3. PARTICULARITY OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE
SEIZEDPLACE TO BE SEARCHED:
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE,respondents.D E C
I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants
issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue
thereof.On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish
Packing Corporation and Uy Chin HoaliasFrank Uy were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish,
executed an Affidavit1stating:1. He has personal knowledge that
UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), a
canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active
management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the
thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without issuing
receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the
Internal Revenue Code.2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated
through the following scheme:(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH
buys in bulk from the company;(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has
a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines processed
by UNIFISH;(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines
that he orders and buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his
purchases;(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH
through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as
White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;(5) Payments made by these tax evading
establishments are made by checks drawn payable to cash and
delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted
(sic);(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of
sardines he had withdrawn from the corporation;3. Another
fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos
direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different
customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH,
being an export company registered with the Board of Investments,
is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one
of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export.
These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition
that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for
export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local
customers.4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of
unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of
tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never
intended to be sold locally to other food processing companies.5.
Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the
UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER)
[,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority
stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t
that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as
what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.6. The records
containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of
both UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the
corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City.
The particular place or spot where these records [official
receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales
books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals,
cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and
may be found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the
arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation
which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "A",7. He
is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of
the foregoing allegations and he is reserving his right to claim
for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.On 1
October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application
sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.After hearing
the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
issued the disputed search warrants. The first2is docketed as
"SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253"
("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU7th Judicial RegionBranch
28Mandaue CityTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,- versus -UY
CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,Unifish Packing CorporationHernan Cortes
St., Cebu CitySEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC.
253
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x(with
sketch)SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:G R E E T I N G S:It
appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination
underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special
Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
(sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of
Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed
and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho
c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
has in his possession, care and control, the following:1. Multiple
sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official
Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock
Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase
& Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate
Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled ChecksYou are
hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or
night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith
seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other
properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.WITNESS MY HAND
this1stday of October, 1993.(sgd.)MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLEJudgeThe
second warrant3is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant
A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in content to Search
Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It
consisted of only one page.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CEBU7th Judicial RegionBranch 28Mandaue CityTHE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,- versus -UY CHIN HO alias
FRANK UY, andUnifish Packing CorporationHernan Cortes
St.,MandaueCitySEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC.
253
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /(with
sketch)SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:G R E E T I N G S:It
appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination
underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special
Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
[sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of
Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed
and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin
HoaliasFrank Uy andUnifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St.,
Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the
following:1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,
Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records;
Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record
Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery
Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales
Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank
Statements/Cancelled ChecksYou are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises and
its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession
of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to
such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs.WITNESS MY HAND this1stday of
October, 1993.(sgd.)MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLEJudgeJudge Gozo-Dadole
issued a third warrant,4which was docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT
93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263"
(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and
the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section
238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use
and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales
invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search
Warrant A-2.On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2
October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and
documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was
duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.On 8
February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the
Department of Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the
nature of this case.On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to
quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu
RTC.The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well
as their subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting
petitioners to file a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that
petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which
states:a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in
seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shall be served on each
of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the
pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by
S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).The CA found that petitioners
did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash,
(2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of
Rodrigo Abos.The CA also held thatcertiorariwas not the proper
remedy to question the resolution denying the motion to quash.In
this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners,
assuming that the Department of Justice will eventually file the
case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail;
a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an
appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case shall have
been tried. This brings us to the case ofLaivs.
Intermediate220SCRA149and the pronouncement, thus:Criminal
Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where
petitioner has other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy
resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for
certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental
presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been granted.
Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their
arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate
court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional
release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a
reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the
fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of
Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D. 911);
3.iftheirpetitionforreviewdoesnotprosper,theycanfileamotiontoquashtheinformationinthetrialcourt.
(Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4.Ifthemotionisdenied,theycanappealthejudgmentofthecourtafterthecaseshallhavebeentriedonthemerits.x
x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but
to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima,
this Court held
thatwhenamotiontoquashacriminalcaseisdenied,theremedyisnotcertioraributtogototrialwithoutprejudicetoreiteratingthespecialdefensesinvolvedinsaidMotion.
In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on
the merits,anappealtherefrom should be the next legal step.xxxIn
this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the
Court issued the Search Warrants without jurisdiction. On the
contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the
Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to
be searched; that the Search Warrants did not describe with
particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of
probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the
discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us,
are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible
by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.5In any event, the CA
ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
warrants.As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile,
petitioners filed the instant petition for review.Petitioners claim
that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the
pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition, as
well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the
CARollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same
in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out
petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.Nevertheless,
the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground
although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case.
