The logic of aid: American foreign policy and USAID in Rwanda
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James Madison UniversityJMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses The Graduate School
Spring 2011
The logic of aid: American foreign policy andUSAID in RwandaAriel F. HendricksonJames Madison University
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Recommended CitationHendrickson, Ariel F., "The logic of aid: American foreign policy and USAID in Rwanda" (2011). Masters Theses. 233.https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/233
TheLogicofAid:AmericanForeignPolicyandUSAIDinRwanda
ArielF.Hendrickson
AthesissubmittedtotheGraduateFacultyof
JAMESMADISONUNIVERSITYIn
PartialFulfillmentoftheRequirements
forthedegreeof
MasterofArts
History
May2011
ii
Acknowledgements
IwouldliketothankmembersoftheJamesMadisonUniversityfacultywho
workeddirectlytomakethisthesispossible.Theguidance,critiques,and
encouragementfrommythesisdirector,Dr.MichaelGubser,ensuredthatthisisthe
bestproductIwascapableofcreating.Dr.DavidOwusu‐AnsahandDr.LamontKing
providedusefulfeedbackandsupportthroughoutmygraduatecareerandthesis
writingprocess.
Iwouldalsoliketothankmyfamilyandfriendsfortheirmoralsupport,
editorialassistanceandneededdistractionsthroughoutthelasttwoyears.
iii
TableofContents
Acknowledgements…………………………………..…………………………………………………ii
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………..…iv
I.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………..1
II.Chapter1:TheDecadeofDevelopment…………………………………………………….12
III.Chapter2:“NewDirections”forRwanda…………………………………………...........30
IV.Chapter3:EconomicInstabilityandtheReaganEra…………………………………54
V.Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………77
VI.Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………..83
iv
Abstract
SincetheendofWorldWarII,developmentaidhasbecomeapermanent
fixtureofU.S.foreignpolicy.TheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternational
Development(USAID)hasbeentheprimaryorganizationforimplementingthe
Americangovernment’sdevelopmentpolicies.Becauseofthis,USAIDprovidesan
excellentlensforviewingthehistoricaltrajectoryofAmericandevelopmentaid.
USAID’sexperienceinRwandademonstratesthebroadpolicyshiftsthatdefinethis
historicaltrajectory.Duringthe1960s,modernizationtheorydirecteddevelopment
projects.Inthe1970sthisshiftedtoaneeds‐basedmandate,andduringthe1980s
marketliberalizationprogramsdefinedUSAID’sobjectives.Therichrelationship
betweenUSAIDandRwandaexemplifiesthegapexistingindevelopmentaid
betweenideologyandpracticality.Developmentaid’svalueindeterminingforeign
policyhasalsobeenunderappreciatedbyscholars,andthecomprehensivereview
ofUSAIDprojectsprovidedaimstocontributetoresolvingtheseshortcomings.
Introduction
Rwandareceivedtremendousinternationalattentionduringthe1990sasa
resultofitscivilwarandgenocide.Themedia,politicians,andscholarshighlighted
manydifferentaspectsofthegenocide,includingtheroleplayedbydevelopment
andforeignaidintheintensificationofethnicanimosities.Internationalrelations
scholarMichaelBarnetthaslamentedthat“post‐1995historiesofRwandahavetwo
definingcharacteristics.One,they’rewrittenfromthevantagepointofthe
genocide.Second,they’rewrittenwithaneyetocorrectwhatareseenas
misconceptionsofthecountry’shistory.”1Bycriticizingscholarsfornarrowing
theirunderstandingtoonecrucialevent,Barnetthasidentifiedamajorshortcoming
inthegrowingliteratureonRwanda.Whileanalysisofthegenocideisnecessary,
Rwanda’shistoryisnotteleological;itdoesnotleadonlytothegenocide.
ByexaminingthehistoryofU.S.aidtoRwanda,adiscussionofRwanda’s
historycanbeginwithoutthegenocideloomingintheforeground.Byfocusingon
USAID’srolefrom1962throughthe1980s,theshiftsinforeignaidcanbeidentified
asmovingfrommodernizationpracticestoaddressingbasichumanneedsand
endingwithmarketreformpolicies.Thisapproachrevealsontheonehandthe
generalideologicalmovementofU.S.foreignaidpolicy,butitcanalsobeseenthat
Rwandaprogramsreflectedthelocalrealitiesofimplementingaidanddidnot
simplytoetheWashingtonline.AsRwandawasremoteandratherunimportant
strategically,aidmanagershadsomelatitudeforcreativeprogrammingspecificto
Rwandanneeds.Theeffectsofthisdistancecanmostclearlyberecognizedinthe
1MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:CornellUniversity,2002),49.
