2013 HENNERBICHLER TUNCELI-DERSIM II; dialogue Turkey-Kurds

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ferdinand Hennerbichler, University of Sulaimani, Faculty of Languages and Humanities, School of Humanities, Department of History, Kurdistan Region IraqE-mail: [email protected], Personal Webpage: http://www.hennerbichler.info

II. INTERNATIONAL TUNCELİ (DERSİM) SYMPOSIUM20-22 September 2013

The Future of the Kurdish Question in the Middle East

By Ferdinand Hennerbichler

mailto:[email protected]




• There will be no solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey and elsewhere by military means and by the use of force

• The Kurdish question in Turkey and elsewhere can only be solved peacefully through dialogue, mutual understanding, democratically legitimized negotiations, compromise and equal rights for all citizens

• However, there is still no established, stable and sustainably peace process for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey according to conventional diplomatic standards and procedures

Basics

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T U R K E Y

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• A democratically elected government uses (a) special branch(es) of its military (security) to conduct non open secret negotiations with a convicted prisoner, so official Turkey, accept him tacitly and unilaterally like a monopoly speaker of its Kurdish population and grant him a status similar to a democratically legitimized representative who would act for an assumed majority will of the Kurdish population in Turkey; this seems unusual, even more so because a good number of democratically elected Kurdish politicians, who would be available for official talks with the government, are not integrated in the dialogue; the negotiations lack, therefore, democratic legitimacy as well as usual political and diplomatic standards

• The negotiations followed until now one top clear military aim to stop the fighting and uphold a ceasefire, but continue to be rather vague and uncheckable in political and diplomatic terms, and also keep changing contents and positions

• In essence it seems still not entire clear what the democratic outcome of the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey should be precisely

Current procedures

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• In political and diplomatic terms the renewed negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey continue to be dominated by the character of two unilateral tit for tat processes: •The government of Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan works out legislation reforms involving the Kurdish question by unilaterally submitting government bills who are later approved by Parliament with majority votes of deputies close to the government

•PKK in return keeps also unilaterally a ceasefire during a declared period of time, stops fighting and withdraws - so far - a small part of its fighters from Turkish territories

•However, neither PKK as such - a broad based movement, as Turkey assumes - nor any democratic Kurdish party is substantially and directly involved in the new law making reform process(es) concerning the Kurdish question in Turkey; up to what extent (if any) political demands of PKK could have been incorporated in government bills is unclear and highly disputed

Unilateral Tit for tat

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• The ongoing reform process(es) concerning the future of Kurds in Turkey is, therefore, in their eyes largely burdened by a lack of Kurdish participation in government decision-making of their own future fate

• Until now, elected Kurdish deputies (who are in a small minority) can only take part in the ongoing law reform making processes by either bowing to the majority and except or otherwise reject government bills in Parliament

• Traditional alternatives like multilateral platforms for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey - most notably within the framework of EU membership negotiations - are not in sight; the negotiation precess will, therefore, be most likely continue like until now; drastic changes are not to be expected

• Consequences: Many Kurds have still severe problems identifying with the ongoing reform processes in Turkey, mainly because they can not participate in them; moreover, relevant legislation as well as court decisions remain highly contradicting and conflicting; and, alas, this will also not change rapidly

Continued lack of Kurdish participation in reform process

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• The peace process is threatened by failure• Trust and confidence on both sides are diminishing• PKK alleging, Turkish government doesn't keep promises to strengthen rights of Kurds, and wanted a renewed war • PKK withdrew until now some 25 percent of an estimated force of 2,000 armed fighters from Turkish territories and is threatening to recruit new armed forces• Especially young people in all quarters seem to be increasingly disillusioned• Hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey in the near future are diminishing• Rising fear that a collapse of the negotiation process could lead to new and even greater violence • Economists and investors express anxieties that Turkey as location for business could come in danger and its economic stability could be seriously challenged• Also, the civil war in Syria is seen by many as danger for Turkey that could curb economic recovery and could intensify internal unrest• Finally, it is argued, Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not make it without decisive votes of Kurds to a desired new strong President next year to stay in power for 10 more years to come, which could even complicate Kurdish peace talks further

