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Dr. Michele Trizio
Qui fere in hoc sensu exponunt Aristotelem Notes on the
Byzantine sources of the Albertinian notion of Intellectus
Possessus
In is philosophical works, Albert the Great mentions the names
of Eustratius of Nicaea1 and Michael of Ephesus2, among a list of
Peripatetic philosophers, at least twice. These references may be
found in relation to that particular status of the intellect that
Albert defines as possessus. As scholars are probably aware, these
two Byzantine Aristotle commentators, who lived and worked between
the XI and XII century, are the authors of commentaries on specific
books of Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics3. Eustratius of Nicaea
commented on books I and VI of this work, whilst Michael of
Ephesus, whose biography is still quite a mystery, commented on
books V, IX and X. Both were all but neglected in Byzantium4, but
in the Latin West were considered essential and authoritative
sources for understanding the Nicomachean Ethics5.
The aim of this article is to account for the association
between the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, in
particular Eustratius of Nicaea, and the
1 On the life and thought of Eustratius of Nicaea cf. J.
DRAESEKE, Zu Eustratios of Nikia, Byzantinische
Zeitschrift, 5 (1886), 319-336; E. MARTINI, Eustratios
Metropolit von Nikaia, in Paulys Realenciclopedie, 1, col.
1490-1491; M. CACOUROS, Eustrate de Nice, in Dictionnaire des
Philosophes Antiques, publi sous la direction de R. GOULET, III,
Paris 2000, 378-388. 2 On Michael of Ephesus cf. K. PRAECHTER,
Review of Hayduck 1904, CAG 22.2 (Michael Ephesii In
Libros De Partibus Animalium Commentaria), Gttingische gelehrte
Anzeigen, 168 (1906), 861-907; Michael of Ephesos and Psellos,
Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 31 (1931), 1-12. To be updated with R.
BROWNING, An Unpublished Funeral Oration for Anna Comnena,
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 188, n.2 (1962),
1-12. This article was reprinted in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle
Tramsformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, New York
1990, 393-406. 3 They are all edited, along with the anonymous
commentary on books II-V, the anonymous Byzantine
commentator on book VII, and Aspasius commentary on book VIII,
in Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea
Commentaria, ed. G. HEYLBUT (CAG, 20), Berlin 1932. On this set of
commentaries cf. H.P.F. MERCKEN, The Greek Commentators on
Aristotles Ethics, in SORABJI, Aristotle Transformed cit., 407-443.
4 In a private conversation J. Demetracopoulos gave me some
evidence of a possible influence of
Eustratius commentaries on books I and VI on the erudite XIV
century monk Barlaam the Calabrian. However, this evidence is
slight and based on a mere parallelism of terms and expression
easily found in Aristotle himself. But the question does indeed
deserve deeper study. The question of the influence of Eustratius
theological treatises in Byzantium is, on the contrary, quite a
different matter. It seems that XII century theologian Niketas of
Maronea used some of Eustratius anti-latin treatises in his own
anti-latin dialogues; cf. A. BARMINE, Une source mconnue des
Dialogues de Nictas de Marone, Revue des tudes byzantines, 58
(2000), 231-243. 5 The corpus of the Greek-Byzantine commentaries
on the Nicomachean Ethics was translated by Robert
Grosseteste, probably immediately before the mid-XIII century.
His translation is partially edited in H. P. F. MERCKEN, The Greek
Commentaries on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin
Translation of Robert Grossateste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253), t. 1:
Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on book II, III and
IV. Critical Edition with an Introductory Study (Corpus Latinum
Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, VI.I), Leiden 1973; The
Greek Commetaries on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the
Latin Translation of Robert Grossateste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253),
t. 3: The Anonymous Commentary on Book VII, Aspasius on book VIII
and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X. Critical Edition with an
Introductory Study (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem
Graecorum, VI, 3), Leuven 1991. I am personally producing the
critical edition of Grossatestes translation of the anonymous
commentary on book V, of Michael of Ephesus commentary on the same
book, and of Eustratius commentary on book VI.
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notion of intellectus possessus elaborated by Albert the Great.
I am going to present the original results of a study on
Grossetestes unedited translation of Eustratius commentary on book
VI of the Nicomachean Ethicsin this regard6. This contains at least
two main passages in which Eustratius mentions the notion of
intellectus possessus as accounting for that peculiar status of the
human intellect characterized by the acquisition of a higher form
of intellection, apparently similar to the one characterising
certain Albertinian arguments on the same topic.
In order to survey this topic I will first analyze the original
Greek text of Eustratius commentary on book VI of the NE,
indicating the sources, structure and philosophical content of the
arguments that are most likely to have attracted Alberts attention.
The corresponding passages in the Latin version of Eustratius
commentary will be considered in order to prove Alberts textual
dependence on Eustratius. Finally, both the peculiarity of
Eustratius description of the status of human intellect in its
highest stage and the originality of Alberts reading of it will
emerge from this comparison of Eustratius position in the original
Greek text and Alberts reading thereof.
1. The status quaestionis
The name of Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesus have
recently been associated with the XIII century constitution and
discussion of the topic of the nature of human happiness in its
final and highest degree7. These Byzantine commentators of the
Nicomachean Ethics are treated as possible sources for the way in
which this topic was elaborated by some Latin thinkers
traditionally labelled as averroist. Moreover, scholars such as de
Libera have recently linked the consideration of the role played by
Eustratius and Michael to the role which was played by Albert the
Great in the discussion of the idea that human happiness reaches
its peek as man joins the agent intellect in a formal conjunction8.
Regarding this, de Libera stresses the importance of what he calls
(f)arabisme or thse farabo-avicenno-ghazalienne. However, de Libera
does not neglect the evidence favouring a theory of happiness
elaborated by Albert that starts from a wider range of sources,
combining al-Farabi, on the one hand, and the Byzantine
commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, on the other. According to
Albert, de Libera claims, the idea that happiness consists in mans
conjunction with the separate substances
6 For Grossatestes translation I will rely on the Eton College
122 manuscript.
7 On this topic see the essential L. BIANCHI, La felicit
intellettuale come professione nella Parigi del
Duecento, Rivista di Filosofia, 78 (1987), 181-199; ID., Il
vescovo e I filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e levoluzione
dellaristotelismo radicale, Bergamo 1990, 149-195. 8 Cf. e.g. A. DE
LIBERA, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie, Paris 1990, 268-269;
ID., Psychologie
philosophique et thologie de l intellect. Pour une histoire de
la philosophie allemande au XIVe sicle, Dialogue, 31,3 (1992),
377-397 ; ID., Averrosme tique et philosophie mystique. De la
flicit intellectuelle la vie bienheureuse, in L. BIANCHI, Filosofia
e teologia nel Trecento, Studi in onore di Eugenio Randi,
Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, 33-42. On Albert possible influence on the
so-called Averroists cf. C. STEEL, Medieval Philosophy: An
Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the Averroistic Ideal of
Happiness, in J. AERTSEN/A. SPEER, Was ist Philosophie im
Mittelalter? Akten des X Internationalen Kongresses fr
mittelalterlichen Philosophie der Societ Internationale pour ltude
de la Philosophie Mdivale, 25 bis 30 August 1997 in Erfurt, voll.
2, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), 152-174, in
part. 159.
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and God is not, to quote the author directly, un ide
exclusivement arabe, ni donc (f)arabienne, cest la charte du
pripattisme grco-arabe9.
However, this renewed interest in Eustratius of Nicaea and
Michael of Ephesus was recently demonstrated by the two articles by
Fioravanti10 and Bianchi11 that appeared in the proceedings of a
conference in Milan organized by the Italian Society for the Study
of Medieval Thought, whose title was Le Felicit nel Medioevo (Forms
of happiness in the Middle Ages). These articles attempt to rethink
the traditional categories used for the description of the
so-called Latin Averroism or Latin Arabism. Bianchi gives the
example of Boethius of Dacias De summo bono, pointing out that the
direct role played by Arabic sources, in particular that of
Averroes, in Boethius elaboration of the topic of the fiducia
philosophantis is actually immaterial. The idea that only
philosophy can truly account for human happiness, by means of a
formal conjunction with the agent intellect or in general by means
of a coniunctio, copulatio or continuatio between the human mind
and the separate intellects, and ultimately with God, is indeed
present in Boethius of Dacia, but via other sources. Bianchi
rightly points out that, given the ethical and practical undertones
of what have also been called speculative happiness or mental
happiness12, there are other sources which may have served the
purpose of sketching an idea of philosophy as the experience of a
contemplative way of life. Here he points to the Byzantine
commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratius of Nicaea and
Michael of Ephesus. In the end, Bianchi claims, we also have
formulas like copulatio or coniunctio, which could resemble similar
arguments to be found in the Latin translation of Arabic sources,
in the Latin translation of Eustratius commentary on book I of the
Nicomachean Ethics13. Moreover, according to Bianchi, the Byzantine
commentators also emphasise the idea of intellectualis vita, the
idea that rational activity makes man truly and authentically man,
which closely resembles certain arguments put forward in Boethius
of Dacias De summo bono14.
It is as yet too early to say whether or not Bianchis intuition
will prove fruitful; the author himself seems to be cautious in
suggesting the possibility of a direct influence of the Byzantine
commentators on the NE on Boethius of Dacia and on other so-called
averroists, neither to be linked immediately to Alberts elaboration
of the topic of the intellectual happiness nor to Alberts reading
of Arabic or Greek source material, like Eustratius of Nicaea. What
one can say is that scholars do not even agree about Alberts view
on the topic at stake, namely, the nature and character of the
Albertinian theory of
9 A. DE LIBERA, Raison et foi, Archologie dune crise dAlbert le
Grand Jean Paul II, Paris 2993, 322.
