Oligarchic Democracy and Democratic Oligarchy in Asian Democratization

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Hee-Yeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eun-hong Park eds. States of Democracy:

Oligarchic Democracies and Asian Democratization. Chinnai: Earthworm Books.

Oligarchic Democracy and Democratic Oligarchy in Asian

Democratization

Cho Hee-Yeon

(Prof. and Director, Democracy and Social Movements Institute, SKHU)

1. INTRODUCTION

After the late 1970s, there was what S. Huntington(1991) called the “third wave of

democratization” which unfolded across various dimensions in many third world

countries. Although there were ebbs and tides, many nations made the transition from

authoritarian regimes to democracies from the late 1970 on words. According to many

studies on democratization which deals with the process of transition to democracy and

democratic consolidation, there are several “valleys of transition” a society must

experience in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The first is the recovery of

free elections which is inherently full of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and contingency.

After passing through this bottleneck, the second which must be surpassed is the

settlement into a competitive structure of elections, and within this competitive structure

there must be power shift from the existing authority. If free elections and a competitive

structure are established and within that system, there is transference of power, which

means that democracy was consolidated. Many scholars feel that in the case of a second

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free election – one which is conducted in competition between various socio-political

forces – democratic competition has been established and democracy has become

consolidated.

However, the nations which belong to the “third wave of democratization”1 are

experiencing intense conflicts and pains even after this phase of democratic

consolidation has been realized. The reality shows opposite pictures. The democratic

governments of these nations have encountered far more intense conflict and crisis. In

1997, an exemplary democratic Constitution was drafted and a government founded on

this Constitution was established in Thailand, and when it seemed that civil society was

on the cusp of replacing the state, there was a military coup d‟etat in September 2006. In

relatively more democratized nations, conflictp becomes more intense. What is more,

despite the fact that electoral democracy has been established to the point that the

opposition party has come into power over two rounds of elections in Korea, there is

intense state-civil society and conservative-progressive conflict over various

controversial agendas. Even in Taiwan, which was considered an exemplary democratic

state due to the replacement of the Kuomintang, after over 50 years in power, by the

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the prospects of maintenance of that power,

there were massive protests against the DPP for over a year, which effectively paralyzed

governmental functions. What this seems to suggest is that there is a need for a new

approach to the conflicts and crises revolving around “democracy after

democratization.”2

This article attempts to expand upon the research on „transitology‟ and

„consolidology‟ that was centered around the examples of Latin America and Southern

Europe in order to apply it to Asia, analyze the intermediate variables which complexify

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the conflict in the democratization process, and develop a discourse in order to find a

model which can encompass the multi-dimensional facets of the various cases of Asian

democratization. We perceive that the democratic instability that comes with the

activation of civil society may be an opportunity for progress toward consolidation. In

other words, we will critically review the existing democratization theory which views

that “stabilization” of the democratic institution, especially election, as the critical factor

that leads to consolidation. Instead of such approach, the important factor for

democratic development depends on how much and well monopolies fixed under the

dictatorship will be disintegrated and changed and how the oligarchic character will be

weakened. In addition, I will point out that a formal polyarchy could be, in actuality, a

variation of an oligarchy within a democratic political form.

I anticipate that this research will give the same intellectual and practical

meaning to progressive forces in both Asian nations whose democracies have been

confronted with crises after democratization and the democratization forces in Asian

nations which are under an authoritarian system or what has been termed “semi-

democracy” or “dictablanda.”.

2. A REVIEW OF CONSOLIDOLOGY AND NEW ISSUES FOR

A NEW APPROACH: TWO VIEWS ON THE COMPLEXITY

OF CONFLICT

After many dictatorships in the third world began to tread the path toward

democratization, transitology and consolidology have come to the attention of American

academia, and as a result, much research has been produced and amassed.3 Among this

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research, there have been attempts to study the cases of nations who experience conflict

during the transition process, or analyze the post-consolidation process.

However, research on this series of events shows a kind of stagnation. The core

reason for this stagnation is that consolidology analyzes such consolidation” as “the

establishment and stabilization of the democratic system” introduced through the

transition process. Here consolidation is interpreted as the “stabilization, routinization,

institutionalization, and legitimation of political activities” (Gunther et. al., 1996: 151).

To borrow the phrase from J. Linz, democratization is regarded as a new condition in

which “the democratic game is the only game in town” (Linz, Juan J., 1990: 156). Of

course, this not only refers to systemic dimensions, but includes attitudinal dimensions

as well. However, after the transition process, the reality of democratized nations has

not been this kind of “stable establishment,” but rather has been characterized by severe

conflict including a possibility of reverse wave.

