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Journal of Educational Psychology1979, Vol. 71, No. 1,3-25
A Theory of Motivation for Some Classroom Experiences
Bernard WeinerUniversity of California, Los Angeles
A theory of motivation based upon attributions of causality for
success andfailure is offered. The heart of the theory consists of
an identification of thedimensions of causality and the relation of
these underlying properties ofcauses to psychological consequences.
Three central causal dimensions havebeen discerned: stability,
locus, and control; these dimensions, respectively,are linked with
expectancy change, esteem-related emotions, and interperso-nal
judgments. Within achievement-related contexts, this theory is
pertinentto a diverse array of phenomena and topics, including
self-esteem mainte-nance, achievement-change programs,
reinforcement schedules, hopelessness,sources of emotion, helping,
evaluation, and liking. The range of the theoryis further
demonstrated by applications to hyperactivity, mastery, parole
deci-sions, loneliness and affiliation, and depression. It appears
that a generaltheory of motivation is under development that has
important implicationsfor the understanding of classroom thought
and behavior.
The attributional approach to classroommotivation and experience
has proven ex-ceedingly rich. In this article I examine
theparticular attributional path I have followedand document its
richness by outlining a fewof the empirical and theoretical
relationsthat appear to be conclusive. The extensityof the
theoretical network suggests that ageneral theory of motivation is
under de-velopment; I also address the issue of theo-retical
breadth here.
Some of the thoughts expressed in thisarticle have been voiced
in previous reviews(Weiner, 1972,1974,1976). With each op-portunity
to take stock of where we are, someideas become more firmly fixed,
others arediscarded and new presumptions take theirplace, some
earlier evidence grows in stature,and other prior data require
reinterpreta-tion. There certainly is some advantage tothe dictum
of publish and perish, which al-lows one to convey his or her ideas
in a single,self-contained, and final package. Likemost others,
however, I communicate mythoughts as they evolve, and prior
ques-tionable truths give way to new, equally un-
This article was written while the author was sup-ported by
Grant MH 25687-04 from the National In-stitute of Mental
Health.
Requests for reprints should be sent to BernardWeiner,
Department of Psychology, University of Cal-ifornia, Los Angeles,
California 90024.
certain laws, while other notions remainunchanged.
The Search for Causes
A central assumption of attributiontheory, which sets it apart
from pleasure-pain theories of motivation, is that the searchfor
understanding is the (or a) basic "springof action." This does not
imply that hu-mans are not pleasure seekers, or that theynever bias
information in the pursuit of he-donic goals. Rather, information
seekingand veridical processing are believed to benormative, may be
manifested in spite of aconflicting pleasure principle, and, at
theleast, comprehension stands with hedonismamong the primary
sources of motivation(see W. Meyer, Folkes, & Weiner,
1976).
In a school setting the search for under-standing often leads to
the attributionalquestion of "Why did I succeed or fail?" or,more
specifically, "Why did I flunk math?"or "Why did Mary get a better
mark on thisexam than me?" But classrooms are envi-ronments for the
satisfaction of motivationsother than achievement. Thus,
attribu-tional questions also might pertain to, forexample,
interpersonal acceptance or rejec-tion, such as "Why doesn't Johnny
like me?"However, for the time being attention will becentered upon
achievement concerns.
Copyright 1979 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-0663/79/7101-0003$00.75
3
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BERNARD WEINER
Among the unknowns of this attributionalanalysis is a clear
statement of when peopleask "why" questions. It has been
demon-strated that this search is more likely givenfailure
(rejection) than success (acceptance)(Folkes, 1978). Furthermore,
it is plausibleto speculate that unexpected events are morelikely
to lead to "why" questions than ex-pected events (Lau &
Russell, Note 1) andthat subjective importance also will influ-ence
the pursuit of knowledge. Finally, ithas been demonstrated that
during taskperformance "failure-oriented" or "helpless"students
especially tend to supply attribu-tions (Diener & Dweck, 1978).
Diener andDweck also intimate that a subset of stu-dents, called
"mastery-oriented," do notengage in attribution making. However,
Isuspect that attributional inferences oftenare quite
retrospective, summarize a numberof experiences, take place below a
level ofimmediate awareness, and are intimatelytied with
self-esteem and self-concept.Thus, I believe that attributions are
suppliedby the mastery-oriented children as well,although not
necessarily during or immedi-ately following all task
performances.
Our initial statement regarding the per-ceived causes of success
and failure (Weiner,Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, &
Rosenbaum,1971) was guided by Heider (1958) as well asour own
intuitions. We postulated that inachievement-related contexts the
causesperceived as most responsible for success andfailure are
ability, effort, task difficulty, andluck. That is, in attempting
to explain theprior success or failure at an achievement-related
event, the individual assesses his orher level of ability, the
amount of effort thatwas expended, the difficulty of the task,
andthe magnitude and direction of experiencedluck. We assumed that
rather generalvalues are assigned to these factors and thatthe task
outcome is differentially ascribed tothe causal sources. In a
similar manner,future expectations of success and failurewould then
be based upon one's perceivedlevel of ability in relation to the
perceiveddifficulty of the task (labeled by Heider ascan), as well
as an estimation of the intendedeffort and anticipated luck.
In listing the four causes reported abovewe did not intend to
convey that they were
the only perceived determinants of successor failure, or even
that they were the mostsalient ones in all achievement
situations.In later work (e.g., Weiner, 1974; Weiner,Russell, &
Lerman, 1978), we explicitly in-dicated that factors such as mood,
fatigue,illness, and bias could serve as necessaryand/or sufficient
reasons for achievementperformance. Research restricting
causalityto the four causes given above at times mightgive rise to
false conclusions. For example,assume that one is testing the
hedonic biasnotion that success primarily is self-ascribed.By not
including help from others, for ex-ample, among the alternative
causes, thehedonic bias hypothesis might be supportedbecause the
given external causes (task dif-ficulty and luck) do not adequately
capturethe phenomenology of the subject.
In the last few years intuition has givenway to empirical
studies attempting toidentify the perceived causes of success
andfailure. At least four investigations of aca-demic attributions
(Elig & Frieze, 1975;Frieze, 1976; Bar-Tal & Darom, Note
2;Cooper & Burger, Note 3) have been con-ducted (there
undoubtedly are many moreunknown to me), and there have been
anumber of studies that examine attributionsoutside of the
classroom context (e.g., workexperiences and athletics). The
methodol-ogies of the classroom inquiries have minorvariations,
with students or teachers statingthe causes of success or failure
at real or im-agined events, and judging themselves orothers. The
responses are then categorizedand tabulated.
Cooper and Burger (Note 3) provide aconcise summary of the data
from three ofthe studies (see Table 1). It is evident thatability,
effort (both typical and immediate),and task difficulty are among
the main per-ceived causes of achievement performance.Thus, the
prior intuitions of Heider (1958)and my colleagues and me were not
incor-rect. In addition, Table 1 shows that others(teachers,
students, and family), motivation(attention and interest), and what
Cooperand Burger label as acquired characteristics(habits and
attitudes) and physiologicalprocesses (mood, maturity, and
health)comprise the central determinants of successand failure.
Luck is not included with the
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION
Table 1Summary of Previous Coding Systems (Adapted From Cooper
& Burger, Note 3)
Frieze (1976) Bar-Tal & Darom (Note 2) Cooper & Burger
(Note 3)
AbilityStable effortImmediate effortTaskOther
personMoodLuckOther
AbilityEffort during testPreparation at homeInterest in the
subject matterDifficulty of the testDifficulty of
materialConditions in the home
Academic abilityPhysical and emotional abilityPrevious
experienceHabitsAttitudesSelf-perceptionsMaturityTypical
effortEffort in
preparationAttentionDirectionsInstructionTaskMoodFamilyOther
studentsMiscellaneous
dominant causes but could be prominent onspecific occasions,
particularly in career orathletic accomplishments (see
Mann,1974).
In sum, there are a myriad of perceivedcauses of achievement
events. In a cross-cultural study it was even reported that
pa-tience (Greece and Japan) and tact and unity(India) are
perceived as causes of success andfailure (Triandis, 1972). But
there is arather small list from which the main causesrepeatedly
are selected. Furthermore,within this list ability and effort
appear to bethe most salient and general of the causes.That is,
outcomes frequently depend uponwhat we can do and how hard we try
to do it.A clear conceptual analysis of only abilityand effort
would greatly add to our knowl-edge, given an attributional
perspective.
