1NCCritiqueThe 1ACs security discourse forwards an atomistic
approach to global problems within orthodox IR that makes
extinction inevitableAhmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is
Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and
Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study
of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of
International Relations, University of Sussex "The international
relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from
the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society"
Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor
Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 ComplicityThis
analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental
security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors
construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological,
energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the
context of the historically-specific socio-political and
geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is
constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of
these very crises (historical sociology and historical
materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR
approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour,
conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the
capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and
inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider
global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical
environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words,
unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself
to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for
understanding the acceleration of global crises. They
simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the
economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted
nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality
of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this
relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the
very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because
positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it
instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86
Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state
behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus
rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human
actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security
by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the
prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms
and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making
in the international system highlights the extent to which both
realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the
acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the
incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing
social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis
acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions
focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power
rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It
is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform
through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under
the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining
prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have
resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to
protect the concurrent structure of the international system from
dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox
approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly
accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically,
fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation
responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation'
refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political
authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an
existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify
going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule
of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers.
By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are
able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making
and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival
itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic
state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the
state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise
extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported
response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of
global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels
of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive
impact on the very global crises generating 'new security
challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that
remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system
(geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international
regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated
from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise
the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social
relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that
orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises
other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR
theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new
theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to
'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state
conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation;
international criminal activities including drugs and arms
trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new
security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their
referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic
theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily
examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other
words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic
crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation
of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable,
requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity
for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political
capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid
on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that
could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing
political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that
state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve
protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal
measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the
context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic
trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise
potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence
toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most
part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a
redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as
potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such
as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of
governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate
change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism,
particularly in regions with large populations and scarce
resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a
'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate
American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a
'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and
instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive
preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and
how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with
their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them
by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this
'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer.
Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting
preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent
US Department of Defense report explores the future of
international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource
competition induced by growing populations and expanding
economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the
South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water
and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security
threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for
depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate
change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian
crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A
similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the
danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of the
dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents, the
report concludes that The implications for future conflict are
ominous.97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: In total,
the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and
reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s, 95 per cent accruing to
developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow
or decline. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa,
where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will
possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.98 The
assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and
Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their
rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report
concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable youth
bulge by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of
25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East
population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by
81 per cent. Growing resentment due to endemic unemployment will be
channelled through political militancy, including radical political
Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and
resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international
system based on nation-states and global market forces. More
strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a
super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the
report warns: The worlds middle classes might unite, using access
to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes
in their own class interest.99 Thus, the securitisation of global
crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular
religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical
interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any
social group which might challenge prevailing global political
economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The
previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically
generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization
against social groups that are constructed as external to the
prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the
internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that
plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these
characteristics by externalising global crises from one another,
externalising states from one another, externalising the
inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and
externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders*. Hence, a
simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the
construction of new "outsider* identities is insufficient to
understand the causal dynamics driving the process of
'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state
preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against
international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex",
where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations
are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries* that
'operate to exclude and include*. Yet these exclusionary discourses
are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes',
such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the
Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider
political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony* by dominating a
resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even
this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of
certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these
geopolitical, strategic and economic interests exclusionary
discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments
in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the
concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It
is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing
criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial
groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a
preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather,
genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social
group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton
observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering* in
which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously
'included* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as
threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious,
political or economic lines eventually legitimising their
annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently
rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby
exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and
'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political
programme. The very process of identifying and classifying
particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined
community of 'inclusion*, justifying exculpatory violence toward
them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be
impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention
to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider
socio-political project - or colonial project designed to
perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological
relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims,
by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction.
Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to
uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can
the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on
this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary
social group construction invariably derives from political
processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that
undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms;
and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by
projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be
somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context
that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not
eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as
contributing to the resolution of crises.105
Their expertism masks politically constructed scenarios as
objective this privileges insulated decision-making authority
causes deference to the executive turns case and results in endless
militarismAziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell
University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law
School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, NATIONAL SECURITY:
LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?, 44 Conn. L. Rev.
1417Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes
today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly
objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As
these claims undergird the current security concept, this
conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process,
indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future
reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that
the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just
as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland
justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world
since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new,
equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer
come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the
Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and
instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by
decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310 [*1486]
Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats
makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the
causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best
response is the further entrenchment of the national security
state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather
intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or
abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that
privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are
simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated
crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an
empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public
agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311
-greatly outweigh the costs. Yet although these sociological views
have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw
about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the
conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of
contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such
claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are
socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed,
the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations
of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and
centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high
profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise
are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and
subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite
knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far
less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the
question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or
insular our institutions should be-remains open as well. Clearly,
technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical
weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the
[*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely
remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee
our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured
domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near
continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities
fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.
n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more
chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the
mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their
likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter
security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective
political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting
ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk
constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist
states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in
the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept
have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than
purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In
particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the
idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of
global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the
Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William
Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and
Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic
constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote
agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate"
for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving
impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional
practices was the importance of sustaining the country's
"pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright
believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities
were essential precisely because the United States found itself
"burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany
such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had
[*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos
and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317
Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of
permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations
about the importance of global primacy. What generated the
condition of continual crisis was not only technological change,
but also the belief that the United States' own national security
rested on the successful projection of power into the internal
affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of
whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of
this project is ultimately an open political question. This
suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating
insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment
as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the
open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the
presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger
facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's
2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S.
noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and
sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a
legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in
recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather
than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing
secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with
a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one
presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative
security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources
expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity,
highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to
persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and
early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous
alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security
aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of
security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless
of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be
equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored
point about the nature of [*1489] modern security expertise,
particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive
intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political
assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that
instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape
the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as
objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested
claims about how to view external actors and their motivations.
