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The Existence of Powers 171
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The Existence of PowersRebekah Johnston
Introduction
Aristotle relies on and uses the concept of , which I will
trans-late throughout this paper as power, in a wide variety of
philosophical discussions. In Metaphysics IX 1-5, Aristotle
provides a detailed account of powers. The discussions in
Metaphysics IX 1, IX 2, and IX 5 focus pri-marily on providing an
account of what it is to be a power. Chapter 1 establishes the
range of things that count as powers in the most proper sense.1 The
primary referent of power is (1046a10-11), i.e., a principle of
change in another or qua other. In addition to this primary
referent Aristotle identifi es that in virtue of which some item
can be acted on and changed by another (1046a11-12) and that in
virtue of which some item is insusceptible to being changed for the
worse by another (1046a13-14). Chapters 2 and 5 further divide
powers into rational and non-rational.
In addition to explaining what powers are and delineating the
dif-ferent sorts of powers, Aristotle argues in Metaphysics IX 3
for the exis-tence of powers. Here, through a series of four
arguments against the Megarics, Aristotle establishes that inactive
powers must exist. There are, however, two important questions to
which Aristotles answers are unclear: 1) what does it mean to say
that powers exist? and 2) how can it be determined that a subject
does in fact possess a particular inactive power?
1 Part of Aristotles project in Metaphysics IX is to develop a
new sense of power, a sense in addition to its proper sense as a
principle of change. I will not be con-cerned, here, with the
development of this new sense.
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172 Rebekah Johnston
There are two main ways in which commentators have sought to
remove this obscurity. Some argue that the criterion of the
possible serves as a test for determining when some subject
possesses a power.2 Others argue that the existence of powers is
best understood through a dispositional analysis. I argue, however,
that neither account is suf-fi cient and that instead powers must
be understood as one in number with but different in essence from
various categorical features of sub-stances. Understanding powers
in this way reveals both what it means to say that inactive powers
exist and when some subject has or lacks a power.
1 The Existence of Powers and the Criterion of the Possible
Although Aristotle is committed to the existence of powers, he
is not clear about what it means to say that a power exists or
about how to determine whether some subject possesses a power. Some
interpreters attempt to clarify Aristotles position about the
latter issue by consider-ing Aristotles claims about the
relationships between the capable and possessing a power and
between the capable and the possible.
In Metaphysics V 12, Aristotle explains three different ways in
which the term is used. In one sense, a thing is if it possess-es a
power (1019a33-b15). For example, a log is with respect to being
burned if it possesses the power for being burned and fi re is with
respect to burning if it possesses the power to burn. I will
translate this sense of as capable. In other sense, specifi es the
not necessarily false (1019b28-9) or that which is not nec-essary
but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible (Prior Analyt-ics
I 13, 32a17-19). In this sense means possible.
Some interpreters, such as Witt and Ide, argue that Aristotles
dis-cussion in Metaphysics IX 3-4 establishes that there is a
relation of mu-tual implication between the two senses of , i.e.,
between the capable and the possible.3 If there is a relation of
mutual implication between the capable and the possible, then
Aristotle is committed to the
2 The criterion of the possible states that X is possible if,
when it is assumed to be actual, no impossibility results. See
Prior Analytics I 13, 32a17-19, Metaphysics IX 4, 1047a24-6.
3 For the arguments in support of this claim see Witt (2003,
30-5) and Ide (1992).
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The Existence of Powers 173
claims (1) if it is possible that Lucy swims, then Lucy must be
capable of swimming and (2) if Lucy is capable of swimming, then it
is possible that Lucy swims.
Given this relationship of mutual implication, in conjunction
with the meaning of being capable, some claim that we can use this
aspect of Aristotles position as a test for when some subject
possesses a pow-er.4 More specifi cally, if I want to know whether
X possesses the power to , I could determine the case as follows.
Since it is the case that (1) if X possesses the power to , X is
capable of -ing and (2) there is a rela-tion of mutual implication
between the capable and the possible, I can determine whether X has
the power to by determining whether it is possible for X to .
Although I think that Witt and Ide are correct about the mutual
im-plication claim, I do not think that this relation of mutual
implication is useful for determining whether a subject possesses a
particular power. The reason it is not useful is that in order to
determine whether or not it is possible for X to one needs already
to know whether X possesses the power to . My evidence for this
claim comes from Aristotles fi nal argument against the Megaric
claim that inactive powers do not exist. In Metaphysics IX 3 at
1047a10-20, Aristotle offers an argument for the existence of
inactive powers which reveals, additionally, how he con-ceives of
the connection between possibilities and powers. This connec-tion
shows that in order to judge whether it is possible for X to it is
necessary already to know whether X possesses the power to .
Aristotle says:
( ),
4 Witt (2003, 25) says that [t]here is little doubt that
Aristotle has here adapted the principle of possibility to serve as
a rule for determining whether a substance has a power. Cleary
(1998) does not explicitly make this point but it follows from his
claim that Aristotles use of at 1047a24 is a very general defi
nition of potency as what something has if there is nothing
impossible in its attaining the activity of which it is said to
have the power (27).