Therefore, in truth, there can be no research on post-consolidation because the

reality is that these nations experience continued instability or return to a condition of

instability after stabilization has almost been attained, and at times – as in the case of

Thailand – the reverse trends appear. That is to say, the reality that consolidation as a

sort of stabilization does not seem to occur is a grave challenge for consolidology and

severely restricts research on post-consolidation.

Therefore, we propose that the consolidation process be understood rather as “a

continued process of conflict within a democratic structure introduced through the

transition process.” On this point, there is a need to critically reflect on the “institution-

centered” viewpoint assumed by transitology and consolidology. Much research has

focused on the analysis of the conflict process which surrounds the introduction of

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regular and free elections which are regarded as the core institutional apparatus of the

emergence of democracy. However, from this point of view, “despite the fact that a

sufficient degree of consolidation has occurred,” and despite the fact that transitology‟s

institutional core systemic apparatus has been established and applied as a rule of the

game, these nations experience instability and crisis. Consequently, there is a need for a

viewpoint which sees the process of consolidation as a new dimension of conflict

process.4

Here, there is a need to examine the dispute which surrounds consolidology

between R. Gunther, among others, and G. O‟Donnell. This is because this dispute

exposes the two general viewpoints concerning the reasons for conflict in the

consolidation process, that is, the reasons for non-consolidation.

First, Gunther (Gunther et. al., 1995) sees the expansion of democratic

institutionalization, beginning with elections, as the pivotal point in consolidation,

regardless of the existence of extremist groups or anti-establishment political forces. In

relation to the consolidation of Spain and South European countries, they see that when

there exists an alteration in power between former rivals, continued widespread support

and stability during times of extreme economic hardship, successful defeat and

punishment of a handful of strategically placed rebels, regime stability in the face of a

radical restructuring of the party system, and the absence of a politically significant anti-

system party or social movements, a society experiences democratic consolidation.

In response to this, G. O‟Donnell(O'Donnell, 1996a, 1996b) criticizes the view

of Gunther, saying that the problem of consolidation is the “expansion of

institutionalization,” particularly the expansion of formal institution, and argues that the

problem is in terms of informal sectors or the quality of democracy. For example,

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O‟Donnell searches for the reasons in the discrepancy between formal rules and actual

actions, or the particularism or clientalism of the reasons for this discrepancy, the lack

of horizontal accountability on the part of state apparatuses or persons responsible, and

the delegative trend of politics. The reason for consolidation failure is the discrepancy

between representation and accountability due to the fact that although a formal

democratic system and regulations have been introduced, they fail to implement rules to

regulate actual political actions because of clientelistic culture or other various reasons.

It is on this reasoning that the new and critical agenda of “the rule of law” surfaced

(O'Donnell, 2004).

Concerning this issue, Gunter (1996: 152) stated, “In a nascent democracy,

when all politically meaningful groups perceive that democracy and related political

institutions are the only legitimate spaces for political struggle and those institutions

conform to the necessary standards, we conclude that this system has been sufficiently

consolidated.” Beyond the dimension of creating democratic institutions, if a viable

democracy is to exist beyond the continuance of an electoral system, the various

institutional dimensions beyond elections must be established and the general public

must accept the need for democracy to surpass other institutions. There is a need for the

maintenance of support for democracy even when negative consequences of democracy

occur which weaken the sense of belonging of the general public, as in an economic

crisis, and the maintenance of systemic stability which operates the democratic system

despite the existence of extremists and anti-establishment parties. That is, despite

negative threats, democracy must be founded on the support of the general public, and

when stability and durability have been ensured, they may be measured as indices of

consolidation.

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However, these two standpoints, or the two views toward consolidation, have

failed to sufficiently encompass the socio-economic dimensions of conflict. It is clear

that, although O‟Donnell‟s analysis may reveal one of the qualitative aspects of the

consolidation process focusing on the discrepancy between formality and informality, it

does not cover all the reasons for the retardation of consolidation.

As Gunther has criticized, favoritism or nepotism cannot be valid reasons to

explain why consolidation is not achieved, because it is a condition common in old

authoritarian systems or nascent democratic states (of course, it is advisable to make

this a quantitative difference rather than a classification difference between advanced

democracies and late democracies). In addition, if we focus on on the discrepancy

between formal democratic system and degenerative informal socio-political culture,

this may present the situation where the problems of democratization will be reduced to

cultural dimensions, and informal cultural dimensions at that.