10 G. FIORAVANTI, La felicit intellettuale: storiografia e
precisazioni, in M. BETTETINI/F.D. PAPARELLA,
Le felicit nel medioevo, Atti del Convegno delle Societ italiana
per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Milano 12-13
settembre 2003, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, 1-34; cf. also. L. BIANCHI,
Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di unantropologia
averroista, Rinascimento, Seconda serie, 32 (1992), 185-201. 11
L. BIANCHI, Felicit intellettuale, ascetismo e arabismo, in
BETTETINI/PAPARELLA, Le felicit cit., 13-34; cf. also L. BIANCHI,
Boce de dacie et lEthique Nicomaque, Documenti e Studi sulla
Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 17 (2006), 231-248. 12
As well known these expressions were first coined by Corti in
1983; cf. M. CORTI, La felicit mentale. Nuove prospettive per
Cavalcanti e Dante, Torino 1983. 13
Cf. also BIANCHI, Felicit intellettuale cit., 31, n. 48. 14
A.J. CELANO, Boethius of Dacia: On the Highest Good, Traditio,
43 (1987), 199-214, 206.
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happiness, i.e. whether this form of contemplative happiness
involves a purely rational effort by human beings or a form of
mystical union15.
Given that we do not here intend to make a survey of this topic,
it is sufficient that we remember that the notion of intellectus
possessus elaborated by Albert and regarded by him as the Greek
term corresponding to the Arabic notion of intellectus adeptus is
essential for the whole Albertinian theory of contemplative
happiness, being the idea of conjunction between the human
intellect and the separate substances and God. This statement is
even more relevant if one bears in mind that, as we will show in
the present paper, the notion of intellectus possessus seems solely
terminologically referable, among the Greek thinkers mentioned by
Albert, to Eustratius of Nicaea.
2. Albert the Great on the Greek notion of intellectus
possessus
As stated above, the names of these two Byzantine Aristotle
commentators are to be found in Albert the Great concerning that
particular state of the intellect which he labels as possessus.
These references are to be found in arguments dealing directly with
the topic of contemplative happiness. A brief reconstruction of the
two main passages in which Albert mentions Eustratius and Michael
in relation to the notion of intellectus adeptus/possessus
follows.
In his De XV problematibus, Albert first introduces what he
calls the standard ancient position of all Peripatetics as
determined by Alfarabi. Here, the author is referring to the idea
that the potential intellect is the species of all intelligibles,
though it is not entirely in material potency in regard thereto.
Albert elaborates this argument further by mentioning the Graeci
sapientes, namely Porphyry, Eustratius of Nicaea, Aspasius, Michael
of Ephesus, and all others following Alexander of Aphrodisias (who
is said to be in agreement with Epicurus). They all share the
characterization of the human intellect as possessus. Possessus is,
according to Albert, a term peculiar to the Greek philosophical
tradition. However, Albert makes it clear that the term possessus
employed by the Greeks has the same meaning as the term adeptus
used by Arabic philosophers in regard to the same status of the
human intellect. Both terms, possessus and adeptus, refer to one
and the same idea: that which is possessus is other and different
in nature from the subject possessing this or that disposition
(aliud est et alterius naturae a possidente)16.
In a well-known passage of his De anima, Albert proposes a
similar scheme and a similar explanation of the concept of
adeptus/possessus in the case of the human intellect. In discussing
the way in which the conjunction between the potential and the
agent intellect takes place, Albert refers to one of the main
points of his theory on the intellect,
15 For an overview of the different opinions on the nature of
Alberts theory of contemplative happiness, cf.
J. MLLER, Natrliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus
Magnus, Mnster 2001, 80-135. 16
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1, 1975,
32,62-71: Hoc igitur omnium Peripateticorum antiqua est positio,
secundum quod eam Alfarabius determinavit. Ex qua sequitur
intellectum possibilem intellegibilium omnium esse speciem et non
omnino potentiam esse materialem ad ipsa. Post hoc Graeci
sapientes, Porphyrius scilicet et Eustratius, Aspasius et Michael
Ephesius et quam plures alii venerunt praeter Alexandrum, qui
Epicuro consentit, qui omnes intellectum hominis intellectum
possessum et non de natura intelligentiae existentem esse dixerunt.
Et quem Graeci sapientes possessum, eundem Arabum philosophi
Avicenna, Averroes, Abubacher et quidam alii adeptum esse dicebant,
quia id quod possessum est, aliud est et alterius naturae a
possidente..
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namely, the idea that the agent intellect does not act as a mere
efficient cause of our knowledge, but acts beyond this towards the
potential intellect as its formal cause, as a form acting upon its
matter (sicut forma materiae)17. The intellectus adeptus, which can
also be called possessus, according to Albert, is the result of
precisely this composition between the agent intellect and the
potential one, evidently following a process of progressive
actualization of mans intellectual potentialities. It is through
this particular compound (compositum) that we achieve our proper
nature and essence as man fully, and are allowed the intellection
of separate substances (intelligere separata)18. Albert ascribes
this form of conjunction to book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where
Aristotle describes the intellect as our most divine part and
contemplation as the highest activity which can be performed by a
human being19. Albert ascribes the idea of a formal conjunction
between the agent and potential intellect to Aristotle himself,
remarking that this very same type of conjunction can also be found
in the above mentioned Eustratius of Nicaea and Michael of
Ephesus20.
These two passages are well known to most specialists. Needless
to say, Alberts theory of the intellect entails a series of aspects
whose complexity cannot be treated here. Problems like the relation
between the doctrine expounded by Albert in his philosophical works
and the one to be found in his theological one, as well as the
problem of the different chronological phases of the Albertinian
elaboration of his main standpoints, go beyond the scope of this
paper21. Nevertheless, the reasons why Albert mentions Eustratius
in regard to the status of the intellect which he calls possessus
have still not been studied by modern scholarship and deserve great
attention. These reasons, as I will try to show, are related to the
sources employed by Eustratius in order to construct the main
arguments in his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics,
in particular the Neoplatonic source material22.
3. Eustratius and the intellectus possessus/pkthtoj.
17 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11, Opera Omnia VII, pars I,
1968, 222,15-28.
18 On the intellectus adeptus, cf. the recent L. STURLESE,
Vernunft und Glck. Die Lehre vom intellectus
adeptus und die mentale Glckseligkeit bei Albert dem Groen,
Mnster 2005 (Lectio Albertina, 7). 19
ARISTOTELES, EN, X,VII,1177a13-18. 20
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11 (Et est digressio declarans
veram causam et modum coniunctionis intellectus agentis nobiscum),
Opera Omnia VII, pars I, 1968, 222,4-14: Et hoc vocatur a
philosophis moveri ad continuitatem et coniunctionem cum agente
intellectu; et cum sic acceperit omnia intelligibilia, habet lumen
agentis ut formam sibi adhaerentem, et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo
quod lumen suum est essentia sua et non est extra ipsum, tunc
adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma materiae. Et hoc
sit compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et
divinus; et tunc homo perfectus est ad operandum opus illud quod
est opus suum, inquantum est homo, et hoc est opus, quod operatur
deus, et hoc est perfecte per seipsum contemplari et intelligere
separata. Et iste modus et ista coniunctionis concordat cum
Aristotele in X Ethicae, ubi gere dicit ista, et praecipue
concordat Eustratio et Michaeli Ephesio, qui fere in hoc sensu
exponunt Aristotelem ibidem.. 21
In this respect it is always useful to refer to H. ANZULEWICZ,
Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des
Albertus Magnus, Archives dHistorie doctrinale et littraire du
Moyen Age, 70 (2003), 165-218. 22
Cf. MICHELE TRIZIO, Eustrazio di Nicaea, Studio storico
dottrinale del commento al VI libro dellEthica Nicomachea, doctoral
dissertation, University of Bari, 2006, 116-289. Here I largely
accounted for the dependence of Eustratiuscommentary on book VI of
the NE upon Proclean sources.
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Eustratius acquaintance with Neoplatonic literature is not an
entirely new issue, although this dependence has often been
described in vague terms or left unqualified. In his monumental
monograph on Michael Psellus, published in 1920, Zervos points out
some evidence of Eustratius dependence upon Proclus, linking this
dependence to the same Psellian heritage and influence on the
immediately following generation of thinkers23. However, it was
through a study by Giocarinis that Eustratius positive attitude
towards Neoplatonism became evident24. This impressive study on
Eustratius commentary on NE,I,4, where the commentator criticises
Aristotles arguments against the Platonic ideal Good, could show
how extensively this commentary depends upon the Neoplatonist
philosophy. In particular, as recently shown by Carlos Steel, the
main source of Eustratius own counter criticism to the Aristotelian
standpoints seems to be Proclus commentary on Platos Parmenides25.
To this commentary by Proclus seems to refer the very same
periphrasis through which Eustratius introduces his counter
arguments. That is, the meaning of the attribution of these counter
arguments to those around Parmenides and Plato26, whereas neither
Parmenides nor the Platonic dialogue named after him seem to
produce such a defence of the doctrine of Ideas.
In a previous article of mine I showed not only that the
influence of Proclus is consistent with both the terminology and
the arguments developed by Eustratius, but also that the presence
of Proclus seems to be widespread through all the three
commentaries written by our commentator27. Focusing on the problem
of the Aristotelian distinction between absolute (plj) and
conditional necessity (x poqsewj), I could show how Eustratius
interprets the distinction at stake within a non-Aristotelian
framework. Despite the complementary nature of the two kinds of
necessity in Aristotle, the commentator strictly applies absolute
necessity, on the one hand, to what he calls beings in the proper
sense of the term(kurwjnta), i.e. those beings properly called so
that always remain self-identical (kurwj nta t e kat t ut ka satwj
conta); and conditional necessity, on the other, to that which is
never a proper being (ntwjodpoten), which he associates to what is
subject to coming to be and passing away28. He also collocates this
particular interpretation of Aristotles different kinds of
necessity within the framework of the distinction between causes
(atia) and concomitant causes (snaitia). Only the first can be
considered proper causes as they are the only ones which transcend
their effect (mna tn atiatn xrhtai)29. In both cases,
23 Cf. C. ZERVOS, Un philosophe noplatonicienne du XIe sicle:
Michel Psellos, New York 1973 (II ed.),
225-227. 24
Cf. K. GIOCARINIS, Eustratios of Nicaeas Defense of the Doctrine
of Ideas, Franciscan Studies, 24 (1964), 159-204; Cf also A.C.
