9781471889639 Exam Practiceresources.hoddereducation.co.uk/files/he/my... · l The US Constitution is largely written and codified, embodied in the original seven ... AO2 requires

1Edexcel AS/A-level Politics: US Politics

Exam practice mark schemes

Chapter 1A1ExaminetheextenttowhichtheUSandUKconstitutionsarewritten

andunwritten. [12]

Question number Indicative content

A1 AO1 (6 marks), AO2 (6 marks)

ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics(AO1)andcandidateswillusethistounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheextenttowhichtheUSandtheUKconstitutionsarewrittenandunwritten:l TheUSConstitutionislargelywrittenandcodified,embodiedintheoriginalseven

Articlesandthesubsequent27amendments.l Manyoftheseprovisionsareaspecificgrantingofpowertothethreebranchesofthe

federalgovernmentorspecificrulesregardinghowgovernmentistooperate.l However,someprovisions,although‘written’,wereleftdeliberatelyvagueandtherefore

opentointerpretationastimepassed.l ThisinterpretationhasbeendonelargelybytheSupremeCourtthroughitspowerof

judicialreview.l Somepartsofthefederalgovernment(e.g.primaryelections,thepresident’scabinet,

theSupremeCourt’spowerofjudicialreview)arenotmentionedanywhereinthewrittenConstitution.

l TheUKConstitution,thoughuncodified,islargelyinwrittenform–inactsofparliament,commonlawandworksofauthority.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtheextenttowhichtheUSandtheUKconstitutionsarewrittenandunwritten:l Bothconstitutionshavesomewrittenandsomeunwrittenaspects.l Thereforetheissuefocuseson‘theextent’.l Themaindifferenceisincodification.l Thisalsohasimplicationssurroundingentrenchment–theUSConstitutionhasspecific

amendmentprocesses,therebyentrenchingtheprovisionsandrightscontainedwithinit,whiletheUKConstitutionhasnosuchentrenchment.

l SomeadvocatesofconstitutionalreformintheUKhavebackedtheadoptionofawrittenconstitution.

Candidates who refer to only one constitution cannot achieve beyond Level 1.

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Exam practice answers and quick quizzes at www.hoddereducation.co.uk/myrevisionnotesdownloads

A2ExaminetheprovisionofdecentralisationintheUSandUKconstitutions. [12]



ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics(AO1)andtheywillusethistounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheprovisionofdecentralisationintheUSandUKconstitutions:l TheUSConstitutionprovidesfordecentralisationthroughitsfederaldivisionofpowers

betweenthenationalandstategovernments,eachhavingtheirownareasofsubstantivejurisdiction.

l ThisisanappropriatestructureforacountryofthesizeanddiversityoftheUSA.l TheprincipleoffederalismhasevolvedoverthetimesincetheConstitutionwasfirst

written,withasubsequentalteringintherelationshipbetweenthefederalandthestategovernment.

l TheUKConstitutionprovidesfordecentralisationthroughtheconstituentpartsthatmakeuptheUK–England,Wales,ScotlandandNorthernIreland.

l Theprovisionhasbeenmostlyduringthepast40yearsthroughthedevolutionlegislationpassedbytheUKParliament.

l Thishasresultedinthesettingupofdevolvedlegislativeandexecutivebodieswithintheprincipalities.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtheprovisionofdecentralisationintheUSandUKconstitutions:l Thisdecentralisationhasbeen–andcontinuestobe–thefocusofheatedpoliticaldebate

inboththeUSAandtheUK.l IntheUSAthishasbeenseenintheCivilWar,theprovisionoftheNewDealand

nowadaysindebatesover‘Washingtonpower’versus‘states’rights’.l ThetwomainpartiesintheUSAreflectsharplydifferingviewsinthisdebate.l IntheUKthishasbeenseeninthedevolutiondebatesincethe1970sandnowadays,for

example,inthemovestowardsScottishindependenceanddirectlyelectedcitymayors.l Thedifferenceisinthelevelofsubservienceofthestatestothefederalgovernmentin

theUSAasopposedtothatbetweentheconstituentpartsoftheUKtoWestminster.



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B1AnalysethesignificantdifferencesbetweentheUSandUKconstitutionsintheirprovisionofchecksandbalances. [12]


B1 AO1 (6 marks), AO2 (6 marks)

ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics,includingcomparativetheories(A01),andUKpolitics(A01),andtheywillusethistounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)whenanalysingthedifferencesintheprovisionofchecksandbalancesintheUSAandtheUK:l Theywillgiveadefinitionofchecksandbalances.l IntheUSA,checksandbalancesareprovidedbytheConstitutionmainlyinArticlesIand

II,andintheSupremeCourtpowerofjudicialreview.l ChecksandbalanceswasanunderpinningtheoryfortheframersoftheUSConstitution,

withtheintentionofavoidingonebranchofgovernmenthavingtoomuchpower.l IntheUK,anychecksandbalancesaremoresubtle,hiddenandinformal.l Thisresultsinagreaterconcentrationofpowerinthehandsoftheexecutive,whichalso

politicallycontrolsthelegislature.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesintheprovisionofchecksandbalancesintheUSAandtheUK:l Thesedifferencesreflectthevariouswaysinwhichthetwogovernmentalsystemscame

intobeingandthefearsandaspirationsthathaveshapedthem.l IntheUSAthesedifferenceshaveprovidedformorelimited,checkedgovernment,but

equallymayleadtogridlock.l IntheUKthesedifferenceshaveoftenledtostrong,one-partygovernment.l Thesedifferencesalsohaveimplicationsforthelevelofprotectionaffordedtotherights

ofindividualsandminorities.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l IntheUSA,the‘separateinstitutions,sharingpowers’leadtostrongerchecksand

balances.l IntheUK,thedoctrineof‘fusionofpower’,especiallybetweentheexecutiveandthe

legislature,leadstoweakerchecksandbalances.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingculturaltheory:l IntheUSA,theculturalsettingoftheWarofIndependenceandtheneedtosafeguard

fromanautocraticexecutiveprovidedtheincentiveforchecksandbalances.l IntheUK,theculturalsettingoflandedgentryandanhereditarymonarchyprovideda

disincentiveforchecksandbalances.

Candidates who refer to only one named country cannot achieve beyond Level 1. Candidates who do not make any comparative theory points cannot achieve beyond Level 3.

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B2AnalysethedifferencesbetweentheUSandUKconstitutionsintheirprovisionofdemocraticparticipation. [12]



ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics,includingcomparativetheories(A01),andtheywillusethistounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)whenanalysingthedifferencesbetweentheUSandUKconstitutionsintheirprovisionofdemocraticparticipation:l adefinitionofdemocraticparticipationl theprovisiontheUSConstitutionmakesfordemocraticparticipationintheelectionofthe

presidentandvicepresidentandbothhousesofCongressl thefrequencyofandfranchisefortheseelectionsl theprovisiontheUKConstitutionmakesfordemocraticparticipationintheelectionofthe

HouseofCommons,plusdevolvedlegislativeandexecutivebodiesandreferendums.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesbetweentheUSandUKconstitutionsintheirprovisionofdemocraticparticipation:l theprogressintheprovisionofdemocraticparticipationineachcountrythrough

constitutionalamendment(USA)andActsofParliament(UK)l thesignificantdifferencesinthelevelsofparticipationprovided,especiallyinthedirect

electionofthepresidentintheUSAand(eventually)ofbothhousesofCongressl thatonlyintheUKarenationalreferendumsprovidedforandthatonlyintheUSAare

directprimariesused(thoughthisisnotaconstitutionalprovision).

