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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's LawsJohn Mouracade
There is a dominant scholarly view that Plato believes
hedonistic con-siderations to be incompatible with the virtuous
life, such that anyonewho is virtuous must be motivated to do what
is right independent ofthe resulting pleasure or pain.1 In the
sequel, I argue, against this domi-nant view, that Plato accepts
psychological hedonism (the view that allhumans are motivated by
what we consider most pleasant) and itscompatibility with virtue in
the Laws. The Athenian seems to plainlyendorse this view when he
claims, 'So the account that does not separatethe pleasant from the
just and fine and good, persuades someone, ifnothing else, to wish
to live a pious and just life ( ', , ).'2 And evenmore decisively
he states,
It is by nature that pleasures, pains, and desires are
especially human( 5 );from these, it is necessary for every mortal
nature simply ( ) to be suspended and to depend upon theweightiest
and greatest of these ( ). It is necessaryto praise the noblest
life ( ), not only because itcharacteristically has a better
reputation, but further ... as superior inthat which we all seek (
) more pleasure and less pain
1 Noteworthy examples include Morris (1934), Mabbott (1937),
Annas (1981). Dissent-ing are Gosling and Taylor (1982) among
others.
2 Laws 663a8-b2; translations are my own unless otherwise noted,
based on the textof Bury (1928).
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74 John Mouracade
throughout the whole of life ( , ).3
The vast majority of scholars have resisted the implications of
suchpassages.4 In Platonic Ethics Old and New, Julia Annas defends
the stand-ard interpretation of Plato's moral psychology in the
Laws. According toAnnas, Plato makes two central claims about
virtue and pleasure. First,the virtuous life delivers more pleasure
than any other. Second, in orderto achieve virtue, one cannot
pursue pleasure, but must desire virtue foritself. Annas states,
'The greatest pleasure, for Plato, is to be found in thelife in
which the person aims not at pleasure but at virtue, and
indeedtrains his desires so thoroughly that he values only virtue,
even whenaccompanied by all conventional evils.'5 And again, 'It is
only when yougive up aiming at pleasure and aim at virtue instead,
in the mostuncompromising way, that you get true pleasure ... .'6
Annas expressesthis necessary condition for virtue in various ways:
that one must valuevirtue alone, that one must pursue virtue alone,
and that one cannot aimat pleasure. In spite of compelling support
for such a view and itspersistent popularity, there are good
reasons for thinking otherwise.Annas acknowledges passages in the
Laws and other dialogues whichcontradict the standard view and
presents arguments for discountingthe force of those passages. I
have not found those arguments persuasive.I find Plato's view of
hedonistic motivation and virtue to be morecomplex than Annas
allows.71 argue, pace Annas et al., that an adequateunderstanding
of Plato's moral psychology must neither completelydisregard (as
the standard line does) nor completely exalt (as a hedonis-tic
interpretation of Plato does) the desire for pleasure. Rather, it
must
3 Laws 732e4-733al
4 Exceptions include R.F. Stalley (1983), Carone (2002).
Although these scholars donot follow the standard line, their
project is not directly arguing against it, as thispaper does.
5 Annas (1999,146)6 Ibid., 149
7 I find it to be more complex in exactly this way. Plato does
not simply precludehedonistic motivations, nor does he simply
endorse them (as Socrates seems to inthe Protagoras). The
complexity is found in Plato's inclusion of some, but not
all,hedonistic considerations in the virtuous life.
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 75
be allowed that there are certain types of hedonistic
motivations that areincompatible with virtue and some that are
compatible with and evennecessary for virtue. In offering such an
account I will show that theeducational program laid out in the
Laws requires this understanding ofhedonistic motivations and
virtue.
Annas' reasoning unfolds in two stages. The first explicates a
passagefrom the Laws (644d7-5cl). Based on this passage, Annas
claims that therelationship between rational motivations and
non-rational motivationsis asymmetrical. The asymmetry is to be
found in reason's ability topursue its goals with no concern for
pleasure and pain, whereas suchconsiderations are all that matter
to non-rational motivations. In thesecond stage of her argument,
she contends that the pursuit of virtue isfundamentally different
from the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance ofpain. In fact, these
pursuits differ so greatly that a motivational transfor-mation must
occur before one can pursue virtue instead of pleasure.8
Annas quotes the passage from the Laws at length.9
Let's think about it in the following way. Let's think of each
of us livingthings as a puppet of the gods, either as one of their
toys or asconstructed for some serious purpose, for that we don't
know. But thiswe do know, that these emotions [pathe] in us are
like cords or stringswhich drag us along. Being opposed to each
other, they pull us indifferent directions to opposite kinds of
action, and this is where thedivision between virtue and vice lies.