Before moving on to this conceptual for-mulation, it should be
recognized that Table1 presents only a description of the
perceivedreasons for success and failure in achieve-ment settings.
Although attribution theoryoften is referred to as a naive
conception,using the language of the person on thestreet, it also
has been appreciated thatscience has to go beyond mere
phenomeno-logy. That is, order must be imposed usingscientific
terminology that may not be partof the logic of the layperson. This
is implicitin, for example, the work of Kelley (1967,
1971). Heider also clearly acknowledged thedistinction between a
naive psychology anda scientific psychology. He stated,
There is no prior reason why the causal description[scientific
language] should be the same as the phe-nomenal description [naive
language], though, of course,the former should adequately account
for the latter.(Heider, 1958, p. 22).
I now turn from the layperson's perceptionof causality to the
scientific language that isimposed on these causes. In this article
Icompletely neglect the process by whichcausal beliefs are reached,
although this isthe most common problem in the attribu-tional field
and is what is meant by the at-tribution process (see Kelley, 1967,
1971;Weiner, 1974). This void is left so that fullspace can be
devoted to the psychologicalconsequences of perceived causality,
thetopic most central to my concerns.
Dimensions of Causality
Inasmuch as the list of conceivable causesof success and failure
is infinite, it is essentialto create a classification scheme or a
taxon-omy of causes. In so doing, similarities anddifferences are
delineated and the underly-ing properties of the causes are
identified.This is an indispensable requirement for the
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6 BERNARD WEINER
construction of an attributional theory ofmotivation.
The prior theoretical analyses of Rotter(1966) and Heider (1958)
were available toserve as our initial guides in this
endeavor.Rotter and his colleagues proposed a one-dimensional
classification of causality.Causes either were within (internal) or
out-side (external to) the person. In a similarmanner, Heider
(1958) as well as de Charms(1968), Deci (1975), and many others
havearticulated an internal-external classifica-tion of causality.
Rotter labeled this di-mension locus of control, whereas in
thepresent context locus is conceived as abackward-looking belief
and therefore isreferred to as locus of causality. Indeed, Icontend
that the concepts of locus and con-trol must be separated.
The causes listed in Table 1 can be readilycatalogued as
internal or external to the in-dividual. From the perspective of
the stu-dent, the personal causes include ability,effort, mood,
maturity, and health, whileteacher, task, and family are among the
ex-ternal sources of causality. But the relativeplacement of a
cause on this dimension is notinvariant over time or between
people. Forexample, health might be perceived as aninternal ("I am
a sickly person") or as anexternal ("The 'flu bug' got me") cause
offailure. Inasmuch as attribution theorydeals with phenomenal
causality, such per-sonal interpretations must be taken
intoaccount. That is, the taxonomic placementof a cause depends
upon its subjectivemeaning. Nonetheless, in spite of
possibleindividual variation, there is general agree-ment when
distinguishing causes as internalor external.
A second dimension of causality, which wehave come to perceive
as increasingly im-portant, is labeled stability (Weiner et
al.,1971). The stability dimension definescauses on a stable
(invariant) versus unstable(variant) continuum. Again Heider
(1958)served as our guide, for he contrasted dis-positional and
relatively fixed characteristicssuch as ability with fluctuating
factors suchas effort and luck. Examining Table 1,ability, typical
effort, and family would beconsidered relatively fixed, while
immediateeffort, attention, and mood are more unsta-
ble. Effort and attention may be augmentedor decreased from one
episode to the next,while mood is conceived as a temporarystate.
However, as indicated previously, theperceived properties of a
cause can vary.For example, mood might be thought of as atemporary
state or as a permanent trait. Inaddition, experimenters can alter
the per-ceived properties of a cause. For example,although
difficulty level of a task generallyis considered a stable
characteristic (Weineret al., 1971), Valle and Frieze (1976)
por-trayed task difficulty as unstable by an-choring this concept
to assigned sales terri-tory, which could be shifted for any
sales-person. At times task difficulty is classifiedas stable,
while the experimental manipu-lation strongly suggests that
subjects wouldperceive this factor as unstable (see
Riemer,1975).
Still a third dimension of causality thatwas identified by
Heider and later incorpo-rated into the achievement domain by
Ros-enbaum (1972) was labeled intentionality.Causes such as effort
or the bias of a teacheror supervisor were categorized as
intentional,whereas ability, the difficulty of the task,mood, and
so on were specified by Rosen-baum to be unintentional.
In prior writings this distinction was ac-cepted (e.g., Weiner,
1974, 1976). But fol-lowing a suggestion of Litman-Adizes (Note4),
it is now apparent that Rosenbaum (1972)mislabeled this dimension.
Rosenbaumargued that the dimension of intentionalityis needed to
differentiate, for example, moodfrom effort. Both of these are
internal andunstable causes, yet intuitively they are
quitedistinct. Rosenbaum invoked the intentdimension to describe
this difference, withmood classified as unintentional and
effortclassified as intentional. However, it seemsthat the
dimension Rosenbaum had identi-fied was that of control. Failure
attributedto a lack of effort does not signify that therewas an
intent to fail. Intent connotes a de-sire, or want. Rather, effort
differs frommood in that only effort is perceived assubject to
volitional control. Hence, I pro-pose that a third dimension of
causality ca-tegorizes causes as controllable versus
un-controllable.
Causes theoretically can be -classified
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION
Table 2Causes of Success and Failure, Classified According to
Locus, Stability, and Controllability
Internal External
Controllability Stable Unstable Stable Unstable
UncontrollableControllable
AbilityTypical effort
MoodImmediate effort
Task difficultyTeacher bias
LuckUnusual help
from others
within one of eight cells (2 levels of locus X2 levels of
stability X 2 levels of control).Among the internal causes, ability
is stableand uncontrollable; typical effort is stableand
controllable; mood, fatigue, and illnessare unstable and
uncontrollable; and tem-porary exertion is unstable and
controllable.Among the external causes, task difficulty isstable
and uncontrollable; teacher bias maybe perceived as stable and
controllable; luckis unstable and uncontrollable; and unusualhelp
from others is unstable and controllable(see Table 2).
Some problems with this classificationscheme remain unsolved,
particularly amongthe external causes. For example, can anexternal
cause be perceived as controllable?The answer to this question
depends on howfar back one goes in a causal inference chainas well
as whether controllability assumesonly the perspective of the
actor, which is notthe case in Table 2 (e.g., teacher bias may
becontrollable from the vantage point of theteacher, but not given
the perspective of thepupil). These questions, as well as the
pro-posed independence of the dimensions, aredifficult issues for
future thought and re-search.
Although the main dimensions of causal-ity in
achievement-related contexts mayhave been identified, other
dimensions arelikely to emerge with further analysis andwill raise
additional problems about the in-dependence of the dimensions.
Intentionmay be one of these dimensions and logicallycould be
separable from control (althoughcauses are certain to correlate
highly on thesetwo dimensions). A causal statement re-garding a
neglected homework assignmentillustrating the separation of intent
fromcontrol is "I wanted to study, but could notcontrol myself from
going out." A con-ceptually similar example disassociating
intent from control concerns a criminal whodoes not want to
commit a crime but cannotcontrol the compulsion. Criminal
justicealso accepts the possibility of control withoutintent, as in
negligence.
Still another possible dimension of cau-sality, identified by
Abramson, Seligman,and Teasdale (1978), has been labeledglobality.
The global versus specific endsof this dimension capture the
concept ofstimulus generalization (while stability ex-presses
temporal generalization). For ex-ample, one's ability may be
perceived astask-specific ("I failed because I am poor atmath") or
as a general trait influencingperformance in a wide variety of
settings ("Ifailed because I am dumb").
The dimensions of causality introducedabove were derived from a
logical examina-tion of perceived causes. More recently, anumber of
investigators have employedtechniques such as factor analysis or
multi-dimensional scaling to discover the dimen-sions of causality
(e.g., J. Meyer, 1978;Passer, 1977; Michela, Peplau, &
Weeks,Note 5). In the inceptive study by Passer,male and female
subjects rated the similarityof the causes of either success or
failure.Eighteen causes were presented in all pos-sible pairs to
the subjects. The similarityjudgments provided the input for a
multi-dimensional scaling procedure. Thismethod is akin to a
cluster analysis and de-picts the underlying judgment
dimensions.
