959 views 4 commentsyabuki/new/2012-13-14.harner-selden.pdfsenkaku-dispute, by yabuki. 1...

interview with professor yabuki on senkaku/diaoyudao crisis 1

http://blogs.forbes.com/stephenharner/

Oct. 3 2012 — 2:48 am | 959 views | 4 comments

Interview with Professor Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis and U.S.-China-Japan Relations

Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, is one of Japan’s most

eminent and thoughtful, as well as prolific, China scholars. For over 40 years, Professor Yabuki has

been remarkably prescient in his analysis of China’s rise, and of challenges and opportunities

presented thereby for Japan and the United States.

In a June 5 post on this blog, titled “Japanese Scholar Says Scrap U.S.-Japan Alliance;

Recognize U.S.-China Co-Dependency,” I summarized Yabuki’s new book 『チャイメリカ―米

中結託と日本の進路』 (Chimerica – U.S.-China Interdependence and the Way

Forward for Japan).

With typically prescience, in that book Yabuki foretold of a likely Japan-China crisis over the

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, as well as why–notwithstanding the U.S.-Japan alliance–Japan cannot

and should not rely upon the backing of military power to resolve it. Yabuki’s views is that the

U.S.-Japan alliance no longer serves, but rather is damaging to Japan’s interests. The U.S. is too

interdependent with China to make credible a commitment to use military power. Moreover, the

U.S.-Japan alliance has been and continues as to be seen in China as justification for vastly increased

military spending, which has created worryingly strong vested interests.

Yabuki’s prescription is for Japan to abrogate the military alliance with the U.S. and to rededicated

itself to active diplomacy to resolve or manage disputes like Senkakus/Diaoyudao.

This week I caught up with Yabuki-sensei again. My questions and his answers (edited) follow.

Q. Harner: Have your analysis/opinions/conclusions changed since you wrote Chimerica–U.S.

China Interdependence and the Way Forward for Japan?

A. Yabuki: I think that what I advocated and foretold have been validated. In particular, in Part

III of the book, I presented in detail the source of mistrust between China and Japan relating first to

Japan contrition for aggressive war and, second, over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute. It goes back

to four meetings between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on

September 26-28, 1972 that decided the terms for restoring diplomatic relations. At a second

meeting, Tanaka solemnly apologized “in all sincerity” (誠心誠意の謝罪 )for Japanese

aggression . But the record of this apology was excised by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

officials from the meeting transcript later released the Japanese government.

Similarly falsified was the record of the dialogue between Tanaka and Zhou during meetings on the

27th and 28th. Tanaka raised the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, soliciting from Zhou a comment. Zhou

first declined to address the issue, saying nothing was to be gained by doing so. At a second meeting,

Zhou again refused to discuss the islands.

The Chinese position was one of “shelving” the matter, not seeking resolution, because “resolution”

required one side to lose. This exchange was similarly removed from MOFA-prepared transcripts.

As a result, the Japanese official position (and record) has been that the issue was never raised

during the Tanaka-Zhou meetings. This situation allowed that the Noda government (and previous

governments) to maintain that the islands “are not disputed,” i.e., the Chinese side had accepted

Japanese sovereignty and control. The Chinese position on Tanaka-Zhou dialogue has been, on the

contrary, that China “implicitly agreed” (黙契) to defer contention (搁置争议）over the issue. The

http://blogs.forbes.com/stephenharner/http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/03/interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis-and-u-s-china-japan-relations/#post_commentshttp://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/03/interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis-and-u-s-china-japan-relations/http://onforb.es/K9ppml


Chinese position is clearly the valid one. The Japanese understanding is clearly fanciful and

contradictory.

At the extraordinary 15 minute Chinese President Hu Jintao-PM Noda “standing summit” that took

place on the edge of the APEC meeting in Vladivostok on September 9, this was the point made by

Hu to Noda. The next day, the Noda government implemented the “nationalization” of the

contested islands, delivering a massive loss of face to President Hu. This crude abnegation of the

Zhou-Tanaka “understanding” incited anti-Japanese government statements and acts, included

some that got out of hand.

Mistrust in Japan-China relations is owed in some cases to “chicken and egg” situations, where cause

and effect are hard to assign. The current case of the abnegation of the “implicit agreement” was

clearly an error by the Noda government, responsibility for which also belongs to past MOFA

officials who falsified transcripts.

It can be said that mistrust in Japan-China relations has been building over the past 40 years. It

burst out into the open during the first half of 2012 during a void in Japan’s foreign policy

governance. This is very much as I predicted. Six months before the publication of Chimerica, in

a March 16 speech to the Kokusai Zenrin Kyokai, I expressed fears and gave warning of a dreadful

deterioration in Japan-China relations this fall. To me what has happened has been completely

expected.

More questions for and answers from Professor Yabuki in my next post.

＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊

Oct. 4 2012 — 2:09 am | 1,730 views | 5 comments

Continuing the Interview with Japanese China Scholar Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyudao

Crisis and Japan-China-U.S. Relations

Continuing yesterday’s interview with Professor Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), one of Japan’s most

eminent China scholars, author of 『チャイメリカ―米中結託と日本の進路』

Tanzan Ishibashi (1884-1973) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

(Chimerica – U.S.-China Interdependence and the Way Forward for Japan).

Q. Harner: You advocated in your book that Japan should abrogate the mutual

defense treaty with the United States, saying that it does not serve Japan’s

interests. Are you still of this view?

A. Yabuki: A former Japanese Prime Minister whom I deeply respect and admire, Ishibashi Tanzan

(石橋湛山) [note: (b. 1884-d. 1973) elected PM December 23, 1956 but compelled to resign just three

months later after suffering a mild stroke], visited China in September 1959 and met with Premier

Zhou Enlai. At that meeting Ishibashi proposed that China and Japan join with each other to

construct a compact for peace in East Asia. This was the Cold War period Ishibashi

“Japan-China-U.S.-Soviet Peace Alliance ” (日中米ソ平和同盟) initiative.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/04/continuing-the-interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyudao-crisis-and-japan-china-u-s-relations/#post_commentshttp://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/04/continuing-the-interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyudao-crisis-and-japan-china-u-s-relations/http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/04/continuing-the-interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyudao-crisis-and-japan-china-u-s-relations/http://onforb.es/O4j38Fhttp://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tanzan_Ishibashi_2.jpg


Earlier, in June of 1959, Ishibashi had written to Zhou, as follows:

“When, as Prime Minister, I was composing my Cabinet, one of my strong desires was to find a way

to join hands with your Honorable Country, and to leverage our combined strength to realize world

peace…. The People’s Republic of China and Japan, acting as if one country, uniting to defend peace

in East Asia, pursuing common policies to promote global peace…. Toward this goal, eliminating

territorial barriers to free exchange in economics, politics, and culture…. Doing this in such a way

that respects our two countries’ existing relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States

and other countries, and not demanding abrupt change; but to the extent practicable, activating

these relationships so that they work toward the aforementioned goal.”

In October 1963 Ishibashi visited China a second time and also met with Mao Zedong. At the time

I was a junior staffer at the Toyo Keizai and was honored to be invited to Ishibashi’s home and to his

vacation bungalow at Yamanaka Lake.

My advocacy of abrogating the U.S.-Japan security treaty is not just my idea. It is an idea whose

genealogy traces to Ishibashi’s “Japan-China-U.S.-Soviet Peace Alliance” initiative. The current

Japan-China conflict has only deepened my conviction that it is the right choice for Japan.

Q. Harner: Do you see any signs that the Japanese government is rethinking the value

or utility of the alliance with the U.S.? Has the U.S.-Japan alliance been a factor

influencing the current Senkaku/Diaoyudao crisis?

A. Yabuki: The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has traditionally embraced the U.S.-Japan security

treaty. The first two leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Hatoyama Yukio and Kan

Naoto, advocated changing Japan’s defense strategy. After both men failed in office, the policy of

PM Noda’s inner circle –called the “Noda LDP faction”– has essentially been the LDP policy. In

other words, while the change in government from the LDP to the DPJ was informed by a policy

position of changing the U.S.-Japan security relationship, that position has now been

abandoned. In this context, abrogating the mutual defense treaty is a very weak position

politically. While people in Okinawa are clamoring opposition to the Osprey aircraft, they cannot

call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces on which they rely for their livelihoods. Which is to say, very

few people think “Okinawa is safe because it is protected by U.S. forces”; rather, the feeling is that

“we are in danger because China will target us.” Okinawa paid tribute to China under the Imperial

tribute system. They have an understanding of Pax Sinica.