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174 Rebekah Johnston
(,) (1047a10-20).Further, (A) if the thing that is deprived of a
power is incapable, then (B) the thing that is not coming to be
will be () of coming to be. And (C&D) the one who says that the
is coming to be or will come to be, will speak falsely (for this
signifi ed ), (E) so that these arguments destroy both motion and
generation. For the thing that is standing will always stand and
the thing that is sit-ting will always sit; for if it sits it will
not get up; for it, what at any rate is not capable of getting up,
will be of getting up. (F) Therefore, if it is not possible to say
these things, then it is evident that power and actuality are
distinct (but these thinkers make power and actuality the same
thing, on account of which they seek to destroy no small
thing).5
I take the explicit claims in the argument to be the
following:
A. If X does not have the to , then X is incapable () of
-ing.
B. If X is not -ing, then X is with respect to -ing.C. X is with
respect to -ing, but is -ing is false. If X is with respect to
-ing, then X is not -ing.D. X is with respect to -ing, but will is
false. If X is with respect to -ing, then X will not .E. Therefore
motion and coming to be are done away with.
F. Since motion and coming to be exist, power and actuality are
not the same, they are different.6
Claim A is an account of what it means to be incapable. As we
have seen, , in one sense, means capable. A subject is capable
of
5 The fi rst instance of clearly means incapable. I have,
however, left the other instances of untranslated because it is
unclear whether they should be translated as incapable or
impossible. I argue below that they must be translated as
impossible.
6 I take Aristotle to be committed here to claims A, C, D, and
F. Claims B and E are the problematic results of the Megaric
position that inactive powers do not exist.
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The Existence of Powers 175
-ing if that subject has a power for -ing. Claim A asserts a
parallel sense of .7 A subject is or incapable of -ing if it does
not have a power for -ing. Given the way the Megaric position is
presented in the opening lines of IX 3, we can assume that
Aristotle takes claim A as uncontroversial. For both the Megarics
and for Aristo-tle himself it is appropriate to claim that some
subject, X, is capable of -ing if that subject has a power for -ing
and it is appropriate to claim that some subject, X, is incapable
of -ing if that subject does not have a power for -ing. The
disagreement is not about what it means to be incapable; it is
about when some subject has or lacks a power.
Claim B is more puzzling. Is it a premise in the argument or is
it a conclusion? In my view claim B must be taken as a
sub-conclusion which is derived from A and several unstated
premises.8 If we fail to take claim B as a conclusion, then the
structure of the argument is un-clear. For it is not immediately
apparent why we should accept claim B. We ought, then, to take
claim B as a sub-conclusion that relies on claim A and one or more
unstated premises.
But what is needed to get from claim A to claim B? This question
intersects with a second diffi culty with claim B. If means
incapable in claim B as it does in claim A, then the missing
premise is easily identifi ed. Since the Megarics hold that there
are no inactive powers, the argument for claim B is:
A. If X does not have the power to , then X is incapable () of
-ing. Implicit Premise. X has the power to iff X is -ing.Therefore,
B. If X is not -ing, then X is incapable () of -ing.
On this reading, the conclusion, B, follows from claim A and an
im-plicit premise that simply states the Megaric position
concerning when X has the power to . This, however, will not do.
The coherence of the passage can only be preserved if in claim B
means impos-
7 See Metaphysics V 12 for this sense of . 8 Beere (2003, 125-9)
takes claim B as a conclusion. I discuss his interpretation
below.
See note 10.
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176 Rebekah Johnston
sible rather than incapable.9 Claim D demands that we understand
to mean impossible in claim B.
If claim B fails to introduce the impossible rather than just
the in-capable, then claim D is false. If a subject presently lacks
the power to and thus is incapable of -ing, it does not follow that
one must be speaking falsely if one asserts that X -s in the
future. X may very well gain the power, become capable, and . If
so, then claim D is false because it is based on an inappropriate
move from incapable now to always incapable. If, however, claim D
is false, then Aristotle is not en-titled to the crucial claim,
claim E, that on the Megaric view motion and coming to be are done
away with.
We must, then, read claim B as introducing the sense of that
means impossible. The path from claim A to claim B, therefore, must
involve more than the implicit premise stated above. What is needed
is an account of why the Megaric cannot respond by saying that
although X is not now capable of -ing, X may become capable of -ing
and at that time. The Megaric, then, may refute claim B if there is
a way to establish, on the Megaric view, that (1) it is possible
that even though X is not now -ing X may in the future and (2) it
is possible that even though X is not now capable of -ing X may
become capable of -ing. Because the Megaric holds that X is capable
of -ing iff X is -ing, claims one and two amount to the same claim
for the Megaric. We must consider, then, whether it is possible
that some subject, X, change from not -ing/incapable of -ing to
-ing/capable of -ing given the Megaric view of when something has a
power.