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingculturaltheory:l IntheUSA,therewasafoundationalbasisoftheneedfordemocraticparticipationas

areactiontotheautocraticmonarchicalrulefromGreatBritainandthishasexpandedquickly.

l IntheUK,thecultureofgovernmentdominatedbyanhereditarymonarch,alandedaristocracyandanestablishedchurchhasmademovementtowardsgreaterdemocraticparticipationmoredifficult.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l IntheUSA,thesurvivaloftheElectoralCollegecanbeseenasthwartingdemocratic

participationattimes.l IntheUK,themake-upandstructureofthesecondchamberthwartsdemocratic

participation.



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C1EvaluatetheextenttowhichtheUSConstitutionprovidesadequatelyforongoingamendment. [30]


C1 AO1 (10 marks), AO2 (10 marks), AO3 (10 marks)

AO1willbeusedbycandidatestounderpintheiranalysis(AO2)andevaluation(AO3).AO2andAO3requirecandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalandevaluativeskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheprocessprovidedbytheUSConstitutionforongoingamendment:l theprocesseslaiddowninArticleVandasevidencedbythe27amendmentspassed

since1789l knowledgeofthoseprocesses,includingtheroleplayedbyCongressl theroleplayedbythestatesl examplesofsomeofthesignificantamendmentspassedsince1789l examplesofsomeproposedamendmentsthathavenotbeenagreedtol theneedfortheSupremeCourt’spowerofjudicialreviewtomakeinterpretative

amendments(notformallyprovidedforbytheConstitution).

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Amendmentsonawiderangeofissueshavebeensuccessfullyproposedandratified

overthepastcenturies.l TherebytheConstitutionhasbeensuccessfullyandappropriatelyupdatedregardingsuch

issuesastheextensionofthefranchisetowomenand18-to21-year-olds,therightsandlibertiesofminorities,theroleofthefederalgovernment,directelectionoftheSenate,presidentialtermlimits,anddisability.

l ThewaytheConstitutionhaspermittedinterpretativeamendmentthroughtheSupremeCourt’spowerofjudicialreviewmakesformalamendmentlessnecessary.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Entrenchedminoritieshavebeenabletothwartmovestowardsconstitutional

amendmentbecauseoftherequirementforsuper-majoritiesinbothproposingandratifyingconstitutionalamendments,thisbeingespeciallytrueintheSenate,andtheneedforthree-quartersofthestatelegislaturestoratifyproposedamendments.

l Itisextremelydifficulttosuccessfullyproposeandratifyamendments.l TheSupremeCourt’spowerofjudicialreviewandtherebythemakingofinterpretative

amendmentsareincompatiblewithademocraticgovernmentgiventhelackofaccountabilityoftheCourt.

l Someamendments(e.g.Prohibition)havebeenpasseddespitethestringentrequirementsforproposalandratification.

Candidates must consider both views in their answers in a balanced way. The judgement a candidate reaches about these views should be reflected in their conclusion. Candidates who have not considered both views in a balanced way cannot achieve marks beyond Level 2.

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C2Evaluatetheextenttowhichthestatesaredominatedbythefederalgovernment. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheprocessoftheconstitutionalrelationshipbetweenthestatesandthefederalgovernment:l adefinitionoffederalisml theconstitutionalprovisionsregardingthefederal–staterelationshipandhowthesehave

changedl theroleplayedbytheSupremeCourtinchangingthefederal–staterelationshipl theSupremacyClause,reservedandconcurrentpowers–andhowthesesetthefederal–

staterelationshipl waysinwhichthefederalgovernmenthascometodominatethestatesinsuchareasas

education,welfare,healthcare,electorallaw,housing,energy,etc.l thethingsthatonlythefederalgovernmentcando,suchasnationaldefenceandsecurity,

immigrationl theareasofconcurrentpowers(e.g.taxation),whichtherebytendtoavoiddominationby

thestatesfromWashington.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l TherelationshipbetweenWashingtonandthestateshaschangedfromoneof

cooperationtooneofdomination.l Thishasbeenbroughtaboutbyconstitutionalamendment,actsofCongressand

decisionsoftheSupremeCourt.l Significantareasofpolicywhichusedtobetheprerogativeofthestateshavebecome

moreandmoretheprerogativeofthefederalgovernment,therebyenablingWashingtontodominatethestates.

l Thefinancial,taxandbudgetarybalanceofpowerhasswungsignificantlyfromthestatestoWashington.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Changesthathavecomeaboutinthefederal–staterelationshiphavebeennecessary

giventhechangesinthenationandthegrowthincomplexityandexpenseofmanypolicyareas.

l Thestates’representationinCongress(especiallyintheSenate)meansthattheWashingtongovernmentisstilllargelycontrolledbythestatesandtheirrepresentatives.

l Thesignificantpowersstillvestedinstategovernmentsareseenintermsofthestatesaslaboratoriesofreformandinnovationandthepoliticalstatureof(especiallybigstate)governors.

l ThestateshaveprovidedenergeticoppositiontosomeofthepoliciesofbothpresidentsObamaandTrump.



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esChapter 2A1ExaminethewaysinwhichtheUSSenateandtheUKHouseofLords

differ. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichtheUSSenateandtheUKHouseofLordsdiffer:l Senateiselected;HouseofLordsmembersareappointed.l Senatehasequallegislativepowerwithlowerchamber;Lordshaspoweronlytoadvise

anddelay.l Senatehassignificantexclusivepowers(confirmationofappointments;ratificationof

treaties);Lordsdoesnot.l Senatehassix-yearterms;Lordshasnolimitsonterm.l Senateisdominatedbyonlytwoparties;Lordshassignificantnumbersofcross-

benchers.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtheextenttowhichthewaysinwhichtheUSSenateandtheUKHouseofLordsdiffer:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l SenateismorepartisanthantheLords.l SenateismorepowerfulthantheLords.l Senateisseenasapossiblesteppingstonetohigheroffice(e.g.president,vice

president,bigstategovernorship)whiletheLordsmoreoftenisseenaspoliticalretirement.

l SenatehasmoredemocraticlegitimacythantheLords.l SenateismorethefocusofpressuregroupactivitythantheLords.


