 1.15851 .32131 .041 Left 13 5.7198 1.35987 .37716

Competition Right 13 5.2885 1.14191 .31671 .201 Left 14 5.9464 1.43171 .38264

Pluralism Right 12 4.4917 1.66540 .48076 .214 Left 14 3.6964 1.51041 .40367

Solidarity Right 13 5.7941 1.56761 .43478 .408 Left 14 5.3020 1.47024 .39294

Note: T-test was conducted to test the significance of differences in mean scores.


To address issues of representativeness noted in the analysis, the TWSCresearch team plans to double the number of respondents. The ideal mix is9 L-LL and 9 R-RL respondents per field, with one L-LL and one R-RLrespondent per institutional affiliation. The number of non-Luzon respondentsper field will also be doubled. To address matters of validation mentioned inthe analysis, a Delphi study will be conducted after the survey responses havebeen collated.12 The approach being considered has a basis in the Hegelian/Dialectical inquiry system, as, given the diversity of experts, the “true nature”of Philippine democracy can only be arrived at when opposing views are madeto engage each other “in an unremitting debate,” an argument that will result(ideally) in a synthesis of opposing views (Mitroff and Turoff 2002, 28). TheTWSC team also decided to use the Delphi method because of theimprobability that most of the experts, due to their busy daily schedules, willbe unavailable for focus group discussions or similar means of data validation.13

The design of the Delphi is still being worked out.

Reflections on the ADIIn our unpublished inception report, submitted to our fellow CADI membersin August 2011, we stated the following:

The survey results [are] expected to show whether or not the knownqualities of “Asian” (typically [permutations] of “Western”)democracies remain valid. This is due to the fact that some of thesurvey questions are explained in the instruments as being rooted incertain preconceived notions of what “Asian democracy” is. Whetherthe survey results reveal that “Asian democracy” can be given anoperational definition that does not deviate from what is known in[existing] literature, or that there is no such animal synonymous toanything in the existing political lexicon, these results are expectedto show whether or not the [advances/regressions in Philippinedemocratization] are indeed attributable to movements centeringon a monopolization/de-monopolization dichotomy.

We have since abandoned any desire to contribute to efforts to uncoverif there is a distinctly “Asian” type of democracy; it is an unending debate thatwe find no value in contributing to. We believe that the survey results havevalidated that the most useful way to view democracy—i.e., the way toconsider it if one wishes his or her state or society to actually attain it, notconsign it to the realm of unattainable ideals—is through the framework ofdemocratization as continuing de-monopolization.


If the results discussed at length are insufficient to support the aboveclaim, consider this: it is undeniable that across Asia, economic power has forthe longest time been concentrated in the hands of a few, even in so-calleddemocracies. Thus, the poverty incidence in most Asian countries isdepressingly high. What if, against all the dictates of neoliberal logic, allenormous private corporations begin to primarily function as charitableagencies, thus causing poverty to dramatically decrease in a certain country?What if the national government of the aforedescribed country also channelsall its resources to the alleviation of poverty nationwide (leaving, say, themilitary high and dry, and foreign debt servicing a thing of the past)? One canreasonably expect that in such a scenario, inequality would decrease, thus thepluralization score of our hypothetical country will be high moderate-high.However, the overall democracy index in such a society would remain at thelow moderate-moderate level, as the influence of both private corporationsand the government on citizens’ activities would be high (resulting in a low-moderate score in autonomy) and, presumably, civil society would have a lowlevel of influence on society, as NGOs/CSOs will have been renderedirrelevant by the surge in what can be termed “monopolist social responsibility.”Such an overall democracy index would still accurately show our hypotheticalcountry’s level of democratization. Monopolies that give more than they takeare unsustainable; the degree of taking necessary to keep a welfare machinewell-oiled will inevitably leave the majority of citizens with just enoughresources to take up their daily burdens for the sustenance of society and getthrough a day with access to basic necessities. Also, as Bernard Crickobserves, one-party states/military regimes have a “tendency for economicinefficiency and wasteful corruption” (2002, 117).

The main obstacle to democratization identified by the ADI’s framersis the undue concentration of politico-socioeconomic powers. It presupposesthat a type of comprehensive de-monopolization will result in a generalinternal consensus that a country has achieved sustainable democracy. TheADI also reminds us that democratization is essentially a war againstauthoritarianism waged in several fronts; as in all wars, strategic alliances,proper resource mobilization, and attack coordination are keys to victory.Discord among combatants supposedly on the same side is detrimental tohaving a continuous advantage in this continuing struggle.


Notes1. Most of these questions emerged from discussions among the following current and

former members of the TWSC research staff: Joel F. Ariate, Jr., Rowell G. Casaclang,Elinor May K. Cruz, and the principal/corresponding author of this text.

2. EDSA is an acronym for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, along which people gatheredto clamor for the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos (and later, other national chiefexecutives whose mandates were brought into question in the court of public opinion).

3. CADI agreed that “expert” refers to a person who possesses knowledge andunderstanding in one of the fields of expertise either because he/she is a person who is(or was) directly engaged in that area or an academician/researcher whose expertiseis in the area. These are people who are familiar with “technical [matters, e.g.,statistical data] with which ordinary citizens may not be familiar” (CADI 2011, 36).

4. We use these in the absence of local holistic human development studies. A HumanSecurity Index (HSI) for the Philippines, developed by TWSC, with funding from theGovernment of the Philippines-UNDP Conflict Prevention and Peace BuildingProgramme, is, as of this writing, being pilot tested in numerous municipalities in thePhilippines. The published findings of the HSI study may be referred to by theTWSC ADI survey team in future country reports.

5. The scores given by the experts for Q7 under politics were recoded for this report,because in the questionnaire, 0 signified the belief that nonelected groups had nopolitical influence, and 10 signified that nonelected groups were highly influential. Areverse designation of extremes, while eliminating the necessity of recoding foraggregation purposes, would have been counterintuitive, possibly confusing therespondents.

6. The scores given by the experts were recoded for this report, because in thequestionnaire, 0 signified the belief that government or political elites had no politicalinfluence, and 10 signified that the aforesaid entities were highly influential. Cf.footnote 5.

7. All the scores in economic pluralization were recoded so that they can be consolidatedwith the scores in political pluralization and civil society pluralization; in thequestionnaire, 0 corresponds to highly desirable situations, while 10 corresponds tohighly undesirable conditions. Cf. footnote 5.

8. Low score = high degree of monopolization9. Scores for Q2 in the civil society questionnaire needed to be recoded for aggregation

purposes. Cf. footnote 5.10. Scores for Q3 in the civil society questionnaire had to be recoded for aggregation

purposes. Cf. footnote 5.11. As in the questionnaire, 0 corresponds to very narrow and 10 corresponds to very wide,

the scores needed to be recoded for aggregation purposes. Cf. footnote 5.12. The use of the Delphi method to CADI was suggested by Clarinda Lusterio Berja.13. There is also the possibility of uncontrollable (and likely unproductive) aggression

among ideologically opposed individuals.

ReferencesCADI (The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index). 2011. The Guidebook: The

Asian Democracy Index. Seoul, South Korea. Unpublished manuscript.


Crick, Bernard. 2002. Democracy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Marcos, Ferdinand E. 1977. The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines. Manila:The author.

Mitroff, Ian I., and Murray Turoff. 2002. “Philosophical and Methodological Foundationsof Delphi”. In The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, edited by HaroldA. Linstone and Murray Turoff. http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/delphibook.pdf.

Nolledo, Jose N. 1992. Student’s Manual on the New Constitution. Caloocan City:National Bookstore, Inc.

____________________________________________________________Miguel Paolo P. Reyes is a university research associate at the Third World Studies Center,College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman.


Rating Philippine Democratization:A Review of Democratization Metrics

MIGUEL PAOLO P. REYES

To those intimately familiar with better-known democracy/democratizationindices, the unique characteristics of the approach of the Consortium for theAsian Democracy Index (CADI) to analyzing democracy should be readilyapparent after an examination of the project’s methodology. To make thosedistinctions clearer, the following is a survey of some of the evaluations ofdemocratization in the world, Asia, and the Philippines. The review of studiesherein also serves to situate the 2011 CADI democratization assessments(included in this volume) in the current discourse of democratizationmeasurement. The following review is by no means exhaustive; the StateFragility Index and Tatu Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Index of Democracy arenoticeably absent, while the World Values Survey (WVS) is only mentionedin passing. However, the author believes that it shows enough of the currentstate of the field of democratization measurement to serve its aforesaidpurposes.