Aristotle does not explain how he gets from claim A to the
conclu-sion B.10 If however, we take into account the context of
the discussion we can fi ll in the path from A to B using
Aristotelian commitments. Ar-
9 Most commentators agree.
10 Beere (2003, 127-8) says that in the background, as support
for claim B, are the claims 1) that are intrinsic features of their
possessors, 2) that change depends on these features, and 3) that
the objects that possess these are completely ready to bring about
or undergo changes before they occur. I agree with Beeres claims,
but I do not think that they are suffi cient to show why Ar-istotle
is entitled to claim B. In order to establish claim B an account of
why the intrinsic properties are required for change is needed. My
explanation attempts to clarify this point by suggesting that on
the Megaric view, the distinction between -ing potentially and -ing
actually is lost. Witt (2003, 28-30) rightly claims that in claim B
must mean impossible because the argument demands it. It is
unclear, however, what Witt takes the path from claim A to claim B
to be.
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The Existence of Powers 177
istotle is concerned, in IX 3, to explore the implications of
limiting the class of the capable to the active. The loss of
inactive powers and thus the loss of a sense in which some X is
capable of what X is not doing are immediately relevant to
Aristotles general concern to defend change against the Parmenidean
attempt to eliminate change and becoming. Aristotle can claim that,
given the Megaric position concerning when X is capable of -ing, if
X is not capable of -ing (now) it is impossible that X will become
capable of -ing and thus it is impossible that X -s because the
Megarics have no way of overcoming the Parmenidean dilemma
concerning change and becoming.11
In Physics I 8 and Generation and Corruption I 3, Aristotle
explains and responds to the Parmenidean position that there is no
coming to be. Parmenides holds that things cannot come to be
because they must come to be either (1) from nothing or (2) from
being. Neither option, however, is acceptable. Clearly something
cannot come to be from nothing. But neither can something come to
be from being since being already is. Given that coming to be
cannot happen either from nothing or from being, Parmenides holds
that coming to be is impossible.
Aristotle solves this dilemma, in Generation and Corruption, by
intro-ducing a third option. He says: [i]n one sense things
come-to-be out of that which has no being without qualifi cation;
yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of what is. For
there must pre-exist something which potentially is, but actually
is not: and this something is spoken of both as being and as
not-being (317b15-17). Aristotles solution to the diffi culty
depends on the distinction between being actually and being
potentially . This distinction depends on the existence of
inac-tive powers. Some subject, X, is potentially but not actually
if X has the inactive power for . Because Aristotle accepts
inactive powers as real/existent items change and becoming are
preserved.
The Megarics, however, deny that inactive powers exist and thus
they cannot accept the distinction between -ing potentially and
-ing actually. By eliminating inactive powers, the Megaric
eliminates the distinction between -ing potentially and -ing
actually and thereby eliminates coming to be. Consider the
following example. In order to avoid claim B, the Megaric asserts
that although Lucy is not now build-ing = Lucy is incapable of
building = Lucy lacks the power to build, Lucy may change such that
she is building = is capable of building =
11 One may object that the Megarics have no interest in
overcoming this dilemma, that they support the elimination of
motion and change.
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178 Rebekah Johnston
has the power to build. If the Parmenidean challenges the
Megaric to explain from what the change came to be, the only
answers the Mega-ric has available are from nothing or from being.
Because the Megaric does not allow for the existence of inactive
powers and thus cannot dis-tinguish potentially building from
actually building, the Megaric must falter on the Parmenidean
challenge.
Aristotle, therefore, has good reason to conclude that for the
Mega-rics, if X is not -ing, then it is impossible for X to . The
Megaric rejec-tion of inactive powers and the attendant restriction
of the capable to the active make it the case that it is impossible
for anything to change.
Claims C and D represent an unacceptable objection to claim B.
The Megarics may try to salvage their position by claiming that
although X is neither capable of -ing nor actually -ing X may
nevertheless in the future. This objection is plausible if one
fails to note the introduc-tion of impossible into claim B.
Aristotle, however, uses claims C and D to draw attention to this
point. Aristotle says that and the one who says that the impossible
[] is coming to be or will come to be, will speak falsely (for
signifi ed this) (1047a12-14). While one would not speak falsely in
such a case if B lacked the modal implica-tion of impossibility,
Aristotle draws attention to this with the claim that this is what
meant.12 Claims C and D, then, represent an objection that has no
force and thus E follows. Claim E is not a dif-ferent claim from
claim B. It is simply a restatement of claim B in more explicit
terms.
Claim E, however, is unacceptable for there is motion and
change. One may object that perhaps the Megarics do not think that
motion and change exist. Aristotle, however, does think that change
and becom-ing exist and thus he is entitled to reject the Megaric
view because it
12 Hintikka (1973, 104) takes this claim as evidence that
Aristotle holds the principle of plenitude. In particular, that
Aristotle defi nes the impossible as what never is. Hintikka,
however, notes that ...the passage is perhaps somewhat
inconclusive, for might possibly be a weak term here, to be
translated in terms of indicating rather than meaning (104). In my
view Aristotle is not giving a defi nition of the impossible as
what never is. Rather, he is pointing out that in claim B means
impossible. Witt (2003, 30) points out that [t]he use of the
imperfect tense in the phrase for that is what adunatos meant (at
1047a13) indicates that Aristotle thinks he is stating a generally
accepted truth, and the two meanings of adunatos (incapable and
impossible) have that status in ordinary Greek. Aristotle is not,
Witt claims, relying on the controversial position that the
principle of plenitude is the basis of the modal concepts.
