Abu Muslims Conquest of Khurasan

7/30/2019 Abu Muslims Conquest of Khurasan

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/abu-muslims-conquest-of-khurasan 1/16

Abū Muslim's Conquest of Khurasan: Preliminaries and Strategy in a Confusing Passage of the

Akhbār Al-Dawlah Al- ʿAbbāsiyyahAuthor(s): Saleh Said AghaReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 120, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 2000), pp. 333-347Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/606006 .

Accessed: 08/12/2011 02:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Oriental Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of

the American Oriental Society.

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aos

http://www.jstor.org/stable/606006?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/606006?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aos



ABU MUSLIM'S CONQUEST OF KHURASAN:

PRELIMINARIES AND STRATEGY IN A CONFUSING

PASSAGE OF THE AKHBARAL-DAWLAH L-CABBASIYYAH

SALEH SAID AGHA

AMERICANUNIVERSITYOFBEIRUT

The Akhbdral-dawlah al-'Abbasiyyah is a major source of information in any understandingof

the CAbbasid evolution. However, one critically important passage in it that describes the initial

eruption and the steps leading up to it has been misunderstood and has given rise to an erroneous

perceptionof the exact strategyof AbuMuslim in regard o the role Marwplayedvis-h-vis the outlying

districtsof Khurasan.Once the meaningof this key section of the text is clarified,a properappreciation

of the precise sequence of events follows and thehighly significantrole of the Iranianpopulacein this

revolt becomes quite obvious.

THE AKHBARAL-DAWLAHL-CABBASIYYAH1s probablythe most important source2 for our knowledge of the so-

called "CAbbfsid revolution" to have been discovered and

published since Tabari's Ta'rikh.3 This source, however, is

not without its own share of difficulties and shortcomings.Its most distressing flaw is the superimposition of an apo-

cryphal CAbbasidpresence on what would otherwise have

been a coherent and tenable sequence of historical events.

Once these CAbbasidinterpolations are isolated and elim-

1Anonymous, Akhbaral-dawlah al-'Abbasiyyahwa-fih akh-

bdral-CAbbaswa waladih, ed. CA.CA.al-DuriandCA. . al-Mut-

talibi (Beirut:Dar al-TaliCah, 971).2 On thedescriptionandevaluation of this uniquesource, see,

'Abd al-CAzizal-Duri, "Daw' jadid Calaal-dacwahal-CAbbasiy-

yah," Majallat Kulliyat al-ddab wa al-'ulum (Baghdad, 1957),2: 64-82; idem, his editorial introduction n the Akhbar,7-20;

FaroukOmar,TheCAbbasid aliphate,132/750-170/786 (Bagh-dad: The National Printing and Publishing Co., 1969), 16-19;Moshe Sharon,"TheCAbbasid aCwaRe-examinedon the Basis

of the Discovery of a New Source," n Arabic and Islamic Stud-

ies, ed. J. Mansour (Ramat Gan, 1973), xxi-xli; idem, Black

Banners from the East (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University;Leiden: E. J.

Brill, 1983), 233-37; Elton Daniel, "The Anony-mous 'History of the Abbasid Family' and its Place in Islamic

Historiography,"nternationalJournal of Middle Eastern Stud-

ies 14 (1982): 419-34; Saleh Said Agha, "The Agents and

ForcesthatToppled he UmmayadCaliphate" Ph.D. diss., Univ.

of Toronto,1993), 19-22, et passim.3 Abu JacfarMuhammadb. Jariral-Tabari,Ta'rikhal-rusul

wa al-muluk, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1879-

1901).

inated, however, the fundamental veracity of the histor-

ical material is restored, and the material it contains can,

henceforth, be subjected to the rigorous standards of the

historical-critical method.4

Other difficulties, which exist in many classical Arabic

historical texts, also exist in the Akhbdr-such diffi-

culties may stem from digressions; from erroneous in-

clusions, omissions, or misplacements of segments of a

text by careless or confused scribes; and from syntacti-cal subtleties, awkwardnesses, and potentially confusing

pronominal or implied and interpretable references. Nat-

urally, difficulties of this kind always call for extremecaution in reading and interpreting such texts, but no-

where more so than in instances where a specific passageis employed as a cornerstone in the understanding, and in

the reconstruction of a coherent sequence, of historical

events whose significance goes beyond the minute de-

tails of the specific text. One such instance is the focal

point of this article.

I

The historical juncture on which the passage in ques-tion reports is the first eruption of the revolt, as it passed

from its clandestine into its open phase. As a conse-quence, a correct or an incorrect reading of the text in this

4 Moreover,the segment of the historicalaccount with which

we will be dealing here is, as far as this CAbbasidonnection is

concerned, intrinsically neutraland, therefore,this general flaw

is of little particularconcern to us in the present context. See

furtherAgha, "The Agents," 19-22, et passim.

333



Journal of the American Oriental Society 120.3 (2000)

instancetends to shape,over and above ourunderstandingof the sequenceof events, the fundamentalunderstandingof Abi Muslim al-Khurasani'ssuccessful strategy-a

strategywhich,by virtue of thefact that t was successful,

reflectsthe true

demographicandscapeof the revolution-

ary forces it was designed to respondto and on whose

geographicalconfigurationt capitalized.An errantreading of the subject text shaped Moshe

Sharon'sreconstructionof the events reported n it,5and

contributedo his missingthecruxof AbuiMuslim'sstrat-

egy, and led to erroneousconclusionsregarding he com-

positionof therevolutionaryorces.Butit wasnotentirelySharon'sfault. The proper placement of this passage,within its textual environment,eluded also the careful

editors of the Akhbar, CA. CA.Al-Duri and CA. J. al-

Muttalibi,who havenot commentedon theproblemat all.

The wider textual environmentwithin which the sub-

ject text is embeddedextends over six pages.6The prob-lematic portionsthemselves (underlinedbelow), and the

mostvitalof its immediate extualenvirons,areas follows:

THE KEY PASSAGE

[p. 274: 1. 3] Wa amara-humAbi Muslim bi-liqd'iikhw&ni-him a al-biCthatilay-himli-yajtamiC'wa

yuqimu bi-mawdi'i-him ild [1. 4] dukhul al-Mu-

harram.Wakanaalladhi dacdAbdMuslim wa daci

Sulayman ld al-ijtimdcanna-hubalagha-hum[1.5]

anna Nasr qad ajma a Cali al-biCthati lay-him wa

iltiqiati-himqabla khuruji-him,wa kdna alladhi

[1.6] ashdra Calay-hi bi-dhalik Salm b. Ahwaz

fa-qdla la-hu: "bddir al-qawm wa-hum mutafar-

riqun taqwa Calay-him[1. 7] bi-jamadati-kqabla

an yata'allafu fa-tardma-humfa-yamtaniC'Calay-

k". Fa-tafarraqat al-duC't alladhin hadaru [1. 8]

raDyAbi Muslim,fa-laqiyat al-shCah, wa baCathat

al-rusul ilay-him li-yajtamiC', a-aqbala [1. 9] al-

nas ilay-himwa AbuMuslimbi-Shanfir[read:Saqi-

dunj or Saqidhanj] qaryat Sulaymdn b. Kathir

[p. 274: 1. 10-p. 275:1. 4 lists some of the partisanswho came to them in this village.]

[p. 275: 1.5] Wabalagha Nasr b. Sayydr jtimai al-

shfah wa-huwa mushtaghilbi-muhdrabatCAliyy .

5 Moshe Sharon, Revolt, the Social and Military Aspects of

the CAbbasidRevolution (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University,

1990),73-78, 88-89.6 Akhbdr,273-78. Thepartsof the immediate extualenvirons

that have been dropped in what follows are not necessarily

less important; hey simply do not weigh as heavily in the fol-

lowing textualanalysis.

al-Kirmdni 1.6]fa-jamacathiqiti-hfa-shdwara-hum

fi-md balagha-hu Canahl al-daCwah .. [11.7-16,deliberations in Nasr's council]. [1. 16] .. .fa-

inqa.daal-majlis Calddhalik wa-lam yubrimu i-hi[1.

17] ra3yan.Wabalagha md kana min

ndhiyati-himfimd aradi bi-hi Abd Muslim wa-man [1. 18]

maca-hu, a-laqiya Sulaymanb. Kathir a-shdwara-hu fi dhalik [theirdeliberationsand resolutions].