LLOYD, The Aristotelianism of Eustratios of Nicaea, in J. WIESNER,
Aristoteles, Werk and Wirkung, Mlanges P. Moraux, t. II, Berlin
1987, 341-351, 350. 25
Cf. C. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the
Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, Bullettin
de Philosophie Mdivale, 44 (2002), 51-57, in part. 52-53. 26
EUSTRATIUS, In I EN, ed. Heylbut, 49,7-11. 27
M. TRIZIO, Eustratius of Nicaea on Absolute and Conditional
Necessity. A survey of the Commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur, XII
(2006), 35-63. 28
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 293,10-20 (ed. Heylbut). 29
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 267,18-22 (ed. Heylbut).
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Proclus seems to be the ever-present shadow behind these
arguments put forward by Eustratius30.
This Proclean influence on our commentator is relevant for the
discussion of the topic of the present paper. In fact, Proclus
seems to be the direct source of Eustratiuss two main arguments,
which seems to account for Alberts reference to the Byzantine
commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics when dealing with the notion
of the intellectus possessus/adeptus. As a matter of fact, there
are two passages in the Latin version of Eustratius commentary on
book VI of the NE in which this notion can be found. They
correspond to 303,19-26 and 314,8-18 of the Heylbut edition. These
passages are very similar to each other. Nevertheless, it might be
convenient to analyze them both.
Let us start with the first one (303,19-27, ed. Heylbut), here
quoted along with the Latin translation.
EUSTRATIUS GRAECUS, In VI EN, 303,19-27 (ed. Heylbut):
gryucjm,nyucneiligmnwj nerge, sullogizomnh ka metabanousa ej
sumpersmata kprotsewn, j d, metcousa no plj pibllei, cousa m,n ka
tj
rcjkatojroujjnophcmata,ginomnhd,katotwnpkeina,tannoergnhtai,tojnohtojnohtjpibllousa,ekamqrwjkamojkaq'parxin,llkaq'nperiecomnhtpntakanoosakaq'kaston,dikatoiath
katstasij o fsij ll xij tj yucj nomzetai, j
xwqenpeisiosakaginomnhpkthtoj.
EUSTRATIUS LATINUS, Eton College 122, f 110 ra: Anima enim ut
quidem involute operatur, syllogizans et transiens in conclusiones
ex propositionibus, ut autem participans intellectu simpliciter
apponit, habens quidem et principia et definitiones ut intellectus,
facta autem ultra haec, cum intellectualis fiat, intellectualibus
intellectualiter congruens, si et non repente et simul ut qui
secundum existentiam ut ab extra superveniens et ingrediens et
facta possessa..
This passage represents nothing more than an interweaving puzzle
of quotations taken from Proclus. The soul qua soul possesses the
intelligibles in an unfolded manner (neiligmnwj/involute), that is
to say within the dimension of discursive reasoning, which acts
syllogistically (sullogizomnh/syllogizans), passing from the order
of premises to the order of conclusions (metabanousa ej sumpersmata
kprotsewn/transiens in conclusiones ex propositionibus). It means
that at first the soul possesses the intelligibles in a divisive,
non-coordinated, and non-articulate manner. But the soul when
participating of the Intellect can grasp the intelligibles by means
of direct apprehensions (plj pibllei/simpliciter apponit). In this
way the soul somehow transcends the dimension of discursive
reasoning, thus beginning to recollect the intelligible contents
that it has itself possessed since the beginning.
This basic description of the twofold manner in which the soul
relates to the intelligibles in the process of concept formation,
passing from discursive to non-discursive thought, is nothing but a
summary made up of technical terms and expressions
30 EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 267,19-22 (ed. Heylbut): tj m,n gr
gnsewj rca o roi ka t
ximata pge tnnagkawn, tjd,prxewjtpoihtikkat telik.
tatagrmnakurwj atia, ti ka mna tn atiatn xrhtai. = PROCLUS,
Elementatio theologica, 75 (ed. Dodds):
Pntkurwjkurwjkurwjkurwjatiatiatiationlegmenonxrhtaixrhtaixrhtaixrhtaitopotelsmatoj.
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to be found in Proclus works31. Even the very same structure of
the argument seems to be borrowed entirely from Proclus. As a
matter of fact, Eustratius emphasises the distinction between, on
the one hand, the soul qua soul (jm,nyuc), which acts by passing
(metabanousa) from the premises to the consequences within the
sequence of a syllogism, and on the other, the soul as
participating in the Nous (j d, metcousano), thus being capable of
grasping the intelligibles in an immediate and direct way
(pljpibllei). If one turns to Proclus commentary on the Timaeus he
will find the very same argument in regard to the ways in which the
logos can attain the knowledge of the eternal Being (te n)32. The
logos qua logos (jm,nlgoj) acts by passing from (metabatikj) one
content to the other within the discursive and analogical
reasoning; on the contrary, the logos in its intellectual activity
proper (jd,non) acts in a simple (metplthtoj) and direct way.
Nevertheless, as known to the specialists of Proclus, the latter
would have stressed that even after recollection, when the passage
from discursive to non-discursive thought takes place, our
knowledge of the intelligibles remains somehow metabatikj33. If
before, within discursive reasoning, we were forced to pass from
the order to the premises to the one of the conclusions as a result
of the dianoetic activity of the soul, the present direct grasping
of the intelligibles still cannot attain simultaneous and unified
knowledge of them: the particular souls can grasp the intelligibles
only one by one, one after the other, running around the Intellect
and dancing around it in a circle, as Eustratius himself had
previously said in his commentary on book I of the NE (47,4-11, ed.
Heylbut), literally quoting from Proclus commentary on the
Parmenides34. It is not the case that in the passage we are
analyzing, Eustratius also follows an argument from Proclus
commentary on the Parmenides closely in order to emphasise the fact
that the soul cannot grasp the intelligibles simultaneously nor all
at once (m qrwj kamo)35; on the contrary, the soul can embrace all
the intelligibles singularly (kaq' nperiecomnh t pnta), grasping
and thinking them one by one, one after the other
(noosakaq'kaston)36.
31 The idea that the soul is all forms in an unfolded manner
(neiligmnwj) can be found in PROCLUS, In
Eucl., 16,10-16 (ed. Friedlein); In Tim., 1,342,16 (ed. Diehl).
For non-discursive reasoning as proceeding through direct
apprehensions or direct grasping of the intelligibles (plj
pibllei/toj nohtojnohtj pibllousa) see PROCLUS, In Parm., 704,28-34
(ed. Cousin); In I Alc., 246,15-18 (ed. Westerink); In Tim.,
2,313,13-15 (ed. Diehl); Eclogae de philosophia Chaldaica, fr.4,1-4
(ed. Des Places). 32
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,19-21 (ed. Heylbut):
gryucjm,nyucneiligmnwj
nerge,sullogizomnhkametabanousaejsumpersmatakprotsewn,jd,metcousanopljpibllei.
= PROCLUS, In Tim., 1,246,5-7: j m,nj m,nj m,nj m,n lgoj nerge
metabametabametabametabatikj, j d,j d,j d,j d, nonnonnonnon
metplplplplthtoj. The expression metcousano, referred to the
particular soul (and not to the divine ones) in its participation
in the Intellect, is to be found in many Proclean passages
literally. Cf. PROCLUS, Theol. Plat, 3,21,26-27 (ed.
Saffrey-Westerink); 5,85,24. The same expression also occurrs in
the specific case of the divine souls, like in PROCLUS, El. Theol.,
182,8-10. 33
Cf e.g. PROCLUS, Theol. Plat., 4,43,20-22 (ed.
Saffrey-Westerink); In Tim., 1,219,1-3 (ed. Diehl); 2,219,4-5.
34
Cf. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources cit., 52-53. 35
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,23-24 (ed. Heylbut): ekamqrwjkamo...=
In Parm., 1165,24-25 (ed. Cousin): ote gr lhn atn (scil. the soul)
momomomo toj to no pargein nomasin: o grqrwjqrwjqrwjqrwjatpfukenrn.
36
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 303,24-25 (ed. Heylbut): kaq' nperiecomnh
tpntaka noosakaq'kaston. = PROCLUS, In Parm., 808,12-14 (ed.
Cousin): kaqorsa (scil. the particular soul) d,
kakastonkastonkastonkastontnllwn,kakaq'nkaq'nkaq'nkaq'n
pntapntapntapntakaoc'mopntanoosanoosanoosanoosa.
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9
What is interesting here is that Eustratius compares the way in
which the particular soul possesses the intelligibles with the way
in which the intelligibles are embraced and grasped by what he
calls the Intellect by existence ( kaq' parxin /qui secundum
existentiam). It is clear that if the particular souls can grasp
the intelligibles only one after the other, then the Intellect
secundum existentiam embraces them in a simultaneous, concentrated,
and unified manner. Elsewhere37, the commentator elaborates this
different possession of the intelligibles further, freely borrowing
a distinction between a nojkat'osan/intellectus secundum
substantiam and a noj kaq' xin/intellectus secundum habitum from an
argument available in Proclus commentary on the Timaeus38. Proclus
describes the latter status as being that disposition by means of
which the soul becomes intelligent. Eustratius simply extends this
description, which Proclus specifically refers to the case of the
World-Soul, to the cases of individual particular souls, evidently
on the grounds that what is valid for the World-Soul must also be
considered valid for the lower realms, namely, for the individual
and particular souls.
