After the Cold War

After the Cold War

The Post-Cold War World:3 periods

First Period,1991-2000: Triumph of the West Triumph of global capitalism Russia’s transition crisis The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak The Western expansion to the post-communist East Formation of the global neoliberal regime

Second Period, 2001-2008: US Hegemony Tested The Islamist challenge and the Bush response Development of a multipolar system Russia’s resurgence Relative decline of US hegemony

Third Period, 2008- The global economic crisis Creeping bankruptcy and political stalemate in the US The crisis of European integration The rise of China as a global power Reset in Russia’s relations with the West

Comparing 1917 and 1991: The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution,

the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a result of the civil war

The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast themselves as leaders of independent nation-states – or of units of the Russian Federation

A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for themselves after communism

Transition to capitalism would enable most of them to maintain and even enhance their power and privilege

Having dissolved the empire, the new elites have been engaged in competition and cooperation between themselves to: secure their control, reform their political-economic systems, find new places in the regional and global orders

THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPERIAL SPOILS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EURASIA

Some of them stick together (RF, CIS, GUUAM) Others go their own separate ways, look for new

partnerships Meanwhile, many other states are exploring opportunities to

expand their influence in Eurasia

Contraction of Russian power

NATO enlargement, 1949-2004

Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end of the Cold War:

1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power Territorial losses Economic depression The military crisis Ideological neutralization

after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20th century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right

2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces with minimal regulation by the state

3. Political affiliation with the West

4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony

Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in the Cold War sense: Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key

enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal regime

RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist, cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies

RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:

The nuclear risks Possibility of a totalitarian backlash Potential for civil war Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a

sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US

(not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other states) – or:

Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US hegemony (a problem for the US)

US objectives vis-à-vis Russia Encourage Russia’s transition to capitalism Prevent Russia from acting as a counterbalance to US Control Russia’ behaviour to keep it congruent with US

interests Expand US influence into the post-Soviet spacePerspectives outside the US: Many countries would like Russia to play the role of a non-

hostile, but relatively independent, actor in international politics

Most Russians have the same perspective

The economy GDP, PPP - $2.2 trln. (No.8 in the world)

Canada – $1.33 trln. GDP per capita - $16,000

Canada - $39,400 Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9% in 2009, 4% in 2010

Canada – 0.5% in 2008, -2.5% in 2009, 3.1% in 2010

US National Intelligence Council forecast for the year 2025, unveiled in October 2008, described Russia as

one of four rising centers of international power: “In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way — roughly from West to East — is without precedent in modern history . . . . No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout. . . . Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.”

“Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”. Washington: National Intelligence Council, November 2008 - http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html , pp. vi, vii

In the 2000s, Russian state capacity was partially restored Putinism has consolidated Russian capitalism, protected it

from internal challenges, and returned Russia to the rank of major international actors

But huge problems remain unsolved, while new problems have been created

The Russian economy needs major modernization to be competitive

The new Russian state is in many ways dysfunctional and needs major reforms to meet Russia’s challenges

The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality Continued resurgence requires new policies and reforms

The structure of Russia’s exports: 93% raw materials

Russian elite interests

The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class, product of the post-communist transformation Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms Dependent on the West, primarily the US Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR Assertive in the political sphere Seeks economic opportunities worldwide Intertwined with state bureaucracy

The bureaucrats The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites

Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get their property

Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more

authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis Federal civilian bureaucracy

Interested in whatever protects and increases their power

Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests

The national bourgeoisie Well below the ranks of the oligarchy Gets little from the West Feels dominated by the oligarchs Is nationalist and protectionist

The politicians 1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United

Russia” – becoming the ruling party under Putin The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis

Russian threat perceptions Security – internal and external Control of resources Russia’s defence capability Technological lag behind the West Negative demography

The dominant trends in Russian foreign policy thinking Relations with the West are top priority No desire to confront the West Recognition of Western concerns

But also: Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence Claim for “special interests” in the post-Soviet space Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other

international actors Pragmatism Primacy of trade and investment issues Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to

problems

Globescan polls, BBC, the 2000s: Steady improvements in Russia’s image in global public

opinion – until 2009. The 2008 poll: Russia’s influence in world affairs?

37% - “mainly positive” 34% - “mainly negative.”

US influence in world affairs? 35% - “mainly positive” 47% - “mainly negative”

Germany: 56% positive, 18% negative China: 47% positive, 32% negative http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbccntryview08/ 

http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbccntryview09/

Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009: http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/

Russia’s military budget Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of

Soviet GDP Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991 Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year In 2006, a new state armaments program, which will span

2007-2015, was adopted Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion). 63% is to be allocated for the procurement of modern

weapons and equipment 27% towards defense research and development. 2010 – defence spending accounted for 2.84% of Russia’s

GDP Plan for 2013 – 3.39% Norm approved in 2000 – 3.5%

Topol-M, Russia’s new mobile ICBM

A Tu-95 over the Arctic

Russian infantry in Georgia, August 2008

A Russian warship in the Caribbean

Russia is buying a Mistral amphibious assault ship from France

NATO Russia

Tanks 12,332 22,950

APCs 31,420 25,080

Submarines 84 66

Principal surface combatants

194 57

Bomber/fighter ground attack

1,905 1,648

Deployable military personnel

3,579 mln. 1,200 mln. (+ active reserve of 0.75 mln.)

Military spending, 2010

$1,085 trln. (3.5% of GDP)

$56 bln.

Status of World Nuclear Forces 2010*

Country StrategicNon-

StrategicOperationa

lTotal

Inventory

 Russia  2,600 2,050a  4,650  12,000b

 United States 1,968 500c  2,468d 9,600e

 France  300 n.a. ~300 300f

 China 180 ? ~180 240g

 United Kingdom 160 n.a. <160 225h

 Israel  80 n.a. n.a. 80i

 Pakistan  70-90 n.a. n.a. 70-90i

 India  60-80 n.a. n.a. 60-80i

 North Korea  <10 n.a. n.a. <10j

Total:   ~5,400k ~2,550k ~7,700k  ~22,600k

* All numbers are estimates and further described in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the nuclear appendix in the SIPRI Yearbook. Additional reports are published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog. Unlike those publications, this table is updated continuously as new information becomes available. Current update: May 26, 2010.

Russia’s foreign policy compass West - US, EU, NATO East – China, India, Japan South - the Muslim world North - the Arctic

Russia in Europe

Russia in Asia

Russia on the Pacific

Russia in the Arctic