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AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OFLEGITIMACY JUDGMENTS
LEIGH PLUNKETT TOSTUniversity of Washington
I develop a theoretical framework that specifies the content
underlying legitimacyjudgments and a model of the process by which
these judgments develop and change.I argue that individual-level
legitimacy judgments are based on evaluations that fallalong three
dimensions (instrumental, relational, and moral). I specify three
stages ofthe legitimacy judgment process and two modes by which
judgments may be devel-oped or revised (evaluative and passive). I
end by discussing implications for thestudy of institutional
change.
The critical role of legitimacy in determiningthe development
and endurance of organiza-tions and other social systems has been
docu-mented by sociologists and strategy researchersfor decades.
For example, Pollock and Rindova(2003) showed that perceptions of
organizationallegitimacy shape investor behavior, and Bansaland
Clelland (2004) demonstrated that organiza-tions with high levels
of legitimacy are insu-lated from unsystematic variations in their
stockprices. Indeed, legitimacy seems to provide or-ganizations
with a “reservoir of support” thatenhances the likelihood of
organizational sur-vival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Rao, 1994)
andperpetuates organizational influence by in-creasing individuals’
loyalty to the organizationand willingness to accept organizational
ac-tions, decisions, and policies (Tyler, 2006; Tyler& Blader,
2000, 2005). Similarly, Thomas, Walker,and Zelditch (1986)
demonstrated that legiti-macy judgments lead to the persistence of
ineq-uitable social structures, and political scientistshave long
argued that legitimacy facilitates ef-fective governance (Gibson,
2004; Weatherford,1992).
Given this pivotal role that it plays in thesurvival of social
systems, legitimacy has beendescribed as “perhaps the most central
conceptin institutional research” (Colyvas & Powell,
2006). Legitimacy is critical in institutional re-search because
it is a necessary component ofinstitutionalization, which occurs as
an emerg-ing social entity gains a taken-for-granted qual-ity that
leads it to be perceived as an objectiveand natural reality.
Consequently, institutionaltheorists increasingly specify
illegitimacy as acritical driver of the pursuit of institutional
andorganizational change (e.g., Greenwood,Suddaby, & Hinings,
2002; Suchman, 1995). Thatis, changes in organizational forms,
practices,and policies require that new arrangements beviewed as
more legitimate than existing ones(Oliver, 1991; Suddaby &
Greenwood, 2005).
The process of institutional change necessar-ily involves shifts
in individuals’ judgments ofthe legitimacy of existing social
entities and,consequently, shifts in individuals’ behaviorswith
respect to those entities. Recognizing thisimplication, in research
on institutional change,scholars have recently begun to focus more
at-tention on the microlevel processes involved ininstitutional
change (e.g., Phillips, Lawrence, &Hardy, 2004; Reay,
Golden-Biddle, & GermAnn,2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005;
Zilber, 2002).Research in this area has focused on under-standing
how interactions among individualsconstitute social reality and
determine what isdeemed acceptable within social systems.
However, institutional theorists have paid rel-atively little
theoretical or empirical attention tothe intraindividual dynamics
of legitimacyjudgments (i.e., the content, formation, andchange of
the judgments themselves). While le-gitimacy is ultimately a
collective-level phe-nomenon, an understanding of the
microleveldynamics of legitimacy judgments is crucial be-
I am grateful to Dan Ariely, Bruce Avolio, Chris Bauman,Drew
Carton, Adam Grant, Rick Larrick, Allan Lind, SimSitkin, Scott
Sonenshein, Tony Tost, Kim Wade-Benzoni, andBennet Zelner for
comments on previous versions of thisarticle. I am also grateful to
associate editor Roy Suddabyand three anonymous reviewers for their
detailed and con-structive feedback throughout the review
process.
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686–710.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0227
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cause individuals’ judgments and perceptionsconstitute the
“micro-motor” (Powell & Colyvas,2008) that guides their
behavior, thereby influ-encing interactions among individuals,
which,in turn, coalesce to constitute collective-levellegitimacy
and social reality. Therefore, an un-derstanding of the
individual-level dynamics oflegitimacy judgments can help scholars
to bet-ter understand not only the dynamics of institu-tional
change but also the critical role that indi-viduals play in those
change processes.
The lack of attention to individual-level judg-ments of
legitimacy does not stem from a lack ofinterest in the
individual-level dynamics of in-stitutional change. Indeed, calls
for more inte-gration of microlevel and macrolevel researchon
legitimacy have become commonplace in theinstitutional literature
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell,1991; Powell & Colyvas, 2008;
Thornton & Ocasio,2008; Zucker, 1991). However, the development
ofa model of the individual-level dynamics of le-gitimacy judgments
requires an integration ofthe social psychological research on
legitimacywith institutional theory, and a number of bar-riers
impede such an endeavor. Specifically, thetwo fields of research
use different definitions oflegitimacy, situate the construct of
legitimacy indifferent nomological networks, tend to
examinedifferent types of targets of legitimacy judg-ments, and
obviously differ with respect to levelof analysis.
My goal in this article is to overcome thesebarriers in order to
make two key contributionsto the study of institutional change.
First, I inte-grate social psychological and institutional
the-ories of legitimacy to specify the content of le-gitimacy
judgments. By “content,” I refer to thesubstantive perceptions and
beliefs that under-lie the judgment of an entity as legitimate
orillegitimate. An understanding of the content oflegitimacy
judgments helps scholars to answerthe question, “What does it mean
substantivelyfor an individual to judge an entity, such as
anorganization or a leader, to be legitimate?” Sec-ond, I integrate
social psychological and insti-tutional theories of the process of
legitimation inorder to construct a model of how
legitimacyjudgments develop and change over time. Anunderstanding
of the process of legitimacy judg-ment formation, use, and change
can help re-searchers to understand when, how, and why
anindividual’s judgment of the legitimacy of anentity changes from
a judgment of legitimacy to
one of illegitimacy (or vice versa) and, conse-quently, leads
the individual to seek change (orto preserve the status quo). Thus,
my central aimin this article is to develop a better understand-ing
of the individual-level dynamics of legiti-macy judgments with
respect to both the contentof those judgments and the process by
whichthey are developed and changed.
I proceed as follows. First, I explore the waysin which the
construct of legitimacy has beendefined and used in institutional
theory and so-cial psychological research. Next, I examinework from
both fields on the content of legiti-macy judgments, and I specify
a typology of thecontent underlying legitimacy judgments. I
thenbuild on this typology, integrating work on theprocess of
legitimation from institutional theoryand research on judgment
formation andchange from social psychology to develop amodel of how
legitimacy judgments developand change over time. I conclude with a
discus-sion of the implications of this typology andmodel for
research on institutional change.
DEFINING LEGITIMACY
While institutional theorists primarily haveexamined the
construct of legitimacy in the con-text of the institutionalization
of organizationsand organizational fields, social psychologistshave
examined the construct primarily in thecontext of group inequality
and support for rulesand procedures. In this section I review the
waysin which institutional theorists and social psy-chologists have
defined and used the term legit-imacy, and I situate my definition
of the termwithin the broader nomological networks ofboth fields.
In Table 1 I provide an overview ofhow the two fields have defined,
used, and spec-ified the content of legitimacy.
Defining Legitimacy: Institutional Theory
Scott explains that institutions “consist of cog-nitive,
normative, and regulative structures andactivities that provide
stability and meaning tosocial behavior” (1995: 33). Similarly,
Greif de-fines an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs,norms
and organizations that together generatea regularity of (social)
behavior” (2006: 30). Thus,institutions are social conventions that
are self-enforcing (Jepperson, 1991; Phillips et al., 2004).
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In this context, early definitions of organiza-tional legitimacy
from institutional theoristsviewed legitimacy as a function of the
congru-ence or conformity of an organization to socialnorms or laws
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Parsons,1956, 1960; Weber, 1978; see
Deephouse & Such-man, 2008, for a review of how legitimacy
hasbeen conceptualized in organizational institu-tionalism). Meyer
and Scott presented a moreextensive definition of organizational
legiti-macy as “the degree of cultural support for
anorganization—the extent to which the array ofestablished cultural
accounts provide expla-nations for its existence, functioning, and
ju-risdiction, and lack or deny alternatives” (1983:201). They
emphasized this cognitive functionof legitimacy, further arguing
that “a com-pletely legitimate organization would be one
about which no question could be raised”(1983: 201). This idea
of legitimacy as the pres-ence or absence of questions became a
criticalaspect of neoinstitutional theorists’ views oflegitimacy,
wherein legitimacy is associatedwith a quality of
taken-for-grantedness. Build-ing on these and other previous
definitions,Suchman proposed a broad-based and inclu-sive
definition of legitimacy as “a generalizedperception or assumption
that the actions ofan entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriatewithin some socially constructed system ofnorms, values,
beliefs, and definitions” (1995:574). Thus, institutional theorists
hold that en-tities are judged to be legitimate when theyare seen
as appropriate for their social con-text. This is the definition I
adopt in this arti-cle.
TABLE 1Overview of the Use of Legitimacy As a Construct in
Institutional Theory and Social Psychology
Aspects ofLegitmacy Institutional Theory Social Psychology
Overlaps, Conflicts, andReconciliations
Current Model ofLegitimacy Judgments
Targets oflegitimacyjudgments
Primarily organizationsand organizationalforms
Actors (e.g., leaders),social hierarchies(e.g., status
beliefs),group procedures andrules
There is substantialoverlap; researchersin both fields
haveexamined targets oflegitimacy outsidetheir traditionalspheres
of focus
The model presentedhere could apply tothe approaches andtargets
characteristicof both fields (e.g.,judgments of thelegitimacy of
leaders,policies,organizations, etc.)