Current situation

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• Government of Premier Erdoğan Regierung Erdogan anxious to calm down• Referring to sweeping and essential reforms since Erdoğan took office in 2003• Announces new „Democratization Package“ for the near future• A further two dozen of laws would be reformed• „Rights of Kurds further strengthened“• „Many demands of Kurds thereby fulfilled“• Parliament to deal with the new „Democratization Package“ in October 2013

Government reassures

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Kurds: Not good enough• Kurds recognize the ongoing reform process but stress it would still be far too slow, in its content lightweight and would not touch on quintessences of the Kurdish question and indeed of further necessary fundamental constitutional changes in Turkey; the situation would be rather conflicting and contradictory; examples: Kurdish permitted only in courts and in some schools; Kurdish politicians like Leyla Zana still threatened by 10 more years in prison after expiration of her Parliamentarian immunity in 2015; atmosphere among Kurds in Turkey between open frustration and cautious optimism





• Turkey keeps on trying to monopolize contacts to PKK in order to control and influence them accordingly; PKK is monopolizing representing the Kurdish question in Turkey; its affiliate PYD monopolizes not only Kurdish interests in border areas of civil war torn Syria but also efforts to dominate these areas and establish there a „Region Westkurdistan“ (kurd. Herema Rojava); see part SYRIA; consequences: • Isolation of PKK: made dialogue with PKK even more difficult; did not break influence of PKK-leader Öcalan and failed to secure for Turkish government lasting and sustainable supremacy in negotiations to solve the Kurdish question peacefully• Branding of PKK as „Terror Organization“: PKK on terror lists of Turkey, USA and EU: prevented an international breakthrough and consensus for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey and protracted the peace process; proved to be diplomatically and tactically unhelpful; sought to obstruct international mediation in the Kurdish question; tried repeatedly to criminalize contacts and reporting; by and large obvious failure• PYD monopoly claims over Syrian border areas invoked dangers of new inter-regional Kurdish fighting; provoked massacres by Syrian opposition Islamist militants on Kurdish civilians, led to a Kurdish mass exodus from Syria into Iraq

Problem of monopolizing

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• Isolation tactics did not lead to a drastic reduction of new victims in this ongoing conflict on both sides • Isolation did not bring about a break through in efforts to solve the Kurdish question once and for all peacefully• Conclusion: Isolation doesn't work in most cases with international implications like the Kurdish question, neither politically nor diplomatically; isolation can never be an equivalent substitute for democratically legitimate and verifiable, direct and meaningful negotiations between conflict partners • Alternative: Securing involvement of legitimate democratically elected representatives of the Kurdish population in Turkey; open negotiation process according to diplomatic international standards and rules with clear aims and verifiable results; broadening of the ongoing dialogue which seems still based on military priorities and considerations; credible involvement of the Kurdish population of Turkey in the ongoing peace talks; making use of international partners and institutions like the European Union to provide a comprehensive platform for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey; aim: broad based sustainable consensus backed up internationally

Problem of isolation

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Content and form of reported understandings (written? agreements?) representatives of government Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and PKK largely unclear. Until now, no authentically valid and allegedly binding paper published. Quoted details in media: • Alleged written accord Turkish special security forc(es) with imprisoned PKK-leader Öcalan; authentic original text not published• Reported Quid-pro-quo procedure: PKK will lay down its arms, proclaim a ceasefire and withdraw all its armed fighters from Turkish territories; in return, the Erdoğan administration promise (vaguely) „strengthened rights“, as quoted in media, for an estimated 15 million of Kurds, ca. one fifth of the population of Turkey • Further more, media quoting from an presumably handwritten letter of Abdullah Öcalan to leading PKK commanders in northern Iraq: Proposing a ceasefire effective end of March 2013 and the withdrawal of (all?) PKK-fighters until August 2013; conversely, a Parliamentary commission will prepare for (again vaguely) new reform legislation in support of the Kurds• In addition: Kurdish Parliamentarians read out a declaration of Öcalan, in which he confirmed readiness for a negotiated settlement, but warned that Turkey could slide into difficulties like Syria or Iraq should peace efforts with Kurds fail