Q. Harner: Has the crisis produced any new thinking, or doubts, within the Japanese

government about Japan’s relations (economic, defense, or other) with China or the

U.S.?

A. Yabuki: For a part of the anti-China faction, the crisis has confirmed their view that China is a

barbaric country, a dictatorship, with which Japan should not continue to interact. But the reality is

that economic and cultural exchange has been steadily deepening. This trend will

continue. Shifting some activity from China to Myanmar may happen, but this do not mean a

decline in China’s share. China and Japan are united by an inescapable, though troubled

relationship (腐れ縁). Like it or not, it cannot be severed. It is like a marriage that has entered the

stage of ennui (倦怠期). At the time of the Tiananmen Incident, there was a similar

debate. Compared with then, the mutually dependent and complementary relationship has vastly

deepened. It doesn’t matter that some Japanese dislike China, they will unable to live without

“made in China.”


Q. Harner: Can you see any possible resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute?

A. Yabuki: It is either recognize the Chinese territorial claim, affirm a shared interest (or

“possession”) relationship (共有関係) , jointly develop the resources; or defer indefinitely any

development (開発棚上げ). These are the only alternatives. Until now, China has asserted that

the islands are its sovereign territory, while Japan has been in effective control. Through the

current crisis, China is effectively gaining international recognition of its sovereignty. China will

refuse to negotiate with the DPJ. If a cabinet headed Abe Shinzo comes into being, he can be

expected to head immediately to Beijing to restart a dialogue. Previously when Abe was elected

Prime Minister, one of his first acts was to go to China to unfreeze the relationship frozen by

Koizumi. It would be a replay of that. The newly elected deputy leader of the LDP Komura

Masahiko (高村正彦), chairman of the Japan-China Parliamentarian Committee, can handle the

liaison.

Harner: Thank you Professor Yabuki.

senkaku-dispute, by yabuki. 1

スチーブン・ハーナー氏による矢吹への書面インタビューと、それに対するコメントにつ

いて（2012年 10月 13日、矢吹晋）

資料 1 ハーナー氏によるインタビュー

10/03/2012 @ 2:48午前 |1,462 views

Interview with Professor Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis and U.S.-China-Japan

Relations

Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, is one of Japan’s

most eminent and thoughtful, as well as prolific, China scholars. For over 40 years,

Professor Yabuki has been remarkably prescient in his analysis of China’s rise, and of

challenges and opportunities presented thereby for Japan and the United States.

In a June 5 post on this blog, titled “Japanese Scholar Says Scrap U.S.-Japan

Alliance; Recognize U.S.-China Co-Dependency,” I summarized Yabuki’s new

book 『チャイメリカ―米中結託と日本の進路』 (Chimerica – U.S.-China Inter-

dependence and the Way Forward for Japan).

With typically prescience, in that book Yabuki foretold of a likely Japan-China crisis over

the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, as well as why–notwithstanding the U.S.-Japan alliance–

Japan cannot and should not rely upon the backing of military power to resolve

it. Yabuki’s views is that the U.S.-Japan alliance no longer serves, but rather is damaging

to Japan’s interests. The U.S. is too interdependent with China to make credible a

commitment to use military power. Moreover, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been and

continues as to be seen in China as justification for vastly increased military spending,

which has created worryingly strong vested interests. Yabuki’s prescription is for Japan to

abrogate the military alliance with the U.S. and to rededicated itself to active diplomacy to

resolve or manage disputes like Senkakus/Diaoyudao. This week I caught up with

Yabuki-sensei again. My questions and his answers (edited) follow.

Q. Harner: Have your analysis/opinions/conclusions changed since you

wrote Chimerica- U.S. China Interdependence and the Way Forward for

Japan?

A. Yabuki: I think that what I advocated and foretold have been validated. In particular,

in Part III of the book, I presented in detail the source of mistrust between China and Japan

relating first to Japan contrition for aggressive war and, second, over the Senkaku/

Diaoyudao dispute. It goes back to four meetings between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue

and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on September 26-28, 1972 that decided the terms for

restoring diplomatic relations. At a second meeting, Tanaka solemnly apologized “in all

sincerity” (誠心誠意の謝罪)for Japanese aggression . But the record of this apology was

excised by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials from the meeting transcript later

released the Japanese government. Similarly falsified was the record of the dialogue

between Tanaka and Zhou during meetings on the 27th and 28th. [矢吹注、橋本恕中国課長の 2000

http://onforb.es/K9ppml


年証言に基づいて、「4日目の首脳会談」すなわち「9月 28日会談」と矢吹は解したが、その後の点検によると、これ

は橋本恕の記憶違いであり、3日目すなわち 9月 27日の会談のヒトコマであった。この点については、張香山回想録、

『日本学刊』 1998年 1期が詳しい] Tanaka raised the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, soliciting from Zhou

a comment. Zhou first declined to address the issue, saying nothing was to be gained by

doing so. At a second meeting, Zhou again refused to discuss the islands. The Chinese

position was one of “shelving” the matter, not seeking resolution, because “resolution”

required one side to lose. This exchange was similarly removed from MOFA-prepared

transcripts. As a result, the Japanese official position (and record) has been that the issue

was never raised during the Tanaka-Zhou meetings. This situation allowed that the Noda

government (and previous governments) to maintain that the islands “are not disputed,”

i.e., the Chinese side had accepted Japanese sovereignty and control. The Chinese position

on Tanaka-Zhou dialogue has been, on the contrary, that China “implicitly agreed” (黙契)

to defer contention (搁置争议）over the issue. The Chinese position is clearly the valid

one. The Japanese understanding is clearly fanciful and contradictory. At the

extraordinary 15 minute Chinese President Hu Jintao-PM Noda “standing summit” that

took place on the edge of the APEC meeting in Vladivostok on September 9, this was the

point made by Hu to Noda. The next day, the Noda government implemented the

“nationalization” of the contested islands, delivering a massive loss of face to President Hu.

This crude abnegation of the Zhou-Tanaka “understanding” incited anti-Japanese

government statements and acts, included some that got out of hand. Mistrust in

Japan-China relations is owed in some cases to “chicken and egg” situations, where cause

and effect are hard to assign. The current case of the abnegation of the “implicit

agreement” was clearly an error by the Noda government, responsibility for which also

belongs to past MOFA officials who falsified transcripts. It can be said that mistrust in

Japan-China relations has been building over the past 40 years. It burst out into the open

during the first half of 2012 during a void in Japan’s foreign policy governance. This is

very much as I predicted. Six months before the publication of Chimerica, in a March 16

speech to the Kokusai Zenrin Kyokai, I expressed fears and gave warning of a dreadful

deterioration in Japan-China relations this fall. To me what has happened has been

completely expected.

More questions for and answers from Professor Yabuki in my next post. 10/04/2012 @ 2:09 午前 |2,259 views

Continuing the Interview with Japanese China Scholar Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyudao

Crisis and Japan-China-U.S. Relations. Continuing yesterday’s interview with

Professor Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), one of Japan’s most eminent China

scholars, author of 『チャイメリカ―米中結託と日本の進路』

http://onforb.es/O4j38Fhttp://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tanzan_Ishibashi_2.jpg


Tanzan Ishibashi (1884-1973) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

(Chimerica – U.S.-China Interdependence and the Way Forward for Japan).

Q. Harner: You advocated in your book that Japan should abrogate the mutual

defense treaty with the United States, saying that it does not serve Japan’s

interests. Are you still of this view?