First, it appears that the case could have been decided without
these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them
essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for
the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,6we held that
the submission of a document together with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a
certified true copy of "material portions of the record as are
referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this
case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation
of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim
could be defeated.7The CA likewise erred in holding that
petitioners cannot avail ofcertiorarito question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note
that the case of "Lai vs. Intermediate," cited by the appellate
court as authority for its ruling does not appear in "220 SCRA149."
The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by
petitioners,8appears to have been taken from the case ofYap vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA245(1993).Yap, however, is
inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash
acomplaintfor qualified theft, not a motion to quash asearch
warrant.The applicable case isMarcelo vs. De Guzman,9where we held
that the issuing judges disregard of the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion,
which may be remedied bycertiorari:Expressly announced in Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that
certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising
judicial functions "has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."In the light of the findings of the lower court,
herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant.
Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the
explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that
"a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."The utter disregard by Judge de
Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the
warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that
where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for
certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal.Moreover, an appeal from the
order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant.
The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total
paralization of the articles and documents which had been
improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an
adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a
mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a
party.This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement
inSilva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br.
XXXIII,10which also involved a special civil action
forcertiorari:11Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must
strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that he must
determine the existence of probable cause by examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. As declared inMarcelo vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious
disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements
before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of
discretion".In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition
before the CA that the issuing judge violated the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing
the disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have
constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged
that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records
and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of
its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy
that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.We now proceed to
the merits of the case.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures:The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In relation
to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:SEC. 3.Requisite for issuing search warrant.- A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.SEC. 4.Examination of
complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.A
search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These
requirements, in outline form, are:(1) the warrant must be issued
upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by
the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3)
in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as
the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.12The absence of any of these requisites will cause the
downright nullification of the search warrants.13The proceedings
upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is
more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which
excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrants will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify under
it.14Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the
subject warrants that command their nullification. They point out
inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in
Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the
persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That
two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for
the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited
as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of
probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants.
Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described
with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render
the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.15Inconsistencies in
the description of the place to be searchedPetitioners observe that
the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St.,CebuCity" while the body of
the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes
St.,MandaueCity." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B
consistently state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes
St.,MandaueCity."The Constitution requires, for the validity of a
search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the
place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized."16The
rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended17and distinguish it from
other places in the community.18Any designation or description
known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement.19Thus, inCastro vs.
Pabalan,20where the search warrant mistakenly identified the
residence of the petitioners therein as BarrioPadasilinstead of the
adjoining BarrioMariaCristina, this Court "admitted that the
deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation."In this case, it was not shown that a street
similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was
it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search
Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where
the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the
warrants invalidation in this case.Inconsistencies in the
description of the persons named in the two warrantsPetitioners
also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was
issuedsolelyagainst "Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant
A-2, on the other hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias
FRANK UY,andUnifish Packing Corporation."These discrepancies are
hardly relevant.InMiller v. Sigler,21it was held that the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, from which Section 2,
Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does
not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the
described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises only and not for the
search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of
such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the
premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the
search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description
of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no
discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place
to be searched.22Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued
not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but
only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could
not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional
rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of
inconsistencies in stating their names.23Two warrants issued at one
time for one crime and one placeIn any event, Search Warrant A-1
should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.Two warrants,
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial
court for the same crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National
Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant
A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address
in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing
Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search
Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be
more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant
was issued and in the description of the place to be searched.
Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single
occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for
a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search
Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should
be deemed revoked by the former.The alleged absence of probable
causePetitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge
Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants.Probable cause is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.24In the
determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of
Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine
orpro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application.25Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy
the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.26The
witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own
personal knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.27Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful
basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.28It may be recalled
that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses,
namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to
be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the
testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated
during the examination:Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy?A. No.Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish
Packing Corporation?A.I have only heard of that thru the affidavit
of our informer, Mr. Abos.Q. Why are you applying for search
warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?A.Because of
that information we received that they are using only delivery
receipts instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly
indicative of fraud.Q. From where did you get that
information?A.From our informer, the former employee of that
establishment.29The above portion of the transcript shows that
Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of petitioners
was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied
by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on
hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search
warrants.30The application for the warrants, however, is not based
solely on Labarias deposition but is supported by that of Abos,
whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was
apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his
deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and
Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place
where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were
located:Q Do you know Frank Uy?A Yes.Q Why do you know him?A
Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of
1993.Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?A Hernan
Cortes St.Q What is it being engaged of?A It is engaged in canning
of fish.Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it
seems that in his business dealings that he is actually doing
something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?A Yes.Q How
is it done?A As an officer, he is an active member of the
corporation who is at the same time making his authority as
appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He
sells these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in
fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the
company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods
and he does not issue any invoices.Q Since he does not issue any
invoices, how is it done?A Thru delivery receipts.Q Is the delivery
receipt official?A No. It is unregistered.Q For how long has this
been going on?A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we
started producing the sardines.Q When was the last time that you
observed that that is what he is doing?A August, 1993, last month.Q
How did you happen to know about this last month?A Because he
delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that
supermarket did not go directly to the company. It went to him and
he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he sold.Q Can
you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?A White
Gold and Gaisano.Q How did you know this fact?A As a manager of the
company I have access to all the records of that company for the
last three years. I was the Operating Chief.Q Until now?A No. I was
separated already.Q When?A August, 1993.Q How does he do this
manipulation?A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich
the company, Unifish will deliver to his customers, then his
customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the
company.Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their
books of account or ledger or whatever?A It is written but it is
supposed to be a secret transaction.1wphi1It is not for the public,
not for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the
transactions between the company and him. It is not made to be
shown to the BIR.Q In that books of account, is it reflected that
they have made some deliveries to certain supermarkets?A Yes.Q For
the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?A It
is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.Q Based on
what?A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to
declare.Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales
invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales records, etc.
These documents are records that you have stated, in your
affidavit, which are only for the consumption of the company?A Yes,
not for the BIR.Q Where are they kept now?A They are kept on the
table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview
(sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina
Tan is the one recording all the confidential transactions of the
company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.Q
This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?A Yes. Exh. "B"
is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.In this blow-up there
are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all
the records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This
first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl prepares the bill
of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the
stocks.This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept.
The records from these people are stored in this place which is
marked as "C".Q So what you want to impress on that now is that
only current records are kept by Gina because according to you the
whole records are already placed in the bodega?A Yes.Q But how can
you enter the bodega?A Here, from the main entrance there is a door
which will lead to this part here. If you go straight there is a
bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after
opening the door.Q The problem is that, when actually in August
have you seen the current records kept by Gina?A I cannot exactly
recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.Q Where are they
now?A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the
Court a bunch of records).Q The transactions that are reflected in
these xerox copies that you have given me, especially this one
which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for
the months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these
transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear in the
ledger being shown to the BIR?A As far as I know, it did not
appear.Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt
for the month of January, what does it show?A It shows that Frank
Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his
customers.Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are
the basis for the report to the BIR?A As far as I know, it does not
reflect.Q What are these xerox copies of checks?A I think we cannot
trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for
payment of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to
Uy Chin Ho for collection.Q It is also stated in your affidavit
that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?A The company
imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of
canned tuna for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege
and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit more to
dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are
sold to another company.Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox
copies?A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.Q In other words,
the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw
material but instead they are selling it locally?A Yes. ([W]itness
showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt
was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams
soya oil.Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by
Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it?A Yes, at a profit.Q
You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans.
What do you mean by this?A There is another privileged [sic] by the
BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. When you
export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking
that advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company
here, again to Virginia Farms.Q Do you have proof to that effect?A
No, but we can get it there.Q Will that fact be shown in any listed
articles in the application for search warrant since according to
you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of
account kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still
there?A Yes. I have received information.COURT: Alright.31Abos
stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to
the company records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies
thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness did not
have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The
contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.The
deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the
inquiries made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash
of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently
probing.Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the
things seizedPetitioners note the similarities in the description
of the things to be seized in the subject warrants and those
inStonehill vs. Diokno,32Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs.
Ruiz,33andAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Herrera.34InStonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were
described as:"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing
all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements."This Court found
that the foregoing description failed to conform to the
requirements set forth by the Constitution since:x x x the warrants
authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining toall
business transactionsof petitioners herein, regardless of whether
the transactions werelegalorillegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure ofallrecords of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be
seized beparticularlydescribed - as well as tending to defeat its
major object: the elimination ofgeneralwarrants.InBache & Co.,
this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description
as those inStonehill:The documents, papers, and effects sought to
be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers'
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications; accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits
and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the
years 1966 to 1970."The description does not meet the requirement
in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.x x xIn Uy Kheytin, et al. vs.
Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion
to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to wit:"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General
Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant
shouldparticularly describethe place to be searched and the things
to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out
by the American authorities."The purpose as thus explained could,
surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued
in this case.A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact
- not of law - by which the warrant officer may be guided in making
the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos,J.,); or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec.