Passer found two clear dimensions ofcausality: (a) a locus
dimension, anchoredat the internal end with causes such as badmood
and no self-confidence and at the ex-ternal extreme with causes
such as badteacher and hard exam; and (b) an
inten-tional-unintentional dimension (which I willcall
controllable-uncontrollable), anchoredat the controllable end with
causes such as
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BERNARD WEINER
never studies hard and lazy, and at the un-controllable extreme
with nervous and badmood. The findings reported by Passer(1977)
were similar for males and females inboth the success and failure
scaling solu-tions.
The proposed third dimension of causal-ity, stability, was not
displayed. Never-theless, Passer's results are encouraging inthat
two of the three dimensions that hadbeen presumed did emerge, and
other un-anticipated dimensions which had not beenpart of the
logical analysis did not appear.
The datajeported by Michela et al. (Note5) were equally
promising. Although theywere concerned with the causes of
loneliness,two familiar dimensions emerged in theirstudy—stability
and locus. There was someindication that control also appeared in
thedata, although it did not come through as anindependent
dimension and was more evi-dent among the internal causes.
Thissuggests that perhaps control cannot bepaired with
externality.
The investigation by J. Meyer (1978)provides the best evidence
for the dimen-sions portrayed in Table 2. Meyer gavesubjects
information relevant to the judg-ment of the causes of success and
failure,such as past history and social norms (Kel-ley, 1967). The
subjects then rated ninepossible causes of the outcomes,
includingability, effort, task difficulty, luck, mood,and teacher.
A factor analysis of these rat-ings yielded the three dimensions
suggestedin Table 2.
It therefore appears that what dimensionsemerge in part depends
on the empiricalprocedure that is used. Given a multidi-mensional
scaling method where subjectsrate the similarity of the causes, the
dimen-sions generated by the logical analysis maynot be identical
to those emerging with theempirical procedure. For example, as
shownin the Passer (1977) data, a naive person maynot spontaneously
recognize that mood, luck,and effort are similar because they are
un-stable, and thus a stability dimension ofcausality will not be
evident. On the otherhand, factor-analytic procedures are
notsubject to this limitation, and as J. Meyer(1978) has
demonstrated, this procedure has
yielded results fully supporting the logicalanalysis. For the
scientist these dimensionsare second-order concepts (Schvitz, 1967,
p.59); they are concepts used by attributiontheorists to organize
the causal concepts ofthe layperson.
Consequences of Causal Properties
I turn now from the dimensions of cau-sality to the consequences
or the implica-tions of these dimensions for thought andaction. I
contend that each of the three di-mensions of causality has a
primary psy-chological function or linkage, as well as anumber of
secondary effects. The primaryrelation of the stability dimension
is to themagnitude of expectancy change followingsuccess or
failure. The locus dimension ofcausality has implications for
self-esteem,one of the emotional consequences ofachievement
performance; affect also is asecondary association for casual
stability.The dimensional linkages with expectancyand affect
(value) integrate attributiontheory with expectancy-value
formulationsof motivation as outlined by Atkinson(1964), Lewin
(1935), and others (seeWeiner, 1972, 1974), although this
unifica-tion is not examined in this article. Finally,perceived
control by others relates to help-ing, evaluation, and liking. The
theory thusaddresses both self- and other-perceptionand intra- as
well as interpersonal behavior.The locus and control dimensions
have anumber of secondary effects that also will bevery briefly
considered.
Stability
The primary conceptual linkage of thestability dimension with
expectancy of suc-cess was first explored by Weiner et al.(1971)
and has not greatly changed since thattime (see Weiner,
1972,1974,1976). I nowmore fully perceive the implications of
thisassociation, other secondary linkages withcausal stability have
been uncovered, andthe empirical data have grown in clarity.But the
following discussion is consistentwith prior statements and is
partially re-dundant with these earlier writings.
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION
Research in the attributional domain hasproven definitively that
causal ascriptionsfor past performance are an important
de-terminant of goal expectancies. For exam-ple, failure that is
ascribed to low ability orto the difficulty of a task decreases the
ex-pectation of future success more than failurethat is ascribed to
bad luck, mood, or a lackof immediate effort. In a similar
manner,success ascribed to good luck or extra exer-tion results in
lesser increments in the sub-jective expectancy of future success
at thattask than does success ascribed to highability or to the
ease of the task. Moregenerally, expectancy shifts after success
andfailure are dependent upon the perceivedstability of the cause
of the prior outcome;ascription of an outcome to stable
factorsproduces greater typical shifts in expectancy(increments in
expectancy after success anddecrements after failure) than do
ascriptionsto unstable causes. Stated somewhat dif-ferently, if one
attains success (or failure)and if the conditions or causes of that
out-come are perceived as remaining unchanged,then success (or
failure) will be anticipatedwith a greater degree of certainty. But
if theconditions or causes are subject to change,then there is some
doubt that the prior out-come will be repeated.
Empirical Evidence
A large number of research investigationssupport the above
theoretical contentions(e.g., Fontaine, 1974; McMahan, 1973;
J.Meyer, 1978; Ostrove, 1978; Rosenbaum,1972; Valle, 1974; Valle
& Frieze, 1976;Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976;
W.Meyer, Note 6; Pancer & Eiser, Note 7). Inthe Weiner et al.
(1976) investigation, it wasdemonstrated that expectancy changes
arerelated to the dimension of stability and arenot associated with
the locus of causality.This is an important finding, not only
be-cause two attributional dimensions arediscriminated, but also
because a vast com-peting literature relates expectancy changesto
the dimension of locus (see Weiner et al.,1976, for a review).
Weiner et al. (1976) gave subjects either 0,1,2,3,4, or 5
consecutive success experiences
at a block-design task, with differentsubjects in the six
experimental conditions.Following the success trial(s), expectancy
ofsuccess and causal ascriptions were assessed.Expectancy of future
success was deter-mined by having subjects indicate "howmany of the
next ten similar designs youbelieve that you will successfully
complete"(Weiner et al., 1976, p. 61). To assess per-ceptions of
causality, subjects were requiredto mark four rating scales that
were identicalwith respect to either the stability or
locusdimensional anchors but differing along thealternate
dimension. Specifically, one at-tribution question was, "Did you
succeed onthis task because you are always good atthese kinds of
tasks, or because you triedespecially hard on this particular
task?""Always good" and "tried hard," the anchorson this scale, are
identical on the locus ofcausality dimension (internal), but
theydiffer in perceived stability, with ability astable attribute
and effort an unstable cause.In a similar manner, judgments were
madebetween "lucky" and "tried hard" (unstablecauses differing in
locus), "these tasks arealways easy" and "lucky" (external
causesdiffering in stability), and "always good" and"always easy"
(stable causes differing inlocus). Thus, the judgments permitted
adirect test of the locus versus stability in-terpretation of
expectancy change.
Expectancy estimates were examinedseparately for each of the
causal judgments.The data revealed that within both the in-ternal
and the external causes, expectancyincrements were positively
associated withthe stability of the ascription; that is, therewere
higher expectancies given ability andtask ease ascriptions than
given effort or luckattributions. Contrasting locus of
causalitydifferences within either the stable or theunstable
ascriptions disclosed that the dis-parate causal locus groups did
not differ intheir expectancies of success.
Locus of Control Controversy
One of my disappointments has been thatinvestigators associated
with social learningtheory and locus of control have failed
torecognize or admit the stability-expectancy
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10 BERNARD WEINER
linkage and the existence of other dimen-sions of perceived
causality. Some re-searchers (e.g., Lefcourt, von Baeyer,
Ware,& Cox, Note 8) are incorporating the stabil-ity dimension
into perceived causality scales.But this is in contrast with the
position ofother investigators. For example, Phares(1978)
states,
At the present time there does not appear to be a con-vincing
body of data supporting the utility of adding thestability
dimension . . . . Even should the addition ofstability find support
in laboratory studies of expec-tancy changes, it is not at all
clear tha t . . . [broader]demonstrations of utility will be
forthcoming, (p.270)
In opposition to this statement, the liter-ature associating
stability with expectancychange is unequivocal, and the
findingsgeneralize outside of the laboratory as wellas beyond the
achievement domain (as willbe documented later). It may indeed
bethat the concept of locus of control has greatutility; my modest
hope is that individualsin this area will acknowledge some of
theprior shortcomings in their conceptualanalysis of expectancy
shifts at skill andchance tasks and in their limited approachto
causality (for a fuller discussion of theseissues, see Weiner et
al., 1976).
