Aristotle on the Soul Book III Selection)

8/2/2019 Aristotle on the Soul Book III Selection)

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CHS. 2, 3 427 a 6 427 a 27 121this impossible? For the same indivisible unity, though in poten-

tiality each of two opposites, in the order of thought andObjection. . J , . i - .,..,,..being is not so, but in actual operation is divided : it isimpossible that it should be at the same time both white and black,and hence impossible that it should receive at the same time theforms of white and black, if reception of the forms constitutessensation and thought. Rather is the case parallel to that of 15A , the point, as some describe it, which is divisible in soAnalogyof the far as it is regarded as one or two. Well then, in so farP m * as the faculty which judges is indivisible, it is one andjudges instantaneously ; but, in so far as it is divisible, it is notone, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. So far asit treats the boundary-point as two, it passes judgment on twoseparate things with a faculty which in a manner is separated intotwo ; so far as it treats the point as one, it passes judgment onone thing, and that instantaneously. So much, then, for the principlein virtue of which we call the animal capable of sensation.There are two different characteristics by which the soul is princi- 3pally defined ; firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly,thinking and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intelli-gence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since thesoul in both of these judges and recognises something existent,sensa ê ancients > at an7 rate> identify intelligence and per-tion and ception : thus, in the words of Empedocles : " Wisdomof old for mankind is increased according to that which isidentified. present to them": and again "Whence they havealso continually a shifting succession of thoughts." Homer'smeaning, too, is the same when he says : " Such is the mind ofmen." In fact, all of them conceive thought to be corporeal 2transl. Bek. Trend. Torst., M om. pr. U, J ft kvl apa, omisso Kal, etiam Soph., fort, jf detvl, & Christ |! 15. alffB^riK^v clvai rk &ov ST U II opla-du E (Bek., etiam Bhl.) bpttrBw E(Rr.), 8iupt voetv Ka.1 rw tppoveiv SUV,rf Kplveiv Kcd voelv Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam in interpr. Simpl. 202, 8 sq. Philop.489, 13 Soph. 115, 1 8 [| 19. annotat in margin e Bas.: post al(r0dvecr6(u deesse videntur,quae Argyropylus reddidit his verbis : considerandum est, si quid intersit inter intelligereac sentire. cui opinioni assentitur Torst., negat excidisse quicquam Bon., stud. Arist.II, III, 131, qui cum Plutarcho, Philopono, Simplicio apodosin, quam iam Alex, apudPhilop. 489, 9 desiderayerat, ab 427 b, 6. STL ptv o$v incipit; in interpungendis singulismembris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. || 19. 8] ybp coni. Susemihl H icol post 8tom. L T i| 20. ^dp] re ybp E S U, re om. etiam Soph, || KpLvei re T] fax*] T, ^ \J/VXTJKptveL rt S U VWy, ^ ifrvxh Kptvci re X, vulgatam tuetur etiam Soph. || 21. ye corr. E,re S U V || 23. âêroc Ej, nunc atferai (Bhl.), dêrctt etiam Them. Philop. 485, 24Soph. || 25. rd S* aro...b, 6. ^ a^rr; etvai in parenth. ponenda putat Susemihl, Oecon.,P* 35 II 25. /SorfXcrat rotrots STUVWy, rb a^ra TQVTO sed post o rasura Eg (Bhl.) ||W. wcrirep xal TO StTV.


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CH. 3 427 a 28427 b 26 123like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as perceive,like by like: as we explained at the outset of the discussion.This view They ought, however, at the same time to have dis-refuted. cussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristicof animal life and in which the soul continues the greater partof its time. It follows from their premisses that either all pre-sentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contactwith what is unlike must constitute error ; this being the converseof the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledgeof contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is errorwith respect to contraries one and the same.

Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the 3same thing. For all animals share in the one, but only a fewin the other. And when we come to thinking, which includes rightthinking and wrong thinking, right thinking being intelligence,knowledge and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites ofthese, neither is this identical with perception. For perceptionof the objects of the special senses is always true and is foundin all animals, while thinking may be false as well as trueand is found in none which have not reason also. Imagination, in 4fact, is something different both from perception and from thought,and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more thanis belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the samething as believing. For the former is in our own power, wheneverwe please : for we can represent an object before our eyes, as dothose who range things under mnemonic headings and picture themto themselves. But opining is not in our power, for the opinion thatwe hold must be either false or true. Moreover, when we are ofopinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel thecorresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. Butwhen we are under the influence of imagination we are no moreaffected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terroror confidence. There are also different forms even of belief; know- 5ledge, opinion, intelligence and their opposites. But the differencebetween these species must be reserved for another discussion.textum recepit Biehl in ecL alt., reliqui codd. vtrrjo-is, etiam Simpl. Philop. || 19.