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The Existence of Powers 179
eliminates change and becoming. Furthermore, McClelland points
out that the initial arguments against the Megarics proceed on the
assump-tion that the Megarics accept change and becoming. Building
occurs and seeing and hearing and tasting occur as well.13 So, the
Megarics themselves, at least according to Aristotles report,
accept change and becoming yet cannot account for it given their
position on the capable.
Aristotles argument, here, reveals why the mutual implication
between the capable and the possible cannot serve as a test for
deter-mining whether a subject possesses a power. In the refutation
of the Megaric position, Aristotle shows that without inactive
powers motion and change are eliminated because it is impossible
for a change to hap-pen without an inactive power. Since, in
general, motion and change are impossible without inactive powers,
it is reasonable that a particu-lar motion or change is also
impossible without the relevant power. The signifi cance of this
claim is that if one tries to apply the possibility test in order
to determine whether a subject possesses a power one must already
know whether the subject possesses the power. For instance, if I
want to know whether it is possible for Lucy to build a house, I
need to consider whether anything impossible results if I assume
that Lucy builds a house. One impossibility I need to be concerned
about is whether Lucy builds without possessing the building power.
So, since I cannot determine whether it is possible for Lucy to
build unless I al-ready know whether she possesses the building
power the possibility test does not provide an answer to whether or
not Lucy has the power to build.
2 How to Understand the Existence of Powers
Another way in which interpreters try to clarify Aristotles
position about the existence of powers is according to a
dispositional analysis. In 2.1 I argue that although powers can be
understood according to a dispositional analysis this method is
insuffi cient as a theory of powers and is not exhaustive of
Aristotles position on powers. In section 2.2 I argue that
Aristotelian powers are one in number with but different in essence
from categorical features of the world.
13 See McClelland (1981, 136).
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180 Rebekah Johnston
2.1 Dispositional analysis
Some interpreters take Aristotles discussion of the activization
condi-tions of powers in Metaphysics IX 5 to reveal not only
Aristotles posi-tion on how to specify a power but also when some X
has a power. Beere says with reference to desire and the
appropriate conditions that these two criteria are formulated as a
specifi cation of when an ability is necessarily exercised. But
they turn out to be criteria for when some-thing has an ability at
all.14 According to Beere, [s]omething has the non-rational ability
to if, given that the relevant conditions obtain, it necessarily
-s. Something has the rational ability to if, given that the
relevant conditions obtain and its decisive desire is to , it -s.15
On this view, powers are understood as dispositions of substances.
Witt, as well, takes powers to be dispositions of substances. She
says that Aristotles discussion of agent and passive powers
strongly suggests that they can be given a dispositional
analysis.16 On her view [t]o say that fi re has the agent power of
heating is to say that under certain con-ditions (which can be
given a general or lawlike specifi cation) fi re will heat another
object.17
While both Witt and Beere take dispositional analyses to reveal
when X has a power and what it is to be a power, there are two
questions that I wish to address: (1) does Aristotles treatment of
powers lend itself to a dispositional analysis? and (2) is this
sort of analysis (a) a suffi cient way to analyze powers? and (b)
exhaustive of Aristotles treatment of pow-ers? Aristotles treatment
of powers does lend itself to a dispositional analysis. This sort
of analysis, however, does not exhaust Aristotles treatment of
powers and it is not a suffi cient analysis of powers. This sort of
analysis makes powers mysterious items in Aristotles ontology and
it is not suffi cient for the task that Beere and Witt attribute to
it. It cannot tell us, in controversial cases, when X has a power
to and when X lacks a power to .
2.1a Aristotelian powers can be given a dispositional analysis.
Aristotles dis-cussions of agent and patient powers in Metaphysics
book IX proceeds
14 Beere (2003, 101)
15 Beere (2003, 101)
16 Witt (2003, 42)
17 Witt (2003, 42)
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The Existence of Powers 181
primarily (but not exclusively) by way of three sorts of claims.
First, Aristotle describes powers in terms of the activities they
are powers for. He provides numerous examples powers may be for
heating or being heated, cooling or being cooled, burning or being
burned, crush-ing or being crushed, curing or being cured, harming
or being harmed, building or being built.
Second, Aristotle describes powers in terms of the substances to
which they belong. For the most part, Aristotle uses the
preposition (in) to describe the relation between a power and the
subject to which it belongs. This occurs at 1046a12 and 1046a22 to
describe the relation between patient powers and their subjects and
it occurs at 1046a26-7 to describe the relation between both
rational and non-rational agent powers and their subjects. It
occurs as a general claim about powers at 1048a3-5. Aristotle makes
a similar claim at 1046a36-b2, but he replaces the preposition with
.