2
programsofthe1980swhenoldprogrammingpoliciesaddressingbasichuman
needslingeredinRwandaaftertheideologicalwindshadchangedinWashington.
ThisthesisfocusesonUnitedStates’involvementinRwandandevelopment
andexamineswhatchangesaffectedUSAID’spositionandobjectivesduringthe
1960s,1970s,and1980s.Althoughtheemergenceofdevelopmentassistanceis
quiterecent,aidhasalreadybecomeapermanentfixtureinforeignpolicyprograms
acrosstheglobe.AscountriesliketheUnitedStatescontinuetofundaidprojectsit
isimportanttounderstandtheirorigins,influencesandrecipients.Byanalyzing
pastprojects,scholarsareabletodetermineifaidhasbeeneffectiveandmake
recommendationsaboutworthwhileassistance.Finally,conclusionsonthevalueof
aidwillleadtoeducatedpolicyrecommendationstoimproveassistanceprograms
ofthefuture.AnthropologistJamesFergusoncriticallyexplainstheimportanceof
developmentasacentralvalueofourtimesaying“warsarefoughtandcoupsare
launchedinitsname.Entiresystemsofgovernmentandphilosophyareevaluated
accordingtotheirabilitytopromoteit.”2Beyondstudyingtheroleofaidindonor
countries,thehistoryofdevelopmentassistancealsoilluminateschangesin
recipientcountries.Manycountries,includingRwanda,arestillrecently
independentandrecognizingtheroleWesternnationsplayedsincecolonialismis
crucialinunderstandinghowthesenationsfunctiontoday.
Threesub‐questionswillbeconsideredtohelpexaminetheroleUSAID
playedinRwanda’sdevelopment.First,whatwerethespecificprojectsundertaken
byUSAIDinRwandaduringthesedecades?Second,howdidthegoalsand
2JamesFerguson,TheAntiPoliticsMachine:“Development,”DepoliticizationandBureaucraticPowerinLesotho,(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1994),xiii.
3
characteristicsoftheseprojectschangeovertime?Lastly,dideventsinRwanda
leadtochangesinUSAIDprojectsorwerechangesdrivenbydevelopmentsinU.S.
foreignpolicy?ResearchonRwandanhistory,U.S.policy,andtheUSAIDarchives
revealmajoreconomic,political,andsocialeventsgloballyandwithinboth
countriesthatinfluencedUSAID’sevolvingobjectivesineachdecade.
Duringthe1960s,PresidentKennedycreatedUSAIDinaccordancewithhis
missiontopromotedevelopmentasameansofwinningColdWarallies.
Modernizationtheoristsbelievedthatlesserdevelopedregionscouldbemore
susceptibletocommunism,3providingtheU.S.reasontosupplyaidtothirdworld
countries.Anothermotivationforsupplyingaidtothedevelopingworldwas
humanitarian,suchasresponsestonaturaldisastersandfamine.Kennedyworked
todistanceaidprogramsfromU.S.diplomacy,ashesawEisenhower’spast
programsasshortsightedandtoonarrowlyfocusedonstrategicpurposes.
Kennedy’sworkcombiningtheacquisitionofalliesandfocusingonhumanitarian
developmentprojects,includingeducationandhealth,allowedUSAIDtomoveaway
fromdevelopmentmissionsofthepast.
Atthesametime,RwandafollowedthetidesweepingacrossAfricaand
declaredindependencefromBelgium.Beginninginthelate1950s,Africannations
rejectedtheircolonialtiesanddeclaredindependence.ThemajorityofAfrican
countriesgainedindependenceduringthe1960s.BoththecreationofUSAIDand
3Worksonmodernizationtheoryinclude:W.WRostow,TheStagesofEconomicGrowth:A
NonCommunistManifesto,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1960);NilsGilman,MandarinsoftheFuture:ModernizationTheoryinColdWarAmerica,(Baltimore:theJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2003);andMichaelLatham,Modernizationasideology:AmericanSocialScienceand“NationBuilding”intheKennedyEra,(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2000).