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A2ExaminethewaysinwhichtheUSCongressandtheUKParliamentpasslegislation. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichCongressandParliamentpasslegislation:l InCongress,thetwochambershaveequalpowers;inParliament,theHouseofCommons

dominates.l InCongress,muchlegislationisinitiatedbyindividualmembers;inParliament,the

governmentdominatesthelegislativeagenda.l InCongress,thecommitteestagecomesbeforethemainfloordebate;inParliament,it

comesafterwards.l InCongress,thecommitteestageisdealtwithbyapolicyspecialistcommittee;in

Parliament,thecommitteestageisdealtwithbymorepolicygeneralistcommittees.l InCongress,legislationoftenrequiresaconferencecommitteetoresolvedifferencesin

twoversionsofthesamebill;inParliament,thetwohousesconsideronlyonebill.l Congresshasthepowertooverrideavetofromtheexecutive;Parliamenthasnosuch

power.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtheextenttowhichthewaysinwhichCongressandParliamentpasslegislationdiffer:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l ThelegislativeprocessisoftenlongerandmorecomplicatedinCongressthanin

Parliament.l ThechancesofabillpassingintolawaremuchlessinCongressthaninParliament.l GridlockismuchmorelikelyinCongressthaninParliament.l IttendstobeharderforthepresidenttogethislegislationthroughCongressthanfor

theprimeministertogethis/herlegislationthroughParliament.



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B1AnalysethewaysinwhichtheUSCongressandtheUKParliamentperformtheiroversightfunction. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichtheUSCongressandtheUKParliamentperformtheiroversightfunction:l knowledgeandunderstandingofwhattheoversightfunctionsofCongressand

Parliamentare–relatingtothepoliciesandactionsoftheexecutivebranchl additionallyintheUSSenatetheconfirmationofappointmentsandratificationoftreatiesl thewaysinwhichthisfunctionofoversightisperformed–inCongressthroughstanding

andselectcommitteesaswellasthroughtheimpeachmentandtrialprocess;inParliamentthroughselectcommittees,QuestionTime,theLiaisonCommittee,earlydaymotions,policydebates,votesofnoconfidence.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthewaysinwhichtheUSCongressandtheUKParliamentperformtheiroversightfunction:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l OversightinCongressisconductedalmostexclusivelyinthecommitteerooms

becauseoftheabsenceoftheexecutivebranchfromthefloorofbothhouses;inParliamentboththechamberandcommitteeroomshaveanimportantoversightrole.

l OversightinCongressisthoughttobemoreeffectivewhenthechambermajorityisnotcontrolledbythepresident’sparty;inParliamenttheprimeministerlargelycontrolstheoversightmachinery.

l InCongress,individualmembersoftheexecutivebranchcanberemovedbyimpeachmentandtrial,butnotthewholeadministration;inParliamentthegovernmentasawholecanfallifitlosesavoteofnoconfidenceintheHouseofCommons.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l Congressisdominatedbytheseparationofpowers,resultingintherebeingnoexecutive

branchmemberspresentonthefloorofeitherchamber.l Congressisgivenconfirmationpowerovernumerouspresidentialappointments.


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B2AnalysethewaysinwhichmembersoftheUSHouseofRepresentativesandtheUKHouseofCommonsperformtheirrepresentativefunction. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichmembersoftheUSHouseofRepresentativesandtheUKHouseofCommonsperformtheirrepresentativefunction:l adefinitionoftheconceptofrepresentation(aswellasdifferentmodelsof

representation)andthewaysmembersperformthisfunction,including:l votingonlegislationonthefloorofthechamberl membershipofandparticipationinstandingcommitteesofparticularrelevanceto

constituents(USHouse)l lobbyingexecutivedepartmentsandagenciesl performingconstituencycaseworkl engagementwithconstituentsthroughmeetings,surgeries,etc.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthewaysinwhichmembersoftheUSHouseofRepresentativesandtheUKHouseofCommonsperformtheirrepresentativefunction:l MembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayregardconstituentrepresentationas

beingofahigherprioritythandomembersoftheCommons.l FrequencyofelectionistwoyearsintheHouseofRepresentatives,fiveyearsinthe

HouseofCommons.l ThereisapossibilityofachallengeinaprimaryforUSHousemembers.l PartyplaysalesserroleinvotingintheHouseofRepresentativesthanintheparty-

whippedsystemsintheHouseofCommons.l USHousemembersaremorelikelytohavealongstandinglinkwiththeirconstituency

thandoUKMPs.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l frequencyofelectionsl levelsofpartydiscipline.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingtherationalchoicetheory:l Tryingtoenhanceone’schancesofre-selectionandre-electionwillprobablybehigherin

themindsofmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesthaninthemindsofmembersoftheHouseofCommons.



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C1EvaluatetheextenttowhichtheSenateismorepowerfulandprestigiousthantheHouse. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofwhatmakestheSenatemorepowerfulandprestigiousthantheHouse:l Senatorsrepresenttheentirestateandservelongerterms.l Senatorsaremorelikelytoholdaleadershipposition.l Asenatoris1ofonly100.l Senateisseenasarecruitingpoolforthevicepresidencyandthepresidency.l Senatepossessessignificantexclusivepowers.l Bothhouseshaveequalpowerinthepassageoflegislation.l Bothhousesmustapprovetheinitiationofconstitutionalamendments.l Bothhousesconductoversightoftheexecutivebranch.l Bothhousesmustvotetooverrideapresidentialveto.l Membersofbothhousesfulfilarepresentativefunction.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l ThewaysinwhichtheSenateismoreprestigiousandpowerfuloutweighthewaysin

whichtheyareequal.l Thisisespeciallythecasewhenitcomestotheconfirmationofnumerousappointments

–bothexecutiveandjudicial–overwhichtheHousehasnopoweratall.l ThefactthatHousememberssofrequentlyseekelectiontotheSenateshowsthatthe

Senateisregardedasmoreprestigious.l ThegreaterprestigeoftheSenatebringsgreaternamerecognition.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Exceptfortheconfirmationofappointmentsandratificationoftreaties,thereislittleor

nothingthattheSenatecandowithouttheagreementoftheHouse.l TheHouseinitiatesallmoneybills.l Conferencecommitteereportsmustbeagreedbybothhouses.l MostHousemembersdonotseekelectiontotheSenatebutregardtheHouseasa

significantandpowerfulinstitutioninitsownright.