These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be
complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be
systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made
by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It
further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be
foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite
knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf
between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its
own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years,
the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the
basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what
obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information
sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace
for government officials to leak security material about terrorism
or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public
debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to
elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for
incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.
Vote neg to reject the 1ACs enframingonly this accesses a
healthy middle ground that reevaluates problematisationCheeseman
& Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales,
and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers,
p. 5-9) This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional
in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia,
even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional
modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global
trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to
give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed,
elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic
experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a
particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book
are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to
its knowledge form as reality in debates on defense and security.
Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a
long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives.
Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias
identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on
defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a
conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of
offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat
alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems
they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the
problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one
that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It
challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real
knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their
context in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is
articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge,
experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All
others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain
outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply
with the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the
official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs
to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand
for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she
is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the
critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of
democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth
century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must
have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and
the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens
of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different
connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the
Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the
totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks
and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences
between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the
Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of
the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them
against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated
criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this
represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry
and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since
positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means
that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the
population must be independent of the state and free to question
its knowledge and power. One must be able to say why to power and
proclaim no to power. Though we do not expect this position to be
accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that
critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be
listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias
security community continues to invoke closed monological
narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the
distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that
informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its
major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate
how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and
policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers,
academics and students of defense and security to think critically
about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask,
of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised
in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it
feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the
ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a
realization that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of
power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that
the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about
it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of
theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of
political life from analysis has direct practical implications for
policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of
steering Australia through some potentially choppy international
waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the
chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so
much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative,
incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find
meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of
international violence. This is why readers will find no single,
fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias
security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in
its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox
literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and
security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7
and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in
security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8)
seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative
theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian
community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world.
All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in
the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material
constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they
avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past
characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics.
This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to
the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A
close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying
assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A
sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary
prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes
an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific
polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter,
we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made
for us but challenging the discursive process which gives [favored
interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct
[Australias] policy/analytical/ military responses. This process is
not restricted to the small, official defense and security
establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in
Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defense
and security community located primarily though not exclusively
within the Australian National University and the University
College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive
processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors
attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which
exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community.
They also question the discourse of regional security, security
cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to
Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This
is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the
disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are
under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging
across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere
to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The
chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on
defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book,
then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and
Edward Saids critical intellectuals. The demand, tacit or
otherwise, that the policy makers frame of reference be accepted as
the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand
year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and
purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based
intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested
concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy
through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether
Australias policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of
broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not
to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of
this book is to democratize the defense and security
theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate
can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an
analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid
variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective
that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of
constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality
itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may
be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to
analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War
Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young
Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the
flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which,
tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims
of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what
unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly
debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this
reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive
contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its
criticisms.
This comes first teaching fear is the infusion point of
militarism justifies perpetual war, colonialism, and academic
racism rejection destabilizes the foundations of
interventionismNguyen 14 [Nicole, Department of Cultural
Foundations of Education at Syracuse University, January 21,
Education as Warfare?: Mapping Securitised Education Interventions
as War on Terror Strategy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pg. 20-6]Since September
11, the US has renewed its focus on domestic education as a
critical component of protecting national and economic security.
This focus includes shifting instruction and curricula toward
preparing students for the military and security industry, infusing
ideas of security and safety into school culture, militarising
school space through the implementation of techniques like zero
tolerance policies and surveillance cameras, and teaching students
these dominant representations of the brown Other. In this
articulation of the role of schools, ghting the war on terror
begins at home in our public schools, which conscript students into
the war effort by educating them for war and perpetuating fear and
anxiety. Such measures are not new in the post-9 / 11 US security
state. Jackson reminds us that educational policies in the United
States have been integrally related to social and economic
policies, with domestic and foreign interests linked inextricably.
112 Following Sputnik , there was a massive infusion of money to
enhance the curriculum of high schools, with a greater emphasis on
math and the sciences as well as foreign language instruction in
order to globally compete economically and militarily. 113 Means
offers that connections between public education, crisis, and
national security are nothing new in the United States. Cold War
anxieties and concerns over national security provided inspiration
for Dwight Eisenhowers National Education Defense Act (NDEA) in
1958 . . . 114 Three years later the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961
promised to bolster language and area studies expertise of American
students and faculty and to increase understanding and mutual
cooperation between the people of the United States and the people
of other countries and to strengthen the ties which unite us with
other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural
interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the
United States and other nations in order to assist in the
development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations
between the United States and the other countries of the world. 115
In other words, by sending US educators abroad, Fulbright-Hays
operated as both a diplomacy project and an effort in spreading
American ideals, values, market economy and epistemologies. David
Austell, while supporting this assertion, argues that these
education initiatives work more insidiously in relation to the US
war agenda: International education in the United States has its
roots rmly planted in views of homeland security stemming from the
Cold War, and its role and effectiveness as a foil to a purely
militaristic foreign policy has changed very little in the
intervening sixty years. 116 Further, Webber, in tracing the
genealogy of the use of US domestic public education as a means to
warehouse and re-socialise immigrants, argues that the democratic
school [in the US] has always been as instrument of the security
state. This is by no means a new idea, pace 9 / 11 . . . . Schools
have always been a hegemonic tool of the security state as
schooling by which Ivan Illich understood it to be a process of
training people to believe in the legitimacy of the states orders.