Global Democracy/Freedom Indices

Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” SurveysUS-based nongovernmental organization Freedom House seeks to measurefreedom, which it defines as “the opportunity to act spontaneously in a varietyof fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potentialdomination” (Freedom House 2011c). Specifically, it measures two categoriesof freedom—Political Rights, or the ability of people

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to participate freely in political process, including the right to votefreely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete forpublic office, join political parties and organizations, and electrepresentatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and areaccountable to the electorate; (Freedom House 2011b)

and Civil Liberties, the exercise of which is ideally “without interferencefrom the state” (Freedom House 2011c). Apart from crafting descriptivenarratives of their subject countries’ state of freedom, Freedom House givesnumerical ratings (from 1-7, with 1 being the most desirable rating) for acountry’s political rights and civil liberties conditions. These ratings are thebasis of Freedom House’s decision to designate a country as Free, PartlyFree, or Not Free (Freedom House 2011c). Freedom House gathers its datathrough expert surveys, the findings of which “are reached after a multilayeredprocess of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars”(Freedom House 2011c). As of this writing, readily available online are“Freedom in the World” analyses from 2002-2011.

Freedom House lowered the status of the Philippines from “Free” from2002-2005 to “Partly Free” status from 2006 onward. The change was dueto “credible allegations of massive electoral fraud, corruption, and thegovernment’s intimidation of elements in the political opposition [all duringthe Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration (2001-2010)]” (Freedom

Table 1: Freedom House Ratings of Political Rights and Civil Liberties in the Philippines, 2002-2011

Year Political Rights Civil Liberties 2002 2 3 2003 2 3 2004 2 3 2005 2 3 2006 3 3 2007 3 3 2008 4 3 2009 4 3 2010 4 3 2011 3 3

Sources: Freedom House 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a.

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House 2006). Before the downgrade, Freedom House gave the Philippinesa Political Rights score of 2 and a Civil Liberties score of 3. In 2006, thecountry’s Political Rights score was lowered to 3, while the Civil Libertiesscore remained the same. In 2008, the country’s Political Rights score wasfurther lowered to 4, “as a result of serious, high-level corruption allegations;the pardon of former president Joseph Estrada [who Arroyo succeeded byvirtue of constitutional succession, following Estrada’s conviction for plunderafter he was ousted by the military defection-cum-mass demonstrationknown as “People Power 2” (2001)]; and a spike in political killings in therun-up to legislative elections [in 2007]” (Freedom House 2008). ThePolitical Rights score would remain at 4 until 2011, when it went up back to3, due to “comparatively peaceful and credible presidential and legislativeelections held in 2010,” when automated voting machines were used for thefirst time in the Philippines (Freedom House 2011a). Table 1 shows theserating changes over the years more clearly.

In its country reports, Freedom House consistently characterizes thePhilippines as “once one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia” thatfell from grace, so to speak, due to “economic mismanagement, widespreadcorruption, insurgencies, and 14 years of dictatorship under FerdinandMarcos [1972-1986]” (Freedom House 2002; 2005; 2008). Theadministrations of Corazon Aquino (who became the country’s chief executiveafter Marcos was ousted by the coup plotters-civil society revolt now referredto as “People Power 1”) and her successor, Fidel Ramos (one of theaforementioned anti-Marcos coup plotters), are described as a period ofsteady gains after a lengthy period of significant losses—a time of nationalrecovery.

Freedom House describes Joseph Estrada’s administration as a stepbackward from achieving democracy, with Estrada being “dogged byallegations of both corruption and that it gave favourable treatment to thebusiness interests of well-connected tycoons” almost at the beginning of histerm (Freedom House 2002). His ouster is viewed uncritically. Arroyo isinitially portrayed by Freedom House in a favorable light (i.e., during the firsttwo years of her unelected term [2001-2004]). Come her term as an electedchief executive, Freedom House began to look at her much more negatively;her decision to run for the presidency despite her earlier promise not to—thereby being the first incumbent president running for a fresh mandate sinceMarcos in 1969—her pardoning of her predecessor—the country’s firstjudicially declared plunderer—and the questionability of her win over a morepopular candidate likely made it inconceivable for the Freedom Houseanalysts to continue to view Arroyo favorably.

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Given its age (it celebrated its 70th anniversary in 2011) and scope, aswell as the accessibility of its analyses, Freedom House understandably setthe global standard in democratization metrics. However, numerous otherindices have come in its wake, with many of them criticizing FreedomHouse’s focus on measuring “freedom” despite its raison d’être being thesupport of “democratic change, [the monitoring of] freedom, and[advocating] for democracy and human rights around the world” (FreedomHouse 2011b).

Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy IndexIn 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit set up a democracy index as a rivalof Freedom House’s freedom assessments, in the belief that FreedomHouse’s subscription to the “thin” concept of democracy of Robert Dahlneeded to be broadened “to include aspects of society and political culture indemocratic societies” (Kekic 2007, 1). The EIU Democracy Index’scategories of democratization are the following: “electoral process andpluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, politicalparticipation, and political culture” (EIU 2010, 1). It thus still bears someresemblance to the Freedom House framework, but it is more overtly aranking tool than the Freedom in the World surveys.

Table 2: EIU Democracy Indices for the Philippines, 2007-2011 Year 2007 2008 2010 2011 Rank (over 167) 63 77 74 75 Overall score 6.48 6.12 6.12 6.12 Electoral process and pluralism

9.17 8.33 8.33 8.33

Functioning of government

5.36 5.00 5.00 5.00

Political participation

5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00

Political culture 3.75 3.13 3.13 3.13 Civil liberties 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 Adjectival ranking

Flawed democracy

Flawed democracy

Flawed democracy

Flawed democracy

Sources: Taken from Kekic 2007, 4; EIU 2008, 6; 2010, 5; 2011, 5.

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Part of the EIU Democracy Index methodology involves conductingexpert surveys to measure how well a country is doing in the aforesaidcategories (Kekic 2007, 8). In addition to these expert surveys, according tothe EIU, a “crucial, differentiating aspect of [their] measure is that [they]use, where available, public opinion surveys—mainly the World ValuesSurvey” (Kekic 2007, 8). WVS data is used as “[indicators] based on thesurveys predominate heavily in the political participation and politicalculture categories, and a few are used in the civil liberties and functioning ofgovernment categories” (Kekic 2007, 8). Apart from the World ValuesSurvey, the EIU also consults “Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, LatinAmerican Barometer, and national [surveys; in] the case of countries forwhich survey results are missing, survey results for similar countries andexpert assessment are used to fill in the gaps” (Kekic 2007,8). Table 2summarizes what the EIU Democracy Index has been saying about Philippinedemocratization since 2007 until 2011.

Whether it was “democracy in stagnation” (2008), “democracy inretreat” (2010), or “democracy under stress” (2011), it seemed that (whoever)the experts consulted and (whatever) opinion surveys studied by the EIUteam show that the country is not progressing at all toward becoming a “fulldemocracy.” Judging from the lack of any discussion on the Philippines inthe EIU Democracy Index reports, the EIU seems to view the Philippinesas an unremarkable “flawed democracy.” But to be fair, one cannot expect theEIU Democracy Index to be a tool for conducting in-depth democratizationdiagnostics, as the index is more useful in tracking global/regional trends indemocratization, as well as showing which democracies are better thanothers, according to EIU’s limited criteria; given its name, EIU ironicallyexcludes democratization in the economic field from its indicators ofdemocratization.

Democracy Ranking of the Quality of DemocracyThe Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy (DRQD) is in manyways very similar to the democracy assessments discussed. It is also in one wayvery similar to the CADI ADI. According to David F.J. Campbell, AcademicDirector of the Democracy Ranking Association, “the structure of theconceptual formula of the Democracy Ranking [of the Quality of Democracy]would be: quality of democracy = (freedom + other characteristics of thepolitical system) + (performance of the non-political dimensions [e.g.,socioeconomic development])” (2008, 41). This formulation echoes theCADI formulation of democratization as liberalization + equalization(leading to de-monopolization/citizen empowerment). The similarity is

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largely due to both assessment frameworks having the same theoreticalfoundations in the work of Guillermo O’Donnell. According to the CADIADI guidebook,

[as observed by Guillermo O’Donnell,] ‘transition fromauthoritarianism’ does not guarantee “transition to democracy.’Second, ‘transition to democracy,’ i.e., ‘achievement in electoraldemocracy’ does not involve ‘realization of representative[democracy].’ Third, transition to substantive [democracy,] i.e.,[‘socialization,’] does not directly follow ‘transition to democracy’(CADI 2011, 3).

Drawn from these observations is the CADI notion that democratizationmust be seen involve “non-political” elements to make a comprehensivedemocratization assessment. The DRQD, meanwhile, based their approachto assessing democracy on O’Donnell’s understanding of democratization asbeing based on the principles “human development,” which “focuses on thebasic conditions or capabilities that enable individuals to act (behave) asagents” (in Campbell 2008, 27), and “human rights,” which are clustered into“political rights, civil rights, and social rights” (in Campbell 2008, 27). Evenif their theoretical bases are the same, the CADI ADI and the DRQD cannotbe assailed as identical, not only because the latter is based in Austria whilethe former is headquartered in South Korea. By the name itself, the DRQDis another ranking tool. It ranks democracies (i.e., countries classified byFreedom House as “Free” or “Partly Free”) based on O’Donnell’s guidelinesfor measuring democracy. DRQD highlights the top ten and the bottom tendemocracies in a two-year period. Another key difference is methodological;the DRQD rankings are the result of investigating “what happens if theFreedom Ratings from Freedom House are [combined] with Human

Table 3: Democracy Ranking of the Philippines according to DRQD (2004-2009)

2004-05 2005-06 2007-08 2008-09 Rank (out of ± 100 democracies)

49 45 64 56

Score (out of 100) 51.19 56.95 46.91 53.97

Sources: Based on Campbell, et al. 2010, 11 and Campbell and Pölzlbauer 2010, 2.