This conceptual diptych of noj kat' osan and noj kaq' xin is
used by Eustratius to describe, again in terms which closely
resemble several Proclean arguments, the difference in possession
of the intelligibles between the separate Nous and the particular
souls. The first possesses all the intelligibles in-itself
(pntacwnnauttgnwst)39, grasping them by means of a direct and
simultaneous act of intellection
(plajpibolajkaqroijkatalambnwnat)40, never losing or abandoning
them (odpotexstataip'atn)41. The second is characterized by a
dispositional status (kaq'xin), and by its discursive activity,
which has the common notions in the realm of syllogistic
argumentation as its starting point42.
Nevertheless, the intellect also possesses innate contents,
which Eustratius describes as certain echoes in it of an absolutely
existing Intellect (phcmattinanauttopljprcontojno). This
description of the innate knowledge in us is again rooted in
Proclus43, and it also occurs in the passage previously subject to
my analysis (303,19-23, ed. Heylbut). In his Super Ethica Albert
discusses this latter expression used
37 EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,19-23 (ed. Heylbut):
m,ngrkat'osannojpntacwnnaut
tgnwstkaplajpibolajkaqroijkatalambnwnatodpotexstataip'atn, d, n
mn noj kaq' xin cwn t enai, mnaj cei x rcj tj koinj nnoaj
okeanergmatakanomataphcmattinanauttopljprcontojno. 38
PROCLUS, In Tim., 2,313,1-4 (ed. Diehl). Cf. also In I Alc.,
65,19-66,6 (ed. Westerink). 39
Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, El. Theol., prop. 194 (ed. Dodds): Psa yuc
pnta cei t edh, nojprtwjcei. 40
Cf. n. 32 and 37. 41
Cf. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 188,8-11 (ed. Westerink):
otegrtkrettonagnhtjmetrajyucjdi maqsewj ersewj tugcnei tj autn
teleithtoj: e gr snesti toj
autngnwstojkaodpoteodpoteodpoteodpotefstataistataistataistataiatnatnatnatnod,ndeggnetaitjokeajgnsewj.In
this passage Proclus claims that the classes superior to our soul
do not attain perfection through a learning process, for they are
always united to their objects of knowledge and they never leave
them (odpote fstataiatn). 42
The term common notions (koina nnoiai) used to describe the
starting points of discursive reasoning and the principles of
scientific demonstrations is very common in the Neoplatonic
literature. Cf e.g. SYRIANUS, In Met. (ed. Kroll.), 18,9-10;
21,31-34; PROCLUS, In I Eucl., (ed. Friedlein), 240,11-14;
AMMONIUS, In de Int., 7,16-22 (ed. Busse); ASCLEPIUS, In Met.,
158,11-13 (ed. Hayduck); JOANNES PHILOPONUS, In A.pr., 2,24-27 (ed.
Wallies). Cf. also D.J. OMEARA, Le problme de la mtaphysique dans
l'antiquit tardive, Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und
Theologie, 33 (1986), 1-14, 12-13. 43
See for instance PROCLUS, In I Alc., 99,13-19 (ed.
Westerink).
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10
by Eustratius at length, rightly pointing out that it should be
understood within the distinction between the possession of the
intelligible forms in the separate intelligences and in the human
intellect. Forms are to be found in us as a kind of resonance (per
redundantiam) of the forms to be found in the separate
intelligences, which are the sources from which they are emanated
(sicut in fonte profundente eas)44. But nevertheless, Albert seems
to diverge in opinion from Eustratius as he claims that these
echoes are not the substance of our intellect (substantia
intellectus nostri), but almost an accident in the soul (accidens
in anima), insofar as we are generally forced to attain the
knowledge of the forms from the particular individuals45. On the
contrary, all the evidence suggests that according to Eustratius
the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect are to be
linked to the logoi ousiodeis of the Neoplatonic tradition46, the
logoi which Proclus, for example, describes as a kind of breathing
thought in us47, and which the soul literally projects before
itself within distinct and articulated acts48. Eustratius reference
to the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect reflects
the idea that the soul proceeds from the Intellect, preserving the
character of its cause, though only secondarily49. This is why the
Intellect is all forms in a unified and concentrated manner,
whereas the soul is all forms in a discursive, analogical, and
unfolding manner. The presence of echoes in us of an absolutely
existing Intellect relates to precisely this principle, namely,
that in the particular souls the indivisible forms have become
logoi. These logoi are ousiodeis, in the sense that, far from being
mere accidents of the soul, as stated by Albert, they constitute
the very essence of the soul itself.
What is more interesting is the way in which Eustratius
describes the intellectual state which he calls kaq' xin, for it
relates directly to the Albertinian notion of intellectus
possessus. In the passage previously analyzed (303,19-27, ed.
Heylbut), after stressing the different kinds of possession of the
intelligibles between the particular soul and what he calls
Intellect by existence (kaq'parxin), he claims that the expression
intellect by disposition (kaq' xin) refers to a condition
(katstasij) of our soul which is as such neither natural (o fsij)
nor essential, but merely dispositional. Dispositional means,
Eustratius explains, that this condition comes over the soul from
outside (xwqen peisiosa/ab extra superveniens) thus becoming
acquired (ginomnhpkthtoj/facta possessa).
The Greek term pkthtoj, acquired or possessed, is rendered as
Grossetesta as possessa. The feminine is easily explainable here by
the fact that possessa refers to the soul (anima) in its
participation in the Intellect (participans intellectu). But, as it
is clear from the text, the term pkthtoj/possessa is explanatory of
the term xij/dispositio in
44 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Ethica, Opera Omnia XIV,2, 1987, liber
VI, lectio VIII, 452,46-50.
45 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Ethica, Opera Omnia XIV,2, 1987, liber
VI, lectio VIII, 452,50-52.
46 Cf. C. STEEL, Breathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate
Knowledge of the Soul, in J.J. O CLEARY (ed.),
The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, Leuven 1997, 293-309,
295-299. 47
Cf. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 192,2-4 (ed. Westerink) 48
Cf. PROCLUS, In Eucl., 17,4-5; 46,12-13 (ed. Friedlein); In
Parm., 896,1-4 (ed. Cousin). 49
Other passages in Eustratius in which the terms phcmata occurs
in a similar context are: EUSTRATIUS, In II An., 222,24-25 (ed.
Hayduck); 257,37-38; In VI EN, 315,33-34 (ed. Heylbut), 377,37;
379,29-30. In all these passages the expression is referred to the
common notions or the axioms upon which discursive reasoning
depends. It means that the expression at stake already refers to
the unfolding and discursive manner in which innate knowledge is
present in our soul. Cf. also. K. IERODIAKONOU, Metaphysics in the
Byzantine Tradition: Eustratios of Nicaea on Universals, Quaestio,
5 (2006), 67-82, in part. 81, n. 30.
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11
regard to the expression nojkaq'xin. Briefly: the two
expressions mean one and the same thing.
As already shown, this Eustratius passage is heavily influenced
by Proclean arguments. The description of the dispositional status
of our intellect as acquired or possessed does not represent an
exception. The term pkthtoj can often be found in Proclus as a
description of a state or condition that does not belong to
something substantially, but only in a participating or
dispositional manner. For example, in his commentary on the
Republic, Proclus claims that every God is essentially or
substantially (ntwj) good, insofar as it is constituted in his
substance (osiwmnoj) according to the good, and it does not possess
the good as something acquired (pkthton) or as a disposition
(jxin). In fact, continues Proclus, that which is good in this
latter way is neither essentially nor truly good (tnti), but has
only participated in the good (togaqometscen)50. Even more striking
is a passage from Proclus commentary on the Timaeus, for it relates
directly to the problem of the different types of knowledge to be
found in the particular souls and in the higher order of realities.
The arguments at stake run as follow: if knowledge among the Gods
is belongs to them essentially and substantially (kat' osan), and
if their intellection is not acquired (pkthtoj), then they will
know what they know in a way coordinated to their essence51.
Eustratius description of the dispositional state of our
intellect as acquired or possessed is borrowed from Proclus in its
entirety. The commentator simply applies the general Proclean
conceptual opposition kat'osan- pkthtoj to the specific case of the
different status and nature of the separate Nous and the human
intellect. This description has to be understood within a
Neoplatonic metaphysical framework, which can once again be traced
back to Proclus, characterized by the distinction between that
which exists and acts by its own essence and that which exists or
acts by participation.
As shown before, the term pkthtojis to be found in Proclus as
opposed to kat'osan, referring to the distinction between a
participatory or dispositional character to the possession of a
property vis--vis the essential possession of this or that
property, as is clear from the Proclean passages mentioned
previously. The same can be said for the notion of kaq' parxin,
which Eustratius associates with the Intellect that he also
defines, as we have seen, askat' osan, or kurwj or kriojnoj,
referring to the Supreme Intellect52. As a matter of fact, the
concept ofkaq'parxin - referred to the separate Intellect by
Eustratius which is to be understood as the essential possession of
the proper mode determining a character, is to be found in Proclus
within a threefold distinction of the modes in which characters
exist, namely in their causes (kat'atan), substantially or
existentially (kaq'parxin), and by participation (katmqexin)53. Or,
and this resembles the case of Eustratius more closely, Proclus
simply refers to the
50 PROCLUS, In Remp., 1,28,17-20 (ed. Kroll).
51 PROCLUS, In Tim., 1,352,19-22 (ed. Diehl). However, it is
also true that in the Elements of Theology
Proclus clearly states that since the substance of every God is
supra-substantial goodness, he has goodness neither as a
disposition (kaq'xin) nor substantially or essentially (kat'osan),
but in a supra-substantial manner. Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol.,
119,16-19 (ed. Dodds). 52
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 314,16 (ed. Heylbut); 317,27. 53
PROCLUS, El. Theol., 65 (ed. Dodds); 140,17-18. On this topic,
cf. C STEEL, UPARXISchez Proclus, in F. ROMANO/D.P. TAORMINA
(eds.), Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel nel neoplatonismo, Atti del I
Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo,
Universit degli Studi di Catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992, Firenze 1994,
79-100.