In search of authentic agreement(s)

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To sum up sketchy indications in media for an alleged „peace agreement“ Öcalan-Erdoğan government; the following are the most crucial issues media attribute to such a presumed understanding:

• „Release of some 2,000 political prisoners“• „Freedom of expression and press“• „Changing of Anti-Terror-Laws“• „Kurdish in education and offices“• „Renaming of cities and villages from Turkish into Kurdish“• „Autonomy"• „Form of self-rule“?• „Special treatment“?• „Federalism“?• „Independence for Kurds in the Southeast of Turkey“?

Equal Treatment & „Autonomy“

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• Most of the listed demands quoted in media represent basically traditional historic demands of Kurds in Turkey (except for highly disputed ones like „special treatment“ for Kurds,„federal state“ or „independence“: see next slide); key aims like „autonomy“ reflect a vivid historic consciousness among Kurds in Turkey that quite a good number of their forefathers helped already Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) reconquering central power at the beginning of the 20th century most notably in battles around Urfa; that they were promised at that time forms of autonomy and „equal treatment“ (since congresses of Erzerum and Sivas 1919), but were later let down and persecuted for these demands, as they see it. That is one reason why many Kurds in Turkey fear that history might repeat itself and that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could let them down as well in their desire for equality and strengthened regional self rule after they would vote for him to establish a powerful new presidential system in the next years.• At the same time and contrary to such strong historic reservations, there are rather weak perceptions (not only among Kurds) how to make the best out of a rapidly changing Middle East in order to initiate new impetus to efforts for a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Kurdish question inter-regionally

Historic demands

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• Federalism/federalization: Autonomy and strong forms of regional self-rule (model: Autonomous Kurdistan Region Iraq) are seen by opponents as weakening of the central power based Republic and as instant danger for disintegration of Turkey• Autonomy only for Kurds in Eastern Anatolia (and also e.g. in Istanbul?) seems highly unlikely, presumably not compatible with the constitution and the principle of equality, and above all politically not enforceable as well• General autonomy for all regions of Turkey: seems equal highly unlikely because the Republic would be transformed into a federal state like Iraq, which opponents would see as weakening of Turkey and - again - as danger for its disintegration• Conclusion: Federalization of Turkey along e.g. the model of Iraq seems in power political terms neither feasible nor enforceable; it would turn the constitutional order upside down and could lead to severe tension and unrest• Most likely development: equal treatment for Kurds within the central power structure; equality for Kurds in the constitutional and administrative order; full democratic, cultural, economic and social rights, enhanced local, communal, urban and regional self-government according to EU guidelines and principles; aim: reformed status of the Kurds in Turkey based on EU-compliant constitutional rights

Issues of conflict

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Conflict issues of no return:• Autonomy only for Kurds = most likely against constitution• Autonomy for all regions of Turkey = seen as federalism like in endangered Iraq• Federalism: If self-rule for Kurds would lead to an abolition of central power and transformation of Turkey in a federal Republic like Iraq with a rather stable Kurdistan Region in the neighborhood = the military could intervene again; justification: separation, destruction of the central power based Republic, encouraging of new Kurdish state comprising Kurdistan Regions of Turkey and Iraq • Laicism vs. autocratic Islam regime: Should Premier Erdoğan indeed try to establish with the help of Kurdish voters a new autocratic presidential regime with a clear orientation of a political Islam, = he would evoke two potential adversaries: a militant autocracy would result in a severe setback of the anyhow stumbling EU membership negotiations; an autocratic Islamic Republic of Turkey (model: Islamic Republic of Iran) would definitely not be tolerated by the military, they could also intervene again; justification: legitimate defence of the laicistic constitutional legal order established by Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk • However, the author is firmly convinced that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will neither try to establish a presidential autocracy nor an Islamic Republic of Turkey