4
Rwandanindependencesetupthelong‐standingdevelopmentrelationshipbetween
theUnitedStatesandRwanda.ThisalsosetinplacethetrajectoryofU.S.foreignaid
beginningwithmodernizationpractices.
Twokeyeventsdistinguishedaidpolicyinthe1970sfromthatofthe1960s.
In1973theUnitedStatesCongressenactedtheNewDirectionsMandatetorefocus
foreignaidonthepoorestofthepoor.NewinternalpressureswithinAmerica,
includinglobbiesoriginatingfromthecivilrightsmovementandtheendofthe
VietnamWar,forcedCongresstorethinkandrefocusforeignaid.This
CongressionalmandateoccurredthesameyearthatamilitarycoupmadeJuvenal
HabyarimanaRwanda’spresident.HabyarimanareplacedGrégoireKayibanda,the
presidentsinceRwandagainedindependence.Thesetwochangesexpandedthe
establishedrelationshipofforeignassistancebetweentheUnitedStatesand
RwandaandshiftedU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesfrommodernizationtoaneeds
mandate.
Finally,duringthe1980s,theU.S.witnessedapoliticalshifttotherightwith
theelectionofPresidentRonaldReaganandanothershiftinthetrajectoryofU.S.
foreignaidfromthe1970sneedsmandatetoaliberalizationfocus.Witha
Republicaninoffice,theU.S.putanewemphasisonfreemarketforces.Thisfocus
oneconomicreformprograms,specificallymarketliberalization,workedto
complementPresidentReagan’splatformofincreasedsecurityandtargetinglesser‐
developedregionstobooststabilityanddemocracy.Thoughprogramsinthe1960s
workedtoestablishbasiceconomicpolicesforthenewlyindependentnations,the
projectsofthe1980sreflectedanunderstandingbasedonadifferentideologyofthe
5
specificeconomicneedsofindividualcountries.Modernizationpracticesofthe
1960sinvolvedstatedirectionwhile1980sliberalizationstressedstateretraction.
Thesenewprogramsworkedonprivatizationanddiversificationofproducts.Even
thoughReaganshiftedUSAID’semphasisinRwandatomarketreform,Rwanda’s
economybeganrapidlydecliningandeventuallycollapsed.Theglobaleconomic
downturnalongwithinternalproblemsduringthe1980sledtoadeclineinprices
forRwanda’stopcommoditiesandseverelydamagedthecountry’seconomy.The
tumblingmarketforcoffeeandtea,Rwanda’smajorexports,anddisastrousweather
conditionsdestroyedthesecashcrops.
ThroughanexaminationofUSAIDdocuments,itbecomesclearthatideology
setsthedecadesapartalongwithmajoreconomic,political,andsocialeventsthat
shiftedUSAID’sdevelopmentobjectivesinRwandaduringeachofthethreedecades
studied.The“developmentconceptcanbelocatedinhistoricalconjuncturesand
canbeunderstoodinrelationtointellectualtrends,shiftsinglobaleconomic
structures,politicalexigencies,andinstitutionaldynamics.”4Analyzingthefull
rangeofUSAID’sworkinRwandaisbeyondthescopeofthisthesis.But,theUSAID
documentsthatcomprisetheprimarysourcebaseforthisresearch–including
interviewswithUSAIDemployees,andregularreportssuchasbudgetsubmissions,
countrydevelopmentstrategies,actionplans,projectupdatesandspecial
evaluationsavailableatUSAID’sonlinearchive,theDevelopmentExperience
Clearinghouse(DEC)–dorevealthemotivationsandinfluencesbehindthe
organization’sworkinRwanda.Itistheseinfluences,andnottheproject’sresults,
4FrederickCooperandRandallPackard,InternationalDevelopmentandtheSocialSciences,(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997),29.
6
thataretheprimaryfocusofthisthesis.Supportingmaterialsincludeworksonthe
UnitedStatesforeignpolicy,Rwandanhistory,andthehistoryofdevelopmentaid.
AlongwithanexaminationofUSAID’sworkinRwanda,anoverviewofthe
historiographyofdevelopmentaidisneededtounderstandthehistorical
interpretationsofaidsincethe1960s.