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Development Index [indicator scores] of the United Nations DevelopmentProgram” (Campbell 2010, 1). Using this method, comprehensive democracyscores are obtained. Table 3 shows DRQD rankings for the Philippines (withcorresponding scores) within the years 2004-2009.

By far the most all-encompassing of the democracy indices discussedthus far—a fact wholly attributable to the type of data taken intoconsideration)—the DRQD is nevertheless not an ideal tool for pinpointinglocally determined deficiencies in democratization, a weakness that all globaldemocracy indices share. At best, like the Freedom in the World surveys andthe EIU’s Democracy Index, the DRQD can be used to show how the countryis faring against other democracies in maintaining/improving its democraticstatus. Are the “Asian democracy” indices predating the conduct of the CADIADI surveys any different?

“Asian Democracy” Indices

East Asia BarometerThe group of scholars known as the East Asia Barometer (EAB) “conductednational random-sample surveys in 2002 in five new democracies [includingthe Philippines, “new” apparently because it underwent decades underauthoritarian rule before 1987], one old democracy (Japan), one quasi-democracy (Hong Kong), and one authoritarian system (China)” (Chu et al.2009, 143). The survey was conducted again in 2005-2006 (Chu et al. 2009,146). The EAB survey is also referred to as the Comparative Survey of

Table 4: Philippine EAB Respondents’ Support for Democracy

Democracy is... Percent of respondents

Desirable for our country now 88.1 Suitable for our country now 80.2 Effective in solving the problems of society 60.7 Preferable to all other kinds of government 63.6 Equally or more important than development 21.8 None of the above 1.5 All of the above 6.7 Mean number of items supported 3.1

Source: Culled from the table in Chu et al. 2009, 144.

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Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia (SWS 2007), a name thatshould give a clue as to its purpose. In the Philippines, EAB surveys wereconducted by Social Weather Stations (Guerrero 2004, 9; SWS 2007), a“non-stock, non-profit, and politically non-partisan social research institute”(Guerrero 2004, 1). 1,200 respondents (300 each in Manila, the Balance ofLuzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) were interviewed in both survey rounds(SWS 2007).

The EAB asked questions designed to “estimate [their respondents’]level of support for democracy” and to obtain their respondents’ assessmentsof the “suitability of democracy for their country” (Chu et al. 2009, 144). Inone set of questions, the respondents were asked to indicate their answersusing a ten-point scale, with 1 expressing either their preference for “completedictatorship” or their belief that democracy is completely unsuitable in theircountry, and 10 expressing either their preference for “complete democracy”or their belief that democracy is perfectly suitable in their national society(Chu et al. 2009, 144). In another set of questions, EAB determined citizens’“apathy for authoritarian alternatives” by asking respondents whether or notthey would favor “strongman rule, military rule, single-party rule, andtechnocratic rule by ‘experts’” (Chu et al. 2009, 146). Tables 4 and 5 show theresults of SWS’s 2002 survey (as published in an article in The WashingtonQuarterly) in the Philippines.

According to EAB, when their survey was conducted in 2005-2006,support for democracy in the Philippines dramatically decreased. LikeFreedom House, EAB (implicitly) attributes this loss to the apparentshenanigans of the Arroyo regime (Chu et al. 2009, 146).

Table 5: Philippine EAB Respondents’ Authoritarian Detachment Item Percent of

respondents Reject “strong leader” 69.4 Reject “military rule” 62.7 Reject “no opposition party” 69.6 Reject “experts decide everything” 76.8 Reject all authoritarian options 35.6 Reject no authoritarian options 4.1 Mean number of items rejected 2.8

Source: Culled from the table in Chu et al. 2009, 147.

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EAB also asked their respondents, "[if] you had to choose betweendemocracy and economic development, which would you say is moreimportant?" to which most respondents chose the latter; according to EAB,less than one-fifth of those polled in the Philippines wanted democracy overeconomic development (Chu et al. 2009, 145). This is rather unsurprising,given how many people in the country are mired in poverty. What is surprisingis that EAB found that many people in the Philippines (more than a third ofthe respondents in their last survey) still find military rule acceptable (Chuet al. 2009, 146). This seems incredible given the publicized horrors thousandssuffered under Marcos’s martial law regime. (According to Rigoberto T.Tiglao, “Marcos unleashed one of the bloodiest eras in Philippine history.Salvaging [extrajudicial killing], ‘hamletting’ and torture became bywordsthat characterized the reign of terror under the regime” (1988, 56).) Alsounexpectedly, EAB found the Philippines to be unique as, after a "correlationanalysis," they found that the Philippines is the only country where democracyis looked upon positively, but authoritarian alternatives to providing solutionsto society’s dilemmas are not disfavored by the majority (Chu et al. 2009,147).Apparently, in the Philippines, there is no increase in the rejection ofauthoritarianism when a democratic regime is “performing well in providingdemocratic rights and freedoms" (Chu et al. 2009, 153). Nevertheless, EABsuggests that "democratic governments must win citizens' support throughbetter performance, both in political and policy [terms,]" i.e., they must showtheir citizens that "democracy works" (Chu et al. 2009, 154-155).

Clearly, EAB considers democracy and development as connected, butdoes not subscribe to the notion of economic democratization, indeedpositioning democracy against economic development in its surveys. Itessentially looks into citizens’ support for democracy as a type of government,as a way of assessing one level of “democratic consolidation” according toLarry Diamond (i.e., the “mass public’s” belief in and valuation of democracy)(Chu et al. 2009, 153-154).

The ARDA Asia Democracy IndexThe Asia (at times styled by the media as “Asian”) Democracy Index of theAlliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia (ARDA) was claimed by theresearchers behind it to be the first democracy assessment that allows peoplein Asia to internally “assess and evaluate the political situations of their owncountries (ARDA c2004).” According to Paul D. Scott, the project directorof the Asia Democracy Index, the survey “is the first of its kind where‘politically aware’ individuals have been asked to assess the level of democratic

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development of their respective political systems (Scott c2007). Apart fromthe departure from the “Western canon” of measuring democracy, Scott liststhe following deficiencies of previous democracy assessments that the ARDAADI sought to address: first, the “excessive reliance on information providedby governments;” second, the “over-reliance on economic indicators”(although “[ARDA acknowledges] that democratic development may wellenhance economic growth and vice versa”); third, the “adoption of a non-prescriptive approach;” and fourth, the “polling [of] communities that mayhave little understanding and knowledge of the countries being studied”(Scott c2007).

The sole ARDA ADI study was conducted in 2005. Sixteen countriesin Asia were studied. ARDA’s criteria for assessing democratization are thefollowing: civil rights, elections and electoral processes, governance andcorruption, the media, rule of law, and participation and representation (Scottc2007). Local nongovernmental organizations were tapped to conduct thesurvey in each of the sixteen countries (Scott c2007). Readily available onlineinformation does not disclose who conducted the ARDA ADI survey in thePhilippines, though the ARDA website reveals that J.R. Nereus O. Acosta,erstwhile member of the Philippines’s House of Representatives and current

Table 6: The Results of the 2005 ARDA ADI Country by Rank Score 1. Japan 62.41% 2. Hong Kong 62.01% 3. Taiwan 55.47% 4. Bangladesh 53.21% 5. Philippines 51.18% 6. Thailand 50.85% 7. Indonesia 50.38% 8. Mongolia 50.33% 9. Sri Lanka 50.19% 10. South Korea 47.30% 11. Pakistan 46.88% 12. Cambodia 44.17% 13. Malaysia 41.93% 14. Nepal 32.13% 15. Singapore 30.42% 16. Myanmar 19.16% Source: From Scott c2007.

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Secretary-General of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, was oneof the signatories of ARDA’s “Resolution of Formation” (ARDA c2000).A standardized, twenty-two item questionnaire was the instrument utilizedfor surveying at least 100 “politically aware” respondents per country (Scottc2007); each local affiliate was given the leeway to formulate their owndefinition of “politically aware” (such as familiarity with political parties orpolitical occurrences) (Au Waipang 2007).

Table 6 shows where the Philippines places among the sixteen countriessurveyed by ARDA in 2005.