Formal Analysis and Self-ConceptMaintenance
McMahan (1973) and Valle and Frieze(1976) have developed formal
models of ex-pectancy shifts based upon the concept ofcausal
stability. Valle and Frieze postulatethat predictions of
expectancies (P) are afunction of the initial expectancy (E)
plusthe degree to which outcomes (O) are at-tributed to stable
causes (S):
P = f|E + 0 [f(S)]j.
In addition, Valle and Frieze (1976) also notethat the perceived
causes of success andfailure are related to the initial
expectancyof success. It has been clearly documentedthat unexpected
outcomes lead to unstableattributions, particularly luck
(Feather,1969; Feather & Simon, 1971; Frieze &
Weiner, 1971). Hence, Valle and Frieze(1976) conclude,
There is some value for the difference between the ini-tial
expectations and the actual outcome that willmaximally change a
person's predictions for the future.If the difference is greater
than this point, the outcomewill be attributed to unstable factors
to such a greatextent that it will have less influence on the
person'sfuture predictions, (p. 581)
These ideas have important implicationsfor the maintenance of
one's self-conceptand for attributional change programs (seeWeiner,
1974,1976). For example, assumethat an individual with a high
self-conceptof ability believes that he or she has a
highprobability of success at a task. It is prob-able that failure
then would be ascribed tounstable causes such as luck or mood,
whichmay not reduce the subsequent expectancyof success and
sustains a high ability self-concept. On the other hand, success
wouldbe ascribed to ability, which increases thesubsequent
expectancy (certainty) of successand confirms one's high
self-regard. Theconverse analysis holds given a low self-concept of
ability and a low expectancy ofsuccess: Success would be ascribed
to un-stable factors, and failure to low ability.These attributions
result in the preservationof the initial self-concept (see Ames,
1978;Fitch, 1970; Gilmore & Minton, 1974; Ickes& Layden,
1978). In addition, the aboveanalysis suggests that in change
programsinvolving expectancies or self-concept theperceived causes
of performance must bealtered, and a modification in
self-perceptionwould have to involve a gradual process(Valle &
Frieze, 1976).
In one research investigation guided bythe above reasoning,
Ames, Ames, and Gar-rison (1977) had children of high or low
socialstatus in the classroom attribute causalityfor positive and
negative interpersonal out-comes. For example, the children
weregiven situations such as, "Suppose you meeta new student at
school and you becomefriends quickly"; or "Imagine you asksomeone
to play with you after school, butthey say they cannot play." The
childrenthen attributed causality for each situationeither to an
internal, external, or mutualcause. The data indicated that given
nega-
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 11
tive interpersonal outcomes, high-social-status children made
greater use of externalcausal ascriptions, and given positive
inter-personal outcomes, they made more internalattributions than
the low-social-status pu-pils.
Resistance to Extinction andAchievement Change
The stability concept is generalizable tothe body of
psychological literature con-cerning experimental extinction (see
Rest,1976). Experimental extinction often isdefined as the
cessation of a previously in-strumental response following the
perma-nent withholding of the reward. It is rea-sonable to presume
that when a response isperceived as no longer instrumental to
goalattainment, the organism will cease makingthat response. Hence,
any attribution thatmaximizes the expectation that the responsewill
not be followed by the goal should fa-cilitate extinction. On the
other hand, at-tributions that minimize goal expectancydecrements
after nonreward should retardextinction.
As discussed above, the stability or in-stability of the
perceived causal factors in-fluences the expectancy that the
outcome ofan action might change in the future.Therefore, I suggest
that resistance to ex-tinction is a function of attributions to
thecausal dimension of stability during the pe-riod of
nonreinforcement. Ascriptions ofnonreinforcement to bad luck, lack
of im-mediate effort, or other unstable causes arehypothesized to
minimize expectancy dec-rements and result in slower extinction
thanattributions of nonattainment of a goal toperceived stable
factors, such as teacher bias,high task difficulty, or lack of
ability. Rest(1976) has presented strong evidence con-firming these
hypotheses. Inasmuch asrandom reinforcement schedules elicit
un-stable causal attributions (Weiner et al.,1971), they also
should (and do) increaseresistance to extinction. In a similar
man-ner, chance rather than skill instructions alsoincrease
resistance to extinction (Phares,1957), presumably because failure
is ascribed
to unstable causes only given the chance in-structions.
A related notion is that information gen-erating lack of effort
ascriptions for failurealso should result in response
maintenance(see Rest, 1976). There are data in the in-frahuman
experimental literature that maybe interpreted as supporting this
hypothesis.Lawrence and Festinger (1962), marshallingevidence to
support their cognitive disso-nance explanation of extinction,
report thatresistance to extinction is positively relatedto the
effortfulness of a response. Ouranalysis suggests that when great
exertion isrequired to attain a reward the salience ofeffort as the
cause of goal attainment isaugmented. Thus, the expectancy of
rewardfollowing nonattainment of the goal shouldbe comparatively
unchanged and extinctionprolonged. With repeated nonreward,however,
the ascription shifts from effort toability and/or task difficulty,
thus decreasingexpectancy and producing extinction.
These ideas have more than just a passingrelevance to
educational practices. Many ofthe burgeoning achievement-chance
pro-grams make direct or indirect use of attri-butional principles.
These programs oftenattempt to induce students to attribute
theirfailures to a lack of effort, which is both un-stable and
under volitional control (see An-drews & Debus, 1978; Chapin
& Dyck, 1976;Dweck, 1975). This goal is expressly es-tablished
for "failure-oriented" children whoapparently ascribe their
failures to a lack ofability, which is a stable and
uncontrollablecause (see Diener & Dweck, 1978). Pre-sumably,
inasmuch as effort can be increasedvolitionally, ascriptions of
nonattainment ofa goal to lack of effort will result in the
sus-taining of hope and increased persistencetoward the goal. On
the other hand, sinceability is stable and not subject to
volitionalcontrol, ascription of nonattainment of a goalto low
ability results in giving up and thecessation of goal-oriented
behavior.
In sum, it is suggested that the relationsbetween diverse
independent variables (re-ward schedules, effortfulness of the
response,and certain attributional biases) and thedependent
variables of resistance to extinc-tion or persistence in
goal-related behaviorare mediated by perceptions of causality:
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12 BERNARD WEINER
Reinforcement schedule;Response effortfulness;Person
characteristics
(attributional biases)
(observation)^ Resistance toextinction
Causal attribution forreward and nonreward
Stability of theattribution
Expectancy of futuregoal attainment
(Inference concerning attributional mediation)
Locus
In contrast with the rather stable beliefsabout causal
stability, our thoughts con-cerning locus of causality have
fluctuatedgreatly. A temporary resolution is proposedhere which is
a synthesis of our previousantithetical positions and better
accounts forthe complexity of human affective re-sponses.
Initially, Weiner et al. (1971) postulatedthat locus of
causality is related to the af-fective consequences of success and
failure.Emotional reactions were believed to bemaximized given
internal attributions forsuccess and failure and minimized
givenexternal attributions. Thus, for example,pride and shame, the
alleged dominant af-fects in achievement situations (Atkinson,1964;
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Low-ell, 1953), would be most
experienced givenpersonal responsibility for success and fail-ure,
as opposed to instances in which exter-nal factors such as luck or
others were per-ceived as the causal agents. This
postulatedrelation seemed intuitively reasonable, wasconsistent
with Atkinson's (1964) formula-tions concerning the incentive value
of suc-cess and failure, and found support in a va-riety of
research investigations. Because adetailed account of this position
recently waspresented in this journal (Weiner, 1977), Iwill not
discuss it in any further detail.
Subsequently, it became evident that it isincorrect to presume
an invariant positiverelation between internality and the
mag-nitude of emotional reactions in achievementsettings. For
example, failure ascribed toothers, such as the bias of a teacher
or hin-
drance from students or family, will pre-sumably generate great
anger and hostility.In this event, externality is positively
relatedto emotional intensity. Thus, the positionexpressed in
Weiner et al. (1971) cannot becorrect (see Weiner, 1977; Weiner et
al.,1978).
We therefore initiated a series of studiesto determine the
relation between attribu-tion and affect (Weiner et al., 1978;
Weiner,Russell, & Lerman, in press). In our firstinvestigation,
subjects were given a scenariothat depicted a success or failure
experienceat an exam, along with a causal attributionfor that
outcome (e.g., Joan failed becauseshe did not have the ability).