Finally, Aristotle describes powers in terms of their
activization con-ditions. In Metaphysics IX 5, he tells us that in
the case of non-rational powers, when agent and patient meet in the
appropriate way, the one must act and the other must be acted on
(1048a5-8). For instance, when fi re comes into contact with
cotton, the fi re must burn the cotton and the cotton must be
burned by the fi re. The case of rational powers is more
complicated. Rational powers, unlike non-rational powers, are for
contraries. The doctor, in virtue of the medical art, can both heal
and harm a patient. Because rational powers are for contrary
effects, the mere meeting of agent and patient cannot necessitate
the activization of the power. Because it is for contraries the
agent would, in such a case, produce both contraries in the same
subject at the same time. And this is impossible. In the case of
rational powers, an additional factor, de-sire or choice, is needed
in order for the rational power to be activated. When a rational
agent power meets a patient power in the appropriate way and
desires one contrary rather than the other, then the rational agent
must act and the patient must be acted on. Although the condi-tions
required for each power to manifest in the particular activity it
is a power for are different, both sorts of powers are discussed in
terms of their activization conditions.
These three aspects of Aristotles account of powers, when
com-bined, reveal that Aristotelian powers can be given a
dispositional analysis. According to this analysis, to say that a
certain substance, X, has a power to is to say that X will if the
appropriate conditions are met. The appropriate conditions are
different for rational powers
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182 Rebekah Johnston
as opposed to non-rational powers, but the basic structure of
the claim is the same for both.
2.1b Is a dispositional analysis suffi cient as an explanation
of the existence of powers? A dispositional analysis of this sort,
while not incorrect, is somewhat uninformative. On this view,
Aristotelian powers remain mysterious. Powers, for Aristotle, are
taken to exist both when they are inactive and when they are
active. The builder has the building power both when she is
building and when she is sleeping. The tree has the power to be
burned both when it is being burned and when it is bloom-ing in the
garden. If, however, we give a dispositional analysis of pow-ers in
terms of what a substance does in certain circumstances, these
powers, especially when they are inactive or unmanifested, remain
mysterious. The conditional statement does not reveal in virtue of
what the substance -s in the appropriate circumstances.18
2.2 Dispositional analysis does not exhaust Aristotles treatment
of powers
In order to remove the obscurity surrounding powers, we need to
con-sider whether Aristotles theory of powers can be developed in
another direction. In Metaphysics IX, in addition to explaining
powers in terms of their subjects, activities, and activization
conditions, Aristotle makes claims of the form X is a power.19 In
IX 2, at 1046b2-3, he says all the arts, i.e. the productive
sciences are powers; for they are principles of change in another
or qua other. At various other places in Metaphys-ics IX he
replaces power with a particular example. For instance at both
1046a26 and at 1046b5 Aristotle gives heat and the art of building
as examples of agent powers and at 1047a4-5 he gives, as examples
of powers, perceptible qualities in general and in particular cold,
hot, and sweet. Such claims can be found outside of the Metaphysics
as well. For instance, in Meteorology IV 1, 378b30, he calls hot,
cold, moist, and dry powers.
18 Molnar (2003, 84-9) calls conditional analyses of this sort
naive. They are prob-lematic because they reveal absolutely nothing
about what the object has that makes the response follow the
stimulus. If this is all there is to Aristotelian powers, then
Aristotles account is vulnerable to this sort of objection.
19 Beere and Witt both recognize that Aristotle makes claims of
the form X is a pow-er but they do not develop this angle of
analysis.
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The Existence of Powers 183
So, in addition to a dispositional analysis constructed from the
sub-ject to which a power belongs, the activity it is for, and its
activiza-tion conditions, we can also detect, in Aristotles
discussion of powers, claims of the form X is a power. These claims
are promising insofar as they focus our attention on the powers
rather than on the subjects that have them. Is claims in Aristotle,
however, have many meanings.20 The claim X is (a) Y could mean that
X is the possessor of the attribute Y as in the apple is red or the
wagon is dirty. Alternatively, X is (a) Y could mean that Y is the
kind (genus or species) to which X belongs as in Socrates is a
human or Felix is a cat. Similarly, X is (a) Y could mean that Y is
the category to which X belongs as in red is a quality or Rover is
a substance. We need, then, to fi gure out what sort of claim
Aristotle is making when he says X is a power. In what follows, I
ar-gue that we should not understand claims of the form X is a
power as expressing the relationship of subject to attribute.
Moreover, I will argue that, although the structure of the claim X
is a power is similar to claims like Socrates is human or Rover is
a substance, neither of these options can capture the correct
relation that holds between X and power in the phrase X is a power.