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C2EvaluatetheextenttowhichCongressisaneffectivelegislativebody. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewayinwhichCongresseffectivelyperformsitslegislativefunction:l theoutlineofthelegislativeprocessinitsmainstagesinbothhousesl thewaysmembersofCongressengagewiththeprocessthroughvotesonthefloorof

thechamber,participationincommitteehearings,possibleparticipationinconferencecommittees

l theamountoflegislationintroducedintoCongressasagainstthenumberofbillsthatareactuallypassedintolaw

l thepotentialroadblockstotheeffectiveperformanceofCongress’slegislativefunctionl powerofstandingcommitteechairstoblocklegislationl poweroftheHouseRulesCommitteetoobstructlegislationl thefilibusterintheSenate,andtheneedforasuper-majoritytoenditl theequalpowerspossessedbybothhousesmakingagreementmoredifficult.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Thedifficultandcomplicatedlegislativeprocessisanassetforeffectivelegislatingas

itweedsoutbillsthatfailtocommandstrongmajoritysupportinbothhouses,therebynotallowingrashorill-consideredlegislation,orlegislationsupportedonlybyavocalminority,topass.

l EffectivenesscanbemeasuredinthatCongresspassingonlyasmallpercentageofallthebillsintroducedisintunewiththeconstitutionalprincipleoflimitedgovernment.

l Powerofstandingcommitteesenhancesdetailedandeffectivescrutinyoflegislationbecausecommitteememberstendtobepolicyspecialists.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l ThesmallproportionofbillsthatsuccessfullypassesthroughCongressisatestimonyto

ineffectivenesscausedbypartisan-inspiredgridlock.l Whenthetwochambersarecontrolledbydifferentparties,effectivelegislatingis

extremelydifficultaseachchamberwilllikelybeworkingtoadifferentpolicyagendaandseekingdifferentpolicyoutcomes.

l IncreasedpartisanshipinCongressinrecentyearshasmadeCongressevenlesseffectiveasalegislativebody.

l Thenumberofbigticketpolicyissuesthatremainunresolved(e.g.guncontrol,immigrationreform,healthcare)isatestimonytotheineffectivenessofCongress.



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esChapter 3A1ExaminethewaysinwhichtherolesandpowersoftheUSpresident

andtheUKprimeministeraredifferent. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftherolesandpowersoftheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeminister:l Thepresidentiselectedaspresident;theprimeministeronlyaspartyleader.l Thepresidentisbothchiefexecutiveandheadofstate;theprimeministerisonlychief

executive.l Thepresidenthaslimiteddirectpowersinthelegislativeprocess;theprimeminister

drawsupthelegislativeagenda.l ThepresidentappointsfellowexecutivememberssubjecttoSenateconfirmation;the

primeministerhasnosuchformalchecksonhis/herpower.l ThepresidenthasalargeEXOP;theprimeministerhasasmallNumber10andCabinet

Officestaff.l Thepresidenthasanumberofmeansbywhichhecanpursuepolicyunilaterally;the

primeministerdoesnot.l Thepresidentislimitedtotwotermsinoffice;noformallimitexistsontheprime

minister’stenure.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthewaysinwhichtherolesandpowersoftheUSpresidentandUKprimeministeraredifferent:l Thepresidentisaffordedgreaterpowerandinfluencebyhisdirectelection,havinga

popularnationalmandate.l Alsobyhisbeingheadofstateaswellaschiefexecutive,affordinghimtheroleofa

nationalrepresentativeandfigurehead.l Hislargestaffenhanceshisroleandinfluenceinpolicymaking.l Thepresidentheadsasingularexecutive,notacollectiveexecutive.l Buttheprimeministerhaspotentiallymuchmorecontroloverlegislationthandoesthe

president.l Theprimeministerismuchlessshackledinchoosinghis/hercabinet.


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A2ExaminethedifferencesintherelationshipthattheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerhavewiththeirrespectivelegislatures. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftherelationshipbetweentheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerandtheirrespectivelegislatures:l Thepresidentisnotamemberofthelegislature;theprimeministerisaservingMP.l ThepresidentdelivershislegislativeprogrammetoCongressinperson;themonarch

deliversthespeechsettingoutthelegislativeprogrammeinParliament.l ThepresidentissubjecttoanumberofspecificchecksbyCongress,includingthe

confirmationofhiscabinet(bytheSenate);theprimeministerfacesnosimilarformalchecksinParliament.

l Thepresident’spartymaycontrolneitherchamberinCongress;theprimeministerisleaderofthelargestpartyintheHouseofCommons.

l Thepresidentissubjecttoimpeachment,trialandremovalbyCongress;theprimeministerandtheirgovernmentmayfalliftheyloseavoteofconfidenceintheHouseofCommons.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtherelationshipbetweentheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerandtheirrespectivelegislatures:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l ThepresidentcannotbepersonallyquestionedinCongress;theprimeministeris

subjecttoaweeklyhalf-hourQuestionTimeintheHouseofCommons.l Thepresidentwillnotfallbecauseoffailuretogethislegislativeprogrammethrough

Congress.l ThepresidentmustbargainwithCongressonlegislation,appointments,etc.inorder

towinvotes;theprimeministercanmorereadilyrelyonpartyvotestogettheirwayinParliament.

l Presidentsmayhavenocongressionalexperience(e.g.Clinton,Trump)whereasprimeministerswillusuallyhavehadaquitelengthyspellofserviceinboththeHouseofCommonsandthe(shadow)cabinet–thisaffectstheirrespectiveunderstandingofhowtheinstitutionworks.



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B1AnalysethedifferentwaysinwhichtheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerappointtheircabinets. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaystheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerappointtheircabinets:l MembersoftheUSpresident’scabinetcannotbeservingmembersofCongress;

membersoftheUKcabinetwillbeservingmembersofParliament.l MembersoftheUSpresident’scabinetmustbeconfirmedbyasimplemajorityvoteinthe

Senate;membersoftheUKcabinetfacenoconfirmationprocess.l TheUSpresidenttriestoappointacabinetthatisbalancedintermsofgender,raceand

age;theUKprimeministermayfacefewerpressuresto‘balance’theircabinet.l TheUSpresidentcanfirehiscabinetatwillwithoutfearthattheywillbecomepolitical

rivals;theUKprimeministerwillbecautiousoffiringhigh-profilecabinetcolleagueswhomaybecomethefocusofdiscontentonthebackbenches.

l TheUSpresidentwillneedtolooktonumerouspoolsofrecruitmentforhiscabinet(e.g.stategovernment,academia,policyspecialists);theUKprimeministerprincipallyrecruitsfromtheirpreviousshadowcabinet.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthewaysinwhichtheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerappointtheircabinets:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l Thepresidentisnot‘firstamongequals’inhiscabinet,ratherallexecutivepower

isgrantedtohimbytheConstitution;theprimeministermustoperatewithinaframeworkofcollectiveresponsibility.

l Thepresident’scabinetmembersarenothispoliticalrivals,theywillnotexpecttobecomepresident;theprimeminister’scabinetmembersarehis/herpoliticalrivalsandoneofthemisalmostcertaintoreplacetheprimeministershouldhe/shefalter.

l Thepresidentcanusethecabinetmeetingaslittleashewishesandmayignoremembers’advice;theprimeministerneedstofollownormaletiquetteinthecallingandrunningofmeetings.

l Thepresident’scabinetwilloftenbestrangerstohimandhewillseethemrarelyoutsideofformalmeetings;theUKcabinetismadeupofclosecolleagueswhoseeeachotherregularlyduringParliament’sworkingday.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l TheUSpresident’scabinetisdeterminedbythestructureofseparationofpowerswithin

whichitmustoperate;alsoofasingularexecutivewithallexecutivepowervestedinthepresident.

l TheUKcabinetisdeterminedbythestructureofthefusionofpowersbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature;alsoofapluralexecutiveoperatingonthebasisofcollectiveresponsibility.