The subjectsthen reported the affects that they surmisedwould be
experienced in this situation.About 100 affects for success and 150
forfailure were provided, with responses madeon rating scales
indicating the intensity withwhich the affects would be
experienced.
There were two general findings of inter-est. First, there was a
set of outcome-de-pendent, attribution-independent affectsthat
represented broad positive or negativereactions to success and
failure, regardlessof the "why" of the outcome. Given
success,feelings of pleasure, happiness, satisfaction,goodness, and
so on were reported as equallyexperienced in the disparate
attributionconditions. In a similar manner, givenfailure, there
were a number of outcome-linked emotions, such as feeling
uncheerful,displeased, and upset. The outcome-de-pendent affects
for both success and failurewere reported as the ones that would be
mostintensely experienced.
But for both success and failure there were
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 13
Table 3: Percentage of Respondents Stating a Particular Emotion
for Success, as a Function ofthe Attribution for Success
Causal attribution
Emotion
CompetenceConfidenceContentmentExcitementGratefulnessGuiltHappinessPrideReliefSatisfactionSurpriseThankfulness
Ability
30204391
4439
41970
Unstableeffort
12194913
43282824161
Stableeffort
201812840
43391616
40
Personality
19190
1183
38431114140
Others
5147
1643
246211394
18
Luck
2426
1418488
260
524
many emotions discriminably related tospecific attributions.
Given success, theunique attribution-affect linkages were
thefollowing: ability-competence and confi-dence; typical
effort-relaxation; immediateeffort-activation; others-gratitude;
per-sonality-conceit; and luck-surprise. Thatis, if one perceived
that success was causedby ability, then competence and
confidencewere reported as intensely experienced; ifone succeeded
because of help from others,then the dominant reported affect
wasgratitude; and so on. In a similar manner,for failure, the
attribution-affect linkageswere the following:
ability-incompetence;effort-guilt and shame;
personality-resig-nation; others-aggression; and luck-surprise(see
Weiner et al, 1978).
It is of interest to point out that at timescausal attributions
yield opposite reactionsfor success and failure, as would be
expectedgiven diametric outcomes (respectively,competence versus
incompetence givenability attributions; gratitude versusaggression
for attributions to others). Butat times the same emotion
accompanies bothpositive and negative outcomes (surprisegiven a
luck attribution); and given still otherascriptions, such as
typical or immediateeffort, the emotions that accompany
success(respectively, relaxation and activation) areunrelated to
the failure-tied affects (guiltand shame).
These data suggested we should reject thesupposition that locus
of causality mediates
affective reactions in achievement contexts.Rather, emotions
appeared to be eitheroutcome or attributionally generated,without
any intervening dimensionalplacement.
Additional evidence, however, has re-sulted in a synthesis of
our prior antitheticalstances. In a recent study (Weiner,
Russell,& Lerman, in press) subjects recreated a"critical
incident" in their lives in which theysucceeded (or failed) at an
academic exambecause of ability, typical effort, immediateeffort,
help (or hindrance) from others,personality, or luck. They then
listed threeaffects they experienced in this situation.Table 3
includes only the emotions that werereported for success by more
than 10% of therespondents for any particular attribution.The table
shows the percentage of subjectsin all the attribution conditions
reportingthese relatively shared experiences.
The data in Table 3 are consistent withour previous findings.
The most dominantaffect, happiness, is expressed regardless ofthe
reason for the success. In addition tothis outcome-linked emotion,
there are sig-nificant attribution-affect linkages.
Theseassociations are as follows: ability-compe-tence and pride;
other people-gratefulnessand thankfulness; stable
effort-content-ment; personality-pride; and luck-surprise,relief,
and guilt (the linkages are based oncomparisons within an emotion
but acrossattributions).
The failure data also revealed systematic
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14 BERNARD WEINER
patterns. There were significant outcome-linked emotions
including disappointment,as well as attribution-affect
associationsconsistent with prior research: ability-incompetence
and resignation; effort-guilt;other people-anger; and
luck-surprise.
Additional analyses of these data alsodemonstrated that causal
dimensions playan essential role in affective life. Given in-ternal
attributions for success (ability, effort,personality), the affects
pride, competence,confidence, and satisfaction were reportedmore
frequently than they were given ex-ternal attributions (others,
luck). Internalascriptions for failure generated the emo-tions of
guilt and resignation. In sum, par-ticular affects clustered with
the internalcauses. Reanalysis of Weiner et al. (1978)revealed
virtually identical results.
It therefore appears that in achievementsituations there are (at
least) three sourcesof affect. First, there are emotions tied
di-rectly to the outcome. One feels "good"given success and "bad"
given failure, re-gardless of the reason for the outcome.These
probably are the initial and strongestreactions. Second,
accompanying thesegeneral feelings are more distinct emotions,such
as gratitude or hostility if success orfailure, respectively, is
due to others, surprisewhen the outcome is due to luck, and so
on.Third, the affects that are associated withself-esteem, such as
competence, pride, andshame, are mediated by self-ascriptions.Many
emotional reactions are shared givensuccess due to ability or
effort, the twodominant internal attributions. It thereforemay be
that the central self-esteem emotionsthat facilitate or impede
subsequentachievement performance are dimensionallylinked, referred
by the actor to him- or her-self. Some affects thus seem to be
mediatedby the locus dimension, but in a mannermuch more complex
than was originallyposited. It is likely that these
dimension-linked affects have the greatest longevity andmost
significance for the individual.
Stability and Affect
In addition to the locus-affect linkage,there also is a relation
between causal sta-bility and emotions. Weiner et al. (1978)
found that the affects of depression, apathy,and resignation
were reported primarilygiven internal and stable attributions
forfailure (lack of ability, lack of typical effort,personality
deficit). This suggests that onlyattributions conveying that events
will notchange in the future beget feelings of help-lessness,
giving up, and depression. Perhapsthe control dimension also plays
a role ingenerating these particular emotions.Hence, the dimensions
of causality relateto different sets of emotions.
In another research investigation sup-porting a
stability-emotion union, Arkin andMaruyama (1979) assessed
students' attri-butions for their success or failure at a
collegeclass. In addition, anxiety associated withschool
performance was measured. It wasfound that among successful
students, thestability of their attributions was
negativelycorrelated with anxiety. That is, whensuccess was
ascribed to stable causes, stu-dents reported relatively little
anxiety. Onthe other hand, among the unsuccessfulstudents,
attributional stability and anxietycorrelated positively; most fear
was reportedwhen failure was perceived as likely to recurin the
future.
Cognition-Emotion Sequence inAchievement Contexts
On the basis of the above discussion, Isuggest that in
achievement-related contexts(and, in particular, school settings),
the actorprogresses through something like the fol-lowing
cognition-emotion scenarios:
1. "I just received a D in the exam. Thatis a very low grade."
(This generates feel-ings of being frustrated and upset.) "I
re-ceived this grade because I did not try hardenough" (followed by
feelings of shame andguilt). "There really is something lackingin
me, and it is permanent" (followed by lowself-esteem or lack of
worth and hopeless-ness).
2. "I just received an A on the exam.That is a very high grade"
(generating hap-piness and satisfaction). "I received thisgrade
because I worked very hard during theentire school year" (producing
contentmentand relaxation). "I really do have somepositive
qualities, and will continue to have
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 15
them in the future" (followed by high self-esteem and feelings
of self-worth, as well asoptimism for the future).
Some Thoughts About Feelings
Psychology is completing two movementsthat have relatively
neglected the study ofaffect. The first is the behavioristic
period,which denied verbal report data; the secondis the cognitive
movement, which focuses onintellective structures. In contrast to
theseperiods, I believe that psychologists andeducators now will
turn to the study of af-fect.
At present many of the investigations ofaffect in the schools
measure some globalfeeling state such as "satisfaction." But forthe
study of emotions greater differentiationmust be allowed. For
example, one mightspeculate that differential classroom
"at-mospheres" provide the opportunity for theexperiencing of
disparate emotions. Per-haps settings that promote internal
ascrip-tions maximize positive or negative self-images and feelings
of pride and shame. Onthe other hand, environments that permitmore
student interaction enhance feelingssuch as gratitude and anger,
inasmuch asattributions of success and failure to othersare
promoted. Overall satisfaction ratingsmask distinctions between,
for example,pride and gratitude. It is time that closerattention
was paid to affective life in theclassroom.
Secondary Linkages
Because of the vast literature in the locusof control area, it
might be anticipated thatcausal locus is directly linked with
manypsychological reactions in addition to es-teem-related affects.