The Philippines placed remarkably high in this ranking, with a score thatis nearly a point higher than Indonesia’s and several points higher than SouthKorea’s, both of which outrank the Philippines in other recent democracyrankings. Even in the criteria-specific rankings, it scores higher than bothcountries (Au Waipang 2007). Scott acknowledged worries of their potentialaffiliates that the ARDA ADI’s methodology might cause some countries toappear “unrealistically democratic” (Scott c2007). Criticism of objectivityof the ARDA affiliate assessors has also been made; regarding the Singaporestudy, one blogger pointed out that the members of the Singapore assessmentteam were all human rights activists vehemently opposed to the currentregime (Au Waipang 2007). The local assessors of Philippine democracydescribed in the next section appear to have ensured that such criticism cannotbe hurled against them by ensuring that their bases for assessment are datafrom a wide variety of sources.

Philippine Assessments of Democracy

The “Philippine Democracy Agenda” SeriesIn 1997, a set of studies on sectoral perspectives on democracy and citizenshipwere published in the book Philippine Democracy Agenda [PDA]: Volume1 - Democracy and Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture. Among thesestudies are Anna Marie A. Karaos’s “Perceptions and Practices of Democracyand Citizenship among Urban Middle Class Families,” Wahab IbrahimGuialal’s “Perceptions on Democracy and Citizenship in MuslimMindanao,” Renato M. Lee’s “Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenshipin the Philippine Business Sector,” and Arturo C. Nuera’s “Workers’Political Culture: Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship.” Theseparticular studies are mentioned here because of the similar methodologiesthe researchers behind them utilized to obtain their data—all of themconducted key informant interviews and/or surveys (some also consulted

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readily available data from pollster groups). In addition, these studiescollectively show how citizens outside of the government from varioussocioeconomic classes considered their role in their allegedly democraticstate.

Diverse class/cluster opinions regarding democracy in the Philippineswere collected through these studies (albeit with the common caveat that thesample sizes for surveys or the number of key informants interviewed weresmall). For example, Karaos found that while most middle class Philippinecitizens believed that democracy can work in the Philippines, members of thisclass were “more cynical of electoral politics than the lower classes” (1997,127); meanwhile, Guialal discovered that “the concept of democracy andcitizenship enshrined among the Muslims [in Southern Philippines] isreduced to mere participation in elections, except among the educated”(1997, 161). The PDA studies thus call attention to the sheer diversity of thenational population of the archipelagic state called the Philippines. Theythus also alert national survey takers to review their stratification categoriesto conform with the realities of divisions in Philippine society.

IDEA-NCPAG Philippine Democracy AssessmentsAccording to the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),an “intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracyworldwide” that is based in Sweden (Landman 2008, 31; 32), their democracyassessment framework revolves around the question, “[how] democratic is[a subject country] and its government [from the perspective of its citizens]?”(Landman 2008, 9) IDEA lists numerous unique characteristics of theirassessment approach, such as “insider” assessors and the use of the assessors’qualitative judgements “strengthened by” quantitative data (Landman 2008,9-10). The key democratic principles of IDEA are “popular control overdecision makers and political equality of those who exercise that control”(Landman 2008, 10-11). The main purpose of a democracy assessment usingthe IDEA approach is “to contribute to public debate and consciousnessraising,” allowing for “the expression of popular understanding as well as anyelite consensus” (Landman 2008, 10). The assessment’s results must also beprescriptive (Landman 2008, 10), with policy implications—which isprobably why the policy study-oriented University of the Philippines’National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG),through Dr. Edna E.A. Co, led the conduct of the assessments in thePhilippines.

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IDEA allows the local affiliate assessors using their framework tochoose which among their indicators of democracy to assess (Landman 2008,10). The first Philippine assessment, published in 2005, was about “Free andFair Elections and the Democratic Role of Political Parties.” In 2007, therewere two concurrent assessments published, one on “MinimizingCorruption,” and another on “Economic and Social Rights.” The 2010assessment—the latest in the series—is about “The Rule of Law and Accessto Justice.” The analyses conducted by IDEA-NCPAG are meticulous,given the amount of data their assessors need to process. It shares the previousPDA studies’ push for greater introspection to defeat anti-democratic forcesinstead of focusing on providing indices of democracy. All four studies agreeon one point—in the Philippines, the means toward further democratization(legal or otherwise institutional) as well as guaranteeing the unhinderedexercise of civil, political, and human rights exist, but the properimplementation or integrity of these means is dismal or questionable.

SynthesisThe last fifteen years of studies on the state of the Philippines’ progress towarddemocratization—qualitative, quantitative, or a combination of both—collectively paint a portrait of a nation struggling to prove itself worthy of itsclaims to be a democratic state. The aforedescribed studies agree that thatstruggle was approaching a stalemate about a decade after the country’scurrent, anti-authoritarian constitution (1987) was ratified; more recentassessments are inclined to conclude that Philippine democratization hasstalled, or that anti-democratic backsliding repeatedly occurs in the country.Nevertheless, all the assessments discussed are unanimous that democracystill exists in the Philippines and is strongly desired by most of its citizens;the local anti-dictatorship chant “never again to martial law!”—first heardduring the waning years of the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship—still appearsto resonate with the majority.

All the assessments discussed also have their share of notable strengthsin measuring democratization, as with all democracy metrics. the PhilippineCADI survey team believes that the CADI ADI reflects many of the meritsof the above assessments, such as the great weight given by the Freedom inthe World analyses and the EIU Democracy Index to political and civilliberties; the identification of human development as an index ofdemocratization by the DRQD; the highlighting of the rejection ofauthoritarianism as a means of assessing democratic consolidation by theEAB surveys; the emphasis given on the “insider’s” perspective by the ARDAADI; the surfacing of local multi-sectoral perspectives on democracy by the

195REYES

TWSC PDA studies; and the IDEA-NCPAG assessments’ identificationof, thereafter recommending solutions to the hindrances to furtherdemocratization in the Philippines.

The survey results of the CADI ADI project, besides adding to orupdating the above described data (especially those of discontinued democracy/democratization level perception studies), were expected by the 2011Philippine survey team to fill many of the gaps unaddressed by the assessmentsdiscussed, notably the lack of focus on the majority of assessments oneconomic democratization. The Philippine CADI members also had nodesire to emulate the researchers behind most democracy indices in their aimto package their work mainly as contributions to the field of comparativedemocracy/democratization. Indeed, as the author of this research note stateselsewhere, the CADI researchers “advocate what can be metaphoricallyillustrated as scientifically gazing at the detritus in [the] navels [of thecountries subjected to ADI evaluation] in order to clean them thoroughly”(2011).

Of course, no democratization index can ever show a complete portraitof democratization in any country; there are always a few “elements ofdemocracy” that are disregarded or undervalued. They can also be subject tousage contrary to their stated function; they can be utilized for not so academicends, or any purpose that is a far cry from the objective examination variety.A government may use such measurements to say that the nation’s citizenryor the international “community” believes that all is right with the way itmanages the country, or to attack “outsiders” as grossly misinformeddemocratization assessors. At worst, they can be used by the rulers of a not sowell-run state (or even what can be referred to as an “internally terroristic”regime) to disregard local or international constructive criticism of theircountry’s political/socioeconomic system. In short, as are many things, nodemocratization index is perfect. But as long as they can fire up debates ondemocratization, then these indices can be considered invaluable assistantsin bringing societies closer to attaining lasting democracy.

Acknowledgement:

Many thanks to Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Socrates for assisting in gatheringsome of the resources for this research note.

196 RESEARCH NOTE

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the Democracy Improvement Ranking 2010. http://www. democracyranking.org/downloads /Key%20f inding s %20of%20the%20Democracy%20R ank ing %202010_A4.pdf.

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Campbell, David F. J. and Georg Pölzlbauer. 2010. The Democracy Ranking 2009 ofthe Quality of Democracy: Method and Ranking Outcome. Comprehensive Scoresand Scores for the Dimensions. Vienna: Democracy Ranking.

Chu, Yun-han; Diamond, Larry; Nathan, Andrew J.; and Doh Chull Shin. 2009. “Asia’sChallenged Democracies.” The Washington Quarterly 32 (1): 143-157.

Co, Edna E.A.; Tigno, Jorge V.; Jayme-Lao, Maria Elissa; and Margarita A. Sayo. 2005.Philippine Democracy Assessment: Free and Fair Elections and the Democratic Roleof Political Parties. Manila: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the UP National College ofPublic Administration and Governance.

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Co, Edna E.A.; Lim, Millard O.; Jayme-Lao, Maria Elissa; and Juan, Lilibeth Jovita.2007. Philippine Democracy Assessment: Minimizing Corruption. Manila: FriedrichEbert Stiftung, British Council, Transparency and Accountability Network, PhilippineDemocracy Audit.

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———. 2010. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf.

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———. 2003. Freedom in the World – Philippines. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/philippines.


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———. 2011b. Freedom House – About Us. http://www.freedomhouse. org/about-us.———. 2011c. Methodology. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/ freedom-world-2011/

methodology.Guerrero, Linda Luz B. 2004. Social Weather Stations: Asia’s Oldest Barometer. Quezon

City, Philippines: Social Weather Stations. Occasional paper.Guialal, Wahab Ibrahim. 1997. “Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim

Mindanao.” In Diokno, Maria Serena I. ed., Philippine Democracy Agenda: Volume1 – Democracy & Citizenship in Filipino Culture, 159-174. Quezon City, Philippines:Third World Studies Center.