A. Yabuki: A former Japanese Prime Minister whom I deeply respect and admire,

Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山) [note: (b. 1884-d. 1973) elected PM December 23, 1956 but

compelled to resign just three months later after suffering a mild stroke], visited China in

September 1959 and met with Premier Zhou Enlai. At that meeting Ishibashi proposed

that China and Japan join with each other to construct a compact for peace in East

Asia. This was the Cold War period Ishibashi “Japan-China-U.S.-Soviet Peace

Alliance ” (日中米ソ平和同盟) initiative. Earlier, in June of 1959, Ishibashi had written to

Zhou, as follows:

“When, as Prime Minister, I was composing my Cabinet, one of my strong desires was to

find a way to join hands with your Honorable Country, and to leverage our combined

strength to realize world peace…. The People’s Republic of China and Japan, acting as if

one country, uniting to defend peace in East Asia, pursuing common policies to promote

global peace…. Toward this goal, eliminating territorial barriers to free exchange in

economics, politics, and culture…. Doing this in such a way that respects our two

countries’ existing relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States and other

countries, and not demanding abrupt change; but to the extent practicable, activating

these relationships so that they work toward the aforementioned goal.”

In October 1963 Ishibashi visited China a second time and also met with Mao Zedong. At

the time I was a junior staffer at the Toyo Keizai and was honored to be invited to

Ishibashi’s home and to his vacation bungalow at Yamanaka Lake. My advocacy of

abrogating the U.S.-Japan security treaty is not just my idea. It is an idea whose genealogy

traces to Ishibashi’s “Japan-China-U.S.-Soviet Peace Alliance” initiative. The current

Japan-China conflict has only deepened my conviction that it is the right choice for Japan.

Q. Harner: Do you see any signs that the Japanese government is rethinking

the value or utility of the alliance with the U.S.? Has the U.S.-Japan alliance

been a factor influencing the current Senkaku/Diaoyudao crisis?

A. Yabuki: The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has traditionally embraced the U.S.-

Japan security treaty. The first two leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),

Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto, advocated changing Japan’s defense strategy. After both

men failed in office, the policy of PM Noda’s inner circle –called the “Noda LDP faction”–

has essentially been the LDP policy. In other words, while the change in government from

the LDP to the DPJ was informed by a policy position of changing the U.S.-Japan security

relationship, that position has now been abandoned. In this context, abrogating the

mutual defense treaty is a very weak position politically. While people in Okinawa are


clamoring opposition to the Osprey aircraft, they cannot call for the withdrawal of U.S.

forces on which they rely for their livelihoods. Which is to say, very few people

think “Okinawa is safe because it is protected by U.S. forces”; rather, the feeling is that “we

are in danger because China will target us.” Okinawa paid tribute to China under the

Imperial tribute system. They have an understanding of Pax Sinica.

Q. Harner: Has the crisis produced any new thinking, or doubts, within the

Japanese government about Japan’s relations (economic, defense, or other)

with China or the U.S.?

PAGE 2 OF 2

A. Yabuki: For a part of the anti-China faction, the crisis has confirmed their view that

China is a barbaric country, a dictatorship, with which Japan should not continue to

interact. But the reality is that economic and cultural exchange has been steadily

deepening. This trend will continue. Shifting some activity from China to Myanmar may

happen, but this do not mean a decline in China’s share. China and Japan are united by an

inescapable, though troubled relationship (腐れ縁). Like it or not, it cannot be severed. It

is like a marriage that has entered the stage of ennui (倦怠期). At the time of the

Tiananmen Incident, there was a similar debate. Compared with then, the mutually

dependent and complementary relationship has vastly deepened. It doesn’t matter that

some Japanese dislike China, they will unable to live without “made in China.”

Q. Harner: Can you see any possible resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao

dispute?

A. Yabuki: It is either recognize the Chinese territorial claim, affirm a shared interest (or

“possession”) relationship (共有関係) , jointly develop the resources; or defer indefinitely

any development (開発棚上げ). These are the only alternatives. Until now, China has

asserted that the islands are its sovereign territory, while Japan has been in effective

control. Through the current crisis, China is effectively gaining international recognition

of its sovereignty. China will refuse to negotiate with the DPJ. If a cabinet headed Abe

Shinzo comes into being, he can be expected to head immediately to Beijing to restart a

dialogue. Previously when Abe was elected Prime Minister, one of his first acts was to go

to China to unfreeze the relationship frozen by Koizumi. It would be a replay of that. The

newly elected deputy leader of the LDP Komura Masahiko (高村正彦), chairman of the

Japan-China Parliamentarian Committee, can handle the liaison.

Harner: Thank you Professor Yabuki.

資料 2 インタビューへのコメントで米議会調査報告 2012-9-25に言及

Date: Thursday, October 11, 2012, 9:06 AM

New comment on your post "Interview with Professor Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu

Crisis and U.S.-China-Japan Relations "


Author : David Clark (IP: 76.126.173.181 , c-76-126-173-181.hsd1.ca.comcast.net)

URL : http://profile.yahoo.com/RYDGMIWTR5R4LUT5JTMSRVLRZQ

Whois : http://whois.arin.net/rest/ip/76.126.173.181

Comment:

Japanese prime minister insists that “There is no doubt that the Senkaku islands are

Japan’s inherent territory in terms of history and international law,” Noda said. “There

is no problem of sovereignty.” He is lying to Japanese. China is not the only one who

doesn’t recognize Japan’s sovereignty over these islands; Washington does not accept

Japan's claims either. A US Congressional report published on Sept. 25 said

Washington has never recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (known

in Japan as Senkaku).[ワシントンは断じて釣魚/尖閣諸島に対する日本の主権を認めたこ

とはない] The report said the US recognizes only Japan's administrative power [米国は

日本の行政権、施政権だけを認めた]over the disputed islands in the East China Sea after

the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed in 1971. China had no diplomatic relations

with US and Japan at the time and the transfer was done without China’s consent. [沖

縄返還協定の当時、中国は米国や日本と外交関係がなかったので、返還は中国の同意なし

に行なわれた] Professor Yabuki is an honest man.[野田首相は国民にウソをついてい

る。ヤブキは、このウソを批判している]

資料 3米議会調査報告 2012-9-25 Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty

Obligations, Congressional Research Service http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf

*この調査報告書の旧版は、元来沖縄返還が米議会で論議された 1972年に Larry Nikschが執筆したものである。Larry

Niksch は 2010年に Congressional Research Service, CRS を引退した。そこで報告書 9月 25日版は、Mark E. Manyin,

Specialist in Asian Affairs が旧版をアップディトして、わずかに修正したもの( updated and modified slightly from

the original)である。

RS Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Senkaku

(Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, Congressional Research Service

Summary

Since the mid-1990s, tensions have spiked periodically among Japan, China, and Taiwan over the

disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu/ Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea. These flare-ups run the risk,

which most observers regard as remote, of involving the United States in an armed conflict in the

region. Japan administers the eight small, uninhabited islands, which some geologists believe sit

near significant oil and natural gas deposits. China and Taiwan both contest Japanese claims of

sovereignty over the islands. U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration

have stated that the United States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has

been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islands, because

Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the

Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). Under the treaty,

the United States guarantees Japan’s security in return for the right to station U.S. troops—which

http://c-76-126-173-181.hsd1.ca.comcast.net/http://profile.yahoo.com/RYDGMIWTR5R4LUT5JTMSRVLRZQhttp://whois.arin.net/rest/ip/76.126.173.181http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf


currently number around 50,000—in dozens of bases throughout the Japanese archipelago.

Although it is commonly understood that Japan will assume the primary responsibility for the

defense of the treaty area, in the event of a significant armed conflict with either China or Taiwan,

most Japanese would likely expect that the U.S. would honor its treaty obligations. Each time

tensions over the islands have flared, questions have arisen concerning the U.S. legal relationship

to the islands. This report will focus on that issue, which has four elements:

・1. U.S. administration of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) from 1953 to 1971;

・2. the application to the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) of the 1971 “Treaty Between Japan and the

United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands”—commonly

known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, approved by the Senate in 1971 and entered into force

the following year (the Daito Islands lie to the east of Okinawa);

・3. the U.S. view on the claims of the disputants; and

・4. the relationship of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the islands.

Members of Congress periodically have been involved or expressed interest in the Senkaku

(Diaoyu) dispute over the decades, most prominently when the issue of the U.S.-Japan Security

Treaty’s application arose during the Senate’s deliberations over the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

More recently, Congressional committees have explored the topic in hearings about maritime

disputes in East Asia.

Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations Congressional Research

Service

Contents

Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1

The Competing Claims .................................................................................................................... 2

U.S. Administration of the Islands, 1953-1971................................................................................ 3

Inclusion of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty............................... 4

U.S. Position on the Competing Claims .................................................................................... 4

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Islands ..............................................................................

5

Figure 1. Map of Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands and Surrounding Region........................... 2

Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 7

Introduction

Periodically, tensions arise among Japan, China, and Taiwan over a small group of islands located

about 120 miles northeast of Taipei, Taiwan. Japan, China (also known as the People’s Republic of

China, or PRC), and Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China, or ROC) all claim sovereignty

over the islands, known as the Senkakus in Japan, the Diaoyu in China, and the Diaoyutai in Taiwan.

China considers the islands to be part of Taiwan, over which it claims sovereignty. The islands are

eight in number, sometimes described as five islets and three rocks, and are uninhabited. The largest

is about two miles in length and less than one mile in width.

However, geologists believe that the waters surrounding them may be rich in oil and natural gas

deposits. The disputed claims are long standing. Most recently, tensions have flared in 2012


following Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara’s April 2012 announcement in Washington, DC, that he

intended to lead a movement to purchase three of the eight islands from their private owner.

Ishihara, who is known for expressing nationalist Japanese views, called for demonstrating Japan’s

control over the islands by building installations such as a telecommunications base, a port, and a

meteorological station. He conducted an online campaign to support his efforts, raising nearly $20

million in private donations for the purchase.1 1 Phred Dvorak and Toko Sekiguchi, “Tokyo Governor Keeps Up Isle

Rhetoric,” Wall Street Journal Asia, August 28,2012. For a video of Ishihara’s April 16, 2012 speech, see

http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/04/ shintaro-ishihara. In a move it said was designed to prevent Ishihara or

other nationalists from acquiring the islands, Japan’s central government on September 12, 2012,

purchased the three islands for ¥2.05 billion (about $16 million at an exchange rate of ¥78:$1).

China and Taiwan protested the move, and across China large-scale anti-Japanese protests erupted,

some of which resulted in violence. Since Ishihara’s April 2012 speech, the islands also have been

the scene of increased activity—and sometimes direct encounters—between activists, fishermen,

and maritime vessels of all three governments. Many observers worry that an accident could result

in armed conflict between Japan and China. Each time tensions erupt over the islands, questions

have arisen concerning the U.S. relationship to the islands. This report will focus on that issue. It

was originally written by Larry Niksch, who retired from CRS in 2010. It has been updated and

modified slightly from the original.

The Competing Claims

The claims of China and Taiwan have a similar basis. China asserts that its Ming Dynasty

(1368-1644) considered the islands part of its maritime territory and included them on maps and

documents of areas covered by Ming Dynasty coastal defenses. China claims that the Qing Dynasty

(1644-1911) went further and placed the islands under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, which was a part

http://www/


of the Qing Dynasty.2

2 State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an InherentTerritory of China,

September 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html. Chinese names are rendered using the Pinyin transliteration system. In 1893, the

Dowager Empress of China, Cixi 慈禧太后, made a grant of the islands to盛宣懐 Sheng Xuanhuai,

head of the Imperial Household, who collected medical herbs on them.3 3 Upton, Peter N., “International

Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy over the Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands,” Boston University Law

Review, Fall 1972: 767. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.

October 27, 28, and 29, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1971. p. 89-90. Hereinafter, the hearings will be cited as

Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings. [矢吹注、慈禧太后が盛宣懐に命じて尖閣諸島で薬草を収集させたとする典拠について

は、その史実に疑問が持たれている]

However, although there are claims that Chinese fishermen used the islands as places of temporary

shelter and repair, China never established a permanent settlement of civilians or military personnel

on the islands, and apparently did not maintain permanent naval forces in adjacent waters.44 Cheng

Tao, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition,” Virginia Journal

of International Law, Winter 1974. p. 244-246, 260. Japan, which argues that there is no territorial dispute, laid

claim to the islands in January 1895, when the Japanese Emperor approved an Imperial Ordinance

annexing them to Japan.5 5 Upton, op. cit., p. 768. Before then, Japan argues, the islands were uninhabited

and “showed no trace of having been under the control of China,” positions the Chinese and

Taiwanese governments reject.6 6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations.

Basic Facts on the Senkaku Islands and the Recent Incident,” October 2010, http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/ china/pdfs/

facts1010.pdf. “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” September 10, 2012,

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/diaodao/t968188.htm

. “The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of the Republic of China (Taiwan),” April 9, 2012,

http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=T02&pid=0000000516. In May 1895, Japan and the

Qing Dynasty government of China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the Sino-Japanese war

that had begun the previous year. Under the Treaty, which China today considers one of a number of

“unequal treaties” forced on it by foreign powers, China ceded Taiwan (Formosa) to Japan “together

with all the islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.” The Treaty did not

specifically mention the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) and the islands were not discussed during the

negotiating sessions.7 7 Upton, op. cit., p. 776. State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, White

Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an InherentTerritory of China, September 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html. Japan

has claimed from this that its incorporation of the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) was an act apart

from the Sino-Japanese War. In contrast, China and Taiwan argue that Japan used its victory in the

war to annex the islands. They also argue that the intent of the Allied declarations at Cairo and

Potsdam during World War II was to restore to China territories taken from it by Japan through

military aggression.8 8 Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, p. 149, 152; “The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the

Territory of the Republic of China (Taiwan).” State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, White Paper on

Diaoyu Dao, an InherentTerritory of China, September 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html. In October

1945, when Japan relinquished authority over Taiwan, it did not specifically mention the disposition

of the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai).

http://www/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/diaodao/t968188.htmhttp://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=T02&pid=0000000516http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.htmlhttp://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html


U.S. Administration of the Islands, 1953-1971

U.S. administration of the islands began in 1953 as a result of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan.9

9 Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169. The Treaty did not mention the Senkakus

(Diaoyu/Diaoyutai), but it referred to other islands that had reverted to Chinese control or which

China claimed. These included Taiwan, the Pescadores (off the western coast of Taiwan), as well as

the Spratlys and the Paracels (both in the South China Sea). Article 3 gave the United States sole

powers of administration of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu and the

Daito Islands)....” In 1953, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus issued U.S. Civil

Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 (USCAR 27), which defined the boundaries of

“Nansei Shoto [the southwestern islands] south of 29 degrees north latitude 北緯 29 度以南” to

include the Senkakus.10

10 Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, p. 149, 152. At the time of the signing of the

Okinawa Reversion Treaty, several State Department officials asserted that following the signing of

the Japan Peace Treaty, “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” was “understood by the

United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands.”1111 The State Department officials included Robert Starr,

Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Harrison Symmes, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for

Congressional Relations; and Howard McElroy, Country Officer for Japan. For their statements, see Okinawa Reversion Hearings,

p. 90-91, 93, 147. Moreover, during the period of U.S. administration, the U.S. Navy established firing

ranges on the islands and paid an annual rent of $11,000 to Jinji Koga, the son of the first Japanese

settler of the islands.12

12 Ibid., p. 77, 94, 119; Hornsby, Michael, “Japan Asserts Rights to Isles Claimed by China,” London

Times, Mar. 19, 1972. Koga’s father ran several commercial operations on the islands, including fish-canning and guano collection.

Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No.

1, 2007, p.150-56. China has described the U.S.-Japan understandings related to the islands as

“backroom deals” that are “illegal and invalid.”13

13 State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of

China, White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, September 2012,

http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html.

Inclusion of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty

The Okinawa Reversion Treaty,14

14 Treaty on Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, signed Jun. 17,

1971, 23 U.S.T. 446.

which was signed on June 17, 1971, and entered into force on May 15, 1972, provided for the return

to Japan of “all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction” over the Ryukyu and

Daito islands, which the United States had held under the Japan Peace Treaty. Article I of the

Okinawa Reversion Treaty defines the term “the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” as “all

territories with their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers

of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under

Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan....” An Agreed Minute to the Okinawa Reversion Treaty

defines the boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito islands “as designated under” USCAR

27. Moreover, the latitude and longitude boundaries set forth in the Agreed Minute appear to include

the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai). A letter of October 20, 1971, by Robert Starr, Acting Assistant

Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs—acting on the instructions of Secretary of State


William Rogers—states that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty contained “the terms and conditions for

the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including the Senkakus.”15

Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, p. 91.

