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F A C U L T Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y U N I V E R S I T Y O F O
X F O R D
FHS Philosophy 2012: report of the Convener of Conveners
Introduction
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List of examiners and assessors
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Prizes
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Take-up and performance statistics
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Take-up by option, by school
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Performance by option, by school
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Mark distribution by option
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Performance by option by gender
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Take-up of submitted work options
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Individual paper reports
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101 History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant
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102 Knowledge and Reality
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103 Ethics
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104 Philosophy of Mind
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105 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Psychology and
Neuroscience.....................................................................
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106 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science
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107 Philosophy of Religion
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108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language
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109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism
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110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas
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112 The Philosophy of Kant
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113 Post-Kantian Philosophy
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114 Theory of Politics
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115 / 130 Plato, Republic
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116/132 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein
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118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein
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119 Formal Logic
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120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics
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122 Philosophy of Mathematics
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124 Philosophy of
Science...................................................................................................................................................
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133 Aristotle, Physics
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135 Latin Philosophy
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Introduction This is the subject report for Honour School
Philosophy in 2012. The report will be of use to future candidates,
who should when revising read the subject reports on the papers
they are offering. The report will also be inspected by the
Philosophy Facultys Undergraduate Studies Committee as part of its
review of the years examining business.
Prof Cecilia Trifogli
Convener of Conveners
List of examiners and assessors The following Faculty members
served as examiners in the Honour Schools in 2012: Philosophy,
Politics and Economics: Prof Ursula Coope, Dr Antony Eagle, Dr
Joseph Schear (convener), Prof Derek Matravers (Cambridge/Open,
external). Literae Humaniores: Dr Anita Avramides, Prof Roger Crisp
(convener), Dr Peter Kail (chair), Prof Angie Hobbs (Warwick,
external). Mathematics and Philosophy & Physics and Philosophy:
Prof Harvey Brown (chair in MP part B, PP), Prof Gonzalo
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Dr Christopher Timpson (convener), Dr ystein
Linnebo (Birkbeck, external). Psychology and Philosophy &
Philosophy and Modern Languages & Philosophy and Theology: Dr
Tim Bayne (convener), Prof Stephen Mulhall, Prof Scott Sturgeon, Dr
Sarah Patterson (Birkbeck, external). The following served as
assessors: Dr Pamela Anderson, Dr Brian Ball, Dr Stephen Blamey,
Prof John Broome, Dr Daniel Came, Dr Laura Castelli, Prof David
Charles, Prof Martin Davies, Dr Manuel Dries, Dr Robert Frazier, Dr
Edward Harcourt, Dr Brian King, Dr Grahame Lock, Prof Adrian Moore,
Dr Michail Peramatzis, Dr Roger Teichmann, Dr Stephen Williams. The
Convener of Conveners, responsible for the overall administration
of Philosophy Finals examining, was Prof Cecilia Trifogli.
Prizes The Henry Wilde Prize for the outstanding performance in
Philosophy across all joint schools was awarded jointly to Olinga
Tahzib (Lady Margaret Hall, Physics and Philosophy) and Benjamin
Zelenka Martin (Brasenose College, PPE). The Duns Scotus Prize for
best performance on the Medieval Philosophy papers was shared by
Katherine Moe (Exeter College) and Maximus Marenbon (St Hughs
College).
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The Elizabeth Anscombe Prize for the best undergraduate
Philosophy thesis was won by Jacob Williamson (Somerville College)
for his thesis on How Kantian is Rawls A Theory of Justice?. The
Gibbs Prize winners for the best performance in Philosophy in each
school were as follows: PPE Vicente Solera Deuchar, Balliol College
Lit. Hum. Rebecca Lees, Worcester College MP, part B Cosmo Grant,
Merton College PP, part B James Read, Oriel College PP, part C
Christopher Hadnutt, St Edmund Hall PPP Jingkai Chen, The Queens
College (proxime accessit Rebecca Hewstone, St Johns) PML No prize
awarded PT Christopher Smith, Keble College
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Take-up and performance statistics
Take-up by option, by school
School 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115
116 117
PPE 62 38 154 14 2 6 32 12 22 1 6 18 38 56 30 1
Lit Hum 10 6 22 1 1 5 3 6 1 3 4 12 18 12
MP 8 15 9 5 1 9 6 1 7 8 5 3
PP 4 15 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
PPP 13 4 3 18 2 9 1 1 3 1
PML 14 5 12 2 1 6 4 11 1 6 10 7 2
PT 16 13 14 4 24 2 7 3 5 3 1
Theology 4
Maths 1
COS 1
Total 128 96 215 48 4 8 82 31 54 3 11 40 72 91 49 5
School 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141
180 Total
PPE 16 3 2 1 514
Lit Hum 2 1 25 8 1 9 1 3 154
MP 4 2 23 3 2 1 112
PP 2 2 17 2 17 70
PPP 2 1 7 65
PML 1 1 2 85
PT 1 93
Theology 4
Maths 1
COS 1 2
Total 27 6 19 2 23 26 10 1 25 8 1 9 1 4 1 1100
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Performance by option, by school Figures are not given for
cohorts of less than 5.
School 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115
116 117
PPE 64.1 65.6 63.3 64.5 - 66.8 65.6 67.9 64.7 - 67.3 67.5 66.8
65.7 65.1 -
Lit Hum 64.0 59.2 63.0 - - 65.6 - 61.5 - - - 65.8 65.6 63.8
MP 66.1 66.3 66.4 65.8 - 68.9 65.5 - 63.4 64.4 69.8 -
PP - 65.4 - - - - - - - -
PPP 65.1 - - 65.0 - 64.9 - - - -
PML 62.4 66.0 63.1 - - 66.2 - 63.7 - 68.3 63.2 67.1 -
PT 63.6 62.6 66.3 - 65.9 - 66.0 - 65.8 - -
Theology -
Maths -
COS -
Overall 64.2 64.5 63.7 64.6 - 65.0 65.5 66.6 64.4 - 66.5 66.8
65.8 66.0 64.6 68.4
School 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141
180 Overall
PPE 67.4 - - - 64.8
Lit Hum - - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - 65.3
MP - - 65.6 - - - 66.3
PP - - 66.8 - 64.9 66.2
PPP - - 64.6 64.3
PML - - - 64.3
PT - 65.0
Theology -
Maths -
COS - -
Overall 66.1 63.0 66.9 - 65.6 64.7 64.1 - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - -
65.0
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Mark distribution by option Figures are not given for cohorts of
less than 5.
Range 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115
116 117
0-39 1
40-49 1 4
50-59 26 14 34 4 1 8 2 10 1 10 9 8
60-69 81 62 143 36 6 59 18 34 8 29 46 60 32
70-100 21 18 34 8 1 15 11 10 3 10 16 22 9
Total 128 96 215 48 4 8 82 31 54 3 11 40 72 91 49 5
Range 118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141
180 Total
0-39 1 2
40-49 5
50-59 1 1 3 4 1 3 1 1 143
60-69 19 3 14 14 17 8 14 4 5 1 722
70-100 7 2 4 6 5 1 8 3 4 2 228
Total 27 6 19 2 23 26 10 1 25 8 1 9 1 4 1 1100
Performance by option by gender
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 116
117
Female 64.6 64.8 63.4 64.4 65.5 64.5 63.8 67.0 66.9 66.1 67.4
66.1
Male 63.9 64.4 63.9 64.8 65.0 65.4 67.8 65.2 66.3 66.8 65.5 65.2
63.3
Overall 64.2 64.5 63.7 64.6 - 65.0 65.5 66.6 64.4 - 66.5 66.8
65.8 66.0 64.6 -
118 119 120 121 122 124 125 128 130 131 132 133 140 141 180
Overall
Female 65.8 62.0 68.5 67.5 66.8 65.7 68.8 65.0 70.8 65.2
Male 66.2 63.2 66.5 64.6 64.3 63.4 66.5 68.5 68.8 64.9
Overall 66.1 63.0 66.9 - 65.6 64.7 64.1 - 67.2 65.9 - 69.7 - - -
65.0
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Take-up of submitted work options Theses There were 16
Philosophy theses submitted this year: this is relatively few, with
normally 20 or 21 being offered. The average mark of the theses was
69.5. No candidate scored below the II(i) band. Extended Essays
There were 31 Extended Essays from Mathematics and Philosophy
candidates, with an average mark of 66.9; 12 Essays were submitted
by Physics and Philosophy students, who averaged 67.2.
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Individual paper reports Reports are not provided where so doing
might identify individual candidates.
