Focusing on the interplay between social networks and institutions as a means to understand adaptive governance challenges Beatrice Crona PhD, Research Fellow (Assistant Prof), SRC
Oct 21, 2014
Focusing on the interplay between social networks and institutions as a means to
understand adaptive governance challenges
Beatrice Crona PhD, Research Fellow (Assistant Prof), SRC
?
PART IQuick recap of the role of knowledge and communication networks in adaptive governance
PART IIHow can social relations create and interact with informal institutions?
How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance?
PART IIIInterplay between trust – leadership and governance
PART IVArrangements which facilitate adaptive governance
Lecture Outline
… all social networks are not created equal!!!
Structural pattern of relations (i.e. the topology) of a social network can have significant impact on how actors actually behave
VIDEO CLIP
PART I: The role of knowledge and communication networks in adaptive governance
Failure of top-down control regulation of CPR
Led Ostrom and others to propose polycentric governance structures
(Ostrom 1990, 2005, Anderies et al. 2004)
Motivated by for e.g. local knowledge, held by communities actually using resource, is often conducive to an insight into natural fluctuations of the resource
Photos: J. Cinner
ESA Conference, Aug 6-11 2006 Dept of Systems Ecology, Stockholm University
Results
Higher level of knowledge
Lower level of knowledge
rela
tive
diffe
renc
e (∆
) in
det
ail o
f kno
wle
dge
MANGROVE REEFSEAGRASS
Seine net
Middlemen
Deep sea
Gill net
Shrimpers
Speargun
Handline
Farmers
Businessmen
Relative difference in LEK among occupational categories
Crona 2006, Ecol & Soc
Crona & Bodin 2006, Ecol & Soc
Knowledge and network are inextricably linked
Common understanding + trust/reciprocity
Uneven knowledge distribution may not be conducive to consensus-building within the community
Effect on info type included in co-management initiatives => important to involve all groups
So why is this interesting?
PART II:How do social relations create and interact with informal institutions?
How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance?
ECOLOGICAL SOCIAL
Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK)
Fishers behavior in response to ecosystem change
(Dampening) feedback
(Reinforcing) feedback
Basin of attraction X Basin of attraction Y
(Dampening) feedback
Regime X Regime Y
How do social networks create and interact with informal institutions?
How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance?
Fishermen have poor knowledge of market conditions
Products are perishable
• fishermen often not in good position to sell themselves
• less storage possibilities
Conditions which make reciprocal agreements in small-scale fisheries particularly important:
Risk• Unpredictable Nature• Price fluctuations• Loss of assets (and life)
(e.g. Platteau & Nugent 1992, Platteau & Abraham 1987)
Middlemen channel preferences and direct which species targeted
Can affect fishers’ behavior in other ways?
Provision of credit to fishers in return for prioritized access to products once harvested => ensuring a steady supply of goods
(Platteau & Nugent 1992, Platteau & Abraham 1987)
What are the effects of these arrangements?E
colo
gic
alS
oci
al
In East Africa, resource dynamics are centred around two monsoon seasons
Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics
Calm waters during the South East monsoon (SEM)High catches
Low catches
Rough weather during the North East monsoon (NEM)
Hotel and tourism industry = main driver governing the type and amount of fish purchased by middlemen
Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics
=> High demand for large fish of high quality and commercial value
Piscivorous Effects on lower trophic levels
Lutjanidae
Red snapper
ScombridaeKingfishCarangidae
Jacks
Fish purchased for the local market = all high-value fish not marketable for the tourism/restaurants (undersized)
+
all other low and medium value fish of all sizes (sub-adults and juveniles)
Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics
Lethrinidae Emperor
Siganidae - Rabbitfish
Scaridae Parrotfish
Benthivores Herbivores
Local market
Hotel/tourism+
piscivores
benthivores herbivores
ecosystem dynamics
high pressure
How do middlemen affect fisheries and coastal SESs in East Africa?