2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant
does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained
in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the
dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the
receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,
contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of
foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the
warrant.InAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the
description of the things to be seized, i.e., "Fire Registers,
Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts
and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc." was held to be
"an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:x x x Because of
this all embracing description which includes all conceivable
records of petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could
paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for
early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO
carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave
prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees
but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued
by it, including the government itself, and of the general public.
And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was
issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.In
the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the
following manner:1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers,
Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or
Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record
Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery
Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales
Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank
Statements/Cancelled ChecksWe agree that most of the items listed
in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially
since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the
documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed
a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description
thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a
warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the
things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the
specificity available will invalidate a general description in a
warrant.35The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets
of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records, provisional & official
receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock cards,"
"sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and
"bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable
considering the circumstances of this case.As regards the terms
"unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase &
sales invoices," however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General
correctly argues that the serial markings of these documents need
not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because
they are unregistered.36Where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature
of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given,
particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof.37Although it appears that
photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed
by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require
the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the
contents thereof, to the minutest detail.The general description of
most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search
and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search
warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. InUnited
States v. Cook,38the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit)
made the following pronouncement:x x x. The leading decision isAday
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415
(1961). InAday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two
particularly described books and myriad other generally described
items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only the
books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully
seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but
rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever
the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items
that were not particularly described.Although the warrant was
defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole.
Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles,
even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely
because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles.
The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered
illegal by the defects concerning other articles.x x xx x x We
agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the
majority of state courts that have considered this question and
hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the
infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional
muster.See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60
(D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite
particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression
of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the
purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items
improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from
its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally
obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that
were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to
those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant
without the necessary description. As the leading commentator has
observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was
issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe
certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the
affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search
for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).Accordingly, the
items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be
returned to petitioners.Petitioners allege that the following
articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by the
enforcing officers:1. One (1) composition notebook containing
Chinese characters,2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese
characters,3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,4. Two (2)
packs of chemicals,5. One (1) bound gate pass,6. Surety
Agreement.39In addition, the searching party also seized items
belonging to the Premier Industrial and Development Corporation
(PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.The things
belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants,
like those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to
petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be
seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and
no other property can be taken thereunder.40InTambasen vs.
People,41it was held:Moreover, by their seizure of articles not
described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant
should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses
may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]);
Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional
provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in
person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the
home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted
(People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).Clearly then, the money which was not
indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing
their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the
illegal seizure. The presumptionjuris tantumof regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz,
231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]).
Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search
and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens
(People v. Damaso,supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil.
230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it inBagahilog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals
cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution
itself abhors."The seizure of the items not specified in the
warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the penultimate
paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties
relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized
as a particular description of the things to be seized.As regards
the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their
return in the present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.42WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject
Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but
REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said
warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby
ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject
premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.SO
ORDEREDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial
Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE
CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80,
Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN,
MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI,respondents.NARVASA,C.J.:In behalf
of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at
bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision
promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals.1Said judgment dismissed the People's petition
forcertiorarito invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A.
Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9,
1996.2as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's
motion for reconsideration.3Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of
explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea
of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of
February 9, 1996:1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued
by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,42) declared inadmissible
for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and3) directed
the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within
five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful
owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search
Warrant."The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the
Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.1. On December 14, 1995,
S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2. The following day, December 15,
1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued
not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four
(4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair
of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from
US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant.
The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon
order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included
allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic
explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without
the items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram
machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d)
fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f)
assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.3. On December 19, 1995,
three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without
mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including
cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing
that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.4. On January
22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged;**" and on the same date, submitted their
"Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;5.
**According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition forcertiorari**): On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted
by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30.1996**to wit:1) That the
residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is
adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;2) That there is no such
number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly
called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"3) That Apartment No.
