31.1.hadjiyanni

On Social Cohesion in GreeceAndromachi Hadjiyanni

The Tocqueville Review/La revue Tocqueville, Volume 31, Number1, 2010, pp. 7-40 (Article)

Published by University of Toronto Press

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The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. XXXI, n 1 2010

ON SOCIAL COHESION IN GREECE

Andromachi HADJIYANNI

In this article we will focus on social cohesion in modern Greek society by presenting aspects of social life where there is either evidence of social cohesion or evidence to the contrary.

The study of social cohesion is not an easy task owing to the fact that the concept has become a battleground of opposing forces engendering heated debates between writers who have attempted, over the last two decades, to give an explicit and comprehensive definition of the concept.1 Some argue that this concept has not been conceptually processed in an adequate way. Consequently, it is characterized by uncertainty and has become construed in numerous ways to suit a variety of situations/agendas. As a result, this term has been adapted to the requirements and the limitations of public action and, for this reason, has been widely disseminated.2 Some others claim that the concept of social cohesion is not a well-defined concept and, as such, does not (and cannot) lead to a clear socio-political project. The vagueness of the concept is not due to poor or contradictory academic work, but to the fact that its content is the subject of multiple rapport de forces between social groups and political organizations that are trying to impose their own project of social cohesion.3

In a recent paper, Fors and Parodi (2009) propose A theory for social cohesion adapting the view that social cohesion is a multidimensional concept whose definition is not obvious because it

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8 Andromachi Hadjiyanni

describes, simultaneously, a situation and a procedure, while, at the same time, provides arguments about the real (real society) and the ideal (a society with ideal configuration) according to the citizens view.4 However, the basic idea, according to analysts around which this theory is organised, is that in our societies, social justice a concept already present in the work of Durkheim is at the heart of social cohesion.5 According to Fors and Parodi, we can estimate the social cohesion of a society based on empirical evidence but this estimate must be based on opinions as well as practices, in facts as well as in rights.

Thus, to what extent can we talk about social cohesion in Modern Greek society and in which areas can we detect it? To answer this question, we have studied three main areas where we believe that social solidarity and, consequently, social cohesion can be identified: - The area of work (which encompasses the issues of employment, unemployment, poverty and social inequalities), - The area of social bonds (which encompasses the issues of social capital and of civil society, the issues of family and the welfare state, the issue of trust in other persons and trust in institutions), and - The area of national identity (which encompasses the issues of religion and religious minorities as well as the issue of immigration).

Before we refer to the aspects of social cohesion in Greece in the recent years, we should highlight some milestones of the political, social and economic life in Greece in the post war era which will facilitate an understanding of our investigation.

Greece, at the end of World War II, had a civil war which left the country deeply split, politically polarized and in a cycle of continuous political crises.6 During the period following the war, there was a large internal migration flow of the mainly agricultural population to urban areas and, at the same time, emigration to the United States, Canada and Western Germany. Within two decades, the country changed dramatically from an agricultural to an urban society: the way of life as well as consumption habits changed. Consequently, a high level of economic development took place. This period after the war was characterised by limited or one could say troubling democracy a contradictory democratic period consisting of elements of authoritarianism and democracy.7 It concluded with the instalment of the dictatorship from 1967 until 1974. This was an especially difficult

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On Social Cohesion in Greece 9

and painful period on a political and social level because all rights were suppressed within Greece whereas the country was isolated internationally.

After the fall of the dictatorship, democracy reappeared in Greece which has been experiencing a 35 year period of democratic stabilization. The social reconciliation among the political forces of the country was promoted allowing Greece to enter the European Union (in 1981) and, subsequently, the Economic and Monetary Union (in 2001).

This entire period is characterised as having economic prosperity, the infrastructure and the standard of living have been significantly improved, the democratic character of the institutions has been reinforced as well as the European orientation of the country. Moreover, the massive influx of immigrants during the decades of 1990 and 2000 has contributed to the economic development of the country.

During this post-dictatorship era, political parties (mainly the two larger parties that alternate in power PASOK, the socialist party and New Democracy, the conservative central-right party) became the most powerful institutions in the country. They served to mobilize large portions of the Greek population around them. Greeks wanted to participate in massive organisations and for the first time were becoming members of political parties. At the same time, other institutions such as unions, professional organisations, co-ops, etc. became substantially larger as well but remained dependent on political parties within a framework of a clientelist political party system. This system has tried to promote reforms (in education, in health, in public administration, etc) but has largely proven to be ineffective. This partycization of civil society institutions led to other consequences as well. On the one hand, it led to a great number of disillusioned citizens who had earlier joined only to subsequently become discouraged. On the other hand, it encouraged corruption since participatory institutions submitted to party interests as well as to private interests.8

The post war era of prosperity during which time the European identity of the country was established, soon reached its limits. Since 2008, signs of a deep economic slump and social crisis9 have become obvious and have culminated in an economic crisis that Greece has

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been facing since the beginning of 2010. At the moment, it is clear to everyone that Greece will only emerge from the current crisis after enduring a particularly difficult and painful journey.

I - EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND INCLUSION

The possibilities that a society offers to its members with respect to finding employment as well as the working conditions for available employment positions (e.g. labour stability, full-time work with benefits, etc.) affect the possibilities people have for a decent standard of living as well as a decent life. This situation determines, to a great extent, whether and how much these people will be integrated into the labour market and the society as a whole. On the contrary, if the members of this society, instead of working in stable jobs, are obliged to work in such situations as the black market, part-time positions, short-term employment contracts, or if they are unemployed (especially for a long period of time), while the social protection system is hardly protecting them at all, then these people and/or groups are faced with great difficulties as far as integration is concerned and are more or less marginalised in this society.10 The question we will try to explore is whether Greek society is offering possibilities for social integration through labour market participation and if so, to what extent.

Employment

Before addressing the core characteristics and the long- term trends of employment and unemployment, we will briefly examine some critical characteristics of the Greek labour market and economy as well as the Greek society at large. The Greek labour market is characterised by the highest percentage of self-employment in the EU-15 and the second highest in the EU-27. The percentage of wage labour, while increasing rapidly recently, remains among the lowest in the EU. At the same time, the percentage of so-called unpaid family assistants, who are traditionally working in small family businesses, remains high despite its decreasing trend over the last two decades. Remarkably, about one third of the countrys productive population in 2007 did not actually participate in the labour market. One should also note the massive number of immigrants both legal and illegal- entering the country since the beginning of the 1990s.