101 History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant Overall, the
performance of this paper was very solid, with few poor scripts. As
ever, the significant majority of the answers were to the questions
set on Descartes and Hume. Locke and Spinoza formed a second group
in terms of frequency of questions attempted, followed by Berkeley
and Leibniz. Very few candidates attempted the Kant questions. We
only comment on the more popular questions. Question 1, In what
sense, if any, is the cogito the foundation of the project of
Descartes Meditations? attracted many answers. Some took it as an
occasion to discuss whether or not the cogito was an inference, but
the better answers distinguished not only different senses of
foundation but also different interpretations of the aims of
Descartes project. Question 2, Why, for Descartes, does human error
need to be reconciled with Gods goodness? Is his reconciliation
successful? again attracted many answers. All but the very best
answers failed properly to criticize the plausibility of Descartes
voluntarism. Question 3 was centred on a quotation: I can obtain
some knowledge of myself without knowledge of my body. But it is
not yet transparently clear to me that this knowledge is complete
and adequate, so as to enable me to be certain that I am not
mistaken in excluding body from my essence. (ARNAULD) Is Arnauld
right to so object to Descartes argument for the real distinction
between mind and body? Too many answers paid mere lip service to
the quotation, choosing instead to rehearse general discussions of
Cartesian dualism. However, the best answers really got to grips
with the issue. The answers to both question 4 (What does Spinoza
mean by claiming that besides God, no substance can be or be
conceived?) and question 5 (Is Spinozas solution to the mind/body
problem satisfactory?) displayed an admirable grasp of the relevant
propositions from the Ethics ad their logical connection, with some
answers to question 5 discussing whether Spinoza has a proper
notion of the mental. Spinozistic freedom is no freedom at all Is
this true? (question 6) attracted textually-informed answers but a
number of answers were insufficiently critical of the conception of
freedom. Many answers to question 13 (Is Lockes project doomed if
his arguments against innate ideas and principles fails?) collapsed
into discussions of the adequacy of Lockes attack on nativism
rather than address the wider issue of Lockes constructive project.
Question 17 (A belief is a lively idea related to or associated
with a present impression (HUME) Discuss and evaluate) was the
least popular of the Hume questions but the answers tended to be
adequate, if unsympathetic. Question 18, Does Humes discussion of
probable inference fatally compromise the project of A Treatise of
Human Nature?, attracted a great many answers, many of a good to
excellent standard. Too many answers to question 19, Must Hume
think that there are no bodies? failed to address the question of
whether the strictures imposed by his Copy Principle precluded any
meaning being attached to the term body, but the best answers not
only considered this issue but also Humes discussion of the
external world in Of the modern philosophy.
PJK
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102 Knowledge and Reality
Some comments on the most commonly answered questions this
year.
Q1 (The theory that knowledge is justified true belief is a
simple and powerful proposal. Just as
we accept simple and powerful, but highly counterintuitive,
theories in fundamental physics,
so too we may accept the knowledge proposal despite its
counterintuitive consequences.
Discuss.): not well done for the most part; candidates did not
use the opportunity to reflect
in any interesting way on philosophical methodology, except to
assert without argument that
simplicity and strength have no part to play in conceptual
analyses; quite why remains
unclear to me.
Q2 (Disjunctivism is untrue to the phenomenology of perceptual
experience. Discuss.) Mostly
anti-disjunctivist. The best answers offered disjunctivist
responses to the phenomenological
objection, often along adverbial lines.
Q7 ("When S knows that p, that is a non-linguistic fact about Ss
mental state. That fact will obtain
regardless of the linguistic context, and, hence, S will know
that p in every such context. So
epistemic contextualism is false." Discuss.). This was poorly
answered for the most part
only a few candidates saw that the argument is invalid, since
the premises arent relevant to
contextualism at all, with most trying to argueinevitably
unsuccessfullythat the claim
that knowledge is a mental state is inconsistent with
contextualism about the semantic value
of knows. No answers grappled to any real extent with the
Williamsonian claim that
knowledge is a mental state. (Many candidates apparently didnt
understand that EC is
ascriber contextualismand change of context for the ascriber
need not involve any change
in the subject. One cannot argue that change in an ascribers
context will induce a change in
a subjects mental state.)
Q9 (It is more useful to think of a priori status as attaching
primarily to justified belief rather than
knowledge. Discuss.) Not well answered. Candidates did not know
what to do with this
questionhardly surprising, since many of them defined a priori
knowledge as knowledge
with an a priori justification. Better answers considered
whether there was a priori
justification for falsehoods; the best answers would have
considered the right way to
understand a priori truth independently of knowledge (e.g.,
Kripke,
Stalnaker/Jackson/Chalmers-style two-dimensionalism).
Q10 (An event A is a cause of a distinct event B just in case
bringing about the occurrence of A
would be an effective means by which a free agent could bring
about the occurrence of B.
(MENZIES and PRICE) Is it?) Too few candidates engaged with the
question; many attempted
to bring it around to counterfactual accounts of causation.
There was little sympathy with
the approach, but objections to its use of free agency were
mostly ill-targeted. The best
answers gave examples of causation without effectiveness, e.g.,
probability-lowering
causation. No one mentioned one of the major issues surrounding
this theory in the
literature, namely, the non-reductive nature of a definition of
causation which explicitly
makes use of the notion of bringing about.
Q12 (Is modality best understood using quantification over
possible worlds?) was mostly
adequately answered. Many candidates appeared to think possible
world is a synonym for
Lewisian possible world, but that means that various ersatzisms
were inexplicably
discounted, and there was much (too much) discussion of the
problems for concrete
possibilia. The best answers gave attention to the role of
understanding in the question,
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arguing that graspability of the basic constituents of a theory
of modality was an important
consideration. An ideal answer would have compared realist
proposals with those views of
modality which make no reference to possible worlds at all, such
as combinatorialism and
modalismunfortunately even the very best of the actual answers
did not spend very much
time on these interesting and salient rivals. Many candidates
assumed that an understanding
of modality must be a reductive understanding of it, something
which is not presupposed by
the question and for which they did not argue.
Q13 (If you are a person, are you essentially a person?)
Candidatesdrawing almost exclusively
on material from general philosophy, disappointinglyfocused on
personhood at the
expense of attention to essentialism. Most argued from animalism
to the falsity of the
essentialist claim, with greater or lesser competence.
Q14 (Can we make sense of change over time without appealing to
temporal parts?) was the
most popular question. Many candidates spent far too long
describing and evaluating
temporal-parts based accounts of persistence, even though the
question did not ask about
them, or about whether a good account of persistence is possible
at allit simply asked
whether there was a good account of persistence that did not
make use of temporal parts.
The best answers kept discussion of temporal parts to a minimum.
Most answers were
competent discussions of endurance, reviewing standard arguments
from the literature.
Better approaches showed some snatches of originalityeither in
perspective or in offering
less familiar objections and observations. Generally, though,
this was answered in a merely
competent fashion. Very few to no answers discussed the notion
of wholly present, a crucial
notion for endurantistsno one discussed the now-prevalent
multiple location conception
of endurance. A few candidates interpreted the question as
meaning whether we can make
sense of change over time without appealing to the A-theoretical
determinations of past,
present and future, as if these determinations were what
temporal parts referred to.
Q18 (If what is true depends on what exists, how can a
presentist explain the truth of Dinosaurs
used to roam around in what is now Oxfordshire?) Mostly well
done. A few candidates
strayed into more general evaluations of presentism, but in
general the focus was rightly on
truthmaker objections, with the best answers distinguished by
their degree of clarity and
incisiveness rather than differing in kind from other
answers.
One suggestion for the examiners/USC: induction is on the
syllabus for both 102 and 124/105/106.
Given that almost all candidates for the latter papers are
candidates for the former too, having the
same topic provides a perverse incentive for difficult-to-police
overlap; and there is no reason why
the papers should share this topic. My preference would be for
it to be allocated to 124/etc., since
there it connects with issues about confirmation and evidential
support that are central to the
subject. In 102, many candidates writing on induction make use
of literature that doesnt
substantially differ from the material studied in general
philosophy, and there is no natural way to
include better material in tutorials for 102 without overlap
with tutorials in philosophy of science.
AE
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103 Ethics There were a few outstanding answers, and several
more which, even if they were not outstanding overall, showed a
pleasing originality of thought and/or a willingness to shape the
answer very exactly to the question set. Q1. The requirements of
morality are requirements of rationality only if I am rationally
required to ask, of any maxim of action of mine, whether I can will
it as a universal law. Discuss.