On the other hand, according to the argument of Gunther that democracy must

have stability and vitality in order to be considered as consolidated – regardless of the

resistance of extremists and the activities of anti-establishment parties – the democratic

system must stabilize as the sole arena for struggle and it must be supported by the

general public. So why does the general public approve of authoritarian methods, and

how is it possible to raise the percentage of the general public who accept that

democracy is the best system in order to achieve consolidation? Unfortunately, there is

no answer. From our viewpoint, the high level of rapport with democracy by the general

public that Gunther spoke of is possible when the various socio-economic subalterns

feel that it can satisfy their socio-economic demands and interests within the new

democracy. This is not something that can be accomplished only through efforts to

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accumulate the trust of the general public. Rather, there must be a perception by the

general public, especially formerly excluded social groups that their socio-economic

interests can be satisfied better under the democratic system than under the past

authoritarian system. In the end, the problem with consolidation is not in the dimension

of democratic systems or the attitudes of the general public in accepting this system or

cultural dimensions, but rather in the substantial dimension, in the socio-economic

structure within the democratic system. Democratic consolidation is only possible when

the various socio-economically underprivileged persons believe that their demands and

understanding can be realized within the democratic system and their attitudes are

molded in accordance with that belief.

In other words, transition is not simply a process in which the governmental

system is changed, but a process in which the existent structural relationships within

that political system are changed, and therefore, it is an intense political process in

which not only the elite, beneficiaries in the dictatorial monopolistic structure, but also

the various socio-economic subalterns dynamically participate and struggle. If I say the

logic of Gunther and et. Al., we consider that the “extremist” groups and their

“extreme” agendas, which looks threatening to Gunther and et. al.‟s eys, must be

internalized rather than being marginalized and excluded in a new democratic form,

which will increase the possibility of consolidation.

3. MULTILAYERED DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND THE

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICTS IN

DEMOCRATIZATION

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1) A New Approach on the Complex Conflicts of Democratization5

Here I want to analyze the “content” of conflict which constrins consolidation of

democracy. Building upon the above discussion, to analyze the complexity and

volatility of the period after the consolidation process in Asia, it is necessary to first re-

stipulate the definition of dictatorship. A dictatorship or authoritarian regime cannot be

defined simply as a long-term regime controlled by one specific leader or the

maintenance of a system of suppressed political advocacy. From our viewpoint, a

dictatorship is a specific social and economic monopolies combined with a political

monopoly. That is, a dictatorship is a kind of “monopoly complex.” In economics, a

monopoly is “the condition in which a specific enterprise (or conglomerate) dominates a

market or industry completely or prevents competitors from entering into the market or

industry.” This concept of economic monopoly – from a modern economist or Marxist

viewpoint – can be extended to the political arena. If that is so, not only economic

monopolies, but also political monopolies, can be discussed in this manner. From this

view, a political monopoly occurs when a specific individual or political group controls

political resources – in particular, state authority and, in a larger sense, political power –

completely or prevents other competitors from entering the political arena. This political

monopoly are exemplified as the military monopoly, the bureaucratic monopoly,

ideological monopoly, political monopoly in the parliament, for example monopoly of

one dominant party and so on.

In addition, there can also be a “social monopoly” in which a specific individual

or social group controls social resources and prevents other competitors from accessing

the resources. Social monopoly is conditions in which various social resources –

prestige and respect, networks, etc. or social power6 in broader sense– are controlled by

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a specific individual or group, but on the other hand, there are various social cleavages

within society which act as borders, causing an unequal distribution of political and

economic power. That is, certain social groups – for example, racial or gender groups –

use these social cleavages as borders to monopolize political and economic resources.

For example, the controlling groups who focus on racial cleavages become groups with

a monopoly on political and economic powers. This is because the difference based on

the borders of social cleavages transforms itself into discrimination. The existent

monopolistic privileged groups exist on each of the political, economic, and social

levels and through this, estranged and excluded disadvantaged groups or subalterns

exist and the alienation and exclusion also combines in many dimensions. In the case of

Korea, the social fissures of regionalism refer to the social monopolies of province

Yeongnam(Southeast region) over province Honam(Southwest region), and this social

monopoly is connected with political and economic monopolies. This monopoly leads

to an “internal colonization process” by the dominant group at the levels of politics,

economics, and society. Therefore, a dictatorship is a system in which monopolies are

complexly combined on the multilayered levels of politics, economics and society.

The economic, political, and social monopolies fuse together to reproduce the

system. Economic monopolies combine with specific political and social monopolies,

and in political monopolies, a specific individual or political group not only merely

controls political power, but also possesses economic and social resources

monopolistically as well.

Here we have to say that such monopolies comprise the oligarchic character of

democracy. If we base ourselves on studies of Asian democratization, we find the

oligarchic character as common one discerned in all Asian societies in democratization.

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If we expand such idea to democracy in general, the oligarchic character can be

interpreted as not as unique only to Asian democracy but as something general and

common to every democracy. It means that all democracies have oligarchic

chracteristices in some aspects. Just as the corporatist character can be interpreted not

only as a specific regime character but also as common one applied to all kinds of

regimes, the oligarchic character can be interpreted in the same way. In this sense, we

have to go over the dualistic view which position oligarchy to polyarchy7 as for

example in R. Dahl‟s framing of democracy.