Karaos, Anna Marie A. 1997. “Perceptions and Practices of Democracy and Citizenshipamong Urban Middle Class Families.” In Diokno, Maria Serena I. ed., PhilippineDemocracy Agenda: Volume 1 – Democracy & Citizenship in Filipino Culture, 113-132. Quezon City, Philippines: Third World Studies Center.

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Landman, Todd ed. 2008. Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of theInternational IDEA Framework. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy andElectoral Assistance.

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Scott, Paul D. c2007. Myanmar Ranks at the Bottom; Japan Tops the Asia DemocracyIndex 2005. http://www.asiademocracy.org/content_view.php? section_id=11&content_id=586.

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Social Weather Stations. 2007. June 2007 Social Weather Survey: Satisfaction with HowDemocracy Works Recovers to 54%. http://www.sws.org.ph/ pr070911.htm.

CADI (The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index). 2011. The Guidebook: TheAsian Democracy Index. Seoul, South Korea. Unpublished manuscript.

Tiglao, Rigoberto T. 1988. “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship.” In Javete-De Dios,Aurora, Petronilo Bn. Daroy and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol eds., Dictatorship and Revolution:Roots of People’s Power, 26-69. Manila: Conspectus.

The following short essays were read during the 2012 Asian Democracy

Index Conference, held on 30-31 August 2012 at Claro M. Recto Hall and

the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman,

Quezon City, Philippines. During the conference, both the results of the 2011

pilot test and the preliminary findings of the then ongoing 2012 ADI survey

were presented.

Comments on the 2011 ADI Pilot TestFELIPE B. MIRANDA

“Man is the measure of all things: of things that are, that they are; ofthings that are not, that they are not.”

- Protagoras (On Truth)

Man, it has been said, is the measure of all things. One must also immediatelyadd that he happens to be the measurer too—the metrician in contemporarysocial science jargon. Particularly in the past fifty years, democracy haswarranted man’s interest and therefore his focused efforts at understandingand measuring it. All over the world, democracy studies and indices haveproliferated, with many of them being international attempts at comparingthe extent and quality of democratization in cross-sectional as well as timeseries studies. Others are clearly national ventures; as democracy becomesan iconic concern, more and more polities try to establish their political bonafides with various indicators and indices of democratization.

This particular morning we are offered an opportunity to assess the utilityof an Asian Democracy Index (ADI), a collaborative project that theConsortium for the Asian Democracy Index (CADI) identifies itself with.Our University of the Philippines host for today’s conference, the ThirdWorld Studies Center (TWSC), is now a member of this scholarly consortium.I must thank both TWSC and CADI for inviting me to react to the overallpresentation of the Asian Democracy Index as well as the findings of severalnational papers using the ADI analytical frame in surveys of experts ondemocratization.

Several points come to mind as I try to discharge my responsibilities asa reactor today.

First, I wonder whether the ADI has sufficiently explored the conceptof democracy in its modern or contemporary guise. The liberal and egalitariandimensions of modern democracy, even as they signal a welcome expansion____________________________________________________________Felipe B. Miranda is professor emeritus at the University of the Philippines-Diliman. He is alsoa founding fellow of Social Weather Stations and the founder of Pulse Asia, Inc.


201MIRANDA

of democracy beyond the traditional procedural concerns of regular elections,legal enactments, and formal constitutional structures, could be more explicitlyjoined by equally essential democratic concerns such as participative politicsand accountable governance. To make the conceptualization truly modern,another dimension—a human quality of life—must also be included and jointhe four dimensions of democracy identified by the consortium. There canbe no democracy, Asian or otherwise, if these modern integral elements arenot explicitly, and with equal valence, made part of the democratic theoreticalframe. A historical fallacy, to give a fuller twist to Philippe Schmitter’sfelicitous phrase, is not only committed when one demands of past societieswhat are properly attributes of our current times but also when one fails toapply to our present societies attributes that are already characteristic of ourtimes. A human quality of life, participatory politics, and accountablegovernance must not only be explored as secondary dimensions ofdemocracy—they must join what ADI has already identified as crucial to alldemocratic frames: liberalization and equalization.

Furthermore, is it not possible to be a bit more ambitious in embeddingthese five integrals within a generous but specific time frame (say half acentury), such that if no demonstrable improvement in the quality or extentof any of these five basic democratic variables can be seen, a regime assessor,on theoretical grounds, is able to classify a given regime as nondemocratic?

As part of a conceptual clean-up relevant to all functional democratizationmetrics: democracy and democratization are not the same; neither is democracyand freedom. Democracy is a type of political regime with specific regimeproperties; democratization, on the other hand, is the process that moves anyregime towards democracy or greater and more enduring, “deepened” or“consolidated,” democracy, even if the starting of democratization point isantithetical to democracy. Likewise, freedom may be an important featureof liberal democracy and democracy may facilitate freedom but they are notthe same. Fareed Zakaria, for instance, outlines a provocative scenario of aworld where illiberal democracy exists.

Having suggested in what ways we might make the democraticconceptualization behind the ADI stronger and more salient to our moderntimes, one can add a few more notes that properly focus on its survey and indexdesign. We are told by ADI paper writers that ADI guidelines prescribe theuse of an “expert” rather than a general public survey. For any given country,it would be good to standardize the meaning of “expert” and, as in theIndonesia paper, a profile of those finally selected as survey respondentsshould be included in the final report.

202 2012 ADI CONFERENCE REACTIONS

While an exploratory survey at this point is the most that could be targetedby ADI members, it would be advisable to increase the target number ofexperts to more than the current 27. The current difficulties of ADI nationalinvestigators in locating “experts” across the board result in noticeablyskewed profiles leaving critical grid cells without respondents. A moreliberal, more realistic time frame might be considered to encourage more“right” experts to participate.

The results of “expert” surveys would do well to be validated by surveysof alternative experts or the same survey in modified Delphi. Ultimately all“expert” surveys should be validated through a general public survey.

Like other indices (Freedom House, Israeli Democracy Index, EconomicIntelligence Unit Democracy Index), mean calculations for all valuesgenerated in the ADI assume that the categories/variables considered (whetherat the highest or lower levels of theoretical generalization) employ at leastinterval, if not ratio scales. Furthermore, that within any given category, thesubcategories have equal significance or weights. This may make forconvenient calculation, but it is conceivable that at any given time somevariables may really—and should have—more weight than others. Thepacing of political or economic democratization may actually reflect thresholdeffects, i.e., for any given country, it takes more effort to improve as oneapproaches a threshold point. The general finding across ADI’s nationalsurveys indicating that experts rate liberalization better/higher thanequalization and that political liberalization occurs sooner than economicliberalization, suggests that uneven weights and threshold valuation might bemore realistically applied than equal weights and categorical estimates forsome countries at some critical point(s) in their political or economicdevelopment.

Subjective interpretation of the figures generated could be threateningto the avowed goal of relative objectivity in using the ADI. How big adifference in index points makes for a significant difference between andamong index scores? Unlike the Korean paper, the Indonesian and Philippinepapers report index scores that most of the time do not differ by more than twoindex points. Also consider: how do we know that midpoint on a scale of 0to 10 is halfway towards becoming a modern democracy? Even given thisnumerical eleven-point scale, why cannot a 7 or even an 8 be the legitimate,qualitatively more sensible midpoint in gauging the progress of a countrytowards reaching democratic status, “consolidated” or otherwise? As hasbeen pointed out in many contemporary examination of prominent democracy-related indices, so much subjective evaluation is usually reflected ininternational and national democracy index work.

203MIRANDA

ADI probes allow for individual country definition of its lead categories,e.g., political orientations—the present Indonesian and Korean probes asreflected in the national papers are basically the same, but the Philippine Leftand Right orientation does not fall within the same categorization of pro- andanti-government. The issue of standardizing questionnaire design may needanother ADI discussion and the possibility of comparative democraticindexing across Asian countries may again be assessed even if, as it now stands,ADI indexing work emphasizes validity primarily within specific nationalrather than cross-country frames.

The possibility of a Delphi being brought to bear on ADI work requiresyet another step, feeding back to the experts their own initial consensus andfinding out whether they would conform to it. Even experts may, after thisprocedure, be said to be vulnerable to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s “spiralof silence.”

Exploratory surveys and nothing more may be realistically expected atthis stage for ADI investigators. This pilot indexing work, even given itsnatural/normal weaknesses at this stage, nevertheless has its propercontribution to make in the challenging study of democratization monitoring.In the social sciences, we still have to appreciate what in the natural sciencesone takes for granted: that most initial experimental work discovers what toavoid doing precisely because we make full contact with it.