Definition oflegitimacy
“A generalizedperception orassumption that theactions of an
entityare desirable, proper,or appropriate withinsome
sociallyconstructed system ofnorms, values, beliefs,and
definitions”(Suchman, 1995: 574)
“The belief thatauthorities areentitled to be obeyed”(Tyler,
1997: 323), or,alternatively,“Subjectiveperceptions of thefairness
or justice ofthe distribution ofsocially distributedoutcomes”
(Major &Schmader, 2001: 180)
Voluntary deference isan outcome, ratherthan the substance,
oflegitimacy;fairness representsonly one of the threedimensions of
thecontent of legitimacyjudgments
Consistent with theinstitutional theoryperspective: thejudgment
that anentity is appropriatefor its social context
Content oflegitimacyjudgments
Focus on instrumental(pragmatic) andmoral; also discussionof
cognitive andregulative
Instrumental, relational,and moral
Instrumental and moraldimensions overlap;relational
dimensionunique to socialpsychology
Institutional, relational,and moral asdimensions of thecontent
of legitimacyjudgments; cognitivelegitimacy is viewedas the essence
oflegitimacy; regulativelegitimacy representsauthorization and
is,thus, a validity cue
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It is critical to distinguish the construct oflegitimacy from
the related construct of insti-tutionalization.
Institutionalization is both anoutcome and a process (Colyvas &
Jonsson,2011). Consistent with the view of institutionsas
self-reinforcing and taken-for-granted so-cial conventions, an
entity can be said to beinstitutionalized when it obtains both a
taken-for-granted status (i.e., a particular variant oflegitimacy,
which institutional theorists termcognitive legitimacy) and the
capacity tomaintain itself (a capacity distinct from legit-imacy).
Thus, legitimacy is a necessary but notsufficient condition for
reaching the outcomeof institutionalization. That is, an entity can
besaid to be legitimate but not institutionalizedif it has not
obtained a capacity to self-reinforce (Jepperson, 1991). In terms
of process,therefore, legitimation (the acquisition of le-gitimacy)
is only one component of the processof institutionalization.
It is also important to distinguish betweenindividual-level
legitimacy and legitimacy atthe collective level. Legitimacy at the
collectivelevel is what Weber (1978) termed validity. Asocial order
is considered valid, according toWeber’s theory, when two
conditions are met: (1)the norms, beliefs, and values that guide
thesocial order are perceived as legitimate by somepeople, and (2)
even those people who do notperceive the order as legitimate at
least knowthat others perceive it as legitimate and under-stand
that it governs behaviors. For example,some individuals may not
view a particular or-ganizational policy as appropriate, but if
othersview it as appropriate and act accordingly, thenthose
individuals who do not see it as appropri-ate will perceive that
others view it as appropri-ate and will therefore permit it to
govern theirbehavior. Therefore, such a policy can be legit-imate
at the collective level (i.e., have validity)but may not be viewed
as appropriate (i.e., aslegitimate) by all individuals in the
group. Inthis way individual-level judgments of legiti-macy can
differ from the collective-level validityof an entity. Dornbush and
Scott (1975) labeledthis individual-level form of legitimacy
propri-ety. In essence, propriety, or individual-level le-gitimacy,
refers to an individual’s own judgmentof the extent to which an
entity is appropriate forits social context, while validity refers
to theextent to which there appears to be a generalconsensus within
a collectivity that the entity is
appropriate for its social context. While the is-sue of how
individual-level judgments of propri-ety coalesce to constitute
collective-level valid-ity is an important consideration, that
issue isoutside the focus of this article.
Thus, because the focus of this article is onindividual-level
judgments of legitimacy, I fo-cus on propriety and adopt the
definition ofindividual-level legitimacy judgments as indi-viduals’
judgments of the extent to which anentity is appropriate for its
social context. Inthe following section I explain how legitimacyhas
been defined in social psychology, high-lighting areas of
divergence relative to insti-tutional theory.
Defining Legitimacy: Social Psychology
Social psychologists have used the constructof legitimacy to
explain the stability of and be-havioral reactions to a broad range
of socialentities, including individuals (e.g., leaders),group
procedures, rules, norms, and social hier-archies. Although
sociological psychologistshave adopted definitions of legitimacy
that areconsistent with the definitions used by institu-tional
theorists (see Johnson, Dowd, & Ridge-way, 2006, for an
excellent review of sociologicalpsychologists’ research on
legitimacy), in themajority of other work on legitimacy in
socialpsychology, researchers have taken a divergentapproach that
differs in two key ways from thedefinitions used by institutional
theorists andfrom the one I adopt here.
First, in a substantial portion of research inthis area,
scholars have defined legitimacy asdeference or obedience to
authorities or rules.For example, Tyler defines legitimacy as
“thebelief that authorities are entitled to beobeyed” (1997: 323).
This approach to legiti-macy derives from French and Raven’s
(1959)concept of legitimate power, which refers to aform of power
that stems from a subordinate’ssense that an authority is entitled
to rule. How-ever, while this type of power—and the feel-ings of
obligation to obey that accompany it—may be an outcome of positive
legitimacyjudgments, the feelings of desire or obligationto obey or
provide support do not themselvesconstitute the legitimacy
judgment. In otherwords, the perceptions and beliefs that under-lie
the judgment that a leader (to take an ex-ample from this level of
analysis) is legitimate
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produce a perception that the leader is enti-tled to his or her
power. This perception ofentitlement to power, in turn, produces a
feel-ing of obligation to comply with the leader’srequests. I
therefore conceive of the feeling ofobligation to comply with the
leader’s requestas an outcome of the legitimacy judgment—not as the
content of the judgment itself. Thisis an important distinction,
because such afeeling of obligation can come from sourcesother than
legitimacy, as when an individualfeels an obligation to comply with
a leader’srequest not because he or she views the leaderas
legitimate but because noncompliancewould produce negative outcomes
for others.
Second, some social psychologists have con-flated the concepts
of legitimacy and fairness.For example, Major and Schmader define
legit-imacy as “subjective perceptions of the fairnessor justice of
the distribution of socially distrib-uted outcomes” (2001: 180).
Similarly, Weber,Mummendy, and Waldzus define illegitimacy as“the
violation of group entitlements to certainoutcomes or a certain
status position” (2002: 451),while Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, and
Hogg de-fine illegitimacy as “the degree to which groupsperceive
their status relations to conflict withvalues of justice or equity”
(2003: 217). This ten-dency to conflate the constructs of
legitimacyand justice likely stems from social psychologi-cal
research specifying fairness as the key de-terminant of legitimacy
judgments (e.g., Tyler,1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992). However, as I
explainbelow, fairness is only one dimension of thecontent that
underlies individual-level legiti-macy judgments. Because other
dimensions oflegitimacy exist, it is critical that scholars
dif-ferentiate the construct of legitimacy from theconstruct of
fairness.
THE CONTENT OF LEGITIMACY JUDGMENTS
In this section I review social psychologists’and institutional
theorists’ research to uncoverthe three dimensions of content
underlying indi-vidual-level legitimacy judgments. The contentof
legitimacy judgments consists of the substan-tive beliefs and
perceptions that influence anindividual’s assessment of the extent
to whichan entity is appropriate for its social context. Ibegin
with social psychologists’ articulations ofthe instrumental,
relational, and moral dimen-sions of legitimacy judgments. I then
discuss
research from institutional theory on two ofthose
dimensions—instrumental and moral—and I explain why two types of
legitimacy com-monly discussed in institutional theory are
notincluded within this typology.
Social Psychology: Instrumental, Relational,and Moral
Dimensions
Social psychologists have proposed two mod-els to specify the
content of legitimacy judg-ments at the individual level.
Instrumentalmodels hold that individuals react to the instru-mental
aspects of their experiences with socialentities and authorities
(e.g., Hollander, 1980;Hollander & Julian, 1970; see also
Tyler, 1997). Aninstrumental perspective on legitimacy predictsthat
entities will be judged as legitimate whenthey are perceived as
promoting the materialinterests of the individual. In contrast,
rela-tional models of legitimacy hold that legiti-macy emerges from
the extent to which a so-cial entity communicates to the individual
thathe or she is accorded respect, dignity, andstatus within the
group context and throughgroup membership (Tyler, 1997; Tyler &
Lind,1992). From a relational perspective, an entityis seen as
legitimate when it affirms individ-uals’ social identities and
bolsters their senseof self-worth.
Previous social psychological research on in-strumental and
relational models of legitimacyhas proceeded by contrasting the two
models todetermine which better explains individuals’behaviors
(e.g., Tyler, 1997). The implication ofthis approach, of course, is
that the content oflegitimacy judgments is entirely (or at least
pri-marily) derived either from instrumental or fromrelational
concerns (but not both). Tyler (1997)has conducted the primary work
in this area,examining the impact of instrumental and rela-tional
concerns on voluntary deference to au-thorities when a conflict
emerges betweenauthorities and subordinates. His work demon-strates
that in cases of conflict between au-thorities and subordinates,
the impact of rela-tional concerns is larger than the impact
ofinstrumental concerns, and he therefore con-cludes that the
content of legitimacy judg-ments derives from individuals’ identity
con-cerns. However, the empirical evidence that hepresents
indicates a significant, though some-what smaller, impact of
instrumental concerns
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as well. Thus, the empirical evidence suggeststhat both
instrumental and relational concernshave some degree of impact on
individuals’legitimacy judgments.