Reason says that we should allfollow along always with one of these
pulling forces and in no wayleave go of it, pulling against the
other strings. This is the directing ofreasoning, and is golden and
holy, and is called the common law of thestate. The others are hard
and like iron, but it is soft, being golden, whilethe others are
like forms of all sorts. We must always co-operate withthe
directing of the law, which is finest; for since reasoning is fine,
butgentle and not violent, its directing needs helpers so that the
goldenkind in us will win over the other kinds. In this way our
story of virtue,which is about us as though we were puppets, would
be a success, andthe idea of being "self-master" or "giving in to
oneself" would become
8 Ibid., 145
9 I will use Annas' translation of this passage which she admits
to be controversial insome respects. See Annas (1999,142 n 15).
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76 John Mouracade
somewhat clearer, as would the point that an individual must
graspthe true reasoning within himself about these pulling forces,
and livefollowing it, and a state must grasp the reasoning (whether
from a godor from a human with knowledge), establish it as law, and
live by itboth internally and with other states. In this way both
vice and virtuewould be more clearly articulated for us.10
Annas identifies two special features of the cord of reason.
First, it is soft whereas they are hard and inflexible ... But
the softnessof the gold cord makes the point that reason can deal
with pleasure andpain in ways that they cannot deal with it. They
simply yank and pull,whereas it can manage and manipulate them; its
greater flexibility givesit greater power over them than they have
over it. Second, the personcan be encouraged to cooperate with and
follow the golden cord; itneeds help, but the person can follow it
and thus be able to withstandthe pullings of pleasure and pain,
inflexible though these are."
Annas correctly observes that the gold cord differs from the
others inso far as it is soft and they are hard. However, there is
ample room fordisagreement about what this means. Annas takes this
to signify reason'sdistinct ability to operate on non-rational
strings of pleasure and painthrough management and manipulation.
Reason's flexibility in dealingwith non-rational strings endows it
with 'greater power over them thanthey have over it'. Thus, Annas
explicates the softness of the gold cordas indicating complex and
varied options for dealing with the appetites(which simply
pull).
It should be noted that the nature of the cords represents how
theydeal with us, not with each other. The cords, according to the
imagery,are connected to the puppet and act directly on the puppet
and onlyindirectly on one another. Reason is one of the cords and
as such doesnot free us from our dominant desire although it does
free us from thedemands of the lower part(s) of the soul.12 Thus,
the life drawn along by
10 laws 644d7-645cl
11 Annas (1999,143)12 This point is also made by Scolnicov
(2003,123) and Gerson (2003,150), Christopher
Bobonich makes an elaborate case for a dissenting opinion in
Bobonich (2002,260-81).
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 77
the golden cord is of the same sort as the life dominated by the
othercords insofar as there is no freedom from the strongest
desire. Thedifference is that the life dominated by the gold cord
is freer in the sensethat the rational life is lived in subjection
to benevolent and persuasivereason and directed by considerations
of truth, goodness, and appropri-ateness as opposed to the
tyrannical rule of appetite which is entirelycoercive.
This explanation of the asymmetry between the rational and
non-ra-tional cords is preferable to Annas' for several reasons.13
There is bettertextual support for my reading within the Laws and
within the Plato'sthought as a whole. In the Laws, one of the most
important points madeby the Athenian is that persuasion is
preferable to compulsion.14 Thisnecessitates preambles for the laws
which attempt to persuade citizensto comply rather than merely
ensuring obedience through coercion. Thepreference for persuasion
over compulsion can be used to explain thesoftness of the golden
cord of reason. It is golden and soft because it isrational and
persuasive as opposed to the non-rational iron cords whoseonly tool
is force. In addition to textual support, there is better
thematicfit with the Laws. The Laws addresses the issues of
education, persuasion,and avoidance of force. My reading of the
story of the strings resonateswith those themes whereas Annas'
reading relies heavily, if not entirely,on the passage quoted at
length above. Such a difficult and metaphoricalpassage should not
bear such a heavy interpretive burden. After all, theparable is
introduced to explain temperance and we should be reticentto draw
conclusions about topics other than temperance without sup-porting
texts elsewhere.