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When we examine the aggregate changes in total employment, it is difficult to recognize the changes occurring within specific employment categories. For example, from 2000 to 2005, a period of significant economic development, the overall increase in employment was rather low. There was a 297,000 net increase in employment positions during this period yielding an average yearly employment growth rate of 1.4%. However, during the same period, a large increase in wage labour took place: wage labourers increased by 407,000 positions, which indicates a 17.2% increase for the five year period. Also during this same period, a small increase in the number of employers took place (22,000 people, or a percentage increase of 6.9%) and at the same time the unpaid family assistants decreased by a large amount (114,000 positions or a percentage decrease of 30.1%). During the same period, self-employment decreased by 18,000 positions.11

If we look over a longer historical period, the changes in the sphere of employment in the last three decades and especially during the last 15 years have been significant as shown in Table 1. The number of self-employed decreased by 6 percentage points in 14 years: it was 27.4% of total employment in 1993 and had declined to 21.3% by 2007. During this same period, there was a corresponding 5.6 percentage point drop in the number of unpaid family assistants from 12% in 1993 to 6.4% in 2007. On the contrary, the category of wage labourers increased by 10 percentage points; in 1993 wage labourers were 53.3% of total employment, while in 2007 they were 64.1% of total employment. There was also a small increase in the number of employers resulting in an increase in their percentage in total employment by 1 percentage point. However, the most important development was a decrease in self-employment and unpaid family assistants on the one hand and the corresponding increase in wage labour on the other. Even with these changes, wage labour in Greece is still considerably lower compared to the other European countries (the EU average is about 84%).

We should also note that in the past several years, there have been significant changes with respect to the employment of women. A great part of the increase in wage labour has been due to women whose numbers correspondingly decreased in the category of unpaid family assistants. The growth rate for wage labour and total employment for women is rapidly increasing; wage labour has

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increased from 62% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2005 and was greater than the equivalent percentage for men in 2005 which was 61.9%.

Table 1- Employed by occupational status, Greece 1993, 2002 2007 (Btrimester)

1993 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Labour Force 3.715 4.016 4.104 4.330 4.382 4.453 4.520

% composition Employer 7.2 7.6 7.3 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.2

Self-employed 27.4 24.8 24.7 22.2 22.1 21.6 21.3

Employee 53.3 59.5 59.7 63.4 63.6 63.6 64.1

Unpaid family assistant 12.0 8.2 8.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.4

Source: NSSG, Labour Force Surveys, 1993, 2002-2007, (B trimester)

Part-time employment in Greece was 5.8% of total employment in 2007 (4.1% in 2001) and remains at the same low level with minor fluctuations over the past two decades. A significant portion of part-time employment is due to the lack of full-time jobs. Additionally, more than 65% of part-time employees are women. Flexible types of employment, in general, and part-time employment, in particular, are not widespread in Greece. Numerous reasons could be responsible for this outcome. Perhaps an important explanation is low wages but also the fact that employers prefer to assign overtime work to the people already employed in their companies instead of hiring part-time employees. Moreover, the existing institutional framework creates obstacles for employers with respect to the expansion of part-time work as well as insecurity for workers themselves who believe that part-time work lacks appropriate employment protection. Finally, another reason for the low percentage of part-time employment is the dominant social belief concerning the low social status part-time employment imparts.12 In general, with respect to new forms of employment, the Greek labour market is characterised by widespread use of fixed-term contracts, project contracts (or quasi-self-employment), subcontracting work and various forms of informal employment (illegal flexibility).

Temporary employment accounts for 11.1% (2007) of wage labour and mainly comprises fixed-term contracts and contracts


through employer-lending companies. However, it seems that the number of temporary employees is increasing mainly in the public sector both in its narrow sense (including national government and state companies) and in its broad sense (which includes the local government and other semi-public companies). Consequently, we notice that more recently, the state, as an employer, has reinforced flexibility including temporal employment at the expense of permanent employment, reproducing the conditions of insecurity experienced by employees at the private sector.13

Unemployment

Until the 1980s, Greece had one of the lowest unemployment rates among EU countries, but since the middle of that decade, there has been a rapid increase in unemployment. In fact, in the past 15 years, Greece has had higher unemployment rates than the EU average. In 1980 the unemployment rate was 2.8%; in 1990 it was 7.0% while in 1999 it reached 11.6%. However, since 1999, the unemployment rate began to decrease and reached 7.2% in 2008, yet since then, the unemployment rate has been increasing constantly due to the international as well as the Greek economic crisis (Figure 1).

Lets examine the characteristics of unemployment in Greece. The two groups that are impacted the most by unemployment are young people aged 15-29 years old and women. Indeed two out of three unemployed people are women. The long-term unemployed have particularly bad circumstances. Since 2000, there has been a significant decrease in the number of unemployed in all categories. The unemployment rate for women has dropped from 18.2% in 1999 to 10.9% in 2008. The percentage of unemployed who are new entrants into the labour market as a proportion of the total number of unemployed dropped from 49.2% in 1998 to 36.5% in 2008. The percentage of long-term unemployed dropped during the same period from 56.6% to 51.5%. However, despite this decrease, the long-term unemployed still amount to half of the unemployed population.

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Figure 1- Unemployment rate, Greece 1974-2009

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

19791980

1981

1982

1983

1984

19851986

19871988

1989

1990

19911992

1993

1994

1995

1996

19971998

1999

2000

2001

2002

20032004

20052006

2007

2008

2009

% of Unemployment

Source: NSSG, Labour Force Surveys, 1974-2009, (B trimester).

Inequality

Among the countries of the EU-15, Greece has recently been characterized as having the second highest level of inequality with respect to the income dispersion indicator (behind Portugal); this ranking did not change considerably even when different inequality indicators were considered (Papatheodorou et al., 2008).

Studying inequality over time, we notice that the overall inequality in the country decreased significantly during the first period immediately following the downfall of the dictatorship (1974-1982), whereas later, it remained rather stable, showing some fluctuations from year to year (Papatheodorou et al., 2008).