Points of no return

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• Power and influence of the military in Turkey have not been „broken for good“ by Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as repeatedly suggested in media, but merely curtailed

• The echelon of the Turkish military is still represented in constitutionally based institutions of the Republic like the National Security Council, even so its powers were restricted (constitutional reform 2003)

• The network and infrastructure of the Turkish armed security forces comprises also an influential, professionally run powerful economic empire including own special social security services

• Their economic influence has been largely extended in recent history into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: there, companies affiliated to high ranking Turkish military are very successfully involved e.g. in construction business

• Personal note: The author has experienced Turkish officers in the course of humanitarian hostage release operations during the 1980s as democracy oriented forces

Military

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• The EU is not only a Union of currently 28 member states, but equally a Union of cities & regions, and indeed of citizens (common constitution [confederation], Lisbon Treaty, Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU citizenship, all effective 2009) • Regions are nor merely statistical structures of the European Union (e.g. Eurostat: so called statistical NUTs regions); cities and regions are represented in own bodies like the Committee of the Regions (assembly of elected local and regional representatives, advisory powers); EU decision making is further based on principle of subsidiarity (EU action should be taken on sub-national level where it cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states alone); finally, the EU has an influential Commissioner for Regional Policies with a substantial budget of € 325 billion out of a total of € 960 billion for 2014-20; the main aim of its funding is to provide compensation between richer and poorer regions of the EU•Conclusion: EU would have available the biggest funds to help above all financing reconstruction of backward areas in Eastern Anatolia and could so substantially contribute to a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey; unfortunately, Turkey is still not utilising the currently biggest economic and political capabilities of the partner EU Europe in this regard but should do so soon

EU

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• EU membership negotiations do not provide for a special chapter like the Kurdish question; Kurds are dealt with mainly in the framework of minorities and humanita-rian issues; the term Kurd rarely mentioned in official EU papers; however, stan-dard EU membership negotiation procedures would also not prevent both partners to agree on a special common sub-agenda and establish a working group dealing specifi-cally with the Kurdish question; maybe this option could prove useful in the future • As for the outcome: There can only be one „acquis communautaire“ (common EU law) for all 28 members and candidate countries including Turkey; a separate other muslim version of the EU Community Acquis would neither be feasible nor negotiable.• At the end of the negotiations for full membership for Turkey will be a form of agreement that will bring the Turkish Republic even closer to Europe; whether in form of full membership or of an equivalent contract remains an open question; the author believes that chances for full EU membership of Turkey are much greater than alternative options; he is also confident that the Kurdish question could be decisively solved within the ongoing EU membership negotiations of Turkey; the framework for that could be up to 20 and more years, depending on the progress; nevertheless, Turkey will become a member of the European Union in our lifetime.

EU

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• Hypothesis: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will continue his policy and tactic to implement reforms in ways that he can expect to stay in power and possibly could even further increase it• His most crucial and controversial issues in the past decade since he took office in 2003 were: the EU full membership negotiations (since October 2005), the Cyprus conflict (unconditionally signing of the so called Ankara protocol of July 2005), a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question, and a comprehensive new EU compatible constitutional order of the Turkish Republic. • Erdoğan tackled all four topics (EU, Cyprus, Kurds, Constitution) in a slow pace and slice by slice mode and could none of them ultimately solve within 10 years• The results were slow motion reforms beyond expectations; Erdoğan did only risk to advance vital reforms up to a level of increasing protests and civil unrest but not to the extreme that he would lose elections and fall from power; it seems therefore, highly unlikely, that he could manage to solve all four in next 10 years• Future: If this holds true, Kurds could expect from a continuation of a slow pace salami tactic policy possibly further small concessions regarding language and culture, increased equal treatment, but hardly „autonomy“, and in 10-20 years time

