15 th Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science CLMPS 2015 University of Helsinki Helsinki, Finland Submitted by: Dr. William M. Kallfelz.

15th Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science

CLMPS 2015University of Helsinki

Helsinki, FinlandSubmitted by: Dr. William M. KallfelzDepartment of Philosophy & Religion

Mississippi State UniversityAugust 7, 2015

Outline•I: Structural Realism: Epistemic, Ontic, and Methodological (ESR, OSR, MSR)

•II. Information Theoretic Structural Realism (ITSR): A Case for Modal Pluralism

•III. Marc Lange’s project and concordance with ITSR.

•IV. Concluding comments on recent criticisms of OSR and implications for Landry’s methodological structural realism (MSR)

I. Structural Realism• “Structural realism” (SR) was explicitly coined by John

Worrall (1989), in an attempt to develop a plausible rendition of scientific realism immune to the “inflationary metaphysics” to which typical

versions (e.g. entity, realism methodologiccal realism) are often vulnerable, some would say..

• (E.g., Bas van Fraassen (1980-2008))

• And also avoid the “indexical anthropocentrism” some might see as

problematic with scientific non-realism..• “Theories can be very different and yet

share all kinds of structure…Hence, a form of realism that is committed

only to the structure of theories might not be undermined by theory

change.” (Ladyman, 2009, 6)

I. Epistemic and Ontic Structural Realism

• Ladyman, et. al. (1998-2009) distinguish epistemic from ontic structural realism (ESR versus OSR)

• ESR (Worrall: 1989) all one can ever fundamentally know about the physical world reduces to the level of structure

• OSR: A position that “most physicists advocate” (whether implicitly or otherwise), the physical world is ultimately individuated by some species of structure: “Ontic structural realists argue that…the nature of space, time and

“””Ontic structural realists argue that…the matter are not compatible with

standard metaphysical views about the ontological relationship between individuals, intrinsic properties and

relations…broadly construed OSR is any form of structural realism based on an

ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological priority of

structure and relations.” (Ladyman, 2009, 11)

I. ESR-Scrutinized & Criticized

• Demopoulos & Friedman’s (1985) criticisms of ESR can be viewed as following in spirit

Newman’s (1928) objection to Russell nmnionRamsificat

nm xxxoooRxxxtttooo ,...,,;,...,,...,...,,;,...,, 212121''

2121 “[I]t is a mistake to think that the Ramsey sentence allows us to eliminate

Demopoulos & Friedman (1985):•If is logically consistent (in the FOL) and all its observational consequences are true, then the truth of its Ramsey sentence R follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic.•The formal structure cannot single out a unique referent, so “only cardinality questions are open to [empirical] discovery, everything else will be known a priori.” (9)•If only the cardinality of the set of observation-terms can be fixed a posteriori, then all theories with the same set of observational consequences will be equally true.•“Russell’s realism collapses into a version of phenomenalism or strict empiricism.” (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1985, 635).

I. Ontic Structural Realism

• Seven different flavors, of varying degrees of metaphysical strength. (Ladyman & Ross, 2007; Ladyman, 2009, 11-21)

• OSR-1: There are no individuals, there is only relational structure.

• OSR-2: There are relational facts and relations that do not supervene on the intrinsic spatiotemporal properties of relata.

• OSR-3: Individual objects have no intrinsic natures.

• OSR-4: There are individual entities, but they have no irreducibly intrinsic properties: “all the properties of individual objects are ontologically dependent on the relational structures.” (Ladyman, 2009, 9)

• OSR-5: Facts about identity and diversity of objects are ontologically dependent on the relational structures, of which they are a part.

I.Ontic Structural Realism• OSR-6: There are no subsistent objects, only

relational structure is ontologically subsistent.• Note 1: An example of this position (jointly

entailed by OSR-3 and OSR-4) is quantum holism.