We should, instead, under-stand the claim X is a power as analogous
to claims such as fi re is an element, Socrates is one, the art of
building is a cause, and the road from Thebes to Athens is the road
from Athens to Thebes that is, we should understand powers as one
in number with, but different in es-sence/being from that of which
they are predicated.21
In all these cases, cases which I think are analogous to cases
like hot is a power, the art of building is a power, and dry is a
power, the is expresses numerical identity but essential
difference. The road from Thebes to Athens is not a numerically
different road from the road from Athens to Thebes, but to be the
latter is not the same in essence as to be the former. Likewise, a
power is not numerically distinct from the item that fi lls in the
placeholder X in the claim X is a power but to be a power is not
the same as it is to be X.
In order to see why we should understand claims of the form X is
a power as expressing the one in number but different in
essence
20 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer from Apeiron for
insightful comments on an earlier version of this section which
assisted me greatly in clarifying my posi-tion.
21 See Metaphysics X 1 and Physics III 3.
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184 Rebekah Johnston
relationship it is useful to consider both elements of the
locution. That is, 1) what evidence is there that Aristotle takes
both X and power in the claim X is a power to be numerically the
same 2) what evidence is there that Aristotle takes X and power to
be different in essence.
Aristotles manner of arguing against the Megaric position in
Meta-physics IX 3 provides evidence for the numerical identity
claim. Aristotle argues that the Megaric position is absurd because
it requires that arts, such as the art of building, are acquired in
a moment (when one starts building) and are lost in a moment (when
one stops building) and this is not how arts are gained and lost
(1046b34-7a4). What is important about this argument is that
Aristotle treats the issue of the acquisition and loss of a power
as answerable through and thus somehow equivalent to issues about
the acquisition and loss of an art. Since he makes his argu-ment
about the acquisition and loss of powers by means of a discussion
of the acquisition and loss of an art, it must be the case that he
considers the art and the power to be, at least numerically, the
same item.
One might object to this analysis on the grounds that the
numerical identity claim is too strong. Could it not be the case
that Aristotle treats the question of the acquisition or loss of a
power through the acquisi-tion or loss of an art not because the
art and the power are numerically the same item but because the
power is an essential attribute of the art? In this case the power
is not the same item as the art but it must never-theless accompany
the art.
If this suggestion is correct, then the claim X is a power
should be understood as expressing the relation of subject to
attribute. But the X in the claim X is a power is not a proper
subject it is, in each case, something that belongs to a subject,
i.e., an attribute of a substance (e.g. hot, cold, dry, art). To
treat these items as subjects that can bear accidents is equivalent
to claiming that properties can bear accidents. Aristotles
analysis, in Metaphysics V 7, of such claims as just is musical or
the musical is white, and his discussion in Posterior Analytics I
22, reveal that he is skeptical about this position. To say that
the musical is just is not to say that the musical has the property
just rather it is to say that the musical and the just are both
accidents of the same substance. If X and power are numerically
distinct items then we will be forced either to take X as a subject
that can bear accidents which is problematic or we will be forced
to treat X and power as two unrelated attributes of the same
substance, like just and musical, in which case Aristotle couldnt
use the arguments he uses in IX 3 against the Megarics.
There are, then, reasons to think that X and power are
numeri-cally the same item. Just as the road from Athens to Thebes
and the
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The Existence of Powers 185
road from Thebes to Athens is numerically the same road so too,
for example, the art of building and the power to build are
numerically the same item and the quality hot and the power to heat
are numerically the same item. Why, then, must we take them as
different rather than the same in essence?
It is clear, as I argued above, that the phrase the art of
building is a power cannot be interpreted as employing the
subject-attribute relation. Why, though, must it be interpreted
according to the one in number but different in essence relation
rather than according to the genus/species to particular relation
or according to the category to par-ticular relation. In other
words, why not interpret the claim X is a pow-er as expressing a
claim either like Socrates is a man or like Rover is a substance
where the predicate tells us what kind of thing the subject is? For
instance, why not take power as specifying the class to which hot,
dry, and art belong?
There is some evidence that makes the class interpretation
plau-sible. Hot and cold are described in Generation and Corruption
at II 1, 329b24-5 and in Meteorology IV 1 at 379b13 as (capable of
act-ing). Dry and moist, on the other hand, are described in these
passages as (capable of being acted on). Furthermore, in
Nicomachean Ethics VI 4, at 1140a6-8, Aristotle describes an art as
a reasoned state of capacity to make, i.e., as . These
characterizations of hot, cold, and art as what can act and of dry
and moist as what can be acted on, are not haphazard descriptions.
In the Meteorology passage, at 378b20, Aristotle says that and are
the accounts we give when we defi ne () their natures ().
Furthermore, in the Nicomachean Ethics passage, Aristotle indicates
that captures what it is () to be an art.
Aristotles characterization of these items as and makes it
tempting and at least plausible to claim that these items are,
essentially, powers, i.e., that being a power is the essence of
hot, cold, dry, moist, art, etc. There are, however, serious
problems with both the genus/species interpretation and the
category interpretation.
First, a power, by defi nition, is a principle of change. Its
status as a principle depends on the existence of that of which it
is a principle, i.e., change. The items that Aristotle identifi es
as powers, i.e., hot, cold, sweet, art, etc., do not depend on
change. When Aristotle speaks of such items in, for instance,
Metaphysics VII 1, he treats them as depen-dent on the substances
to which they belong but he does not cast them as dependent on the
existence of change.