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B2AnalysethedifferentwaysinwhichtheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerareheldaccountablebytheirrespectivelegislatures. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichtheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerareheldaccountablebytheirrespectivelegislatures:l TheUSpresidentisheldaccountablebyCongressprincipallythroughtheinvestigative

andscrutinyfunctionsofstandingandselectcommittees.l Althoughtheycannotquestionthepresidentinperson(exceptunderhighlyexceptional

circumstances),theycaninvestigatehispoliciesandscrutinisehisactionsandthoseofhisadministration.

l TheUSpresidentisalsoheldaccountablespecificallybytheconfirmationprocessofappointments(Senate),theratificationoftreaties(Senate)andtheimpeachmentprocess.

l TheUKprimeministerisheldaccountabletoParliamentontheflooroftheHouseofCommonsthroughQuestionTime,policydebatesandthetablingofearlydaymotions.

l TheUKprimeministerisalsoheldaccountabletoParliamentthroughtheworkofselectcommittees,theLiaisonCommitteeandvotesofnoconfidence.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentwaysinwhichtheUSpresidentandtheUKprimeministerareheldaccountablebytheirrespectivelegislatures:l Thesesignificantdifferenceshaveanumberofimportantconsequencesandeffects,

namely:l TheUSpresidentisheldaccountablemorethroughhisadministrationofficialsrather

thanbyCongressdirectlyquestioninghim;buttheUKprimeministerissubjecttoregular,personalquestioning,whichmakesaccountabilitypotentiallymoreeffective.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l TheUSpresident’scabinetisdeterminedbythestructureofseparationofpowerswithin

whichitmustoperate;alsoofasingularexecutivewithallexecutivepowervestedinthepresident.

l TheUKcabinetisdeterminedbythestructureofthefusionofpowersbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature;alsoofapluralexecutiveoperatingonthebasisofcollectiveresponsibility.



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C1Evaluatetheextenttowhichthepresidentissubjecttoeffectivechecks. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthevariouschecksonthepresident:l checksbyCongress,includingitspowertoamend,delayorrejectthepresident’s

legislativeproposals;overrideveto;amendbudget;refusetoconfirmappointmentsorratifytreaties(Senateonly);powersofinvestigationandimpeachment

l checksbytheSupremeCourt,includingdeclaringthepresident’sactionsunconstitutional;rulingonimmunityfromprosecution

l checksbythefederalbureaucracy,publicopinion,pressuregroups,stategovernments,theelectorate.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Thechecksmaybemademoreeffectivebytheotherinstitutionsandgroupsusingtheir

powerseffectively.l ThechecksbyCongressmaybemoreeffectiveifoneorbothhousesarenotcontrolledby

thepresident’sownparty.l Thechecksmaybemoreeffectiveinapresident’ssecondterm,ifthepresidentwas

electedonanarrowmandate,ifhispublicopinionratingsarelow.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l ThechecksbyCongressmayturnintomere‘rubberstamping’,especiallyifbothhouses

ofCongressarecontrolledbythepresident’sparty.l Thechecksmaybelesseffectiveifthepresidenthasbeenelectedbyasizablemajorityof

thepopularvoteand/orenjoyshighpublicapprovalratings.l Someoftheconstitutionalchecksonthepresident(e.g.regardinguseoftroopsabroad)

maybeinstitutionallyineffective.


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C2Evaluatetheextenttowhichthepresident’scabinetplaysasignificantrolewithintheexecutivebranch. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthepresident’scabinet:l adefinitionofthecabinetl thecabinetasindividualsandasacollectivityl thenominationandappointmentprocessl theworkofcabinetmembersinrunningtheexecutivedepartmentsandliaisingwith

Congressonlegislationrelevanttotheirdepartmentsl thefactthatallexecutivepowerisvestedinthepresidentbyArticleIIl theregularity(orotherwise)ofcabinetmeetingsl thefunctionofcabinetmeetings.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Thecabinetcontainssomepeoplewhoholdpowerfulpositionswithintheexecutive

branchandareresponsibleforsubstantialbudgetsandrunhugebureaucracies.l Sometop-tiercabinetmembers(e.g.secretariesofstateanddefense,attorneygeneral)

maybehighlyinfluentialinpolicymakingandmayseethepresidentindividually.l TheirroleinliaisingwithCongressandpilotinglegislationthroughthetwochambersis

asignificantone–especiallyiftheirpolicyareaisuppermostinthepresident’spolicypriorities.

l Somepresidentsholdfrequent,regularandsignificantcabinetmeetings.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Cabinetofficersrunninglower-tierdepartmentsmayseelittleofthepresidentandhave

littleinfluencewithintheadministration.l Cabinetmeetingscanturnintosomewhatboringandmeaninglesseventswherelittleof

substanceisdiscussed.l Thereisnocollectiveresponsibility;intheend,allexecutivepowerisvestedinthe

president.



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esChapter 4A1ExaminethedifferencesbetweentheUSandUKSupremeCourtsin

termsofmembershipandtenure. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthemembershipandtenureoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l numberofmembers:US9(thoughthishasvariedsince1789);UK12l namesofoneortwocurrentmembersl howappointed:US–bythepresidentwiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate;UK–bya

selectioncommission,whichmakesarecommendationtotheLordChancellorl tenure:US–lifetenure;UK–mustretireat70or75dependingonwhenfirstappointedto

judicialofficel removal:US–onlybyimpeachment(House)andbeingfoundguiltyintrial(Senate);

UK–onlybypetitiontothemonarchbybothhousesofParliament.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesbetweenthemembershipandtenureoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l TheUSAhasanoddnumberofjusticesasallhearallcases;thereforeitislesslikelyto

haveadeadlockedcourt;UK:only5–11justiceshearanyparticularcase.l TherequirementofformalconfirmationintheUSSenatebothaffectswhoisnominated

andinvitespossiblerejections(e.g.Bork)andwithdrawals(e.g.Miers).l Itisalsoimportanttorememberthatpresidentmayfaceamajorityfromtheopposition

partyinSenate.l Lifetenure(US)versusmandatoryretirement(UK)clearlyelevatestheinfluenceofUS

justices,whomayremainontheCourtfordecades.l Bothremovalprocessesarehighlyunlikelytobeused,butthethreatcouldleadto

resignations.


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A2ExaminetheroleplayedbyjudicialreviewintheUSandUKSupremeCourts. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofjudicialreviewintheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l adefinitionofjudicialreviewintheUSAl adefinition/understandingofjudicialreviewandultra vires intheUKl anunderstandingofthereasonsforthesedifferencesl someexamplesofwhenthesepowershavebeenused.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesinjudicialreviewintheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l whatimplicationsthesedifferenceshaveforthepoliticalimportanceofeachcourtl howthisrolerelatestothedebateconcerningjudicialactivisml howthisrolerelatestothedebateconcerningjudicialindependence.