Thus far, it may not be clear that there is a significant
differencebetween my reading and Annas'. Perhaps the complex and
variedoptions available to reason on Annas' account include various
modes ofpersuasion. Granting that persuasion is among the ways
reason canmanage the appetites (and perhaps exhausts the options,
but we need
13 Another minor reason that may appeal to some is the
following. It is a moreconservative reading of the text which is
supported by other passages in the Lawsand in the Republic. Given
the metaphorical nature of the passage in the Laws quotedabove, we
should not put undue interpretive burden upon it.
14 Laws 719e6-722c4. For a very good discussion of this topic,
see Bobonich (1991) andthe corresponding discussion in Bobonich
(2002,97-106).
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78 John Moumcade
not go that far), this would be merely incidental to Annas'
account as sheexplains the difference between reason and appetite
completely in termsof the fact that appetite has only one way to
deal with reason and reasonhas many ways to deal with appetite. She
emphasizes the complexityand number of ways of managing the
appetites, whereas I emphasizethe way reason does the managing.
Though this difference may not itselfseem significant, it underlies
the two fundamentally different ways ofviewing reason's relation to
the desire for pleasure considered in thispaper (the standard view
and my view). The significance resides in therole of persuasion. If
reason must persuade the appetites (as I hold) topursue a virtuous
life, then hedonistic considerations must be compat-ible with the
pursuit of virtue since desires can only respond to hedon-istic
considerations.15
Annas' second claim about the golden cord begins with an
innocuousassertion. She points out that a person can follow the
guidance of reasonwhen it conflicts with the demands of the
non-rational desires. But thenAnnas makes an interesting
substitution. Whereas Plato claims that weought to follow the
golden cord of reason and pull against all the othercords which are
identified as emotions (pathe), Annas' second point isthat we
should follow reason and withstand the 'pullings of pleasureand
pain.'
Understood one way, she is correct to make this substitution,
butunderstood differently she is not. We can see the two ways of
under-standing this point if we bring before us the context of the
passagequoted above while keeping in mind that Plato has recognized
differenttypes of pleasure elsewhere (Republic IX, Symposium,
Philebus, Gorgias).Plato's other discussions of pleasure and
self-control are worth consid-ering in this regard, especially
Republic 389d9-e2 where self-control isdescribed as being a ruler
of the pleasures of food, sex and drink( ). Prior to thepassage
quoted above, the Athenian reminds his interlocutors, 'Weagreed a
long time ago that those who are capable of ruling themselvesare
good, and those who cannot are bad.'16 This point is agreed upon
and
15 Bobonich has a prolonged argument for the absence of belief
and judgment fromdesires in Plato's psychological theory of the
Laws. See Bobonich (2001,295-334).
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 79
the Athenian offers to clarify the point by offering a story.
This serves asan introduction to the divine puppet story. So, the
point of this story isto explain temperance, as the Athenian
reminds his interlocutors againat the end of the story. And surely
the temperate person obeys reasonand does not give in to the all
desires for physical pleasure and allrepulsions from physical pain.
This is one way in which reason mustwithstand pleasure and pain by
withstanding a subset of pleasuresand pains. The second way to
understand Annas' point is to take thepulling of reason as not
merely conflicting with the desires for physicalpleasure, but as
conflicting with the unqualified pursuit of pleasure andavoidance
of pain.17 Since Annas claims that the virtuous person, 'valuesonly
virtue' and gives up 'aiming at pleasure and aims at virtue
instead',she seems committed to the latter understanding wherein
reason resiststhe pull of all pains and pleasures.
In order to evaluate Annas' claim that reason pulls against all
moti-vations of pleasure and pain, we must proceed to the second
stage ofAnnas' argument. Here, she claims that the pursuit of
virtue differsfundamentally from the pursuit of pleasure. While
Annas does not addmuch in the way of arguing for this position, she
clarifies her view. It isimportant to discuss her view in light of
these clarifications. Annasmaintains that the virtuous life is the
most pleasant on Plato's scheme,but she also claims that the
virtuous life cannot be lived while pursuingpleasure, not even
while pursuing the pleasure that derives from avirtuous life. She
states, 'Pleasure thus comes, we may say, only whennot directly
sought, and it comes as a result of what is sought,
namelyvirtue.'18 In a similar vein she claims, "The desire for
pleasure is the mostbasic motivation that we have, but rational
reflection can so educate andtrain the person that they aim in an
appropriately uncompromising wayat being virtuous. The person who
succeeds in becoming virtuous, andwho does not aim directly at
pleasure, in fact gets pleasure as a result ofhis virtue.'19 She
makes this point even more succinctly by later claiming,
17 For a detailed discussion of Plato's use of pleasure to
sometimes pick out physicalpleasures and to sometimes refer to all
pleasures, see Grube (1980, Chapter 2,especially p. 66).