It is noteworthy that according to the data since 1996, Greece increased social welfare spending considerably (roughly 25-30%). It now ranges around the EU-15 average. Nevertheless, this spending has not had any impact since neither inequality nor poverty have been reduced despite the fact that social program funding has actually been generously increased and Greeks currently pay the same proportion of their wealth for social policy programs as the average European (about 26%).14

A crucial question is why social transfers (including pensions and all other forms of benefits) have not managed to lower inequality and poverty in Greece like they have in other European countries that spend almost the same amounts. The reason is that social policy

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expenditures (primarily pensions) are not directed towards the poorest but, instead, are directed toward the middle and richer strata of the population: the richest strata actually receives pensions that are three time higher than the poorer ones receive on the basis of the reciprocity principle15 (Table 2). Thus, pensions exaggerate income inequality instead of reducing it. The poor have no priority in receiving social benefits; therefore, social transfers do not effectively result in the reduction of inequality.

Table 2 - Distribution of social benefits and pensions by income category (in )

Income category 1st

poorest 2nd 3rd 4rth 5th

richest

Total available income

3,574 6,043 8,275 11,401 18,601

Income from pensions

2,327 3,144 3,845 4,893 6,937

Income from social benefits (without pensions)

420 569 524 439 464

Percentage of households receiving a social benefit

23% 30% 27% 20% 15%

Source: Calculations from raw data EU-SILK 2004 (the table is presented at Lymberaki A., 2008).

When we examine the overall inequality of the various population groups with regard to some key socio-economic characteristics of the people composing these groups (e.g. size or the composition of the household, the degree of urbanity, age, gender, educational level, professional status, etc.), it becomes obvious that a larger proportion of inequality is due to the income dispersion within these groups. However, it seems that the degree of urbanity is one of the factors that explain a great proportion of the overall inequality in the country because it reflects the higher proportion of the population that live in rural areas in Greece and thus have a low income and high poverty level.

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Poverty

It is known that Greece and Portugal are the countries characterized by the highest poverty rates in the EU, regardless of the methodology used to measure poverty rates. In addition, the four countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain) are characterized as having higher poverty rates compared to the other EU countries.

Despite a significant increase in GDP in Greece during the last decade, poverty and inequality remain almost invariable. In 2006, Greece had the highest poverty rate in the EU-15 (20.1%), and the second highest rate in EU-27, while it had the highest percentage in the poverty gap and in long-term poverty.16 One can notice that Greece does not simply have a higher number of poor people but, additionally, the average income of these poor people is far below the poverty threshold; moreover, those that are poor remain in poverty for a long period of time.

But who are the poor in Greece? In general, the groups characterized as having high poverty risk do not change dramatically overtime. People with low educational levels, pensioners, members of households whose leader is unemployed and members of rural households are the groups with poverty indicators that are much higher than the national average. In the past, there were an exceptionally high proportion of farmers who were in poverty whereas more recently, the largest group of poor has been pensioners due to the shrinkage of the rural sector and the ageing of the population.17

According to a dominate view in the social dialogue and the official government rhetoric, economic development and a decrease in unemployment are the central and necessary preliminary requirements for the reduction of relative poverty. However, this view is not supported by empirical evidence. In the last decade, the rate of economic development in Greece has been higher than the average EU rate without leading to a reduction in poverty. Among countries with similar levels of economic development, the differences in poverty rates are explained only by the differences in each countrys social protection system. The reduction in unemployment in Greece does not seem to have had a significant effect on its poverty rate.

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Although the unemployed in Greece run a higher poverty risk than those who are working, they constitute a small proportion of the total in poverty. The great majority of poor people are either employed or retired. Moreover, part-time employees have similar poverty rates compared to the unemployed, a fact that raises questions about the effectiveness of policies promoting flexible working relations and part-time employment, in particular, as a means of reducing poverty. On the contrary, an increase in salaries and pensions seems to be necessary for the reduction of poverty.18

Satisfaction from life

The satisfaction that members of a society feel, regarding their life, is an important indicator demonstrating the extent to which they feel they belong to this society in the sense that they participate in the making of the present and the future of the society. In the past few years, discontent among Greek citizens with their daily life has been increasing (56% of the citizens report that they were discontent in the spring of 2009) chiefly due to the dire situation in the Greek economy. However, their discontent also stems from their feelings of insecurity caused by the uncertainties in the labour market, the high cost of living, and also, in general, because of their (poor) quality of life. This percentage is significantly higher then the EU-27 average of 22%.19

At the same time, Greeks are continuing to rank the general economic situation and inflation as the most important problems they are facing at the personal level, with percentages 47% and 43% respectively while these percentages are significantly higher than the European average (26% and 38% respectively). They also believe that Greece is moving in the wrong direction; that it needs more reforms to tackle the problems of the future (88%). They argue that these reforms, which should be instituted to benefit future generations, must be carried out even if the current generation has to endure some sacrifices.20 Through this position, they are standing in solidarity because it is becoming increasingly obvious21 to both working and to retired people especially since the beginning of the economic crisis two years ago and the adverse economic situation Greece finds itself in that the situation will become much worse for future generations.

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II SOCIAL TIES

Family and welfare state

When we are talking about social solidarity issues and issues relating to the integration of people and groups into Greek society, we need to refer to the development of the welfare state and the role of the Greek family as a multi-operational support institution.

The development of the welfare state in Greece has been problematic and fragmented and is characterized by the fact that social protection is limited to the granting of benefits whereas the delivery of public services falls short of what is required (Matsaganis, 2003). More emphasis is given to benefits instead of providing adequate services. Furthermore, the services that are provided are granted mainly for the fulfilment of traditional needs (such as retirement which represents 90% of social transfers) resulting in relatively acceptable protection for certain groups (e.g. the employed and pensioners) and inadequate protection for other groups such as the unemployed, the temporarily employed or those that are below the poverty threshold.

Another characteristic of the welfare state in Greece is the lack of a legal framework for ensuring a minimum income at the personal or family level (Flaquer, 2003), while the overall spending for social protection is low (lower than the EU average).