This indeed is likelyto be the case. For example, it has been
re-ported that locus of control relates positivelyto behaviors such
as information seeking andto experiences such as feeling like an
"origin"(de Charms, 1968). In most of this research,however, the
concepts of locus and controlare united. It is not reasonable to
expectindividuals who attribute failure to a lack ofability, which
is internal but uncontrollable,to seek out information or feel like
origins.
Rather, it seems that the experiential stateof an origin and
correlated behaviors areexhibited because of the perceived
personalcontrol of the situation, or the belief thatcausality is
both internal and controllable.Thus, the discussion of the
secondary link-ages with locus is postponed until the pre-sentation
of the control dimension of cau-sality.
Control
Attribution theory as formulated byHeider (1958), Jones and
Davis (1965), andKelley (1967) primarily concerns
person-perception, or inferences about the inten-tions and
dispostions of others. But thus farin this article I have only been
concernedwith self-perception. I believe that one ofthe main
contributions of our work has beenthe adaptation of some principles
of socialperception for the construction of a theoryof motivation
that has the individual as theunit of analysis.
In the discussion of the implications ofcausal dimensions, self-
and other-percep-tion were not distinguished. Consideringchanges in
the expectancy of success, thesame cause-effect logic pertaining to
causalstability should hold when consideringoneself or others. The
discussion of affectalso is equally applicable to both the self
andothers, although of course, the emotionalexperiences are limited
to the self and in-ferred about others. But if success or failureis
perceived as being due to certain causes,then particular affective
experiences shouldfollow.
The following examination of the dimen-sion of control centers
upon inferences aboutothers and how beliefs about another's
re-sponsibility for success and failure influencean actor's
reactions toward that person.The reactions examined are helping,
evalu-ation, and sentiments.
Helping
Ickes and Kidd (1976), guided by Weineret al. (1971) and
Rosenbaum (1972), pro-posed an attributional analysis of
helpingbehavior. A number of investigators prior
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16 BERNARD WEINER
to Ickes and Kidd (1976) had establishedthat the tendency to
help is influenced by theperceived cause of the need for aid
(e.g.,Berkowitz, 1969; Ickes, Kidd, & Berkowitz,1976; Piliavin,
Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969;Schopler & Matthews, 1965). The
majorityof these experiments concluded that help ismore likely when
the perceived cause of theneed is an environmental barrier, as
opposedto being internal to the person desirous ofaid. For example,
Berkowitz (1969) re-ported that individuals are more inclined
tohelp an experimental subject when the ex-perimenter, caused a
delay in the subject'sresponse, in contrast with a condition
inwhich the subject is perceived as personallyresponsible for
falling behind in the experi-ment.
In their review, Ickes and Kidd (1976)argued that this locus of
control explanationof helping confounds the causal dimensionsof
locus and intentionality (which I again willcall controllability).
They suggest that inthe study conducted by Berkowitz (1969),the
causal ascription to the experimenter isboth external and
uncontrollable (from theperspective of the actor), whereas an
attri-bution to the subject's own mismanagementis internal to the
actor and is perceived bythe potential helper as under
volitionalcontrol. Hence, two dimensions of causalityare
confounded, and it is impossible to de-termine which of the two
causal dimensionsis responsible for the differential help
giving.Ickes and Kidd, in contrast with Berkowitz,suggest that it
is the controllable aspect ofthe perceived cause, and not the
locus, thatmediated the disparate help giving. Thereader should
note how similar this analysisis to the one pertaining to
expectancy shiftsin skill and chance tasks. Both contro-versies
point out that the locus of controlliterature has been plagued by
an inadequateanalysis of perceived causality. Further-more, what is
required is research that sep-arates the various causal
dimensions.
Other data support the Ickes and Kidd(1976) interpretation of
helping behavior.For example, Piliavin et al. (1969) found
thatthere is a bias to aid an ill person in distressas opposed to
helping a drunk. Accordingto the above argument, this is
becausedrunkenness is perceived as subject to voli-
tional control, whereas illness is not. Whena failure is
perceived as controllable, thenhelp is withheld; the persons
presumablyshould help themselves. For this reason, itis much easier
to raise charity funds forbattered children or blindness than for
al-coholism centers.
Guided by the prior research of Barnes,Ickes, and Kidd (Note 9),
Simon and Weiner(in press) applied these ideas to one instanceof
altruism in the classroom—lending classnotes to an unknown
classmate. In this in-vestigation, two themes were created for
astudent's failure to take class notes. Onetheme involved a
professor, and the secondconcerned an employer. In the
professortheme, the student always (stable) or some-times
(unstable) did not take notes becauseof something about himself
(internal) orsomething about the professor (external).Either he was
unable to take good notes(uncontrollable) or he did not try
(control-lable), while the professor either was unableto give a
clear lecture or did not try. Thus,for example, an internal,
stable, and uncon-trollable cause was that the student neverwas
able to take good notes (low ability),while an external, unstable,
and uncontrol-lable cause was that the professor at timescould not
give a clear lecture. Each storywithin the eight possible causal
combina-tions (2 levels of stability X 2 levels of locusX 2 levels
of control) elaborated the basicscenario. The second theme involved
a worksituation in which the student did not havethe notes because
he (or the boss) always(sometimes) was responsible for his
cominglate to school, which could (could not) havebeen avoided.
Following each causal statement thesubjects rated the likelihood
of lending theirnotes to the student. Judgments were madeon a
10-point scale anchored at the extremeswith "definitely would lend
my notes" and"definitely would not lend my notes."
The mean helping judgments for fourconditions (2 levels of locus
X 2 levels ofcontrol) are shown in Table 4. Stability didnot effect
the judgments and thus is ignoredin the analysis. Table 4 reveals
that helpingis reported to be relatively equal and rea-sonably high
in all conditions except whenthe cause is internal and
controllable, in
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 17
Table 4Mean Likelihood of Helping as a Function ofPerceived
Locus of Causality andControllability
Locus ofcausality
InternalExternal
Controllable
3.137.35
Uncontrollable
6.746.98
Note. Data are from Simon and Weiner (in press). Highernumbers
indicate greater likelihood of note lending.
which case aid is unlikely to be given. Thatis, if the student
did not try to take notes(professor theme) or could have
avoidedbeing absent (employer theme), then help iswithheld. The
findings concerning the in-fluence of intent information on
moraljudgments and criminal justice support thisline of reasoning
(see Carroll & Payne, 1976,1977, discussed later in this
article).
Evaluation
Some of the early experimental workconducted by me and my
colleagues wasundertaken to promote the distinction be-tween
various causes of success and failure.In particular, we attempted
to provide evi-dence that ability and effort should be
dis-tinguished, although both are internal inlocus of
causality.
In one reference experiment that wasemployed, subjects were
asked to pretendthat they were teachers and were to
provideevaluative "feedback" to their pupils (e.g.,Eswara, 1972;
Kaplan & Swant, 1973; Rest,Nierenberg, Weiner, &
Heckhausen, 1973;Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner &
Peter,1973). The pupils were characterized interms of effort,
ability, and performance onan exam. The data from these
investiga-tions conclusively demonstrated that effortis of greater
importance than ability in de-termining reward and punishment.
Higheffort was rewarded more than high abilitygiven success, and
lack of effort was pun-ished more than lack of ability given
failure.To explain these findings, I stated,
There appear to be two reasons for the discrepancybetween
ability and effort as determinants of rewardand punishment. First,
effort attributions elicit strong
moral feelings—trying to attain a socially valued goalis
something that one "ought" to do. Second, rewardingand punishing
effort is instrumental to changing be-havior, inasmuch as effort is
believed to be subject tovolitional control. On the other hand,
ability is per-ceived as nonvolitional and relatively stable and
thusshould be insensitive to external control attempts.(Weiner,
1977, p. 508)
Thus, both the moral and control aspectsof evaluation were
considered. But it wasnot realized that evaluation is
conceptuallysimilar to behaviors and feelings such as helpgiving,
altruism, liking, and blame. That is,there is a pervasive influence
of perceivedcontrollability or personal responsibility
oninterpersonal judgments in achievement-related contexts,
including how students aregraded.