The traditional view of democracy disregarded such an oligarchic character

inherent in democracy because of dualistic counter-positioning of oligarchy and

polyarchy. In this sense, Marxism was a theory which brought to the fore the economic

“oligarchic” character of the modern democracy. If we extend this view to democracy in

its all facets, we can bring into relief the inherent deficiencies with the concept of

oligarchic character8.

This kind of oligarchic character was also examined by R. Michels in Political

Parties. Although he mainly focused on oligarchic character of the political party, and

thought that the legacy of autocracy comprised the oligarchic base of the modern

democracy, he suggested that this character can exist as an inherent one in modern

democracy: “in modern party life aristocracy gladly presents itself in democratic guise,

whilst the substance of democracy is permeated with aristocratic elements. On the one

side we have aristocracy in a democratic life, and on the other democracy with an

aristocratic content(Michels, 1962: 50).” In the same vein, S. M. Lipset in the preface to

Michels' bookBBBB. “It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the

elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over

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the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy” (Lipset, 1962: 15).

In my view, although he focused only on the political aspect such as regression

of the representative democracy to elite democracy, this oligarchic character can be

applied extensively to economic and social aspect of the modern democracy. We can

define the modern democracy as multi-layered and multi-faceted "oligarchic

democracy" or "democratic oligarchy".

If we look deeply into the working of the modern democracy combined with

diverse kinds of economic and social inequality and discrimination, all elites in every

society tries to make their special capabilities, skills, assets or statuses exclusive to other

inherent competitors. Under the pre-modern society, this kind of exclusion has been

done by such coercive institutional measure as estate system. However, in the modern

society, it is done by diverse kinds of formal "democratic" measures such as making it a

special certificate, “free” market process, and so on. In the market system, the big

business sustains its monopolitic position by way of market competition which seems

very rationally working and free and equal to all participants. Power monopolies on all

levels constrains democracy, formally equal to all, to result in oligarchic one.

In the study on democratization, how much and how high the former monopolies fixed

under the dictatorship are disintegrated and how the oligarchic character is changed

should be focused.

2) The Establishment of a New Analytical Framework Concerning

the Democratization Process as a Multilayered De-

Monopolization

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When we define dictatorship as a complex of monopolies, the democratization process

naturally becomes a de-monopolization process which departs from the former

monopolistic structure. The substantial formation process of democracy becomes a

restructuring process within a democratic framework through the dismantling of the

former monopolistic structure on multiple levels. From this viewpoint, the

democratization process can be thought of as a process which coupling fixed under the

dictatorship undergoes de-coupling and then re-coupling anew. Within this definition,

the democratization process can be identified as a social restructuring process through

political, economic and social de-monopolization. Therefore, the conflicts in

democratization are conflicts which surround the political, economic and social

monopolies and these multilayered conflicts interact with one another to further

complicate democratization. This causes society after democratization to become an

intense “arena of complex conflicts and crisis.”

This kind of complex conflict is naturally manifest in the conflict between social

groups. The conflict is on the one hand between established monopolistic dominant

interest groups which resist against the dismantling and transformation of the

monopolistic structure. A structure constructed under the previous dictatorship. On the

other hand the various socio-economic subalterns which were oppressed and estranged

under the former dictatorship determines the internal condition or direction of activation

of civil society and, is influenced by the direction of the dismantling of the former

monopolistic structure. The path of democratization may lead to constant conflict, a

complete reversal or non-antagonistic co-existence, in accordance with what result of

this DDDD.

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The resistance of former monopolistic forces and the socio-economic subalterns

during the process of democratization is reflected in civil society and determines the

direction of the activation of civil society and influences the path of democratization.

Because civil society is the arena in which independent and autonomous social

activity from the state takes place, it may also be regarded as the arena in which the

conflict between various social groups is expressed. Of course, the resistance of former

power-wielding groups against multilevel de-monopolization and the struggle for rights

of various socio-economic subalterns is reflected in civil society. If there is a transition

from dictatorship to democracy, the “resistant activation of civil society” will

encompass the presentation and struggle to attain the various demands, interests and

rights which were suppressed under the dictatorship, within the new democratic space.

It can be said that the dictatorial structure under which political, economic and social

monopolies were constructed is a structure which suppressed the demands and interests

of the socio-economic subalterns. Furthermore, the various socio-economic subalterns

under the dictatorial structure existed as an accommodating entity which simply

accepted what was given them by the existent monopolistic structure. However, with

the recovery of democracy and the advent of a democratic environment, the lopsided

oppressive structure as failed and various demands and interests EEEE come forth

through defiant collective action. This condition can be referred to as the new “self-

empowered subjective activation of civil society,” different from “resistant activation of

it”. Furthermore, the way of democratic consolidation will change in accordance to the

level and character of this self-empowered subjective activation of civil society9. There

will be cases in which the level and dynamics of the independent activation of civil

society are restricted and other cases in which they are not. For instance, if the resistant

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or defiant activation of civil society against a dictatorial regime is conducted on a large

scale, the democratization of that dictatorial regime will gain tremendous force. This

naturally facilitates democratization and the de-monopolization of political monopoly.