Erdoğan

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Negative:

• Severe setback for Turkish economy; most new (international) investments could be further blocked, no noticeable improvement of living conditions• Aggravation of internal tensions and unrest• Erdoğan could not secure vital votes of Kurds to become a new strong President for the next 10 years to come• Kurdish conflict could escalate into an even worse situation and in renewed armed conflicts• Anti-regime demonstrators and disillusioned Kurds could turn Turkey into a domestic Pandora‘s Box• Outcome unpredictable

Future options

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Positive:• A peaceful solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey could change the geo-strategic power structure in Middle East and Eurasia: it could result in a gravity shift of power structures further to the East: Turkey could compensate a thinning out military presence of the USA in Northern Iraq by strengthening an already economically dominating position in the neighbouring Kurdistan Region of Iraq; we will elaborate on that later • An agreement in the Kurdish question could also pave the way for urgently needed international investments, and could make feasible a comprehensive reconstruction of poor house Eastern Anatolia with funds of the European Union • Vital connections between Turkey and the oil/gas-rich Kurdistan-Region Iraq could be further strengthened; Turkey could gain a new oil/gas/pipeline partner• The role of Turkey as new old regulatory peacekeeping power in Near East and Eurasia could get a new important impetus• Turkey even could become a model for the transformation of young, Islamist regimes in Near East, Eurasia and northern Africa to full fletched democracies • A lasting negotiated settlement with the Kurds could open a completely new chapter in Turkish politics and would increase its international standing

Future options

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• A clear majority of the populations in Turkey are said to back the peace process with the Kurds

• There are at the same time indications that the rejection of the peace process with Kurds by nationalist groups has increased

• Turkey seems to be on a crossroads between a feasible lasting peace option with the Kurds and new aggravated unrest

• The peace process with the Kurds has not failed yet ultimately

• Kurds express increasing frustration about the ongoing conflicting and a for them unsatisfying situation

• Continuation of conflicting future options

Future trends

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S Y R I A





• Kurdish movements in Syria are divided in some 16 different mostly conflicting organisations; their alignments vary on a regular bases without identifiable continuous principles; except for the traditional attitude to try to keep an influence as much as possible in all emerging developments in order to secure at the end a desired success in at least one of them• PYD (Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat, Democratic Union Party), a PKK affiliate, dominates Kurdish populated border areas to Turkey• Syrian President Bashar al-Assad decreed in March 2013 a reorganisation of the regional administrative order and proclaimed Kamishli/Qamishlo to a so called Muhafaza district; by that he created a new combined district in border areas of northern Syria where at the time nearly 85 percent of the Kurdish population live (Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder) • Soon after PYD established a Kurdish Region in the border areas (kurd. „Herema Rojava“, "Region Westkurdistan"); administering the area, adjudicating in ad hoc revolutionary tribunals, sentencing people, killing even innocent Kurds like an 18 year old unarmed nephew of a Kurdish scientist working in Germany, monopolising regional power and expelling even KRG/KDP Iraq influence from the area by force

Kurds Syria

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• As a consequence, rivalries and conflicts of PYD with KRG and in particular KDP Iraq are increasing; tensions are growing

• There is a danger of an inner-Kurdish civil war Northern Syria, Southern Turkey, Kurdistan Region Iraq, provoked by PYD forces

• PKK and PYD see the formation of a "Westkurdistan Region" in northern Syria as important demonstration of their strategic power and influence beyond Turkey

• The PYD self declared "Westkurdistan Region" seems to be tolerated if not encouraged by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus

• Alleged aim: to keep Turkey and Iraqi Kurds out of the Syrian civil war and to form a kind of a buffer zone along the northern border