Many analysts find similarities between the welfare of Greece and the welfare states of the other southern European countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal). They often refer to the Southern-European model (Moreno, 2006; Flaquer, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2006), which is characterized by the central role of the family in all areas of social protection and particularly in the creation and distribution of income and services. This strong presence of the family covers the disparities and inefficiencies of the social protection system (the provision for day care services as well as services for the elderly is especially inadequate). The family offers significant services for the care of its members based on strong family solidarity across generations, which shows the durable interdependence of the family members: the younger members are dependent on the older ones and eventually the older members are dependent on the younger ones. For this exchange of services to be possible, new couples often live in very close

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proximity to their parental residence, if not living in the same building (Maloutas, 1990).

Therefore, the care of the elderly and the children remains mainly a family task, especially for women, whether they are working or not. However, the continuing massive participation of women in the labour market, in addition to gender equality declarations, impinges on the lack of infrastructure (e.g. childcare facilities) but also on the lack of opportunities for part-time employment. As a result, it is resolved at the personal level within each household: grandparents take care of their grandchildren and older members of the household are taken care of by their children. At the same time, existing care needs are covered partially by the private sector (private childcare centers and senior citizens assisted living facilities) as well as by the immigrant women who are working in private households taking care of the older people and the children at their homes (where they often stay themselves).

Essentially, the Greek family offers a protective shield for its unemployed members by providing an alternative source of living instead of letting them drop below the poverty threshold as indicated in recent studies (Soulios and Boukouvalas, 2008). The Greek family offers to its adult children a place to live, economic and emotional support as well as the possibility to postpone their entry into the labour market until a satisfactory choice presents itself.

This arrangement is related to another characteristic of Greek households, namely the delayed departure of the adult children from the family residence even beyond their educational period. Consequently, the family provides its young members the opportunity to enter the labour market and obtain an adequate job without enduring the stress that result from the pressure of immediate vocational rehabilitation. Simultaneously, the family activates its social network to find an appropriate job for its younger members. This practice is quite common in Greece as well as in the other Southern European countries (Hadjiyanni, 2006).

Discussing the multi-functional role of the family and the critical contribution of women, we have to comment about the position and role of women in the Greek family as well as in Modern Greek society.

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To begin with, during the last three decades Greek women have made important steps with regard to their full presence in the political and economic life of the country. They are currently educated equivalently with men22 and participate increasingly at the decision centers (e.g. the government, the judicial system, etc). At the same time, their employment percentages increase year after year. However, these changes do not invalidate the dominant traditional model and the traditional division of roles between the genders. According to this traditional model, women, whether working or not, are responsible for the housework, the children and the elderly whereas men contribute much less to these activities.23 Consequently, women are relegated to inferior positions of employment which would be expressed in such ways as having a brief career, stagnating opportunities to rise in the company hierarchy, lower pay, smaller accumulation of work experience as well as holding employment positions that are more insecure or temporary. Consequently, they accept the view that family care is primarily their responsibility.

At the same time, the lack of policies for the conciliation of family and work as well as the incongruity between social timetables (the operating hours of public organisations and the institutions of the social infrastructure in general) and the working hours of the great majority of workers hinders the provision of services to employees working full-time. An example of this is that public schools finish at 13:30-14:00 while full-time employees do not finish their work before 15:30 at the earliest. Moreover, at most schools, keeping the kids for longer periods is not possible.

The civil society

Every social scientist studying civil society in Greece or documenting and measuring social capital at the societal level (a concept that is cognate with that of civil society) agrees that civil society in Greece is cachectic, atrophic or fragile.24 There are several reasons why civil society (in the sense of citizens participation in collective bodies, associations, unions and voluntary organizations of any kind as well as the participation in informal and non-institutionalized collective activities) in Greece has not managed to develop until recently. The primary reason appears to be the dominant role of the state and the development of particularly strong political parties through which citizens have participated in the

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political and social life of the country. Political parties, as dominant institutions, have always controlled the professional associations and trade unions through the mainly cliental relationships with the citizens whose collective action has been limited to the participation in these organizations.25

The situation seems to be changing in recent years (indeed since the beginning of the 1990s) because the relationship between citizens and the political parties, the unions and politics in general, shows clear signs of crisis. Simultaneously, Greeces participation in the EU and the effort to Europeanize state politics has provided fresh incentives for collective action and the motivation of civil society. Other reasons that have contributed to the strengthening of civil society are the crisis of the social state, the decline of social movements from the 1970s and the 1980s, many demands of which have been integrated into state policies (e.g. gender equality, environment protection, etc), as well as new conceptions about self-organization, self-help and self-management.26 One should not overlook, however, that in parallel to the institutional type of citizens participation in organizations of every kind, there are also non-institutional, atypical forms of participation that take place at the micro level. Some researchers27 claim that these latter types of participation have been multifaceted and dense especially in Greece during the past two decades. Hence, although it is not easy to measure this unofficial and informal civil society, we can delineate it since, it appears in the form of informal gatherings and unofficial interactions among individual citizens, small initiative groups, periodic meetings and gatherings in closed or open public areas as well as with the operation of networks facilitated by the fast spread of the use of the internet.28

Along with the weak but steady development of the civil society through the citizens participation in every sort of organization (NGOs, voluntary organizations, clubs, unions etc.), there is interest among social scientists in the documentation, measurement and analysis both of the civil society and of the social capital in the country. These efforts have taken place largely within the framework of some European or international programs and are quite fragmentary due to the lack of an institutional framework, within which all data about the organizations themselves, their members and their activities would be recorded.

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The most systematic documentation and analysis of social capital namely through the political participation of citizens, their involvement in communal activities, the operation of social networks, the measurement of sociability, and finally through the expression of trust in people, institutions and values, was conducted through the European Social Survey in 2003. The results of this research concerning the participation of citizens in organizations of every sort (voluntary, non-governmental etc.) confirm the more general tendency towards low participation recorded in previous studies. Nevertheless, they still detect a tendency towards a larger degree of mobilization among citizens, approximately 20% of whom state that they do take part in one or more organizations, unions or political parties. Most of these citizens, however, (2/3) declare that they take part only in non-governmental organizations (Table 3).