U.S. Position on the Competing Claims During Senate deliberations on whether to consent to the

ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, the State Department asserted that the United States

took a neutral position with regard to the competing claims of Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite the

return of the islands to Japanese administration. Department officials asserted that reversion of

administrative rights to Japan did not prejudice any claims to the islands. When asked by the

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how the Okinawa Reversion Treaty would

affect the determination of sovereignty over the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai), Secretary of State

William Rogers answered 15 Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, p. 91. that “this treaty does not affect the

legal status of those islands at all.”16

16 Ibid., p. 11. In his letter of October 20, 1971, Acting Assistant

Legal Adviser Robert Starr stated: The Governments of the Republic of China and Japan are in

disagreement as to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. You should know as well that the People’s

Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over the islands. The United States believes that a

return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can

in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan

possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by

giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has made no

claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for

resolution by the parties concerned.17

17 Ibid., p. 91. Successive U.S. administrations have restated this

position of neutrality regarding the claims, particularly during periods when tensions over the

islands have flared, as in 1996, 2010, and 2012.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Islands

The inclusion of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty under the

definition of “the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” made Article II of the Treaty applicable to

the islands. Article II states that “treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between

Japan and the United States of America, including, but without limitation to the Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America ... become applicable to

the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”18

18

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, 11 U.S.T. 1632, was signed on January 19,

1960, and entered into force on June 23 of the same year. Using “Okinawa” as shorthand for the territory covered

by the Treaty, Secretary of State Rogers stated in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee that the Security Treaty “becomes applicable to Okinawa” in the same way as it applied

to the Japanese home islands.19

19 Okinawa Reversion Hearings, p. 22. Deputy Secretary of Defense David

Packard, in his testimony, stressed that Japan would assume the “primary responsibility” for the

defense of the treaty area but that the Security Treaty was applicable.20

20 Ibid., p. 42, 44.

In short, while maintaining neutrality on the competing claims, the United States agreed in the

Okinawa Reversion Treaty to apply the Security Treaty to the treaty area, including the Senkaku


(Diaoyu/Diaoyutai). During a 2010 worsening of Japan-PRC relations over the islands, Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton summed up the U.S. stance by stating, “... with respect to the Senkaku Islands,

the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have made it very clear that the

islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan.”21

21 “Hillary

Rodham Clinton Remarks Following Signing Ceremonies,” Hanoi, Vietnam, October 30, 2010. Clinton went on to say that “We

have certainly encouraged both Japan and China to seek peaceful resolution of any

disagreements that they have in this area or others. It is in all of our interest for China

and Japan to have stable, peaceful relations. And we have recommended to both that

the United States is more than willing to host a trilateral, where we would bring Japan

and China and their foreign ministers together to discuss a range of issues.” In 2004, Deputy

Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty “ ... would require any attack on

Japan, or the administrative territories under Japanese control, to be seen as an attack on the United

States.” (emphasis added) U.S. State Department, “Remarks and Q & A at the Japan National Press Club, Richard L. Armitage,

Deputy Secretary of State,” February 2, 2004.

(continued...)

It also should be noted that in providing its consent to U.S. ratification of the Treaty, the Senate did

not act on the advice of several committee witnesses that it include a reservation concerning the

Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification. Moreover, the

Security Treaty itself declares in Article V that each party would act “in accordance with its

constitutional provisions and processes”22

22 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was one of several collective defense

agreements entered by the United States between 1947 and 1960. Almost all of them, including the U.S.-Japan agreement, include a

provision specifying that the parties’ obligations shall be carried out in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

This language was included to satisfy congressional concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President

to take military action in defense of treaty parties without additional congressional authorization (i.e., a declaration of war or joint

resolution authorizing military force). For further discussion, see CRS Report R40614, Congressional Oversight and Related Issues

Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States, by Michael John Garcia and R. Chuck Mason.

in response to “an armed attack ... in the territories under the administration of Japan.”

“Administration” rather than “sovereignty” is the key distinction that applies to the islands. Since

1971, the United States and Japan have not altered the application of the Security Treaty to the

islands.

The Japan-China Dispute over Their Maritime Boundary

Japan and China are involved in another East China Sea disagreement over maritime boundary (as

opposed to the competing claims over the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku

(Diaoyu/Diaoyutai)). While China claims the whole continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough,

Japan claims the same shelf to a median line between its undisputed territory and that of China.

Since at least the 1970s, China has been exploring and building pipelines on and around its side of

the median line in the disputed waters, under which are oil and gas deposits. In the first decade of

the 2000s, Japan and China began to pursue a bilateral agreement over the exploitation of the

undersea hydrocarbon resources. In their negotiations, both Beijing and Tokyo sought to make a


distinction between their territorial dispute over the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) and the rights

to develop the undersea hydrocarbon fields. In June 2008, the two sides announced an agreement

on joint exploration for gas and oil in two of the fields close to or straddling the “median line”

that Japan claims is the rightful boundary between the two countries’ 200-mile exclusive

economic zones (EEZs). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

defines an EEZ as the area extending from a country’s coastline outwards up to 200 nautical miles

from the edge of a country’s territorial sea, which ends 12 miles from its coastline. The

Japan-China joint development explicitly states that it does not prejudice either side’s legal claims

in the area. Under the agreement, the two countries reached an “understanding” for cooperation in

the Chunxiao gas and oil fields (called Shirakaba in Japanese), the southernmost of the fields. To

date, however, no progress has been made in implementing the agreement. It is unclear to what

extent and in which situations the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security treaty, which refers to an armed

attack on the territories of under the administration of Japan, would apply in the event of a

Sino-Japanese military conflict over the two countries’ maritime boundary dispute. Regardless of

the treaty’s technicalities and its interpretation, however, it is likely that Japanese policymakers

and citizens would expect that the treaty would apply to any Sino-Japanese military conflict,

including those involving the competing maritime claims.

(...continued)Author Contact Information Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs,