Kurds Syria

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• It is not clear whether PYD forces could be intentionally mislead by the Syrian regime to act as a temporary geo-strategic buffer to Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds under a vague pretext to get future regional autonomy in return, whereas in real terms the regime in Damascus could drop them any time if they would not be useful for it any more

• Recently, militant Islamists within oppositional forces fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime (possibly Al-Nusra fighters close to Al-Qaida mercenaries) massacred hundreds of civilian Kurds, mostly women, children and elderly

• Since then more than 30,000 Syrian Kurds are fleeing into Northern Iraq and are sheltered in KRG camps

• Should this exodus into Iraq continue and Syrian Kurds be further forced into Iraqi exile they could contribute to a regional de facto enlarged influence zone of the KRG in border areas of Iraq to Syria

Kurds Syria

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Future developments Kurds Syria:

• There will be in all probability no meaningful political autonomy for Kurds in (Northern) Syria: consensus USA, NATO, Turkey, Syrian opposition• Syria will most likely not be transformed in a federal state like Iraq with autonomous regions (including a Kurdish dominated one)• It will not be possible for PYD or any other Kurdish movement to achieve by force of arms autonomy or any other form of federal self-rule in Syria• The creation of an inter-regional, united independent Kurdish state stretching over border areas of Syria and Turkey including the Kurdistan Region Iraq seems unrealistic and will not materialise in any foreseeable future • There seems to be only one realistic future option for the Kurds in Syria: to participate in peaceful negotiations for a future democratic Syria with the aim of a sustainable national compromise regarding a fair power sharing

Future Kurds Syria

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I R A Q





• Autonomous Kurdistan Region Iraq one and only territorial self-rule of Kurds internationally• Semi-state with sweeping regional powers within Iraqi constitution• Most stable region of Iraq with relatively few terror incidents• Tight security, leads otherwise to complaints that it would increasingly infringe civil liberties • Middle East comparison: Relative but fragile stability with potentials to explode from time to time, more stable than e.g. Lebanon• Experiment democracy slowly improving to a full democracy, slow pace disputed • Free elections, but predominance of power-sharing KDP-PUK; at the same time growing influence of opposition (notably Goran/Change); tendencies of KDP accumulating power causing ongoing tensions• Continuation of dominant KDP-PUK power-sharing rule highly likely• Strong youth, distinct majority of roughly 5 million Kurds under 18, never experienced war, increasingly pushing for full democracy, freedom of speech, expression, and press, most notably also for women rights, criticising corruption, mismanagement and nepotism; violent protests 2011 calmed down since 2012

Iraq

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• Rapid pace of reconstruction and modernisation; aim: international free trade region (model: Dubai, Gulf States) • Regional capital Erbil: booming like Sulaimaniya, but restricted atmosphere, accented conservative; Sulaimaniya: most liberal with touch of international flair; Kirkuk: multi-cultural, economically most important town, but constantly terror torn, thrown back in development 10-20 years; current trend: Kurds are stabilising dominant influence over Kirkuk (continued tensions with central power in Baghdad) • Most infrastructure projects concentrated in Erbil area, causing criticism• Regional budget (steady and guaranteed but depending on varying oil/gas prices on the word markets): approximately 17% of Iraq's oil exports (2011: $83 billions, 2012: ca. $87bn): = ca. $ 14bn Kurdistan Region (locally confirmed only $ 11-12bn); black market economy assumed considerable, but no concrete figures available; additional regional taxes and custom: ca. 1% of regional budget• However, nearly two thirds of yearly budget bound fixed costs for administration, civil servants, and former Peshmergas; 30,000 academics without jobs get minimum income; further unemployed get benefits; unemployment rate officially 18%, among young people up to 40% and more than 50%; therefore, only ca. 30% of budget available for investments of regional government; increasing numbers of foreign workers mainly from Asia doing poor paid jobs (road sweeper, housemaids, hotel servants)