TRANSLATION:

And Abu Muslim ordered [the members of his

council] to meet their brethren[the partisans]and

to communicateto them [the instructions]to gatherand dwell in [the council members'] locality until

the advent of Muharram.Whathad motivated Abi

Muslim, and whathadmotivatedSulayman,to con-

vene the meeting was that they had learned thatNasr had resolved to crack down on them and ap-

prehend them before they revolted. The one who

had counseled [Nasr] to do so was Salm b. Ahwaz

[who] had said to him: Rush them with an assault

[now] while they are dispersed;you [would] over-

come them with your assembled troopsbefore they

assemble; [for, if you wait until then,] you [might]

want [to get] them, but they [would have become]immune from you. So the propagandists(al-duCdt)

who witnessed AbuMuslim's[deliberationsand]de-

cision, dispersed;they met [some of] the partisans,and sent

messengersto

[therest

of]them

[withthe

instructions]to come together. So people came to

them when Abi Muslim was in Saqidunj(or Saqi-

dhanj), Sulaymanb. Kathir'svillage....

Nasr b. Sayyar learned of the partisans'gatheringwhile he was occupied with fighting CAlib. al-Kir-

mani;so he gatheredhis confidantsandtookcounsel

with them in what he had learnedaboutthe constit-

uents of the daCwah.... The council adjournedon

that [note], andthey did not reacha resolution.Abu

Muslim learned of what came to pass [in Nasr's

council] and of theirintentionsagainsthim and his

comrades,so he met with Sulaymanb. Kathirand

took counsel with him in regardto that [matter].

Accepting the textual flow and sequence at face value

would produce an extremely confused, and confusing,

narrative.Startingwith wa kdna alladhi daci (274: 4),7

which involves in this context an undisputableArabic

7Henceforth,the references to the text of the Akhbdrwill be

bypageand ine numberspage: ine).

334



AGHA:Abi Muslim'sConquestof Khurasan

counterpartof the English past perfect tense, the reader

would be lured into an exquisitely, albeit inadvertently,

camouflaged textual trap. This is buttressed by similar

usages all throughthe problematicsegment of the text:

anna-hu balagha-hum (274: 4), qad ajmaCa(274: 5),and wa kdna alladhi ashdra (274: 5-6). Combined with

a relaxed and self-confident approachto the linguistic

context, this indisputable past perfect would leave no

doubt in the mind of the readerthatthe word al-ijtimd',

i.e., "the meeting" (274: 4), refers to a meeting the

reporting about which has been concluded.8 Actually,

moreover,the Akhbar, mmediatelybefore this problem-atic segment of the text, had been reportingon a meet-

ing-probably the most strategicallypivotal meeting at

thatjuncture.Thus, a relaxed reader would be luredinto

a false sense of having understood the passage cor-

rectly. But, two considerationsmust arrest his attention:

(1) when the problematicsegmentof the text started, heongoing reportingon the supposedmeetingandits imme-

diate aftermathhas not been concluded as yet. In reality,the remainderof the narrative ontinuesto flow naturally,

immediately after the end of the problematic segment

(274: 7ff.), as if it had not existed; (2) the problematic

segment purports o explain why the meeting took placeat all, but the reasonsadvancedhave nothingto do with

the meeting being reportedon at that point in the text.

They explain why an entirelydifferentmeeting was held

later.And this raises an awkwardpoint.It soon becomes clear that something is essentially

wrong with the textual sequence. The meeting to which

the problematic segment appearsto refer cannot be the

one it actually refers to. This latter ijtimac came on the

heels of, and as a reaction to, a governmental meetingin which Salm b. Ahwaz, the chief of police in the prov-ince, had urged its governor, Nasr b. Sayyar, to attack

the revolutionaries before they got their act together.This characterizationapplies literally to the meeting be-

tween AbuiMuslim and Sulayman b. Kathir,the report

concerning which (275: 17-276: 6) comes twenty-fourlines down in the text, in naturaltextual flow, immedi-

ately after the report(275: 5-17) about the relevantgov-ernmentalmeeting to which it was a reaction. It is also

amply clear that the problematic segment of the text isintrusive-interjected between Abu Muslim's orders to

8Or, even worse, it could lead the reader to interpret jtimac

as meaning "a rather quick understanding"reached between

Abu Muslim and Sulayman (Sharon, Revolt, 75)-an under-

standingthathad actually been established priorto this point in

the textual narrative Akhbdr,272-73).

the members of his council (274: 2-3), with which the

currentmeeting culminated and with the way the mem-

bersrelayedthese orders to the partisans(274: 7-8), and

the logistics of the partisans'response (274: 8-275: 4).

Thenet

outcomeof this

ratherinvolved textual dis-

section is that, historically, we are reading here about

two separate revolutionary meetings and one govern-mental meeting that took place interim. Textually, the

threereportson the threemeetingsare woven into a flow-

ing narrativethat is subsequentlyupset by an intrusive

segment that has a potential of erasing the decisive

boundariesbetween the two revolutionarymeetings. The

otherwisecarefuleditorsof the Akhbaracceptedthispartof the text of their unique manuscriptat face value and

printedit without annotation. Moshe Sharon, in his re-

construction,also acceptedthe printedtext at face value,and thus fused the two separaterevolutionary meetings

into a single meeting,with far-reachingresults.9Over and above its being intrusive, the problematic

segmentof the text is an ill-placed and ill-conceived ex-

planatoryremark hatrepeats,redundantly, wo correctly

placed lines (the second underlinedsegment of the text,275: 17-18). I think that it could not have been the work

of the anonymousauthorof the Akhbar.It is most prob-

ably a foreign segmentthatmust have been a notationbyan owner of a manuscriptearlierthanthe unique extant

one. A careless or confused scribe copied from this pre-sumed owner's manuscript into the extant manuscript,or into a lost motherthereof, and he must have inserted

the foreign notation into the original text, and in the

worst possible place. The only way to preservethis seg-

ment(if it must be preserved)and to maintaina measure

of coherence at the same time is to relocate it to lines

17-18 on page 275 (before or after the second under-

lined segmentof the text). But I wouldpreferto readthe

text without this alien segment altogether.

With the elimination of the alien segment, there re-

mains little room for misunderstanding-save for nor-

mal syntacticaldifficulties.Events fall into sequence,and

the text becomes rathertransparent.

On the revolution-

ary front, we are clearly dealing with two distinct and

separate meetings, two resolutions, two dates, and two

sets of envoys to two constellations of districts-subur-ban andremote-with two completelydifferentmissions,

reflecting the two distinct roles assigned to Marw and

9Sharon, Revolt, 73-78, 88-89. Sharon'serroneous nterpre-

tation and its consequences will be discussed below.

335




its suburbs,on one hand,and to the outlyingdistricts,on

the other.Understanding his situationand the dynamics

underlying t or generatedby its evolution is essential to

a proper comprehensionof the revolutionarystrategy,and of the

geographicand

demographicconfigurationsof

the antagonists to which the said strategy respondedand on which it capitalized.This is also a necessarycor-

ollary to understandingthe real ethnic identity of the

revolutionaries.

The revolutionaryorganizationhadhadthe fundamen-

tal strategyfor its clandestinephase drawnup since the

days of Bukayrb. Mahan'sandAbu Salamahal-Khallal's

non-resident eadershipof the Khurasanchapterof the

Hdshimiyyah.But now the clandestinephasewas drawingto a close, and t was timefor an"applied" trategy hatre-

spondedto the variablesof an evolving situationwithout

losing sight of the constants in the fundamentalplan-

namely, that the leadershipwas to remainin Marw(and

its suburbs) and the vast demographic reservoir to be

organized and unleashed continue to be in the outlyingdistricts.Therefore,Abi Muslim'smoves would always

reflectthe distinctionbetween these two geographiccon-

stellations, and the Akhbar'stext would almost always

pronounce on it in decisive textual parallelism, and in

accord with the natureand direction of Abu Muslim's

moves. The readerought to be able to understand learlywhich of these moves or orders was meant for, or di-

rected to, Marw (and its suburbs)only, to the outlyingdistrictsonly, or to both constellations together.

An ideally structuredexample comes from the Akh-

bdr's account of what immediately followed the resolu-

tion of the internal struggle between Abu Muslim and

Sulaymanover the leadershipof the organization:

TEXT

[Sulaymansaid to Abu Muslim:]

[Withrespectto Marw]

[a] Ibcath la al-du Catbi-Khurasdni-md hawla-kfa-

ya'tiya-ka manqadiraCaladhalik(272: 17-18),

[a] Fa-baththaAbi Muslimal-rusulfi-md yali Marw

(272: 18-273: 1).

[Withrespectto the outlying districts]

[b] wa uktub ld man i al-kuwarfa-lyata'ahhabuwa

yasta Ciddu(272: 18).

[So]

[b] wa katabaild manfi al-kuwarya'muru-humbi-al-

isti Cdadi-l-Muharram anat thalathinwa mi'ah,fa-

'in nazaCa-hum had azharuamra-humwa hdrabumanhdraba-hum 273: 1-2).

TRANSLATION

[Sulaymansaid to Abu Muslim:]

[a] Send to the duct in Khurasan, thoseof themwho [b] andwrite to those [of them]who are in the [out-

are]aroundyou[rvicinity], so thatthose [of them]who lying] districtsthatthey mustget readyandbe fully

can would come to you, prepared.