Comments on the ADI Project from the

Indian Perspective

BONOJIT HUSSAIN

It has long been proposed by proponents of democracy from a certain

ideological vantage point that political democracy becomes meaningful only

when its frontiers are ever expanding in the realm of social and economic

citizenship (good living standards, life with dignity free of discrimination and

fear, universal access to education, health, housing, etc.). This means that

democracy is not only an “end in itself” that needs to be pursued but also a

process that is not devoid of conflicts and contestations under the global

system it necessarily operates within. And, I believe, the Consortium of Asian

Democracy Index (CADI) is yet another noble effort towards reaffirming the

same.

I have been asked to comment on the CADI project from the point of view

of someone who is consideringthe possibility of conducting the survey in

India. Let me start by saying that while going through the CADI theoretical

framework, I was struck by the absence of any discussion on social diversity

vis-à-vis democracy. To put in the terminology of CADI, the theoretical

exposition as far as social de-monopolization is concerned is rather weak.

The relationship between democracy and diversity has proven to be

particularly difficult in South Asia, for both ends of this relationship pose a

challenge in this region. The nature of diversity itself is a challenge to political

imagination. Probably more than any other region in the world, South Asia

represents a bewildering mosaic of different collective identity—religious,

linguistic, ethnic, sub-regional—which overlap and cut across one another

in innumerable ways. This difficulty in the relationship between democracy

and diversity has essentially to do with the idea of Westphalian notion of

modern nation-state whose “boundaries must also correspond and coincide

with homogenous cultural boundaries.”

____________________________________________________________

Bonojit Hussain is an independent researcher and political analyst from Assam, India. Heis affiliated with New Socialist Initiative-Delhi Chapter.


205HUSSAIN

Hence, it is of utmost importance to realize the fact that in India (like

in numerous non-homogenous countries in the Third World), formal equal

political citizenship exists in a very unequal society marred by issues of castes,

indigenes, oppressed nationalities, gender, etc. which perpetuates exclusion

and oppression in the everyday lives of millions. From the Indian experience,

it can safely be noted that a well functioning multi-party democracy does not

ensure everyday democracy at the local level. A political democracy at the

national level does not realize itself in a meaningful sense without social and

economic justice at the local level.

“Really existing democracy” in Asia has failed to address the issues of the

“downtrodden,” oppressed and marginalized on many accounts. The issues

of exclusionary structures, which violate socioeconomic and cultural rights,

have become a part of official State discourse but more often than not just as

lip service. A good illustration on this point would be again India, where out

of approximately three million (in both tiers of State and central government)

elected representatives, two million are women and twenty-two percent

represents dalits and indigenes (adivasis), and yet women, dalits and indigenes

remain more oppressed and vulnerable than ever before. It can be argued that

within the present “really existing democratic” framework, representation

often becomes a mechanism of producing new “rent-taking” political elites

who might still bear the name of the marginalized.

Like I hinted above, even though India has a formal political democratic

setup, democracy is visualized, and it operates within the larger paradigm of

nation building/nation, without recognizing or evading the homogenizing

tendencies of the notion of modern nation itself which renders minority

nationalities and linguistic, religious and other minority as the “other.” This

has led to conflict with the State, often militarizing the society; examples are

innumerable starting from India’s Northeast and Kashmir.

Another aspect in the CADI framework that struck me was the

unsubstantiated use of concepts (both in theoretical and descriptive sense)

like civil society and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). If CADI is

using “civil society” in a Gramscian sense, then it needs to spell it out, as it

is a much used and abused concept in contemporary political theory. For the

past two decades the most popular concept in the analysis of the social basis

and agent of “democratic” struggles among the Western academia and

activists as well as external support for democratic political reform (notably

from western donors) have undoubtedly been “civil society.” Civil society has

been said to be the powerhouse which sustains democracy through

associational engagement and democratic deliberation. Many Western

proponents of the so-called third wave democracies point out that civil society


promotes democratic consolidation by “inculcating not only the participatory

habits, interests, and skills of democratic citizenship but also the deeper

values of a democratic political culture, such as tolerance, moderation,

willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing views.” Of course civil

society as a category and as a concept has a very rich history and no doubt that

deliberation in public sphere is crucial to sustain an inclusive democracy that

be. But if we were to consider the fact that civil society in the “third wave sense”

in a largely rural Asian context is confined to urban centres and the middle

classes, there arises serious doubts on fairness and equality in deliberations.

The public sphere of “Asian civil society” essentially excludes certain voices

and marginalizes others by glossing over intersection of class/gender/race/

caste/nationality. The language that so-called civil society operates through

and deliberates is the language of legality and civic morality derived from the

notion of modern state, whereas in a Third World country like India, majority

of the population doesn’t have access to knowledge (or even basic literacy)

that produces expertise over that language. In other words, the deliberative

language of Indian civil society is monopolized by few in the larger society.

On the other hand, a careful look at Indian or rather Asian society

(excluding perhaps the first world countries in Asia) can be telling of the fact

that civil society as it is constituted today is not autonomous of the State. The

realm of collective action and deliberation of civil society functions within

the parameters laid down by the State. Within that permissible parameters

civil society can do whatever they want, but once it puts forth redistributive

demands which might destabilize the very socioeconomic structures

generating inequalities, the “civil actor” might be relegated beyond the dark

realm of civic rights and law.

Now, again, CADI should be careful in using NGO as a conceptual

term; it is understood differently by political masses in different countries,

depending on where the countries (the nation, the people) stand in the global

division of labor. Across the Third World countries, for politically conscious

masses the concept of NGO immediately gets connected with multilateral

lending agencies like World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) who

have been funding scores of NGOs to promote the ideology of “self-help.”

These NGOs are often hailed as agents of democratic deepening, but a closer

critical look might reveal something else. Not much attention has been paid

to analyze or critically engage whether NGOs promoted by World Bank and

ADB help deepen democracy or undermine it at a structural level. Most of

these NGOs are service providers or promoter of self help groups operating

in local level, and in the process they provide an opportunity for the

“democratic” State to roll back from providing basic services and amenities

207HUSSAIN

to its citizen. And since these NGOs, unlike the State, are not accountable

to the people in a real sense, in the process it transforms historically hard

earned basic rights into services.

The era of neoliberal globalization of capital and “free market” ideology

has seriously weakened the “social” character of democracy. While

neoliberalism promotes a form of market utopia of prosperity and at the same

time it has also been destroying people’s lives in form of extreme

commoditization. The fate of people is being constantly “thrown into the

floating global market away from the will of the voters.” It has been happening

because neoliberalism requires the State to constantly withdraw from its

welfarist role, which was obtained through struggle, and to become more

interventionist in favor of capital. Recent glaring examples again come from

India, the largest functioning democracy in Asia, where the “democratic”

State is increasingly putting its weight behind big capital against its own

denizens (whereas traditionally it played a mediating role, biased though,

between capital and people/labor).

And, I believe, this is what the CADI survey had to measure. It is complex

but it is a workable and desirable initiative which could possibly enable

processes of understanding “Asian” democracy in all its complexities, yet not

be colored by Western unilateralism.

Reaction to the Findings of the 2011 ADI PilotTest and the Preliminary Findings of the 2012ADI SurveyTEMARIO C. RIVERA

I would like to thank the organizers of this conference for this opportunityto share my comments on their presentations. Let me start with some overallcomments. In any exercise of this kind, much of the clarification has to do withthe kinds of concepts we use. If the concepts we use are not clear, no amountof indexing will be very useful. There has to be a consistency between the kindsof concepts we use and our attempts at measuring or indexing.

Let us start with the concept of democracy. The whole exercise seeks toexplain, directly or indirectly, the concept of democracy and democraticconsolidation, or address what in the literature is sometimes referred to as theproblem of improving the quality of democracy. Conceptually, I think CADIneeds to clarify precisely what it means by democracy, as pointed out earlierby Professor Miranda. There is an extensive literature and long debates aboutthese concepts—contentions about whether to use the procedural definitionof democracy or a more substantive one. Reading your papers and listeningto the presentations, it is clear that you seek an understanding of democracythat goes beyond a simply procedural definition. But it would be moresatisfactory if you can clarify what we might consider to be the commonattributes of a democratic political system.

Let us focus on the four countries included in the study. From yourpresentations, you all assume that these four countries (South Korea,Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) are now democratic politicalsystems. However, in our book, Chasing the Wind: Assessing PhilippineDemocracy (Miranda et al. 2011), we argue that at this stage we cannotstrictly call the Philippine political system a democracy. At best, it is

____________________________________________________________Temario C. Rivera is a former professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo,Japan and the editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal.


209RIVERA

democratizing—it is not yet a full democracy. In fact, one common descriptionof the Philippines is that it is an “oligarchic democracy.” Is that not anoxymoron? If it is an “oligarchic democracy,” is there a democracy at all? Whydon’t we just call it an oligarchy for that matter? All of these are reflectionsof the need to clarify a very basic conceptual issue. What is a democraticpolitical system? Can we agree on its key attributes? Is it different conceptuallyfrom democratization? These are some of the things that we would like to seein the final output of the group.