Many saw this simply as an opportunity to discuss whether all
and only morally acceptable maxims meet some version of a
universalizability test. This is certainly relevant, since if moral
acceptability and universalizability dont coincide then it would
not be enough to show that the requirements of morality are
requirements of rationality that I am rationally required to ask,
of any maxim, whether I can will it as a universal law. However,
the minority of candidates who went on to address the latter
question were rewarded for it. Q2. Even the best arguments for
moral relativism succeed only in establishing moral scepticism.
Discuss.
Candidates sometimes took moral skepticism to mean what Mackie
means by this phrase, i.e. the error theory. That interpretation
made the question more of a struggle than it would be if one took
the phrase (surely more naturally?) to mean first-order moral
skepticism.
Q3. The only intelligible way of relating moral properties to
natural properties is to reduce the former to the latter.
Discuss.
Decently answered on the whole.
Q4(a) The best explanations of moral beliefs explain them by
appeal to factors that are incidental to their truth. So we cannot
have any justified moral beliefs. Discuss.
Almost no candidates chose to answer this, though answers to the
next disjunct showed that many were familiar with Mackies argument
from relativity, which appeals to best explanation.
Q4(b) Should we be surprised if convinced moral error theorists
continue to care about the difference between moral right and
wrong?
A popular question, on the whole decently answered.
Q5(a) Just because reason alone is not a motive to any action of
the will (HUME), it need not follow that moral attitudes cannot be
beliefs. Discuss.
A popular question, which many took to be a straightforward
invitation to discuss the Humean two-step, i.e. beliefs dont
motivate, moral attitudes do, so moral attitudes arent beliefs as
if every Ethics paper must contain this very question, and it is
just a matter of identifying it through the different disguises in
which it appears from year to year. But there can be more than one
question about Hume and motivation! The point of italicizing alone
was to get people to comment on the difference between reason alone
isnt a motive (or beliefs alone dont motivate) and beliefs dont
motivate, not to ignore the difference.
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Q5b. Could there be such a thing as moral perception?
This drew very few answers, despite the opportunity to make
something of the comparison between moral properties and secondary
qualities.
Q6. The distinction between intended and foreseen but unintended
consequences is real enough, but it cannot bear any moral weight.
Discuss.
Popular, and on the whole well answered.
Q11. Though I want to stay in bed, I decide it would be better
to go to the lecture, so I go to the lecture. Though I want to stay
in bed, I decide it would be better to go to the lecture but I stay
in bed. Unless reason is practical, can we account for the
difference between these two cases?
An oddity of the answers to this question is how few used the
word weakness of will (or akrasia), suggesting that perhaps
candidates did not see the difference between the two cases in the
light of this concept.
Q12a. Must consequentialism misunderstand the value of close
personal relations?
A very popular question. Some, wrongly, saw it as an invitation
to discuss integrity. Others might have made more of the
agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, and of differences
between forms of consequentialism. But on the whole competently
answered.
Q12b. Consequentialism can make no sense of excusable wrongs, so
consequentialism is false. Discuss.
The better answers pointed out that consequentialism can
distinguish wrong actions from blameworthy ones. Few, however,
either explored whether this distinction is ultimately viable, or
worried about whether there might be a pre-theoretical notion of an
excusable wrong which consequentialism is required to make sense
of.
Q13a. The problem with virtue ethics is that its not interested
enough in what it is to be imperfectly virtuous. Discuss.
Candidates took several different approaches towards this
question, but surprisingly few mentioned the unity of the virtues,
i.e. the idea that you cant have any virtue unless you have them
all.
Q13b. Being morally good and being excellent of ones kind are
two quite different things, so virtue ethics cannot possibly tell
us anything about moral goodness. Discuss.
Decently answered on the whole, though a few took this to be the
(distinct) question whether being a morally good person is good for
that person.
ERFH
104 Philosophy of Mind All questions except Q7a (What would it
be to naturalize intentionality? Why might one want to do so?), Q12
(Are emotions properly conceived as propositional attitudes?), and
Q13a (What does it mean to say that experience is transparent?)
received at least one answer. The most popular questions were: Q2a
(Is the mere multiple realizability of psychological kinds a good
objection to the central state identity theory? 12 responses); Q3
(Is functionalism a real advance on behaviourism as far as the
philosophical problems of consciousness are concerned? 27
responses); Q4a (I do
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not believe we can ever specify what it is about the brain that
is responsible for consciousness, but I am sure that whatever it is
it is not inherently miraculous. The problem arises ... because we
are cut off by our very constitution from achieving a conception of
the natural property of the brain (or of consciousness) that
accounts for the link. (McGINN) Discuss. 19 responses); Q6 (Are
bodily sensations intentional states? 7 responses); and Q8b (Can we
accept the completeness of physics without being committed to
epiphenomenalism about the mental? 24 responses). Candidates seem
to have overlooked the inclusion of the word mere in Q2a, and few
answers considered the implications of the distinction between
multiple realizability as a (mere) conceptual possibility and
multiple realization as an empirical claim. However, candidates did
generally demonstrate a good grasp of the various options open to
the identity theorist for responding to the challenge of multiple
realizability, and they were able to discuss the limitations of
those options in an intelligent manner. Answers to Q3 typically
suffered from a lack of rigour in characterizing behaviourism and
functionalism. Moreover, many candidates used this question as an
opportunity to wax lyrical on the perceived shortcomings of
behaviourism and/or functionalism in general, rather than focus on
the question asked. Some of the best answers spent some time
characterizing the philosophical problems of consciousness. Q4 was
one of the most popular questions, although the quality of answers
given to it was not commensurate with its popularity. Surprisingly
few candidates demonstrated any appreciation of McGinns arguments
for the position outlined in the quotation. Many candidates used
this question as an opportunity to discuss Jacksons knowledge
argument. This strategy met with mixed success, although some
candidates were able to draw on their knowledge of the debate about
phenomenal concepts to illuminate McGinns position. Answers to Q6
were somewhat one-dimensional, and candidates tended to give
insufficient attention to objections to the view that they
defended. For example, those who argued that bodily sensations are
intentional generally paid little attention to the arguments that
have been given for thinking that bodily sensations are
non-intentional. Answers to this question also tended to suffer
from insufficient attention to the question of what it is for a
mental state to be intentional. Most candidates structured their
answer to Q8Can we accept the completeness of physics without being
committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental?around responses to
Kims exclusion problem, focusing either on Davidsons token identity
account or on treatments of causation that might allow one to avoid
the exclusion assumption, such as counter-factual accounts.
Candidates were generally well-prepared for this question, although
few went significantly beyond the material presented in
lectures.
TB
105 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Psychology and
Neuroscience See also 124 Philosophy of Science. This paper was
available for the last time in 2012 and was taken by four
candidates. Ten other candidates took paper 125 Philosophy of
Cognitive Science, which was available for the first time. Part B
of the 105 paper offered ten questions of which Q17 (Why do
questions about the degree to which the mind is modular matter?)
attracted two answers and three other questions attracted one
answer each: Q16 (What is the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis
committed to, over and above
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realism about propositional attitude states? What grounds, if
any, are there for this further commitment?), Q20 (What
implications might the study of delusions have for accounts of the
architecture of cognition and perception?), and Q21 (Is our
everyday folk psychological conception of thinking and reasoning
committed to any principles that are incompatible with
connectionism? What evidence might there be for such a
commitment?). The five Part B answers ranged from brief in extent
and under-developed to articulate, well informed, and showing
independent thinking.
MKD
106 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science See
also 124 Philosophy of Science. Eight students sat this paper. Only
one student answered more than one Part B question (on Philosophy
of Social Science), and there was only one overlap (one of the two
questions answered by the only student answering two was also
answered by another student). As such, there are no patterns in the
answers to speak of. Two comments are worth making. The first that
that candidates made a good effort to answer the question as set. I
don't think that there were any "canned" answers at all. The second
is that the strongest papers exemplified and explained theoretical
ideas and claims using work with which they were familiar from
their own studies within the social sciences.
RLF
107 Philosophy of Religion In 2012, the quality of scripts in
Philosophy of Religion (FHS Philosophy 0107) bunched in the middle
60s. The least good scripts were not too bad, but the very best
scripts were not great either. The main overall weakness of the
scripts was the familiar tendency on this paper to offer fairly
superficial summaries of arguments in answer to the most popular
topics; and this year as in the past the popular topics continued
to be the problem of evil, the ontological and teleological proofs
for the existence of God and a divine attribute (e.g.,
omniscience). The weakness of the answers, then, is a serious
philosophical weakness: that is, a failure to problematize core
concepts and to engage philosophically in the debates raised by the
questions. The choice of old-familiar topics and traditional
answers also does not help the candidate demonstrate her or his
analytical and critical skills on new or novel background issues in
philosophy. Consider a few central examples from the specific
questions on this years scripts. First, almost everyone answered
question 11 on the problem of evil (To defuse the logical problem
of evil, it is enough simply to point to the logical possibility
that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil.