However, there forces linked to the ex-dictatorial regime andFFFF conservative

groups of civil society. The direction of these conservative groups in civil society in

transition and consolidation is an important variable in determining the direction of

democratization. In the process of democratization, this conservative civil society may

be dramatically weakened or they may not. The changes in political monopolies lead to

the perception of the threat that these conservative groups in civil society pose and there

may be a “voluntary” conservative activation of civil society. In addition, if anti-

dictatorship democratization forces advance the transition to democracy at the level of

political regime, the opposite phenomenon in which the conservative civil society is

activated in resistance to the democratic government may occur. In Thailand, this

conservative civil society made a alliance with progressive civil society groups in

demonstration aimed to topple Thaksin government before the military coup de‟tat in

September 2006. In South Korea, in the wake of democratization, this conservative civil

society has lost their influence on the populace and been silent, because they have been

a subordinate partner of the dictatorship. However, under the democratic governments

from 1998 to 2007, it began to be re-activated by the help of many failure and mistrust

of the governments, problematizing them from conservative viewpoint with

conservative major newspapers.

The democratization process unfolds as a complex process, without exception,

where on one hand, the radical demands of democracy may be presented through the

self-powered subjective activation of civil society, and on the other hand, conservative

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civil society may be activated in resistance to the transition process toward democracy.

In this manner, there is an eruption of conflict in civil society at some point in

consolidation and post-consolidation. It is here that civil society becomes the scene of

intense struggle in what Antonio Gramsci(1971) meant by “the terrain of hegemonic

competition10

.” The possibility for political change and level of de-monoplizataion on

the multiple levels is dependent upon how the hegemonic structure within civil society

changes. The above argument can be explained through the following figure.

Figure 1. Socio-political Chart of De-monopolization

4. FOR COMPLEXIFYING THE CONFLICT IN

DEMOCRATIZATION AND A TYPIFICATION OF ASIAN

CASES

1) Intermediate Variables which Concretize the Complexity of

Conflict

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Fissures and crises under the democratic governments are related with the new

exclusive or inclusive characters which come as a result of the governing of the new

anti-dictatorship forces. Neo-exclusiveness and neo-inclusiveness explains that there are

individuals, groups, and social classes which benefit from civilian governmenton the

one hand, and on the other hand, there are those which are newly excluded and

disadvantaged through the same government – because it is different from the past

dictatorship. Therefore, which groups are relatively greater among the newly excluded

groups or the newly included groups in one society determines the level of crisis a

democratic government faces. In this duality, if anti-dictatorship democratization forces

manage to seize state authority, on one hand, there is the advantage that they will be

able to enact reforms, but on the other hand, they will become the target of ex-

authoritarian forces‟ “resistance.” The benefits from democratic institutionalization and

the disadvantages of the resulting situation arise simultaneously, and in this way, the

composition of resistance changes.

This is influenced by the “strategic capacity” of the democratic government or

its capacity to ensure hegemony. The ability to create a consensus and integrate various

social groups influences the direction of democratization. For instance, the Thaksin

government in Thailand secured a big support structure from the general public in the

many-especially Northeast- provinces and among the lower classes through rural

support programs such as the revolving fund of one million baht for every village, an

agrarian debt moratorium, and a 30 baht-per-visit scheme of healthcare.

Of course, the strategic capability of democratic governments may vary. In

certain cases, if the governing capacity of a democratic government is weak, those cases

may show a path which leads to the promotion of conservative activation. As in the the

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Roh Moo-hyun government in Korea(2003-2007), the government wash sandwiched by

conservative resistance, on the one hand, and by dissatisfaction and feeling of

frustration of the progressively oriented supporters who backed him in the presidential

election, on the other hand. In addition, not only the contents of the policy but the

rhetoric, language, and behavior of the democratic government caused disrepute and

was labeled by the consertative media as shallow, resulting in further decline of the

public creditilty of the president and government. Furthermore, the economic

contradictions of the democratic government also became a critical issue. Because

democratization has been coupled with neoliberal globalization, even democratic

governments find themselves pursuing liberalization, privatization, and flexibilization

policies, which influence its political infrastructure in promoting economic inequality as

in a “20:80” or “two nations” society. These strategic and intervention capabilities

become factors in deciding the paths of political, economic, and social de-

monopolization.