• OSR-7: Individual objects are epistemic constructs.• Note 2: Antigone Nounou (2012) comments

further on these distinctions as introducing varying alternatives positions OSR can adopt,

in meeting the “relations without relata charge” of eliminativist OSR (e-OSR) in OSR-

1.• Moreover, OSR-2 “does not constitute a

variety of OSR as it only states a fact of QM, which hardly suffices for concluding that structure is all there is.” (n. 7, 122)

• While OSR-3, OSR-4 exemplify reductionist OSR (r-OSR) insofar as objects and kinds have no irreducible properties.

• OSR-5, OSR-6 advocate an ontological dependence (od-OSR)

I. Ontic Structural Realism •“There is no unanimity about the difference between

individuals, objects, and entities among philosophers but one neutral way of putting the issue is to ask whether there are only individual objects in the logical sense… as the value of a first-order variable, or whether there are individuals in some more substantive sense (for example, being subject to laws of identity, or being substances).” (Ladyman, 2009, 12)

•Note 3: To that effect, Chakravartty (2012) argues non-eliminative OSRs (e.g. od-OSR) fare no better than OSRs against the “relations without relata” objection.

•Note 4: On the other hand, using examples from General Relativity, (GR) Dean Rickles presents a case for r-OSR based on (Carlo Rovelli’s) distinction between complete versus partial observables. The former are gauge invariant and ontologically constituted by relational properties because of GR’s background independence.

I. Ontic Structural Realism •Note 5: Between the two extremes (Rickles versus

Charkravartty) “left leaning” (i.e relatively closer to Rickles) advocates include Nounou (2012), whose focus on three types of relational properties suggested by fundamental physics (QFT, etc.)

• ..By drawing on a distinction between structural versus relational

•Note 6: While “right leaning” advocates Katherine Brading and Alexander Skiles (2012) drive a wedge between object identification versus indivduation, thus deflated the underdetermination argument implicitly in favor of e-OSR in Ladyman & Ross (2007). I’ll revisit their law-constitutive approach in the concluding section.

•Note 7: Brading & Landry ‘s case that no prior, theory-independent conditions for objecthood exist heralds Elaine Landry’s (2012) methodological structural realism (MSR)-to be discussed in the concluding section.

I. The Central Principles•Principle of Naturalistic Closure (PNC): A metaphysical

claim to be taken seriously at time t –i.e., if the claim is accepted as true at time t—should only be motivated by showing how two (or more) fundamental hypotheses (at least one such hypothesis drawn from fundamental physics) can jointly explain more than the sum of what the hypotheses can explain, when taken separately.

•Primacy of Physics Constraint (PPC): Hypotheses in special sciences that conflict with the consensus in fundamental physics “should be rejected for that reason alone. Fundamental physical hypotheses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of the special sciences.” (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, 44)

•Adopting the PNC and PPC suggests a Peircean verificationism, methodologically one cannot draw any principled distinction between fundamental physics and metaphysics. (45, n.45)

•Note 8: Chakravartty (2012, 202) argue that the PPC is question-begging.

II. II. OSR and Information•Objective modality characterizes OSR to be a rendition of

scientific realism…• In their chapter 3 on fundamental physics (Ladyman & Ross,

2007) the primarily operative category is information (whether conceived classically—e.g., Shannon-Weaver, or quantum mechanically—e.g., von Neumann).

•“Information is apt for characterizing QM [quantum mechanics] because it is a modal concept…

•The world is not made of anything [understood in the classically metaphysical substantival sense of a primitive atomistic ontology] and information is a fundamental concept for understanding the objective modality of the world, for example, laws, causation, and kinds.“ (188-9)

II. Information and Modality•“For ‘modal’ read ‘nomological’ if you like. We do not take it to

be ‘causal structure’ [as]…causal structure is the pragmatically essential proxy for it in the special sciences (but not fundamental physics).” (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, 130)

•“[W]e are motivated [by]…the PNC to take seriously the world is structure and relations. Individual things are locally focused abstractions from modal structure.

•By modal structure we mean the relationships among phenomena (tracked or located…as things, properties, events, and processes) that pertain to necessity, possibility, potentiality, and probability. (153-4).