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12
opposition kaq' parxin - kat mqexin, indipendently from from the
general description of the Triadic structure of Reality, in order
to draw a more general distinction between the substantial
inherence of a character or property as opposed to possession
through mere participation in the same character54. It is therefore
unsurprising that Eustratius himself refers to this Proclean
principle in comparing the Intellect kaq'parxin, the absolutely
(plj) existing one, with the intellect by disposition, the
previously seen nojkaq'xin. The commentator confirms that this
distinction has to be understood within the more general
distinction between essential and participatory modes of existence
of a character as he explicitly states that our intellect is
neither absolute nor by existence, but by disposition, kaq'xin,
where the latter expression has to be strictly understood as
katmqexin, i.e. by participation55.
The second passage (314,8-18) by Eustratius in which the Latin
term possessus appears shows many similarities to the one seen
previously (303,19-27). As a matter of fact, Eustratius also
stresses the different manner in which the intelligibles are to be
found in the Supreme Intellect (kriojnoj) and in the particular
soul here56. Proclus is once again the main source for the argument
at stake. When pure and free from the passions (kaqar gr genomnh ka
leuqra tn paqn yuc)57 the soul is illuminated because of the
proximity to the Intellect (llmpetai m,n t prj
nongeitnisei/resplendet ea quae ad intellectum vicinitate), thus
acquiring or receiving the capacity of acting in a purely
intellectual way (noerj/intellectualiter), and no longer in a
merely discursive manner. It can therefore grasp the intelligibles
by means of direct apprehensions, though neither simultaneously nor
all at once, but dancing around the Intellect (tnnonpericoreousa)
and moving (metabanousa) from one intelligible to the other.
Two things are interesting in this passage. The first one is the
reference to the illumination affecting the soul as it acts in a
purely intellectual manner. In fact, as the Proclus specialist is
aware, the expression kat' llamyin, by illumination or irradiation,
is linked to the notion of kaq' xin, by disposition, at least once
in
54 Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, In I Alc., 104,7-8 (ed. Westerink). Here
the Gods are said to be self-sufficient kaq'
parxin, whereas the other things are self-sufficient katmqexin.
55
EUSTRATIUS, IN VI EN, 303,16-17 (ed- Heylbut). 56
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, ed. Heylbut, 314,8-18: e gr ka noern lgei
tn yucn ka
nonprceinfhsnnat,ll'okosiwdjprceinnattnnontqetai,llgekthtnka j xin
piginmenon, kaq ka prteron erhtai. di toto ka taj lhqeutikaj
xesinatnsunhrqmhsen,rnatnkaktmenonxwqenkapoballmenon.kaqargrgenomnhkaleuqratnpaqnyuc,llmpetaim,ntprjnongeitnisei,dcetaid,keqentnoerjnergen,kaotwtntnntwnproslambneikatlhyinplajpibolajfaptomnhatn,okqronjkriojnojod,pntwnmo,llkaq'
nkastonatntnnonpericoreousaka
xtrwntnp'atonooumnwnejteronmetabanousa. = EUSTRATIUS LATINUS, Eton
College 122, f 112 va: Etsi enim intellectualem dicit animam et
intellectum existere ait in ipsa, sed non substantialiter existere
in ipsa intellectum ponit, sed possessum et ut habitum
supervenientem, quemadmodum et prius dictum est, propter hoc et
veridicis habitibus ipsum conumeravit, videns ipsum et possessum ab
extra et depositum. Pura enim facta et libera a passionibus anima
resplendet ea quae ad intellectum vicinitate, recipit autem illinc
intellectualiter operari, et sic entium assumit comprehensionem
simplicibus appositionibus contingens ipsa, non repente ut proprie
intellectus neque omnia simul, sed secundum unumquodque ipsorum
intellectum circumambulans et ex alteris quae ab ipso intellectu
intelliguntur in alterum transiens. 57
Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol., 209 (ed. Dodds). A reference to this
very same argument by Proclus is to be found also in EUSTRATIUS, In
VI EN, 317,24-25.
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13
Proclus works. This connection can be found in Proclus
commentary on the Alcibiades, where Proclus re-examines the
threefold distinction of the types of intellect already discussed
in his commentary on the Timaeus58, from the point of view of the
three types of love. The third one is the one which subsists in the
soul by illumination (kat'llamyin), corresponding to the intellect
by disposition (kaq' xin). This reference cannot be casual,
especially if one bears in mind that the illumination of the soul
which grants it the possibility of acting intellectually is due to
what Eustratius calls the proximity to the Intellect (t prj non
geitnisei). This expression is literally borrowed from Proclus
Platonic Theology59, and serves to stress the participatory and
dispositional character of the intellectual operation proper to the
particular souls within the argument expounded by Eustratius once
again.
The second interesting element is more directly related to the
topic of the intellect by disposition. Eustratius ascribes this
particular characterization of the intellect to Aristotle himself.
As a matter of fact, in book VI of the NE, the intellect is defined
by Aristotle, along with Art, Science, Practical Wisdom, and
Wisdom, as a truth attaining disposition(xij)60. The commentator
claims that according to Aristotle the intellect is actually a
disposition like the other four insofar as it is acquired from
outside (ktmenonxwqen) and can also be lost (poballmenon). But what
is surprising here is that what Eustratius ascribes directly to
Aristotle is expressed with the words and arguments of Proclus.
Actually, the argument expounded by Eustratius here is almost
identical to the one seen previously. The intellect does not
subsist in the soul essentially (osiwdj/substantialiter), but as
something acquired (kthtn/possessus), a supervening disposition (j
xin piginmenon). The term kthtn is synonymous with pkthtoj, and
like pkthtoj is rendered by Grosseteste as possessum. In this
context it has the same function as pkthtoj did in the previous
passage, namely, to characterise the intellectual activity of the
particular souls as participatory and dispositional, as opposed to
the essential (osiwdj/kat' osan) possession of this very same
property. The same is true of the expression j xin piginmenon,
which closely resembles the expression jxwqenpeisiosa employed by
Eustratius in the first passage analysed here, and which
immediately precedes the expression pkthtoj.
The Proclean background of these arguments now seems to be
clear. If possible, one could even add that the two expressions, j
xin piginmenon and j xwqenpeisiosa, to be found in the two
different Eustratius passages under discussion here, appear almost
literally in Proclus in one and the same passage from his
commentary on the Parmenides61. Here Proclus distinguishes between
two types of Multiplicity among beings, the first one essential,
and the other that supervenes from outside and is adventitious
(xwqen pigignmenon ka peisodidej). In this respect, these two terms
are closely related to the form gggnesqai used by Proclus to
describe generally
58 Cf. n. 38.
59 PROCLUS, Theol. Plat., 1,66,20-23 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink):
yuc d, atoknhtoj osa tj kat
nonmetceizwjkakatcrnonnergosattjnergeajpaustonkatngrupnonzwnktjprjprjprjprjtnnonnonnonnonceigeitnisegeitnisegeitnisegeitnisewj.
The same expression occurrs in EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,28-30 (ed.
Heylbut). 60
ARISTOTELES, EN,VI,3,1139b14-17. 61
PROCLUS, In Parm., 1187,41-1188,3 (ed. Cousin). Cf. also MICHAEL
PSELLUS, Theologica, 4,28-29 (ed. Gautier).
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14
that which comes into being in the soul from outside, like, for
example, those concepts (nomata) which are the result of an
abstractive process from sensible particulars and which do not
subsist (kat'osan) in our soul essentially62.
It seems that in general Eustratius simply applies terms and
expressions used by Proclus to describe the different types of
existence and the different manners which a character possesses in
the specific case of the different types of intellect. What is
clear is that when Albert refers the notion of intellectus
possessus to the Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics,
as the general Greek counterpart of the Arabic notion of
intellectus adeptus, he is probably referring to the two Eustratius
passages mentioned here.
It might be objected that the notion of nojkaq'xin, which lies
behind the notion of intellectus possessus, is not peculiar to
Eustratius, but is also to be found in other Late-Ancient
commentators. True, the expression noj kaq' xin occurs in many
relevant passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary on the De
Anima63, as well as in Themistius64 paraphrase of the same work,
and in Philoponus own commentary65. Nevertheless, according to
these commentators, this expression generally refers to that
particular state of the human intellect when it possesses a series
of thoughts without actually thinking them66, although in
Aristotles De anima (3,5,430a15) the term xij also seems to refer
to the active intellect directly67.
It might also be objected that in one passage of Alexander of
Aphrodisias De anima one can find a description of the nojkaq'xin
that appears to be similar to the one produced by Eustratius.