mmanyin @crs. loc.gov, 7-7653

yabuki.susumu, senkaku2 1

尖閣問題の交渉経緯の真相

以下の資料 1.から分かるように、第三回首脳会談で田中が尖閣を提起し、周恩来が「今、

これを話すのはよくない」と棚上げ案を返答しています。外務省会談記録は、その趣旨を

次のように記録しています。

資料 1. 外務省が公表した「田中角栄首相、周恩来総理会談」記録によれば、第三回首脳会

談 1972年 9月 27日午後 4時 10分から、国際問題を語り、そのなかで尖閣を話した。

田中総理「尖閣諸島についてどう思うか? 私のところに、いろいろ言ってくる人がいる」。

周総理「尖閣諸島問題については、今、これを話すのはよくない。石油が出るから、これ

が問題になった。石油が出なければ、台湾も米国も問題にしない」。――『記録と考証、日中国交

正常化』岩波書店、2003年、68ページ。

もう少し詳細な記録が欲しいところですが、この簡潔な要旨記録から明らかなように、

田中は第三回首脳会談で尖閣を提起して、周恩来は、以上のように答えています。

その後、橋本恕中国課長は、次のような証言を行いました。

資料 2. 橋本恕の第 4回［実は第 3回］首脳会談 1972年 9月 28日[実は 27日]の回想。「台

湾問題が結着したあと」、周首相が「いよいよこれですべて終わりましたね」と言った。

ところが「イヤ、まだ残っている」と田中首相が持ち出したのが尖閣列島問題だった。周

首相は「これを言い出したら、双方とも言うことがいっぱいあって、首脳会談はとてもじ

ゃないが終わりませんよ。だから今回はこれは触れないでおきましょう」と言ったので、

田中首相の方も「それはそうだ、じゃ、これは別の機会に」、ということで交渉はすべて

終わったのです。――橋本恕の 2000年 4月 4日清水幹夫への証言、大平正芳記念財団編『去華就実聞き書き大平

正芳』2000年。『記録と考証、日中国交正常化』岩波書店、2003年、223-4ページに再録。

ここで橋本が、外務省記録にある 27日の尖閣発言の翌日、再度問題を提起したと証言し

ているのは、記憶違いのように思われる。周恩来が「双方とも言うことがいっぱいあって、

首脳会談はとてもじゃないが終わらない」という理由で、棚上げを提案し、田中が同意し

たのは、話の内容が 27日の対話と同じだ。27日の田中・周恩来会談のやりとりを最も詳し

く証言しているのは、中国外交部顧問張香山の回想記である。

資料 3.中国外交部顧問として、日中会談に同席した張香山の回想記は、次のように記録して

いる。この記述は、中国側会談記録に基づくものと矢吹は推測する。

張香山曰く、この問題に関しては、第3回首脳会談[9月27日]がまもなく終わろうという時に話

が始まったが、双方は態度を表明しただけで議論はしなかった――

田中首相1――「私はやはり一言言いたい。私はあなたの側の寛大な態度に感謝しつつ、この場を

借りて、中国側の尖閣列島（＝釣魚島）に対する態度如何を伺いたい」。

周総理1――「この問題について私は今回は話したくない。今話しても利益がない」。

田中首相2――「私が北京に来た以上、提起もしないで帰ると困難に遭遇する。いま私がちょっと

提起しておけば、彼らに申し開きできる」［申し開きの中国語＝交待］。


周総理 2――「もっともだ！そこは海底に石油が発見されたから、台湾はそれを取り上げて問題

にする。現在アメリカもこれをあげつらおうとし、この問題を大きくしている。

田中3――「よし！これ以上話す必要はなくなった。またにしよう」。

総理3――「またにしよう。今回我々は解決できる基本問題、たとえば両国関係の正常化問題を先

に解決する。これは最も差し迫った問題だ。いくつかの問題は時の推移を待ってから話そう」。

田中4――「一旦国交が正常化すれば、私はその他の問題は解決できると信じる」。

出所：『日本学刊』1998 年第 1 期。なお、この回想記は、張香山著『中日関系管窺与見証』当代世界出版社、1998

年には、収められていない。

以上から分かるように、「田中が4回、周恩来が3回」発言した。ちなみに日本外務省の会談記録

では、「田中1回、周恩来1回」だけの応答であったように記録されている。

念のために、張香山の原文を以下に掲げる。

在第三次首脑会谈快要结束的时候谈起的，双方只是表个态就不谈了。当时

a田中首相说：我还想说一句话，我对贵方的宽大态度很感谢，借这个机会我想问一下贵方对

“尖阁列岛”(即我钓鱼岛)的态度如何？

b周总理说：这个问题我这次不想谈，现在谈没有好处。

c田中首相说：既然我到了北京，不提一下，回去会遇到一些困难。现在我提了一下，就可以

向他们交待了。

d周总理说：对!就因为那里海底发现了石油，台湾拿它大作文章，现在美国也要作这个文章，

把这个问题搞得很大。

e田中说：好!不需要再谈了，以后再说。

f总理也说：以后再说，这次我们把能解决的基本问题，比如两国关系正常化问题先解决。这

是最迫切的问题。有些问题要等到时间转移后来谈。

g田中说：一旦邦交正常化，我相信其他问题是能够解决的。

张香山中日复交谈判回顾《日本学刊》 1998年第 1期

ちなみに、もう一つのキーワード「共同開発」について、張香山は次のように記録している。

釣魚島の「共同開発」問題に関して、私[張香山]の知るところでは、1979年 5月鄧小平副総理が訪

中した鈴木善幸氏と会談した時に提起されたものである。鈴木善幸氏は聞いた後、この意見を持ち帰

り、大平正芳首相に知らせると表明した。

原文は以下の通りである。

关于钓鱼岛共同开发问题，据我所知是在 1979年 5月邓小平副总理同来华访问的铃木善

幸先生会谈时提出来的。铃木先生听后表示要把这个意见带回去，告诉大平首相。

反霸条款问题，总理向竹入提出的八条三项方案里就有这一条。总理告诉竹入说，这是

基辛格的发明，已写入中美公报中，现在中日联合声明也用上了，这样中国、美国、日本三


国都同意了。竹入听了以后说，这一条可能会产生一些影响。总理说：如果日苏会谈，苏联

也讲这一句不是很好吗!总理还说因为这个东西是美国搞的，估计美国是不会反对的。当然，

如果这个问题田中首相觉得有问题，可以商量。竹入表示很感谢，说要去说服他们两位。结

果，在古井先生带来的日本对案中，已写入这一条，倒是到签订中日和平友好条约时却发生

了问题。出所：『日本学刊』1998年第 1期

このやりとりを指して、中国側は「黙契」・「共識」(共通認識の意)と呼んでいます。

「黙契や共通認識はなかった」とする日本政府の主張は、田中・周恩来会談の真相をゆ

がめるものです。中国はいま、日本政府の認識と尖閣国有化は、田中・周恩来会談におけ

る棚上げを反故にしたものと非難しています。

改竄された外務省記録をもとに戻すことが必要です。当事者の橋本恕中国課長(のち中国

大使)は「1972 年の真実」を 28 年後の 2000 年になってようやく告白した経緯を知らない

日本人は、「尖閣問題の棚上げ」「尖閣問題についての共通認識」はなかったと受け取り、

「尖閣は日本固有の領土だ」とする一方的理解だけが刷り込まれてしまったのですが、こ

れを是正することが必要です。

以下に三つの関連資料を挙げます。一つは、いわゆる竹入メモの筆者竹入義勝の回顧録。

もう一つは、国交正常化 6年後の 1978年に来日した鄧小平記者会見の尖閣についての発言

です。周恩来の認識と鄧小平の認識は、基本的に同じです。「尖閣は日本固有の領土だ」

とする日本側主張に対して、「釣魚島は中国固有の領土だ」と主張しています。そして両

者の立場表明を前提としつつ、棚上げで合意しているのです。この合意を日本政府が否定

したことによって、国交正常化当時の約束が反故にされたと中国は主張しているわけです。

田中・周恩来会談において、「中国側は領有権主張を行わなかった」とする解釈は、明ら

かに間違いであり、そのような記述を行った服部龍二『日中国交正常化』（中公新書、2011

年）に、アジア・太平洋賞特別賞を与えた『毎日新聞』や、大佛次郎論壇賞を与えた『朝

日新聞』は、日本世論をミスリードした責任を免れないのです。最後に２年前の国会論議

を一つ。大平も園田も、野田政権みたいな独善的態度ではなかったことは明らかです。

資料 4. 当時公明党委員長として田中訪中へのメッセンジャー役を務めた竹入義勝は、次の

ような証言を残している。

尖閣列島の帰属は、周首相との会談で、どうしても言わざるを得なかった。「歴史上も文献

からしても日本の固有の領土だ」と言うと周首相は笑いながら答えた。「竹入さん、われわ

れも同じことを言いますよ。釣魚島は昔から中国の領土で、わが方も見解を変えるわけに

はいかない」。さらに「この問題を取り上げれば、際限ない。ぶつかりあうだけで何も出て

こない。棚上げして、後の賢い人たちに任せしょう」と強調した。――『記録と考証、日中国交