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186 Rebekah Johnston
Since being a power is dependent on the existence of other
activities, not just on the existence of substances as possessors,
it is conceivable that hot could remain what it is, i.e., a quality
of a body, without being a power. Aristotles analysis of
perceptibles, one sort of power, in Meta-physics IV 5 at
1010b30-11a2 confi rms this. Without ensouled beings perception
does not exist. And without perception there are no per-ceptibles
but the substrata the items that give rise to perception and would
be perceptibles if perception existed, do continue to exist. This
analysis implies that although the property that we call visible is
a power, that property, as substrate, could remain what it is even
though perception and thus that qualitys status as a power is
compromised. If the subject can remain what it is while no longer
being described by the predicate, then it cannot be the case that
the predicate picks out the genus or species of the subject. Since
the substratum remains what it is even if it were to fail to be a
power, then it cannot be the case that power specifi es the genus
or species of that substratum.
Second, there is more than one way of saying what something is.
Sometimes when Aristotle speaks of saying what something is he
means that we should say what category it belongs to, i.e.
substance or quality or quantity. In other places, however, when he
speaks of saying what something is he means that we should give the
defi nition, i.e., two-footed rational creature or three-sided
plane fi gure. If one says that X is a power, this is more like
saying that it is a quality or quantity than it is like giving the
defi nition. Power, however, like element, cause, and one, the
items Aristotle identifi es as being one in number with but
different in essence from the subjects of which they are
predicated, is not one of the categories Aristotle identifi es.
As I suggested above, I think that we should understand powers
as being one in number with but different in essence from that of
which they are predicated. On this view a power is numerically the
same as some other item, but nevertheless different in
being/essence from that item. In Metaphysics X 1, after setting out
the various meanings of the word one, Aristotle makes the following
claim. He says: [i]t is neces-sary to consider that one must not
assume that to say what sort of thing is said to be one and what it
is to be one and what its formula is are the same ... (1052b2-4).
In this discussion he identifi es several other items such as
element and cause as items of this sort, items for which it is not
the same thing to say what it is predicable of and what its defi
nition is (1052b4-16).
According to this discussion, if I say that a man is one, I am
saying: a) that there is only one item, a man, b) that to be that
item is not the
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The Existence of Powers 187
same as to be one, i.e. that the defi nition of man and the defi
nition of one differ and c) that one has an account of its own.
Likewise with cause or element; if I say that fi re is an element,
I am saying a) that there is only one item, i.e., fi re, b) that to
be that item, i.e., to be fi re is not the same in essence as being
an element, and c) that element has an account/essence of its own.
While Aristotle does not specifi cally men-tion powers as items of
this sort, he indicates, at 1052b16, that this list (cause,
element, one) is not exhaustive of terms of this sort.
Since the claim X is a power cannot be interpreted as expressing
the relation of subject to attribute or particular to species/genus
or particu-lar to category, and since power like cause, element,
and one func-tion like class terms but are not identifi ed by
Aristotle as amongst the categories, it seems that we should
understand the claim X is a power as expressing the one in number
but different in essence relation. Ac-cording to this analysis if I
say that X is a power, I am saying that a) there is only one item,
X, b) that to be X is not the same in essence as to be a power, and
c) that power has an account/essence of its own. This analysis
allows one to identify the items in the world that are powers
without reducing what it is to be a power to what it is to be these
items and thereby eliminating powers from Aristotles ontology.
Understanding a power as one in number with but different in
es-sence from some quality such as hot, dry, art, etc., allows us
to focus specifi cally on the item the substance has rather than on
hypothetical situations which may tell us that something has a
power but cannot tell us, specifi cally, what item power picks out.
To say that the builder has the building power when she is sleeping
is to say that she has the art of building. The art of building is
a science and as such is a quality of a substance. This item,
however, is also properly described as a power, i.e., as a
principle of change in another or qua other.
3 Controversial cases of unmanifested powers
I suggested above that the dispositional analysis Beere and Witt
pro-vide cannot, as they claim, be the criterion for determining
when some X has a power. While this analysis cannot reveal when
some X has an unmanifested power, understanding powers in terms of
is claims can solve this diffi culty.
Although, according to the discussion in Metaphysics IX 5, when
agent and patient meet in the appropriate way the one must act and
the other must be acted on, it is not always that case that the
appropriate
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188 Rebekah Johnston
circumstances are present. This is the meaning of Aristotles
commit-ment to the claim that inactive powers exist. Since there
will be times when some subject does not manifest its power, how
will we distin-guish those cases from cases where the subject
simply doesnt have the power? The dispositional analysis that Beere
and Witt provide will only work if we ignore this distinction. Once
we accept this distinction it is insuffi cient for telling us, in
hard cases, when some X has a power and when it lacks that power.
For example, we may ask whether wood at the bottom of the ocean has
or lacks the ability to be burned by fi re. Clearly, wood at the
bottom of the ocean cannot be burned by fi re right now but does it
have or lack the inactive power to be burned?