Next, changes in a divided social monopolistic structure influence the

complexity of conflict in accordance with democratization. Particularly, in the case of

the resistance of social minority groups manifesting in secession or independence

movements, the conflict inherent in the democratization process becomes even more

complex. This depends on how the character of racial conflict had been structured under

the past dictatorship and whether the social cleavages formed under the past dictatorship

were overcome in the democratization process. These are critical variables in

determining the direction of democratization.

GGGGIn addition, neoliberal globalization has an important influence over the

direction of the restructuring of monopolies. The waves of neoliberal globalization refer

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to the complex interaction between political, economic, social de-monopolization which

occurs during the transition/consolidation/post-consolidation processes which are

manipulated by the existent powers. Due to the nature of neoliberal globalization which

signifies the intensification of global competition and the reception of threatening

economic challenges by countries as a whole, rather than economic reform against the

marketism, it creates an environment which pressures and induces market-friendly

policies.

On the other hand, globalization also facilitates the possibility for various

disadvantaged members of society and the marginalized sectors of the market to express

their demands which were previously suppressed, through “nation-state relativization.”

In the relationship between the state and its people, because the former monopolistic

status is weakened, it is possible that this might strengthen the various minority or

economically disadvantaged identities which had been suppressed under authoritarian

regime. Of course, the exact opposite, where there is an expansion of free markets and

the emergence of a strong state working in unison, may occur and there is the possibility

that conflict between the neoliberal state and civil society may escalate.

Commonly, economic monopolistic forces take advantage of neoliberal

globalization in order to protect their economic interests and to increase production in

the midst of the challenge of democratization. In the case of the Philippines, although a

part of the former economic monopolistic structure and the existent power structure

experienced reform, they were left largely untouched, and were modified and

reproduced (Park Seung-woo, 2007). For this reason the Philippine democracy is often

referred to as a “cacique democracy” (Anderson, 1988).

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2) Typification of Asian Cases of Democratization

Based on the discussion above, we can go forwards to make a typology of the variation

in democratization. In my view, there might be two ideal types which is supposed in

relation to the qualitative differences in de-monopolization during the democratization

process11

. One is the case in which the interests of the former monopolistic group

remain largely unchanged. The other is the case in which de-monopolization in all of

the political, economic and social dimensions occurs on a large-scale. If the former is a

“minimalist de-monopolization type,” then the latter is a maximalist de-monopolization

type.” In reality, society lies on the continuum between the two extremes, that is, the

maximalist de-monopolization pattern and the minimalist de-monopolization pattern. 1,

I divided the level of political demonopolization into high and low.

Table 1. The Dissolution Level of Political Monopoly and Civil Society

The Dissolution Level of Political Monopoly

High Low

The level of activation of

civil society and social

movements

High

Competitive

oligarchic

democracy

Conflictual neo-oligarchy

(democratic oligarchy)

Low

Stable

oligarchic

democracy

stagnant neo-

oligarchy(democratic oligarchy)

In the period of developmental dictatorship, there exists a peculiar political

monopolistic structure or political oligarchy. This is of course combined with social and

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economic monopolies. To what extent this political oligarchy is dismantled in the

democratization process determines the level of democratization. Here we can

distinguish 3 types of democracies in Asia. The first is a type of pre-democratic

transition, which includes Malaysia and Burma. These societies is still in the stage

before the road of democratic transition. The second is a neo-oligarchy type of

democratization. This can be called a type of neo-oligarchy(“democratic” oligarchy‟).

Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines might be covered by this type. The third is a

„oligarchic democracy‟ type, compared to the second neo-oligarchy. This covers South

Korea and Taiwan. This type might be a parallel to so-called „polyarchy‟(Dahl, 1971).

Therefore, it can be called “polyarchic type”.

Under neo-oligarchy or democratic oligarchy, the past political oligarchical

order is basically maintained, but transformed to a certain level by the pressure by

challenges of civil society and social classes from below. This neo-oligarchy retains its

oligarchical nature from the point that the general public is isolated from access to the

authority, but because it does not continue in the same form – uniform changes in the

internal composition of the oligarchic groups also occur – it can be considered a new

form of oligarchy such as populist pluto-democracy in Thailand(Park Eun-hong, 2007).

The concrete form of these changes is the possible internal replacement of the

hegemonic group or changes at an individual power elite level. As in the Philippines, a

corrupt leader from a politically distinguished family may be ousted but another

member of that family may appear in his stead (Hur Sung-woo, 2007). From this point,

the neo-oligarchy is a “transformed oligarchy” or a “democratic” oligrachy. Here

“democratic” means that even the neo-oligarchy regime works under a formal form of

democracy.