[So]

[a]So Abu Muslim

spreadmessengersin [thevillages

and suburbs]neighboringMarw.

Consider,against the sharpdistinctionabove between

the two geographic constellations, Abu Muslim's geo-

graphicallyunilateralorders that concluded the first of

[b] andhe wroteto those who were in the [outlying]

districts,orderingthemto prepare or the monthof

Muharram f the yearone hundred hirty,andthat,

shouldany partychallenge them, they shouldblow

theirown cover, andfight those who fightthem.

the two separaterevolutionarymeetings thatmakeup the

focal point of this article:

336



AGHA:Abu Muslim's Conquest of Khurasan

[ForMarw] [Forthe outlying districts]

[a] And Abi Muslim ordered[themembers of his [b] [nothing]

council] to meet their brethren the partisans]andto

communicateto them [the instructions]to gatherand

dwell in [thecouncil members'] ocality until the advent

of Muharram 274: 3-4).

The unilateralityof these orders, and the fact that theywere directed to the partisans in Marw (and its sub-

urbs)only, can hardlybe disputed. A number of textual

and contextual elements corroborate this contention,and are,by themselves, illuminating.Firstly,the govern-mental meeting (275: 5-17), which occurredin reaction

to this first of the two separate revolutionarymeetings,had not takenplace; yet neither,of course,had the second

of these two revolutionarymeetings, which, itself, came

in reactionto the governmentalmeeting.In the first(273:8-274: 2) of the two separate revolutionary meetings,Abu Muslim and his council of nuqabadand prominentducatl0 discussed where to make their first open move.

They agreed on Marw as the place. They did not have

to discuss the date because it had been previously set"

and communicated to the partisansin the outlying dis-

tricts (273: 1). The districts had their standing orders

which did not have to be alteredby the outcome of this

meeting. Furtherreportedcommunicationswith the dis-

tricts, in this textual environment, will not materialize

until later, both in the course of events and in the text.

When they do materialize:

Wa bacatha CAmrb. Acyan wa Aba Dawud ild Tu-

khdristan li-ma amara man bi-ha min al-shicah bi-al-

istiCddd la an ya'tiya-hum ra'yu-hufa-in basata ahad

ilay-himyada-hu bi-makruh mtanaCuwa qdtalu,

And he [Abu Muslim] sent CAmrb. A'yan and Abui

Dawuid o Tukharistan wing to [= pursuant o] what he

10 On the nuqabd3and the ducat, the leaders of the organiza-

tion, see, Akhbdr,213-23. Cf. Omar,CAbbasidCaliphate, 72-

74, 352-56; Sharon,Black Banners, 189-98; Elton Daniel, The

Political and Social History of KhurasanunderAbbasid Rule,747-820 (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica,

1979), 33-36; JacobLassner,Islamic Revolutionand Historical

Memory (New Haven: American OrientalSociety, 1986), 77-

82; Agha, "The Agents,"55, 465-85.

11The date was initially set for Muharram1, 130 (September

11, 747) (Akhbar,273, 274, 277, 278). It was even said aboutthe

alleged CAbbasideader of the dacwah, Ibrahimal-Imam, the

son of Muhammadb. CAli, hat he was the one who had fixed

this date at least four years earlier(Akhbar,267-68).

had ordered those of the partisans [living] in it to stay

ready until they should hear from him, [but that] should

any party, [in the meantime], extend them a hand with

[the intent to] harm, they ought to defend themselves

and fight.12

These communications will almost literally pick upfrom where the last orders to the partisans in the districts

(which had been communicatedto them afterthe resolu-

tion of the internalstruggle and before the first of thetwo separaterevolutionarymeetingsoccurred) eft them,that is,

... to preparefor the month of Muharramof the year

130, and that, should any party challenge them, they

should blow their own cover, and fight those who fight

them. 13

What had to be communicated, pursuant to the outcome

of this first of the two separate revolutionary meetings,

strictly concerned the Marw oasis only. And so it was.

Thenuqabai

and theprominent

ducat whoparticipatedin this meeting were ordered to disseminate, personally

and via messengers, Abu Muslim's instructions to the

partisans in Marw and its immediate surroundings,to

gather and dwell (i.e., to relocate to) where Abi Muslim

was (274: 3-4), and not in their own localities.

Secondly, the natureof these instructions,and the ac-

tual logistical moves of the partisans n compliancewith

them, confirm their geographic specificity. These in-

structions echo the first half of Sulayman'sprevious ad-vice to Abu Muslim:

Send to the ducat of Khurasan n your vicinity so that

those who can would come to you.'4

and AbE Muslim's immediate implementation of it:

12Akhbar,277: 19-278: 1.

13Akhbar, 73: 1-2; supra, he second"b"elementof thestructured xample.

14Akhbdr, 272: 17-18; supra, the first "a" element of the

structured xample.

337




So AbuMuslim preadmessengersn [thevillagesand

suburbs] eighboringMarw.15

But now that Marw itself, Abu Muslim's headquarters,was the

placechosen for the first

eruption,the

messageacquiredmore urgency and requiredfurtherspecific in-

structions which had to be morepointed:

Wa amra-humAbu Muslim bi-liqa' ikhwani-himwa al-

bicthati ilay-him li-yajtamiii wa yuqimf bi-mawdiCi-

him ild dukhulal-Muharram.

And Abti Muslim ordered hem [i.e., the membersof his

council]to meet their brethrenthepartisans] nd to

communicateo them i.e.,to thepartisans]the nstruc-

tions]to gatheranddwellin their[i.e., in the council

members']ocalityuntil he advent f Muharram.16

Moshe Sharonparaphrasedhepassageabove as follows:

Immediately fter the meeting,Abu Muslim ordered

thosewho werepresento contact heirbrethrenach n

his own region, and to advise them not to leave their

places of residenceuntil the beginningof Muharram

130/11 September747.17

This rendering s wrong on four counts: (1) Sharon dis-

countedaltogetherthe sentence li- yajtami'C("thattheyshould gather,congregate");(2) he renderedwa yuqimuas "not to leave," i.e., to stay put, instead of "[tocome in

order] to dwell," effectively, to relocate; (3) he did nottake seriously the singularform of the nounmawdic(lo-

cality, place); (4) he misconstrued he possessive pronoun

him, attached to mawdi', as referringto the partisansratherthan to "those who were present"-an errorhe

would probably not have committed had he respectedthe singularformof the possessed mawdi'.This singularmawdicwas the council's headquarters, .e., where Abu

Muslim happenedto be at the time; andthat was "Shan-

fir [read:Saqidunj],Sulaymanb. Kathir'svillage" in the

oasis of Marw (274: 9), where the partisanswould im-

mediately converge from the various quarters of the

oasis, in direct response to these very instructions(274:

8-275: 4).We may surmise, but not know definitely, which of

these four errors ed Sharonto the rest. What is certainis

that he mistook an order to the partisansof Marw to

leave their quartersand congregatearoundtheir leader-

15Akhbar,272: 18-273: 1; supra,the second "a" element of

the structuredxample.16

Akhbdr,274: 3-4.17 Sharon,Revolt, 75: 3-6 (emphasis mine).

ship as an order to the partisansof the outlying districts

to stay"puteach in his own region"and "not to leave their

places of residence."

This, and Sharon's usion of the two separaterevolu-

tionary meetingsinto

one,led him to a furthermisunder-

standing.The prominentnuqabd3and ducat whom Abu

Muslim sent later to lead the risings in the outlying dis-

tricts (Balkh, Abiward, Nasa, Marw al-Rudh...) were

mistakenby Sharonfor "messengers [who] went out to

the various centers of the Dacwah... and alertedthem to

the prescribeddate," i.e., the Muharramdate.'8Besides

the fact that this date had been set and communicated

much earlier,which makes this mission a redundantand

casts top officers of the revolution in roles not theirs,Sharon's ompoundedmisunderstandingsumblethe evo-

lution of events and preemptan accurateunderstandingof the revolutionarystrategyas anchoredin the revolu-

tion's sources of strength and as reflecting its instiga-tors' ethnic identity. The outcome is a distortion of the

sequence of Abu Muslim's deployments in the overall

context of his careful orchestrationof the contemporary

pan-Iranian ruption.

III

With the above textual difficulties cleared, the Akh-

bar's account of the events of this historicaljuncture-the eruption of the clandestine movement into the

open-acquires a greatermeasureof consistency, coher-

ence, and transparency.The following is a recount(par-

tially repetitive) of the Akhbdr'snarrative.The internalstrugglebetween Abi Muslim andSulay-

mainhadbeen somehow resolved.19The "reconciliation"

was capped with Sulayman'scounsel to Abi Muslim to

send forthe partisansn the suburbsandvillages of Marw

so that those capable should come to his headquarters,

18Sharon,Revolt,75 (emphasismine);see also p. 88 and

comparewithAkhbar, 74,277:19-278: 10. Cf. theappendix,below.