Asmorecountriesincludedevelopmentaidpermanentlyintheirforeignaid
policyportfolios,thehistoryofdevelopmentbecomesmorepertinent.Thehistory
ofinternationaldevelopmentisstillanemergingtopic,andwhilepoliticalscientists
andeconomistshavelongwrittenanalysesofaid,historicalworksarestillrelatively
few.Scholarsfromdifferentfieldsgenerallyagreethataidisthe
voluntarytransferofpublicresourcesfromonegovernmenttoanothergovernment,internationalorganization,ornon‐governmentalorganization(includingnot‐for‐profitorganizationsworkingonspecificissues,publicinterestorganizations,churchesandtheirassociatedorganizations,universities,foundations,evenprivate,for‐profitbusinessenterprises)toimprovethelivesandlivelihoodsinthecountryreceivingtheaid,amongothergoals.5
USAIDhascommissionedhistoricalreviewsforitsowninternalpurposes,butthe
organizationhasattractedtheattentionoffewotherhistorians.
Historicalliteratureondevelopmentaidhaslargelyemergedonlyinthelast
twodecades.Onehistoricalexaminationofforeignaidcanbefoundinthe2003
specialissueofContemporaryEuropeanHistorydedicatedtoEurope’s“first
developmentdecade”duringthe1960s.Theissueincludeshistoricalcasestudies
5CarolLancaster,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwentyFirst
Century,(WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),6.
7
ontheaidportfoliosoftheUnitedKingdom,France,Norway,andtheNetherlands.
Thesearticlesexpandthehistoriographyofofficialaidprogramsandprovidea
complementaryviewtotheoriginsoftheUnitedStates’developmentprogram.
AccordingtoHeide‐IreneSchmidtandHelgePharo,“historicalanalysismayhelpto
uncoverthecontinuitiesanddiscontinuitiesintheevolutionandimplementationof
developmentstrategies.”6ThiscasestudyofUSAIDinRwandasimilarlyfocuseson
continuitiesanddiscontinuitiesinaidtypeandimplementationoverthreedecades.
Examiningthefactorsandinfluencesthatcreatedandshapedothergovernments’
aidprogramselucidatetheuniqueandspecificeventsthatledtotheformationand
developmentoftheUnitedStates’aidprogram.FortheU.S.,domesticand
internationalfactorsdeterminedthetypeofaidprovided,distinguishingthemfrom
otherdonornations.
Modernizationhasattractedparticularhistoricalattention.NilsGilman’s
MandarinsoftheFutureexaminestheintellectualhistoryofmodernizationtheory,
includingW.W.Rostow’sTheStagesofEconomicGrowth.Gilmanarguesthatwhile
thetheoryfocusedontheplightofthethirdworld,italsolookedattheunfolding
sentimentsinAmericaabouttheconditionofmodernityathome.Gilman
contextualizedmodernizationtheorywhileexamining“theimageofpostcoloniality
thatundergirdedthetheory,”andcomparedworksbymodernizationtheoriststhat
debatedthedefinitionofmodernity.7Gilman’sworksisimportantinidentifying
contributorstothecreationofAmerica’sdevelopmentpolicies.MichaelLatham’s
6Heide‐IreneSchmidtandHelgePharo,“Introduction,”ContemporaryEuropeanHistory12
(2003),393‐394.7Gilman,4.
8
ModernizationasIdeologyarguesthatmodernization“wasalsoameansof
understandingtheprocessofglobalchangeandidentifyingwaystheU.S.could
accelerate,channel,anddirect[development].”8Byexaminingtheideological
backgroundandeffectsofmodernizationtheory,Latham’sworkopensnewareas
forinquiryaboutnationalidentity,specificallyAmericanidentity,andtheimpactof
theColdWaronforeignpolicies.9
DavidEkbladh’sTheGreatAmericanMissiondescribeshowU.S.“perceptions
motivatedandthenshapedactualmodernizationpolicyandactivity.”10Focusingon
projectsimplementedinAsia,Ekbladharguesthat“understandinghow
developmentwasbroughttobearintheinternationalarenabytheU.S.”allowsfor
“indispensableinsightintothehistoryofapowerfulinternationalthemeand
providescriticalperspectiveonhowitrelatestotheworldtoday.”11Ekbladhwas
particularlyconcernedwithhowmodernizationfitintothewidersenseofAmerica’s
developmentmission.Ekbladh’sworkprovidesusefulbackgroundinformationand
supportstheargumentthatthereweremanyfactorsthatinfluencedU.S.