Discuss). However, almost no one actually engaged with the question
which was intended to elicit discussion of logical possibility,
what it is for a state of affairs to be logically possible, and how
we determine whether a state of affairs is logically possible. No
candidate addressed the issue of whether or not conceivability
entails possibility. Instead candidates quickly rushed to discuss
Mackie and Plantinga which is fine except when the background
debates/issues were not assessed at all. Second, there was also a
preponderance of answers to question 10, on the fine-tuning
argument.
(Does God provide a good explanation of the so-called
fine-tuning of the universe?) There were
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some philosophically impressive answers, but a large number of
candidates wasted space rehearsing the history of the argument and
its Paleyan predecessor. But, again here, summaries of arguments
does not actually exhibit any philosophical skills, say, by
assessing the comparative merits of theism and multiverse.
Admittedly, most candidates who answered this question correctly
identified the multiverse hypothesis as the main alternative
explanation to the so-called fine-tuning. However, very few, if
any, candidates raised the philosophical question whether theism or
the multiverse hypothesis violates Ockhams Razor; furthermore, none
actually looked in depth at the nature of Ockhams Razor. Third, the
question of the possibility of God (Is God possible?) was the next
popular question and many candidates correctly related this
question of possibility to the modal ontological argument for the
existence of God. Yet once more, standard arguments were rehearsed
concerning the compatibility or not of the divine attributes. Much
more could have been done philosophically and imaginatively with
this question. Finally, the least answered questions were 4 on
Dawkins (The robust muscular Christian haranguing us from the
pulpit of my old school admitted a sneaking regard for atheists.
... What this preacher couldnt stand was agnostics. (DAWKINS)
Discuss), and 5 on Kants transcendental argument (Transcendental
arguments purport to identify the preconditions for the truth of
something that is assumed by all parties. Does Kant have a
successful transcendental argument for Gods existence?). Fair
enough, since these topics were not directly covered in lectures
and probably not in tutorials. However, it is a pity that no matter
what the other questions are on the paper, candidates still tend to
answer the very same core topics in Christian theism every year. In
fact, the nature and content of questions 4 and 5 are totally
different from each other. So, a candidate could have brought in
some of their greater philosophical knowledge into at least
question 5, and similarly, into question 7 on unsurpassable
knowledge (A being is omniscient if and only if it has
unsurpassable knowledge. Discuss). But there is only the slightest
evidence that candidates are endeavouring to think independently on
the nature of the issues at the heart of a range of questions in
philosophy of religion. To repeat, the quality of the scripts was
not generally bad; but scripts did generally lack real, independent
philosophical thinking. Instead text-book answers were often given.
Perhaps, with this paper, part of the problem is that students
think it ok to answer questions as if they were reproducing
theology or defending Christian theism. However, this is a
philosophy paper for which rigour, incisiveness and other critical
skills are necessary!
PSA
108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language 31 candidates sat the
paper of whom 11 received first-class marks, and 2 received lower
second-class marks; the remainder received upper second-class
marks. The overall standard was high. The most popular questions
were Question 1 (Do sorites paradoxes show that classical logic is
untenable?; 17 answers), 14a (Do proper names and definite
descriptions ever mean the same thing?; 15 answers), and 14(b)
(What is the logical form of sentences like The King of France is
bald?; 11 answers). These were followed by Question 7 (Can
metaphorical sentences and non-
metaphorical ones ever mean the same thing?; 9 answers), and
17(a) (Evaluate the following argument: if its true that Sherlock
Holmes is a detective, then Sherlock Holmes exists; but Sherlock
Holmes doesnt exist. So its not true that Sherlock Holmes is a
detective; 9 answers).
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Questions 4 (Can basic logical principles be justified?), 9
(What is meant by the claim that translation is indeterminate? Is
it true?), 17(b) (Is exists a second-level predicate?), 19 (Use
determines meaning. Meaning determines truth-conditions. So
truth-conditions cannot transcend use. Discuss), and 21 (Are
pronouns variables?) received no answers. Of the popular questions,
Question 1 was well and shrewdly answered, candidates often
displaying a good knowledge of standard theories and criticisms;
several showed awareness of the relevance of higher order vagueness
and the difficulties it posed. Question 14(a) was not so well
answered, too many candidates adopting an insufficiently critical
attitude to standard problems with descriptivism. Question 14(b)
elicited some very good answers, the best ones containing, rather
than presupposing, at least a brief explanation of logical form.
The questions on metaphor and empty names showed a sound knowledge
of the literature. The other questions received too few answers to
draw any substantive conclusion, though the examiners welcomed the
fact that most questions received answers, indicating overall a
reasonably wide coverage of the syllabus.
SGW
109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism Few of the
scripts submitted were flawed in serious ways: most candidates
showed a reasonable familiarity with key texts and central issues,
and were able to put together clearly expressed and well-structured
essays under examination conditions. At the same time, however, few
answers were genuinely outstanding: although a pleasing number
displayed qualities of the kind expected from first class scripts,
few of them invited us to use the higher range of first class
marks; and few of the scripts in the high second class range
encouraged us to consider them seriously for a first class mark.
There were several reasons for this. 1. Of the four most popular
questions on this paper - question 1 (Can a great work of art be
immoral?), question 2 (Is work of art a family resemblance
concept?), question 8 (If we restricted ourselves to
non-representational art, we could avoid all of Platos criticisms
of art. Discuss) and question 16 (Is the intentional fallacy a
fallacy?) - it is striking that only one is author-based: the other
author-based questions on the paper (question 9 on Aristotle,
question 10 on Hume, and question 11 on Kant) attracted far fewer
candidates. We suspect that this was because some effort had been
made to ensure that these questions could not be answered simply by
providing an exegesis of the relevant historical texts, but also
required candidates to engage with broader conceptual or thematic
questions. And we further suspect that the relative lack of
excellent answers to the Plato question was due to the fact that
most candidates failed to appreciate that the same was also true in
that case (since question 8 could only be well answered by
candidates willing to query whether mimesis was a synonym for
representation, and willing to explore the question of what makes a
work or genre or medium or art non-representational). Good
candidates can put their exegetical knowledge to use in addressing
matters of broader philosophical import; they do not write as if
these authors were of essentially hermeneutic interest, and as if
the authorities dimension of this paper was essentially distinct
from its thematic concerns. 2. Few candidates made productive use
of their work on other philosophy papers in answering questions on
this paper whether by enriching their account of an authors view on
aesthetics by linking it to his or her views on other matters, or
by deepening their treatment of a topic in aesthetics by drawing on
broader philosophical treatments of pertinent concepts. For
example, few candidates addressing question 16 made any use of work
on the concept of intention in the philosophy of mind and action,
or of work on the concept of meaning in the philosophy of language;
and even more surprisingly, few candidates who addressed question
10 (Humes approach to
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aesthetic judgement is subverted by his decision to model his
account of good taste on his account of the sensory faculty of
taste. Discuss.) could buttress their knowledge of Humes account of
good taste with an equally detailed knowledge of his account of
secondary qualities. 3. Few candidates showed much sensitivity to
the historical context of art and aesthetics. Several questions on
the paper invited them to consider the historical and cultural
specificity of various aesthetic concepts, and indeed of the idea
of the aesthetic as a distinct evaluative field; and they were
amongst the least popular. Question 4 (Is the very idea of a
literary canon politically or morally suspect?) received two
answers; question 6 (The realm of the aesthetic is an invention of
modernity. Discuss) received two; and question 7 (Modernism is an
indispensable concept for understanding the history of art; our
current need to resort to the concept of post-modernism indicates
that we have reached the end of that history. Discuss.) was the
only question on the paper to be entirely avoided. 4. Candidates
were generally unwilling to draw on their personal interests in and
engagements with to enrich their answers. Few discussed particular
works of art in any detail, or any real familiarity with
influential periods or movements or schools in the history of art,
or figures or events in the contemporary art world. To judge from
these scripts, very few candidates are drawn to this paper by
anything other than a purely academic interest in philosophical
aesthetics; we find this hard to believe.
SM
110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas Three candidates sat this
paper. The standard was higher than in the last couple of years.
The best candidate showed a very high degree of engagement with
Aquinas's texts. No questions from section B (Action and Will,
Natural Law) were answered. The only question that received more
than one answer was q. 3, Since wisdom and power are distinct
accidents in creatures, then they are also distinct accidents in
God. How would Aquinas reply?, which all three candidates answered.