1978年の尖閣合意（コンセンサス、共識）について。

資料 5. 1978年 8月 10日、園田外相が訪中して北京で、鄧小平・園田会談が行なわれた。


尖閣についてのやりとりは、張香山著『中日関系管窺与見証』によると、以下の通り。な

お、日本外務省の会談記録は、尖閣の箇所を削除したものしか発表していない。

・中日両国間には若干の懸案がないわけではない。たとえば、日本は尖閣列島と呼び、中

国は釣魚島と呼ぶ、この問題もあるし、大陸棚の問題もある（我們両国併不是不存在一些問題的。

比如你們説的尖閣列島，我們叫釣魚台問題，還有大陸架問題）。

・日本では一部の人がこの問題を利用して『友好条約』の調印を妨害したではありません

か。わが国にも調印を妨害した人がいないわけではない。たとえばアメリカに留学し、ア

メリカ国籍をとった者、一部の華僑たち、彼らの中に「保釣」運動がある。台湾にも「保

釣」運動がありますよ（但在你們国内不是有一些人企図挑起這様的事情来妨礙和平友好条

約的簽訂嗎？我們中国人也不是没有這種人，比如説，我們留美的，加入美国籍的，有些還

是華僑，不是有一個保釣島嗎？在台湾也有＂保釣＂呢！）。

・この種の問題は、今引っ張りだしてはいけない。『平和友好条約』の精神がありさえすれ

ば、何年か放って置いておいて構わない。何十年か経って協議整わずでもかまわない。ま

さか解決できなければ、仲違いでもないでしょう（這様的問題現在不要牽進去，本着「和平友好条約」

的精神，放幾年不要緊，很可能這様的問題，幾十年也達不成協議。達不成，我們就不友好了嗎？）

・釣魚島問題は片方に置いてゆっくりゆうゆうと考えればよい。中日両国間には確かに懸

案はある（要把釣魚台問題放在一辺，慢慢来，従容考慮。我們両国之間是有問題的）。

・両国は政治体制も置かれている立場も異なる。いかなる問題でも同じ言い方になるのは

不可能だ。とはいえ、同時に両国は共通点も多い。要するに、『小異を残して大同に就く』

ことが重要だ（我們両国政治体制不同，処境不同，不可能任何問題上都是同様語言。但是我們間共同点很多，凡是

都可以「求大同，存小異」）。

・われわれは多くの共通点を探し、相互協力、相互援助、相呼応する道を探るべきです。『友

好条約』の性格はつまりこのような方向を定めている。まさに園田先生のいう新たな起点

です（我們要更多的尋求共同点，尋求相互合作，相互幫助，相互配合的途径）条約的性質就是規定了這方向，正是你

説的一個新的起点）。

これを受けて、園田は次のように応じた――鄧小平閣下がこの問題に言及されたので、

日本外相として私も一言発言しないわけにはいきません。もし発言しないとすれば、帰国

してから申し開きできない。尖閣に対する日本の立場は閣下がご存じの通りです。今後二

度とあのような偶然［張香山注、中国漁船隊が尖閣海域に侵入したこと］が起こらないよう希望したい。

私はこの一言を申し上げたい（你談了這個問題，我作為日本外相，也不能不説一点。如果不説，回去就不好交

代。関于日本対尖閣的立場，閣下是知道的，希望不再発生那様的偶然事情指中国捕魚船隊，一度進入釣魚島海域，我講

這麽一句）。

これを受けて、鄧小平は次のように応じた――この種の事柄を並べると、われわれの世代

の者には、解決方法が見出せない。次の世代は、その次の世代は、解決方法を探し当てる

ことができるでしょう（把這様的事情擺開，我們這一代人，没有找到辦法，我們的下一代，再下一代総会找

到辦法解決的）。

――張香山著『中日関系管窺与見証』当代世界出版社、1998年

園田外相の訪中を踏まえて友好条約が調印されたので、その批准書交換のために鄧小平の

訪日が行なわれた。鄧小平は 1978年 10月 25日日本記者クラブで、記者会見を行った。そ


の発言趣旨は、資料 5.と酷似している。つまり、北京における園田・鄧小平会談を踏まえ

て、資料 6があることは明らかだ。

資料 6. 鄧小平副首相尖閣列島は、我々は釣魚諸島と言います。だから名前も呼び方も違

っております。だから、確かにこの点については、双方に食い違った見方があります。中

日国交正常化の際も、双方はこの問題に触れないということを約束しました。今回、中日

平和友好条約を交渉した際もやはり同じく、この問題に触れないということで一致しまし

た。中国人の知恵からして、こういう方法しか考え出せません。というのは、その問題に

触れますと、それははっきり言えなくなってしまいます。そこで、確かに一部のものはこ

ういう問題を借りて、中日両国の関係に水を差したがっております。ですから、両国政府

が交渉する際、この問題を避けるということが良いと思います。こういう問題は、一時棚

上げにしてもかまわないと思います。十年棚上げにしてもかまいません。我々の、この世

代の人間は知恵が足りません。この問題は話がまとまりません。次の世代は、きっと我々

よりは賢くなるでしょう。そのときは必ずや、お互いに皆が受け入れられる良い方法を見

つけることができるでしょう。――鄧小平記者会見「未来に目を向けた友好関係を」1978

年 10月 25日日本記者クラブホームページ http://www.jnpc.or.jp/files/opdf/117.pdf

資料 5.と資料 6.で得られた「合意、共識、コンセンサス」は、その後、国会でどのように

認識されていたかを示す資料を一つだけ掲げる。

資料 7．衆院安保特別委（2010年 10月 21日）の議事録。

船長逮捕事件における前原誠司発言が出た際の、民主党議員の質問です。「棚上げ」を園田

直外相も大平正芳首相も認めていたと紹介しています。

○神風英男委員（民主）＝（野田内閣・野田改造の防衛大臣政務官）

日本としては、（棚上げ）合意がないという立場であろうと思います。ただ、当時大平内

閣のもとで、当時の沖縄開発庁が調査団を尖閣諸島に派遣した、この調査に関して、中国

が、鄧小平副首相との合意に反するという抗議があったわけであります。これを受けて、

衆議院の外務委員会において、当時の園田直外務大臣がこのように述べられている。

「日本の国益ということを考えた場合に、じっとして今の状態を続けていった方が国益な

のか、あるいはここに問題をいろいろ起こした方が国益なのか、私は、じっとして、鄧小

平副主席が言われた、二十年、三十年、今のままでいいじゃないかというような状態で通

すことが日本独自の利益からいってもありがたいことではないかと考えます。」

こういうように述べられているわけでありまして、いわば棚上げ状態にしておくことが

日本の国益にも合致するんだというような趣旨のことを当時の園田外務大臣が述べられ、

また、いろいろその当時の議事録を拝見しますと、大平総理も同じような立場に立ってい

るようであります。

資料８．尖閣問題を紛争のタネにするな――『読売新聞』1979年 5月 31日付社説

http://www.jnpc.or.jp/files/opdf/117.pdf


2012年 10月 9日修正版


尖閣騒動――頂門の一針

あるジャーナリストの話である――今の日本のメディア特に民放は、桜井よしことか中

西輝政とか渡辺利夫のようなシロウトに中国を語らせますが、無節操もはなはだしい。今

回の尖閣国有化をめぐっては、7月の段階ですでに CCTV4の「中国新聞」で、「非法」［不

法］、「購島」［島の政府買い上げ］、「閙劇」［茶番劇］をキーワードとして連日、日本批判を繰

り返していました。9月 13日の CCTV4昼ニュースは、最初から 30分間、尖閣問題のオン

パレード。

自称「CCTV4 ウォッチャー」の小生は、このままでは済まないと思っていたのですが、

同日夜ＮＨＫの「ニュース 9」と、翌 14日のＮＨＫ「おはよう日本」7時～7時 45分のニ

ュースには「尖閣なし」。あまりにも大きなギャップに絶句――

このジャーナリストの絶句に近い体験を私はこの半年、数回味わった。

3月 16日、国際善隣協会で講演した際には、2月 16日夜、北京での日本友好 7団体の胡

錦涛会見拒否に触れつつ、「40周年記念イベントの幕開け」がこの体たらくでは「本番の秋

は更に凄まじいことになりそうだ」と警告した(『善隣』4月号

http://www25.big.jp/~yabuki/2012/mitsugetsu.pdf)。

私の予想というか、危惧は、遺憾ながら的中した。

問題は、このような形で日中の矛盾が爆発したにもかかわらず、依然として何事が起こ

ったのかを大方の日本人が自覚できていないことだ。

尖閣は日本固有の領土だ、と金切り声をあげる政治家を英雄扱いし、「中国は事実上、尖

閣諸島の領有権を放棄した」と明々白々の事実誤認を書いた御用学者（服部龍二『日中国

交正常化』）を繰り返しマスコミに登用させている（毎日、朝日、ＮＨＫ）。私はこの本が

史実を隠蔽し、改竄する本であり、田中角栄・周恩来会談の真相をゆがめるものだと批判