Iraq

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• Turkey exports to Iraq 2011 total of $11-12bn; thereof estimated 70% into Autonomous Kurdistan Region • Goods from Turkey mainly consumer articles, and food; further strong presence of Turkish companies most notably in construction business • Steady amount of trade with Kurdistan Region Iraq of increasing importance also for Turkey

Turkey dominating foreign trade

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Iran 2nd largest trading partner• Iran 2nd largest international trade partner of Kurdistan Region Iraq• Iran exports to Iraq 2011 up to $6-8bn, thereof mainly into Kurdistan Region• Most Iranian goods consumer products and food; increasing Iranian investments • Goods from Syria drastically decreasing because of civil war

• Kurdistan Region Iraq vastly destroyed; no important industry (except e.g. cement), still weak agriculture in reconstruction, important upcoming tourism; nevertheless, economic trends steep upwards: economic growth: 2008: 1,8%, 2009: 4,3%, 2010: 7%, 2012: estimated 12%. However, also gap rich-poor rapidly growing; small groups of nouveau riche accumulating considerable wealth

Upswing economy & rich-poor-gap





• Relative, increasing regional independence of Kurdistan Iraq was virtually bought politically and diplomatically by allowing Turkey and Iran greater influence • Consequences Turkey: 1: Turkey dominates Kurdistan Region Iraq already economically; 2: secures additional vital $12+bn per year for stabilisation of own economy; 3: new KRG pipeline under construction to Ceyhan will a) strengthen international position of Turkey as leading East-West energy hub mainly to Europe, and b) will give Turkey the option to tap directly into (by any account) one of the biggest estimated oil and gas reserves worldwide, and should even further enhance its outstanding energy-supply position as well as its international influence• Turkey, therefore can‘t have any further interest and intention to massively intervene militarily in the Kurdistan Region Iraq, because it is already there, economically in a commanding position and presumably keen to protect its investments and future economic prospects accordingly• Kurdish state?: At the moment it seems by far more likely that Turkey would (tacitly) tolerate the formation of a Kurdish state in the eastern neighbourhood should Iraq eventually disintegrate; however, there is no soon emerging in sight ofa new state in form of a Kurdistan Republic

Relative independence diplomatically bought

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• Influence Iran on Kurdistan Region Iraq seen politically and geo-strategically more burdened with problems: 1: main price for allowing Iran more influence visibly trends to Islamisation of society; bigger impacts in conservative North than in more liberal South with longstanding laicistic traditions; in general terms tensions growing because of increasing Islamisation; 2: Iran exerting efforts to have a say in crucial political matters like the question, who should become the next (Kurdish) president of Iraq; 3: influence of militant Islamic groups rising mainly in border areas; threatening security; 4: also drugs seeping in from Iran more frequently; 5: economically, Iran second largest partner of Kurdistan region, including a growing number of tourists and investment • Kurdish state? At the moment it seems also more likely that Iran too would tolerate the formation of a Kurdish state in the North-West, should it emerge at all, than to try to prevent it militarily by armed force• PKK: Kurdish authorities are tolerating PKK forces on KRG territories, mainly between the Qandil-mountains and the district of Amadiya; PKK managed to resist attacks by the Turkish army, KDP and PUK, by own military power and alliances with Syria and Iran; even so, attitude of Iran towards PKK and PYD not entire clear

Influence Iran

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• Kurdistan Region Iraq seems to remain the most stable part of Iraq, but with a continuously fragile security situation, including dangers of time and again erupting tensions and unrest over unsolved problems, but basically steady on its way to an enhanced and (hopefully) at the end full fledged democracy

• Kurdistan Region Iraq sees itself as coherent territorial habitat of Kurds here to stay permanently, and by far more difficult to be crushed as ever before

• Pan-Kurdistan? There is no base in realpolitik and therefore, no danger for opponents of such an idea, that an alleged Pan-Kurdistan could emerge in any foreseeable future comprising NW Iran, Kurdistan N Iraq, Eastern Turkey and N Syria