Based on this observation, I take a differentapproach and
conceive of instrumental con-cerns and relational concerns as the
bases fortwo separate dimensions of perceptions or be-liefs that
underlie the content of legitimacyjudgments. For example, rather
than examiningwhether an entity is supported primarily on
in-strumental or relational bases, I instead advo-cate examining
the independent and interactiveeffects of both bases of legitimacy.
Viewing in-strumental and relational concerns as the basesof
different dimensions of perception that cansimultaneously impact
overall legitimacy judg-ments, rather than as separate models of
legit-imacy judgments, permits researchers to con-sider how aspects
of the social context orcharacteristics of the evaluators may
moderatewhen one or the other comes to dominate in thelegitimacy
judgment process. For example, Ty-ler’s (1997) analyses appear to
indicate that re-lational concerns dominate legitimacy judg-ments
in cases of conflict between supervisorsand subordinates, but there
may be a number ofother situations in which instrumental judg-ments
would predominate.
As another example, consider Reay and col-leagues’ (2006)
account of the introduction of anew work role—nurse
practitioner—into an es-tablished health care system in Alberta,
Can-ada. Some individuals in the health care systemmay have viewed
the new work role as legiti-mate, feeling that the new role
promoted or pro-tected instrumental needs at either the individ-ual
or group level. They may have perceivedthat the integration of
nurse practitioners intothe system would benefit them personally
(per-haps by increasing the chance they would findemployment in the
nurse practitioner role—thatis, individual-level instrumental
concerns), orthey may have believed that the change wouldpromote
the organizational goal of more effec-tive and efficient health
care provision (i.e.,group-level instrumental concerns). At the
sametime, individuals may have viewed the changeas legitimate
because the new work role pro-moted or protected relational needs
at the indi-vidual or group level. For example, individualnurse
practitioners may have felt personallyvalidated by being granted
new status within
the health care system, and nurse practitionersin general may
have felt that their social iden-tity as a group was gaining in
status and re-spect as well.
However, these two dimensions of legitimacyjudgments are not
mutually exclusive. For ex-ample, an individual may view an entity
as le-gitimate on both instrumental and relationalgrounds.
Alternatively, an entity may be viewedas legitimate from an
instrumental standpointand as illegitimate from a relational
standpoint.Thus, a given entity may be viewed as legiti-mate on one
ground, both grounds, or neitherground. Viewing instrumental and
relational di-mensions not as separate models of legitimacybut
instead as separate bases of legitimacy per-mits researchers to
consider the circumstancesunder which one or another basis of
legitimacywill have greater or lesser influence on the over-all
legitimacy judgment and, consequently, thelargest impact on
behavior.
While the majority of their previous researchon legitimacy has
focused on examining the rel-ative explanatory power of the
instrumental andrelational models, social psychologists have
re-cently begun to espouse a moral dimension tolegitimacy as well.
Skitka, Bauman, and Lytle(2009) demonstrated that individuals’
degrees ofmoral conviction about an issue on which theSupreme Court
had recently ruled predicted per-ceptions about the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy.In addition, social psychologists have arguedthat
morality is an important general dimensionof evaluation of social
entities (e.g., Leach, Elle-mers, & Barreto, 2007). Leach and
colleagues ar-gued that while both moral and relational con-cerns
can be viewed as consistent with a singleconcept of benevolence,
the two types of con-cerns are conceptually distinct. In a series
ofstudies they demonstrated that instrumental, re-lational, and
moral concerns constitute distinctfactors of evaluation and that in
many circum-stances morality concerns are actually more im-portant
in evaluations than are instrumentaland relational concerns.
Thus, research on the social psychology oflegitimacy judgments
points to three dimen-sions underlying legitimacy: instrumental,
rela-tional, and moral. In the next section I discussthe
dimensionality of legitimacy from the per-spective of institutional
theory.
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Institutional Theory: Instrumental, Moral,Cognitive, and
Regulative
Institutional theorists also recognize an in-strumental
dimension to legitimacy. This basisof legitimacy has been termed
pragmatic legit-imacy (Suchman, 1995) and is viewed as rootedin the
self-interested calculations of individualsand groups. In this
view, individuals or constit-uencies may support an entity because
its con-tinued existence entails a higher expectedvalue than its
absence, or because the entity isseen as being responsive to the
individual orconstituency’s larger interests.
While institutional theorists have not ex-plored the relational
dimension of legitimacy, amoral dimension has been studied
extensively.Indeed, as Scott (2001) explains, the predomi-nant view
of the substantive content of legiti-macy among sociologists,
including many insti-tutional theorists, is one in which the
primarydeterminant of legitimacy is the moral status ofthe entity,
or the extent to which the entity con-forms to moral values and
ethical principles.Suchman describes the moral dimension of
le-gitimacy as grounded in “a prosocial logic” andconcerned with
whether the entity in questionpromotes “social welfare, as defined
by the au-dience’s socially constructed value system”(1995: 579).
In this way the basis of moral legiti-macy differs fundamentally
from the self-interested orientation involved in the instru-mental
dimension.
Thus, there is considerable overlap betweensocial psychologists’
views of the instrumentaland moral bases of legitimacy and
institutionaltheorists’ views of pragmatic and moral legiti-macy.
Institutional theorists have also identifiedtwo other types of
legitimacy that merit consid-eration in this discussion: cognitive
legitimacyand regulative legitimacy. I argue that thesetwo
constructs do not constitute substantivebases of the content of
legitimacy judgments.Instead, cognitive legitimacy represents the
ab-sence of substantive content in the legitimacyjudgment (i.e.,
taken-for-grantedness), whereasregulative legitimacy represents
social cues in-dicating the validity of an entity (i.e.,
indicatorsof collective-level legitimacy) but does not rep-resent a
substantive domain of judgment con-tent in itself.
The construct of cognitive legitimacy is basedon the early
neoinstitutionalist definitions of le-
gitimacy involving the absence of questions orchallenges
regarding an entity. Thus, Suchman(1995) explains that cognitive
legitimacy is fun-damentally different from moral and
pragmaticlegitimacy. Specifically, he contends that legit-imacy can
entail either active or passive sup-port: “Legitimacy may involve
either affirmativebacking for an organization or mere acceptanceof
the organization as necessary or inevitablebased on some
taken-for-granted cultural ac-count” (1995: 582). Whereas the
instrumental, re-lational, and moral dimensions of
legitimacyinvolve active affirmative backing on the basisof
instrumental, relational, and moral concerns,respectively,
cognitive legitimacy entails pas-sive support. Cognitive legitimacy
is the ab-sence of questions about or challenges to anentity. In
the absence of such questions or chal-lenges, there is no need for
affirmative backing.Indeed, the provision of any affirmative
instru-mental, relational, or moral account for an entitywith a
high level of cognitive legitimacy maybackfire (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990). As Suchmanexplains:
Both pragmatic and moral legitimacy rest ondiscursive
evaluation, whereas cognitive legit-imacy does not: Audiences
arrive at cost-benefit appraisals and ethical judgmentslargely
through explicit public discussion, andorganizations often can win
pragmatic andmoral legitimacy by participating vigorously insuch
dialogues; in contrast, cognitive legitima-tion implicates unspoken
orienting assump-tions, and heated defenses of
organizationalendeavors tend to imperil the objectivity
andexteriority of such taken-for-granted schemata(1995: 585).
Thus, cognitive legitimacy does not representa dimension of the
substantive content of le-gitimacy judgments. Instead, it
represents theabsence of content. Indeed, this absence ofcontent is
its power: “for things to be otherwisebecomes literally
unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983:25). Organizations (or other social
entities forthat matter) with a high level of cognitive le-gitimacy
require no justification, so there is noneed for content to
underlie a justification. Forthis reason Suchman contends that the
taken-for-granted nature of cognitive legitimacy“represents the
most subtle and powerfulsource of legitimacy identified to date”
(1995:583).
This description may seem to imply that cog-nitive legitimacy
only applies to fully institu-
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tionalized entities (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). How-ever, a key
insight of institutional theory is thatisomorphism legitimates
(Deephouse, 1996). Inother words, to the extent that a new entity
con-forms to the expectations carved by existing in-stitutions,
that new entity is not subjected toactive evaluations but, instead,
is passively ac-cepted and unquestioned. In this way the powerof
cognitive legitimacy can be applied to theemergence of the rules,
norms, and organiza-tions that Greif (2006) calls “institutional
ele-ments.” For example, Glynn and Abzug (2002)demonstrate that
organizations that adoptnames that conform to the conventional
struc-tures and styles of names within their institu-tional field
benefit from greater legitimacy. Sim-ilarly, Deephouse (1996)
demonstrates thatisomorphism in commercial banks is
positivelyrelated to legitimacy. This phenomenon mayalso apply to
emergent institutions. Henisz andZelner describe emergent
institutions as institu-tions that are newly created and, thus,
“stillsubject to evaluation” (2005: 363). However, to theextent
that an emergent institution can be con-structed in such a way as
to be compatible withexisting institutions, the evaluation (and
im-plied challenge) that Henisz and Zelner refer tois less likely
to occur, and so the emergent in-stitution can begin to accrue the
immunity toquestioning that is cognitive legitimacy. In es-sence,
isomporphism legitimates because itleads to the absence of
questions or challengesand thereby holds substantive,
content-basedevaluation at bay. Thus, while cognitive legiti-macy
is typically conceived of as a property offully institutionalized
(i.e., self-reproducing andtaken-for-granted) entities, emergent
organiza-tions, institutions, and institutional elementscan tap
into the power of cognitive legitimacyby conforming to cultural
expectations andnorms.