117 The late nineteenth-century warehousing of Native Americans in
white boarding schools in the United States also served to
assimilate populations wholesale to defuse the threat they
putatively posed. In present day, such historical efforts an
esthetise contemporary educational projects abroad as purely
apolitical aid, and provide the humanitarian veneer necessary to
continue such efforts. Following this history, recent domestic
school reforms rely on fear and insecurity to justify and
legitimise reforms that situate schools squarely in line with the
war agenda. Former Chancellor of New York Citys Department of
Education Joel Klein and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
explain in their 2012 U.S. Education Reform and National Security
com-missioned report that far too many U.S. schools are failing to
teach students the academic skills . . . they need to succeed and,
as such, . . . Americas failure to educate is affecting national
security . 118 The Report specically calls for a focus on job
training in math and science human capital development in order to
continue to protect and defend the US homeland and economy. This
follows The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century
report (Phase III: Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for
Change, Journeys through the Teacher Pipeline addendum, 2001). 119
This report names education as a national security imperative where
[US] education in science, mathematics, and engineering has special
relevance for the future of U.S. national security, for Americas
ability to lead . . . 120 Such discourses around national and
economic in/security, risk, and education do much work to continue
to authorise and justify particular school reform efforts intended
to train and recruit students for war and work in the multi-billion
dollar security industry. Following this logic, schools are
transformed from a public good to a security risk. 121 Such
preparation contributes to the warmachine. 122 Since the Cold War,
the US has increasingly militarised schools, reective of the larger
push of militarisation the privileging of the military and military
logics in everyday day life in the US. Militarising and
securitising education means that schools adopt harsh disciplinary
policies, regulate student movement and mobility, and teach
students to value and privilege military doctrine. While fear of
nuclear warfare dotted US school curriculum and pedagogy during the
Cold War, the global war on terrorism has continued to reshape US
public education. Indeed, since the Cold War, US cities
increasingly militarise, police, and fortify schools and children.
123 In 2008, several greater-DC area counties and their school
districts formed the Mid-Atlantic Homeland Security Network of
Educators (MHSNE) in order to respond to the regions critical
shortage of skilled homeland security workers by working to create
a kindergarten to career pipeline aimed at training young people to
work in the homeland security industry in public high schools
re-designed to meet security industry needs. The Network does so by
partnering homeland security and emergency preparedness
professionals with educators to develop curriculum together. Such
school-industry partnerships engender a neoliberal militarised and
securitised form of education aimed at training future workers to
defend and protect the homeland from the brown Other. Based on
preliminary eldwork I conducted atone such high school, students
built rockets with representatives from NASA, learned to protect
nuclear reactors from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
engineer, and discussed important military weaponry from AR 15s to
Desert Eagles to Remotely Operated Weapons Systems (ROWS). A local
base commander congratulated students for their participation in
the homeland security programme, citing this passage from Heinleins
military-science novel Starship Troopers delineating the
differences between mere civilian and citizen: The difference lies
in the eld of civic virtue. A citizen accepts personal
responsibility for the safety of the body politic, of which he is a
member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does
not. The commander applauded students: You are taking a very large
step from walking down the road as a civilian in the greatest
country in the world to a citizen making a difference. 124 In this
way public schools and staff communicate to students certain
versions of militarised citizenship, security, and terrorism that
both perpetuate fear and representations of the brown Other and
call them to action as citizen[s] making a difference by learning
to defend the greatest country in the world with their lives.