• Future option: Kurdistan Region Iraq is most likely stabilising its territorial autonomous position within the Iraqi federal state, maintaining stronger links with Turkey and Iran, possibly also with the European Union; the outcome of the civil war in Syria seems unclear, including consequences for the Iraqi Kurds

Kurdistan Region Iraq - Future options

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I R A N





• Autonomy & Democracy: Since the downfall of the Shah 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1980 Kurds are fighting for two main goals: autonomy for Kurds and democracy for Iran; they could not achieve both goals until today• Kordestān Province is one of 31 in Iran; no real powers of regional self-rule• KDP-I: Mainstream representation of Iranian Kurds is since its foundation on August 16, 1945, in Mahabad the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan; a few months later KDP-I established in a leading role the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad; it lasted from January 22nd, 1946, to March 30th, 1947, when it was overthrown and its leaders executed; others like Iraqi Kurdish leaders who helped to establish the short-lived Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad, notably Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), went into Ex-USSR exile (Armenian Soviet Republic); he remained there from 1947- 1958; interestingly, during the early years of that time after WWII the Soviets offered Kurds to help them establish a greater Kurdistan, comprising Eastern Anatolia, Northern Iraq and Northwestern Iran; the plan was backed up and authorised by Josef Stalin (1878-1953); it failed according to eyewitnesses e.o. because Mustafa Barzani is said to have refused to share power with Kurdish leaders from Turkey, Iraq and Iran

Autonomy for Kurds - Democracy for Iran

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• New beginning: Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou (1930-1989) rebuilt the KDP-I since the early days of the Islamic Revolution in Iran; from 1979 onwards until his death 1989 he negotiated with various leaders of the newly (1980) established Islamic Republic (e.g. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 1902-1989, former labour minister Dariush Forouhar, 1928-1998, finally and indirectly with Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, *1934) for implementation of autonomy for Kurds and democracy for Iran; Ghassemlou was assassinated by emissaries of the Islamic Republic on July 13, 1989, in Vienna • Reasons for assassination: Ghassemlou was suspected that he wanted to overthrow the Islamic regime and its central power in Teheran, and would have been ready to participate in an oil-rich break away „Free Western Iran“, run by Ex-Shah generals and officials, promoted by later deposed and executed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) as early as 1980, and backed up by the USA and others; subsequently, in a row were alleged proponents of a „Free West Iran“ assassinated: general Gholam Ali Oveisi in 1984, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989, and Shapour Bakhtiar in 1991.• Ghassemlou: Stressed repeatedly that he did not want to overthrow Iran‘s central power but merely wanted to help transform it into a democratic system; and he had openly declined to proclaim a free Kurdistan in Iran, even if its administration would have been paid for by the then Saddam Hussein regime (Jalal Talabani)

Assassinations

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• Present development: KDP-I continues to fight for autonomy for Kurds and democracy for Iran; the movement is under new leadership after the successor of Ghassemlou, Sadegh Sharafkandi, together with three colleagues was also assassinated on September 17th, 1992 at a restaurant in Berlin; according to the verdict passed by a court in Berlin on April 10th, 1997, the crime was committed on order of the leadership of the Islamic Republic • Since these assassinations KDP-I and other Kurdish movements in Iran split into fractions; they are regrouping but beyond any real chance to force upon meaningful autonomy for Kurds in Iran or to help effectively to transform the Islamic Republic into a laicistic democracy; the situation of Kurds in Iran is unchanged not good• Voices of moderation: Currently the new elected Iranian President Hassan Rohani (*1948) seems to be anxious to express moderation and signals limited liberalisa-tion; however, it seems to early for any sweeping conclusions out of that; even so, and as things stand at the moment, it seems highly unlikely that the Islamic Republic would e.g. be ready to be engaged in a full-fledged war against the USA over Syria, mainly because it could not afford that financially and economically

Autonomy & Democracy

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Thank you!

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2013 HENNERBICHLER TUNCELI-DERSIM II; dialogue Turkey-Kurds

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