Table 3 - Participation of Greeks in any kind of organisation for the year 2003 Participation by kind of organisation

Number of people (thousands) %

No participation 2.042 79.5 Participation only in non-governmental organisations

392 15.3

Participation only in political and/or professional organisations

71 2.8

Participation in several types of organisations

61 2.4

Total 2.566 100.0 Source: European Social Survey, Greece 2003, National Centre for Social Research

Trust in people

The issue of social trust, that is, of the trust running through human relations in every society and often referred to as social capital, is also a significant indicator of development, in the sense that trust among a societys members fosters mutual support and collective action.29

There is little available empirical data showing to what extent Greek citizens trust each other, and the data that is available comes mainly from the different waves of the European Social Survey, which poses certain questions on trust or mistrust of others (Table 4). Thus the question: can we trust or should we be cautious of other people, was answered by 47.4% of the respondents stating we

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should be cautious (the respective percentage in 2003 was 51.4%); while only 15.9% of people responded that we should trust most people.

Table 4 - Trust in others Can we trust the others or should be cautious in our relationships with others?

2003 2005 2009 We should always be cautious with people

We can trust most people

We should always be cautious with people


We should always be cautious with people


51.4% 14.8% 46.8% 17.0% 47.4% 15.9%

Would most people try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity or would they be fair with you?

2003 2005 2009 Most people would try to take advantage of me

Most peoplewould try to be fair with me

Most people would try to take advantage of me

Most peoplewould try to be fair with me

Most people would try to take advantage of me

Most people would try to be fair with me

49.9% 14.6% 47.7% 11.7% 49.1% 11.2%

Do people often help others or care mostly about themselves? 2003 2005 2009

People care mostly about themselves

People try to help others





63.3% 8.6% 58.3% 9.1% 58.3% 9.8

Source: ESS 2003, 2005, 2009, Greece: First results, National Centre for Social Research

Equivalent responses were also obtained from the question Do you believe that most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity or would they be fair with you where half of the respondents, (49.1%), responded that most people would try to take advantage of them. Only 11.2% of Greeks believed that most people would be fair with them. These percentages have scarcely changed during the last decade.

Finally, the question Do you believe that people often help each other or they care mostly about themselves, had more than half of


the respondents (58.3%) answering that people care mostly about themselves.

Through these responses we clearly see evidence of a general suspiciousness and mistrust of others but, also, an atmosphere of individualism, which has been highlighted by many researchers30 as characteristics of Greek society in recent decades. These results are not surprising for anyone who is aware that during the political changeover (after 1974), the political parties that came to power did not attempt to engender a climate of trust, neither with respect to the basic state institutions nor among citizens, because they operated in a clientel way and often distributed benefits to groups according to their political orientation and the pressure power they had.31

We should note, however, that some researchers have detected a certain dualism in the attitudes of those citizens, who, on the one hand, express a self-centred model of social behaviour, while, on the other hand, in a variety of special cases or in natural disasters (earthquakes, fires, Olympic games, fund-raising for people in need) promptly express their social solidarity in various informal forms of mutual help.32

Trust in institutions

Citizens trust in the institutions of the country as well as their trust in the efficient operation of institutions that guarantee the smooth operation of democracy is one of the most important indicators for the successful operation of a specific society and, at the same time, a critical indicator of social cohesion.33

In Greece, citizens are mistrusting of the central institutions that are directly connected with the implementation of state power such as the Parliament, government, public administration and political parties (Table 5). A high level of mistrust is expressed by Greeks for political parties (81%) both in 2002 and in 2009, articulating in this way, their disappointment concerning the parties political action as well as their method of operation. In this respect, the responses of Greeks can not be differentiated from the answers of the other European citizens, 79% of whom say that they mistrust political parties. Additionally, a significant proportion of Greek citizens, (54%), mistrust the Greek government as well as the Parliament (52%). The equivalent European averages are 65% and 63%

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respectively. Finally, 52% of Greeks mistrust their local and regional administrations. This percentage is quite different from the EU-27 average which is 43%34.

Table 5 - Which institutions do the Greeks trust? 2002 2009

Institutions Not trusted Trusted Not trusted Trusted Parliament 50.8 52.0 Government 55.3 54.0 Local authorities/Public administration

65.3 52.0

Political parties 80.9 81.0 Justice 61.1 52.0 Military 80.3 69.0

Source: Eurobarometer No 57(2002), Eurobarometer No 72 (2009)

Greek citizens appear to trust two institutions: the judicial system and the military. The judicial system is trusted by 52% of Greeks (61.1% in 2002) while the military is trusted by 69% (80.9% in 2002). However, there is evidence that even for the two most trusted institutions by Greeks, there has been a significant decrease in trust recently. According to some analysts35 the expression of mistrust in the institutions is associated with the participation of citizens in non-governmental organizations or by the total lack of participation in any organization, union etc. Thus, citizens who actively take part in non-governmental organizations or similar unions appear to be the most mistrustful towards the various political institutions (Parliament, parties, politicians), clearly because these are people who have distanced themselves completely from politics or people who have tried to be socially active through alternative organizational forms.

To conclude, we could say that there are certain indications that Greeces civil society seems to be growing slowly but steadily. However, Greece still seems to be quite distant from other European countries, even in the South, concerning this characteristic.

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III NATIONAL IDENTITY, IMMIGRANTS AND RELIGION: US AND THE OTHERS

National identity and religion

As a result of a number of historical factors connected to the establishment and consolidation of the Modern Greek state, the Greek national identity has become synonymous with an ethnic identity wherein the Eastern Orthodox religion became its main component (Polis, 1999). As a consequence, orthodoxy continues to remain a part of the identity for the great majority of modern Greeks who essentially declare that they are Christian Orthodox. Concurrently, relatively small religious minorities continue to exist, although accurate data concerning them is scarce. According to estimates, Muslims, Jews, Christian Catholics, Christian Protestants, Jehovah Witnesses and Old Calendarists account for approximately 10% of the countrys population.36 Others, however, estimate this proportion to be 5%.37 In actuality, the religious and ethnic minority of Muslims in Thrace is the only officially recognized minority in the country. Following the 1990s, significant changes occurred regarding the issue of religious minorities in Greece because of the influx of about one million immigrants, most of whom have been Muslims from neighboring countries such as Albania.