Regulative legitimacy also emphasizes con-formity, but rather
than conformity or congru-ence with cultural expectations (as in
the case ofcognitive legitimacy), regulative legitimacyemerges from
conformity with law or other formsof collective regulation
(Greenwood et al., 2002;Greve, 2005; Scott, 1995). In this sense
regulativelegitimacy is highly related to cognitive legiti-macy:
organizations (the key target of consider-ation in research on
regulative legitimacy) areexpected to conform to regulations, and
failureto do so raises questions about the nature of the
organization that the organization would haveotherwise avoided.
However, regulative legiti-macy is also distinct from cognitive
legitimacybecause regulative legitimacy involves an ac-tive
external validation of the organization bysome agent (e.g., a
government agency or a pro-fessional association).
Validity, as explained above, refers not to in-dividual-level
judgments of legitimacy but tocollective-level legitimacy.
Researchers haveidentified two types of social cues that canemerge
regarding the validity of a social entity:endorsement of the entity
by peers and authori-zation of the entity by authorities (Dornbush
&Scott, 1975). Regulative legitimacy represents aform of
authorization. Authorization does not,however, establish a
particular basis on whichto judge an entity to be legitimate;
rather, itmerely provides evidence that others havejudged it to be
legitimate. Importantly, themeaning of regulative legitimacy can
varyacross contexts. In a democracy, authorizationin the form of
formal laws supporting an insti-tutional arrangement indicates
fairly broad-based endorsement of that arrangement. Thesame would
not be the case in a dictatorship.Thus, while cognitive legitimacy
is excludedfrom the typology of the content of legitimacyjudgments
because cognitive legitimacy repre-sents the absence of substantive
judgment con-tent, regulative legitimacy is excluded becauseit
represents a special case of the use of others’evaluations as
heuristic substitutes for individ-ual-level evaluation.
Summary
In summary, I argue that there are three di-mensions of content
underlying legitimacy judg-ments: instrumental, relational, and
moral. Spe-cifically, an entity is viewed as legitimate
oninstrumental grounds when it is perceived tofacilitate the
individual’s or group’s attempts toreach self-defined or
internalized goals or out-comes. Examples of perceptions or beliefs
thatconstitute the content of the instrumental di-mension of
legitimacy judgments include per-ceptions or beliefs related to the
effectiveness,efficiency, or utility of the entity. Second,
anentity is viewed as legitimate on relationalgrounds when it is
perceived to affirm thesocial identity and self-worth of
individuals orsocial groups and to ensure that individuals or
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groups are treated with dignity and respectand receive outcomes
commensurate withtheir entitlement. Examples of perceptions
orbeliefs that constitute the content of the rela-tional dimension
of legitimacy judgments in-clude perceptions or beliefs related to
the fair-ness, benevolence, or communality thatcharacterizes the
entity. Finally, an entity isperceived as legitimate on moral
groundswhen it is perceived to be consistent with theevaluator’s
moral and ethical values. Thus,examples of perceptions or beliefs
that consti-tute the content of the moral dimension of le-gitimacy
judgments include perceptions or be-liefs related to the morality,
ethicality, orintegrity of an entity.
It is important to highlight that these threedimensions are not
mutually exclusive; entitiesmay be evaluated simultaneously on all
threedimensions or on some subset of the dimen-sions. In addition,
the three domains may alsooverlap—that is, the specific beliefs and
percep-tions that underlie any given legitimacy judg-ment may fall
into one or more categories. Forexample, the observation that a
particular insti-tutional practice is highly efficient would
cer-tainly fall into the instrumental dimension.However, in the
context of an organizational cul-ture that places a high value on
efficiency (e.g.,Wal-Mart), that observation may fall into themoral
dimension as well (i.e., the observationthat a practice is
efficient may constitute bothinstrumental and moral grounds for
maintain-ing it). In other types of organizational or
groupcultures, there may be a significant overlap be-tween the
relational and moral dimensions.Similarly, in groups that do not
have a strongculture or value system and do not recognizerelational
practices as promoting efficiency,there may be relatively little
overlap across thethree dimensions. Thus, the degree of
overlapamong the three dimensions may be moderatedby a number of
variables, such as group or or-ganizational culture and individual
value orien-tations.
In the next section I build on this typology toconstruct a model
of the legitimacy judgmentprocess, and in doing so I explain that
the na-ture of the relationships between the three di-mensions of
legitimacy judgments and an over-all legitimacy judgment depends on
the stage ofthe legitimacy judgment process.
THE LEGITIMACY JUDGMENT PROCESS
While institutional scholars view legitimacyas the key driver of
institutional change, verylittle research has examined how
individual-level legitimacy judgments develop and changeover time.
Institutional theorists have recentlypaid increasing attention to
microprocesses ofinstitutional change (e.g., Phillips et al.,
2004;Reay et al., 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005;Zilber,
2002). However, much of the research inthis area has focused not on
individual-leveljudgments of legitimacy but, rather, on how
in-teractions among individuals constitute socialreality and guide
institutional change (e.g.,Reay et al., 2006; Zilber, 2002; Zucker,
1977) orhow rhetoric and discourse are used as tools ofinfluence in
the process of institutional change(e.g., Phillips et al., 2004;
Suddaby & Greenwood,2005; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006).
In otherwords, institutional theorists have not examinedhow
individuals come to judge existing institu-tional arrangements as
legitimate or illegiti-mate or how those judgments emerge to
moti-vate individuals to work for change or maintainthe status
quo.
In this section I build on research from insti-tutional theory
and social psychology to developa model of the legitimacy judgment
process thatcan speak to these issues and, therefore, cancontribute
to research on the microprocesses ofinstitutional change (e.g., by
helping to specifythe circumstances under which individuals be-come
motivated to engage in activities forchange, as well as the forms
and content ofrhetoric that are likely to resonate with
differentaudiences). Specifically, I argue that the legiti-macy
judgment process is a three-stage cyclicalprocess that is
characterized by two judgmentstages (judgment formation and
judgment reas-sessment) and an additional stage in which
thejudgment is used (see Figures 1 and 2). In thejudgment formation
stage an initial legitimacy
FIGURE 1The Legitimacy Judgment Cycle
Judgmentuse
Judgmentformation
Judgmentreassessment
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judgment is formed either through an evaluativeor passive
judgment mode. In the use stage theexisting judgment is deployed to
guide behaviorand is bolstered through processes of affirma-tion
and cognitive assimilation. The use stagemay continue in
perpetuity, or instead individu-als may engage or reengage in the
evaluativemode in the judgment reassessment stage. Inthe sections
below I explain each of thesestages in more detail.
Judgment Formation
In the judgment formation stage individualsengage in either an
evaluative or passive modeof information processing, which leads to
a gen-eralized legitimacy judgment that representsthe entity as
either appropriate (i.e., legitimate)or inappropriate (i.e.,
illegitimate) for its socialcontext. The two modes of the
legitimacy judg-ment process differ with respect to the sources
ofinformation used, the extent of cognitive effortemployed, and the
effects on the generalizedlegitimacy judgment reached.
Evaluative mode. In the evaluative modejudgments of the overall
legitimacy of an entityare constructed on the basis of evaluations
ofthe entity along instrumental, relational, and/ormoral
dimensions. In addition, the evaluativemode involves effortful
attempts at judgmentcreation. In this mode the individual is
activelymotivated to construct an evaluation of the en-
tity. It is important to note, however, that thiseffortful
nature characterizing the evaluativemode does not mean that the
evaluative mode isimmune to cognitive biases. Indeed,
extensiveresearch documents that individuals can pro-duce biased
judgments despite a motivation foraccuracy (Gilovich, Griffin,
& Kahneman, 2002;Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Kahneman &Tversky, 2000). The effortful nature of the
evalu-ative mode does not imply that judgmentsare not biased;
rather, it simply indicates thatindividuals are actively engaged in
a consciousattempt to construct a judgment. Thus, in theevaluative
mode of the legitimacy judgmentprocess, instrumental, relational,
and moralevaluations drive judgments of generalized
le-gitimacy.
Consequently, to understand the dynamics ofthe evaluative mode,
it is necessary to under-stand the circumstances under which one or
theother of the three dimensions is likely to beprioritized in the
judgment process. Previous so-cial psychological research has
demonstratedthat the relative prioritization of the three
di-mensions is driven at least in part by evalua-tors’ social
identification with the group that isassociated with the entity
under evaluation. So-cial identification with the group refers to
theextent to which group members form their iden-tities around
their group membership and inte-grate the group into their
self-concepts (Tajfel &Turner, 1979). In his research Tyler
(1997) found
FIGURE 2Model of the Legitimacy Judgment Process
Validitycues
Instrumentalevaluations
Instrumentalevaluations
Relationalevaluations
Relationalevaluations
Moralevaluations
Moralevaluations
Mode:passive vs.evaluative
Generalizedlegitimacy
Generalizedlegitimacy
Extrinsic vs.intrinsic
orientation togroup
Judgment formation and reassessment stages
+
++
+
+
–
–+
–
–
–
Use stage
Support for(or resistance to)
change
+ +
+
++
+
+
2011 695Tost
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that social identification with the group leads toa greater
prioritization of the relational dimen-sion of legitimacy
judgments. Specifically, indi-viduals who draw more heavily on the
group fortheir personal sense of identity and who havecloser bonds
with the group tend to placegreater emphasis on relational concerns
in de-termining their evaluations of the legitimacy ofauthorities
and group policies.