Direct link to external markets + Provision of credit
Prioritization of certain species
Which stocks targeted > diversity of fish functional groups > ecosystem dynamics
Provision of credit to fishermen
Buffers income variations due to seasonal fluctuations in fish catches > affects incentives for livelihood diversification
> disconnects fishing pressure from seasonal dynamics
> promotes constant exploitation
How does the role of affect resilience of coastal SESs in East Africa?
Direct link to external markets + Provision of credit
Prioritization of certain species
Which stocks targeted > diversity of fish functional groups > ecosystem dynamics
Provision of credit to fishermen
Buffers income variations due to seasonal fluctuations in fish catches > affects incentives for livelihood diversification
> disconnects fishing pressure from seasonal dynamics > promotes constant exploitation
Social-ecological traps
• feedback between social and ecological processes lead toward undesirable states that are difficult or impossible to reverse.
Figure: Steneck 2009 Current Biology, Photos: T. Hughes
(Dampening/stabilizing) feedback
(Reinforcing) feedback
Healthy reef fishery Degraded reefs and overexploited fishery
(Dampening/stabilizing) feedback
Middlemen
Key agents (informal institutions) that mediate fishers behavior
Not included in management or governance
Important to recognize in order to steer away from social-ecological traps
Why interesting for adaptive governance in small-scale fisheries in East Africa?
Social Capital Agency
SOCIAL CAPITAL AGENCY - LEADERSHIP
Collective action
Krishna 2002 – Active Social CapitalBurt 1999 – The social capital of opinion leaders
Coleman 1990 – Foundations of social theoryBorgatti 1998 – Network measures of social capitalFukuyama 1995 – Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity
Theoretical framework
Community Social CapitalProcedures to solve conflictsand enforce rules?
Central positions inimportant networks
• Who are they?•Provide linking social capital?• Understanding of problems facing NRM?• Their relations?
Collective action
Social Capital
Agency
Social n etwork characteristics
Density Fragmentation Bonding/Bridging
Influential actors
Socio-demographics Linkages to external
resources Relations among
themselves Etc.
Network positions
Conflict resolution & monitoring
Trusted parties & common procedures
Perceptions, knowledge and
capabilities
Collective action
Social Capital
Agency
Social n etwork characteristics
Density Fragmentation Bonding/Bridging
Influential actors
Socio-demographics Linkages to external
resources Relations among
themselves Etc.
Network positions
Conflict resolution & monitoring
Trusted parties & common procedures
Perceptions, knowledge and
capabilities
SOCIAL CAPITAL AGENCY - LEADERSHIP
Theoretical framework
Density of social support network = 1.3 relations / ind
low but in range with other cases such as US GSS
One main network component – i.e. one coherent network
conducive for SC development (Putnam/Coleman) – argue that low levels of fragmentation enhance SC by knitting together community & generating trust
Ratio of bonding (ties within groups) and bridging (ties between
groups) ranged 50% - 75%
OK but relative measure
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social network characteristics
59% state no specific person to whom they would report NRM violations
43% villagers would not report any rule-breaking unless very serious crimes committed
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Person Number of times cited by villagers
Citations for conflict resolutionChairman 143
Sub-chief 85
Deep Sea Fisherman A 17
Former Sub-chief 5
Member of elders’ council 5
Citations for report of rule-breakingChairman 40
Sub-chief 14
Former Beach Chairman 8
Fisheries officer 6
Deep Sea Fisherman B 4
Conflict resolution
10 + 2 Key Individuals identified
Clearly stand out in terms of centrality ranking
E.g. KI have direct social ties to 49% of the other villagers…
…AND …
… if reported contacts’ ties are also included, KI are no more than two relational steps from reaching 82% of entire village.