19Akhbar, 270: 5-272: 17, 273: 2-6. This part of the Akh-

bar's text does not belong in this textual environment-which

I described as consistent, coherent and transparent.Actually,the accounts of the internalstruggle between Abu Muslim and

Sulaymanare as confused and self-contradictoryin the Akhbar

as they are in other sources. The deliberate confusion in these

accounts is too obvious to miss. They belong to the same breed

as otherCAbbasidnterpolationsand"disinformation"see Agha,

"The Agents," 120-23). However, what mattersin this imme-

diatecontext s thatAbuMuslimdid establish working ela-

tionship-of-sortsithSulayman,ookcharge f themovement,

and set about unleashing a chain reaction, the first move in

which was convening the first of the two subject meetings.

338



AGHA: Aba Muslim'sConquest of Khurasan

and to write to the partisansin the outlying districts to

prepare or the open revolt,on Muharram1, 130/Septem-ber 11, 747.20Abi Muslimimplementedbothmeasures.21

This settled, the first of the two revolutionarymeet-

ingsin

questionwas now

held,with the sole

purposeof

determiningthe place for the first eruption.22They con-

sideredKhwarizmand Marwal-Rudh,but for soundand,as shall become evident,obvious reasonscompatiblewith

their overall strategy,Kamil b. al-Muzaffar,the prudentda'i, suggested Marw,23and they unanimously agreed(273: 8-274: 2). Concludingthis meeting, Abu Muslim

ordered the council members who were presentto com-

municate o thepartisansn the oasis of Marwthe instruc-

tions to relocate to his headquarters, orminga protectiveshield until the advent of Muharram.Subsequently, heydid exactly that (274: 3-4, 7-8, with the alien text 4-7

deleted).The partisansresponded o these instructionsby

converging on Abi Muslim's headquarters rom all thevillages of Marw, min kull wajh min rasatiq Marw (274:

8-275: 4).News of this first of the two separaterevolutionary

meetings,and of theensuing convergenceof thepartisansof Marw on Abu Muslim'sheadquartershen reached the

governorof Khurasan,Nasr b. Sayyar.Nasr held a meet-

ing to consult with his senior staff. His chief of police,Salm b. Ahwaz, counseled an attack,but 'Aqil b. Macqil,a cousin of Nasr's, advised caution. They did not settle

on a decisive course of action.24News of these deliber-

ations reached Abi Muslim, and it was then that with

Sulaymanb. Kathir he held the second of the two meet-

ings.25At the second, Abu Muslimconsulted with Sulay-man,who suggestedthatthey shouldtakethe initiative of

20Akhbar, 72: 17-18;supra,he first"a"and"b"elements

of thestructuredxample.21Akhbar, 72: 18-273: 2; supra, he second "a"and "b"

elements f thestructuredxample.22 In thephrase,"first ruption,"he word"first"houldnot

be taken n thesense of a chronologicalrder. tmust ndicatethecenter, heplaceof prime mportance,heheadquartersftheleadership,where herevolutionwouldbe proclaimed,nd

where he first ymbolicblackbannerswouldbe hoisted imul-taneouslywith theforestsof bannerswhichwould lutter vertheland,onthesame,previouslyet date.

23 Actually,hesite of first ruptionouldnothavebeenelse-where.ChoosingMarwdidnothingmore han ecognize num-berof strategicactorswhichKamilb. al-Muzaffarxpoundedin his half-metaphoric,alf-succinctway (Akhbar, 73: 18-274: 1). It hadnothing o do withthetribal actor,as SharoncontendsRevolt, 4: 16-75:23. Seealso,infra).

24Akhbar,275: 5-17.

25Akhbir, 275: 17-18.

going into the open before Nasr could attackthem, but

thatAbi Muslim should first consult his othercomrades.

Abu Muslim called a meeting, a sequel to the presentone, and they agreed "and set a date for going into the

open,the

yawmal-fitrof the

year 129,"June

15th,747.26

This change of date was certainly a vital factor that

had to be communicatedto the districts. Therefore,the

new date must have been set afterheeding the baremin-

imum of time necessary for the new orders to be com-

municated to the remoterlocations. But while they were

still makingpreliminarypreparations,an incidental fire,lit one night by some companions in a nearbyTamimite

village, was misreadby the revolutionaries as an enemybeacon. Abi Muslim ordered their own beacon fire to

be lit, and a fresh wave of partisansand otherKhuzaiitetribesmen,keen to protect their tribalhonor, convergedon Abu Muslim'scamp.When the misunderstandingwas

cleared up, Kamil b. al-Muzaffar,the sage of the move-ment, suggested that they had lost their cover, and that

it was, therefore, too late to go back. They agreed to

proceed. The next morningwas Thursday,Ramadan25,129 (June 8th, 747).27

Five precious days were thus lost for those who were

to carry the new orders to the remoter of the districts.

But it did not actually have any adverse consequences.The partisans in the districts understood the strategybehind setting one and the same date for a concerted

rising all over the province, and they knew that the

strategy took precedence over the date itself. Though

symbolically important,being the first of the ten days of

Karbala',the first of Muharramwas not tacticallysacro-sanct. Therefore,when they got news of the prematurepublic appearancein Marw,it was for them a sufficient

signal, overridingthe Muharramdate. In Talaqan,Nasa,Marwal-Rudh,Amul and its vicinity, they did not haveto wait for the coordinatingofficersor leaders commis-

sioned from the Marw headquarters o arrive with the

specific new instructions; they took matters into theirown hands and broke into the open, before the leadersfrom Marw arrivedto lead them.28After all, they werenot awaiting reinforcements from Marw; indeed, theywould soon be sending reinforcements to Marw.

Therefore,there is no

reasonto assume, as Sharondid,that these developments compelled Abu Muslim to act

swiftly.29"These developments," .e., the quick responseof the outlying districts,cannotbe expected to have sur-

prisedAbu Muslim or compelled him to do anythingin

26Akhbar,275: 18-276: 6.

27Akhbar,276: 6-277: 8.

28Akhbar,278: 8-10.

29Sharon,Revolt, 89.

339




any direction.They were nothing more than the "devel-

opments"thathe had sent his own commandersspecifi-

cally to set in motion.30And, news of their occurrence

only added to his resolution and strength(fa-zada dhd-

lika fi quwwati-hi).31If anything, these developmentsought to have increasedhis options, or, at least, restored

the situation as originally planned by offsetting the

effects of the forced advancementof the date.

When messengers were sent out to the districts with

the Muharram-datemessage, they were nameless couri-

ers.32 t is not truethat "Abi Muslim had sent several im-

portant eaders to the centers which had to be restrained

from acting as far as possible until the beginning of the

year 130," as in Sharon'smisinterpretation.33With the

exception of al-CAla'b. Hurayth,who had earlier pro-ceeded to his vast and autonomous regional command

in Transoxania (nawahi-h allati kana yadcu bi-hi min

Khwdrizm wa Amul wa min Bukhara wa al-Sughd),34 allsuch important eaderswere only now commissioned, or

sent back to their traditionalcommands, some time be-

tween the decision to advance the date to yawm al-fitr

and the occurrence of the mixed signals which forced

the additionalfive-dayadvancement.35 nd, they had not

been sent to relay messages or to restrainthe partisans;

they were commissioned to coordinate and/or lead the

no longer postponableeruption.36

30Akhbdr,277: 20-278: 1.

31Akhbdr,278: 9.

32 Akhbar,272: 18-273: 1.

33Sharon,Revolt,88-89 (emphasismine).34Akhbar,78.Al-CAla appearsohave eftMarw ndgone

back ohis commandn thewakeof thefirst trategyession-

thefirstof the twosubjectmeetings-in whichMarwwascho-

sen as the central heateror theeruption.A resident f both

Marw,pecificallyMakhuwan,ndhis nativeSoghdia, emust

have playedan unreportedole in supportingAbu Muslim

againstSulayman. hemissionaccomplished,ndtherevolu-

tion mminent, e wentback o hiscommand.Hisearlydepar-

tures attested ythe act hat herewasnosignof him nMarw

afterwards;ut,morepertinent,n viewof thescantreporting

onhim, s Abual-Khattab'sxplicittatementhatAbual-Jahm

b. 'Atiyyah, nothermember f thepro-AbuMuslimandanti-

Sulayman roup,was sent to al-CAla'n Khwarizmwiththe

newRamada1n-datedessage.SeeTabari, a'rikh,: 1953.The

Akhbdr'sathermbiguousext 278:4-8) lendstselftothesame

reading.On al-CAla' ndthe vital Soghdian onnection, ee

Agha,"TheAgents," t.2, ch. 1,etpassim.35This s whataccruesroma careful eading f theAkhbdr,

274-78 andAbual Khattab'sccountTabari,: 1953-59);and

otheranonymousources f Tabari'sTabari,: 1964).36Seetheappendix, elow.