developmentpolicy.AndthoughNickCullather’sTheHungryWorldbeganasa
8Latham,2.9OtherworksconsiderdevelopmentoutsidetheU.S.policyframework.AmyStaples’The
BirthofDevelopmentexaminesthecreationoftheWorldBank,theFoodandAgricultureOrganizationandtheWorldHealthOrganization.WhilenotspecificallyfocusingontheUnitedStates,thisworkadvancesthehistoriographyofdevelopmentstudiesusefulincontextualizingU.S.foreignaidprograms.Similarly,thevolumeInternationalDevelopmentandtheSocialScienceseditedbyhistorianFrederickCooperandRandallPackard,workstounderstandtheproduction,transmission,andimplementationofdevelopmentthoughtwithinhistoricalandpoliticalcontexts.
10DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofanAmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),11.
11Ekbladh,13.
9
studyonfoodandagriculture,specificallythe1960sGreenRevolution,12itgrew
intoanexaminationofU.S.development,suchasnationbuilding,humanitarian
relief,andforeignaidthatalsoaddsmuchtothediscussionofU.S.developmentaid.
Thereisalsoawiderangeofworksbyeconomistsandpoliticalscientistson
thetopicofdevelopmentaid.Oneoftheleadingdevelopmenttheoristsonthe
historyofAmerica’saidprogramisCarolLancaster,theDeanandProfessorof
PoliticsintheSchoolofForeignServiceatGeorgetownUniversity.Shehaswritten
extensivelyonU.S.aid,usingherbackgroundintheStateDepartmentandUSAIDto
helpexplainpastdevelopmentpoliciesandmakerecommendationsforthefuture.13
AccordingtoLancaster,“booksthatcomeoutregularlyaboutaidrarelylookatU.S.
aid,”makingherextensivelistofcontributionsinvaluabletothefieldofboth
developmentalhistoryandhistoryofU.S.foreignaid.14
AnotherscholarcontributingtothehistoriographyofU.S.aidisSamuelHale
Butterfield,adevelopmentofficerfrom1958to1980,wholatertaughttheoryand
practiceofinternationaldevelopment.Hiswork,U.S.DevelopmentAid,anHistoric
First,isanextensivelookattheachievementsandfailuresofU.S.aidinthe
twentiethcenturyandservesasacontinuationofU.S.DevelopmentAssistancePolicy,
a1996bookbyVernonRuttan,anagriculturaleconomistwhoworkedwithUSAID
12AccordingtoCullather,theGreenRevolutionwasthewaveofdevelopmentactivitythatpeakedinthe1950sand1960s.
13WorksonforeignaidbyCarolLancasterincludeAidtoAfrica:SoMuchtoDo,SoLittleDone,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999;TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwentyFirstCentury,WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000;OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwentyFirstCentury,withAnnVanDuson,WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,2005;ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2007;GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?WashingtonD.C.:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008;“RedesigningForeignAid,”ForeignAffairs79(2000),74‐88.
14Lancaster,TransformingForeignAid,vii.
10
andtaughtinternationaldevelopment.ButterfieldandRuttanprovidemodelsfor
examiningAmerica’sforeignaidhistoryinspecificcases,suchasRwanda.
WhiletherearesomeworthwhilegeneralstudiesofU.S.foreignassistance,
thehistoricalliteraturelacksspecificcasesstudies.Anthropologistshavetherefore
influencedourunderstandingofthelocaleffectsofdevelopment.JamesFerguson’s
workisaprimeexample,ashechosetoplacehisstudyinLesotho,takinghis
primaryfocusasthedevelopmentapparatus.Hearguesthatdevelopment
institutionscreatetheirownformofdiscourse,constructingcountries“asa
particularkindofobjectofknowledgeandastructureofknowledgearoundthat
object.”15Thesearguments,byFergusonandotheranthropologistscontributeto
thestudyofdevelopment:itshistory,purposeandscholarship.