Actually, Alexander distinguishes between an intellect which he
calls natural (fusikj) or material (likj), common to all men who
are not physically incapacitated (n psin toj m pephrwmnoij), and
one that is acquired (pkthtoj), which comes to be only afterwards
(steron gginmenoj), and which Alexander calls form (edoj) and
disposition or habit (xij), i.e. the perfection of the natural and
material intellect (teleithj tofusiko)68. In this passage the term
pkthtoj, which Eustratius borrows from Proclus, and the expression
sterongginmenoj, similar to the forms jxinpiginmenonand
jxwqenpeisiosa, which are also in Eustratius via Proclus, also
characterise Alexanders notion of nojkaq' xin. But, again, despite
the occurrences of the same terms, it is clear that the intellect
in habit or by disposition at stake here is not the same one as
Eustratius is referring to. Alexander speaks of that habit or
disposition which happens to be in those who go through a process
of practice and learning69. On the contrary, Eustratius notion
62 PROCLUS, In Parm., 892,17-19 (ed. Cousin).
63 ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, De anima, 86,5 (ed. Bruns); 88,6;
De anima libri Mantissa, 107,20-21 (ed.
Bruns). 64
THEMISTIUS, In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis, 95,30-31
(ed. Heinze); 98,21-24; 100,2-3; 65
JOAHNNES PHILOPONUS, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria,
490,27 (ed. Hayduck). 66
For some exceptions to this general trend, see H.A. DAVIDSON,
Alfarabi, Avicenna, & Averroes, on Intellect. Their
Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect. & Theories of
Human Intellect, New York-Oxford 1992, 10, n. 22. 67
ARISTOTELES, De anima, 3,5,430a14-15: kastinm,ntoiotojnojtpnta
gnesqai,d,tpntapoien,jxijtij,oontfj. 68
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, De anima, 81,26-82,1 (ed. Bruns).
69
A different interpretation of Alexander reference to the
acquired (pkthtoj) character of the intellect is to be found in M.
GEOFFROY, La tradition arabe du Per no dAlexandre dAphrodise, in C.
DANCONA/G. SERRA (eds.), Aristotele e Alessandro dAfrodisia nella
tradizione araba, Aristotele e
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15
of nojkaq'xin/pkthtoj refers, as previously shown, to the
participatory character of the intellectual operation proper to the
particular soul, and it cannot therefore be assimilated with the
analogous notion to be found in Alexander. The very same reference
to the concept of katmqexin explaining the expression kaq'xinseems
to leave no doubt on the Neoplatonic, and particularly Proclean
root of Eustratius description of the dispositional intellect. As a
matter of fact, the same Albert, who, moreover, could not have read
Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima, reflects Eustratius emphasis on
the adventitious and acquired character of the intellect by
disposition as he claims that id quod possessum est, aliud est et
alterius naturae a possidente.70.
4. Alberts reading of Eustratius intellect theory
There are some relevant observations to be made regarding
Alberts reading of these and others of Eustratius passages from his
commentary on book VI of the NE. Most of them are strictly related
to the topic of the different states of intellect, specifically
concerning the intellects which Grosseteste renders as secundum
substantiam or secundum existentiam, on the one hand, and secundum
habitum, on the other.
First of all, Albert must without doubt have found the general
Neoplatonic flavour of certain arguments expounded by Eustratius
attractive, insofar as they show apparent affinities to arguments
and formulas found in the Latin translations of certain Arabic
philosophical works. For instance, Eustratius reference to the
different modes of possessions of the intelligible in the separate
Nous (concentrated, simultaneous, and united), and in the
particular soul (non-coordinated and discursive) fits in with
similar but more general arguments in the Liber de Causis, for
example, which concerns the different degrees of universality
possessed by the intelligible contents in the various separate
intelligences, as well as in Alberts reading of these arguments in
the De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa71.
In the latter work Albert literally recalls Eustratius
distinction between the two different statuses of the separate Nous
and the particular soul, as he identifies Eustratius intellectus
secundum substantiam with the notion of intellectus per
essentiam72, i.e. that intellect which is always in act and
identical to its thoughts, as a state belonging to the
Alessandro dAfrodisia nella tradizione araba, Padova 2002,
191-231, 217, in which the author interprets the terms pkthtoj as
referring to the qraqen of Aristotles agent intellect. However, I
am not sure that this, at least in De anima 81,26-82,1, is truly
the case. My interpretation of Alexanders reference to the term
pkthtoj is also confirmed in DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 10-12 and in
DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 254-255. 70
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1, 1975,
32,70-71 (quoted in full at n. 10). 71
Cf. e.g. Liber de Causis, IX,8-23 (ed. Pattin); ALBERTUS MAGNUS,
De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, Opera Omnia
XVII,2, 2,2,22,4-14. On this topic see E. COCCIA, Intellectus sive
intelligentia. Alberto Magno, Avverro e la noetica degli arabi,
Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosphie und Theologie, 53, 1/2,
(2006), 133-187. 72
On this notion see ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De Intellectu et
Intelliggibili, Opera Omnia IX, ed. Borgnet, Paris 1890, 507b.
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16
intellectus universaliter agens73, as opposed to the intellectus
possessus, which can only perform its operation in an imperfect
manner, according to its proper limit and capacity74. In making his
point Alberts argument is reminiscent of Eustratius description of
the different modes of existence and operation of the separate Nous
and the human intellect.
For example, other formulas employed by Eustratius seem to match
Alberts own habit of refering to concepts and notions related to
the category of emanationism. As we have already seen, Eustratius
develops an argument according to which the illumination of the
soul, which grants it the possibility of performing an intellectual
operation, is due to the proximity to the Intellect
(tprjtnnongeitnisei). Elsewhere he refers to the latter expression,
borrowed from Proclus Platonic Theology75, within a more general
argument on the status of the human intellect in regard to the
nature and function of the whole process of causation76. Through
the proximity to the Intellect (tprjtnnongeitnisei/quae ad
intellectum vicinitate), Eustratius claims, the particular human
soul acquires a certain intellectual capacity by participating in a
principle superior in rank to itself (to p,r atn tetagmnou
metcousan/eo quod super ipsam ordinatio participantem)77. This
proximity is explained by Eustratius through reference to the
general principle that the processions from the First Cause
(aprodoiktjprthjataj/entium egressus a prima causa) must take place
in a way that respects and preserves the unity of the causal chain
or concatenation (kaq' ermn / secundum ordinem). In this respect,
that which is lower in the hierarchy of beings must always be in
conjunction with that which is immediately superior to it, thus
keeping an element of similitude with it (e tofeimnousunaptomnou
tpratoka tinaprjkeno kekthmnou mowsin/semper suppositio coniunctio
ei quod ante ipsum et quamdam ad illud possidentem
similitudinem).
The Latin version of this puzzle of terms and expressions taken
here and there mainly from Proclus Elements of Theology78 and from
other works seems to provide Albert with a terminology that is very
close to that in his own works, borrowed mainly from Arabic
sources. The term vicinitas, used to describe the relation between
the soul and the Intellect, from which the particular soul receives
the capacity of performing a purely intellectual operation , the
expression entium egressus a prima causa, and finally the term
coniunctio, to be found in reference to the necessary unity of the
chain of causes, all closely relate to Alberts arguments on the
coniunctio, continuatio, and copulatio with
73 On the aequivocity of this notion, to be found in Albert as
referred to both the human active intellect and
to the separate Intelligence, if not to the Intellect of the
First Cause, cf. ANZULEWICZ, Entwicklung cit., 198-199. 74
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima
causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 2,2,20,114,82-115,4: Est autem
intellectus per essentiam, qui sua essentia universaliter agens
est, et movens omne quod est ad formam intellectus: et hoc propter
hoc quod semper in actu est, et per essentiam actu est, nec
adeptus, nec possessus dici potest. Propter quod dicit Eustratius,
quod possessus intellectus numquam potest tantum depurari et
perfici, quod per essentiam intellectus efficiatur, vel illi
similis, nisi per analogiam suae possibilitatis; 2,2,33,126,63-70;
2,1,8,16-20: Ab esse autem, quod superius est, deficit noster
intellectus eo quod non habemus intellectum, qui per essentiam
intellectus sit, sed potius intellectum, qui ex superiori causa
influxus est nobis, cuius virtus non nisi per studium adepta est..
75
Cf. n. 57. 76
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,28-32 (ed. Heylbut). 77
This formula is freely borrowed by Eustratius from PROCLUS, In
Tim., 3,269,15-20 (ed. Diehl), where Proclus discusses the way in
which the Indivisible is present in the particular souls. 78
Cf. PROCLUS, El. Theol., 11,8; (ed. Dodds); 21,15-18; 29,3-4;
132,29-30; PROCLUS, Theologia Platonica, 5,103,5-6 (ed.
Saffrey-Westerink).
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17
the separate substances79, as well as to Albert frequent
references to the term processio or fluxus in the description of
the emanation process80.
Despite these similarities, which can be explained by referring
to the common Neoplatonic background between Eustratius and the
other sources read and discussed by Albert, like the texts of the
Arabic tradition or Ps.-Dionysius, there are nevertheless
consistent differences between Eustratius authentic arguments and
their reading by Albert. These differences are primarily
terminological.
Eustratius formulas relating to the different states and types
of intellect strictly reflect his main source, namely Proclus. In
his commentary on book VI of the NE, much more than in the
commentary on book I, Eustratius develops a theory of recollection
where the description of the transition from discursive reasoning
of the particular soul to its purely intellectual activity can
clearly be traced back to several Proclean arguments. This
statement can also be supported by Eustratius claim that through
recollection the human intellect again becomes solely itself (auto
mnou genmenoj). Here the commentator literally quotes from Proclus
commentary on the Alcibiades, sharing with his source the very same
doctrine of the soul self-reversion as the process through which
the soul regains its proper essence81.
Indeed, one could rightly argue that even Eustratius reference
to self-reversion fits in with Alberts emphasis on the fact that
through the formal conjunction with the agent intellect man can act
and operate according to its true essence, as Albert himself states
in the De anima82. Moreover, in the De intellectu et intelligibili
Albert explicitly links the attainment of the status adeptionis to
knowledge of the self83. But, again, several differences remain. In
Eustratius there is no trace of the terminology that a Latin reader
might have found in the Latin translation of the Arabic
philosophical texts concerning the classification of the different
types of intellects for example, nor are there any references to a
system of separate intelligences comparable to the one present in
the Arabic source material. On the contrary, Eustratius only seems
to borrow a general metaphysical scheme from Proclus, which is
founded on the distinction between the Nous as a separate
hypostasis and the particular souls. This scheme can safely be
assimilated into certain Arabic theories on the intellect only if
it is taken in its general terms and not in its specificity.