Perhaps less noticeably, students learned to valorise the military
with the JROTC Color Guard opening meetings, military and security
industry banners hanging in the hallway, the encouragement of
teachers to discuss guns and weaponry, the presence of military
gures in their school, the valuing of hyper-masculinities noted by
a knowledge of weapons and military war history, the continual
reference to America as the greatest and freest nation in the
country, the perpetual suggestion of bad guys out there threatening
the US, and the framing of military action as the only means to
security. US students in these types of schools are not only
drafted as foot soldiers in the war on terror, they are also taught
to view the world according to these hegemonic imaginative
geographies. For example, while watching a lm on teen violence,
students remarked, Well, that explains it! when a young brown boy
opened a Quran to pray. Students articulated what they had learned
in class and in everyday life in the US: Islam and brown skin
communicated danger and violence. Nationally, the greater DC areas
public schools are not alone in their current efforts to supply the
security industry with skilled workers and, historically, such
school reforms merely serve as another node on the longer genealogy
of US educations role in supporting military agendas. While these
programmes intend to (and do) engage students with hands-on
lessons, eld trips, and guest lecturers as well as make them
marketable for the booming US security industry, the inuence of
neoliberal and securitised logic is readily apparent. Students, for
example, learned about parabolas by pretending to be snipers
needing to nd and hit their target, North Korea. They shadowed
workers at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and
secured internships at the National Security Agency (NSA). This
type of education excited students through these hands-on
opportunities and lessons seemingly readily applicable to everyday
life and future job opportunities. The heightened attention toward
security that has shaped US school reform projects means that
children develop securitized subjectivities as they are prepared
for the long war. In other words, young people enrolled in these
programmes develop a sense of self dened by heightened fear,
anxiety, and uncertainty of an unknown threat. This normalised
apprehension and subsequent practices of militarism are justied in
the name of US and personal safety and security. 125 Building US
public schools around a militarised interpretation of homeland
security relies on the aforementioned scenes of legibility that map
terror and threat onto brown bodies. Given this putative threat,
students must arm and prepare to enter the homeland security
workforce. These priorities shift the purpose of education away
from fostering critical thinking for democratic participation to
training young people for the war on terror. Corporations partner
with public high schools, donating dollars and expertise in order
to ensure a pipeline of diverse talent needed for our future
workforce. 126 Northrop Grumman allocated $20.9 of its $28.2
mil-lion philanthropic donations toward the development of STEM
education across the nation, its core philanthropic focus according
to its 2011 Corporate Responsibility Report. Northrop Grumman
argues that supporting STEM initiatives is critical for our
business and for U.S. competitiveness, so weve embraced programs
that we think will help build a diverse employee pipeline. 127 For
Northrop Grumman, the development of and investment in STEM K-16
education programmes ensure the health and life of the business and
the security of the homeland. Such school reform projects follow
calls from the US state to improve STEM education. The U.S.
Commission on National Security / 21st Century outlines, for
instance that to ensure the vitality of all its core institutions,
the United States must make it a priority of national policy to
improve the quality of primary and secondary education,
particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era
when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of
government, the United States must create more advanced and
effective forms of public / private partnerships to promote public
benet from scientic-technological innovation. 128 In this way,
homeland security programmes and schools typify how securitised
neoliberal logic, fuelled by corporate dollars, is infused into
school reform, curriculum, and everyday (normalised) neoliberal and
securitised school subjectivities. While the Obama administration
ended the war in Iraq, promised troop reduction in Afghanistan, and
increased its use of drones, much of my time in the homeland
security high school revolved around talk of the growing pipeline
initiative to continue to grow the programme throughout the state
and to extend it through all grade levels in order to meet the
nations growing security needs. In a meeting with school
administrators and representatives of the defence corporations,
students from local elementary, middle, and high schools as well as
current college students presented how the homeland security
programme was useful to them, how the corporations might get more
young people interested in working in the industry, and what they
found exciting in the programme. The school also holds several
recruiting events at the elementary schools, simulated
cyber-security battle labs, and homeland security fairs to spur
local interest. The mushrooming number of regional and national
initiatives aimed at further institutionalising homeland security
education in US public schools indicates that this form of
securitised education has drastically shifted public schooling in
the United States even as the war on terror strategy continues to
morph under the Obama administration. The continued portrayed need
to secure US borders, cyber space, and the homeland authorised this
emphasis on homeland security in US public schools. The fears of
the dangerous brown Other and of ungoverned school space
dramatically altered the architecture of school discipline at
Wellington. These changes highlight how this fear and anxiety can
be used to mobilise school reforms intending to fortify US public
schools and control brown bodies, and borrow from the scripts used
to make sense of US interventions in Iraq. Further, the US state
portrays a lack of skilled workers as a national security risk,
demanding US public schools reform their schools in order to meet
the needs of the security industry. As the reverberations of
September 11 and the long war continue to structure US public
schools, children educated in these schools learn to interpret the
world and their place in it through a lens of homeland security and
war. In this way, US public schools become yet another site of war
on terror strategy. Taken together, these militarised and
securitised US public school reforms instituting homeland security
studies programmes, tactical US engagements with madrassas, and the
emphasis on girls education as empowerment highlight the critical
role education plays in supporting and furthering war on terror
strategy both materially and discursively. Though disparately
located, these sites of education are connected by larger social
processes invested in the reproduction of difference and
inequality, the advancement of capitalist imperialism, and the
furthering of US warfare through the circulation of specic
geographic imaginaries of here and there and us and them.
DISRUPTIONS Through this analysis, we can see how the US constructs
and mobilises convenient scripts and imaginative geographies in
order to perpetuate hegemony, justify war, and humanise US military
intervention while refuelling a sense of imminent danger and fear
across the US homeland. We see this in looking specically at three
distinct sites of education: Framed by Orientalist understandings
of brown women as oppressed by brown men, girls education
initiatives mobilised by the United States work to humanise and
justify war under the guise of advancing human rights and feminism.
The representation of madrassas as incubators of terrorism
authorises the implementation of US-style education programmes and
military intervention. Lastly, US public schools organise their
schools to abate the threat posed by brown bodies and the spaces
they occupy, and to prepare young people to defend the homeland
either militarily or through their work in the security industry.