More closely related to the exercise of indexing is the concept ofdemocratic consolidation. Again, I believe that the unstated assumption ofall these indexing exercises is that we want to have a sense of how consolidatedthese democratic systems are—assuming that to begin with, of course, theyare indeed democracies. All of these exercises in indexing will be muchclearer if we are given a sense of what sort of scores would be considered tobe reflective of a democratically consolidated system. When you come outwith a final output, it would be useful if you can agree on what kinds of scoresmight constitute something that would qualify as a democratically consolidatedsystem. Thus, using your index ratings would you consider a country with anoverall index of 5.0 or 6.0 as democratically consolidated, for instance? Whyor why not?

Another issue about indexing, of course, is weighting. At the moment youdo not have a system of weighting for your indicators. I am not sure whetheryou will go into that exercise, but again, that is something you might want tolook into. For instance, should you give a greater weight to the de-monopolization processes that are taking place within the political sphere asagainst the economic sphere or the civil society sphere? Are these issues thatyou would like to address in your final output?

Some of you also have done tests of correlations and significance on yourvariables. I think two countries have done that—Indonesia and the Philippines.But it seems that there is no common agreement whether or not to use thesetests. What stands out from the four country exercises so far is that the processof de-monopolization, to use your concept, has taken place most impressivelyin the sphere of politics. Thus, one of the questions you might also want topursue is whether there is any causal relationship between the level ofdemocratic consolidation in the political sphere with those of the two otherspheres. Or you might even raise a more interesting question: where is thedirection of the causality, if there is such causality? Is it democratization thatis facilitating the process of de-monopolization? Or is it the other wayaround? You might want to pursue some of these questions.


Another general comment on the methodology for all the country studieswould be the choice of respondents. Again, there is no uniformity on thisquestion. As you have rightly pointed out, the question of defining andchoosing experts itself is already quite a problem. How do you chooseexperts? The four teams have adopted different responses to this question.The Philippine team, apparently, is now in the process of seriously evaluatingits earlier classification of experts as selected mainly on the basis of theirideological affiliation: a left-center-right continuum. This premise assumesthat one’s ideological affiliation is a fairly stable and coherent one but inreality, one can have a range of ideological positions on different kinds ofissues. I was also struck by our Malaysian colleagues’ basis for their choiceof respondents. It appears to be a very subjective and a very limited pool, notto mention what I think is an over-representation of the Chinese experts,given the demographic composition of Malaysia.

I hope that in the final report you can also provide a clear, more up-to-date contextualization of the indexing process, i.e., clarifying the political andthe social context by which a reader will be able to make more sense out ofthe figures. Some of you are already doing that but you might want to relateit more directly to the indexing system. For instance, why is it that incomparing two years, say 2011 and 2012, you have in the case of two countriesa decrease in the index of democracy? What were the most important politicalfactors, both internal and external, that might have contributed to this? Or ifthere has been a significant increase in the democracy index, the reader wouldalso be interested in understanding the context for these developments.

For instance, in Indonesia, the context there might be significantlyrelated to some reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono’s administration.It would be interesting if you can point out if there have been any significantpolicy initiatives or institutional changes that might have taken place to affectthese indices.

The Korean situation has always fascinated me because historically,Korea, together with Japan, was one of the very few cases which defied theprojections of some well-established economic studies. Recall the famousKuznets curve that basically said that when a country is experiencing rapideconomic growth, that growth will inevitably be accompanied by the worseningof income inequality in the earlier years of growth. But even during the periodof the dictatorship, the Korean experience belied such an analysis. Significanteconomic growth took place under the military dictatorship but incomeinequalities were addressed by major institutional reforms, for instance, thesuccessful land reform program. Based on your studies, you said that in thelast two years, the progress in your political index has not been accompanied

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by a increase in your economic index. Again, we want to understand thecontext for this. Part of the explanation perhaps would be the impact of theeconomic crisis, especially after 2008, and the subsequent institutionalreforms.

In Malaysia, political contestation has also become more robust with theemergence of a vibrant opposition under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim.It would be interesting to find out whether or not these recent developmentswould significantly affect your democracy indices.

These are some of the comments that I would like to share with you. Asyou can see, my biggest concern has to do with conceptual issues as I pointedout in the first part of my commentary. Thank you very much.

The 2011 ADI Pilot Test:Some Comments on the ReportsEDNA ESTIFANIA A. CO

First of all, let me thank the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) of theUniversity of the Philippines for inviting me to this presentation forum onthe Asian Democracy Index (ADI). Secondly, let me congratulate theTWSC and the other Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index researchersfrom Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and India for being part of this democracystudy in Asia. It is indeed important that each country and the citizens of thatcountry do examine the state of their democracy.

Sometime in June 2011, I was asked by the TWSC to respond to the ADIsurvey—I am sorry that I failed to participate in the survey and interview. Idid not evade the survey; I was simply caught in the web of responsibilitiesand activities at that time that the TWSC needed the survey. After reading thedemocracy index draft reports and having heard from the presentations today,I am pleased and thankful that I did not make it as a respondent to the survey.I would not want to be classified as either a citizen who has “L” (left) leaning,or “R” (right) political inclinations; neither do I want to be labelled as pro-government or anti-government. I don’t think there is a straight jackettaxonomy of individuals given one’s views on various issues and elementsunder study, and under movable times and circumstances. In other words,one’s views on democracy and its various elements may change givendiffering or changing periods and circumstances, players, events and suchother variables.

I am not going to comment on the substance and findings of thedemocracy studies on Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Their scholars andpeople have the better right to talk about their own democracy.

____________________________________________________________Edna Estifania A. Co is professor and dean of the National College of PublicAdministration and Governance, University of the Philippines-Diliman.


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On the ADI MethodologyI appreciate three things about the study, namely the identification of a) aninitial focus, b) the benchmarks used across countries, and c) the attempt atrigor in putting together the survey data and information alongside theinsights and analysis of the expert-reviewers. However, somehow, somewhereI feel that the analysis drops and fades due to a lack of a clear agreement onfundamental concepts of democracy. I also hope to see an analysis thatestablishes the causation of democracy—at whichever state it is observed ina country. I did not see much of that analysis in the reports.

I must admit that I am not a great believer of the American FreedomHouse approach nor am I a fan of the Economist Intelligence Unit DemocracyIndex. At best, I could only acknowledge the efforts done by the so-calledmany experts on democracy worldwide—and how they measure democracyincluding the use of metrics. It may be good to know the state of democracyof a country or of countries with the use of metrics, rating and ranking. Andfor some academics, such information are worthwhile “good-to-know”sources based upon certain indices and comparative barometers shown byscores and rankings. I welcome these approaches and the data that result fromsuch rankings. After all, ours is a liberal world. However, I believe there areother ways of examining democracy, and especially so, by the citizens of acountry whose democracy is being scrutinized. I think the ADI approachreflects a cross-section of opinions about certain indicators of democracy—from autonomy, competition, pluralization, and solidarity which fall underthe broad principles of liberalization and equalization. I certainly agree thatthese are among the universal principles of democracy and their subprinciples,so to speak. However, I think the measures of democracy could still beexpanded and that these core and subprinciples could still be broken downto articulate: a) other normative values of democracy such as representation,participation, effectiveness and accountability among others, as well as b) thedynamism of democracy which is mirrored for example in the variousinstitutions, mechanisms, operational platforms and programmes, includingthe dynamics between and among the institutions and other bearers ofdemocracy in a country at a given time or period. As we know, the time orperiod under which democracy is assessed is pivotal. Citizens should regularlyexamine their own democracy because events, issues, and challenges todemocracy are moving and they do change from time to time.

One may also examine the presence of laws and policies that warrantdemocracy and the practices of these policies and laws, as observed and


witnessed by the community of democracy. If I may add to suggest, one caninclude as well the negative indicators that are observable.

To me, a study on democracy should be a conversation among peoplesand groups in a particular society. A conversation among citizens of a countryis important if one wants to see a truly cross-sectional view on democracy andthe state of democracy. A conversation about democracy draws in many moreplayers—perhaps not just the so-called “experts” from the private sector, theacademe, the nongovernment organizations/civil society organizations(NGOs/CSOs) as are the sources of information/data adopted by the ADIstudy. A conversation about democracy is important and should be muchmore inclusive.

To my mind, it is important to draw in the ordinary citizens as amongthe experts of democracy. For example when one speaks of the “Rule ofLaw”—are the victims of injustice and those who seek justice part of the circleof informants? Are they considered “experts”? Are the marginal members ofindigenous communities and Muslim population included as among the keyinformants in a meaningful search and understanding of democracy whererule of law and justice are measured? What if there are different rules of lawbrought about by culture, ethnicity, and by political tradition and history,thereby making local informants the main and best sources of information ondemocracy and rule of law? Or are the marginal groups such as labor, farmers,indigenous communities considered as “experts on democracy” benchmarkedby economic and social rights? Are they represented in the dissection of thesubprinciple of competition?