Although the Greek constitution protects free religious practice for all known religions, religious minorities face legal and administrative obstacles in the actual practice of their religious duties. They confront great difficulties in the establishment of churches or temples and in the foundation of religious associations, while the non-Christian Orthodox educators rarely get appointed in public schools. Additionally, the legal status of many religious minorities is not recognized which encumbers the practice of their religious tasks. Recently, under the pressure of appeals to the European Court of Human Rights and as a result of the activities of the Greek Ombudsman (an independent authority established in 1998 which protects among other things religious minorities), measures have been adopted fostering the respect for the rights of religious minorities. One example of this new respect is the abolition (in 2006) of the requirement for the permission or the advice of the church authority representing the Greek Orthodox Church for the foundation, erection or operation of a church or temple of any


dogma or religion. However, these measures, as well as the relevant European Court decisions, are rarely implemented due to the opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church which continues to wield considerable leverage within the entire public administration as well as in the Greek society as a whole.

Orthodox Church and Greek Society

The reason we discuss, in the present article, the Greek Orthodox Church and its relationship to the Modern Greek state with its different manifestations of religious expression in Greek society, is because the separation between church and state has not come about in Greece. The presence of the Greek Orthodox Church in public life remains strong while the official religion of the country is Christian Orthodox as designated by the constitution (owing to the fact that it is the prevailing religion).

The relationship between the national identity of Greeks and the religious tradition of the Orthodox Christian Church has been and remains tight38 while the presence of the Greek Orthodox Church is evident in many facets of the social, political and cultural life of Greeks. Examples include divinity courses at school, students attending religious mass, the oath of the President, Prime Minister and Ministers of the government before the Archbishop of Greece, and Orthodox priests positions as civil servants salaried by the Greek state. Furthermore, religious marriages and specifically, Greek Orthodox marriage ceremonies are preferred by the majority of those deciding to wed which is one of the clearest examples of its strong presence in Greek society.

But what is the relationship of Orthodox Greeks with their religion and how secularized is Greek society at present? If we consider issues such as attending mass, praying and self characterization of the strength of religiosity (ranging from not religious to very religious) as some of the critical factors determining the extent of secularization in a society, then modern Greek society is not characterized very much by secularization. Instead, it can be more accurately characterized by the phrase diffused religiosity.39

This diffused religiosity is represented by a very high percentage (75%) of people who are self-characterised as fairly or very

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religious. Additionally, a significant proportion of the population claim that they pray daily (46%) while, on the contrary, the percentage of those who attend church regularly is not equivalently high (26%), according to a European Community Social Survey of 2003.40 It is a remarkable point for the Greek case considering the low percentages of those reporting to be not religious (1.7%), those who are not attending church at all, and those who are never praying (4.1%). These low percentages, relative to other European countries, are a relatively recent phenomenon since the percentage of those Greeks who never prayed was 16% in 1985. According to some analysts,41this emerging phenomenon coincides with Greece entering the new environment of Economic and Monetary Union as well as the enlargement of the EU, a fact that seems to provoke fear and insecurity among a proportion of citizens. These people may be turning to the church because it is a traditional institution that creates an identity and cultivates feelings of socio-cultural stability and continuity.

Greeks and immigrants

Since the end of the 1980s, Greece has been faced with an unprecedented phenomenon, namely a massive influx of immigrants into the country. Before this period, Greece was considered a country of emigration (in the decades of the 1950s, 60s and 70s and, to a lesser extent, the decade of the 1980s, Greek emigrants went to Canada, the USA and Australia and later on to Western Europe and particularly Germany).

Consequently, Greece has been unprepared to receive and manage the one million immigrants that have entered the country. The 2001 Census reported that, from a total population of 11 million, 762.000 people had foreign nationality (7% of the population, compared to 177.000 or 2% in 1981).42 According to estimates, the real population of immigrants has been, at the same time, considerably greater due to a significant portion of immigrants avoiding inclusion in the census. These are mostly illegal immigrants, specifically those who have not been able to have their status recognized or legalized. As a result, according to these estimates, the percentage of immigrants in the population is 9% while their proportion in the labour force is 12%.43 We should note that 70% of the immigrants reported by the Census are from eight Eastern

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European countries (more than half are from neighbouring Albania) and only 15% from other western countries. The presence of immigrants is quite significant in certain areas of the country. In the broader metropolitan region around the capital their percentage exceeds 10% and in areas including Thessaloniki and the Greek islands, the proportion of immigrants is also higher. In other regions of the country their presence is relatively low (below 6%).

With regard to recent immigration flows, we can identify different phases of immigration policy in Greece which relate to the way immigration has been treated by the Greek authorities, the implementation of certain policies, and the institutionalisation of measures or the lack of such measures.44 Thus, in the first period (until 1997), the authorities denied the existence of an issue and did not admit to the problem. All the immigrants at that time had an illegal status (i.e. had no official documents allowing them to stay in the country) because there was no legal framework for immigration and, hence, for any legalisation procedure. Immigrants were often arrested and deported/repatriated by the police. In 1997 the first pieces of legalisation were designed for those who had a dependent employment relationship. In subsequent years it could be said that there was a general tolerance of immigrants. In 2001, the first comprehensive and extensive legalisation was implemented entitling 400,000 immigrants to become legalised. Nevertheless, a considerable number of immigrants remained illegal either due the lack of necessary funds to pay the legalisation fees or because they did not fulfil the requirements outlined in the legalisation applications (e.g. dependent work) or for other reasons. In 2005, a second package of legislation was introduced. During this period, special social policies were introduced in order to satisfy the need for incorporating European Union law into Greek law. By then, public debate had been transformed and daily life with immigrants had become a more positive experience. Unfortunately, soon after that, we shifted to a period of economic crisis, which continues to the present. Currently, there is a surge in racial violence and xenophobia which is primarily due to the economic crisis. Immigrants have become targets while more and more Greeks are demanding that the state should legally regulate issues pertaining to second-generation immigrates who cannot get the Greek citizenship and lack political rights.45 The same is true for immigrants that have been (legally) residing in the country.