Gregory proposes that for us to cease turning on the treadmill of
the colonial present it will be necessary to explore other
spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative
geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and
enhance our sense of the world and enable us to situate ourselves
within it with care, concern, and humility. 129 As the US continues
to invent and invest in new forms of education to service the war
industry, the challenge posed by critical geopolitics is to work to
disrupt the geographies that enable these education and military
practices. Throughout this work, we have seen how the architecture
of enmity animated through various Orientalist and patriarchal
discourses shapes and justies US engagements with education to
buttress war on terror efforts and to revivify the USs standing as
the worlds moral compass. Informed by a longer colonial genealogy
long before September 11 noted by various inection points during
the Cold War, this analysis recognises that these operative
hegemonic discourses and ideologies appear and reappear across time
and space their traces always and everywhere superimposed and
enable seemingly unconnected practices to work together to maintain
and extend patriarchal and colonial dominance. 130 Plotting the
ideological and discursive routes that link various sites that make
up the topography of imperial, securitised education can help us
map and, in turn, challenge the contours of US interventions with
education. A re-scripting of the Middle East as well as of the
United States role in putatively promoting global security while
risking the human security of millions of brown bodies across the
globe acts as one step toward dismantling the prevailing
geopolitical imagination(s) that operates on and through brown
bodies in dangerous and violent ways. By exposing the patriarchal
and imperial investments of dominant geopolitical scripts, this
analysis has worked to provide some entry points for reframing the
conversation around in/security and education in ways that might
de-centre and destabilise US hegemonic imaginings and, in turn,
privilege Other ways of knowing.
1NCInherencyStatus quo solves cloud computingRelander 3/27
[Brett, Investment Advisor, 2015, Cloud-Computing: An industry In
Exponential Growth,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/032715/cloudcomputing-industry-exponential-growth.asp]Driving
the growth in the cloud industry is the cost savings associated
with the ability to outsource the software and hardware necessary
for tech services. According to Nasdaq, investments in key
strategic areas such as big data analytics, enterprise mobile,
security and cloud technology, is expected to increase to more than
$40 million by 2018. With cloud-based services expected to increase
exponentially in the future, there has never been a better time to
invest, but it is important to make sure you do so cautiously. (See
article: A Primer On Investing In The Tech Industry.)
Lack of EU investment makes solvency impossible every single
speech or action Obamas taken and then failed to fully implement
prove the aff would be seen as another failed attempt AND people
dont trust the NSA because they lied in congress trust is the key
internalLomas 13 (Natasha, NSA Spying Risks Undermining Trust In
U.S. Cloud Computing Businesses, Warns Kroes, Tech Crunch, July 4,
2013, Accessed April 8, 2015,
http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/04/spying-bad-for-business/)//ADThe
NSA spying scandal risks undermining trust in U.S. cloud computing
businesses, the European Commissions vice-president, Neelie Kroes,
has warned in a speech today. Kroes also reiterated calls for
clarity and transparency from the U.S. regarding the scope and
nature of its surveillance and access to data on individuals and
businesses living and conducting business in Europe in order to
avoid a knock-on effect on cloud businesses. Loss of Europeans
trust could result in multi-billion euro consequences for U.S.
cloud providers, she added. Kroes was speaking during a press
conference held in Estonia, following a meeting of the ECs European
Cloud Partnership Steering Board, which was held to agree on
EU-wide specifications for cloud procurement. In her speech, part
of which follows below, she argued that cloud computing businesses
are at particular risk of fallout from a wide-reaching U.S.
government surveillance program because they rely on their
customers trust to function trust that the data entrusted to them
is stored securely. Kroes said: If businesses or governments think
they might be spied on, they will have less reason to trust the
cloud, and it will be cloud providers who ultimately miss out. Why
would you pay someone else to hold your commercial or other
secrets, if you suspect or know they are being shared against your
wishes? Front or back door it doesnt matter any smart person doesnt
want the information shared at all. Customers will act rationally,
and providers will miss out on a great opportunity.
1NCWarmingNo internal link other countries wont model US
adaptation or invest especially true since the other NSA spying
programs still exist
Alt cause lack of accurate models faster data processing means
nothing if were using the same approach
Depictions of climate conflict cause pre-emptive military
build-up starting great power conflict before the migration even
occursMichael Brzoska 8, Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg [The securitization of climate
change and the power of conceptions of security, Paper prepared for
the International Studies Association Convention 2008, 3/26-29]It
will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the
change in living conditions will be for the worse. This may, in
turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human
environment and the resulting violent conflict may induce large
numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas
less negatively affected by climate change. Beyond local and
regional effects, climate change increases the global risk of
violent conflict by adding another element of contention to the
competition among major powers. These dangers associated with
climate change are by now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the
probability that they will occur? How likely is it that climate
change will lead to more interstate wars, intrastate wars or
terrorism? How much do we know about the links between climate
change and violence? Are these dangers real in the sense of having
a high likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious,
edge-of-range possibilities that are used to draw attention to
climate change, a level of attention that would not be attainable
by stressing the more likely, but less spectacular economic and
social consequences of the problem? The latter would be
understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature
on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized
it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and
resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever
1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round exceptionalism
in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional
localization towards security experts (Bigot 2006), such as the
military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these
security organizations such as more use of arms, force and violence
will gain in importance in the discourse on what to do. A good
example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War
(Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the
organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West
confrontation became an existential conflict that was
overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the
potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the
political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary
to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a
similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the
distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the
losses and gains in income arising from change in the human
environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating
the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from
becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change
as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer
countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to
strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of
violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that
will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by
major powers as a justification for improving their military
preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms
races.
Social change is key to solve adaptation even if the aff gives
us the capabilities they cant overcome the implementation barrier
their cardRomero 08 [Purple, reporter for ABS-CBN news, 05/17/2008,
Climate change and human extinction--are you ready to be
fossilized?