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CH. 3 427 b 27 428 a 21 125To turn to thought : since it is different from sense-perception

imagi- an


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CH. 3 428 a 22 428 b 17 127though many have imagination. Further, every opinion impliesconviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, andpersuasion implies reason. Among brutes, however, though somehave imagination, none have reason. It is evident, then, that 9imagination is neither opinion joined with sensation nor opinion

through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sen-opinion sation, both on these grounds and because nothing- elsecombined ^with is the object of opinion but that which is the object ofsensation* - T -,-,1 i /--, .. /-sensation : I mean, it is the complex of the opinion ofwhite and the sensation of white, not surely of the opinion of goodwith the sensation of white, which alone could constitute imagina-tion. To imagine, then, will be on this supposition to opine directly,not indirectly, that which we perceive. But there are false imagin- 10ings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a trueconception. For example, the sun appears only a foot in diameter,but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world :in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing andwithout any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument,we have abandoned the true opinion which we had about it;or else, if we still retain it, the same opinion must be both true andfalse. It could have proved false only in the event of the objecthaving changed without our observing it. It is not, then, eitherone of the two, opinion and sensation, singly, or a combinationof the two, which constitutes imagination.Now when one thing is moved, something else can be moved nby it. And imagination is thought to be a species of motion andnot to arise apart from sensation, but only in sentient beingsand with the objects of sense for its objects. Motion, again, may

. be produced by actual sensation, and such motion mustmovement resemble the sensation which caused it. From all thissubsidiaryto sensa- it follows that this particular motion cannot arise apartfrom sensation nor be found anywhere except in sentient

beings: and in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to doand experience many things : imagination, too, may be both true and6. Tri\av9av6jJ.voi> LT UVWX H 7. r^v atirrp om, pr. E, ante tod-yKij ponunt LW y |{post eivtu addendum iruTrebeiv censet Essen III, p. 23 || 8. tytvero E, sed in litura{Trend.), LSUVXy Torst., eyfrero reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Susemihl, B. J.XXX, 47 || dXXd.,.9- TrpayfJ-a. Torst. suspecta sunt, non legisse videntur Them. Simpl.Soph., leg. etiam Philop. || 9. oti/c #pct ELTWy || 10. route SUVy || n. ad verbal 5e...12. afo6i)


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CH. 3 428 b 18 429 a 9 129false. The reasons for the last conclusion are as follows. Perception 12of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimumof error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes : andat this point error may come in. As to the whiteness of an objectsense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whetherthe white object is this thing or something else. Thirdly, thereis perception of the common attributes, that is, the concomitantsof the things to which the special attributes belong : I mean,for example, motion and magnitude, which are attributes ofsensibles. And it is concerning them that sense is most aptto be deceived. But the motion which is the result of actual 13sensation will be different according as it arises from one or otherof these three kinds of perception. The first kind, so long as thesensation is present, is true : the other kinds may be false, whetherthe sensation is present or absent, and especially when the objectperceived is a long way off. If then, imagination possesses no

other characteristics than the aforesaid, and if it is whatImagi-nation it has been described to be, imagination will be a motiondefined.

generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the 14principal sense, imagination has derived even its name (avrao-ia)from light (


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CH. 4 429 a 10 429 b 7 131As to the part of the soul with which it knows and under- 4

intellect stands, whether such -part -be separable spatially, or notor Mind. separable spatially but only in thought, we have to con-sider what is its distinctive character and how thinking comes about.Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a 2being acted upon by the object of thought or in something else ofthis kind. This part of the soul, then, must be impassive, but recep- 3tive of the form and potentially like_this form, though not identicalwith it : and, as the faculty of sense is to sensible objects, so mustmEEltect 'be related to intelligible objects. The mind, then, sinceit thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, betmmbc^_with_ any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by'intruding its own form it hinders and obstructs that which isalien to it ; hence it has no other nature than this, that it is aA poten- capacity. Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call*' th^piace intellect (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soulof forms." thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually beforeit thinks. Hence, too, we cannot reasonably conceive it to be 4mixed with the body : for in that case it would acquire some par-ticular quality, cold or heat, or would even have some organ, as theperceptive faculty has. But as a matter of fact it has none. There-fore it has been well said that the soul is a place of forms or ideas :except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soulwhich can think, and again that the forms are there not in actuality,but potentially. But that the impassivity of sense is different from 5that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense-organs and atsense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible objecthas been too intense : thus it cannot hear sound after very loudnoises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can neithersee nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking onan object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able tothink of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not in-dependent of body, whereas intellect is separable. But when the 6

intellect has thus become everything in the sense inwhich one who actually is a scholar is said to be so (which

happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even26. $ *a*>] Kal K&V S, K&V TW Soph. Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86, Kov rov peyAXov [77] T&V [UKpCov tybQw Them. 104, 34 || IK om. E, otov i^6ef>ov IK r&vAtey. ^. etiam Soph. || 4. verba dXXa /caijLtaXXop interpolata esse censet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil.1867, p. 246, leg. etiam Them. || 5. 6 te vovs x


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Aristotle on the Soul Book III Selection)

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