Simultaneously, there are problems related to the continuous influx of new immigrants, largely from the coast of Turkey, and the living conditions at the reception centres. While this is happening, state officials are still failing to control the immigration flow.

Another important aspect of the immigration situation is the education of second-generation immigrants. The significant presence of foreign students (mostly Albanians) at all levels of the educational system has not only brought about the introduction of cross-culture education, the creation of reception classes, and tutorial courses but also the creation of cross-cultural schools. However, the majority of foreign students attend classes at regular public school.46 During the 2005-2006 school year, the percentage of foreign students at all educational levels was 8.5%, with a strong presence in kindergarten, primary school and technical high schools but a much smaller presence at general high schools. We should note that the language of the foreign students is not taught in any of the Greek schools. Because of the difficulties foreign students face in Greek public schools, they typically experience a high drop rate predominantly after the end of compulsory education. Many non-governmental organisations offer teaching lessons in the Greek language for immigrants in Athens and other cities but there is not such an equivalent offer from state organisations (e.g. first or second level local government).

Immigrants in Greece are working in specific economic sectors, such as construction, hotels and restaurants, private households (where they take care of the elderly and children and do housework) and in agriculture. These are the sectors that use mostly unskilled labour, making the immigrants vulnerable to fluctuations in the activities of these sectors. Immigrants are characterised in general as having proportionally higher participation in the labour force compared to Greeks and having lower unemployment rates as well.47

In the Greek countryside the restructuring of agriculture has been based, to a great extent, on the massive entry of immigrants in the rural areas of the country. Immigrants do not work exclusively in agriculture but also in non-agricultural activities as well as in tasks supporting elderly households, especially in mountainous and deprived rural areas. In this way, immigrants have taken a structural position in rural labour markets at the same time that their presence


has accelerated the modernisation of agricultural production. Particularly in the instances of seasonal and intensive crops, immigrants offer the necessary labour for the restructuring of the techniques of agricultural production and the application of new technologies. Nevertheless, they do not act as a substitute for the labour of the indigenous population. Their contribution to the local economy and agricultural operations is recognised as positive by the majority of the rural population.48

The larger problem of immigrants with respect to labour and thus their social integration in Greece is the illegal status of a great number of them (due to legal requirements and the expensive deposit required). This circumstance obliges them to work in the informal sector earning much lower wages and being uninsured. An additional aspect is that the proportion of uninsured immigrants differs with respect to their country of origin and is also larger for women (24.2%) compared to men (16%).49

Us and the others

How has Greek society reacted to this massive influx of immigrants over such a short period of time and to what extent has the society welcomed them? Our first albeit brief answer to this question is that the immigrants have been received with great cautiousness and even negativity. Analysing empirical data on the attitudes against immigrants and to any kind of otherness (from the Euro barometer and the European Social Survey) for the period 1988-2003, Kafetzis50 remarks very accurately that there is an intolerant attitude (among Greeks) against what en bloc is different. Thus, in a special Eurobarometer survey of 2003 with the theme Citizenship and sense of belonging, Greeks ranked first by a wide margin when compared to citizens of other countries in the survey, stating that they agree (83% percent) that it is better for a country if almost everybody is sharing the same customs and traditions. Furthermore, the majority disagreed with the opinion that it is better if a country is comprised of many religions. In the same survey, 70% of Greeks agreed that immigrants are a threat to our way of living and it ranked first in its harsh attitude rejecting foreigners/immigrants on the basis of their non-sameness. This result indicates Greece differs greatly from the European average (42%) and from the


responses from countries with long-term and massive immigration such as Belgium and the United Kingdom.51

These negative attitudes of the Greek people against otherness in general and not against specific foreigners/immigrants emanates from a strong devotion to the view of a national and cultural homogeneity which they feel is probably the most important part of their identity as Greeks. This attitude of Greeks against any kind of foreignness that is depicted in surveys is not mirrored in any equivalent way in the everyday life of people. In many Greek households, the household assistant is a foreigner. This person is usually taking care of the elderly parents and/or the small children of the family and usually stays in the house with the family. Additionally, the children have foreigners as classmates, foreigners help with household repairs, and they often work in small family businesses.

This familiarization seems to diminish prejudices at a personal level, but at the same time, there is still a fear about the other, especially when there is a high concentration of the others within the country (it is often heard in public debates that the problem is not the mere presence of immigrants but, rather, their presence in high numbers). We should also note that a significant number of non-governmental organisations and associations have taken action over the past few years by providing help, protection and support for the rights of immigrants.

CONCLUSION

In the afore-mentioned analysis, we have undertaken the task of identifying elements that show both the existence and absence of social cohesion in Modern Greek society in the areas of labour, social attachments as well as in the areas of national identity and attitudes towards others. Lets first examine, briefly, the elements that reduce social cohesion.

We saw that regarding the issue of poverty, Greece is characterized by alarming indicators of the lack of social cohesion compared to the EU average, and, that inequalities have not diminished in recent years. Poverty strikes, to a greater extent, the unemployed, the retired, and people with low educational attainment but also working people in part-time positions (especially women that cannot find full-time employment). Although overall economic

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inequality in the country was significantly lowered in the period immediately following the fall of the dictatorship, it stubbornly remained at that level since then, regardless of how much social policy expenditures increased. And this situation has occurred during the period of three decades in which the country has been characterized by relative prosperity as well as an improvement in the standard of living.

Recent empirical evidence and trends in the areas of employment and unemployment are also quite pessimistic and ominous. Long-term unemployment persists; part-time employment is more common for women but does not represent, in the majority of cases, their choice of employment; at the same time certain types of work organization have become more evident (fixed contracts, project contracts, subcontracting work and unsecured work) as well as different forms of informal work. These characteristics create an environment and a reality of employment relations in which it becomes continuously more difficult for those already facing problems in the labour market (the unemployed, youth who are trying to enter the labour market, women or immigrants) to enter and advance in their careers.

In this environment of labour insecurity, for a significant portion of the population, (and additionally because of the recent severe economic crisis that is expected to affect all Greek citizens), we expect to see signs of expressed discontent about peoples current circumstances as well as prospects for their daily life in the near future.