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/05/16/08/climate-change-and-human-extinction-are-you-ready-be-fossilized]Climate
change killed the dinosaurs. Will it kill us as well? Will we let
it destroy the human race? This was the grim, depressing message
that hung in the background of the Climate Change Forum hosted on
Friday by the Philippine National Red Cross at the Manila Hotel.
"Not one dinosaur is alive today. Maybe someday it will be our
fossils that another race will dig up in the future, " said Roger
Bracke of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, underscoring his point that no less than
extinction is faced by the human race, unless we are able to
address global warming and climate change in this generation.
Bracke, however, countered the pessimistic mood of the day by
saying that the human race still has an opportunity to save itself.
This more hopeful view was also presented by the four other
speakers in the forum. Bracke pointed out that all peoples of the
world must be involved in two types of response to the threat of
climate change: mitigation and adaptation. "Prevention" is no
longer possible, according to Bracke and the other experts at the
forum, since climate change is already happening. Last chance The
forum's speakers all noted the increasing number and intensity of
devastating typhoons--most recently cyclone Nargis in Myanmar,
which killed more than 100,000 people--as evidence that the world's
climatic and weather conditions are turning deadly because of
climate change. They also reminded the audience that deadly
typhoons have also hit the Philippines recently, particularly
Milenyo and Reming, which left hundreds of thousands of Filipino
families homeless. World Wildlife Fund Climate and Energy Program
head Naderev Sao said that "this generation is the last chance for
the human race" to do something and ensure that humanity stays
alive in this planet. According to Sao, while most members of our
generation will be dead by the time the worst effects of climate
change are felt, our children will be the ones to suffer. How will
Filipinos survive climate change? Well, first of all, they have to
be made aware that climate change is a problem that threatens their
lives. The easiest way to do this as former Consultant for the
Secretariats of the UN Convention on Climate Change Dr. Pak Sum Low
told abs-cbnews.com/Newsbreak is to particularize the disasters
that it could cause. Talking in the language of destruction, Pak
and other experts paint this portrait of a Philippines hit by
climate change: increased typhoons in Visayas, drought in Mindanao,
destroyed agricultural areas in Pampanga, and higher incidence
rates of dengue and malaria. Saom said that as polar ice caps melt
due to global warming, sea levels will rise, endangering coastal
and low-lying areas like Manila. He said Manila Bay would
experience a sea level increase of 72 meters over 20 years. This
means that from Pampanga to Nueva Ecija, farms and fishponds would
be in danger of being would be inundated in saltwater. Saom added
that Albay, which has been marked as a vulnerable area to typhoons,
would be the top province at risk. Saom also pointed out that
extreme weather conditions arising from climate change, including
typhoons and severe droughts, would have social, economic and
political consequences: Ruined farmlands and fishponds would hamper
crop growth and reduce food sources, typhoons would displace
people, cause diseases, and limit actions in education and
employment. Thus, Sao said, while environmental protection should
remain at the top of the agenda in fighting climate change,
solutions to the phenomenon "must also be economic, social, moral
and political." Mitigation Joyceline Goco, Climate Change
Coordinator of the Environment Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, focused her lecture on the
programs Philippine government is implementing in order to mitigate
the effects of climate change. Goco said that the Philippines is
already a signatory to global agreements calling for a reduction in
the "greenhouse gasses"--mostly carbon dioxide, chloroflourocarbons
and methane--that are responsible for trapping heat inside the
planet and raising global temperatures. Goco said the DENR, which
is tasked to oversee and activate the Clean Development Mechanism,
has registered projects which would reduce methane and carbon
dioxide. These projects include landfill and electricity generation
initiatives. She also said that the government is also looking at
alternative fuel sources in order do reduce the country's
dependence on the burning of fossil fuels--oil--which are known
culprits behind global warming. Bracke however said that mitigation
is not enough. "The ongoing debate about mitigation of climate
change effects is highly technical. It involves making fundamental
changes in the policies of governments, making costly changes in
how industry operates. All of this takes time and, frankly, we're
not even sure if such mitigation efforts will be successful. In the
meantime, while the debate goes on, the effects of climate change
are already happening to us." Adaptation A few nations and
communities have already begun adapting their lifestyles to cope
with the effects of climate change. In Bangladesh, farmers have
switched to raising ducks instead of chickens because the latter
easily succumb to weather disturbances and immediate effects, such
as floods. In Norway, houses with elevated foundations have been
constructed to decrease displacement due to typhoons. In the
Philippines main body for fighting climate change, the Presidential
Task Force on Climate Change, (PTFCC) headed by Department on
Energy Sec. Angelo Reyes, has identified emission reduction
measures and has looked into what fuel mix could be both
environment and economic friendly. The Department of Health has
started work with the World Health Organization in strengthening
its surveillance mechanisms for health services. However, bringing
information hatched from PTFCCs studies down to and crafting an
action plan for adaptation with the communities in the barangay
level remains a challenge. Bracke said that the Red Cross is
already at the forefront of efforts to prepare for disasters
related to climate change. He pointed out that since the Red Cross
was founded in 1919, it has already been helping people beset by
natural disasters. "The problems resulting from climate change are
not new to the Red Cross. The Red Cross has been facing those
challenges for a long time. However, the frequency and magnitude of
those problems are unprecedented. This is why the Red Cross can no
longer face these problems alone," he said. Using a medieval
analogy, Bracke said that the Red Cross can no longer be a "knight
in shining armor rescuing a damsel in distress" whenever disaster
strikes. He said that disaster preparedness in the face of climate
change has to involve people at the grassroots level. "The role of
the Red Cross in the era of climate change will be less as a direct
actor and increase as a trainor and guide to other partners who
will help us adapt to climate change and respond to disasters,"
said Bracke. PNRC chairman and Senator Richard Gordon gave a
picture of how the PNRC plans to take climate change response to
the grassroots level, through its project, dubbed "Red Cross 143".
