Trends in Terrorism and the Architecture of TRIA Peter Chalk Associate Political Scientist June 20, 2005 National Symposium on Terrorism Risk Insurance.

Trends in Terrorism and the Architecture of TRIA

Peter Chalk

Associate Political Scientist

June 20, 2005

National Symposium on Terrorism Risk Insurance

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GWOT Has Decisively Limited Environmental and Strategic Context al-Qaeda Operates In

• Al-Qaeda remains principal focus of concern about imported terrorist threats to the United States

• Attacks on Taliban in Afghanistan have led to loss of al-Qaeda safe haven

– Scattering core of leadership to locales in Middle East and throughout Central, South, Southeast Asia

• Unremitting campaign has led to capture/elimination of many al-Qaeda’s critical field commanders and functionaries

• Focus on staunching international flow of money has denuded group’s ability to plan and execute large-scale, complex attacks

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In Fact, GWOT Successes Have Led al-Qaeda to Reconfigure Itself

Late-1990s: Monolithic Structure

Now: “Movement of Movements”

• Centrally controlled organization

• Strategic assaults executed by inner core of jihadist activists

• Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric organization

• Tactically oriented strikes done by affiliated cells (individuals) and when opportunity arises

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Based on Changes, We Postulate Foural-Qaeda Trends for the Future

Now: “Movement of Movements”

• Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric organization

• Tactically oriented strikes done by affiliated cells (individuals) and when opportunity arises

1. Continuing interest in hard targets but increased focus on soft, civilian-centric venues

2. Ongoing emphasis on economic attacks

3. Continued reliance on suicide strikes

4. Desire to use CBRN weapons but little abilityto execute large-scale conventional attacks

Future Trends

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1. Continuing Interest in Hard Targets but Growing Focus on Soft Venues (1)

• Focus on hard targets underscores credentials as meaningful force

• Ongoing presence of Egyptian Islamic Jihad helps al-Qaeda

• Numerous attacks on hard targets since 9/11 shows importance to al-Qaeda

– American-led Coalition headquarters in Baghdad (2003)

– UN compound in Baghdad (2003)

– Central office of Saudi General Security Service (2004)

UN Compound in Baghdad, Before and After

Aftermath of Attack on SGSS

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1. Continuing Interest in Hard Targets but Growing Focus on Soft Venues (2)

• Have largely unimpeded access and large concentrations of people

– Yielding significant body count

• Provide greater scope for locally based cells and supporters

– Yielding useful “force multiplier” that puts al-Qaeda in all places at all times

• Dramatic rise in post-9/11 period

– Nightclubs (Bali, 2002)

– Synagogues (Djerba Tunisia, 2002)

– Hotels (Marriott in Jakarta, 2003)

– Public transport (Madrid, 2004)

Attack on Bali Nightclub (2002)

Madrid Train Attack (2004)

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2. Ongoing Emphasis on Economic Attacks

• For Bin Laden, 9/11 exposed U.S. as “paper tiger” on verge of financial ruin and total collapse

• Attacks underscored vulnerability of highly complex critical infrastructure

• Has focused on venues liable to generate disruptive commercial effects

– Oil installations

– Banks

– Shipping

• Al-Qaeda would like to pursue its economic war against the United States on American soil

Attack on MV Limburg off Yemen

(2002)

Attack on HSBC Bankin Istanbul

(2003)

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3. Continued Reliance on Suicide Strikes

• Suicide attacks across Europe, Asia, and Middle East have killed over 900 since 9/11

– Nightclubs, restaurants, hotels, housing compounds

• No attacks since in U.S.

– Difficult to get operatives into U.S.

– Hard to (externally) indoctrinate/ motivating cadres in place

– Perhaps not part of image wants to convey in U.S. context

• But U.S. well-suited to attacks

– Lots of venues, lack of law enforcement expertise, highly risk-averse nature of society

Damage to Hotel in Casablanca (2003)

Damage to House in Riyadh (2003)

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4. Desire for CBRN Attacks but Little Ability toExecute Large-Scale Conventional Attacks

• Al-Qaeda has active interest in large-scale CBRN attacks

– In 1998 Bin Laden asserted that acquiring CBRN for mass killing is religious duty for all Muslims

– Documents and discs recovered in Afghanistan underscore focus on mass casualties

– Explored possibility of obtaining CBRN from Russia, Czech Republic and North Korea

• But no evidence Al-Qaeda gotten CBRN for mass casualty attacks

• Most likely scenarios are radiological releases and low-tech biological attacks