The weakest answer dealt almost exclusively with the simplicity of
God, without addressing the specific question about the attributes
of God.
CT
112 The Philosophy of Kant Eleven candidates sat this paper. As
usual, the performance was very strong, with three of the
candidates gaining a first-class mark, and the remaining candidates
gaining an upper-second class mark. The most popular questions were
Q. 2 (We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards
all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert
its transcendental ideality. (B44/A 28) Explain and evaluate. - six
answers), Q. 7 (What are Kants arguments against the Humean
sceptic? Are they convincing? - six answers), Q. 12 (Does Kants
transcendental unity of apperception commit him to the rejection of
any substantive notion of the self? - six answers) and Q. 10 (Why
does the concept of synthesis play such an important role in the
Deduction? - four answers). Other questions received two answers or
fewer. Q.2 This question did not attract very good answers.
Candidates generally provided an accurate explanation of the
quotation but their evaluation of it was disappointing. The best
answers showed a
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very good knowledge of the secondary literature but did not
display a high degree of independent discussion. Q.7 Most
candidates took this question as an occasion to discuss Kant's
reply to Hume's scepticism about causality rather than addressing
the issue in a more comprehensive way. Some attempts were made to
consider Kant's defence of synthetic a priori arguments against the
Humean sceptic, but they were insufficiently critical. Q.12 This
question was generally well-focussed and also attracted some
excellent answers. The best candidates provided a very articulated
and subtle discussion of what a substantive notion of the self can
mean and argued incisively for a negative answer. Q.10 There were
some excellent answers that showed a detailed textual knowledge of
Kant's Deduction, good argumentative skills, and effective use of
the secondary literature. The weakest candidates tended to give a
clear but too general and scarcely critical presentation of Kant's
project in the Deduction.
CT
113 Post-Kantian Philosophy The exams on the whole were quite
good. Many of the essays displayed a hard earned grasp of the texts
and arguments. No less importantly, students for the most part
approached these texts, not out of hero worship, but rather with
their gloves off i.e. ready first of all to interpret the positions
in the best possible light, but also ready where necessary to
challenge those positions. The most popular questions were on
Nietzsche, predictably, and Sartre, less predictably. Merleau-Ponty
also enjoyed a significant uptick in attention compared to last
year (6 essays, from 2 the year before), whereas Heidegger suffered
a significant downtick (9 answers, from 15 the year before). Of the
two general questions not directed toward any particular
philosopher, question 29 (The traditional picture of human beings
as rational animals must be overcome. Discuss with regard to one or
more of the post-Kantian philosophers.) had 5 answers, several of
which were bold, interesting, and creative. The better answers here
focused on a single philosopher and gave traditional picture,
rational animals, and overcome determinate interpretations. As for
the Nietzsche questions, there were 9 answers to question 10 (What
then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and
anthropomorphismsTruths are illusions which we have forgotten are
illusions. (NIETZSCHE) Is this true?), 10 answers to question 11
(What would it be like to live a life beyond good and evil?), 10
answers to question 12 (a) (Is Nietzsche a naturalist?), and only 1
answer to question 9 (According to The Birth of Tragedy, art is
better guide to the true nature of things than philosophy.
Discuss.) The best answers to question 10 addressed rather than
ignored the idea of a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and
anthropomorphisms. The weaker answers headed straight to the more
familiar issue of whether there is some kind of paradox in
asserting that truths are illusions. The best answers to question
11 accommodated, indeed pursued, the many remarks sprinkled
throughout the Genealogy that make the following clear: Nietzsches
picture of life beyond good and evil is not a nostalgic plea for a
return to a pre-moral condition. The best answers to question 12
(a) disambiguated the term naturalist in careful and precise terms,
and proceeded to give evidence for and against categorizing
Nietzsche as a naturalist in the various senses. Many students
unfortunately rehearsed standard secondary literature positions on
the naturalism issue, which of course was not sufficient to earn
first class distinction.
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The most popular Sartre questions were 22 (The problem with
Sartres account of bad faith is that he leaves it unclear how we
might avoid it, and what it might be like we did avoid it.
Discuss.) and 23 (Sartre neither solves nor dissolves the
traditional problem of other minds. Discuss.). Very few answers to
question 22 actually took up the issue of what it would be like to
avoid bad faith, if it is accepted that it is avoidable; the few
that did were rewarded for answering the question. Several high
quality answers rejected the idea that bad faith is avoidable, and
explained clearly why such a rejection should be attributed to
Sartre. The best answers to 23 were careful to address the sense of
solves and of dissolves in the question, and careful also to spell
out what precisely the problem of other minds is. There were 7
answers to the Hegel questions, and 11 answers to the Schopenhauer
questions with questions 5 (5 answers) and 6 (6 answers) most
popular. Questions 7 and 8 were entirely avoided. Like last years
essays on these two 19th century giants, a fair amount of the
essays this year displayed decent knowledge of the texts. However,
many essays failed to motivate the issue addressed by the
respective question, or assess the position held by the mighty dead
systematic philosopher at issue.
JS
114 Theory of Politics As usual, there was a general tendency to
fail to retain attention on the specific question throughout the
answer. Many scripts used their introduction to address the
question directly, only to deviate from it in subsequent
paragraphs. Weaker scripts generally seemed to invoke points of
analysis independently of one another whereas better scripts
offered a stronger structure of argument. There was a high level of
uniformity between answers. Nearly all candidates are well prepared
with a repertoire of stock positions and points, gleaned mainly
from textbooks and lectures, which they manage to some extent to
orient to the question put. Candidates are generally unprepared or
unwilling to engage in much independent critical analysis of the
concepts, the arguments, or the intellectual problems posed. Those
who seemed to be thinking for themselves, making but going beyond
the familiar moves while retaining focus and control of their
answers, did very well. This means that candidates, for instance,
who answered the question on neutrality did very little to analyse
that concept, turning the question instead to one about the freedom
of the individual; candidates who answered the question on
majoritarianism didnt notice the significance of decision
procedure; candidates did nothing with the concept political in the
obligation question beyond proposing the lecturers (Im guessing)
argument that legal obligation is political. Candidates often
failed to tackle both 'arms' or components of a question - for
instance a good many candidates wrote about what the industrious
might owe to the lazy, but not to the reckless (and one the other
way around). Similarly, a number of answers to the obligation
question were fairly stock responses to a question about whether we
had an obligation to obey the law, and not about what political
obligations citizens might have in general. Several candidates
failed to clearly structure their answers, though there were
notable exceptions who managed to produce excellent work in the
conditions.
1. Does democracy require majority-rule as a decision procedure?
A fairly popular question. Many candidates saw this as their
opportunity to make general points about deliberative v aggregative
conceptions of democracy. Candidates largely failed to
distinguish
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the conceptual relation of majority-rule to democracy and the
substantive question of whether the best forms of democracy involve
majority-rule.
2. Poverty restricts freedom, disability does not. Do you agree?
A very popular question not well answered for the most part, though
most were familiar with the stock point that property rights are
upheld by law. A surprisingly large number of candidates either
agreed with the statement or argued that both/neither restrict
freedom relatively few argued that either could represent
restrictions on freedom depending on further factors. Many insisted
that the constraints on the poor were human or social while those
on the disabled were natural, missing the extent to which it is the
interaction of natural capacity and human or social decision (e.g.
construction of buildings, or jobs) that affects the options
available to the naturally impaired.
3. EITHER: Do the industrious owe anything to the lazy or the
reckless?
A fairly popular question producing a broad spectrum of quality
in answers, the weaker ones answering only with respect to the lazy
or the reckless rather than both. Most took the opportunity to
offer general discussions of luck egalitarianism. A large number of
candidates simply assumed the lazy and reckless to be in relevantly
similar positions with respect to the industrious. Stronger answers
reflected on possible different explanatory factors for
industriousness, laziness and recklessness.
OR: What should egalitarians believe?
Again fairly popular and again a wide range in the quality of
answers. Weaker ones tended to offer a general discussion of luck
egalitarianism and the weakest took this as an excuse to discuss
the metric of equality. Better answers either discussed the
leveling down objection or contrasted the luck egalitarian view
with status or relational views of equality. The distinction
between telic and deontic forms of egalitarianism was sometimes
introduced, though very few of the candidates that did so seemed to
understand it.
4. Legislation by representatives is a form of aristocracy. Do
you agree?
Very few takers for this question. Those who answered it did not
handle the concept of aristocracy well.
5. Does the claim that gender is socially constructed help the
feminist?