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B1AnalysethedifferencesintheoriginsoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheoriginsoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l IntheUSA:

l ArticleIIIoftheConstitution–intermsofthepowersandmembershipoftheUSSupremeCourt

l howitfittedintotheprincipleofseparationofpowers,separationofpersonnell theframerscreatednootherfederalcourts–thoughthesewerealmostimmediately

createdbyCongressl theframers,increatingtheCourt,didnotspecificallygrantitthepowerofjudicial

review.l IntheUK:

l theCourtwascreatedin2009byActofParliamentl itspredecessorwastheAppellateCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsl itspowersandmembership.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentoriginsoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l thesignificanceofwhenandhoweachcameaboutl thesignificanceoftherelationshipsofeachCourtwiththeirrespectivelegislatureand

executivel whatthedifferentoriginstellusaboutthedifferentsocietiesinwhichtheywerecreated.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l Theoriginsofbothcourtsreflectthedifferentgovernmentalstructuresofeachcountry

relatingtoseparationofpowers,checksandbalances.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingculturaltheory:l Theoriginsofbothcourtsreflectthedifferentculturalbackgroundsofeachcountry

relatingtothepositionofthejudiciarywithinculturalhierarchies.


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B2AnalysethedifferencesinthewaysinwhichmembersoftheUSandUKSupremeCourtsareappointed. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichmembersoftheUSandUKSupremeCourtsareappointed:l IntheUSA:

l nominatedbythepresident;confirmedbyasimplemajorityvoteoftheSenatel involvementofthemedia,pressuregroups,politicalpartiesl vacanciesoccuronlythroughdeathorvoluntaryretirementofsittingjustices.

l IntheUK:l nominatedbyanindependentbody–theJudicialAppointmentsCommissionl candidatesrecommendedtotheLordChancellorforappointmentl vacanciesoccurthroughdeathormandatoryretirementbroughtaboutbyagelimit.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentwaysinwhichmembersoftheUSandUKSupremeCourtsareappointed:l thepoliticisednatureoftheappointmentprocessintheUSAl theinvolvementofpoliticians(president,senators)l votingonconfirmationofnomineeshasbecomemuchmorepartisanl thepoliticalneutralityoftheappointmentprocessintheUKl noinvolvementofpartypoliticiansl nopublichearingsorvotingl thustheappointmentprocessesreflectthenatureofthecourtsthemselves.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l Theappointmentprocessesarereflectiveofthedifferentgovernmentalstructuresof

eachcountryrelatingtoseparationofpowers,checksandbalances.



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C1EvaluatetheextenttowhichtheSupremeCourthasquasi-legislativepowers. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheSupremeCourt’squasi-legislativepowers:l anunderstandingthatthisquestionrelatestotheSupremeCourt’spowerofjudicial

reviewl adefinitionofjudicialreviewl anunderstandingoftheterm‘quasi-legislativepowers’l arangeofrecentexamplesofcasesthatcouldbesaidtosuggestthattheSupreme

Courthassuchpowers–concerning,forexample,abortionrights,guncontrol,thedeathpenalty,gaymarriage

l thewaythisrelatestothedebatesconcerningjudicialactivismandjudicialrestraint,aswellasstrictandlooseconstructionandtheideaofalivingConstitution.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l TheeffectofmanydecisionsoftheCourtisalmostasifanewlawhasbeenpassed.l Thisquasi-legislativepowermeansthatmanycometoseetheCourtanditsmembersas

beinginsomewayspoliticisedbecausetheyaredecidingcontroversialissuesregardingsocietythatareoftenatthecentreofelectioncampaignsandofthedebatesbetweenthetwomajorparties.

l TheextenttowhichthisisanaccurateviewoftheCourtwilldependpartlyonone’sviewsofthepolicyareasbeingdecided.

l ThisisalegitimateroleoftheCourtinreinterpretinga‘livingConstitution’.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l ThechecksontheCourtstopitfrombecomeaquasi-legislativebody.l TheCourtisindependentandnotsubjecttothekindofpoliticalpressureassociatedwith

alegislativebody.l TheCourtmakesdecisionsbasedonlegalandconstitutionalargumentsasjudges,noton

politicalconsiderationsaslegislators.


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C2EvaluatetheextenttowhichthenominationandconfirmationprocessofSupremeCourtjusticeshasbeenpoliticised. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthenominationandconfirmationofSupremeCourtjustices:l thewayvacanciesmayoccurl theconsultationthatprecedesthepresident’sannouncementofanomineel theconsiderationsthepresidentislikelytohaveinmindinchoosinghisnomineel thehearingsinfrontoftheSenateJudiciaryCommitteel thefloordebateandfinalvotel withdrawalsanddefeats.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Thenominationprocesshasbeenpoliticisedbythepresidentinthecriteriausedfor

choosingcandidates.l TheconfirmationprocesshasbeenpoliticisedbytheSenateJudiciaryCommitteeinthe

partisanwayitconductsboththehearingandtherecommendatoryvote.l TheconfirmationprocesshasbeenpoliticisedbythefullSenateinthewayitdebatesand

votesonthenominee.l Theprocesshasbeenpoliticisedbythemediaandbypressuregroups.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Presidentshavealwaystakencompatiblejudicialphilosophyintoconsiderationinmaking

SupremeCourtnominationsandthisinitselfdoesnotpoliticisetheprocess.l Giventhepowerofthejusticesandthekindsofdecisionstheymake,focusingon

controversialpolicyareasdoesnotofitselfpoliticisetheprocess–onecouldarguethattheCourt,inthatsense,hasalwaysbeenpolitical.

l Chargesofpoliticisationcansometimesbeacoverforthosewhomerelydisapproveofthenominee.



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theUSAandtheUK. [12]



ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics(AO1)andthiswillbeusedbycandidatestounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofrightsandthemeansbywhichtheyareprotectedintheUSAandtheUK:l definitionofandexamplesofpressuregroups,especiallyNAACP,ACLUl definitionofandexamplesofrightsl intheUSA,pressuregroupstrytobringinfluenceonlegislature,executivebutmost

especiallythejudiciaryl intheUSA,pressuregroupsmaylegallyandfinanciallysupportthebringingofpotentially

landmarkcasestotheSupremeCourtforitsrulingl theymayalsosubmitamicus curiae briefstothecourtsl alsoengageinbuildingpublicsupportl intheUK,pressuregroupstrytobringinfluenceonParliament,relevantgovernment

departmentsand(recently)thenewSupremeCourt.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingtherolepressuregroupsplayintheprotectionofrightsintheUSAandtheUK:l IntheUSA,thereismuchmorefocusonthejudiciarythanintheUKbecauseofthepower

ofjudicialreview.l Theymightofferashortcasestudyin,forexample,rightsconcerninggender,race,

equality,freedomofspeech,sexuality,etc.l Successwillbedeterminedbyanumberofvariablessuchasfinancialbacking,the

balanceofpublicopinion,strengthofcountervailinggroups,accesstothemedia,etc.