22

Under the oligarchic democracy, which is a result of some wider rage of

disintegration of the former monopolies, new forces (for instance, the anti-dictatorship

reformative liberal political forces), distinct from the political oligarchy groups which

existed under the past dictatorship (for instance, the ultra-conservative forces), emerge

as intense competitive forces – at times experiencing transferences of power – and

create competition. Many Asian countries experienced the government changes, by

which the former anti-dictatorship opposition parties could become a new dominant

party, although it happed in the form of diverse kinds of alliance of some fraction of the

former dictatorial political forces and anti-dictatorship reformative political forces.

In this type of countries, democratization proceeded a little “successfully” to

result in a kind of “plural” political regime in which a few political forces compete with

each other quite freely in order to get a majority support from the populace in the

election. However, in most cases belonging to this type, this kind of political de-

monopolization does not extend to economic and social areas and such political process

falls far behind the expectation of the formerly repressed social groups.

Even in this “polyarchic” type, former socially and economically monopolistic

forces do not lose their powers much and retain them in a transformed way and form in

the post-dictatorship context. If we see the achievement of democratization from the

viewpoint of the lower class, it does not seem to have brought a meaningful changes in

their economic and social lives. For example, big conglomerates in South Korea, called

Chaebol, are keeping or expanding their economic power successfully by way of a new

market competition, although there has been some change in the ranking hierarchy

within them in the process of democratization. This kind of economic re-

23

monopolization can be applied not only to in the Philippines in the neo-oligarchy type

but also to South Korea in the polyarchic type of democratization.

Comparatively speaking, the “neo-oligarchy” type is the one in which the

democratic reform has been realized in a relatively minimal way, while the “oligarchic”

democracy is the one in which relatively wider range of the democratic reform has been

realized.

On the other hand, the level of stable establishment of the democratic system,

which is one aspect of consolidation, differs in accordance with the level of activation

of civil society. As seen in the Table 1, although the level of dissolution of monopolies

is also considered, the path of democracy may differ in accordance with the level of

activation of civil society and social movements as a part of it. In the case of a

oligarchic democracy in which the level of dissolution of political monopolies is high, a

“competitive“ type will arise if the level of activation of civil society is high and a

“stable” type will arise if the level is low. On the other hand, if the case of a neo-

oligarchy in which the level of activation of civil society is high, a “conflictual neo-

oligarchy” will be formed and a “stagnant neo-oligarchy” will be formed if the level is

low.

I would emphasize here that the argument that the crisis of democratic

governance comes from an overabundance of participation, proposed by certain political

scientists such as Huntington(Huntington et. al, 1975), presupposes in fact a certain

political message that low level of activation of civil society guarantee the “stability” of

a new democracy. In addition, I would also emphasize that, because the activation of

civil society and social movements is the backbone to keep up progress of the

democracy, the stable oligarchic democracy could easily regress into a neo-oligarchy.

24

Finally, let's clarify the characteristics of neo-oligarchy (democratic oligrachy)

and oligarchic democracy in relation to other discussions. First, as noted before,

oligarchic democracy can be defined as polyarchy in its own meaning, if we see the

procedural and formal aspects. In the neo-oligarchy, the government power change to

different political parties includes the former anti-dictatorship party, and the former

opposition leader who then become the president or prime minister of the post-

dictatorship government, thus fulfilling the criterion of polyarchy, though the level of

power shift might vaugh. However, I argue that this formal “polyarchy” does not bring

any stability to new democracies, without substantial de-monopolization on political,

economic and social levels.

Second, Hujiwara Kiichi(Butalia, 2006) differentiated the variation in Asian

democratization into exclusive democracy, tutelary democracy, delegative democracy,

and illiberal democracy. Here the exclusive democracy is a case in which the procedure

of formal democracy allows exclusion of a certain social groups, and tutelary

democracy allows veto-rights of a certain group, individual or institution, albeit formal.

In addition, delegative democracy means a case in which political power is in reality

concentrated and entrusted to administration or its leader giving them a new

unconstrained power. Illiberal democracy means that a new democracy is regulated to

guarantee the political continual dominance of a political group or party. In my view,

these types are not antithetical to each other. These can be regarded as diverse kinds of

characteristics of deficiencies of new democracies. I define neo-oligarchy type as

having characteristics defined as exclusive, tutelary and delegative democracy.

Third, Larry Diamond(1999) tried to define the next step after democratic

transition and consolidation as "liberal democracy" meaning American style of plural

25

democracy, which achieves a certain level of political and social pluralities. However, I

think he presupposes a kind of unilinear view of democratic development from

transition to democracy through consolidation to liberalization or pluralization of

democracy based on American model. In my view, American democracy remained a

oligarchic democracy confined to the white Americans until the late 1950s, when the

African Americans began to problematize such ethnic oligarchic-ness inherent in it,

which has been admired as ideal "plural democracy" and "democracy of freedom and

opportunity". We have to say that all democracies has oligarchic-ness as a inherent

character in it.