TherearenoworksbyhistoriansonUSAID’shistoryinRwanda,thoughthe
UnitedStateshasalongrelationshipofprovidingassistancetothecountry.The
mostpertinentvolumecomesfromPeterUvin,apoliticalscientistandauthorof
AidingViolence.Uvin’sworkisveryusefulinexaminingdevelopmentaid’simpact
ontheRwandangenocide,butdoesnotfocusononespecificdonorandrelies
primarilyonevidencefromthe1980s.AworkfocusingsolelyonUSAIDinRwanda
spanningallthreedecadesfromindependencetothecivilwarislacking.Theaimof
thisthesisistofillthatgapandcontributetothegrowingbodyofworkonboth
USAIDhistoryanddevelopmentaidinRwanda.
15Ferguson,xiv.
11
Thisthesishasthreemainchapters.Thefirstexaminesthemajoreventsin
AmericaandRwandainthe1960sthataffectedUSAIDobjectives,especially
Rwanda’sdeclarationofindependence,thecreationofUSAIDintheUnitedStates
andtheestablishmentofdevelopmentassistancebetweenthetwocountries.The
secondchapterexaminesthe1970s,whichbeganinRwandawithamilitarycoup
thatputJuvenalHabyarimanainpowerandwitnessedtheNewDirectionsMandate
intheUnitedStatesreorientingaidtowardpovertyalleviationandawayfrom
modernizationandgrowth.Finally,inthe1980s,thefocusofchapterthree,the
shiftsthatimpactedUSAIDinRwandathedecadebeforeviolencebrokeoutare
examined.TheseshiftsincludedecliningeconomicconditionsinRwandathatledto
aneconomiccollapseandtheelectionofPresidentReaganintheU.S.,which
resultedinnewmarket‐friendlyaidpolicies.Theconclusionbrieflyconsiders
Rwandaduringthe1990s,especiallytheimpactofthe1990civilwarandtheendof
theColdWar.ItcontinuesontoprovideamorecompletepictureofhowUSAID
continuedtoevolveinRwanda.
Thesechapterssupporttheargumentthateconomic,socialandpolitical
shiftsintheUnitedStatesandRwandaaffectedthetypeofaidimplementedin
Rwandafrom1962throughthe1980s.ExaminingRwanda’sdevelopmenthistory
withouthighlightingthe1994genocidecontributestothedeficientbodyof
literaturewithoutadeterministperspectiveleadingtogenocide.BecauseRwanda
hasbeenusedbothasasymbolofWesternsuccessandfailure,asmodelof
developmentandawarningsign,areinterpretationofRwanda’shistoryisneeded
tounderstandtheimportanceofdevelopmentaidandtheimpactofUSAID.
Chapter1:TheDecadeofDevelopment
Rwanda,borderingtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Uganda,Tanzania,
andBurundiinCentralEastAfrica,isslightlysmallerthanthestateofMaryland,but
its2011populationofover11millionmakesitthemostdenselypopulatedAfrican
nation.TherearethreemainethnicgroupsthatcompriseRwandabutrelations
amongtheTutsi,Hutu,andTwahavenotalwaysbeenclearlydefined.
AnthropologistJohanPottierexplainedthat“fortheperiodupto1860,itwas
correcttosaythathistoriansknewnexttonothingabouthowtheterms‘Twa,’
‘Hutu,’and‘Tutsi’wereusedinsocialdiscourse.”1Thetermshavebeenexplainedas
alternatelyracial,cultural,economic,andsocialdesignations.Duringthe
reconstructionofRwandaafterthegenocide,allcitizensweretobereferredtoas
“Rwandan”tohelpovercometheviolenceanddiscriminationofthepast.Whilethis
changemayhelpforthefuture,itdoesnothelpclarifythepast.Therehavebeen
manydebatesbetweenscholarsontheoriginsanddistinctionsofthesegroups.
Revisitingthesedebatesfrompre‐independentRwandacanclarifydevelopment
objectivesduringthe1960s.
ItiswidelyacceptedthatTutsismigratedtotheregionofRwanda
supposedlywhilefleeingdroughtandfamineinEthiopiainthefifteenthand
sixteenthcenturies.TheTutsiswerepastoralist;owningcattle,acovetedresource,
madethemeconomicallysuperiortotheexistinggroupsinRwanda,includingthe
agriculturalistHutus,whohadmigratedtofertileRwandafromCentralAfrica
1JohanPottier,ReImaginingRwanda:Conflict,SurvivalandDisinformationintheLate
TwentiethCentury,(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),12‐13.WorkbyhistorianJanVansinahashelpedclarifymanymisconceptionsandunknownsofRwandabefore1900.