AGENCY - LEADERSHIP
Identification of Key Individuals (KI)
Influential actors(Key Individuals)
AGENCY - LEADERSHIP
Characteristics of Key Individuals (KI)
Rank order
Leader attributes External Contacts
Occupation Age Tribe Governmental agencies NGOs Finance Market/Suppliersa
FSb FOc AGd
1 Businessman 48 Bajuni X
2 Middleman 37 Bajuni X X
3 Retired fisherman 76 Bajuni X X X X
4 Deep sea fisherman and captain
32 Pemba X X
5 Chairman 59 Digo X X X X
6 Deep sea fisherman and captain
36 Bondoi X X X X
7 Deep sea fisherman and middleman
51 Bajuni X X X X
8 Deep sea fisherman and captain
39 Pemba X X X
9 Deep sea fisherman 40 Pemba
10 Deep sea fisherman 38 Bajuni X
>10 Beach chairman and Kigumi fisherman
37 Digo X X X X
>10 Subchief 41 Rabai X X X X
Sum of contacts: 9 (75%) 6 (50%) 7 (58%) 4 (33%) 1 (8%) 6 (50%)
DemographicsLinks to resourcesRelations amongst KI
ESA Conference, Aug 6-11 2006 Dept of Systems Ecology, Stockholm University
Results
Higher level of knowledge
Lower level of knowledge
rela
tive
diffe
renc
e (∆
) in
det
ail o
f kno
wle
dge
MANGROVE REEFSEAGRASS
Seine net
Middlemen
Deep sea
Gill net
Shrimpers
Speargun
Handline
Farmers
Businessmen
Relative difference in LEK among occupational categories
Crona 2006, Ecol & Soc
?
Collective action
Social Capital
Agency
Social network characteristics
Density Fragmentation Bonding/Bridging
Influential actors
Socio-demographics Linkages to external
resources Relations among
themselves Etc.
Network positions
Trusted parties & common procedures
Conflict resolution & monitoring
Perceptions, knowledge and
capabilities
The community is seemingly highly dependent on the chairman for initiating collective action of any kind.
Vulnerability, or reduction of resilience, lies in this dependency and the impact personal that characteristics and interests of a single person can have on prioritization and decision-making.
This is perhaps an inevitable side-effect associated with boundary-spanning leadership - an issue that should be accounted for when arguing for the benefits of such kind of leadership.
Good or Bad?
Implications for governance
Social Capital alone is not enough to instigate collective action
Problem awareness among influential individuals is crucial
Homogeneity among influential individuals determines whether perceptions of status of the resource are used to effect change
Leadership is more than the sum of influential individuals...
... related to structural relations among them and the resulting dynamic.
Local is not always simple
Bridging organizations as a way to achieve the linking of actors - horizontally and across scales(e.g. Olsson et al 2004, Berkes et al 2005, Ayles et al 2007, Eamemr 2006)
PART IV: Arrangements to facilitate adaptive governance?
BRIDGING ORGANIZATIONS
organizations that span social gaps among actors and can facilitate (mobilize) cooperation among diverse stakeholders who cannot solve a certain problem by themselves
(Brown 1991, Bridging organizations and sustainable development)
Concept coined in attempt to better understand how interactions across science-policy boundary could improve policy making
(Guston 1999, 2001)
Developed to include a broader array of stakeholder and to also deal with divergent interests and knowledge co-production
(Miller 2001, O’Mahony 2008, Klerkx&Leeuwis 2008)
BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS
Boundary orgs have at least three features:
i) they involve specialized roles within the organization for managing the boundary;
(ii) they have clear lines of responsibility and accountability to distinct social arenas on opposite sides of the boundary; and
(iii) they provide a forum in which information can be co-produced by actors from different sides of the boundary through the use of "boundary objects"
(Guston 1999)
Mechanisms for facilitating knowledge co-production and collaboration in BORGS
Depoliticized space
Creation and use of boundary objects
Chamions to guide the process
1) Depoliticized (neutral) space for groups to provide incentives to one another
helps lower cultural barriers => important for effective communication and knowledge transfer (Landry et al 2003)
fosters growth of social networks (Cash and Moser 2000, Cash et al 2003)
2) Creation and use of boundary objects • explicit strategy to engage participants and promote
and build shared understanding (Star and Griesemer, 1989, Cash et al 2003)
3) Champions to guide the process of collaboration and knowledge co-production (e.g. Quay 2004)
Key players to forge relations and ignite collaborations
To reflect on…
Are there sysems (or situations) where knowledge sharing and consensus buidling are less important for adaptive governance?
How could the establishment of a bridging/boundary organization help address some of the issues highlighted in the Kenyan community exemplified here?