•“[T]he central concept in our theory of ontology, ‘information’, has multiple scientific interpretations (and goodness knows how many philosophical ones).” (210)

• Their naturalism, however, as directed by the PPC and PNC, recognizes only nomological modality.

•

II. Information and Modality

•To account for a theory of ontology, the sense of information as logical depth or algorithmic compressibility is the appropriate property of “structural models of real patterns.” (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, 220)

•This notion of information qua logical depth constitutes their theory of an objective measurement in the abstract, which is adopted in their “rainforest realism” (220-238) or “information-theoretic structural realism” (ITSR, 238-257)

•Nevertheless, information as thermodynamic depth (i.e. the minimum quantity of entropy produced for a the evolution of a state) is likewise reserved “in discussion of special [e.g. biological] systems,” (221)

• In the context of fundamental physics, quantum information occupies a central position in OSR “because it is a modal concept.” (188)

II. Information and Modality: A Case for Modal Pluralism

•Do all the above notions of information reduce to nomological modality?• I maintain that they do not…

•L : Information as logical depth connotes a notion of logical modality.

•N : Information as thermodynamic depth applied to “special systems”

connotes a notion of nomological modality—vis-à-vis the laws of the particular special science in question whose ontology such systems comprise.

• Whereas quantum information may connote logical modality --Conceived as classical information stored in quantum systems (Duwell, 2003)• Or nomological modality (Bub), conceived of as a new physical entity

(Bub, 2004)•…or even just E epistemic modality (Fuchs & Peres). Conceived of as

just a subjective measure of degrees of belief (Fuchs & Peres, 2000).

III. Natural Necessity (Marc Lange)•Lange’s analysis is squarely situated in the tradition of

analytic philosophy of science and metaphysics, nevertheless devoid of the ‘neo-scholastic’ constitutive ontological assumptions that Ladyman and Ross (2007) cite from some sources as evidence for dismissing this activity tout court.

•Lange utilizes the tools of analytic metaphysics precisely in that fashion, i.e. as playing a regulative role, and his overall naturalistic stance is rather apparent:

•“[I]f we take seriously the possibility that our intuitions have been corrupted by our philosophy, then we must step back, reconsider our conclusions, and seek reflective equilibrium. Naturally I have tried to craft an account of law that saves the phenomena I find most central to scientific practice. “(2009, 55, italics added)

III. Nomic Preservation and Sub-Nomic Stability To distinguish laws from accidents vis-à-vis sets of

counterfactuals, Lange introduces the following two principles:

•Nomic Preservation (NP): For any subnomic fact m: m is a law if and only if in any context p m for any p that is logically consistent with all the n’s taken together, where it is a law that n. (2009, 25)

• To avoid problems in triviality, circularity, and arbitrariness, NP filtering condition is supplemented with sub-nomic stability.

• Sub-Nomic Stability (SNS): Any nonempty set (deductively closed) is subnomically stable if and only if for each m : ~ (p ~m), ~ (q (p ~m)), ~ (r (q (p ~m))), …. for all p, q, r…. such that {p} is logically consistent, {q} is logically consistent, {r} is logically consistent, … (2009, 29)

III. The Varieties of Natural Necessity: The Modality Principle

• From the previous construction involving NP and SNS, Lange (2009, 45-89) establishes a natural bijection with a hierarchy of nomological modalities of varying strengths, i.e. a hierarchy of natural necessity

• The dual to NP is Lange’s Modality Principle (MP):•Modality Principle (MP): In any context, the subnomic fact q is

necessary if and only if ~( p ~q) for any p that is logically consistent with all the n’s taken together, such that n (it is necessary that n). (2009, 74)

•“For each variety of genuine necessity, the sub-nomic truths possessing it form a subnomically stable set—and for each sub-nomically stable set (except the set of all sub-nomic truths, if it be stable), there is a variety of genuine necessity where the sub-nomic truths so necessary are exactly the set’s members. In short, for the sub-nomic truths, there is a correspondence between the varieties of genuine necessity and the non-maximal sets possessing sub-nomic stability. (2009, 75, italics added)

III. Analogies and Disanalogies•Analogy: The PPC and PNC (Primacy of Physics Constraint,

Principle of Naturalistic Closure) acting as regulative and constitutive principles for a naturalized metaphysics, so the NP and SNS be so understood as regulative and constitutive principles distinguishing laws from accidents.