13
duringthewiderBantumigrationsbetweenthefifthandeleventhcenturies.Both
groupsintrudedupontheoriginalinhabitantsofthearea,theTwa.Thissmall
group,comprisingapproximatelyonepercentofRwanda’spopulationtoday,were
generallyartisansandhunters.2
Whilemostscholarsacceptthistimeline,itremainsuncertainwhenthe
differentgroupsenteredtheregion.HistorianJanVansinaexplained,“therenever
were[definitive]successiveimmigrationsofTwaforagers,Hutufarmers,andTutsi
herders…[T]hesettlementhistoryofRwandaisactuallyveryancientandquite
complex.”3Regardlessoforigin,thesethreegroupshadintegratedalmost
completelybythetimeEuropeanexplorersenteredtheregion.Forcenturies“they
spokethesamelanguage,believedinthesamegod,sharedthesameculture,
belongedtojointclans,andlivedsidebysidethroughoutthecountry.”4Whilethese
threegroupshadlargelyintegratedbythemid‐nineteenthcentury,theAbazungu,5
orwhitepeople,disruptedtheequilibriumandexacerbatedthepreexistingtensions
oftheseethnicandsocialgroups.
TheAbazungucolonialistsdividedandconqueredAfricaduringthe1880s.
InRwandatheoriginalGermancolonialists–andBelgiansafter1916–comprised
nomorethanonepercentofthepopulation,butheldallthewealthandpower.The
colonialpowersenforcedindirectrule,making“socialrelationshipsinRwanda
moreuniformandexploitativethanever,withaclearhierarchyfromBazunguto
2PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(WestHartford:KumarianPress,1998),14.
3JanVansina,AntecedentstoModernRwanda:TheNyiginyaKingdom,(Madison:theUniversityofWisconsinPress,2004),198.
4Uvin,14.5ThetermisKinyarwandan.BazunguistheSwahilitermforwhitepeople.
14
TutsitoHututoTwa.”AnewhierarchyfromEuropeansattoptotheTwaatbottom
restedonan“ideologyofracialsuperiority.”6
AsGermany’scolonialcontrolincreased,Rwandaexperiencedinternal
conflicts.ThetraditionalRwandandynastywitnessedaviolentsuccessionbattle
followingthedeathofthelastleader,Mwami(King)KigeliIVRwabugiri.The
combinedresultsofGermany’spresenceandtheinternalpoliticalupheavalwasa
“politicalstructure…oftendescribedasadualcolonialism,”whereTutsielites
workedtoexploitthelowerHutuclassalongsidetheGermans.7WhiletheTutsis
weretheminoritygroupinRwanda,forcenturiestheyhadruledovertheHutu.
WhentheTutsismigratedintoRwanda,theywereestablishedaseconomically
superiorherders.Owningcattleelevatedinhabitantsfinanciallyandwiththis
supremacy,theTutsistookcontrolfirstatthecommunityleveltheninthe
monarchy.TheTutsismaintainedtheirprominentpositioninthecountrywhenthe
GermansarrivedandafterWorldWarIwhenRwandawasgiventoBelgium.When
thecolonialpowersenteredRwandatheyaggravatedthissocialdivision.
Eventuallythesocialstratificationschangedandinthe1930s,Belgiumsolidifiedthe
shiftofsocio‐economicclassesintodifferentethnicities.8
BelgiumheldcolonialpowerinRwandauntil1962.FollowingtheGermans’
lead,BelgiuminitiallyacceptedtheestablishedhierarchyinRwandaandfavoredthe
rulingTutsis.AsBelgiansinfluencedtheestablishedsocialdivisionsandinstituted
6Uvin,17.7PhilipGourevitch,WeWishtoInformYouThatTomorrowWeWillBeKilledWithOur
Families:StoriesfromRwanda,(NewYork:Picador,1998),54.8JanVansina’sAntecedentstoModernRwandaisthemostaccurateandaccessiblehistoryof
pre‐colonialRwanda.