IV

The fusion of the two separate revolutionary meet-

ings into one which resulted from the misreading of

the text resultedin further and more

consequentialfusions. All othercases of paired tems-the duetsof res-

olutions, of dates, of sets of envoys, of missions, andof

geographicconstellationsas explainedabove-were each

fused into one. A highly significant consequence was

that the decisive functional difference between the two

distinct roles assigned in the revolutionary strategy to

Marw (and its suburbs), on the one hand, and to the

outlying districts, on the other, was all but completely

blunted, if not entirely lost. Thus the distinct strategic

(demographicand military) propertiesof each of these

two geographic constellations, which mandated the

specific role assigned to each, were also blurred.One

vitally illuminatingindicatorof the true ethnic identityof the revolutionaries was thus lost to Sharon. Little

wonderit did not temperhis eagernessto join revisionist

voices in contending that the ethnic identity of the rev-

olution was preponderantlyArab.37

The revolutionwas a mass uprising38hatconcluded a

lengthy clandestineprocess of inciting the Iranianpopu-lation. This process rested on two major efforts which

37"Revisionist" ithrespect o theworksof G. vanVloten

andJ.Wellhausen, hoseviewsregardingheIranianharacter

of therevolutionepresentedhemain tream f scholarshipn

thesubjectuntilF.Omar,M.A. ShabanTheCAbbasidevolu-

tion Cambridge:ambridgeniv.Press,1970]),M.Sharon,nd

others ried o buttressD. Dennett'shallengeo the"classical"

theoryDanielC.Dennett, MarwanbnMuhammad:hePass-

ing of the UmayyadCaliphate"Ph.D.diss., HarvardUniv.,

1939]).Cf., Agha,"TheAgents," -13, 16,et passim.38Thisis aninvolvedaspectof themain ssue.Evidence f

a massmovementervades lmostalltheprimaryourcese.g.,

Tabari,: 1962;AbuHanifahAhmad .Dawud l-Dinawari,l-

Akhbarl-tiwdl, d.V.GuirgassLeiden: .J.Brill,1888],338,

340-41, 344, 356, 359-60; Akhbdr,passim). But modem schol-

ars tayed achon theirprechartedourse.Obviously,roponentsof the"Arab"

heorywouldend o

disagreewith hemassmove-

ment theory (cf. H. A. R. Gibb, TheArab Conquestsin Central

Asia,1923[rpt.:NewYork:AMSPress,1970],94);andsome

would end o seetheeventasan eventwithinhe"garrison"-

a military coup of sorts. (Shaban[CAbbdsid evolution,152] re-

strictshemovementotheprovincialarrisonf Marw.) ropo-

nentsof theIranianheory, owever, ecognizedhecataclysm

forwhat t was(e.g.,JuliusWellhausen,heArabKingdomnd

itsFall,tr.M. G.Weir Calcutta:niv.of Calcutta, 927],498;

so did Daniel [Khurasan,51-52, 58, 86], who views the revolu-

tionas anethnicallyndeconomicallymixedmassmovement).

340



AGHA: Abi Muslim's Conquest of Khurasan

the clandestine Hashimiyyah organization undertook si-

multaneously: converting the Iranian masses to Islam and

recruiting the converts in its ranks.39 At the heart of this

strategy were Bukayr b. Mahan's organizations which

confirmed theleadership

of theorganization

in Marw, but

also extended its reach to the outlying districts, and thus

streamlined the momentous but chaotic outcome of the

preceding efforts under the leadership of Khidash.40By the

time that Abui Muslim was ready to take the revolution

into the open, the organization had been married to the

Iranian masses throughout the land. In Tabari's words:

Wa baththa al-du'Ctfi aqtar Khurasanfa-dakhala al-

nds afwdjan wa kathuri wafashat al-duCati Khurasan

kulli-h.

[Abu Muslim] spread the ducat all over the districts of

Khurasan,and people joined in throngs and grew nu-

merous, and the ducat permeatedall of Khurasan.41

Almost purely Iranian, the outlying districts had be-

come defacto demographic strongholds of the revolution

before the revolution erupted.

39 Centralto the theory of an uprising en masse is also the

questionof widespread onversion to Islamby Iranians.Probably

seeing the potentially detrimentalimplications of recognizingthe phenomenon of widespread conversion, Shaban (CAbbasid

Revolution, xv, 115) consistently denied it. Bulliet explicitlyestablished the connection, and,attemptinga quantitativestudy

of the phenomenon of conversion, found for Shaban(Richard

Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essayin Quantitative History [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.

Press, 1979], 43-44, and n. 1; for a discussion of Bulliet's

method and findings, see, Agha, "The Agents," 169ff.). Unlike

Shaban,Dennett and Sharonrecognize the phenomenonbut fail

to take stock of its potential implications (Daniel C. Dennett,

Conversion and the Poll Tax n EarlyIslam [Cambridge,Mass.:

HarvardUniv. Press, 1950], 119, 128; Sharon,Revolt,28). That

mass conversion was the orderof the times is a fact which other

scholars recognized and took stock of (Wellhausen, King-

dom, 457; Richard N. Frye, "The Role of Abu Muslim in the

CAbbasidRevolt,"Muslim World37 [1974]: 31). For a detailed

discussion of conversion and its implications, see Agha, "The

Agents,"267-316.

40 Khidash originalname,CAmmarr CUmarah) residedover

the Khurasanchapterof the organizationfor almost a decade

(109-18/727-37). His tenurewas messy in organization,prosper-ous in attractingmasses of recruits,andalluringly ax andpatchyin the ideology he preached.It ended with his crucifixionand a

temporary hatteringof the organizational tructure f the move-

ment in Khurasan.See Agha, "TheAgents,"42-47, et passim.41

Tabari,2: 1962.

On the other side of the ethnic divide, the Arab pres-

ence, overwhelmingly military in nature, was limited in

size and deployed over the entire province-a demo-

graphic archipelago in a vast Iranian sea.42 Marw was the

maingarrison city

where the bulk of the Arab commu-

nity was stationed. Moreover, this Arab Umayyad armyhad been paralyzed by internal tribal strife for almost

three years, following the insurgency of Judayc b. CAll

al-Kirmani, which erupted in 126.43

Succinctly put, the Iranian populations of the outlying

districts of Khurasan had been thoroughly indoctrinated

against the thinly spread contingents of the Arab army

dispersed in their midst. Marw, by contrast, housed two

leaderships: the revolutionary leadership supported by a

small but solidly unified army of partisans;44 and the

Umayyad Arab provincial government nominally head-

ing the main bulk of the once formidable Arab army, but

actually paralyzed by the tribal stand-off that split itsranks. It is against this macro demography, rather than

the micro demography of tribal distribution, that the

choice of Marw as the center of revolutionary eruptionmust be understood.

Our observation that the choice of Marw was a natural

result mandated by the foregoing strategic considerations

highlights Abu Muslim's grasp of the situation, which

was articulated by his spokesman, Abtu Salih Kamil b.

al-Muzaffar. For the other nuqabad and ducat who at-

tended the first of the two revolutionary meetings, Marw

42 Saleh Said Agha, "The Arab Populationin Khurasandur-

ing the Umayyad Period: Some Demographic Computations,"Arabica 46 (1999): 211-29. On the archipelago-likedispersionof the Arabs in Khurasan, ee, Agha, "The Agents," 344-46.

43 Tabari,2: 1855-66. Kirmani's nsurgency was carriedon,

after his death in 129/746-47, by his two sons, CAliand cUth-

man, who allied themselves to Abu Muslim. This three-year

insurgency overlapped with the last years of the extended in-

surgency of the Murji'ah and other tribal elements, led byal-Harith b. Surayj. The period also witnessed the Kharijiterebellion led by Shayban b. Salamah al-Haruri. See Tabari,2: 1970ff., 1984ff., 1967ff., 1888ff., 1917ff., 1995ff.; Saleh Said

Agha, "AViewpoint

of theMurji'a

in theUmayyad

Period:

Evolution throughApplication,"Journal of Islamic Studies 8.1

(1997): 22-25.44 On Dhu'l-QaCdah , 129 (July 22, 747), one month and a

half after proclaiming the revolution, Abu Muslim relocated

from Saqidunj to Makhuwan,where he ordered a trench to be

dug and a record of his soldiers to be kept. The count of his

soldiers was found to be seven thousand (Tabari,2: 1967-69).M. A. Shaban(CAbbdsid evolution, 158), oblivious to the hefty

presence outside Marw, contends that this number comprisedthe entire revolutionaryarmy.