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B1AnalysethedifferencesbetweenthewaysinwhichrightsareprotectedintheUSAandtheUK. [12]



ThisquestionrequirescandidatestodrawontheirknowledgeandunderstandingofUSandUKpolitics,includingcomparativetheories(A01),andthiswillbeusedbycandidatestounderpintheiranalysis(AO2).AO2requirescandidatestodeveloptheiranswers,showinganalyticalskillstoaddressthequestion–suchresponseswillbeunderpinnedbytheiruseofknowledgeandunderstanding.

Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthewaysinwhichrightsareprotectedintheUSAandtheUK:l definitionofrightsl examplesofrightsthatmayneedprotection,e.g.thoserelatingtogender,race,equality,

sexualityl themeansbywhichrightsareprotected:through,forexample,theconstitution,

legislation,actionbytheexecutivebranch,courtdecisions.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentoriginsoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l IntheUSA,avarietyofwayshavebeenusedtoprotectrightswithvaryinglevelsof

effectiveness:theConstitutionprotectedsomesignificantrightsintheBillofRightsandinlateramendments;theSupremeCourtbecameactivefromthe1950sasdidthepresident,andCongresssoonfollowed.

l TheSupremeCourthasbeenthemostwidelyusedmechanismfortheeffectiveprotectionofrightsinrecentdecades.

l IntheUK,Parliamenthasbeenattheforefrontoftheeffectiveprotectionofrightswithlegislationconcerningequalpay,genderdiscrimination,racialdiscrimination,disabilityrights,freedomofinformation,etc.–thoughnotalllegislationhasprovedeffective.

l Inthelastdecade,thenewlyformedUKSupremeCourthasalsotakenonthisrole.



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C1EvaluatetheextenttowhichdecisionsoftheSupremeCourthaveweakenedaffirmativeactionprogrammesintheUSA. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofaffirmativeactionprogrammesandthefunctioningoftheSupremeCourt:l definitionofaffirmativeactionl areasofpolicyinwhichitismostoftenused:education,housing,employmentl thefunctioningoftheSupremeCourtandespeciallyinitsuseofitspowerofjudicial

reviewl examplesofdecisionsoftheSupremeCourtrelatingtoaffirmativeactionprogrammes,

suchas:Gratz v Bollinger, Grutter v Bollinger, Parents Involved v Seattle, Fisher v University of Texas.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l ThemajorityviewoftheCourtmaychangeasthemembershipchanges,resultingina

changeinthejudicialphilosophyoftheCourt’smajority.l Somejusticesmaycometodifferentconclusionsondifferentcasesatdifferenttimes,

especiallyswingjusticeAnthonyKennedy.l IssuestheCourthastriedtoaddressfocusonsuchmattersashow‘mechanical’or

‘tailored’theaffirmativeactionprogrammeis.l Alsoaddressedissuesofreversediscriminationand‘strictscrutiny’.l Generallyspeaking,moreconservative,strictconstructionistjusticesmayseekto

weakenaffirmativeactionprogrammes.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Generallyspeaking,moreliberal,looseconstructionistjusticesmayseektosupport

affirmativeactionprogrammes.l Alsosomedecisionsthatmightappeartoweakensuchprogrammeswereverynarrowin

theirscope.l Evensomesupportersofsuchprogrammesagreethattheyoughttohaveadesignated

shelflife.


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Chapter 6C1Evaluatetheextenttowhichpresidentialprimariesareimportant.[30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofpresidentialprimaries:l definitionofpresidentialprimaryl functionsofprimariesl typesofprimariesl scheduleofprimaries.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Theyaretheonlymeansbywhichcandidatesnowadayscanwintheirparty’spresidential

nomination.l Theyaretheonlymeansofwinningtherequirednumberofdelegatestosecurethe

presidentialnomination.l Theyattractalargeamountofmediacoverage.l Theycanincreasenamerecognition,boostpollratingsandtherebyhelpdrawinmore

money.l Theyareasignificantweeding-outprocess.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Theyoftenmerelyconfirmwhathasalreadybeendecidedintheso-calledinvisible

primary.l Theintra-partyTVdebatesmaybeagreaterdeterminantofvotersupportthanthe

primariesthemselves.l Voterturnoutisoftenlowandunrepresentative.l Nationallyknown,well-fundedcandidatesdominatetheprimariestosuchanextentthat

itcallsintoquestionwhetherprimariesareanylongeranimportantpartoftheprocess.



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C2EvaluatetheextenttowhichtheElectoralCollegeisinneedofreform. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)oftheElectoralCollege:l adefinitionoftheElectoralCollegel abriefexplanationofhowtheElectoralCollegeworks,includingthewayvotesare

allocatedtothestates;thenumberrequiredtobeelectedpresident;thewinner-take-allprincipleinmoststates

l anexampleofafinalresultintheElectoralCollegefromarecentelection.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l becauseofthepossibilityofthepopularvoteloserbeingelectedpresident(e.g.2000,

2016)l becauseofrogue/faithlessElectorsl becauseoftheunfairnesstonationalthirdpartiesl becauseoftheprocessshouldnocandidatereceivetherequiredoverallmajority.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l becausethereisnoagreementastobetteralternativesl becausesomeoftheproposedreformsmightevenmakethesystemworsel becausemostsubstantivereformwouldrequireaconstitutionalamendment,which

wouldbealmostimpossibletoachievel becausethecurrentsystemdoeshavecertainstrengths.


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Chapter 7A1ExaminethewaysinwhichtheimportanceofthirdpartiesintheUSA

andtheUKdiffers. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthirdparties:l whatconstitutesathirdpartyl examplesofthirdpartiesl differenttypesofthirdpartiesl levelofelectoralsupportenjoyedbythirdpartiesintheUSAandtheUKl levelsofsupportenjoyedbythirdpartiesinCongressandParliament.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesbetweenthemembershipandtenureoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l TheimportanceofthirdpartiesintheUSAislimited–atfederal,stateandlocallevel.l Thepercentageofthevotewoninanyelectionisusuallyverysmall(thoughtherearea

fewexceptions).l Rarelydotheywinalegislativeseat.l Theironlyimportancecanbeasaspoiler,orasapurveyorofpolicieswhichmaybe

adoptedbyamajorparty.l TheimportanceofthirdpartiesintheUKcanbesubstantial.l Thethirdpartyformedacoalitiongovernmentin2010–15.l Theycanwinsubstantialproportionsofthevoteinvariouselections.l However,FPTPmakesitdifficultforthemtowinparliamentaryseats.



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A2ExaminethefactorsthatenhancethepowerofpressuregroupsinelectionsinboththeUSAandtheUK. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofpressuregroups:l definitionofapressuregroupl types,functionsofpressuregroupsl examplesofpressuregroupsl politicalactioncommitteesintheUSAl theeffectsofcampaignfinanceregulationsl thewaypressuregroupsoperateduringelections:electioneeringandcandidate

endorsement.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenexaminingthedifferencesbetweenthemembershipandtenureoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l thewaypressuregroupsactivelysupportoropposecandidatesduringelection

campaignsl theywillaimtheirresourcesatkeymarginal/winnableseatsl anexaminationofsuchfactorsassizeofmembership,amountofmoneyavailable,the

balanceofpublicopinion,strengthofcountervailinggroups,abilitytoaccessthemedia.