Therefore, the problem lies in understanding how Alberts reading of
Eustratius combines this scheme with his own intellect theory.
79 On this topic, see A. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand et la
philosophie, Paris 1990, 246-251; 262-277; ID.
Penser au Moyen ge, Paris 1991, 290-292. 80
Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a
prima causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 1,4,1,42,35-44,3; 2,1,15,78,52-55;
2,3,3,147,71-148,9, 2,3,4,142,29-33. 81
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 317,24-26 (ed. Heylbut):
tand,tjtnpaqnpallagsugcsewjkatn sunhrthmnwn perarq dunmewn ka t
tleion ato polyetai auto mnougenmenoj. This passage is actually
constructed by assembling together two Proclean passages, namely
PROCLUS, In I Alc., 224,8-9 (ed. Westerink) (a reference to Timaeus
d7): tj deutraj ka trtajdunmdunmdunmdunmeij tj
sunhrthmnsunhrthmnsunhrthmnsunhrthmnajat (scil. the soul), and
PROCLUS, In I Alc., 20,15-14: qen dka Swkrthj p tlei to dialgou tn
ej autn pistrafnta ka auto genmenoauto genmenoauto genmenoauto
genmenon qewrnnteqen. On Proclus theory of self-reflection and
self-reversion, cf. C. STEEL, Proclus ber Selbstreflexion und
Selbstbegrndung, in M. PERCKAMS/R.M. PICCIONE (eds.), Proklos,
Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik, Leiden-Boston 2006, 230-255.
82
Cf. n. 13. 83
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, II, Opera Omnia
IX, Paris 1890, 515a; 516a: Ex his igitur patet qualiter per
studium intellectus adipiscitur seipsum..
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18
In the passage from the De XV Problematibus84 seen previously
Albert uses the notion of intellectus possessus synonymously to the
notion of intellectus adeptus. The names of Eustratius, Aspasius,
and Michael of Ephesus are given as the source of the notion of
intellectus possessus. Nevertheless, as he explains what these
identical notions refer to he mentions the idea that the
intelligent soul is image (imago) of the 10th intelligence. As
already stated, references to a system of separate intelligences
comparable to the Arabic one are not found in Eustratius
explicitly.
Albert also refers to the idea that the human intellect is
received (possessus) and acquired (adeptus) from a superior nature
(a natura superiori)85. Nevertheless, despite the reference to the
Greek Peripatetic tradition, Alberts reading of Eustratius seems to
focus more on the Arabic one, which Albert mentions in order to
discuss the idea of the unity of the intellect. However, what one
can notice is that Eustratius distinction between the two types of
intellect is understood by Albert as being similar to the relation
between the dator formarum and the human soul, which he ascribes to
the Arabic philosophical tradition. In this respect, Eustratius
seems to suggest a general Neoplatonic scheme to Albert that the
latter immediately refers to his own interpretation and discussion
of the Arabic theories on the intellect.
What is more problematic is Alberts reference to Eustratius in
his De anima86. As said before, in this passage Albert depicts the
intellectus adeptus/possessus as the result of a formal conjunction
between the potential and the agent intellect in terms of
compositum, like form with matter (sicut forma materiae). Albert
refers this type of conjunction directly to book X of the NE,
adding that the commentators on the NE, namely Eustratius and
Michael of Ephesus, also interpret Aristotle in this way.
In his commentary on book X of the NE, Michael of Ephesus often
employs expressions related to the term conjunction or assimilation
to the divine things, often revealing a Neoplatonic background
behind formulas which he usually links to the Platonicmowsijqe to
be found in Thaetetus 176b, for instance87. He also develops an
argument in which the intellect is said to be akin to God,
stressing that this relation to God is not an essential one
(suggenj d'otnosan), but is only according to the similitude of the
operation (kattntjnergeajmoithta)88. Nevertheless, on the topic of
the types of intellect presenting elements Eustratius, who also
refers to the general idea of conjunction with the separate
substances89, best fits Alberts reference to the Byzantine
commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics regarding to the notion of
intellectus possessus.
However, Alberts account of the formal conjunction in the De
anima seems to show consistent differences to the authentic
doctrine in Eustratius. In fact, according to the latter, the
expressions intellectus secundum substantiam and intellectus
possessus or secundum habitum strictly apply respectively to the
separate Nous and to the human
84 Cf. n. 10.
85 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De XV problematibus, Opera Omnia XVII,1,
1975, 33,54-56.
86 cf. n. 12.
87 Cf. MICHAEL EPHESIUS, In X EN, 579,3-6 (ed. Heylbut);
586,9-11; 591,22-24. On Michaels dependence
upon Neoplatonic source-material cf. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources
cit., 54-57. 88
MICHAEL EPHESIUS, In X EN, 603,15-20 (ed. Heylbut). Similar
arguments are to be found in PROCLUS, In Crat., 128,14-21 (ed.
Pasquali); In Remp., 2,85,5-7 (ed. Kroll); 2,85,20-22; 2,148,7-10;
Theol. Plat., 1,24,3-11 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink). 89
EUSTRATIUS, In I EN, 6,13-18 (ed. Heylbut); 38,25-28; 63,19-25.
Cf. n. 11.
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19
intellect. If this is the case, Alberts idea that the
intellectus adeptus/possessus is the result of the composition
between the agent intellect and the potential one, similar to form
and matter, does not fit in with Eustratius arguments. The reason
for this conclusion is that according to Albert the agent intellect
is an individual principle, although it emanates from the First
Intellect. However, it shares the essential character of its
operation and activity with the latter intellect. Briefly, Alberts
individual agent intellect is per essentiam90. On the contrary, as
we have seen, according to Eustratius this notion applies
univocally to the separate Nous, and not to the case of human
intellect, whose intellectual operation does not belong to it
essentially. According to the commentator, there is, on the one
hand, a Nous to be understood as a separate hypostasis, which is
the principle of its own existence and operation, and the
particular souls, on the other, which exist and act by
participation of something else. There is no trace in Eustratius of
the idea of formal conjunction as expounded by Albert, nor that the
terminology employed by the commentator can be assimilated with
that of the Late-Ancient and Arabic discussion on the status of the
agent intellect and the potential one.
It might be said that if it is true that the Neoplatonic
doctrine of the logoi ousiodeis underlies Eustratius theory of the
process of concept formation, then it is clear that one must admit
a form of actuality in the particular soul, insofar as these logoi
are constantly breathing and pulsating in us, and it is us who are
not aware of them, as we live in a state of ignorance after the
shock of birth91. Nevertheless, Eustratius never develops all the
logical consequences of his reference to the doctrine of
recollection, preferring simply to sketch the distinction which
exists between the two modes of existence and operation belonging
to the separate Nous and to the particular souls in general terms.
In this scheme there is no place, neither in terms nor contents,
for a solution which admits an individual principle such as Alberts
agent intellect which is secundum substantiam/per essentiam, for
according to Eustratius this latter mode of existence and operation
belong to the sole separate Nous.
Therefore, one would not be wrong in saying that Alberts
interpretation of Eustratius theory on the intellect expounded in
the De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa seems to be
much safer than what Albert himself ascribes to the commentator in
the De anima92. But even in the De causis, the model provided by
Eustratius only fits in with Alberts reading if we accept that
Alberts intellectus agens universaliter univocally refers to
intellect of the First Cause, as he seems to claim in one passage
from the same De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa93,
and not to the human active intellect, which is caused by the
intellectus primae causae and which can perform intellection only
in a secondary manner94.
5. Conclusion
90 Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De Intellectu et Intelliggibili, II,
Opera Omnia IX, ed. Borgnet, Paris 1890, 507.
Cf. L. STURLESE, Storia della filosofia tedesca nel medioevo. Il
Secolo XIII, Firenze 1996, 114, n. 188. 91
Cf. C. STEEL, Breathing Thought cit., 299. 92
Cf. n. 71. 93
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a prima
causa, Opera Omnia XVII,2, 1,2,2, 26,45-78. Cf. also n. 73. 94
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De homine, Opera Omnia XXXV, Paris 1896, tr.1,
q.55, a.3, 464b.
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20
In his famous Albert le Grand et la philosophie de Libera
reconstructs the history of the notion of intellectus adeptus
starting from Alexander of Aphrodisias, showing how the arabic
philosophers elaborated on this notion, in order to clarify Alberts
own interpretation of it95. We are now in a position where we can
update and revise de Liberas results.
As we have seen, in Alexander of Aphrodisias terms like acquired
intellect (pkthtoj) and habitual intellect (nojkaq'xin) seem to
characterize the intellect that results from the activity of the
active intellect on the material one, which produces a sort of
habit for human thought. However, this text was not available to
the Latin readers, so that what Albert had in front of him was
basically the re-elaboration of Alexanders notion by the Arabic
philosophers. On the contrary, in the Latin version of Eustratius
commentary on book VI of the NE one can find the expression
intellectus possessus as the direct translation of the Greek term
pkthtoj, as well as the expression intellectus secundum habitum as
the translation of the Greek nojkaq'xin. We then have a path for
the Latin reception of this notion other than the traditional one
going from Alexander to the Latin West via the Arabic philosophers.
When Albert refers to the term possessus as peculiar to the Greek
philosophical tradition he is probably not referring to Alexander,
but to the two passages by Eustratius studied in the present paper,
for none of the Latin translations of Arabic sources seems to
render the only occurrence of the term pkthtoj in Alexanders De
anima as possessus96.