I raise doubt about the inclusiveness of the NGOs/CSOs—the NGOs/CSOs are a strange nomenclature these days, when even political elites’foundations could be categorized as NGOs or CSOs. I have my doubt aboutcivil society organizations—a nomenclature now challenged globally—because the CSOs do not necessarily reflect the membership-based, warmbodies of citizens that make for a more inclusive citizenry. To ensure areference to the broad constituency of people—I would rather seek the directparticipation of citizen groups in the data gathering exercises rather thansimply pick representatives of some civil society groups.

Let me humbly share our experience in assessing democracy. Bringingpeople from a cross-section of society on democracy or principles of democracyhas been an amazing experience. In fact, bringing diverse people togetherserves as an instant triangulation of views, understanding, and dissection ofdemocracy. We did this when we touched base with a cross-section of Muslimwomen, indigenous peoples, health workers, local municipal health officers,private health practitioners and district health officers—all considered

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“experts” on health under our assessment of people’s economic and socialrights. Prior to this, on our corruption assessment, we brought togetherchurch advocates, public school teachers, barangay officials, and NGOrepresentatives in trying to assess the nuances of corruption and how corruptionor its absence is a measure of democracy. With an ongoing examination oflocal democracy in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, weengage and converse with the Ullamah, the local leaders, the unschooled folksin villages, the local election advocates and former officers of the Commissionon Elections among others. We also engage legislators from the AutonomousRegion of Muslim Mindanao. The cross-sectioning of “experts” instantlybrings with it differences in views, itself a plurality of ideas, itself democraticin process. The diversity of views are recorded and noted by the assessors. Nocensorship, no editing. But certainly the data come with evidence-basedanalysis.

I should also think that a conversation about democracy should includegovernment and its many offices or representatives. For how could one dissectdemocracy and the state of democracy, and yet not include the supposedprotectors and those who ought to be the ardent promoters of democracy?How could one dissect political democracy from the point of view ofbystander experts of elections, and yet not include the men and women whomake elections happen and who ought to make electoral democracy work?Their absence would indeed make for a biased perspective on the workingsand performance of democracy.

It is interesting that in Mongolia for example the initiative to scrutinizedemocracy was taken by the government of Mongolia itself—working withacademics, community people, and government channels. Such democracyassessment in Mongolia has led to a suggestion for a ninth MillenniumDevelopment Goal (MDG) relevant to their country, on top of the eightUnited Nations Development Programme-prescribed MDGs.

How could one dissect democracy and the subprinciples of subsidiaryand pluralization or solidarity when for example, local government officialsare not considered as among the “experts” or the source of information?

How could one examine democracy measured by the rule of law andaccess to justice and the extent by which democracy exists without involvinglawyers, judges, policemen as enforcers, barangay officials who are the basicarbiters of justice, the victims of injustice, the poor who are usually kept outof the loop of justice, and the Supreme Court which is the ultimate protectorof justice?

Democracy studies are interestingly a democratic exercise in themselves—they should be inclusive in terms of “sources of information,” of “experts,”


and of process. The people of such country are themselves the experts ondemocracy and on the state of their democracy.

I imagine that there are no clear cut and dried answers to democracyenquiry—hence, there is not a fixed score or rank in the democracy ladder.Beyond the scores or the rankings determined by outside experts, there is thecollective, albeit diverse interpretations of the state of democracy by thecitizens of that country.

Finally, what is pivotal to a democracy enquiry are the questions askedto assess democracy— the quality of these questions and how these questionsare framed. The questions should be able to help fathom the breadth and depthof democracy, its many measures, the roles of institutions, players, and theprocesses. The answers to the query on democracy are in the hands of variousrespondents and informants and there are probably no singular, correctanswers to the democracy questions. What is vital is the solidness of thequestions that we raise and how they are framed enough to generate responsesfrom an inclusive set of informants.

Democracy Study: What for?Let me end by asking the question:

What does a democracy study serve? In my view, it is meant to movedemocracy forward, or at least to face up to the challenges of democracythrough the collaborative efforts by those I call here as representatives and“experts” of democracy—the government, the middle class, the academics,the poor, the women, the labor sector, the poor, the policymakers, and so on.The purpose of a democracy study is something not for the shelf to keep andto collect dust. It is something to touch base with and to pursue precisely sothat we could realize or strengthen democracy.

Having said so, we in the democracy assessment wagon always say thatour democracy study and its findings are a platform upon which we wish tocontinue to engage our citizens and our policymakers in addressingdemocracy. By doing so, we are not only “expert academics” but are also activecitizens who have a mission in the public sphere. We hope to use ourdemocracy study to pursue our conversation with people and sectors whomatter in shaping democracy.

Reaction to the ADI Pilot Studies:Indonesia, the Philippines, and South KoreaMALAYA C. RONAS

The most promising aspect of this program is its contribution to theconceptualization of “Asian democracy.” Its demonopolization andequalization indices capture the characteristic of formally democratizingpolities within an economic and social environment of severe equity problem.This is the situation of most democratizing Asian countries.

The paper on Indonesian democratization, for example, notes that theoverall Asian Democracy Index of 4.99 points on a scale of 0-10 indicates“that developments and achievements are out of balance with the concept ofpropping up democracy in the ongoing process of transition.” Moreover, itstates that “Indonesian democracy has been propped up by significantliberalization of politics, but this has been accompanied by low equalizationin the economic sphere.” Further, the paper asserts “that the index findingsappear to confirm various criticisms by experts regarding the oligarchyphenomenon—a serious issue that Indonesian democracy now faces.” Lastly,the paper expressed doubt about the claim of some studies “that Indonesiandemocracy has been consolidated.”

In the context of the potential of Consortium for the Asian DemocracyIndex (CADI) in contributing to the conceptualization of “Asian democracy,”it is regrettable that the paper about Philippine democratization sees no needto engage in this discussion. It states:

We have since abandoned any desire to contribute efforts if there isa distinctly “Asian” type of democracy; it is an unending debate thatwe can find no value in contributing to.

____________________________________________________________Malaya C. Ronas is former associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Collegeof Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman.


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The challenge in pursing this task is formidable. But when successfullyachieved, this effort of CADI would benefit similarly situated democratizingcountries in the Third World.

The pessimism of the Philippine paper is not shared by the paper onSouth Korean democratization. The paper states:

This survey also brought to the attention some commoncharacteristics of democracy in Asia. For example, though democraticexercises of free and fair elections are carried out regularly, economicinequality is an enduring problem. The ADI is significant thus fora generalization of the characteristic of Asian democracy by itsaccumulation of empirical data.

Closely related to the observation of the pilot studies that politics isliberalizing amid the glaring economic disparities is the need to understandthe “oligarchy phenomenon.” South Korea’s economic disparities might notbe as glaring as those in Indonesia and the Philippines, but it continues toexperience the “enduring problem of economic inequality.” Hence, theIndonesian paper suggests that part of CADI’s future studies is to examinethe “oligarchy phenomenon”—the monopolies, conglomerates, and chaebols.

In regard to the methodological issues, the self-criticisms of the pilotstudies are instructive. The Indonesian paper acknowledges “the importanceof looking at the relations between these sectors (political, economic, andcivil society) in influencing the overall democracy index score.” TheConsortium might like to consider perspectives, such as Seymour MartinLipset’s, that emphasize the significance of the economic and socialpreconditions of a democratic polity.

The Korean paper observes the “1) difficulty in comparing democraticrealities of countries with one another, and 2) the problem of how to tacklethe huge differences between scores of respondents.” The paper’s preferredapproach, which is accepted in all the other papers, is to hold “supplementalsurveys” through the Delphi survey method. In addition, the Consortiumshould also consider clarifying its “level and rule of aggregation” (Munck2009, cited in Miranda et al. 2011, 22) in dealing with these methodologicalconcerns.

The Philippine paper discussed the issue of representativeness. Theresearch team plans to “double the number of respondents.” It prescribes anideal mix: “nine [left-left leaning] and nine [right-right leaning] respondentsper field, with one L-LL and one R-RL.” The team also plans to double non-Luzon respondents. While the issue of representativeness is important, a


prior problem needs to be tackled. The pilot studies use different classificationsof respondents. The classes of respondents vary from “conservative-moderate-liberal,” “pro-government, independent, anti-government,” to “leftist-rightist.” The Consortium should rethink their varying classifications ofrespondents to avoid conceptual conflation or overstretching (Miranda et al.2011).

In conclusion, we should not lose sight of the inspiration of the framersof CADI. As stated in the Philippine paper, they see “the undue concentrationof politico-socioeconomic power” as the main obstacle to democratization.CADI is animated by the “war against authoritarianism waged on severalfronts.” Indeed, this inspiration makes CADI partisans for democracyworthy of being supported by democrats all over the world.

ReferencesMiranda, Felipe B., Temario C. Rivera, Malaya C. Ronas, and Ronald D. Holmes. 2011.

Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy. Quezon City: The PhilippineCommission on Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme.

Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship andPolitics. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

For inquiries regarding submission of articles, reviews, and other

content for possible publication in Asian Democracy Review and other

matters related to the journal or the Asian Democracy Index project, please

email us at [email protected].

Asian Democracy Review Vol 1 2012

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