This feminism question with no obvious stock answer had few
takers. The weakest answers did not know what socially constructed
meant. The best reflected on the different ways in which the claim
might help.
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6. Socialism and liberalism can be rendered compatible only by
abandoning the essence of
each. Discuss. Another non-standard question, this time
requiring candidates to talk about two isms at once, proved
unpopular. Some clearly answering out of desperation talked almost
entirely about one or the other but the few with the resources to
discuss both produced some very good answers.
7. Should minority groups have cultural rights? A fairly popular
question. The better answers managed to distinguish between rights
for minority groups and rights specific to members of minority
groups. Candidates tended to offer unnuanced yes or no conclusions.
The weakest candidates wrote down anything they knew about
rights.
8. Citizens have political obligations, but the obligation to
obey the law is not one of them. Do you agree?
A very popular question answered by many keen to offer standard
general discussions of possible grounds for the obligation to obey
the law. Better answers tried to explain why the obligation to obey
the law was indeed a political obligation, though often in a
handwaving way suggesting they were regurgitating something from a
lecture rather than something they really understood.
Disappointingly few explored in any detail what other political
obligations there might be (e.g. to engage in civil
disobedience?).
9. How can we tell when people are subject to power?
Not a popular question. Most candidates invoked Lukes and
answers often focused primarily on a discussion of when people are
subject to power rather than the issue of how we can tell that they
are subject to it. The best answers challenged the framing of the
question.
10. Can conservatives offer coherent criteria for evaluating
political options? A tricky question with correspondingly few
takers and generally poor answers: little reflection on what might
count as coherent criteria and rarely any discussion of the
difference between philosophical conservatism and political
conservatism.
11. Should political theorists be realistic? Not a popular
question but this was generally answered very well perhaps the best
of all the questions - with those choosing it showing good
knowledge of the literature and control of the issues. There was
some good discussion of why being realistic might be thought to be
a good thing and on the whole answers came to balanced conclusions
on the basis of interesting and coherent arguments.
12. The principles of justice that apply within nation-states
are different from those that apply between them. Discuss.
This fairly straightforward question proved relatively popular
and generally attracted solid answers. Most candidates offered a
general discussion of associative v non-associative views of
principles of justice, while better answers distinguished between
different bases for affirming global principles of justice. There
was, however, little reflection on possible differences between
principles of justice and other normative principles. Weaker
candidates seeing the word justice chose to write down what they
knew about Rawls.
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13. Should the state try to be neutral with respect to its
citizens views about how they should
live their lives? A mix of answers though overall this was
answered better than other questions. Weaker answers neglected try
and discussed the impossibility of neutrality in abstract terms.
Better answers tried to get to grips with the motivation for trying
to be neutral. The best tied this to a reflection on the unique
role of the state.
DPIR
115 / 130 Plato, Republic Some of the more difficult questions
on this paper drew excellent and imaginative answers. Weaker
candidates tended to confuse simply presenting Platos views with
defending them. References to texts of Plato other than the
Republic were rare. In answering the gobbets questions, candidates
often failed to mention the context (or where they did mention the
context, did not specify it precisely enough). (Some comments on
the more popular questions are provided below. The numerals refer
to the question number in 115, with the 130 number in brackets.) 1.
(2) Why is the notion of a ruler in the strict sense important in
Republic I? Is the use that is made of this notion defensible? Most
candidates were able to explain the way in which the notion of a
ruler in the strict sense is used in Thrasymachus argument. In
general, candidates needed to pay more attention to the role of
this notion in Republic I, and to evaluating whether its use is
defensible. 2. (3) Why is early education in music and gymnastics
important for future guardians? Is this view of education
plausible? Weaker answers simply said that this education prepares
the soul for later education in mathematics. Better answers drew on
a more detailed knowledge of the text, and attempted to show how
exactly this education might act as such a preparation. Such
answers considered, for instance, how listening to the right kind
of music might contribute to developing a harmonious soul. 3. (4)
Is the tripartite division of the soul useful for explaining human
behaviour? Some good points were made in answers to this question.
Among weaker candidates, there was a tendency simply to describe
Platos own view, using his examples, as if this by itself answered
the question. Better candidates were able to discuss, critically,
how well Platos view might explain behaviour of various different
types (beyond those mentioned in the examples with which Plato
introduces the view in the Republic). 5. (4) Does Plato have any
good reason for supposing that justice in the individual must
resemble justice in the city? A surprisingly large number of
candidates didnt mention the forms in answering this question. The
better answers discussed the way in which the soul is structurally
analogous to the city. Some of the better candidates also made use
of the distinction between vulgar justice and Platonic justice.
There could have been more discussion of whether there is a causal
relation between a citys being just and its rulers being just (and
whether, if there is, that suggests that justice in the two is the
same).
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23
6. (7 ) Does Plato think it possible to have knowledge of the
many beautifuls? Is he right? There were some good attempts here to
explain the distinction between knowledge and true belief in
Republic V. More consideration could have been given to the
problems Plato needs to answer if he thinks that it is not possible
to have knowledge of the many beautifuls (or would need to answer,
if he thought this). For instance, if we cant have such knowledge,
then how can knowledge of forms help philosophers to rule in the
world of particulars? Some candidates didnt distinguish clearly
enough between the claim (i) that we cant have knowledge of the
many beautifuls, and the claim (ii) that we cant have knowledge of
the many beautifuls unless we have knowledge of a form, beauty.
7. (8) In the divided line, what is thought (dianoia)? Does
Plato present a plausible view about the importance of its role in
intellectual progress? In answering this, candidates would have
benefited from a more detailed knowledge of the relevant parts of
the text. There was a tendency, moreover, simply to present Platos
view without really evaluating its plausibility. 8. (9) Even if
there is a form of the good, it cannot have any relevance to
practical matters. How might Plato respond? Most candidates claimed
that Plato would answer that an understanding of the form of the
good is important for ruling, but few candidates really attempted
to explain why having such an understanding is important for
ruling. 9. (10) Does the Republic offer any good argument against
the view that a calm and self-controlled criminal could be happy?
Not all candidates noticed that Plato might object to the very
possibility of a calm and self-controlled criminal. Of those who
did notice this, most simply said that Plato doesnt think it is
possible to be a self-controlled harmonious criminal, without
explaining how Plato might defend this claim. Insufficient
attention was paid to what might be meant, in this context, by a
criminal. 11 (12). In modern Greece and Italy, governments of
unelected economic experts are imposing austerity. If so, would
Plato approve? There were some good, imaginative answers to this
question, making excellent use of the text as a whole. Several
candidates said that though Plato would approve of having unelected
experts as rulers, he wouldnt think that a training in economics
qualified one to be a ruler. Some candidates also went on to
discuss whether Plato would approve of imposing economic austerity.
12. (13) Does Platos attack on imitation (mimesis) apply equally
well to both poetry and painting? This was a popular question and
was, in many cases, well answered. The best answers considered
arguments from both books 3 and 10. 13a (1a) Passage from I.350
This question was very popular. Most candidates managed to give a
plausible analysis of the argument, and raised objections to it.
Several candidates failed to note the possible ambiguity in outdo
(pleonektein) 13b (1b) Passage from IV.420 This question was also
popular. The best answers explained the analogy between state and
statue, and went on to raise questions about this. Several
candidates discussed whether this analogy suggests that Plato is
thinking of the state in an objectionably totalitarian way. Others
discussed what notion of happiness (eudaimonia) is being employed
here. Weaker candidates (especially those doing the English version
of the paper, which gave less context) failed to identify the
context of the
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24
passage, and hence failed to see that it is a response to a
worry about whether the guardians will be happy. 13c (1c) Passage
from VII.518 Many answers stressed the difficulty of education and
the analogy drawn here between intellect and sight. The best
candidates were also able to discuss what it means to say that the
whole soul is turned around. A few good candidates also raised
questions about claim made here that this power is in everyones
soul. 13d (1e) Passage from VIII.553 This passage was frequently
misidentified. The better candidates knew the context of the
passage, and were able to discuss what it shows about Platos views
on parts of the soul. 13e (1f) Passage from IX.585 Many candidates
didnt focus enough on the argument presented in this passage, and
attempted, instead, to rehearse all of Platos arguments about
pleasure in Republic IX. 13f (1d) Passage from X.617 There were
several excellent answers to this question, many of them containing
interesting discussions of the roles of luck and
responsibility.