341




did not appear as the natural choice. On the contrary,

strategistsof lesser genius than Abi Muslim would have

ruled it out, since it was the centerof Umayyadpower in

the province.And, indeed, the deliberations n this meet-

ing convey such perceptions:

(1) Abu al-Najm 'Imran b. IsmaCil,Abu Muslim's

father-in-law, uggestedKhwarizmbecauseof its remote-

ness. Before the governor, Nasr b. Sayyar, would have

been able to send his soldiers,Abual-Najmreasoned,the

partisanswould have flocked to the revolutionary eader-

ship, and they would thus be able to beat the enemy.45

(2) Musa b. Kacb and Lahiz b. Qurayz suggestedMarw al-Rudh because of its intermediate location be-

tween BalkhandMarw.Malik b. al-Haytham,al-CAli' b.

Hurayth,and Talhahb. Zurayqseconded this motion be-

cause the partisanstherewere numerousand the author-

ities hadgrownweak. Sulaymfn concurred,because"our

strengththereis greater,and our enemy is weaker."46(3) But Abu Muslim was not seeking merelyan initial

victory that he may not have been able to sustain. He

turned o the silent sage, Abu Salih Kamilb. al-Muzaffar,for his view. Kamil articulatedthe sound strategywhich

Abu Muslim adopted: "If the trunk is uprooted, the

branchis doomed. If you [first]breakout into the open

anywhere other than in Marw, your ruler would free

himself to [deal with] you, and his enemy would assist

him against you."47

The proponentsof Khwarizmand Marw al-Rudhhad

presented valid reasons for their choices that reflect

a sound understandingof the revolutionaryposition in

the outlying districts-sparse Arab presence amidst anoverwhelmingly Iranianpopulation.48But this was onlya part of the overall picture. They failed to assess the

comprehensiveprovincial situationas an integralwhole

and,thus,couldnotappreciatehestrategicelements atent

in the situation n Marw.By contrastKamil b. al-Muzaffar

could and he did exactly that.

What Kamil meant was that the very circumstances

that made the revolution opportuneat the time would

disappearif the center of the plannederuptionwere to

relocate to any place outside the capital district. The

warringtribal Arabmuqatilah,the mainstayof the Arab

Umayyadestablishment,would have had time to realize

the necessity of suspending their differences and come

45 Akhbar,273: 9-12.46

Akhbar,273: 12-17.

47 Akhbar,273: 17-274: 2.48 Sharon (Revolt, 74-75) attemptsto find tribal reasons in

the nomination of Marw al-Rudh by two groups of nuqabd',

who belonged to two competing tribes, Tamimand Khuzacah.

to the aid of the governor.The center of the revolution

would hold only if it preventedthe centerof governmentitself fromholdingfirm. If they succeededin keepingthe

Arabs at the throats of one another,the battle for Marw

would remainessentially a political one and the real bulk

of the Umayyadforces would never have to be engaged

directly.Thejob did not requirean overwhelmingforce. What

the revolutionaries needed was an imposing presence in

this theater n the face of the three otherwarringgroups.49Moreimportantwas the ability to conductcraftymaneu-

vers and make theirpresencelook sufficientlyinviolable

but not too menacing;and be adequatelydisengaged so

as not to become any one group's priority, but also

sufficiently friendly and approachable,so as to deceive

the unwitting, whoever they might be.50Equally impor-tant was Abu Muslim's organizationalability to engulf

the entireterritory n one blaze, ragingevenly and simul-taneously,thus affordinghim the crucial opportunityfor

maneuveringat Marw. This way the real battles for ter-

ritorywould be fought elsewhere-actually all over the

province except Marw-where the partisans would be

allowed to reap quickly, in one sweep, and without in-

terference,the fruits of their uncontested supremacyin

numbers,though probablynot in pure military prowess.Such battles would be nothingmore than skirmishesbe-

tween masses of Iraniansand small and dispersedArab

contingents representing ittle more than a police force.

After these two interactive cornerstones of the revolu-

tionarystrategy-the orchestratedrising in the districts,

and the paralyzing deadlock at Marw-had worked tofull advantage, the revolution would have gained mo-

mentum,and any engagements with Umayyad forces in

the province could be won.

Therefore,in deciding where to make a debut, Kamil

and Abu Muslim must have thought that it did not

really matterthat the temporarymilitarybalance was in

their favor in Marw al-Rudh or Khwarizmand against

49 There were three main warring Arab parties: the loyal

tribes, mainly Mudarite,with the governor,Nasr b. Sayyar;the

anti-Mudar,but not anti-establishment,opposition partyof the

Azd, led by the two sons of al-Kirmani, CAlland cUthman;

and the Khawarij,led by Shayban b. Salamah and allied to a

Rabi'ah faction of the Banu Hanifah under CAllb. Macqil al-

Hanafi. Supra,note 42.

50 Abu Muslim's maneuvers, and the three parties'reactions

to them, constitute almost the entirety of events at Marw cov-

ered in the histories during the period from eruptionto capitu-

lation. See Tabari, 2: 1949-76, 1984-97; Akhbar, 278-318;

Wellhausen,Kingdom,521-39.

342



AGHA:Abu Muslim's Conquest of Khurasan

them in Marw. If the Arab army were permitted to be

compact and mobile, any such precarious balance would,

in due course, become meaningless. An orchestrated ris-

ing would deteriorate into messy entanglements which,

at best,could

hope to create short-lived revolutionaryenclaves that would be eventually crushed one by one.

The foregoing depiction of Abu Muslim's strategy is

not the result of a mind-reading exercise. Two crystal-

clear texts in the Akhbar "encapsulate" the spirit and

letter of this strategy. Abu Salamah al-Khallal allegedly

wrote to Abu Muslim as follows:

When you emerge into the open, nothing should out-

weigh [your decision to] dig a trench for yourself and

your followers; this is the Imam's opinion, and in it

[lies] your strength.Nasr's enemies and those who have

been fighting him will resort to you to find strength.

Keep avoiding war for as long as you can; advance andretreat;and do not antagonize Nasr until the advent of

Muharram.51

Abu Muslim did just that. He had a trench dug at Ma-

khuwan, and

his soldiers kept growing in numberby various means;

he kept growing stronger, and people kept coming to

him; [all the while] he refrained from fighting. God

grantedhim the conquest of numerous towns [and dis-

tricts] by virtue of [his] patience, prayer,and tact (mu-

darat) for the durationof five months in which he did

not do battle.52

The stark contrast, both of chronology and manner, in

which the revolution made its sweeping territorial gainsin the outlying districts first, and in Marw last, conveysthe essence of Abu Muslim's strategy and tactics. When

this strategy started yielding its quick and successive

gains, Nasr b. Sayyar was still in Marw, holding his own

but completely paralyzed by his inability to stop the tribal

war thanks, in good part, to this very strategy. Within a

few months of first eruption, the entire territory (north,

east, and south of Marw, and the territory immediately to

the west of theoasis)

wasswept clean, leaving only

a

southwesterly corridor-the one that Nasr b. Sayyarwould soon use in his flight via the Sarakhs highway to

Tuis, Nishapur, up to the Sawah oasis.53 All the while,

Abu Muslim was conducting his political maneuvers in

51 Akhbdr,277: 15-19.52

Akhbar,281: 12-14.

53 Tabari,2: 1991; 3: 2; Akhbdr,319-20; see the map,below.

Marw. The bewildered governor described the revolu-

tionary strategy with photographic accuracy:

Talaqan, Marw al-Ruidh, Balkh, [the hamlets] on the

bank of the River [Oxus], and Abiward have encircled

us. Here is Marw,where the situation has deterioratedas

much as it did; and [now] the people of Jurjanare flock-

ing to them. It is as if you arewitnessing the ropes being

put around our necks.54

It was death-by-asphyxiation for Arab rule in Khurasan.

The besieged governor did not enumerate, in this spe-cific text, all the localities ranged against him in Marw;55

but, in a letter to the caliph, which acquires special histo-

riographical significance, he delineates the monster which

had then swallowed up the entire east, from Rayy in the

west to Sughd in the east, ma bayna al-Rayy ild al-Sughd.56

Around seven months after firsteruption

on Rama-

dan 25, 129, the capitulation of Marw came like the fall

of an over-ripe fruit. Abu Muslim, without striking a

blow, entered the city on Rabic II 7, 130 (December 15,

747).57 He had reaped the ultimate benefit of his binary

54 Akhbar,293: 6-8.55 In otherpronouncements,however, he did add to these lo-

calities Nasa, Amul, and Zamm (Akhbar, 284, 289). Most of

these localities are, aside from Nasr's pronouncements, inde-

pendently attested by Akhbdr and Tabari as having been won

over to the revolution. To them, Tabari(2: 1966) and Dinawari

(359) add Harat;and the Akhbar(278) hints at Bukhara. Thiscovers most of centraland easternKhurasanat large, includingTransoxania.Dinawari adds Samarqand,Kashsh, Nasaf, Sagh-

anyan, Khuttalan,Bushanj, and even Tis and Nishapur, to the

revolutionarymap (Dinawari, 338, 359-60). While Dinawari's

romantic sweep may, from a purely historiographicalpoint of

view, discredit the map, it should not be totally dismissed. It

does reflect the mood of the land at the time, attestedby other

reliable source material.