1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;4) That there are no
connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to
Apartment No. 1;5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1
have its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.There
being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the
same be reduced on the records.SO ORDERED.6. On February 9, 1996,
respondent Judge**issued its order duly granting the motion to
quash search warrant**;57. On February 12, 1996, private
respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss**;8. On
February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed
a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12,
1996, private respondents filed opposition/comment and supplemental
opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration**;10. On May
28, 1996, respondent Judge**issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents
filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.Chiefly to
nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above
referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special
civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals. The action did
not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division
of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11,
1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.The judgment was
grounded on the following propositions, to wit:61. The place
actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the
Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not
objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January
30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein
petitioners) were then residing, wasApartment No.1. It is a place
other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit
adjacent to,Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search
warrant.2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted
to Judge Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant,
actually depicted the particular place to be searched was
effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said
"SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and not
even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge
(Bacalla, who) instead**directed them to search Abigail Variety
Store Apartment 1207**in the Order**dated December 15, 1995" this,
too, being the address given "in the Application for Search Warrant
dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James
Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made
more patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of its
petition forcertiorariin the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was
in truth "not attached to the application for search warrant**(but)
merely attached to the motion for reconsideration."7Quoted with
approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of
Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996,viz.:8d) **
**it is very clear that the place searched is different from the
place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even
P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar
D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their
tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were
not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable
Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or
"KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin"
or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were
not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS
"RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY
STORE, the place they are going to raid."**.3. The search was not
accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place
(herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said
occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at
the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.94. The
articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done
after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.105. Judge Casanova "correctly took
cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant to the
doctrinal tenets laid down inNolasco vs.Pao (139 SCRA 152)which
overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court inTemplo vs.de
la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever
a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof and
a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as
a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is
deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure.
The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant
proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the
right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).6. Grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of
"Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is
an appeal, not the special civil action ofcertiorari.The Solicitor
General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to
the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:1) sanctioning
"the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings
before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's determination
of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched;"2)
sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear
evidence**to the contrary;"3) ignoring "the very issues raised in
the petition before it;"4) "holding that the validity of an
otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by
which the return is made;"5) hastily applying "the general rule
thatcertioraricannot be made a substitute for appeal although the
circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the
exceptions to that rule;" and6) depriving petitioner of "the
opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the
warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without
informing petitioner thereof."The whole case actually hinges on the
question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as
regards the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that
particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.The Government insists that the police officers who applied
to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search:
this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers
who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4)
separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "AbigailVariety
Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in
mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers'
own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their
application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down
a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what
the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at
Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search
was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's
admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the
premises herein described."Now, at the time of the application for
a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in
the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store,"
and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units.
These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each
other although there are no connecting doors through which a person
could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of
the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be
entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the
police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but
of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's
Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number
1).However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the
physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind the
store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand
the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant which directs that the search be
"limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the
rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated,
according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to
Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the
search warrant.The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is
sanctioned byBurgos, Sr.v.Chief of Staff,AFP,11allegedly to the
effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to
the affidavit in the official court file.Burgosis inapplicable.
That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The
application in said case was for seizure of subversive material
allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No.
20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution
of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently
indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City)
as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden.
This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error
was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the
Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place.
Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants
specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address,
"784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City"
appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court
concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended
to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]);
and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously
typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could
consult the records in the official court file.12The case at bar,
however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious
typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place
to be searched, as inBurgos, but the search of a place different
from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. InBurgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was
immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In
the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of
a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what
was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had
in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from
that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually
searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what
they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or
had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing
the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context
of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear
of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot
be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requiresinter aliathe search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers
the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be
that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a
search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search.The Government faults
Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's
finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A
perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge Casanova
did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's
Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the
identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla.13In
Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent
in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of
the facts on which the search warrant was founded.The Government
alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable
cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant.
While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the
place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only
place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in
mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to
search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in
the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less
properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at
the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the
private respondents were then residing.It bears stressing that
under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing
that:14The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the things to be seized.it does not suffice,
for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it
particularly describe the place to be searched,15the manifest
intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place
so described.There was therefore in this case an infringement of
the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly
describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that
"(a)ny evidence obtained in violation**(inter aliaof the
search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.16In light of what has just been discussed, it is
needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the
Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of
the building housing the store and the residential apartment units
the place to be searched being plainly marked was in fact attached
to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place
(herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the
search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return
was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to
receive "evidence which**(the People) had earlier been denied
opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy
of the special civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals had
been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would
not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and
seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the
search warrant is different from that which the officers actually
searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the
premises searched were precisely what they had described to the
Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.Only one other
matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that
where a search warrant has been "issued by a courtotherthan the one
trying the main criminal case," the "proper recourse" of persons
wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the
subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.17In support, it cites
the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this Court
inMalaloan v. Court of Appeals18concerning "possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction)
where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal
property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case."
Said second guideline reads:192. When the latter court (referring
to the court which doesnottry the main criminal case) issues the
search warrant,a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse
to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then
available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise
they shall be deemed waived.The guidelines have been misconstrued.
Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal
action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced
in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the
warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first
time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal
action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so
to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are
subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against
forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy
guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar,
to wit:3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in
or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in
the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by
the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate
higher court.In this case, the search warrant was applied for in,
and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the
warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant,
or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No
such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action
had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and
to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus
falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which
the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its
competence.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which dismissed the
Peoples petition forcertiorariseeking nullification of the Orders
of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and
May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set
out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement
as to costs.SO ORDERED.ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This petition
for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming
the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, Makati
City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y
Quino3(petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.The accusatory portion of the
Information against petitioner reads:That on or about the 27th day
of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu), a regulated drug.Contrary to law.4During arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.Witnesses5for the prosecution testified as to the following
set of facts:On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance
and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos
Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2
Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo,
SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo
Lectura,6was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC
of Manila on 26 August 1996.7At around 3:00 p.m., the team
proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway,
Makati. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of
said building to seek assistance in serving the warrant. Security
Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and
they proceeded to Unit 615.At their knocking, a male person naked
from the waist up opened the door.8He was later identified as
petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to
petitioner.9Upon entry, the police operatives searched the unit,
which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider
separating the sala from the bedroom.10In the presence of
petitioner and Punsaran, the group started searching the place and
eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances
later confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an
improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic
sachets.11Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the
properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly
signed by petitioner in their presence and that of
Punsaran.12Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same
building to serve the warrant and search the place. The police
operatives did not find any occupant in the room.Petitioner was
then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of
evidence gathered by the police operatives were brought to the NBI
for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic Chemist Loreto F.
Bravo issued a certification stating that upon examination, the
specimen submitted yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.13The following day, the Arrest Report and Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives
leading to the arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.In his defense, petitioner
testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300, 2600
Roxas Boulevard, Manila.14He also happens to be the registered
owner of Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium in Makati City, which he
leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996.15On 27 August
1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to collect
payment of rental from Lee. Upon knocking at the door, petitioner
was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee inside
the room while she went out to buy some refreshments. After a
while, petitioner heard somebodyknocking at the door and he opened
it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who suddenly barged into the
room. The officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and
petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium unit.
The police operatives then proceeded to search the house for the
next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the sala. Petitioner
was also forced to sign some documents at gunpoint. Petitioner was
then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. Two days later, he
was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case
was subsequently filed against him.16In behalf of petitioner, Luis
Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that
Lee was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was
arrested.17Celso Fiesta, petitioners driver, also stated in court
that petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he
dropped petitioner off at Cityland Condominium between 1:00 and
2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he went back to pick him up.
As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at him and
introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the
car and the PARAC team searched the vehicle. They found a gun and
brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the following
day.18After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum.19In convicting petitioner, the trial court relied heavily
on the clear, straightforward, and candid testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses:They were all present when the search warrant
was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland Condominium. No infirmity or
flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the Court
considered that they are public officers and there was no showing
that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or bad faith to
falsely testify against the accused. There was no evidence of
intent to harass the accused. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions can be fairly applied.20On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling, modifying
however the penalty to be imposed on petitioner in that he shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision
correccional as maximum.21Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said
judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of the
warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the subject shabu
justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises,
that of the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as
basis for the presence of the police operatives in the Cityland
Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into
two issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was
properly enforced and whether petitioner was validly arrested
without warrant.The issue as to whether the search warrant was
validly implemented necessitates a review of the tenor of the
search warrant, vis--vis the conduct of the police operatives
enforcing such warrant. Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURTNATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL
REGIONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff- versus -BERNARD
LIM22Room 615 Cityland CondominiumSouth Superhighway, Makati
CityRespondent.SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A.
6425(Dangerous Drug Act 1972)
SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:GREETINGS:It appearing to the
satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP SPO4
ISAGANI J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable
ground to believe that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been
committed or is about to be committed and there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in his possession
and control.You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime
of the day or night of the premises abovementioned and forthwith
seize and take possession of the abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring to this
Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may
direct. You are further directed to submit return within ten (10)
days from today.GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this
26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila, Philippines.HON. WILLIAM M.
BAYHONExecutive Judge, RTCBranch XXIII, ManilaNOTE: This Search
Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of
issue.23Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search
warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner was not the
subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway
with the search and his resulting arrest. According to him, the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a search warrant is
issued for the search of specifically described premises and not of
a person, the omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such
property in the warrant does not invalidate the same. Petitioner
contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant does
not indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the
premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the subject search
warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject
thereof is Kim.This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites
for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:SEC. 4. Requisites for
issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oat