This effect likely emerges because individu-als having high
levels of social identificationwith the group tend to have an
intrinsic orienta-tion to the group such that engagement with
thegroup is a source of identity, joy, and meaning(Amabile, Hill,
Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). Forthese individuals, the relational
and moral le-gitimacy of group policies and practices arehighly
personally relevant—these policies andpractices construct central
aspects of their self-concept and personal meaning. Relative to
thedeeply meaningful implications of the rela-tional and moral
status of group-based entitiesfor these individuals, instrumental
concerns arelikely to be less critical. In contrast, individualswho
have a low level of identification with thegroup tend to have an
extrinsic orientation tothe group, engaging in group activities not
be-cause the group functions as a source of iden-tity, joy, or
meaning but because the group canprovide valued outcomes (Amabile
et al., 1994).For these individuals, the relational and moralstatus
of group-based policies and practices areonly meaningful to the
extent that these consid-erations impact the personal outcomes the
indi-vidual desires (i.e., to the extent that these con-siderations
are instrumental to the individual’spersonal interests). Therefore,
individuals withan extrinsic orientation to the group (e.g.,
indi-viduals with low group identification) are likelyto place
primary emphasis on the instrumentaldimension and very little
emphasis on the rela-tional and moral dimensions in
determiningtheir generalized legitimacy judgments in theevaluative
mode.
Passive mode. In the passive mode, however,rather than engage in
effortful information pro-cessing, individuals either use validity
cues ascognitive shortcuts to reach a legitimacy judg-ment or
passively assume the legitimacy of en-tities that conform to
cultural expectations (orsome combination of the two). In the
former pro-cess individuals observe authorizations or en-dorsements
from others and base their own
judgments entirely on those observations ratherthan on their own
evaluations of the instrumen-tal, relational, and moral status of
the entity. Inthe latter process individuals simply passivelyaccept
entities that conform to their expecta-tions. This latter process
is consistent with thediscussion of how new entities can tap into
thepower of cognitive legitimacy by merely con-forming to cultural
expectations. As Johnson andcolleagues explain, sometimes
legitimacy maybe acquired “simply by not being implicitly
orexplicitly challenged” (2006: 60). Thus, in thepassive mode of
the legitimacy judgment pro-cess, validity cues and/or mere
acceptancedrives judgments of generalized legitimacy.
Relationship between the two modes. Thesetwo modes correspond to
modes of reasoningidentified in a wide range of areas of
socialpsychological research. Dual-process models insocial
psychology generally distinguish be-tween two modes of cognitive
operations: onethat is effortful, controlled, and
self-aware—thatis, an evaluative mode—and another that is
ef-fortless, automatic, and quick—that is, a passivemode (e.g.,
Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman &Frederick, 2002). Social
psychological researchfurther suggests that because individuals
tendto approach judgment tasks in ways that con-serve cognitive
energy, the passive mode pre-dominates unless it becomes necessary
or desir-able for the evaluative mode to intervene(Gilbert, 2002;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002;Lieberman, 2003).
Thus, the passive mode is likely to predomi-nate in the judgment
formation stage unless theindividual deems it necessary or
desirable touse more effort in the judgment process. Thereare
therefore two factors likely to impact whichof the two modes
predominates in the judgmentformation stage: the availability of
validity cuesand the extent to which the entity that is thetarget
of judgment conforms to cultural expecta-tions. If validity cues
are unavailable, as may bethe case for a newly proposed entity, the
evalu-ative mode is more likely to be engaged. Inaddition, if the
entity conflicts with some aspectof the individual’s culturally
based expecta-tions, the evaluative mode is more likely to
beengaged. Hence, in most circumstances (i.e.,when validity cues
are available or when thereis a high level of congruence with
existing insti-tutional arrangements), the passive mode
pre-dominates.
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An important implication of the predominanceof the passive mode
in most circumstances ofinitial judgment formation is that initial
judg-ments are likely to be biased in a positive direc-tion.
Specifically, Ridgeway and Berger (1986)argue that when peers or
authorities merely actas though an entity is legitimate, their
behavioris sufficient to produce validity cues. This dy-namic is
referred to as weak validation becausemere behavioral compliance
with the dictates ofan institutional arrangement implies
collective-level legitimacy, regardless of the actual
indi-vidual-level legitimacy judgments of the indi-viduals engaging
in compliance. The power ofweak validation in the form of mere
behavioralcompliance means that when individuals pre-suppose a
consensus that an entity is legiti-mate, and they then act on that
supposition,their act itself functions as confirmation of
theirpresupposition for other actors, and the fact thatother actors
do nothing to oppose the initial ac-tion provides further
confirmation. This dynamiccan produce a strong bias in favor of
positiveperceptions of validity, which, in turn, have apositive
impact on individual-level generalizedlegitimacy judgments.
Regardless of whether the passive mode orevaluative mode
predominates in the judgmentformation stage, the outcome of the
judgmentformation stage is a generalized legitimacyjudgment that
represents the entity as legiti-mate or illegitimate to some
degree. Once sucha generalized legitimacy judgment is estab-lished,
the individual moves into the use stageof the legitimacy judgment
process.
Use Stage
The generalized legitimacy judgment formedin the judgment
formation stage is carried overinto the use stage, where it guides
behavior withrespect to the entity. In the use stage
legitimacyjudgments come to function as pivotal cogni-tions (Lind,
2001) that can move people betweentwo very different types of
behaviors: on the onehand, to the extent that an entity is viewed
aslegitimate, it is supported, and attempts tochange it are
resisted; on the other hand, to theextent that an entity is viewed
as illegitimate,people actively seek to change it.
Thus, in the use stage the entity is no longerjudged; instead,
the existing judgment is de-ployed. Consequently, in the use phase
cogni-
tive energy is no longer geared toward judg-ment formation and
is instead focused onassimilating incoming bits of information
andstimuli to conform to the initial generalized le-gitimacy
judgment in a process characterized bymotivated reasoning (Kunda,
1990). In this waythe generalized legitimacy judgment thatemerges
from the judgment stage acts as ananchor that guides
interpretations of new legit-imacy-relevant experiences such that
new infor-mation is viewed as consistent with the
existinggeneralized legitimacy judgment.
The assimilation process occurs for two rea-sons (Tost &
Lind, 2010). First, this process helpsindividuals manage the
uncertainty associatedwith their social worlds (Lind, 2001; Tost
& Lind,2010). If each new legitimacy-related experiencerequired
individuals to evaluate anew their ex-isting legitimacy judgments,
the legitimacy ofmultitudes of social entities would constantly
becalled into question. Using the initial general-ized legitimacy
judgment as an anchor to guidethe interpretation of new information
ensuresthat this type of potentially incapacitating am-bivalence
and uncertainty is minimized. Thesecond reason for the assimilation
process isrelated to the first. Specifically, assimilationminimizes
the cognitive energy that must beallocated to legitimacy judgments
(Lind, 2001;Tost & Lind, 2010). If assessing the legitimacy
ofthe social environment required individuals toconstantly monitor
their environments for evi-dence of illegitimacy, very little could
be accom-plished. Such a high level of monitoring wouldrequire too
much attention and cognitive energyand would leave individuals
unable to engagein other judgment tasks or activities. Thus,
theassimilation process characterizing the usestage reduces the
cognitive resources that arenecessary for individuals to assess
their secu-rity within their social environments.
There are three important implications emerg-ing from the nature
of the assimilation that oc-curs in the use stage. First, to the
extent thatsome form of substantive content (i.e., instru-mental,
relational, or moral concerns) was usedto justify the initial
generalized legitimacy judg-ment (i.e., if the evaluative mode was
employedin the judgment formation stage), this contentdissipates in
the use stage. The content dissi-pates because it is no longer
needed—the entityis no longer a target of evaluation along
instru-mental, relational, or moral dimensions. In-
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stead, it is simply viewed as legitimate (or ille-gitimate,
depending on the outcome of thejudgment formation stage), and new
informationrelevant to its instrumental, relational, or moralstatus
is interpreted in a manner to be consis-tent with the generalized
legitimacy judgment.As Zilber explains, once institutionalization
oc-curs, the relevant social entities “acquire arealitylike status,
and their social origin is for-gotten” (2002: 234).
Thus, as the content dissipates, cognitive le-gitimacy emerges.
The idea that more substan-tive justifications precede the
development ofcognitive legitimacy is consistent with numer-ous
models of and empirical findings on theprocess of
institutionalization. For example, intheir model of the stages of
institutional change,Greenwood and colleagues (2002) indicate
thatpragmatic and moral legitimacy are assessedbefore cognitive
legitimacy emerges. Similarly,Colyvas (2007) demonstrates how
substantive le-gitimacy preceded cognitive legitimacy in
theinstitutionalization of technology transfer atStanford
University (see also Baum & Powell,1995, and Hoffman,
1999).