Gordon explained how Red Cross 143 will train forty-four volunteers
from each community at a barangay level. These volunteers will have
training in leading communities in disaster response. Red Cross 143
volunteers will rely on information technology like cellular phones
to alert the PNRC about disasters in their localities, mobilize
people for evacuation, and lead efforts to get health care,
emergency supplies, rescue efforts, etc.
1NCDiseaseInternal link disconnect the uq card is about human
genomes but the internals are about bacterial genomes which are
0.1% of the size of the human code means the status quo solves
because more computing power isnt necessary
Kosers about TB they have no ev that says genome sequencing is
key to every other disease
Cant solve cross-resistance too many mutations and species
variation make genome specificity impossible also means resistance
is inevitable
Diseases wont cause extinction burnout or variationYork 14 Ian,
head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the
Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC,
former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology
(MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity
(UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology
(McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), Why Don't Diseases
Completely Wipe Out Species? 6/4,
http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-speciesBut
mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several
reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those
that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is
highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less
likely that individuals will contact each other during the
infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn
themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation.
Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide
range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some
pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in
combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We
see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans
who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either
because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there
are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions
of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of
this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes
contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have
spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare
mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the
carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were
serious threats to the species.
Their disease descriptions are shaped by political interests and
in turn shape reality turns the aff MacPhail 09 (Theresa, medical
anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley The
Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle over Viral Samples and Chinas Role
in Global Public Health, Journal of language and politics, 8:3,
2009)In fact, the health development strategies of international
organizations are judged as significant in reinforcing the role of
the state in relation to the production of primary products for the
world market, thereby perpetuating international relations of
dominance and dependency. Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in
Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General
Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional committee and
testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by
the Bush administration to suppress or downplay any public health
information that contradicted the administrations beliefs and/or
policies. Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr.
Carmona was only one of a growing list of present and former
administration officials to charge that politics often trumped
science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan
government health and scientific agencies (Harris 2007). Dr.
Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced political
interference on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex
education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the
resultant diminution of public health both its reputation as
non-biased and the general understanding of important public health
issues in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007).
In the wake of Dr. Carmonas testimony, it would appear that these
are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns
and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have never
been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and
the public imagination. Dr. Carmonas testimony on the fuzzy
boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line
with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of
drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu
outbreak all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and
medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of
the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until
recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally
been popularly conceptualized as separate fields. Public health,
undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as the science and
practice of protecting and improving the health of a community
(public health 2007), regardless of political borders on
geographical maps. Disease prevention and care is typically
regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments
can work together for the direct (or indirect) benefit of all.
Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely
Aristotelian sense of the word, or politika, as the art or science
of government or governing, especially the governing of a political
entity, such as a nation, and the administration and control of its
internal and external affairs (politics 2007). If we take to be
relevant Clausewitzs formulation that war is merely the
continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we
then argue that the recent wars on disease specifically the one
being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu are
merely a continuation of politics by different means? In an article
written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health
professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally
when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public
health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other
potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly informs
public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific
research, has the potential to create a situation in which ideology
clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and
politics become dangerous (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The
authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health
professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues,
and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes
with the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and
healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these
cross-discussions. Nevertheless the interaction provides an
opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for
public grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan
political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however, never suggest
that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a
viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease prevention
policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of
science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of potential
ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health
policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public
health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the
foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh
1988: 132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has,
until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse by the
ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael
Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient relationship: The issue of
control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence
(Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt goodwill of organizations such
as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on
politics? Certainly there is argumentation to support a claim that
public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics.
Examining the hidden arguments underlying public health policies,
Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: disease prevention began to acquire
political meaning. No longer merely ways to control diseases,
prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending
political arguments about the form the new society would take
(1988: 11). Science is a reason of state in Ashis Nandys Science,
Hegemony and Violence (1988: 1). Echoing current battles over viral
samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used
as a political plank within the United States in the ideological
battle against ungodly communism (1988: 3). Scientific performance
is linked to political dividends (1988: 9), with science becoming a
substitute for politics in many societies (1988: 10). What remains
novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and
medicine is the new politics of scale of the war on global disease,
specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza.
As doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: the WHO
manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad wealthy
nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of
self-interest an age-old public health ploy acknowledged as such in
the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections (Farmer
2001: 5657). What Farmers observation underlines is that public
health has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity.
Institutions like the WHO are increasingly needed to negotiate
between nations they function as the new diplomats of health.
Modern politics, then, have arguably turned into health politics.