UC
116/132 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics This paper was reasonably
well done. Better candidates paid close attention to the question,
argued independently, and used knowledge of the text as a whole
(and occasionally other works by Aristotle and others). Essays
(Question number for 116 first, followed by 131 in brackets) Q.1
(2) What does Aristotle mean by the claim that happiness is
complete (teleios)? Is his claim correct? Many candidates didnt say
clearly what they took Aristotle to mean by complete. A significant
number of candidates confused completeness with self-sufficiency,
or failed to distinguish between the claim that happiness is
complete and the claim that it is most complete. Q. 2 (3) Since the
gods as well as human beings are rational, Aristotles function
argument is a failure. Discuss. Some good and imaginative answers
on this, explaining why this claim might be raised as a criticism
of the function argument, and then suggesting some reply (e.g. that
godly rationality is different from human rationality). Some
candidates failed to note that in book 10 Aristotle does recommend
striving to be godlike. Q. 3 (4) Once the Doctrine [of the Mean] is
literally expressed it becomes platitudinous (BARNES). Discuss. Not
a popular question. Few of those who answered it discussed
Aristotles own advice based on the mean in 2.9, or his own
recognition in 6.1 of the doctrines possible emptiness.
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25
Q. 4 (5) Can Aristotle allow that some apparently vicious
actions are to be excused when they result from mental illness?
Some excellent answers, drawing distinctions between different
forms of mental illness and relating them to various claims made by
Aristotle in book 3 in particular. Q. 5 (6) Is Aristotle right to
suggest that we are jointly responsible (sunaitioi ps) for our
characters? Surprisingly unpopular. Better candidates showed good
understanding of 3.5. Q. 6 (7) In what way is magnanimity an
adornment of the virtues? This was a straightforward question. Its
unpopularity is perhaps to be explained by its not concerning a
standard tutorial topic. Q. 7 (8) Analyse critically Aristotles
account of the relation between prudence (phronsis) and the virtues
of character. Better answers showed signs of serious thought about
the end of book 6, and were genuinely critical. Q. 8 (9) Is the
idea of the practical syllogism helpful in explaining incontinence?
Too many candidates answered Yes to this question, and then
provided little more than a summary of Aristotles argument in 7.3.
Few seemed aware of the question whether the bad syllogism concerns
sweetness or some other property, such as unhealthiness. Q. 9 (10)
Is Aristotle right that there is something lacking in friendships
between vicious people? Popular and usually well done, including
discussion of friendship for utility and for pleasure. Q. 10 (11)
What is the role of pleasure in Aristotles account of the human
good? Unpopular, though those who knew the text were able to offer
wide-ranging and imaginative answers. Little awareness was shown of
Aristotles position on false pleasures. Q. 11 (12) How might
Aristotle advise someone undecided between a life of great
political virtue and a life of contemplation? This was especially
well done by those candidates with knowledge of the text as a
whole, including books 1 and 10 in particular. Commentaries As
often, many candidates did less well on gobbets than on essays.
Misidentification was worryingly common. Some candidates would have
benefited from more advice about how to approach gobbets (the need
to say something about the context, and the need to try to find
something philosophically interesting to say about the passage).
Candidates should avoid merely paraphrasing the content of a
gobbet, unless that is required for elucidation.
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Q. 12(a) (1(a)) 1.8: Aristotles methodology. Unpopular. The
better candidates were able to provide examples of Aristotelian
dialectic, as well as criticism of it. Q. 12 (b) (1(b)) 2.4: Acting
in accord with the virtues. The best answers were able to explain
the exact context of these remarks, as well as to comment on the
particular conditions placed here on acting virtuously. Q. 12 (c)
(1(c)) 3.3: Deliberation. The best answers explained why this
remark might be puzzling, and discussed, e.g., whether there is any
sense (for Aristotle) in which we do deliberate about ends. Helpful
links were established by some candidates with work on Hume for
paper 103. Q. 12 (d) (1(d)) 5.7: Natural justice. Quite frequently
misidentified. Too many candidates brought in irrelevant discussion
of universal justice. Q. 12 (e) (1(e)) 6.12: Value of prudence and
wisdom. Rarely and then usually not well done. Few were able to
explain the context. Q. 12 (f) (1(f)) 9.8: Sacrifice. Popular and
often reasonably well done, though several candidates failed
accurately to describe the context of the passage.
RSC
117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein The exam had 17 questions,
6 with a and b parts, yielding 23 questions in total. With only 5
candidates sitting the exam obviously not all questions were
answered. Most popular were Frege on Concepts and on Sense and
Reference, Russell on Descriptions, and Wittgenstein on the Picture
Theory; but the answers were fairly widely distributed with 10 of
the questions having been attempted by at least one candidate.
Below I comment on those questions which received more than one
answer. In general, though, answers displayed good general
knowledge of the material; stronger answers marshalled this
knowledge effectively in directly answering the question asked. Q2
Answers: 1 Q3 Answers: 3 This question concerned Freges view that
phrases of the form the concept F denote objects, not concepts. All
answers correctly noted that if singular terms are complete, and
complete phrases denote objects, then such phrases must denote
objects and not concepts (which are denoted by incomplete predicate
expressions). Stronger answers also recognized (a) that concepts
belong, on Freges view, to the more general category of functions,
and (b) that objects cannot serve as
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representatives for concepts since there are strictly fewer of
the former than there are of the latter. Somewhat surprisingly, no
answers explicitly mentioned Freges Law V, the truth of which
requires (impossibly) a one-one relation between concepts and their
extensions. Q6a Answers: 2 This question concerned Freges grounds
for drawing a distinction between sense and reference; answers to
it were particularly strong. Candidates wisely began by
articulating some theses of Freges concerning sense and reference
for instance, that the former determines the latter, and that
senses are to be distinguished not only from referents but also
from ideas. Freges concerns surrounding identity statements were
taken to motivate the distinction; it was also recognized that his
worries about differences in informational value between sentences
involving substitution of co-referring terms generalize. A
distinction was drawn between the cases of singular terms and of
other expressions and in the former case between names and definite
descriptions. General considerations from the philosophy of
language were brought to bear (e.g. those surrounding Kripkes
Paderewski case), as were considerations specific to those working
in the period (e.g. whether Russells theory of descriptions might
provide a better explanation). Q8a Answers: 2 Candidates were asked
to explain how Russell avoided rejecting the law of excluded
middle. Answers were solid, recognizing that he appealed to his
theory of descriptions, and to the (scope) distinction between
primary and secondary occurrences. Meinongs alternative was
compared; Russells criticisms were upheld somewhat flat-footedly
(in particular, without challenge). Q8b Answers: 1 Q10 Answers: 1
Q11b Answers: 1 Q14 Answers: 2 This question concerned
Wittgensteins picture theory of meaning. Candidates distinguished
pictorial form, representational form, and logical form, and
recognized that isomorphism is a key component of the possibility
of meaning in the Tractatus. Q15b Answers: 1 Q16 Answers: 1
BB
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118 The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein There were twenty-seven
candidates for this paper. The paper contained fourteen questions.
Pleasingly, every single question was answered. Indeed, every
single question was answered at least twice. The most popular
questions were Question 7on whether it would be possible for only
one person, only once in a life-time, to follow a rulewhich was
answered by seventeen candidates, and Question 9on whether there is
any sense in which Wittgenstein thinks that sensations are
privatewhich was answered by sixteen candidates. No other question
received more than nine answers The marks ranged from 57 to 76.
Apart from the one script that was awarded 57, every script was
awarded at least 61. Nineteen scripts were awarded marks in the
60s, three were awarded 70, three were awarded 71, and one was
awarded 76. This means that seven candidates (just over a quarter)
were awarded a First Class mark. Only one of them, however,
performed at a level significantly above the class borderline, as
their marks testify. In general, the scripts had a solid Upper
Second Class feel about them. On the one hand, the candidates
tended to display good knowledge of Wittgensteins texts, together
with good expository skills and a commendable ability to marshal
their knowledge in response to the questions posed. There was
little of the irrelevance that so frustrates examiners (with the
notable exception of a tendency for candidates who answered
Question 6on whether Wittgenstein thinks that understanding is akin
to an abilityto focus on rule-following, despite the fact that
there was another question, explicitly on rule-following, to which
their answers would have been more relevant). On the other hand,
the candidates tended to be somewhat unadventurous in what they
wrote. Just as there was little irrelevance, so too there was
little originality. The candidates also tended to do something that
candidates for this paper nearly always do: they showed a certain
reluctance to take issue with Wittgenstein (though it has to be
admitted that the reluctance was less deeply rooted than in
previous years, and their broad consensus was in many cases laced
with points of incidental criticism). Overall, this was a year in
which the answers were on the whole good, but where there was very
little that was really outstanding.