As a concluding remark, the conflict in the process of democratization happens

over transformative reorganization or dismantling reorganization of the former

economic, political and social monopolies. The former means that the former

monopolies are not disorganized and just transformed. As a result, the former

monopolistic forces keeps their power, and former repressed remains marginalized.

However, the dismantling reorganization means that the former monopolies are

disintegrated highly by way of radical extension of democracy, as a result of which

former monopolistic exclusion, discrimination and inequality changes substantially.

From radical democratic viewpoint, we have to try to transform a new democracy

towards the latter direction. I would call this direction 'socialization of democracy' or

'democratic socialization' 1. Democracies in the context of change from dictatorship to a

1 G. O'Donnell(1986) referred to 'socialization of democracy' in his book, Transitions from Authoritarian

Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, but does not analyze it further. What I mean

by the concept is close to Geoff Eley(2002: 22)'s expression, „making social of democracy‟. Socialization

of democracy means that the formerly monopolized power becomes shared more and more by the

26

new democracy should be socialized as high as possible. The state and politics should

be changed to include the formerly excluded demands and needs by way of economic,

political and social de-monopolization and the diverse kinds of subalterns should be the

new included political subjects.

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FOOTNOTE

1) S. Huntington samual ----------------------------------------

2) ------------------(AAAA)

3 Thus far, transitology and consolidology has focused on an analysis of “the third wave of

democratization” through various methods. If we analyze the flow through a few representative

arguments, Linz, Diamond and Lipset(1988-1999), O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead(1986),

Hungtington(1991) compiled the theories on construction and activity and Przeworski(1991), who tried to

understand the dynamics of the transition to democracy, expanded upon the analysis of the transition

32

process. However, the research which focused on the recovery and conversion to a democratic system

changed to research on consolidation, the complex process after transition. Much research on

consolidation has emerged, of which pioneering research was done by Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and

Valenzuela(1992). The recent research conducted by Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle(1995) based on

the Southern European cases is a good progress, which will be critically dealt with in this paper.

4 Samuel Huntington proposed the following problems as causes for the impediment of democratic

consolidation. The first type of problems covers transition problems. This includes the torturer

problem, which asks how to resolve the infringement of human rights incidents under an authoritarian

system, and the praetorian problems, which deal with reduction of the political involvement of military

authorities and the reshuffling of civilian-military relations. The second type of problems covers

contextual problems. This refers to insurrection, racial problems, regionalism, poverty, socio-economic

inequality, inflation, foreign debts, low growth, and in particular, low rates of development is the most

important problem in the consolidation of democracy. The third type of problems covers systemic

problems. Stalemates, retardation of policy-making, susceptibility to demagoguery, and domination by

vested economic interests belong to this type of problems (Huntington 1991, 208-209).

5 For more information, refer to Cho, Hee-Yeon Cho(2007).

6 This valuable resources, which are the object of social monopoly, can called 'social

power', different from political and economic power. Generally social power has two

usages. The one is that a certain individual and group retains the power and influence in

social areas and relations dominating others. The other is found in referring to laborers'

power, people's power, civic power or civil society power and so on. E. O. Wright(2006)

uses social power in the second usage, referring to social empowerment in response to

sate power and economic power.

33

7 R. Dahl(1971) suggests as constitutive conditions elective officials, free and fair elections, inclusive

suffrage, the right to run to office, freedom of expression, alternative information, associational autonomy.

These conditions and factors are important for working of democracy properly. However, if we see the

problem of a new democracy in Asian democratization context, democracy seemingly works successfully

in the formal working of democracy without substantial changes of the earlier monopolistic structure. The

former oligarchic and monopolistic character is well reproduced in the new polyarchic democracy,

although continual conflict and instability go on. Of course, we could say that it is not a proper polyarchy.

But it is not a solution. The point is whether the substantial change will be realized or not and whether we

can achieve a new conceptualization including such a real change.

8 C.W. Mills(1956) in his book, The Power Elite, showed the existence of a strong monopoly combination

of political, economic and military powers.

9 (Cho, Hee-Yeon, 2003: Mohiuddin and Cho. 2008)

10 This meaning is expressed quite clearly by Buchi-Glucksman(1980: vii): "politics is hegemony"

11 Laothamatas(1997) divides two different views: the one argues that "development drives democracy"

and the other "development doesn't drive democracy". Type I covers Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea,

Type II covers Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and Type III covers the Philippines and Burma. In type

I countries characterized by ethnic homogeneity, rapid development has driven democratic transition,

while, in type II countries characterized by intense ethnic conflict, development did not give rise to

democratic transition. In addition, the type III showed another trajectory in which the failure in economic

development resulted in strong pressure for political change.