A dispositional analysis constructed from the subject, the
activ-ity, and the actualization conditions cannot provide an
answer to our question. Start with the claim: Wood has the power to
be burned = under certain conditions (which can be given a law-like
specifi cation) wood will be burned. In order to fi ll in the
conditions we can consider cases where wood is burned and cases
where it isnt. So, for instance, wood doesnt burn when it is wet
but it does burn when it is dry, wood doesnt burn when it is not in
contact with fi re and it does burn when it is in contact with fi
re and wood doesnt burn where there is insuffi cient oxygen and
wood does burn where suffi cient oxygen is present. We can now fi
ll in the relevant conditions and generate the following
con-ditional statement: wood has the power to be burned: if under
certain conditions (i.e., the wood is dry, the wood is in contact
with fi re, and there is suffi cient oxygen), wood burns. To
determine whether wood at the bottom of the ocean has the power to
be burned we must ask: would the wood burn if it was dry and came
into contact with fi re and there was suffi cient oxygen? If yes,
then the wood at the bottom of the ocean has the power to be
burned: if no, then the wood at the bottom of the ocean does not
have the power to be burned. The problem with this is clear. It can
reveal nothing at all about the wood at the bottom of the ocean for
one of the conditions is the removal of the wood from the bottom of
the ocean.
If it were the case that all the powers substances have belong
to them necessarily or always, just in virtue of what they are,
then the condi-tional analysis would tell us something about the
wood at the bottom of the ocean. But Aristotle makes it clear, in
both Metaphysics IX 3 and IX 5, that many powers can be gained and
lost. Removing the wood from the bottom of the ocean, therefore, is
problematic, because that process may cause the acquisition of the
power about which we are concerned.
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The Existence of Powers 189
The question: does wood at the bottom of the ocean have the
power to be burned? can be answered in an alternative manner if we
take seriously Aristotles claims about certain properties being
powers. That is, to ask whether the wood at the bottom of the ocean
has the power to be burned is to ask: does the wood at the bottom
of the ocean have the specifi c property which is one in number
with the woods power to be burned? That is, we can ask: is the wood
dry? The wood is not dry, so it does not have the power to be
burned. This manner of questioning does not require that we take
subjects as having their powers always and forever and it allows us
to give different answers about the same subject in cases that may
seem, initially, to be structurally similar. For instance, we can
answer no to the question does the wood at the bot-tom of the ocean
have the power to be burned but we can answer yes to the question
does wood locked in a metal box have the power to be burned. In
both cases, the wood will not be burned right now but in the former
case it is because the wood lacks the power (dryness) and in the
other case it is because the conditions are not right. If we switch
our emphasis from talking about mysterious possessions certain
subjects have to talking about specifi c, categorical, actual
features of those subjects, then we can determine whether a subject
has a power at a certain time without relying on possibility claims
or on conditional statements.
Conclusion
In Metaphysics IX 3 and IX 4, Aristotle continues his
consideration of powers in the strict sense. Although he provides
details, in IX 1, IX 2, and IX 5, about the scope of power in the
strict sense and about the vari-ous referents of power he does not,
in these chapters, argue specifi cally for the existence of powers.
In IX 3, he undertakes the task of showing, not only that powers
exist but that inactive powers exist. The existence of powers is
important; without powers, Aristotle argues, nothing is ca-pable of
doing anything other than what it is presently doing. Change
depends on the existence of inactive powers. Aristotles position,
then, is that inactive powers exist and thus that substances, as
possessors of powers are capable of doing things they are not now
doing.
Although Aristotle is clearly committed to the existence of
powers, he does not provide a detailed account of how we should
understand the claim. He does not specifi cally address the
question of what it means to say that a power exists and he does
not specifi cally address how
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190 Rebekah Johnston
it can be determined whether a subject possesses or lacks an
inactive power. The criterion of the possible and dispositional
analyses are not adequate for the tasks of specifying what it means
to say that powers exist and of determining whether or not a
subject possesses an inactive power. The fi rst is unsatisfactory
because in order to use the test one must already know whether the
subject has or lacks the power under consideration. The second is
unsatisfactory because it focuses on the subjects that possess the
powers rather than on the powers themselves and because it cannot
be used to distinguish cases where a subject lacks a power from
cases where the conditions for manifestation simply have not been
met.
Although these two strategies are unsatisfactory, Aristotle also
makes claims of the form X is a power where X picks out a specifi c
categorical feature such as hot, sweet, or art. By understanding
powers as one in number with but different in essence from these
items it becomes clear both what it means to say that some subject
possesses a power and how to tell when the subject does in fact
possess this power.22
Department of PhilosophyWilfrid Laurier University
75 University Avenue WestWaterloo, ON
N2L [email protected]
22 I wish to thank Kara Richardson, Lloyd Gerson, Brad Inwood,
Jennifer Whiting, Marguerite Deslauriers and an anonymous reviewer
at Apeiron for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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The Existence of Powers 191
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192 Rebekah Johnston
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