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1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, [email protected] October 2, 2012
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Page 1: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

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UTILITIES

G406, Regulation, ch.7Utilities Eric Rasmusen, [email protected]

October 2, 2012

Page 2: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Natural Monopoly2

Page 3: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

The Companies 3

There are 3,273 traditional electrical utilities in the USA---210 investor-owned 2,009 state and local, 9 Federal electric utilities, 883 rural electric cooperatives. 1,738 nonutility power producers,

38% of the gigawatt capacity is from investor-owned utilities, 9% state-and-local, 7% federal, 4% cooperatives, and 42% nonutilities.

Page 4: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Solutions to Natural Monopoly4

1. Just let it be an unregulated monopoly. 2. The government sells a license to be the unregulated monopoly in that industry. 3. Government ownership 4. Marginal-cost pricing plus a subsidy 5. Price caps 6. Average-cost pricing

Page 5: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Laissez Faire5

Page 6: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Franchise bidding6

Franchise bidding: sell the right to be the monopoly by auction. If all potential companies had the same costs, they would all bid amount 80($20-$10)- $300= $500. A variant on this is to have each company's bid take the form of the price it would charge for electricity.

Page 7: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Government Ownership7

Perhaps costs will be higher than for a private company, but the government enterprise at least could set the price equal to marginal cost, and cover the resulting losses (since $P <AC$ in that case) using revenue from income taxes. The price would be $10 and the subsidy would equal area ($11-$10)(160) = $160.

Page 8: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Privatization8

Page 9: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Marginal Cost +Subsidy9

Require P=10.Pay the firm

an annual subsidy.

Page 10: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Average-Cost Pricing10

Require the firm to sell at a price of 12, so P=AC.

This is also called rate-of-return regulation.

Price-cap regulation is also a form of this.

Page 11: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Price-Cap Regulation

Price-cap regulation is now common for electricity and phone service. The regulators set an initial price,which then rises at the inflation rate minus an “X-factor”. The X-factor is intended to reflect the fact that costs of providing utilities rises less than the general inflation rate. Thus, if the X-factor is 3% and inflation is 4%, the utility could increase its price by 1% that year (=4-3). If inflation is 2% the next year, then that year the utility must reduce its price by 1% (=2-3).

A big problem is that the government might renege on its promise if the company does make high profits.

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Page 12: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Rate-of-Return Regulation12

Go to: http://rasmusen.org/g406/chapters/07ramsey.xls

Page 13: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

A NIPSCO Rate Case

Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) sells electricity and natural gas in northern Indiana. It has 460,000 customers. Though only 1% of its customers are industrial, they buy 53% of the electricity. You cannot buy stock in just NIPSCO, because it is owned by a holding company, NiSource, which also owns utilities in other states.

NIPSCO is regulated by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC). Its electricity rates had last been set in 1987.

In June 2008 it proposed an increase.

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Page 14: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

The IN Utility Reg. Com.14

David Lott Hardy, Chairman, 2005, Previously he practiced law, concentrating on utility-related issues. (now stepped down)

Jim Atterholt, 2009. Congressional staffer, Indiana State Representative, Director of Government Affairs for AT T--Indiana, the State Insurance Commissioner. (now chairman)

Larry S. Landis, 2003. Marketing manager and professional campaign staffer,

Carolene R. Mays, 2010. Publisher of th Indiana Minority Business Magazine, Indiana House of Representatives.

David E. Ziegner, 1990. Senior staff attorney for the Legislative Services Agency, General Counsel for the Commission.

Page 15: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

A Rate Case’s Timeline15

Page 16: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

NIPSCO’s Rate Base16

Page 17: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

NIPSCO’s Cost of Capital17

Page 18: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

NIPSCO’s Prices18

Page 19: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Ramsey Pricing Diagram I19

FC=1800Revenue=(37-20)*63 = 1,071DWL = .5(17)*(17)= 144.50

Revenue=(37-20)*46 = 736 DWL = .5(80-46)*(17)= 289

Page 20: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Ramsey Pricing Diagram20

If prices are equal:Revenue= 1,071DWL = 144.50

If prices are equal: Revenue= 736 DWL = 289

FC=1800Revenue=(40-20)*60 = 1,200DWL = .5(20)*(20)= 200

Revenue=(30-20)*60 = 600 DWL = .5(80-60)*(10)= 100

Page 21: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Ramsey Pricing--Elasticities21

What are the elasticitiesfor business and homedemand at various prices?

See http://www.econtools.com/jevons/java/elastic/Elasticity.html

Page 22: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

Equal Prices22

Pb=37, Qb=63

Ph=37, Qb=46

Pb=40, Qb=60

Ph=30, Qb=60

Page 23: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

The Ramsey Pricing Rule23

Page 24: 1 UTILITIES G406, Regulation, ch.7 Utilities Eric Rasmusen, erasmuse@indiana.edu erasmuse@indiana.edu October 2, 2012.

A Spreadsheet; Practice Problems

Go to: http://rasmusen.org/g406/chapters/07utilities-problems.pdf

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Go to: http://rasmusen.org/g406/chapters/07ramsey.xls