As another example, consider an individualwho engages in the
evaluative processing modein the judgment formation stage. The
individualmay conclude that an entity is legitimate oninstrumental
but not on moral grounds and mayfurther conclude that the
instrumental dimen-sion is the most important for consideration
inthe present circumstance (e.g., the individualmay have an
extrinsic orientation to the group).In this case the generalized
legitimacy judg-ment will be positive. For some time after
theestablishment of the judgment, the individualmay recall the
moral qualms he or she initiallyheld about the entity such that
those initialmoral evaluations continue to have an impacton
subsequent moral evaluations, regardless ofthe nature of the
generalized legitimacy judg-ment. However, as time passes, the
process ofassimilation will bias and neutralize that recol-lection
such that the negative moral implica-tions of the entity will be
consistently and pro-gressively minimized (as in the process
ofethical fading described by Tenbrunsel & Mes-sick, 2004) and
the entity will come to be viewedmore favorably on the moral
dimension. Thus,over time, the substantive grounds of the origi-nal
judgment will become blurred and replacedby a noncritical
acceptance of the entity. In this
way the assimilation process that characterizesthe use stage has
the effect of nullifying or neu-tralizing the initial instrumental,
relational, andmoral evaluations (or validity cues) that pro-duced
the generalized legitimacy judgment inthe first place.
This example also points to a second impor-tant implication of
the process of assimilation:assimilation reverses the causal
direction be-tween the generalized legitimacy judgment andthe three
dimensions of legitimacy judgments.In contrast to the evaluative
mode of the judg-ment stages, in which instrumental, relational,and
moral evaluations produce a generalizedlegitimacy judgment, in the
use stage the gen-eralized legitimacy judgment produces the
in-strumental, relational, and moral evaluations ofthe entity. In
other words, the generalized legit-imacy judgments established in
the judgmentformation stage can actually influence
passiveperceptions of the entity with respect to instru-mental,
relational, and moral considerationsduring the use stage.
This contention that the cognitive legitimacythat emerges in the
use stage has a causal im-pact on the dimensions of evaluation is
con-sistent with extensive research in social psy-chology. For
example, research on systemjustification theory (for reviews see
Jost, Banaji,& Nosek, 2004; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sullo-way, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005) shows
thatindividuals have an innate motivation to viewhighly
institutionalized entities as fair and just.Furthermore,
researchers in this area haveshown that individuals rationalize
institutional-ized entities by subjectively enhancing
theirperceptions of the desirability of current institu-tional
arrangements and outcomes (e.g., Kay etal., 2009; Kay, Jimenez,
& Jost, 2002).
Thus, the stage and mode of the legitimacyjudgment process
determine the causal direc-tion of the relationship between the
generalizedlegitimacy judgment and the three domains ofcontent. In
the judgment stages (judgment for-mation and judgment
reassessment), when theevaluative mode is employed, the
instrumental,relational, and moral evaluations of the
entitydetermine the generalized legitimacy judgment.If the passive
mode is used, then validity cuesdetermine the generalized
legitimacy judgment.However, once the individual enters the
usestage, this dynamic reverses. In the use stagethe generalized
legitimacy judgment that was
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formed in the judgment stage biases evalua-tions of the entity
along the three dimensionsand also colors perceptions of the extent
of theentity’s validity. The implications of this rever-sal of
causal direction are not substantial incircumstances in which a
judgment formed inthe evaluative mode did not involve
conflictsacross dimensions. That is, if evaluations acrossall three
dimensions point consistently to eitherpositive or negative
evaluations, there is littlesubstantive consequence of the reverse
ofcausal directions. However, if there is conflictacross the
dimensions in the evaluative mode,as when the entity is viewed as
legitimate oninstrumental but not on moral grounds, then
thereversal of causal direction that occurs in theuse stage can
result in a shift in perceptionsover time, leading the individual
to view asmoral what was previously viewed as immoral(or to view as
instrumental what was previouslyviewed as noninstrumental).
The third implication of the assimilation pro-cess is that the
initial legitimacy judgment willbe perpetuated throughout the use
stage. Thisimplication is particularly important given thepositive
bias that characterizes the judgmentformation stage. This
persistence of initial pos-itive judgments is a dynamic familiar to
socialpsychologists (e.g., Klauer & Stern, 1992). Indeed,much
of the social psychological research rele-vant to institutional
change has examined thetopic of change indirectly, by exploring its
ab-sence. Support for the status quo is a key depen-dent variable
in research on system justificationtheory (Jost et al., 2004; Jost
et al., 2003; Jost &Hunyady, 2002, 2005) and the just world
hypoth-esis (which holds that individuals are motivatedto perceive
their social environments as charac-terized by a high degree of
fairness or justice;see Lerner, 1980), as well as in many
studiesexamining the denial of injustice (Crosby, 1984)and victim
derogation (e.g., Kay, Jost, & Young,2005). The majority of
these theories and ap-proaches share the notion that individuals
tendto resist viewing their social systems as illegit-imate and,
thus, tend to support the status quo.Findings in this area of
research provide sup-port for the contention that individuals
gener-ally exhibit positive legitimacy judgments of ex-isting
institutional arrangements and resist theperception that existing
institutions and socialsystems are lacking in legitimacy.
However, it is clear that there are circum-stances in which
individuals do come to viewexisting social entities as
illegitimate—circum-stances where individuals do not resist
changeand instead desire and promote institutionalchange. Thus, any
theory of the legitimacy judg-ment process must not only account
for the ten-dency to justify existing social entities but
alsospecify the circumstances that mitigate this ten-dency and lead
instead to a more critical con-sideration of the legitimacy of
existing institu-tions and social arrangements. In the
followingsection I describe the judgment reassessmentstage of the
legitimacy judgment process andthen address a critical question in
the study ofinstitutional change: Once an individual has en-tered
the use stage, what are the factors that canmotivate the individual
to reconsider the legiti-macy of a social entity?
Judgment Reassessment Stage
While individuals use motivated reasoning inthe form of
assimilation processes to bolster ini-tial legitimacy judgments in
the use stage, thejudgment reassessment stage is dominated by
amotivation to make effortful and considered per-sonal assessments
of the legitimacy of the en-tity. This motivation to engage in
effortful as-sessments does not imply that individuals in
thejudgment reassessment stage are free of percep-tual biases or
are able to be more objective intheir judgments. Instead, they are
simply moremotivated to engage in the process of judgmentformation.
In addition, entering the judgmentreassessment stage does not
necessarily meanthat the judgment itself will ultimately be
re-vised; an individual may reassess the judgmentand deem that it
does not require revision. Thekey characteristic of the judgment
reassessmentstage is that the individual is motivated to ac-tively
reconsider the existing legitimacy judg-ment. Thus, in the
reassessment stage the eval-uative mode predominates, and
individualsengage in active attempts to evaluate the entityalong
the dimensions of instrumental, rela-tional, and/or moral
legitimacy, which onceagain drive judgments of generalized
legiti-macy. Individuals may also incorporate validitycues into
consideration in the evaluative pro-cess in the reassessment stage,
but the primaryemphasis is on their own assessments of
theinstrumental, relational, and moral status of the
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entity because the motive to form a personaljudgment becomes
paramount.
As the individual engages in effortful consid-eration of the
instrumental, relational, andmoral legitimacy of a social entity,
he or shecreates a new generalized legitimacy judgment.Once a new
generalized legitimacy judgment isformed, the individual reenters
the use stage,where the newly formed generalized legitimacyjudgment
will again function as a pivotal cog-nition, guiding behavior with
respect to the en-tity, and as a heuristic, influencing the
interpre-tation of additional information related to theentity.
Moreover, because the evaluative mode(rather than the passive mode)
predominates inthe judgment reassessment stage, the positivebias
that characterizes the judgment formationstage is not present.
Consequently, it is at thisstage in the legitimacy judgment process
thatjudgments of illegitimacy (and, hence, supportfor change) are
most likely to emerge. A criticalissue, therefore, is to determine
what leads in-dividuals to transition from the use stage intothe
judgment reassessment stage. I tackle thisissue in the following
section.
Switching from the Use Stage to the JudgmentReassessment
Stage
The process of switching from the use stage tothe judgment
reassessment stage taps into fun-damental issues in both
institutional theory andsocial psychology. Specifically,
institutionaltheorists grapple with an issue that has beentermed
the paradox of embedded agency (Batti-lana, Leca, & Boxenbaum,
2009; Seo & Creed,2002), which refers to the tension between
theidea of individuals as active shapers of theirinstitutional
environments and the view of indi-viduals’ behaviors as determined
by the institu-tions in which they are embedded. How canindividuals
change institutions “if their actions,intentions, and rationality
are all conditioned bythe very institution they wish to change”
(Holm,1995: 398)? In other words, how can an individualextract him
or herself from the grips of cognitivelegitimacy? The paradox,
thus, is between indi-vidual agency and institutional
determinism,and part of the challenge is to determine whatmakes
cognitive legitimacy erode at the individ-ual level. If cognitive
legitimacy is the absenceof questions, what is it that leads
individuals tobegin to actively interrogate an existing social
entity and to imagine possible alternatives? Toput the issue in
the framework of the model ofthe legitimacy judgment process
presentedhere, what are the factors that lead people tomove out of
the use stage, where institutionalarrangements are passively
accepted, and intothe judgment reassessment stage, where
insti-tutional arrangements are actively interro-gated?