してきたが私の批判は無視されている。

http://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching

_65.html

この本は，外務省高官の自画自讃にすぎず、「鳥なき里の蝙蝠の饒舌」ではないかと批判

してきた。田中角栄、大平正芳、園田直ら、国交正常化を真に担った人々の没後に、その

精神をゆがめる解釈ではないかと批判してきた。

http://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching

_66.html

40年来の史実をこのようにゆがめることがいかなる事態を招くかを、深く憂慮してきた。

というのは、これらは、すべて中国から見ると、「日本右翼の挑戦」、尖閣についての「黙

契と共識」（暗黙の約束と共通認識）の無視と受け止められることを危惧したからだ。果た

して、誠に遺憾ながら、そのような結果になった。

しかしながら、事ここに及んでも、まるで事の成り行きに無頓着というか、事態のどの

ように進展しつつあるかを認知できていない。日本社会の「尖閣カルト」はもはや、カル

トと呼ぶほかないような錯乱ぶりではないか。

*****

http://www25.big.jp/~yabuki/2012/mitsugetsu.pdfhttp://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching_65.htmlhttp://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching_65.htmlhttp://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching_66.htmlhttp://www.21ccs.jp/china_watching/DirectorsWatching_YABUKI/Directors_watching_66.html


実は、「領土問題は存在しない」という民主党政権＝外務省の強弁は、すでに破産したの

だ。この問題が登場して以来、かねて内外の識者たちが指摘してきた、周知の事柄ではあ

るが、中国の『尖閣/釣魚台白書』（9月 25日）がついに、「無主地先占」論の矛盾を標的に

据えて、日本政府の主張の弱点を鋭く衝いてきた。

いまや日本側が依拠してきた「固有の領土とする原点」が大きく揺らいでいる。

・1885 年 9 月 22 日、沖縄県令が釣魚島を秘密調査した後、山県有朋内務卿に提出した秘

密報告では、これらの無人島は「『中山伝信録』に記載された釣魚台、黄尾嶼、赤尾嶼など

と同一の島嶼であり」、すでに清朝の冊封使船によってよく知られ、かつ琉球に向かう航海

の目印として、それぞれ名称が付けられている。したがって、国の標杭を立てるべきかど

うか懸念があり、それについて上の指示を仰ぐ、としている。85 年 10 月 9 日、山県有朋

内務卿は井上馨外務卿に書簡を送り、意見を求めた。

・10月 21日、井上馨から山県有朋宛ての回答書簡では、「この時機に公然と国の標杭を立

てれば、必ずや清国の猜疑心を招く。ゆえに当面は実地調査およびその港湾の形状、後日

開発が期待できるような土地や物産などを詳細に報告するにとどめるべきである。国の標

識設置や開発着手などは、後ほど機会を見て行えばよい」としている。井上馨はまた、「今

回の調査の件は、おそらくいずれも官報や新聞に掲載しないほうがいい」ことをとくに強

調した。そのため、日本政府は沖縄県が国の標杭を立てる要求に同意しなかった。

・1890年 1月 13日、沖縄県知事はまた内務大臣に、釣魚島などの島嶼は「無人島であり、

今までその所轄がまだ定められていない」、「それを本県管轄下の八重山役所の所轄にして

ほしい」との伺いを出した。

・1893 年 11 月 2 日、沖縄県知事は国の標杭を立て、版図に組み入れることをふたたび上

申したが、日本政府はやはり回答を示さなかった。

以上で指摘された諸事実は、『日本外交文書』に基づくものであり、中国が偽造したもの

ではない(ただし、念のために書くが、これらの史料を私自身は、確認していない。信頼で

きる内外の歴史家の分析に依拠している)。

以上の事実は、すべて日本政府が「無主地先占」を主張する前夜の事柄だ。もし尖閣が

ほんとうに「無主地」ならば、なぜ山県有朋や井上馨がこのような態度をとったのか、そ

れを説明しなければなるまい。この「史実」をどこまで無視できるか。それが問われてい

るのだ。

なお、「棚上げ」についての「黙契あるいは共識」の有無を疑う人々は、以下の史料を読

んだ上で発言してほしい。

****************************

尖閣問題の交渉経緯の真相

以下の資料 1.から分かるように、第三回首脳会談で田中が尖閣を提起し、周恩来が「今、

これを話すのはよくない」と棚上げ案を返答しています。外務省会談記録は、その趣旨を

次のように記録しています。

資料 1. 外務省が公表した「田中角栄首相、周恩来総理会談」記録によれば、第三回首脳会

談 1972年 9月 27日午後 4時 10分から、国際問題を語り、そのなかで尖閣を話した。

田中総理「尖閣諸島についてどう思うか? 私のところに、いろいろ言ってくる人がいる」。


周総理「尖閣諸島問題については、今、これを話すのはよくない。石油が出るから、これ

が問題になった。石油が出なければ、台湾も米国も問題にしない」。――『記録と考証、日中国交


もう少し詳細な記録が欲しいところですが、この簡潔な要旨記録から明らかなように、

田中は第三回首脳会談で尖閣を提起して、周恩来は、以上のように答えています。

その後、橋本恕中国課長は、次のような証言を行いました。

資料 2. 橋本恕の第 4回［実は第 3回］首脳会談 1972年 9月 28日[実は 27日]の回想。「台

湾問題が結着したあと」、周首相が「いよいよこれですべて終わりましたね」と言った。

ところが「イヤ、まだ残っている」と田中首相が持ち出したのが尖閣列島問題だった。周

首相は「これを言い出したら、双方とも言うことがいっぱいあって、首脳会談はとてもじ

ゃないが終わりませんよ。だから今回はこれは触れないでおきましょう」と言ったので、

田中首相の方も「それはそうだ、じゃ、これは別の機会に」、ということで交渉はすべて

終わったのです。――橋本恕の 2000年 4月 4日清水幹夫への証言、大平正芳記念財団編『去華就実聞き書き大平

正芳』2000年。『記録と考証、日中国交正常化』岩波書店、2003年、223-4ページに再録。

ここで橋本が、外務省記録にある 27日の尖閣発言の翌日、再度問題を提起したと証言し

ているのは、記憶違いのように思われる。周恩来が「双方とも言うことがいっぱいあって、

首脳会談はとてもじゃないが終わらない」という理由で、棚上げを提案し、田中が同意し

たのは、話の内容が 27日の対話と同じだ。27日の田中・周恩来会談のやりとりを最も詳し

く証言しているのは、中国外交部顧問張香山の回想記である。

資料 3.中国外交部顧問として、日中会談に同席した張香山の回想記は、次のように記録して

いる。この記述は、中国側会談記録に基づくものと矢吹は推測する。

張香山曰く、この問題に関しては、第3回首脳会談[9月27日]がまもなく終わろうという時に話

が始まったが、双方は態度を表明しただけで議論はしなかった――

田中首相1――「私はやはり一言言いたい。私はあなたの側の寛大な態度に感謝しつつ、この場を

借りて、中国側の尖閣列島（＝釣魚島）に対する態度如何を伺いたい」。

周総理1――「この問題について私は今回は話したくない。今話しても利益がない」。

田中首相2――「私が北京に来た以上、提起もしないで帰ると困難に遭遇する。いま私がちょっと

提起しておけば、彼らに申し開きできる」［申し開きの中国語＝交待］。

周総理 2――「もっともだ！そこは海底に石油が発見されたから、台湾はそれを取り上げて問題

にする。現在アメリカもこれをあげつらおうとし、この問題を大きくしている。

田中3――「よし！これ以上話す必要はなくなった。またにしよう」。

総理3――「またにしよう。今回我々は解決できる基本問題、たとえば両国関係の正常化問題を先

に解決する。これは最も差し迫った問題だ。いくつかの問題は時の推移を待ってから話そう」。


田中4――「一旦国交が正常化すれば、私はその他の問題は解決できると信じる」。

出所：『日本学刊』1998 年第 1 期。なお、この回想記は、張香山著『中日関系管窺与見証』当代世界出版社、1998

959 views 4 commentsyabuki/new/2012-13-14.harner-selden.pdfsenkaku-dispute, by yabuki. 1...

Documents