Sentiments
Investigations linking liking to percep-tions of controllability
primarily have beenconducted in the area of loneliness (seePeplau,
Russell, & Heim, in press). Michela,Peplau, & Weeks (Note
5) found that per-sons lonely for reasons thought to be
con-trollable (e.g., does not try to make friends)are liked less
than individuals lonely foruncontrollable reasons (e.g., no
opportunityto meet people). In addition, when a lonelyperson puts
forth effort to make friends, thatperson is liked and elicits
sympathy (Wimer& Peplau, Note 10). In contrast, if it is
be-lieved that the lonely individual is respon-sible for his or her
plight, then sympathy isnot forthcoming, and respondents
indicatethey would avoid such persons. I assumethat this pattern of
results will also be evi-dent in achievement-related
contexts.Surely a teacher will not particularly like astudent who
does not try, and failure per-ceived as due to lack of effort does
not elicitsympathy.
Self-Perception of Control
While perceived control in others relatesto interpersonal
judgments, self-perceptionsof control have quite a different array
ofconsequences. These intrapersonal effectsappear to be vast,
ranging from experientialstates, such as feeling as an origin
(deCharms, 1968) and perceiving freedom of
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18 BERNARD WEINER
Antecedent conditions — *• Perceived causes *
Ability
Effort (typical)and immediate)
Others (students,family, teacher)
Motivation (atten-tion, interest)
Etc.
Causal dimension
Intentionality
Globality
' Primary effects
affects
judgments
— » Other consequences
Performance intensity
Persistence
Choice
Etc.
Figure 1. Partial representation of an attributional theory of
motivation.
choice (Steiner, 1970), to specific behaviors,such as
information search (see Rotter, 1966)and normal functioning rather
than learning,cognitive, and motivational deficits that
arepostulated to accompany the loss of control(Seligman, 1975).
This is a complex subjectmatter in need of systematic
examinationand synthesis that goes well beyond thescope of our
present knowledge.
Summary
A variety of sources of information (notdiscussed here) are used
to reach causal in-ferences in achievement-related contexts.The
perceived causes of success and failureprimarily are ability and
effort but also in-clude a small number of other salient
factorssuch as home environment and teacher, anda countless host of
idiosyncratic factors.These causes can be comprised within
threeprimary dimensions of causality: stability,locus, and control.
There also are an unde-termined number of subordinate causal
di-mensions, including perhaps intentionalityand globality. The
three main dimensions,respectively, are linked to
expectancychanges, esteem-related affects, and inter-personal
judgments (decisions about help-ing, evaluation, and sentiments).
In addi-tion, there are secondary linkages betweenthe causal
dimensions and psychologicaleffects: Stability relates to
depression-typeaffects, and control is associated with par-ticular
feeling states and behaviors. Thedimension-consequence linkages
influencemotivated behaviors such as persistenceand choice. This
theory is depicted inFigure 1.
Theoretical Range
The theory rather sketchily conveyed inFigure 1 has been shown
to be relevant tomany classroom-related thoughts and ac-tions. The
topics already examined in thisarticle include the perceived
reasons forsuccess and failure, expectancy change,self-concept
maintenance, achievementchange programs, reinforcement
schedules,hopelessness, sources of emotion, self-es-teem, helping,
evaluation, and liking. Stillother achievement-related topics have
beendemonstrated to be encompassed within thisattributional
conception (see Weiner, 1974,1976). The breadth of the phenomena
in-corporated within our attributional frame-work intimates that a
general theory of mo-tivation is being constructed. In the
re-mainder of this article I document otherareas to which the
theory is applicable.Some of the theoretical extensions are
ger-mane to the school setting, while other topicsare of interest
to an audience of educationalpsychologists* primarily because they
dem-onstrate the range of the conception.
Hyperactivity and Psychostimulants
Whalen and Henker (1976) have outlinedan attributional analysis
of the effects ofdrug treatment for hyperactive children.They
contend that when hyperactivity iscombated with a drug, the belief
is conveyedto both the child and his or her parents thatthe cause
of hyperactivity is a physiologicaldysfunction. Hence, the involved
individ-uals are not responsible for or in control of
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 19
the maladaptive behavior that is exhibited.Because this
physiological deficit is per-ceived as an uncontrollable cause,
neitherthe child nor the parents need feel guilty orblame
themselves for the aberrant behavior.That is, the shift in
perceived causality from"lack of effort" minimizes self-blame,
lowself-esteem, and negative evaluations fromothers. This appears
to be a beneficial andan unanticipated side effect of the
treatmenttechnique.
On the other hand, Whalen and Henker(1976) also state that "the
reputed physio-logical dysfunctions used to explain thefailures of
hyperactive children are fre-quently viewed as stable and
relatively un-responsive to behavior change effects" (p.1123).
Thus, the perception of fixed cau-sation might lead to
"demoralization aboutproblem solutions.... and interferes
witheffective coping" (Whalen & Henker, 1976,p. 1124).
In sum, again this is an analysis of a psy-chological phenomenon
from the perspectiveshown in Figure 1. Individuals utilize
in-formation (treatment technique) to infercausation about an event
(hyperactivity).The perceived cause (a genetic deficit) isperceived
as uncontrollable and stable. Thisminimizes certain negative
affects and un-favorable evaluations (beneficial effects) butalso
weakens the perceived possibility ofrecovery (a harmful
consequence). Thesetwo factors, in turn, influence the
long-rangeinfluence of the treatment (negatively, ac-cording to
Whalen and Henker, 1976, inas-much as they perceive expectancy to
be themore potent determinant of long-term be-havioral change).
Mastery
The labels mastery and competence areprominent among the
writings of manypsychologists (e.g., Nissen, 1954; White,1959).
However, in my opinion systematicexperimental work elucidating
these allegedmotivators of behavior has not been con-ducted. An
investigation by Nuttin (1973),described as demonstrating
"causalitypleasure," could provide an important ex-perimental
paradigm for this area. Nuttin
placed 5-year-olds in an experimental roomcontaining two
machines. The machineseach had colored lights and movable
handles.For one machine (A), the onset of the lightswas
preprogrammed by the experimenter.The lights in the alternate
machine (B) wenton or off only when the handle was movedbeyond a
certain point. Thus, althoughboth machines stimulated the viewer
per-ceptually, the children were the producers orthe cause of the
stimulation only with ma-chine B.
The subjects in this experiment were freeto spend their time
with either machine.The experimenters recorded various indexesof
choice or preference, such as the timespent with each machine and
verbal reportsof liking. Both observational and self-reportdata
revealed that the children stronglypreferred machine B over machine
A.These findings have been replicated byWeiner, Kun, and Weiner (in
press).
From the theoretical perspective shown inFigure 1, the
experiment by Nuttin (1973)illustrates a temporal sequence
involving theuse of information, inferences concerninglocus of
causality, positive affect, and somebehavioral consequences of
emotional states.That is, on the basis of the observed covar-iation
between their own actions and theonset of the lights in machine B,
the childreninfer that they are personally responsible(ability and
effort) for the stimulation fromthat machine. Self-attribution for
the out-come increases positive esteem-related af-fects, and the
augmented affect increases theprobability of engaging in the action
again aswell as increasing "liking" about playing withthe
machine.
This interpretation is applicable to an-other developmental
study that has not beenconceptualized as involving
mastery-typebehavior. Watson (1966, 1967) demon-strated that
8-week-old infants can learn aninstrumental response (a head turn)
to in-crease stimulation (the movement of a mo-bile). He also
reported that infants in theinstrumental response condition
apparentlydisplayed more instances of positive affect(smiling and
cooing) than children in a con-dition in which the mobile movement
wascontrolled by the experimenter. This againsuggests the following
temporal sequence:
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20 BERNARD WEINER
Specific caseinformation aboutthe crime and thecriminal,
e.g.,crime description,prior record
General knowledge(beliefs) aboutcrime, criminals,or any other
rele-vant knowledge
Judgment ofgoodness—badness
Judgment offuture acts
/ "Punishment"\. severity
I likeableness••Tresponsibility
y ) Parole decision.̂ prison term
* N criminality
P'Risk"/ recidivismS. expectations
Figure 2. An attributional framework for the parole decision
process (in this case, an attributional analysisof perceptions of
crime and criminals). (From Carroll and Payne, 1977, p. 200.
Copyright 1977 by PlenumPress, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
response-outcome covariation - perceivedinternal causation -
positive affects of com-petence and pride - choice. That is,
theenhanced positive affect and subsequentperformance of the
instrumental responseare mediated by perceptions of
self-respon-sibility (perhaps the control dimension alsoplays a
role here).