AWM
119 Formal Logic There were six candidates: three PPE, two PP
(one Part B and one Part C), and one PML. Two scripts were
Ist-class; three scripts were in the II.1 band; and one got a mark
a little below the III/Pass borderline. An erratum sheet was
provided to correct a misplaced occurrence of nonempty in the
statement of the Axiom of Countable Choice in question 8.
Propositional and Predicate Logic Two candidates answered three
questions (and answered none from any other section). Four
candidates answered two questions.
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Question 1 (expressive adequacy and non-standard connectives): 2
answers. Question 2 (axiom systems and the Deduction Theorem): 5
answers. In part (c) the exercise was to show that all theorems of
a system S1 were theorems of a system S2, where the systems were
exactly the same except that S1 had an axiom scheme (B1) where S2
had an axiom scheme (B2). Three of the answers (more than half) set
out to show this with a back-to-front argument, attempting to show
that instances of (B2) could be derived in S1 using (B1), which it
was impossible to do anyway, since S2 was strictly stronger than
S1. There was also a lot of sloppiness in answersespecially in
parts (d) and (e)because of not distinguishing between an axiom and
an axiom scheme. Question 3 (first-order semantics): 3 answers.
There was some unfortunate use/mention confusionor, at least,
sloppinessin one of the answers. Question 4 (the expressive power
of first-order languages): 3 answers. One answer went seriously
astray because of confusion over the Compactness Theorema weirdly
off-key statement of the theorem was offered. Another went wrong by
supposing that an infinite set of sentences could be conjoined to
form a single sentence. Question 5 (the construction of a maximally
consistent set of first-order sentences): 1 answer. Set Theory Only
one candidate answered a question from this section. Question 6
(the Axiom of Foundation): 1 answer. The answer insisted that the
empty set has no subsetand claimed that therefore part (b) was ill
formulated. But the empty set does have a subset: the empty set.
Question 7 (orderings): 0 answers. Question 8 (the Axiom of
Choice): 0 answers. Question 9 (ordinals and cardinals): 0 answers.
Metamathematics Three candidates answered a question from this
section. Question 10 (primitive recursive functions): 1 answer. The
answer claimedfalselythat a function was primitive recursive if it
was URM-computable, and went on to do everything with URM programs.
Question 12 (computable functions; no effective enumeration of
total ones): 0 answers. Question 12 (axiomatization of specified
theories in the language of arithmetic): 0 answers. Question 13 (a
variation on Gdels First Incompleteness Theorem): 2 answers. In
parts (c) and (d) both answers fudged things: they both jumped
straight from the theoremhood in T of an arithmetized statement of
the existence of a proof in T to the actual existence of such a
proof, rather
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than appealing to the definition of what it is for a theory to
express (represent) an arithmetical relation and to the
-consistency of Tboth of which had figured explicitly earlier in
the question. They appeared to be making the assumption that the
standard model of arithmetic was a model of the theory T, but they
didnt say so; and such an assumption was in any case
inappropriate.
SB
120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics 19 candidates took this
paper. The overall standard was solid (average mark 67), but less
distinguished than sometimes, with no mark above 75 in the first
class bracket and a general clustering at the upper end of the 2.1
bracket. Answers were rather unevenly distributed between sections
A and B, with only a little over 1/3 of answers from Section A (1/3
is the minimum possible). Section A: The following questions
received one answer each only: 2. How can it be that inertial
coordinate transformations have empirical content? 3.Henceforth
space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away into
mere shadows... (MINKOWSKI) To what extent, if any, does the
Special Theory of Relativity vindicate this pronouncement? The most
popular question (13 answers) in section A was 4 (Why would an
explanation of the Twins Paradox which rested on appeal to the
relativity of simultaneity be a bad explanation?) and this was well
handled overall. The best answers noted the significance of
simultaneity conventions (possibly distinct) in both frames and
included discussion of various relevant senses of explanation. Some
answers showed impressive recall of the Debs and Redhead discussion
of conventionality of simultaneity, which was very relevant to the
question. Next most popular in section A (4 answers) was 1 (Is it
any more than a convention that force-free bodies move with uniform
speed in straight lines?). While all answers had a decent grip on
the issue, some struggled to organise the material effectively. Q 5
(The late Einstein stated the core content of the Special Theory of
Relativity as being that the laws of non-gravitational physics are
Lorentz covariant. Was he right to prefer this to his earlier
formulation in terms of the 1905 postulates?) received only two
answers. Strong answers would distinguish both constructive from
principle-theory approaches and different forms of constructive
approach (e.g. geometric vs. dynamical). Section B Q6. (What is the
nature of the hypothetical de Broglie-Bohm corpuscles and what
active role, if any, do they play in the theory?) This was the most
popular question in Section B. Reasonably well done overall, better
answers took care to introduce the features of the de B-B theory
carefully (while avoiding the danger of sliding into a generic
essay on the pros and cons of de B-B). The Everett in denial
objection was reasonably popular. Quite a few slips in detail
throughout, however. Q 7. (What should a proper account of the
measurement process in quantum theory look like?). With only three
answers, a somewhat unpopular questions. Good answers avoided the
temptation
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to reproduce a standard measurement problem essay and looked in
detail at the physical analysis of measurement procedures. Q. 8.
(Bells theorem is not required in order to show that quantum theory
is non-local. Do you agree?) The second most popular question of
this section (10 answers). While the majority of answers had a
decent grip on the dialectic, details were often weak or muddled;
or where they werent, the discussion tended to be rather too brief.
Q 9. (Does it matter for questions of quantum ontology that
decoherence is not a precise process?) Six answers; rather mixed.
Weaker answers were hand-waving about what decoherence was (indeed
no answer really adequately characterized decoherence) and tended
to endorse a Dennett/Wallace approach without much argument. Q 10.
(Is quantum theory an intrinsically probabilistic theory?) Four
answers. By and large not handled that well, with a notable
exception. Overall comment on the paper: While a good general grip
of the issues was on show from candidates, overall there was a
disappointing lack of attention to detail, particularly technical
detail, which was often missing (rendering answers rather thinner
than one would like) or muffed. More ambition in this direction
would have led to better answers overall and is to be
encouraged.
CGT
122 Philosophy of Mathematics The examination consisted of 15
questions, two of which (qq. 8 and 11) were disjunctive. The
examiners were pleased by the fact that every question was
attempted by at least one of the 23 candidates, all of whom
belonged to the Mathematics & Philosophy Final Honours School,
Part B. There were six Firsts (26%), fourteen Upper Seconds (61%),
and three Lower Seconds (13%); the mean mark was 65.6 and the
standard deviation was 5.2. Qq. 2, 3, 9, 12, and 15 were each
attempted by only a single candidate. Q. 1, 'What can we learn
about the nature of mathematics from Socrates exchange with the
slave-boy in Platos Meno?', (6 attempts): Generally not well
answered. Candidates either focused on a general exposition of
Platonic philosophy of mathematics or on questions surrounding
contemporary platonism. Almost every candidate failed to focus on
the significance of the slave-boy's proof. Q. 4, 'Assess the view
that the most interesting differences between mathematical
knowledge and natural-scientific knowledge are all differences of
degree, not of kind.', (10 attempts): The second most popular
question. This question was too often used as an excuse for an
automatic answer on Quine or on empiricist philosophy of
mathematics more generally. The best answers made good use of Quine
as a proponent of this view without forgetting that the view, and
not he, is the object of the question. Q. 5, 'Does logicism rest on
an inappropriately robust conception of logic?', (6 attempts):
Largely poorly answered with garbled accounts of Quine's and
Boolos' pronouncements on second-order logic or an automatic essay
on logicism. At their best they considered what evidence might be
adduced for and against a conception of logic. Q. 6, 'Does
consistency, in a mathematical context, guarantee existence?', (5
attempts): There was a
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wide range of marks for answers to this question. Some used it
as an opportunity for automatic essays on Hilbert and were duly
punished; others considered the question on its own merits, using a
broad range of ideas and arguments (including Hilbert's), and were
duly rewarded. Q. 7, 'Can the structuralist give an account of
mathematical epistemology without relying on the existence of
abstract objects?', (15 attempts): By far the most popular
question, with most candidates attempting an answer. Unfortunately,
very few candidates focused on mathematical epistemology, as the
question required, preferring instead to offer automatic (and
irrelevant) essays on structuralism. As with q. 5, there was a
certain amount of attempted restatement of Boolos' views on plural
semantics for second-order logic. Q. 8a, 'Taking the principle of
the excluded middle from the mathematician would be the same as
prohibiting... the boxer the use of his fists. (HILBERT) Discuss.',
(3 attempts): Answers tended to offer a rather vague di