Origins of the Cold War Q: Was the Cold War inevitable after WWII?

Origins of the Cold War

Q: Was the Cold War inevitable after WWII?

Harry S. Truman was a realistic, pragmatic President who skillfully led the American people against the menace posed by the Soviet Union. Assess the validity of this generalization for President Truman’s foreign policy. (84)

Analyze the influence of TWO of the following on American-Soviet relations in the decade following the Second World War.: Yalta Conference; Communist Revolution in China; Korean War; McCarthysim (96)

I. Commanding Heights Conflict competing econ. systems Redevelopment 1st, development 3rd World

US took seriously econ. development poorer nations: World Bank, International Monetary Fund

USSR refused to join: US control “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery

and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.”

Harry Truman, March 12, 1947

II. Decolonization Collapse British, French, German,

Japanese empires Nationalism communism

Opp. colonizers (West) “communism” Capitalism as means of oppression Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong

Non-alignment: Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt)

III. Lessons from Munich No appeasement: “Red fascism”

Stalin’s “orgy of terror”: purges, gulags, starvation, mass murder communists pathologically murderous

USSR really was “evil empire” BUT post-WWII USSR unclear goals (satellite nations for

buffer; spread communism?), regional not global power: threat was limit to US expansion, not direct attack; Cold War mentality led US to undermine democracy at home + abroad (“Cold War consensus”)

No depressions political extremism, war

IV. Irony of the Boom US econ depended trade (10% GDP,

import resources) Europe: “dollar gap” (insufficient currency to

buy US goods) Communists/nationalists closed trade

(autarky: econ independence)

V. Small World After All Long-range bombers + ICBMS far-flung

defenses needed Sec’y Navy James Forrestal: ships

“Wherever there is a sea.”

VI. PersonalitiesA. FDR’s Two Foreign Policies

FDR’s public vs. private policies Universalist: Wilsonian

“universal” values that US supports and will promote throughout world (Four Freedoms: speech, religion, from fear, from want)

Sphere of influence: divide up world between great powers

Public: Atlantic Charter Private: Four Policemen (US, GB, USSR, China) Spheres only practical solution: Red Army in

Eastern Europe—is US willing to go to war in Poland?

Soviets did not want repeat Napoleon, WWI, WWII Precedent in Italy: GB+US liberate Italy

determine interim gov’t w/o consulting USSR or Italian communists: whoever wins, rules (Germany vs. Japan) Stalin followed same pattern in Romania

Yalta Summit, April 1945: 2 policies conflict over Poland

Red Army in Poland, but Poles don’t want USSR

US commitment to “free” elections in Poland (never happened)

USSR claimed Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria

Some believe FDR would continue policy after war (set up United Nations for this purpose), but died

B. Scaring the Hell out of the American People

“Get-Tough” HT met with FDR twice during vice-

presidency: FDR thought him corrupt and stupid

HT little foreign policy experience blunt, undiplomatic

HT hard core universalist: No empire; didn’t always distinguish Fascist and Communist Stalin global domination; only US had strength + moral resolve But Vietnam and French

Potsdam: Atomic bomb HT harder line USSR out of E. Europe

Stalin didn’t react: 1) working on own bomb, 2) calculated US public would not support use in Poland

Late ‘45/46 HT demanding withdrawal

Mid-1946 negotiation impossible rearmament

Stalin 1st declared Cold War Feb. ’46: capitalism + communism incompatible

March ‘46: Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech Exaggerated as monolithic, aggressive

archenemy

VII. Containment Feb. 1946: George Kennan,

Ambassador to USSR: 8,000 word telegram (Long Telegram): argued Stalin not stop till western democracies destroyed

Anonymous article in Foreign Affairs (“X Article”): argued containment USSRUS superior economy to tie countries to capitalist democracies

Greece and the Truman Doctrine March 1947: HT declares in response to British

request for aid in Greece (GB couldn’t afford to prop up king against several thousand “Communist” guerillas; not actually backed by Soviets)

Tough sell: history of activity in Latin America, but needed to make a break to support through the world

Dean Acheson (Sec’y State): public won’t accept unless “scare the hell” out of them

March 12, 1947: Truman Doctrine

Greece 1st domino in chain that leads to Mid East oil

What was WWII for anyway?

Won’t accept change in status quo (anticommunists freedom fighters, even if brutal dictators)

$250 mil to Greece; $150 mil to Turkey

Shattered isolationism Scared Americans so much began asking

“why not doing more?”

“why a Cold war if they’re so bad?”

HT found that Republicans could play Red Card better than Dems (Nixon, McCarthy)

VIII. Marshall Plan: Catalyst of Cold War Sec’y State Gen. George C. Marshall Don’t repeat WWI: rebuild and reintegrate

our enemies (Germany, Western Europe) Strengthen ties between US and Europe

(economic and political) Keep Europe open to US products (no

repeat GD) $13 billion in 4 years (Europe already

rebuilding: catalyst, gave confidence) Fueled division of Europe: West vs. East;

those with us and those against us

Germany: deindustrialization policy at end of war

1946: James Byrnes’ “Speech of hope” repudiate Morgenthau Plan (fear push to communism)

Right-wing Republicans initially opposed the Plan until Stalin refused to allow Poland or Czechoslovakia to accept any aid; communist coup in Hungary sealed the deal