•Disanalogy: The entire treatment of nomological modality in Ladyman and Ross (2007) is de re—fundamental structural features of the world are cashed out via “real patterns”

•Lange adopts the opposite approach: Since laws are a species of subjunctive facts:

•“I am concerned only with the modality of facts—that is, with de dicto modality, not with de re modality. Moreover…I set aside doxastic…deontic, and teleological modalities, since (for example) that all persons are legally obligated to obey the nation’s laws does not entail that all do.” (Lange 2009, n. 5, 207-208).

III. Concordance Claims

• Claim 1 (Kallfelz, 2013a, 16): This type mismatch presents no serious obstacle:

• As Ladyman and Ross’s de re claims concerning objective modal structure naturally evince a de

dicto propositional structure by and through which Lange’s account of natural laws can logically

supervene.•Claim 2 (2013b, 24): Lange’s subjunctive facts: the

lawmaker which constitute NP and SNS are the de dicto renditions of Ladyman & Lange’s real patterns

•Lange refines and substantiates Ladyman and Ross’s fundamentally naturalistic outlook, while conditioning and refining some of their more extreme claims.

IV. Concluding Remarks: Implications for MSR •Elaine Landry (2012), in response to Steven French’s (2012)

principled distinction of OSR as a tool for representation (at the philosopher of science’s meta-level) as opposed to object presentation (at the level of scientific theory)…

•Argues for a third alternative: Methodological structural realism (MSR):

•“To carve out a naturalistic or methodological structuralist account that serves to underpin scientists’ belief in, for example, bosons and fermions via those structural properties..

•Known by considering the shared structures between those models (both theoretical and data models) that are taken to present the content of what we say about them as kinds of objects.” (2012, 29)

• Note 1: In the philosophy of mathematics, compare this with thin realism: I.e. that there is a body of truth about abstract mind-independent objects—but their properties don not extend beyond what mathematical practice tells us about them. (Susan Vineberg, 2015)

IV. Concluding Remarks: Implications for MSR • I.e, following Carnap, “I place my focus…on what can be said of

that match between what we say and what exists from within some mathematically expressed scientific theory qua a ‘linguistic framework’ and this is determined by the methods, rules, etc., as employed by scientific practice.” (2012, 44)

•“I take a scientific theory, as a hierarchy of models, linguistically framed by some mathematical theory, to present the content and structure of what we say about what exists.” (ibid.)

•Landry’s MSR suggests likewise a close concordance with Lange, since qua linguistic frameworks: “…for the scientific realist only the … ‘language of science’ notion of ‘structure yields objectivity’…My aim…is to consider what work mathematical structure does at the ‘object-level’ of scientific practice.” (2012, 33)

•This accords well with Lange’s de dicto application of nomological modality in his naturalistic approach, focusing on the context of scientific practice.

IV. Concluding Remarks: Implications for MSR

• In short, Lange’s analysis compensates for defects OSR as well as providing a framework for the “law constitute account” (2012, p. 50) of the presentation of objects in MSR

•This accords well with Lange’s de dicto application of nomological modality in his naturalistic approach, focusing on the context of scientific practice.

•Question for further investigation: Can Lange’s (2009) framework articulate systematically the “law constitutive ontology” of Brading & Skiles (2012)?

Acknowledgments• Especial thanks to Dr. John Bickle, Professor of

Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of Psychology, and Department Head,of Philosophy & Religion at Mississippi State University, and Fellow, Institute for Imaging and Analytic Technologies, for many extended and constructive discussions and much valuable feedback on this and other topics I have attempted to coherently formulate throughout recent years.

• Especial thanks also Dr. John Bickle, Department Head of Philosophy & Religion and The President, Dr. Mark E. Keenum, of Mississippi State University for approving and fully funding my travel expenses, making this presentation and my one-week participation possible at this memorable event.

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