What is interesting is that Eustratius noj kaq'
xin-pkthtoj/secundum habitum-possessus, hardly fits in with the
similar occurrences of these terms in the Greek-Arabic
interpretation of Aristotles De anima. This expression does not
relate to the kaq' xin/bil-malaka of the Greek-Arabic Peripatetic
tradition, namely, the previously seen stage of the human intellect
characterized by the possession of thoughts more or less without
actually thinking them97. Nor does Eustratius intellectus secundum
habitum match the intellectus in habitu, or even in effectu, which
a Latin reader could have found in the available translations of
the Arabic source-material in relation to the process of
progressive actualization of the human intellects potentialities98.
On the contrary, it entails a reference to that participatory
disposition of the soul which renders it intelligent, and as such
it is much closer to the notion of actively acquired intellect of
the
95 Cf. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 251-266.
96 On the Arabic interpretation of Alexanders acquired intellect
or intellect from without, see A.
BADAWI, New Philosophical Texts Lost in Greek, in P. MOREWEDGE
(ed.), Islamici Philosophical Theology, Albany 4-5. The passages in
the Arabic translation of Alexanders De intellectus in which the
expression intellect from without is to be found, though not
literally translated, are J. FINNEGAN, Texte arabe duperno
dAlexandre dAphrodise, Melanges de lUniversit Saint Joseph, 33,2
(1956), 157-202, 172, 191. 97
Cf. e.g. AL-KINDI, Rasil, 1,358 (ed. Abu Rida); AVICENNA, De
anima, I,5 (ed. Rahman), 49,13 (intellect in habitu, i.e.
possessing the primary intelligibles); I,5,50,1 (intellect in
effectu, i.e. possessing the secondary intelligibles without
actually thinking them); AVERROES, Commentarium Magnum in
Aristotelis De anima libros, 496-497 (ed. Crawford). Cf. also
DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 10-11, 84, 99-102, 273, 332-333; D.N.
HASSE, Avicennas De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a
Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300, London-Turin 2000,
178ff. 98
Cf. e.g. Liber de Causis primis et secundis, ed. R. DE VAUX,
Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin, Paris 1934, 128,24-129,13;
AL-FARABI, De intellectu, ed. E. GILSON, Les sources grco-arabes de
laugustinisme avicennisant, Archives dHistoire doctrinale et
littraire de Moyen ge, 4 (1929), ; AVICENNA LATINUS, De anima,
96,44-97,55 (ed. Van Riet).
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21
same Arabic tradition99, or to Alberts own interpretation of the
Aristotelian passage of De generatione animalium (2,3,736b28) which
he expounds in the De anima100. Nevertheless, as said before,
Eustratius never speaks of a formal conjunction, nor is the
participatory character of the noj kaq' xin-pkthtoj/secundum
habitum-possessus explained as the result of a compound between a
formal principle and a material one.
Alberts reading of Eustratius theory of the intellect seems to
attempt a forced reconciliation, on the grounds of a common
Neoplatonic background, between a Byzantine admirer of Proclus with
the Arabic interpreters of Aristotles De anima101. Often this
attempt is made difficult by the very same terminology employed by
Eustratius. The Latin translation of Eustratius commentary on book
VI of the NE by Grossateste offers a text in which the stage of the
intellectus adeptus/possessus is generally defined as intellectus
secundum habitum, making it impossible to link Eustratius arguments
on the two types of intellect, separate and human, directly to the
traditional Greek-Arabic classification of the different stages of
intellects, in which in habitu and adeptus do not refer to one and
the same intellectual stage.
Finally, despite the analogy with the Arabic notion of the
actively acquired intellect, which is in the same line as the
Arabic interpretation of Alexanders reference to the intellect
coming from outside in the De intellectu, Eustratius intellectus
possessus also shows elements of originality. In fact, this
particular noj kaq' xin-pkthtoj, borrowed from Proclus in its
entirety, seems as well to require a stage of activation, something
comparable to Alberts notion of per studium as that which allows
the attainment of the status adeptionis102. Eustratius actually
follows Proclus quite strictly in stating that the transition
between discursive and non-discursive thought, and in general the
whole process of recollection, starts from outside, from what we
collect through sense-perception103. The commentator even uses the
same term employed by Proclus to explain the awakening function of
that which comes from outside, from the sense-data, namely the
forms related to the root neger-104. It is through a process of
learning, or in general through experience within the realm of
sensorial data, that the soul can revert back onto itself, leaving
the dimension of discursive reasoning and becoming purely
intellectual105. This participatory disposition which allows the
soul to become intelligent and grasp the intelligibles directly,
though not in the manner proper to the separate Nous,
99 Cf. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi cit., 11-12.
100 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, III,3,11, Opera Omnia VII, pars
I, 1968, 222,29-37.
101 On Alberts dependence upon the Arabic sources for the
elaboration of his own intellect theory, cf. D.N.
HASSE, Das Lehrstck von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik:
von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus, Recherches de
Thologie et Philosophie mdivales, 21-77; J. MLLER, Der Einflu der
arabischen Intellektspekulation auf die Ethik des Albertus Magnus,
in A. SPEER/L. WEGENER (eds.) Wissen ber Grenzen. Arabischen Wissen
und lateinisches Mittelalter, Berlin-New York (Miscellanea
Mediaevalia, 33), 545-568. 102
Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, II,8,
Opera Omnia IX, 514b: De intellectu adeptum per studium disseramus
adeptus est qui acquiritur per studium. Adeptus igitur intellectus
est quando per studium aliquis verum et proprium suum adipiscitur
intellectum. 103
Cf. e.g. PROCLUS, In I Eucl., 45,10-14 (ed. Friedlein); In
Parm., 894,19-23. Cf. STEEL, Brething Thought cit., 301, 303.
104
Cf. EUSTRATIUS, In II An. Post, 22,24-28 (ed. Hayduck);
265,19-24. Compare these passages for example with PROCLUS, In I
Eucl., 18,17-19 (ed. Friedlein) (on the specific case of
mathematics); Theol. Plat., 1,16,16-18 (ed. Saffrey-Westerink).
105
That this correspond to Eustratius position it is clear from
EUSTRATIUS, In VI EN, 348,30-37. This passage strongly echoes
PROCLUS, In Parm., 879,17-19 (ed. Cousin).
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22
is something which is activated only after the relation with the
data of sense-perception. The latter constitute the starting point
of the whole process of concept formation, which, nevertheless, is
accomplished fully only when that which we collect from sensorial
experience is referred to what Eustratius calls the echoes in us of
an absolutely existing Intellect106.
Eustratius intellectus possessus conveys both the traditional
understanding of the nojkaq'xin-pkthtoj, namely the progressive
acquisition of a habit in thought, and the previously mentioned
intellectus adeptus agens, a supervening disposition corresponding
to the Arabic interpretation of the nojqraqen107. These two
different types of intellectus adeptus, which De Libera calls
intellectus adeptus 1 and intellectus adeptus 2108, are one and the
same thing for Eustratius, one and the same acquired intellect.
Given the importance of this notion in Alberts own theory of the
intellect, it is hereby clear that the role played by some of
Eustratius arguments concerning the notion of intellectus possessus
are relevant and cannot be underestimated by modern scholarship
anymore than the equally essential Arabic source-material. But
nevertheless, one cannot help but notice the originality of Alberts
interpretation of these arguments.
It is still too early to say whether Eustratius may represent an
alternative or additional source for the XIII century elaboration
of the felicitas speculativa, besides the well researched Arabic
ones. However, one can safely claim that Eustratius never developed
any theory of contemplative happiness that is comparable in terms
and contents to the Latin discussion of this issue. On the
contrary, the commentator simply seems to depict a theory on the
different types of intellect and intellection grounded entirely on
Proclean formulas and arguments that are borrows freely, and which
are re-elaborated by him in an autonomous argumentative structure.
It is Albert the Great who employs these arguments made by
Eustratius in order to support his own elaboration and discussion
of the topic of contemplative happiness originating from the Arabic
source-material.
What seems to emerge from Eustratius commentary on book VI of
the NE is more often a theory of the process of concept formation
grounded entirely on recollection, and particularly on Proclus
theories of causation and intellection, with some Christian
elements added quite sporadically by the commentator. If, as I have
said before, it is still early to understand to what extent
Eustratius played a role in the XIII century discussions on
contemplative happiness, nevertheless it is at least clear that he
fully deserves a relevant place in the history of the reception of
Proclus in the Latin Middle Ages, and that the frequent quotations
of Eustratius that are to be found in Berthold of Moosburgs
commentary on Proclus Elements of Theology, for example, are an
open invitation for
106 Cf. n. 31.
107 Cf. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grand cit., 253-262, in part. 254.
The same author accidentally refers to one of
the two passages from the Eustratius Latinus in which the notion
of intellectus possessus appears in A. DE LIBERA, Albert le Grande
le Platonisme. De la doctrine des Ides la theorie des trois tats de
luniversel, in E.O. BOS/P.A. MEIJER, On Proclus & His Influence
in Medieval Philosophy, Leiden-New York-Kln 1992, 89-119, 106, n.
61. Nevertheless, the author does not recognize the Proclean source
of this passage (In VI EN, 303,19-27), nor he realizes that the
Greek term correspondent to possessus is precisely pkthtoj. 108
-
23
modern scholars to investigate this Byzantine commentators
reception in the Latin West109.
109 Some intuitions concerning Eustratius role in Berthold of
Moosburg can be found in T. IREMADZE,
Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der
Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgisce Mittelalter.
Dietrich von Freiberg-Berthold von Moosburg-Joane Petrizi,
Amsterdam-Philadelphia 2004, 62, 128ff.