In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious
diseases. The resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic
and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What
started as a reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since
developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness which
is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health,
national security, or economic and political stability. In other
words, disease and public health have gone global. But, as law and
international disease scholar David Fidler points out, the meeting
of realpolitik and pathogens that he terms microbialpolitik is
anything but new (Fidler 2001: 81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as
international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only
the brief half-century respite provided by antibiotics, modern
medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the
coupling of politics and public health seem out-of-date. But now we
have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures
have weakened, thus making a return to microbialpolitiks
inevitable. As Fidler argues: The reglobalization of public health
is well underway, and the international politics of infectious
disease control have returned (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three years
later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public
health was triumphant, having emerged prominently on the agendas of
many policy areas in international relations, including national
security, international trade, economic development, globalization,
human rights, and global governance (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas
King suggests, the resurgence of such microbialpolitiking owes much
to the discourse of risk so prevalent in todays world. The current
focus on risk, as it specifically pertains to disease and its
relationship to national security concerns, has been constructed by
the interaction of a variety of different social actors:
scientists, the media, and health and security experts (King
2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a
strategic and historically resonant scale politics, making it
attractive to journalists, biomedical researchers, activists,
politicians, and public health and national security experts.
Campaigners identification of causes and consequences at particular
scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and
thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for intervention
at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances
ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King traces
this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morses
1989 conference on Emerging Viruses. Like the UN Security Council
resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake
of HIV/AIDS. In Kings retelling, it was Morses descriptions of the
causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that
changed the politics of public health (2004: 66). The
epidemiological community followed in Morses footsteps, with such
luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a global
surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases
such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the problem and
the effort were global by default, any interventions would involve
passing through American laboratories, biotechnology firms,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts
(King 2004: 69). Following the conference, disease became a hot
topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett
(The Coming Plague) and Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the
emerging virus fires, creating what amounted to a viral panic or
viral paranoia (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire,
such as Prestons account of Ebola, helped reify the notion that
localized events were of international importance. Such causal
chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the timing
was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the
aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using
scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King
2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the Foucaultian
concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The
Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the ways in which medicine
is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine
itself becomes a task for the nation (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues
that the practice of medicine is itself political and that the
struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad
government (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of
emerging diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucaults equation
of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nations
capacity to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker
not of just biological, but of political, health. She argues that
the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a
governing system (2007: 1). Whats more, ruptures in health can lead
to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of
governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests: Failures in
governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result
in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance and
political legitimacy (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird
flu in China would equate to an example of Foucaults bad
government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of
medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined.
Foucault writes: There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply
rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology
and those of medical technology (Foucault 1994: 38). In other
words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmonas
testimony or by debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health
have always arguably gone hand-in-hand
1NCEconomyDeterrence, trade, and lack of convincing ideology
prevent the impacts to China risePosen 14 [Barry, Ford
International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the
director of MIT's Security Studies Program, June 24, Restraint : A
New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press,
pg. 94-5/AKG]Some aspects of the situation will likely make China a
less potent competitor than the Soviet Union, especially on a
global scale. First, China faces a geopolitically more problematic
environment than did the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union after World
War II faced immediate neighbors exhausted by war, and hence
vulnerable. The opposite is the case today; global prosperity has
been growing since the end of the Cold War. China has two nuclear
neighborsIndia and Russia. One of them is potentially as dynamic
economically as China. Two other neighbors, the Republic of Korea
and Japan could easily become nuclear weapons states. Chinas own
population near its land borders often consists of ethnic
minorities, restless under governance from Beijing. China cannot
afford war on those borders. 50 Many neighboring countries are
separated from China by bodies of water, which would make it
difficult for China to apply military pressure, if it ever came to
that. Finally, at least for the immediate future, Chinas economic
prosperity is inextricably bound up with global trade, which leaves
it vulnerable in extremis to blockade. United States naval, air,
and space power allow it to dominate the open oceans. So long as
this remains the case, in the event of hot war, the independent
nations on the edge of the East and South China Seas would all have
access to the outside world, while China would not. Second, and
related, Chinas geography makes it at most an Asian land power. The
Soviet Union spanned Eurasia and thus it had inherent potential to
be a global power: it had ports and airfields that allowed it to
project at least some power in almost any direction, and it could
move resources from one theater to another overland or through its
own controlled airspace. Chinas naval geography, even in Asia,
helps hem it in. Independent countries with their own nationalist
sensibilities sit astride Chinas route to open waters. Third, China
does not have ideology working for it. The colonial empires were
collapsing as the Cold War opened. In part due to resentment of the
capitalist system of their former colonial masters, and in part due
simply to the moment in history, communism was an attractive
ideology and social system in the early Cold War. It served as a
legitimating force for Soviet activities worldwide. Local
nationalisms in the developing world were more suspicious of the
West than they were the Soviet Union, creating opportunities for
Soviet political penetration in the emergent countries. Nationalist
sentiment today seems to be omnidirectionally suspicious, which
would make Chinese penetration difficult, and leave Chinese
influence vulnerable to constant local attack. China does not have
an ideology or social system that travels, in any case.
Authoritarian capitalism with Chinese nationalist overtones and
communist trappings is not much of a brand.
Cant solve China long-term Hsu says China's defense budget could
outstrip that of the U.S. within the next 20 years
Framing economic leadership as the driver of US-China peace
strains relations and causes US aggressionNilsson 12 (Fredrik, Lund
University Graduate School in Poly Sci, Securitizing Chinas
Peaceful Rise An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese
Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in
the South China Sea,
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)The
main objective of this study was to investigate how the United
States has approached elements of Chinas economic growth and
military modernization. By employing securitization theory and
neorealist notions of security, I sought to reveal the
transformation of the U.S. approach from being of a political
nature to becoming issues of security. I employed a slightly
modified model of securitization theory, emphasizing the importance
of facilitating conditions and the institutional power of
securitizing actors. I have argued that the United States has
chosen to securitize a range of issues pert