The underlying premise of this inter-pretation of Watson's
(1966,1967) researchis that affect and choice can be used to
infercognitive processes (perceptions of causali-ty). It may seem
far-fetched to draw theinference that 8-week-olds have the
cogni-tive capacities to make causal deductions.However, it also
may be that a differentia-tion between the self and the
environmenthas developed by that age, and that primitiveinferences
about locus and control can bemade using proprioceptive feedback
infor-mation. If this interpretation has any va-lidity, then Watson
perhaps has identifiedthe existence of attempts at mastery
amongvery young infants. Note also that one mayconsider the
contribution of the Watson in-vestigations from a light somewhat
differentfrom what is usual for psychologists—theobservation of the
behavior is of interestprimarily because it tells us something
aboutthe contents of the mind!
Parole Decisions
A parole decision is a complex judgmentin which causal
attributions play a majorrole. Figure 2 depicts the parole
decision
process as conceptualized by Carroll andPayne (1976, 1977). The
figure indicatesthat the decision maker is provided with avariety
of information about the criminal,the crime, and other pertinent
facts. Thisinformation is combined and synthesized,yielding
attributions about the cause of thecrime. The causal attributions,
in turn, in-fluence judgments about deserved punish-ment and social
risk, which are believed to bethe basis for the final parole
decision.
Carroll and Payne (1976), after reviewingan extensive
literature, contend that theparole decision process is
based on a simple two-part model. In the first part, theprimary
concern of the decision maker is to make thepunishment fit the
crime .... At the second part. ..the primary concern . . . is with
parole risk, i.e., theprobability that the person being considered
for releasewill again violate the laws of society, (p. 15)
According to Figure 2, crimes that are as-cribed to internal
and/or intentional (con-trollable) factors (e.g., personality
charac-teristics, evil intents) should result inharsher evaluation
(punishment) thancrimes attributed to external and/or
unin-tentional (uncontrollable) causes (e.g., eco-nomic conditions,
bad friends, etc.). In ad-dition, the risk associated with parole
shoulddepend on the stability of the perceivedcause of the crime.
If, for example, thecrime is attributed to some fixed
personalitytrait, then the decision maker will expectthat a crime
again will be committed if theprisoner is paroled. On the other
hand, if
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 21
the cause of the crime has been or can be al-tered (e.g.,
economic conditions have im-proved, a job can be found, etc.), then
thecriminal will be perceived as a good parolerisk.
Given the above analysis, a criminal isleast likely to be
paroled if the cause of thecrime is perceived as internal and/or
con-trollable but stable ("He is an evil person").Conversely,
parole will tend to be grantedwhen the crime is perceived as caused
byexternal and/or noncontrollable and unsta-ble factors (e.g.,
prior economic conditions).The remaining causal combinations
shouldfall between these extremes in terms of pa-role
probability.
Carroll and Payne have furnished supportfor these hypotheses,
examining professionalparole decision makers and the judgmentsof
college students when given simulatedcriminal cases. They find, for
example, thatperceptions of the locus, stability, and
con-trollability of causes significantly relate toperceived
responsibility for the crime, like-lihood of recidivism,
likability, prison term,and the purpose of the sentence.
In sum, according to Carroll and Payne(1976, 1977) the parole
decision procedureis conceptually identical to the
perceivedsequence of events in the achievement do-main: Antecedent
information is processed,a causal judgment is reached, and the
causeis placed within the locus, stability, and in-tentionality
(control) dimensions. Thisinfluences evaluation and expectancy,
whichare the main determinants of the parole de-cision.
Affiliation and Loneliness
It has been reasoned that in our culturetwo sources of
motivation are most domi-nant: achievement and social
recognition(or, in Freud's more general terms, Arbeitand Liebe).
Hence, affiliative motivationis a natural area to turn toward in
the de-velopment of a theory of motivation.
An attributional analysis of affiliativemotivation guided by the
theory shown inFigure 1 conceives of loneliness as a socialfailure
(Gordon, 1976; Stein & Bailey, 1973).Hanusa (Note 11) and Heim
(Note 12) ex-amined the perceived causes of social success
and failure and found them to be similar tothe causes of
achievement success and fail-ure. As already indicated, Michela et
al.(Note 5) used scaling procedures to discoverthe dimensions of
the causes of social failureand found them to be similar to the
dimen-sions uncovered in achievement contexts.
The question that then remains is whetherthe attributional
dimensions in the affiliativedomain relate to psychological factors
in thesame manner as in the achievement domain.Research reveals
that is indeed the case (seePeplau et al., in press). Stability
relates tothe perceived probability of remaining lonelyin the
future, locus is associated with es-teem-related affects, and as
previouslystated, control is linked with liking andsympathy toward
the lonely person (also seeFolkes, 1978).
Depression and Learned Helplessness
In accordance with the trend in lonelinessresearch, recent
explanations of depressionhave focused upon the cognitive, rather
thanthe affective, aspects of this disorder (e.g.,Beck, 1976). The
work of Seligman (1975),captured under the label of learned
help-lessness, has been especially influential. Iwill not dwell
upon Seligman's use of thisconstruct or the supporting empirical
evi-dence in this context. Rather, my goal is toconvey the
pertinence of the learned help-lessness literature to the
attributional modeldepicted in Figure 1 (see Abramson et al.,1978;
Weiner & Litman-Adizes, in press).
Learned helplessness communicates thebelief that there is no
perceived associationbetween responding and environmentaloutcomes.
That is, the actor believes thatthe likelihood of an event is
independent ofwhat he or she does. The belief in help-lessness is
alleged to produce deficits inmotivation and learning, negative
affect, anda syndrome that has been labeled "depres-sion."
As this work has progressed from infra-human to human research,
it has becomeevident that it also is essential to considerwhy
actions and outcomes are perceived tobe independent. For example,
Klein, Fen-cil-Morse, and Seligman (1976) found that
-
22 BERNARD WEINER
only individuals making internal attribu-tions for
response-outcome independenceexhibited aspects of the learned
helplessnesssyndrome. Attributions of response-out-come
independence to external factors didnot produce any learning
deficits. In asimilar manner, Tennen and Eller (1977)found learned
helplessness only under con-ditions that promote low ability
attributionsfor prior lack of control.
Partially because of these data, Abramsonet al. (1978) adopted
an attributionalframework for helplessness. I have ex-tracted the
following from the Abramson etal. (1978) manuscript and pieced
togethernew paragraphs to illustrate their think-ing.
Our reformulated hypothesis makes a major new set ofpredictions.
The helpless individual first finds out thatcertain outcomes and
responses are independent, thenhe makes an attribution about the
cause's. This attri-bution determines the chronicity, generality,
and in-tensity of the deficits. Depressed people seem to makemore
global, stable, and possibly internal attributionsabout the cause
of their helplessness and as a conse-quence show more general,
chronic, and intense deficitsthan nondepressed people.
Depression occurs when an individual expects that theprobability
of a highly preferred outcome is low and heexpects that he is
helpless to increase it. If the attri-butions for the present state
of affairs are to stable andglobal factors, the future will look
dark to the individual.He expects that he will find himself
helpless again andagain. This is what is usually meant by
"hopelessness."Another implication of the formulation is that
indi-viduals will show the greatest loss of self-esteem whenthey
make internal, global, and stable attributions fortheir failures.
(Abramson et al., 1978)
In sum, it is argued that depressed indi-viduals attempt to make
sense out of per-ceived evidence that their responses do notaffect
outcomes. A cause is determinedwhich often is classified as stable,
internal,and global. This leads to a low expectancyof success
across a wide array of environ-ments and a heightened negative
affect (lossof self-esteem), which are sufficient precur-sers of
depression.
Conclusion
I have selectively reviewed the extensiveliterature outside of
the achievement do-main, including hyperactivity, mastery, pa-
role decisions, loneliness and affiliation, anddepression. The
data strongly suggest thata general conception of motivation, as
wellas a particular method of psychologicalanalysis, is
evolving.
Reference Notes
1. Lau, R. R., & Russell, D. Attributions in the
sportspages: A field test of some current hypotheses inattribution
research. Unpublished manuscript,University of California, Los
Angeles, 1978.
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success or failure by teachers and pupils:A comparison. Unpublished
manuscript, Uni-versity of Tel-Aviv, Israel, 1977.
3. Cooper, H. M., & Burger, J. M. Internality, sta-bility,
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4. Litman-Adizes, T. An attributional model of de-pression:
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Unpublished manuscript, Universityof California, Los Angeles,
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Meeting of the Eastern Psy-chological Association, New York, April
1975.
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A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 23
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