At the same time, a critical concern in socialpsychological
research is identifying the cir-cumstances under which individuals
will en-gage in effortful and reflective information pro-cessing
rather than conserve cognitive energyand resources. Recent research
in the area ofsocial cognitive neuroscience provides an
inter-esting response to this issue. Specifically, thisresearch has
identified a “neural alarm system”that appears to switch
individuals between pas-sive and active judgment processes
(Eisen-berger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lie-berman, &
Williams, 2003; Lieberman &Eisenberger, 2004; Ullsperger, Volz,
& Von Cra-mon, 2004). Research on the activity of this neu-ral
alarm system indicates that the system isactivated when the
potential for errors in judg-ments or outcomes is perceived to be
high(Carter et al., 1998, 2000). For example, the Strooptask, which
requires individuals to identify thecolor of ink in which a word is
written, althoughthe word itself specifies a different color
(e.g.,the word “red” presented in green ink), has beenshown to
activate the neural alarm system(Lieberman, 2007). Thus, social
psychological re-search suggests that individuals will move fromthe
use stage to the judgment reassessmentstage when this mental alarm
is activated.
Integrating insights from social psychologyand institutional
theory, I argue that a mentalalarm is triggered when individuals
detect andthen examine questions that can be raisedabout existing
social entities. Institutional the-orists have posited three
sources of such ques-tions: jolts, contradictions, and
reflexivity.
Jolts. Institutional theorists have argued thatmajor events,
such as technological changes,social upheaval, actions of
competitors, or reg-ulatory changes, can act as jolts to the
institu-tional field, disturbing the functioning of thefield and
thereby prompting consideration of thepotential for institutional
change (Battilana etal., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2002). In
disruptingthe functioning of the institutional field, this
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type of event produces a violation of the expec-tations that are
based on the generalized legit-imacy judgment—social entities are
no longerable to function as they did before the jolt.
Thisviolation of expectations alerts individuals thattheir current
judgments about existing entitiesare no longer reliable, and (to
situate this dy-namic in the context of the present discussion)the
mental alarm is triggered.
Institutional theorists, however, have said rel-atively little
about the necessary features thatmust characterize an event in
order for thatevent to constitute a jolt. I argue that for anevent
to act as a jolt triggering the mentalalarm, the event must provide
new informationor outcomes that preclude assimilation into
ex-isting expectations. In particular, this event ornew piece of
information must be sufficientlyoutside the realm of expectation
that it cannotbe assimilated into existing legitimacy judg-ments
without active and effortful considerationof the challenges the
jolt presents. In this waythe jolt disrupts the assimilation
process, pre-venting it from proceeding, and thereby acti-vates the
mental alarm. Consequently, minorexpectation violations are not
likely to triggerthe mental alarm. The contention that violationsof
expectations can lead people to question theirexisting legitimacy
judgments is also consistentwith previous social psychological
researchdemonstrating that violations of expectationsproduce
discontent with existing social entities(e.g., Rasinski, Tyler,
& Fridkin, 1985).
Consistent with the notion that expectationviolation is
necessary for the activation of themental alarm, I expect that the
mental alarm ismore likely to be activated when the valence
ofunexpected events suggests that a switch be-tween positive and
negative legitimacy judg-ments may be in order. I view legitimacy
as acontinuous variable, with values above a neu-tral point
constituting positive legitimacy judg-ments and values below a
neutral point consti-tuting negative legitimacy judgments
(i.e.,illegitimacy). While dramatic unexpectedevents may indicate
that an existing positivelegitimacy judgment should be increased or
anexisting negative legitimacy judgment shouldbe decreased, events
that suggest a reversal ofthe valence of the legitimacy judgment
are par-ticularly likely to activate the alarm because thecontrast
in valence between the existing judg-ment and the event’s
implications is particularly
likely to catch the individual’s attention and dis-rupt the
assimilation process. This suggestiondoes not imply, however, that
these alarm acti-vations will necessarily elicit a change in
thelegitimacy judgment; they merely elicit an entryinto the
judgment reassessment stage, where adeliberate reevaluation of the
legitimacy judg-ment takes place.
In addition, it is important to note that whileprevious
institutional theory research has con-ceived of the jolt at the
macro level (e.g., at thelevel of the institutional field or
organization),the model presented here suggests that the joltcan
also occur at the individual level. For exam-ple, major life
changes, such as the loss of a job,a personal illness, or the death
of a loved one,can alter the individual’s position within
andperspective on an institutional field. This al-tered perspective
may create new expectationsthat may go unmet or may render the
currentinstitutional arrangements incapable of meet-ing preexisting
expectations. Similarly, if a re-spected friend or colleague
explicitly chal-lenges the legitimacy of existing social
entitiesthat had previously been taken for granted, thischallenge
can act as an exogenous jolt thatis not easily assimilated into the
existing judg-ment. The assimilation process is therefore
in-terrupted, which leads the individual to activelyconsider the
challenge to legitimacy, leading toan erosion of cognitive
legitimacy. In such acircumstance the mental alarm will be
activatedfor the individual without any substantialchange at higher
levels of analysis.
Thus, the experience of a dramatic violation ofexpectations can
function as a trigger for themental alarm, alerting the individual
to theneed to reconsider existing legitimacy judg-ments in a more
effortful and reflective fashion.In this sense the function of
jolts is to expose theformerly invisible assumptions underlying
gen-eralized legitimacy judgments and to motivatethe individual to
actively interrogate those as-sumptions previously passively
accepted. Inthis way jolts cause cognitive legitimacy to dis-solve
or dissipate. In doing so they lead individ-uals to switch from the
use stage of the legiti-macy judgment process to the
reassessmentstage, where they actively question the legiti-macy of
social entities and, if they reach a judg-ment of illegitimacy,
come to actively pursuechange.
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Contradictions. Institutional theorists havealso specified an
additional mechanism thatcan lead individuals to reconsider
existing le-gitimacy judgments. Seo and Creed (2002) haveargued
that contradictions in institutional logics(the underlying
assumptions that shape ways ofviewing and thinking about the social
worldwithin an institutional field) can lead individu-als to
question the legitimacy of existing insti-tutional arrangements.
This approach recog-nizes that actors are simultaneously embeddedin
multiple institutional fields and that conflictsand contradictions
can arise between andamong those fields (Greenwood &
Suddaby,2006; Hoffman, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002). Fromthis
perspective, when these institutional fieldsproduce contradictions,
these contradictionstrigger the mental alarm, alerting actors
thattheir existing judgments may be unreliable. Atthis point the
individuals exercise agency byentering the judgment reassessment
stage andevaluating (or reevaluating) existing institu-tions and
attributing problems to one or moreexisting institutions (i.e.,
specification; seeGreenwood et al., 2002).1 Thus, when an
individ-ual detects contradictions among institutionallogics, the
mental alarm is activated and cogni-tive legitimacy (at the
individual level) begins toerode.
However, given that individuals are embed-ded in a multitude of
institutional arrangementsand that such contradictions are
pervasive, itremains unclear which contradictions are likelyto
attract the attention of which actors. I arguethat for
contradictions across institutional fieldsto trigger the mental
alarm, they must interferewith an individual’s goal pursuits. If a
contra-diction does not have meaningful implicationsfor the
individual’s ability to pursue valuedgoals, such as the achievement
of desired out-comes or the promotion of closely held values,then
the individual is not likely to expend thecognitive energy
necessary to engage in thejudgment reassessment stage. However,
when
contradictions interfere with goal pursuit, theyhave the effect
of revealing and calling intoquestion the nature of existing
institutional ar-rangements and motivating individuals to
reex-amine their existing legitimacy judgments, be-cause doing so
can serve the individuals’ goals.Thus, just as jolts can occur at
either the macro-institutional or individual levels (or any level
inbetween), contradictions can emerge for singleindividuals or for
collectivities (e.g., organiza-tions), and different contradictions
will be evi-dent to different actors depending on the goalsand
values the actors pursue.
Reflexivity. Reflexivity refers to the ability ofindividuals to
consciously reflect on institu-tional arrangements. In order to do
so, individ-uals must distance themselves from the institu-tional
arrangements in which they areembedded by making deliberate efforts
to inter-rogate those arrangements and consider possi-ble
alternatives (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Ofcourse, this is
precisely the type of reflectiveconsideration of institutional
arrangements thatoccurs in the reassessment stage. However,some
theorists have suggested that there maybe certain personality types
or traits that willlead some individuals to be particularly
predis-posed to engage in this type of reflection. Forexample,
Mutch (2007) explored Archer’s (2003)concept of the autonomous
reflexive, which re-fers to a type of individual who monitors
thesocial environment and engages in internal de-bates that serve
to challenge arrangements thatconflict with individual-level
concerns. This ap-proach suggests that there may be individualswho
are predisposed by the nature of their per-sonality or personal
experience to question ex-isting institutional arrangements. These
indi-viduals may have personal tendencies ormotivations that
function as internal triggers ofthe mental alarm, thus moving them
from theuse stage to the reassessment stage without theneed for an
external jolt or contradiction.
Summary
In summary, the legitimacy judgment processis characterized by
three stages. In the judgmentformation stage the individual forms
legitimacyjudgments using either a passive or evaluativemode of
information processing. The passivemode involves the use of
validity cues as a basisfor a generalized legitimacy judgment,
whereas
1 Of course, the individual can also further exerciseagency at
this point by formulating a vision for institutionalchange and
mobilizing to achieve that change. However, Ifocus here on the
aspect of agency involved in the legiti-macy judgment formation
process and leave for future workthe task of exploring the role of
agency in determining howindividuals act on these judgments in
pursuit of institutionalchange.