“Dirty Bomb” Suspect, Joseph

Padilla (2002)

Videotapes Describing

Training on How to Release

Cyanide Gas into Buildings (2002)

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The Anti-Globalism (AG) Movement HasTaken on a More Coherent Worldview

• Opposes concentrations of state and corporate power

• Challenges the intrinsic qualities of capitalism

• Forcefully rejects argument that trans-border trade, investment, technology, info flow enhance human condition

• Rank and file activists generally have not engaged in direct violence against the state

Cancun (2003)

Genoa (2001)

Seattle (2000)

London, May Day (2002)

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Real Threat of AG Movement Lies in ImpactIt’s Having on Three Homegrown Groups

Anarchists

Environmental Extremists

Far Right

AG Movement

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What Threat Does Anarchism Pose?

• Radicals increasingly prepared to attack symbols of state order

• Animated by AG assertion that international trade/commerce is mask to hide/covertly advance U.S. global economic, cultural, and political power

• Major danger of AG-inspired anarchism is radicalization of fringe elements toward terrorist designs

– Already occurred in Italy

• In U.S., anarchists have potential to influence more civilian-centric violence

Black Bloc in Sacramento (2003)

Black Bloc in D.C. (2003)

Black Bloc in Chicago(2000)

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What Threat Does the Far Right Pose?

• Right-wing/xenophobic militias have emerged, championing combo of revolutionary, racist, anti-Semitic doctrines

• AG movement has sharpened and galvanized imperatives

– Dislike of increased state power and belief that increasing internationalism favors Jewish capitalists

• Adoption of AG rhetoric may reflect convergence with parts of far left

– Already occurring in France and Germany

• Far right has demonstrated penchant for catastrophic violence

– Bombing of Murrah building

Neo-Nazi “Taxpayers Against Terrorism” Rally, Washington (2002)

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What Threat Do Environmental Extremists Pose?

Car dealership, West Covina,

California (2003)

• Environmental extremism largely reflected in guise of ELF– In 2004, FBI designated “eco-

terrorism” as number one militant threat from inside own borders

• ELF attacks have caused an estimated $35–$45 million in property damage

• Scale and focus of attacks likely to expand due to growing nexus with AG movement– Focus now is directly on

globalization and its negative impact on the environment

– Multinational corporations seen at heart of “unrestrained” capitalism increasingly targeted for action

ArsonFire in

Maryland(2004)

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Questions and Answers

• What is the evolving threat from transnational terrorism?

• What are the implications for terrorism insurance?

• What is the evolving threat from domestic terrorism

• What are the implications for terrorism insurance?

• Attacks on al-Qaeda have led it to reconfigure itself, suggesting four trends for future threat

Questions

• Trends expose weaknesses in terrorism insurance market

• Spreading anti-globalism movement is having impact on three homegrown entities

• Increasing homegrown threat against private-sector targets reveals large gap in terrorism insurance

Answers

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Assaults Perpetrated by a Purely DomesticEntity Are Not Covered by TRIA

• TRIA defines certified actions as those “carried out by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign source person or foreign interest”

• Many insurers are making domestic terrorism insurance available

– Most insureds who purchase TRIA have purchased it

– But take-up rates will be lower than for TRIA-covered attacks

– Catastrophic domestic attack carries with it elevated risk of insolvency for insurers involved

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Assaults Perpetrated by a Purely DomesticEntity Are Not Covered by TRIA

• TRIA defines certified actions as those “carried out by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign source person or foreign interest”

• Many insurers are making domestic terrorism insurance available

– Most insureds who purchase TRIA have purchased it

– But take-up rates will be lower than for TRIA-covered attacks

– Catastrophic domestic attack carries with it elevated risk of insolvency for insurers involved

Represents big gap in current system for managing/mitigating financial risk of terrorist attack in U.S.

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Practical Application of Distinction BetweenDomestic/International Attack Is Difficult

• Al-Qaeda routinely relies on affiliates to carry out assaults—especially citizens/established residents of targeted country

• If U.S. national carries out bombing on U.S. soil, would this be domestic or international terrorist act?

– If an American inspired but not trained, financed or advised by jihadist cause commits an attack, is it covered by TRIA?

• Perpetrators of 2001 anthrax attacks were never identified and thus not possible to certify attacks

– If they occurred today and were large enough to trigger TRIA, they could lead to insolvency for some insurance companies . . . if not certified

• Such confusion will not help recovery from attack

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