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80 John Mouracade
The best pleasure comes only to those who don't seek it.'20 She
alsoclaims that the virtuous person will 'acquire a radically
different atti-tude' to pleasure.21
Is Annas right about this? Does Plato require us to abandon our
searchfor pleasure in favor of pursuing virtue in order to become
virtuous?Does the golden cord of reason pull against all pleasure
and pain? Thereare good reasons for thinking this is not so. To
begin with, Annas' claimis a strong assertion and the only textual
support she musters on behalfof her view is the story about the
puppets. Even if she had the correctunderstanding of Plato's theory
of human motivation and virtue, weshould not be convinced solely by
an appeal to such a difficult piece oftext. There should be
corroboration and Annas offers none.22 Besides alack of
corroborating evidence, there is textual support in the Laws
andelsewhere for the opposite of Annas' suggestion. In Laws ,
whilediscussing the relation between justice and pleasure and the
Athenianargues that the just life is the pleasantest.23 He then
insists that a distinc-tion between the just and the pleasant is
harmful and should be prohib-ited because 'no one willingly
consents to be persuaded to do somethingunless more pleasure and
less pain comes from it.'24 More decisively inBook V the Athenian
asserts, 'It is by nature that pleasures, pains, anddesires are
especially human; from these, it is necessary for every
mortalnature simply to be suspended and to depend upon the
weightiest andgreatest of these. It is necessary to praise the
noblest life, not only becauseit characteristically has a better
reputation, but further ... as superior inthat which we all seek
more pleasure and less pain throughout the whole
20 Ibid., 147
21 Ibid., 148
22 Annas does not offer additional evidence for this view, but
she argues that it issimilar in various ways to Plato's other
discussions of pleasure in the Republic,Gorgias, and Philebus.
While these other dialogues offer support for different aspectsof
her view, none of them are offered as evidence that Plato requires
a motivationalshift.
23 Laws 662b and ff.
24 Laws 663b2-5. .
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 81
of life.'25 To this the Athenian later adds, 'But if we eve
speak of ourselvesas desiring an object other than those aforesaid
[the preponderance ofpleasure over pain], the statement is due to
ignorance and defectiveexperience of actual lives.'26
Annas is correct to note that there must be a motivational
transforma-tion. The above texts show that she is incorrect to
assert (as she doesmany times and as the standard interpretation
requires) that the trans-formation is from one that is
hedonistically based to one that is entirelydevoid of hedonistic
considerations and focuses only on virtue. Theeducational program
of the Laws indicates that the motivational trans-formation is not
away from desiring pleasure, but away from desiringsome pleasures
to desiring others. Regarding education in Magnesia,R.F. Stalley
correctly observes: 'Since virtue consists in having our de-sires
adjusted to whatever reason judges to be right, the citizen's
educa-tion will involve so training a child's feelings of pleasure
and pain that,even before his reason can grasp the nature of
virtue, he loves what oughtto be loved and hates what ought to be
hated (653a-c).'27 Again Stalleynotes, "The main theme of Book [of
the Laws] is that the young mustbe educated to take pleasure in the
right things.'28 Christopher Bobonichalso observes that the
legislators must 'pay close attention to pleasure,since enjoying
the right pleasures is not simply a constituent of the happylife
and a concomitant of achieved virtue, but is essential to the
develop-ment of virtue itself.'29 In connection with these points
(with which Iwholeheartedly agree), Laws 636d7-e3 offers profound
support, 'Pleas-ure and pain, you see, flow like two springs
released by nature. If a mandraws the right amount from the right
one at the right time, he is happy;but if he draws unintelligently
at the wrong time, his life will be quitethe opposite. State and
individual and every living being are on the samefooting here.'30
It is in light of this view of the importance of pleasure that
25 Larvs 732a4-el
26 Lflms733d3-6
27 Stalley (1983,124)28 Ibid., 62
29 Bobonich (2001,351)30 Trans. Saunders (1997) with
modifications.