702 OctoberAcademy of Management Review
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the evaluative mode involves an effortful con-sideration of the
entity along instrumental, rela-tional, and moral dimensions. The
generalizedlegitimacy judgment that emerges from thejudgment
formation stage functions as a heuris-tic in the use stage, guiding
perceptions andbehavior relevant to the entity. The use stage
ischaracterized by a process of assimilation,which leads to the
accumulation of cognitivelegitimacy. The use stage persists until
an ex-ogenous jolt, contradictions in the institutionalfield, or
reflexivity at the individual level triggerthe mental alarm and
motivate the individual tomove into the judgment reassessment
stage. Inthe reassessment stage the legitimacy judgmentprocess
involves a more effortful and deliberateapproach to evaluating the
legitimacy of thesocial entity along instrumental, relational,
andmoral dimensions. It is therefore in the reassess-ment stage of
the legitimacy judgment processthat judgments of illegitimacy are
most likely toemerge. Those judgments of illegitimacy, inturn,
produce the desire for institutional change.Upon forming a new
positive or negative legiti-macy judgment, the individual reenters
the usestage.2
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The theoretical framework of legitimacy judg-ments I have
developed here integrates legiti-macy research from institutional
theory and so-cial psychology. Social psychologists haveconceived
of legitimacy as a function of instru-mental and relational
considerations and haveonly recently come to examine the moral
dimen-sion of legitimacy. At the same time, institu-tional
theorists have conceptualized pragmaticlegitimacy (i.e., the
instrumental dimension),moral legitimacy, and cognitive
legitimacy(Suchman, 1995) but have generally neglected toconsider
the importance of the relational dimen-sion and have not examined
the formation andchange of these judgments at the individuallevel.
The theoretical framework presented hereintegrates this previous
work, highlighting theways in which research from both fields
caninform and complement one another. Moreover,the model of
legitimacy judgments presented
here can be applied broadly to help scholarsunderstand
legitimacy evaluations of a varietyof social entities, including
organizations, socialstructures, organizational policies,
procedures,and leaders.
Importantly, this integrative theoreticalframework empowers
researchers to exploreboth the content and process dynamics of
legit-imacy judgments. With respect to the content oflegitimacy
judgments, I argue that rather thanviewing the instrumental,
relational, and moraldimensions as competing models for
under-standing the content underlying legitimacyjudgments, these
three types of perceptions, be-liefs, and concerns should be viewed
as threedifferent dimensions of judgment that may si-multaneously
impact individuals’ judgments ofthe generalized legitimacy of a
social target.Viewing them in this way permits scholars toexplore
the ways in which each of the types ofconcerns contributes to (or
is guided by, as in theuse stage) generalized legitimacy judgments.
Inaddition, this perspective empowers research-ers to consider the
factors that influence whichof the three dimensions is prioritized
in the eval-uative mode. An understanding of the contentunderlying
legitimacy judgments can thereforecontribute meaningfully to
scholars’ under-standing of the factors that impact
individuals’judgments of the legitimacy of organizations,groups,
social structures, policies, procedures,and leaders.
At the same time, with respect to the legiti-macy judgment
process, the distinction betweenthe use stage and the judgment
stages (judg-ment formation and judgment reassessment) ofthe
legitimacy judgment process providesmuch-needed conceptual clarity
to the relation-ships between legitimacy and power, on the onehand,
and legitimacy and fairness, on the otherhand. First, the
distinction between the judg-ment stages and the use stage helps to
eluci-date when legitimacy is a source of power thatproduces
deference to organizational authori-ties and rules and when it
instead represents acontingent judgment that is under
development.Specifically, in the use stage legitimacy judg-ments
guide people’s interpretations of informa-tion related to social
entities and determine in-dividuals’ behavioral orientations to
thoseentities. Consequently, a positive legitimacyjudgment provides
the entity with a cushion ofsupport that promotes deference to
institutional
2 The cyclical nature of this process is similar to punctu-ated
equilibrium models of change (Gersick, 1991).
2011 703Tost
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constraints. In this sense, a positive legitimacyjudgment is a
source of power for organizations,institutions, and institutional
authorities whenevaluators are in the use stage. However, whenan
individual enters the evaluative mode, legit-imacy is contested and
can no longer functionas a cushion of support; it is instead a
develop-ing judgment that is contingent on the individ-ual’s
evaluations of the entity along instrumen-tal, relational, and/or
moral dimensions.
Second, the distinction between the use stageand the judgment
stages also helps scholarsconceptualize the distinctions between
legiti-macy and fairness. Specifically, while muchprevious social
psychological research has con-flated legitimacy and fairness,
there has alsobeen some confusion within the field of
socialpsychology as to whether legitimacy should betreated as an
antecedent to fairness perceptions(e.g., Tyler, 2006; Tyler &
Degoey, 1995) or as anoutcome of fairness perceptions (e.g.,
Hegtvedt &Johnson, 2000). The process model presentedhere
suggests that, in fact, fairness is both anantecedent to and an
outcome of legitimacy,depending on the stage of the legitimacy
judg-ment process. Specifically, in the evaluativemode of the
judgment stages, I would expectthat procedural and interactional
fairnesswould contribute positively to relational evalu-ations and
that fairness in general (e.g., Am-brose & Schminke, 2009)
would have a positiveimpact on both relational and moral
evalua-tions. However, in the use stage the generalizedlegitimacy
judgment would be expected toguide judgments of the fairness of the
entity justas it guides other judgments related to the en-tity.
Therefore, in the use stage legitimacy func-tions as an antecedent
to fairness perceptions,but in the evaluative mode fairness is an
ante-cedent to legitimacy.
Implications for Institutional Change
In addition, an understanding of how legiti-macy judgments
develop and change over timecan contribute substantially to
scholarly under-standing of the individual-level dynamics ofsupport
for and resistance to institutionalchange. Specifically, because
legitimacy func-tions as a pivotal cognition that impacts
indi-viduals’ inclinations to support a social entity orwork for
change, understanding how and whylegitimacy judgments change can
help re-
searchers understand how and why individuals’behavioral
orientations to social entities mayshift and cause them either to
support or to re-sist institutional change.
As explained above, most models of institu-tional change
conceive of the deinstitutionaliza-tion process as being preceded
by a precipitat-ing or destabilizing jolt to the social
ororganizational system (e.g., Greenwood et al.,2002; Meyer,
Brooks, & Goes, 1990). However, theway in which such a jolt
would initiate changeprocesses at the level of individual
behaviorand the circumstances under which it would doso are rarely
addressed in this literature. Thepresent model has implications
regarding boththe nature of the jolt and its impact. According
tothe model presented here (but in contradiction toa common
assumption in institutional research),the jolt need not occur at
the macro level. Themental alarm can indeed be activated by
radi-cal environmental changes, such as crises, thatoccur at the
macro level (assuming such envi-ronmental changes produce
unexpected out-comes). However, the mental alarm can also
betriggered by unexpected outcomes at the indi-vidual level,
leading a single individual to re-consider the legitimacy of
existing social enti-ties and, if a judgment of illegitimacy is
formed,to take on a change leadership role and worktoward change at
the group or organizationallevels.
Furthermore, the view presented here of thetransition between
the use stage and the judg-ment reassessment stage further
specifies thecircumstances under which institutional
contra-dictions act as a precursor to institutionalchange. Previous
work in this area has exploredhow an actor’s social position may
influence thelikelihood of detecting institutional contradic-tions
(see Battilana et al., 2009, for a review). Iargue that in addition
to considering the likeli-hood of detection, it is also necessary
to con-sider the motivation to examine the questionsraised by any
contradictions that are detected. Ifa contradiction is encountered
but it does notinterfere with the pursuit of desired outcomes orthe
promotion of personal values, then the indi-vidual is not likely to
explore the questions thatsuch a contradiction raises about
existing insti-tutional arrangements (and, consequently,
thecognitive legitimacy of those arrangements re-mains intact). In
order to enter the judgmentreassessment stage in response to
institutional
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contradictions, an individual must have both theopportunity to
detect contradictions (e.g., socialposition) and the motivation to
examine thequestions arising from those contradictions.
Thus, this model also has important implica-tions for the study
of institutional entrepreneur-ship. Institutional entrepreneurs are
individualswho take on leadership roles in institutionalchange
efforts (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood& Suddaby, 2006),
using what Fligstein (2001)calls “social skill” to induce others to
cooperatein the pursuit of change. Accordingly, institu-tional
entrepreneurs are individuals who haveformed a judgment of existing
social entities asillegitimate and therefore seek change. Becauseof
their critical role in initiating change andpersuading others to
support change, Dacin,Goodstein, and Scott (2002: 47) call
institutionalentrepreneurs “agents of legitimacy.” That
is,institutional entrepreneurs use influence to per-suade others of
the illegitimacy of existing so-cial arrangements and of the
legitimacy of al-ternatives, thereby recruiting others to join
themin institutional change efforts. The model of thelegitimacy
judgment process presented herehas important implications for
understandingthe determinants of institutional
entrepreneurs’success in their role as agents of legitimacy.
First, the model suggests that institutional en-trepreneurs will
be most effective in their per-suasion attempts if the targets of
their influenceare in t