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B1AnalysethedifferencesinpartysystemsintheUSAandtheUK. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofpartysystemsintheUSAandUK,whichmayinclude:l dominant-partysystemsl two-partysystemsl multipartysystemsl theextenttowhichtheUSA–atfederal,stateandlocallevel–isatwo-partysysteml theextenttowhichtheUKhasmovedfromatwo-partysystemtoamultipartysysteml examplesofvoteshareinelectionsinbothcountries,aswellasseatshareinthe

respectivelegislatures.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentoriginsoftheUSandUKSupremeCourts:l TheUSAhasatwo-partysysteminwhichthetwomajorpartiesdominatepoliticsatall

levels.l Thisislargelybecauseoftheelectoralsystemandtheflexibilityofthetwomajorparties

toreflectdifferentregionalideologies.l Alsoprimariesmakesthepartiesmoresusceptibletochange.l TheUKnowhasamultipartysystem,certainlyintermsofvotescastbutalsointermsof

legislativeseatswon(thoughintermsofcontroloftheexecutiveatWestminster,itstillhasalargelytwo-partyarrangement).

l ThisislargelybecauseofdifferentelectoralsystemsandtheincreasedsignificanceofnationalisminScotland,WalesandNorthernIreland,aswellastheriseofUKIPinEnglandbetween2005and2015.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingculturaltheory:l thechangingcultureoftheUKregardingindependence/devolutionforScotland,Wales

andNorthernIrelandl thechangingcultureoftheUKregardingBritain’srelationshipwiththeEUandtheriseof

UKIP.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingrationalchoicetheory:l votersmayactinarationalsense,choosingtovoteforacertainpartyoutofself-interest

andasthebestwayofachievingtheirpoliticalgoals.



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B2AnalysethedifferencesintheopportunitiesforpressuregroupstoinfluencethejudiciaryintheUSAandtheUK. [12]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofpressuresgroupsandthejudiciaryintheUSAandUK:l typesofpressuregroupsl functionsofpressuregroupsl methodsusedbypressuregroupsl examplesofpressuregroupsl thepowerandroleofthejudiciaryintheUSAandtheUKl therolesoftherespectiveSupremeCourtsineachcountry.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalyticalpoints(AO2)whenanalysingthedifferentopportunitiesforpressuregroupstoinfluencethejudiciaryintheUSAandtheUK:l roleofpressuregroupsintheUSAintheirattempttoinfluencejudicialnominations,

especiallythosetotheSupremeCourt,includingABAratingsl roleofpressuregroupsintheUSAintheirattempttoinfluencejudicialdecisionsthrough

amicus curiae briefingsl roleofpressuregroupsintheUSAinhelpingtobringpotentiallylandmarkcasestothe

SupremeCourt–especiallyroleofNAACPandACLUl lesserroleforpressuregroupsintheUKbecausethejudiciaryislesspolitically

significantl noestablishedmethodoflobbyingtheUKSupremeCourtgiventhatitwasformedonlya

decadeagol judiciaryintheUKmustoperatewithinthedoctrineofparliamentarysovereigntyand

withoutacodifiedconstitution–thislimitspotentialroleofpressuregroupsregardingthecourts.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingstructuraltheory:l thedifferentconstitutionalstructuresresultindifferentopportunitiesforpressure

groupstoinfluencethejudiciary–greaterandmoresignificantopportunitiesintheUSA;fewerandlesssignificantopportunitiesintheUK.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowingwhenanalysingrationalchoicetheory:l theself-interestedwaypressuregroupsseekinfluenceinordertoenhancetheinterests

oftheirmembers.


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C1EvaluatetheextenttowhichthirdpartiesintheUSAalwayslose. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofthirdparties:l typesofthirdpartiesl examplesofthirdpartiesl thedifficultiesthatthirdpartiesface,especiallyregardingtheelectoralsystem,electoral

law,lackofresources,lackofmediaaccess,co-optationofpoliciesbymajorparties.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l intermsofvotescast,thirdpartiesalmostalwayslose–examplesfrompresidentialand

congressionalracesl intermsoflegislativeseats,especiallyinCongress;onlyso-calledthird-partywinners

areusuallycloselyalliedtoorevenformermembersofoneofthetwomajorpartiesl first-past-the-postandwinner-take-allmeanthatthirdpartydefeatisalmostalways

inevitable.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l Althoughthey‘lose’numerically,theymightalsobeinfluential.l Inaverycloserace,athird-partycandidatecanbecomeeitherthekingmakerorthe

spoiler.l Fromtimetotime,policiesthatthirdpartiesespousewillgainwidespreadsupport

amongtheelectorate,butone(orboth)ofthetwomajorpartieswillthenoftenco-opttheirpoliciesinordertowinbacktheirvoters.

l TheexampleofRossPerot’ssuccessin1992,buthisquickdemisein1996and2000.



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C2EvaluatetheextenttowhichpressuregroupsareanecessaryevilintheUSpoliticalsystem. [30]




Candidatesmaydemonstratethefollowingknowledgeandunderstanding(AO1)ofpressuregroups:l definitionofapressuregroupl pluralistversuselitisttheoryl typesofpressuregroupsl functionsofpressuregroupsl methodsusedbypressuregroupsl successofpressuregroups.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhenagreeingwiththeview:l Therearetwoissuesthatneedtobediscussed:‘necessary’and‘evil’.l Pressuregroupsarenecessarytoademocracycanbesupportedthroughtheargument

infavourofapluralistsysteminwhichgroupsrepresentingwidelydifferinginterestsandpositionscancompeteforpoliticalpowerandinfluence.

l Pressuregroupsarenecessarytoaggregateandgivevoicetospecificinterestsofvarioussocietalgroupsthatotherwisewouldnotbeheard.

l Unlikeparties,pressuregroupsseekto‘campaign’notjustatelectiontime.l Thattheyare‘evil’suggeststheyhaveinsomewaycorruptedthedemocraticprocess,

usually,itissuggested,bybuyinginfluenceandthroughcosyrelationshipswithpoliticalelites,orhavingunequalinfluenceinagivenpolicyarea.

Candidatesmayrefertothefollowinganalytical(AO2)andevaluative(AO3)pointswhendisagreeingwiththeview:l ofthecontraryview:thattheyarenot‘necessary’–thatdemocracycouldfunctionwell

(better?)withouttheml becausetheytendtoargueforthespecialinterestoverthepublicinterestl equally,onecouldwellsuggestthattheyarenot‘evil’inthattheygivelegitimatevoiceto

citizens’concernsl thatpressuregroupinfluenceisrightlylinkedtothedegreeofsupportanyparticular

interestcommandswithinsocietyasawhole.


9781471889639 Exam Practiceresources.hoddereducation.co.uk/files/he/my... · l The US Constitution is largely written and codified, embodied in the original seven ... AO2 requires

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