56 Akhbar,293: 14; from a letter by Nasr to MarwanII, urg-

ing him to order the governor of Jurjan o crack down on Abu

CAwnCAbd l-Malik b. Yazid, the "hiding snake"(hayyahmun-

tawiyah) who spoiled the territory or Umayyad rule. Historio-

graphical significance accrues from the Akhbdr'sclaim that theletter itself was found amongst Marwan II's documents that

were capturedwhen he was killed.57

Wellhausen, Kingdom,491; Akhbar, 315; Tabari'sanony-mous source, 2: 1993; Mada'ini dates the event to Rabic II, 7

or 9, while Abu al-Khattabdelays it one or two full months, to

Jumada I or II, 9 (Tabari, 2: 1990, 1987, 1984); Baladhuri

advances it to Rabic I (Ahmad b. Yahya al-Baladhuri, Ansdb

al-ashrdf, vol. 3, ed. CA. A. al-Duri [Wiesbaden:FranzSteiner

Verlag, 1978], 130).

343




strategy of perpetuating a deadlock at Marw through po-

litical maneuvering, and of overpowering the Arab

forces in the outlying districts.

The course of Abu Muslim's conquest of Khurasan

displays three features that further corroborate the fore-

going interpretation of his strategy. Firstly, his com-

missioned commanders and coordinating officers did not

march with any armies from Marw. The Marw revolu-

tionary resources could only sustain the show of force

Abu Muslim needed right there. It took around a month

and a half, or probably more, for his forces in Marw to

total 7,000 men.58 The only reinforcements he ever sent

out, before the entire province became completely his,

were the contingent of slaves he sent to Musa b. KaCb n

Abiward and Nasa.59 And that was neither because

Musa needed the reinforcements, nor because Abu Mus-

lim could spare them. The slaves' presence in Abui Mus-

lim's ranks in Marw, where the battle was primarily oneof politics and propaganda, was becoming increasingly

costly politically,60 and Abiward was the closest city, in

case he needed to retrieve them. Actually, reinforce-

ments soon started to flow in the reverse direction, from

the oversaturated districts to starved Marw. Abui Mus-

lim frequently asked for and received reinforcements

from these districts, especially from Tukharistan: Ta-

laqan, Balkh, and Marw al-Rudh.61 These commanders

simply traveled to their armies, which had always been

stationed where the soldiers were born. Abu Muslim's

conquest of Khurasan was not achieved by marching

armies, but by local eruptions. The only real march was

Qahtabah's, and it was to the heart of the Umayyad

domain, from an already-won Khurasan.

Secondly, the massacres and atrocities which oc-

curred, or which were rumored to have occurred, espe-

cially in the outlying districts, served to promote the

"mob" psychology that was one of Abu Muslim's prin-

cipal weapons.62 Whether or not atrocities were actually

58Tabari,2: 1969.

59 Akhbar, 281; Tabari,2: 1968-69.60

Akhbar,280-81, 284.61

Akhbar,280, 297, 299.62Accordingto Khalifah,afterQahtabahhad defeated Nuba-

tah b. Hanzalah in Jurjan, such atrocities did occur. Kalifah

reportsas follows: "Abui l-Dhayyal said: 'the people of Khur-

asan and the people of Jurjankilled that day those of the Banu

Tamim and the people of the mosques (ahl al-masdjid) who

were there'"(Abul AmrKhalifahb. KhayyiatShababal-CUsfuri,

Ta'rikhKhalifahb. Khayyat,ed. A. D. al-'Umari [Najaf: 1967],

2: 413). Ibrahimb. Maymumal-Sa'igh, himself later killed by

Abu Muslim, is reportedby Dhahabi to have said: ".. God

perpetrated, the mere rumors gave vivid credence to one

of the movement's weapons of propaganda: yasir al-ruCb

bayna aydi-him ("fright is their vanguard").63

inflictedAbu Muslim on the [Arabs] ... " and he comments:"I

said: 'Abu Muslim was a great affliction on the Arabs of

Khurasan;he exterminated them by the edge of the sword"'

(qult: KanaAbu Muslimbald'an CazimanCaldCArabKhurasan,

fa-inna-hu abdda-humbi-haddal-sayf). (Muhammadb. Ahmad

Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi, Siyar aclam al-nubalda, ed. Sh. al-

Arn'uit et al. [Beirut:Mu'assasat al-Risalah, 1981-85], 6: 53).

Ibn CAsakir elates that AbuiMuslim had the slaves kill their

masters (Abu al-Qasim Thiqat al-Din Ibn CAsakir,al-Ta'rikh

al-Kabir [Damascus: 1909], 2: 131; see Daniel, Khurasan, 70,

n. 154). The same allegation is also made by Theophanes

(Wellhausen,Kingdom,534).

More pertinentare Nasr b. Sayyar'sclaims, and the accusa-tions made against Abu Muslim by Nasr'sdelegation to him re-

gardingthe atrocitiesthatthe partisanshad committed in Nasa,

Talaqan,Marw al-Rudh, Amul, and Zamm (Akhbar,284: 2-7,

289: 9). To these specific accusations, Abu Muslim answered:

wa ammdahl Nasa wa Talaqan wa Amul a-inna alladhi kdna

min-hum am yakun Canra~yi-nawa Id bi-amri-na wa lakinna-

hum ummahurida zulmu-humwa safk dimdai-him a-imtana'Ci

fa-la hujjata'alay-him (Akhbar,284: 10-11).

The text must translate as follows: "As for the people of

Nasa, Talaqan,and Amul, what they did was not instigated by

counsel of ours nor authorizedby us. However, as they are a

communitythat was targetedfor oppressionand bloodshed, so

they defendedthemselves,and therefore hey cannotbe blamed."

There is no room for Daniel's misunderstanding hat "Abu

Muslim disavowed these [excesses], saying thatthey were com-

mitted not by true partisansbut by people who wanted only to

do evil and shed blood" (Daniel, Khurasan, 54). What Abu

Muslim actually said was that the deeds were not authorizedby

his command. He disavowed the policy although he admitted

the occurrencesand thathis truepartisanswere the agents of it.

The resulting paradox he explained by saying that the perpe-

trators were justified in that they did what they did in self-

defense. Abfi Muslim's verdict on the whole affair is that the

victims have no cause and there is no case against the perpe-

trators.Beware,

Abu Muslim means tosay-especially

to the

Marwites who were then talking to him-the same may be

repeated,with all the unintendedconsequences.

63 Akhbdr,207. At least two such events are authentic,even

though the magnitude may have been exaggerated. Amul and

Zamm must have been prime revolutionarytargets:as the two

vital crossings on the Oxus, they must have been as heavily

guardedas they were strongly coveted. There is no doubt that,

if the local partisans' trengthwas not enough to overwhelm the

Umayyad forces there, then these crossings must have been

344



AGHA:Abi Muslim's Conquest of Khurasan

Thirdly,in the various accounts of how all of Khura-

san fell to the revolutionaries,with the exception of two

cases, we do not hear of majorbattles of the sort that

occur between armies,not even in Marw. Save for Balkh

and Tus, two battles which had their ownlogic,

the

conquest was almost always a matter of killing or

expelling the government's man in a given district.64

The multitudesmustusually have engulfed the compara-

tively tiny garrisons;or the garrisons simply disbanded

and melted away, or fled to the largerregionalUmayyad

strongholds.The only two battles in which Khurasanite

Umayyad forces were engaged were last-stand battles

made by such remnantswho converged on two main lo-

cationsfrom scatteredandstampededdetachments. n the

east, the vanquishedremnantsof the garrisonsof Trans-

oxania and eastern Tukharistanconverged on Tirmidh,and thus occurredthe battle for Balkh.65 n the west, af-

ter the fall of Marw,the remnantsfrom Sarakhs, Nasa,Abiward,and the rest of central and western Khurasan,in additionto the bulk of the Marwgarrison, convergedon Tis (and Jurjan). In Tis the Arabs of Khurasan

fought their last battle.66

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Most of the basic historiographicalbuilding blocks

that contributeto the depiction above have been knownto scholars since the publicationof Tabari.It is true that

the Akhbar provides a wealth of previously unknown

details, but it also reinforces the basic veracity of the

historiographicaltraditionwhich was hithertothe main-

stay of Umayyad studies. What accrues from a careful

probeof the account in theAkhbardoes not structurallyalterwhatderives fromTabari.All the variantaccountsinboth sources, and in many others, testify to an orches-

taken by revolutionaryforces advancing from the right bank,

i.e., from Transoxania.On the left bank, they were surrounded

by desert. The revolutionariesmust have been especially ruth-

less in order to secure these two crucial posts at a very early

stage. Effectively swept off the face of the Soghdianterrain,and

the two crossings thuscaptured,Umayyadforces and theirlocalallies had only one place to gc to, that is, Tirmidh,where theywould be next encountered.