We have observed that religious minorities face legal and administrative obstacles in the practice of their religious duties even though, over the past few years, measures have been increasingly adopted providing for the respect of their rights. However, these measures are scarcely implemented due to the reaction of the Greek Orthodox Church which continues to exercise significant influence on the public administration as well as Greek society in general. At the same time, a great proportion of (Orthodox) Greek citizens self-report high religiosity and maintain a loose but unfailing relationship with the Greek-Orthodox religion and the Greek Orthodox church because they believe that this encompasses a piece of their national identity.

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The more significant problems faced by immigrants in Greece, regarding their integration in the Greek society, are, on the one hand, difficulties with respect to their legalization process and, on the other hand, the mistrust and/or negativity the Greeks have toward them. The negative attitudes of Greeks against otherness in general and not against specific foreigners/immigrants in particular, seems to be connected to a fear that the presence of immigrants will affect their national and cultural homogeneity which they believe is an element of their identity.

In Greece, people seem to mistrust the basic institutions that are directly connected with the exercise of state power such as the Parliament, the government, the public administration and the political parties. On the contrary, they do trust the judicial system and the military. Greeks not only mistrust institutions, they also mistrust their fellow citizens. This lack of a trusting climate among the citizens and the mistrust against the others characterizes Modern Greek society.

Finally, we have observed that, until recently, civil society in Greece has been rather weak while only after the 1990s, has there been evidence of weak but stable development of the civil society. Additionally, the participation of citizens in NGOs, voluntary organizations, clubs and unions has increased.

The characteristics that reinforce social cohesion are not only few but they appear to be losing strength or their existence is being threatened to a greater or lesser extent as time passes. These characteristics include strong family ties and the supporting role of the family, the increased participation of women in the labour market and a strong national identity.

We have also witnessed that the welfare state in Greece has always been inadequate in the sense that social protection is limited to the dispensing of benefits whereas the public supply of services is lacking significantly and social protection expenditure is low. The inefficiencies of the social security system are masked by the presence of the family which offers its services in a variety of fields: care for children and the elderly, protection of the unemployed members of the family, and the emotional and economic support for the adult children that face difficulties entering the labour market and remain in the parental home beyond their educational period.

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However, this type of family solidarity was largely based on women and a family model in which women were housewives. Recent economic developments and the continuously increasing employment rates of women will certainly call into question the effectiveness of this model as time passes. At the same time, the increased employment rates of women and the decline of their employment as unpaid assistants in family businesses, is an element strengthening social cohesion through the advancement of gender equality in the labour market.

Lastly, with respect to national identity, perhaps its most important element is national and cultural homogeneity (an aspect of which is the Greek-Orthodox religion). The massive influx of immigrants in the country, as well as the decision by many of them to stay in Greece permanently (mostly second-generation Albanian immigrants), appears to be creating a crack in national and cultural homogeneity and is influencing national identity in a negative way.

The evidence we have presented indicates how limited social cohesion has been and remains in Modern Greek society. We have highlighted the extent to which poverty, unemployment, inequalities, immigration and changes in the family as well as factors relating to national identity are threatening the current level of social solidarity in the country at least for the next few years as the country continues to face a severe economic crisis.

NOTES

[1] Helly D., 2002, Maloutas Th. and Pandelidou-Malouta M., 2004. [2] Guibert Lafaye C., 2009, Bernard P., 1999. [3] Maloutas Th. and Pandelidou-Malouta M., 2004, p. 452. [4] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009, p. 25. [5] Ibid, p. 25. [6] The left parties remained outside the law following the civil war that

occurred after WWII until the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. During this period many politically left citizens were prosecuted and lived for years in exile.

[7] Voulgaris Y., 2008. [8] Voulgaris Y., 2008, p. 97.


[9] The rebellion of youth in December of 2008 initially in Athens and later in the rest of Greece is characteristic of a social value crisis.

[10] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009. [11] Kikilias E., 2007. [12] Lymberaki A., Dendrinos Y., 2004. [13] INE/GSEE, 2008. [14] Lymberaki A., 2008. [15] Papatheodorou Ch., Petmetzidou M., 2004, Lymberaki A., 2008. [16] Papatheodorou Ch., 2008. [17] Tsakloglou P., 2008. [18] Papatheodorou Ch., 2008. [19] Eurobarometer No 71, Spring 2009. [20] Eurobarometer No 72, Autumn 2009. [21] More and more citizens are talking about this public debate that is

taking place in the occasion of the reform of the insurance system. [22] While the percentage of women succeeding in the entrance test for

tertiary education has surpassed the equivalent percentage for men and more women than men graduate from tertiary education, men, more often than women, enroll in post-graduate studies while women look for employment positions compatible with the traditional role they have in the family (i.e. they often work as teachers, employees in health services, work as social workers, office clerks, etc) and are much less satisfied with their employment situation (Hadjiyanni A., 2001).

[23] Symeonidou, H. et al., 2001. [24] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007. [25] Voulgaris Y., 2007, p. 316. [26] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007, p. 231. [27] Sotiropoulos D., 2004. [28] Ibid. [29] Fukuyamma F., 1995. [30] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007. [31] Ibid. [32] Sotiropoulos D., 2004. [33] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009. [34] Eurobarometer No 57(2002), Eurobarometer No 72 (2009).[35] Lymberaki A., Paraskevopoulos C., 2002. [36] Polis A., 1999, p. 179. [37] Filos A., 2004. [38] Often in public debate there is reference to the Greek-Christian

civilization as if the Greek tradition cannot be separated from the tradition of the Christian orthodox one.

[39] Georgiadou V., Nikolakopoulos H., 2007, p. 144. [40] Ibid, p. 142. [41] Ibid, p. 143. [42] Kotzamanis V., 2008. [43] Triandafilidou A., 2005. [44] For an analytic presentation of the Greek immigration policy, see

Paulou M., 2009.


[45] At the time of the writing of this paper there is a process of public consultation concerning a bill for acquiring Greek citizenship by second-generation immigrants and for acquiring political and social rights for the immigrants legally residing in the country.

[46] Mavrommatis Y., Tsitselikis K., 2004. [47] Nikolitsa D., 2008. [48] Kassimis Ch., 2008. [49] Kanellopoulos K., 2008. [50] Kafetzis T., 2009. [51] Ibid.

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