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82 John Mouracade
the educational program focuses on training children to take
pleasure inthe right sort of things. To this end the Athenian
states, 'We should tryto use the children's games to channel their
pleasures and desires to-wards the activities in which they will
have to engage when they areadult.'31 The Athenian makes it quite
clear that this description appliesto education in virtue their
topic of discussion (643e).32 The Athenianlater asserts:
I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in
infancy arepleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue
and vice firstenter the soul ... I call "education" the initial
acquisition of virtue bythe child, when pleasure and affection,
pain and hatred are channeledin the right courses before he can
understand the reason why ... Butthere is one element you could
isolate in any account you give, and thisis the correct formation
of our feelings of pleasure and pain, whichmakes us hate what we
ought to hate from first to last, and love whatwe ought to love.
Call this "education", and I, especially, think youwould be giving
it its correct name.33
Plato continues to develop this view, claiming that 'the correct
orderingof pleasures and pains is education.'34 These feelings are
so important,that Plato ordains Dionysian festivals to revive the
sense of pleasure inthe aged. And again, 'pleasure is indeed a
proper criterion in the arts,but not the pleasure experienced by
anybody and everybody.'35 Rather,it is the people of high moral
character and advanced education whomust be pleased by good art
(658e). We are then told that children mustbe educated to feel
pleasure according to the law and 'find pleasure andpain in the
same things as the old.'36 The Athenian continues the discus-
31 Laws 643c7-9, trans. Saunders (1997)32 It is also noteworthy
that these comments about pleasure almost immediately
precede the puppet story, which begins less than one Stephanas
page later.
33 Laws 653a5-c4, trans. Saunders (1997) with modifications.34
Lflu>s653c8
35 Luo*658e7-9
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 83
sion advocating a constraint on poets; they would be compelled
to neversay that 'there are men who live a pleasant life in spite
of being wicked.'37
It is in light of the educational program established by the
Athenianthat we must consider Plato's view of human motivation and
the rela-tionship between pursuing pleasure and acquiring virtue.
The Athenianspeaks univocally on this matter. Children are educated
in virtue bylearning to take pleasure in the right sort of things.
It is this view whichleads the Athenian to proclaim that the
educator/legislator must notallow the virtuous life to be
conceptually separated from the mostpleasant life in order to
provide a compelling argument for living justly.38On the standard
view, one must pursue virtue for itself and not beprompted by
hedonistic considerations. This would make it impossiblefor an
argument like the one cited directly above to persuade someoneto
live a virtuous life because it is impossible to acquire virtue
whilebeing motivated by such considerations. Additionally at
732e5-6 theAthenian claims, 'pleasures, pains, and desires are by
nature especiallyhuman.' He continues that the virtuous life should
be praised because'it is superior in that which we all seek more
pleasure and less painthroughout the whole of life.'39 He concludes
with a compelling indict-ment of the standard view: 'We must think
of all of our human lives asnaturally bound up in these two
feelings [pleasure and pain], and wemust also determine what kind
of life we naturally desire. But if we saywe wish for something
besides these, we are talking out of ignorance andconfusion about
life as it is really is.'40
There is another feature of the puppet account that merits
discussion.The cord which pulls against the emotions () is
calculation (-). The logismos is the calculating and prudential
faculty of the mindwhereas nous is the theoretical and
understanding part. If Plato hadclaimed that nous pulled against
the emotions, the standard interpreta-tion would have better
textual grounds. As it is, Plato claims thatcalculation pulls
against the emotions, leaving open the interpretationthat the
judgment which is based on a calculation of long term pleasures
37 Lau*662b4-cl
38 Laws 663a8-b2
39 Laws733a2
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84 John Mouracade
and pains pulls against the pathe whose focus is on the
immediate orshort run pleasures and pains.41 And this
interpretation is not merely leftopen by the text as calculation is
described as that which determineswhich pleasures and pains are
better and which are worse (644c5-d3). Itis this calculation which
'when it becomes a public decree is named thelaw of the state.'42
This identification of calculation with law recurswithin the puppet
imagery as we are told that there is one cord we oughtto hold on to
which is 'the leading of calculation which is golden andholy and is
called the public law of the state ( ' , ).'43Since the golden cord
is calculation and it determines which pleasuresare better and
which are worse, it cannot be that following the goldencord means
ignoring considerations of pleasure and pain.
Department of PhilosophyOklahoma Baptist University
500 W. UniversityShawnee OK, 74804
[email protected]
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41 Scolnicov (2003,124) contains an interesting discussion of
this point.42 Lui)s644d443 Laws(A5al-2
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Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 85
Cooper, John, ed. 1997. Plato's Complete Worte. Indianapolis:
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