64 Consider the examples of Marw al-Rudh and Harat, two

majorArab garrisons:Tabari,2: 1959-60, 1966. Jurjan,where

a battle did occur between the revolutionaryarmy led by Qah-tabah b. Shabib and the Syrian armyled by Nubatah b. Hanza-

lah, is not a partof administrativeKhurasan.65 Tabari,2: 1997-2000; Agha, "The Agents," 145-55.66 Tabari,2: 2000-2003; Akhbar,323-25.

tratedrising, andthey reportthe fall of numerous cities

before Marw had capitulated. But, understandably,

they all focus on the events in the Marw oasis about

which more information was available. This politically

proportionatebut

demographicallyand

strategicallydis-

proportionatefocus is also largely reflected in modern

studies. The inevitable consequence was that the great

significance of the strategy of orchestrationas crucial

evidence of a mass Iranianuprisingwas either dilutedor

completely lost.

APPENDIX

ABU MUSLIM'S DEPLOYMENT OF NUQABA' AND OTHER

OFFICERS TO THE OUTLYING DISTRICTS

The administrativegeography of the east had been

mapped by Abu Salamah al-Khallal during Bukayr b.

Mahan's leadership of the revolutionary organization.Abu Salamahcreated three regional commands:one in

Jurjan, tself a separateUmayyad administrativeunit on

the eastern shores of the Caspiansea; another in Marw;and a third in Transoxania.67

To Jurjan,Abu Muslim sent nothing-neither officers

norinstructions.TheJurjanid artisans,however, "aggre-

gated in huge numbersto join theirbrethren n Marw,so

Abi Muslim and his comradeswerejoyous at the news"

and, of course, Nasr b. Sayyar felt the noose tightening

accordingly.68

Revolutionaryactivities in Transoxaniaare even more

severely underreported han those in Jurjan.The exactgeographicallocationof the Transoxanian egionalcom-

mand is as elusive as its commander, al-CAla> . Hur-

ayth. It couldhave been locatedanywherebetweenAmul,or probablyeven Zamm in the south, and Khwarizm in

the north,and between the Oxus in the west and Samar-

qand in the east. To al-CAla',Abu Muslim sent Abu al-

Jahm b. CAtiyyahwith the news that the date had beenadvancedto Ramadan.69Abi al-Khattabexplicitly statesthatal-CAla'was in Khwarizm,and it may well havebeenso. Accordingto Tabari's nonymoussource,Abii Muslimsent al-Nadr b. Subayh (read: Subh) and Sharik b. 'Isa

(read: CUsayy)to Amul and Bukhara, also a territory

67Akhbar, 47-48; Agha,"TheAgents," 3-85.

68Akhbar,293. The brief coverageof activities in Jurjandur-

ing this period is, however, not commensurate with its impor-tance in the formative period of the organization, or with the

importantrole the Jurjaniddivision played, under Abi CAwn

CAbdl-Malik . Yazid, n Qahtabah. Shabib'sampaignnd

beyond.69 Abu al-Khattab n Tabari,2: 1953.

345




underal-'Ala'.70Butthis isunlikely.According

to Abilal-

Khattab, hese two leaders were sent to Marw al-Rudh.71

This discrepancy may be irresolvable, but it is not of

muchsignificance.Whoeverwas, orwere,sent to al-CAla'

and his territorywere not mere messengers. These were

men of status in the organization;and the coordination

they were supposed to provide was also, in one of its

aspects, an assertion of Abu Muslim's central author-

ity, the statusof al-CAla'as a comparativelyautonomous

ally notwithstanding.We don't know exactly what course

events took in Transoxania.We can only infer thatpurg-

ing the area of Umayyad presencewas neithera long nor

a roughtask.Thereare,however, referencesto atrocities

committedin the early sweep of Amul and Zammon theleft bank of the Oxus.72

ToTukharistan,astof theMurghab iver,AbuMuslim

sent two naqibs,Abu Dawud Khalid b. Ibrahimand CAmr

70Tabari, : 1964.71Tabari, : 1953;Maddaini as al-Nadraccompaniedy

Bassamb.IbrahimTabari,: 1959);Akhbar,78,onlyal-Nadr.72 Akhbar, 248, 289.

b. Acyan.73Abu al-Khattab s more specific and differs

slightly. He specifies Abi Dawid's and Ibn Acyan'sdes-

tinationas the areabelow Balkh,specificallyTalaqan.He

says that AbuMuslim sent AbuiCAsimread:cIsam)CAbd

al-Rahmanb. Sulaym(read:Sulayman),74 n ally of Abui

Dawiid and, later,his chief of police and successor. All

of these men were top "officers."Balkhand Khuttalwere

initially, althoughnot exclusively, Abu Dawud's areaof

activity.Ziyadb. Salih, of whose activity in this context

we hear nothing, shared the direction of propaganda n

the areawith him.75These men were sent to lead. Before

they reached their destinations,the partisans n Talaqanhad risen.76

To Marwal-Rudh,Abu Muslim sent either al-Nadrb.Subh alone or accompanied by Sharik b. CUsayy.But

according to the anonymous source of Tabari, it was

Khazim b. Khuzaymahimself who was dispatched to

73 Akhbar, 77;theanonymousourcenTabari : 1964.

74Tabari,2: 1953.75

Akhbir, 268.76

Akhbar,278.

346



AGHA:Aba Muslim'sConquest of Khurasan

Marwal-Rudh.77Khazim,one of the top militarystarsof

the organization,was also its resident leader in the dis-

trict. The discrepancymay be irresolvable,but it is againof little consequence.Morepertinent s the storyof Kha-

zim's swiftcapture

of thecity.

When his own tribe tried

to preventhim, he convinced them to stand neutral,and

overnight he attacked, killed the subgovenor, and sent

to Abi Muslim news of the conquest.78Farther o the southwest, Abu Muslim sent al-Nadrb.

Nucaymto Harat,who immediatelycaptured he city and

chased off the governmentofficial.79

West of Marw,the spectacleof hoistingthe black ban-

ners did not have to wait for Abu Muslim's commander.

Usaydb. CAbdAllah in Nasa was apparentlyhe very first

to flaunt the color outside Marw;thereafterneighboringAbiward followed suit.80AbuMuslim then appointedthe

naqib Musa b. Kacbto the command of the area.8'

77 Tabari,2: 1964.78

Accordingo Mada'ini n Tabari, : 1959-60.79Mada'ini n Tabari, : 1966.80

Tabari, 2: 1972; Akhbdr, 278; CAli b. al-Husayn al-

MasC'di, Murujal-dhahab wa maCadinal-jawhar, ed. C. Bar-

bier de Meynard and A. Pavet de Courteille, rev. C. Pellat

(Beirut:Lebanese University, 1973), 4: 78; Dinawari, 359; Ba-

ladhurihas Abiwardrising first (Ansdbal-ashrdf, 3: 131).81

Akhbdr,278; Tabari,2: 1964, 1997.

According to Mada'ini, the first conquest was that

of Abiward, by Misa, followed by that of Marw al-

Rudh,by Khazim.82Accordingto the Akhbar,the "pub-lic appearancesof the people of Nasa, Talaqan, Marw

al-Rudh,and Amul and its

vicinitywere close to one

another."83 ctually the expression "public appearance,"

althougha correct translation of zuhar, is not, by itself,

adequate for the context. The act of zuhur almost im-

mediately "translated" nto its other lexical meaning of

"overcoming" (perhapswith the sole exception of Marw

itself). The hoisting of the black banners of the revolu-

tion was in most cases an instantaneousraising of the

official flag of the new regime.There can be no doubt that, while the political drama

at Marw was still unfolding, most, if not all, of the

above-named localities had capitulatedor simply fallen

into the hands of the revolutionariesearly in the period.

Thus, with the exceptions of Tirmidhand Balkh in theeast, and Sarakhs, Tis, and Nishapurin the west, where

there was no early zuhur, the revolution had won all of

Khurasan,Tukharistan, ndTransoxaniaalmost from the

moment it broke into the open with full force, and defi-

nitely before it finally won Marw.

82Tabari,2: 1952-53.

83Akhbdr,278.

347

Abu Muslims Conquest of Khurasan

Documents