15
rigidethnicclassifications,scientifictestswereadministeredtoseparatethegroups
andsupportTutsifavoritism.Thesetestsincludedmeasuringnoseandskullsizes
andcountingthenumberofcattleownedbyindividualsorfamilies.BecauseTutsis
supposedlyhadmoreCaucasianfeaturesandgenerallymorecattle,theycontinued
tobethepreferredgroupinRwanda.
ThisfavoritismaggravatedanalreadytensesituationasBelgiansmade“this
polarizationthecornerstoneoftheircolonialpolicy”inRwanda.9Thesetense
situationswerenotoriginallylinkedtotheethnicproblemscreatedbythe
colonizers,butinsteadstemmedfromtherulingclass’abuseofthestrugglinglower
class.TheBelgiansmadecontinuallymoreinvasivechangeswithinRwanda,
startingwiththeremovalofallundesirablelocalleaders.Theseundesirables
includedthefewHutuleadersandTutsisunwillingtoactaspuppetsoftheBelgian
government.From1933to1934Belgiumimplementedthemostdamagingchange,
theintroductionofethnicidentificationcards.Thesecards,explainedjournalist
PhilipGourevitch,made“itvirtuallyimpossibleforHutustobecomeTutsis,and
permittedtheBelgianstoperfecttheadministrationofanapartheidsystemrooted
inthemythofTutsisuperiority.”10TheCatholicChurch,theleadingreligious
organizationinRwanda,supportedthisnewsystem.Thesechangesquickly
solidifiedethniclines.
Thissituationlasteduntilarevolutionin1959putHutusinpoweroverthe
minorityTutsigroup.Africancountriesbegantobreakfreefromtheircolonial
mastersintheearly1950s,andwithinadecadealmostallAfricannationsoutsideof
9Gourevitch,54.10Gourevitch,57.
16
southernAfricawereindependent.Rwandanindependencecameontheheelsof
theHutuRevolutionof1959.Asplanswerebeinglaidforindependence,Hutus
revoltedandoverthrewtheTutsimonarchy,replacingitwithapresidential
republic.ContrarytomanyotherAfricanindependencemovements,thepushfor
Rwandanindependenceinvolvedanethnicandsocialrevolutionthatintensified
interethnicanimosity.
TheHutuRevolutionentailedseveralstagesofviolence.Outbreaksbeganas
“localizedanti‐Tutsiviolenceandsmallpogromsinsomeprovinces;hundredswere
killed,andquiteafewTutsifledthecountry.”11Alongwithwidespreadviolence,
over100,000TutsisfledRwandatoneighboringcountries.Catholicpriestsand
Belgianofficialshadencouragedthisfirststageofviolenceformonthsbeforeit
climaxed.FollowingWorldWarII,RwandasawaninfluxofBelgianFlemishPriests,
whoasaminorityintheirhomecountry,identifiedwiththedisenfranchisedHutu
population.SympathizingwiththeHutus,thenewlyarrivedpriestsencouraged
themtofightforpower.12Intandemwiththisnewinfluence,theUnitedNations
appliedpressureonBelgiumtorelinquishitscolonialcontrol.Theseinfluencesled
tothecreationofaunitedHutufrontcallingforradicalchange.
InMarch1957,thesecondstageofrevolutionbeganwhenHutuintellectuals
publishedtheHutuManifesto,arguingfordemocracyandcallingfortheremovalof
Tutsisfrompower.PhilipGourevitchdescribedthesituation,“AsnewHutuparties
sprangup,rallyingthemassestouniteintheir‘Hutuness,’theenthusiasticBelgians
scheduledtheelections.ButbeforeanyRwandanssawaballotbox,hundredsof
11Uvin,19.12Gourevitch,58.
17
themwerekilled.”13StartinginNovember1957,violencebrokeoutregularly
betweenTutsisandHutusacrossthecountry.Thisviolencewasspurredby
CatholicpriestsandencouragedbyretreatingBelgiancolonialists.TheBelgians
supportedtheHutupowergrabpartlyinretaliationforTutsisresistancetocolonial
control.TheUnitedNationsalsoencouragedtheswitchtomajoritarianruleasthe
independencemovementinRwandaprogressed.14Thecolonialauthorities
eventuallyacknowledgedthesocialrevolutionoccurringwithinRwanda,and“the
breakbetweentheBelgianauthoritiesandtheirlong‐coddledTutsielite[came]
aboutonlybecausethecolonialadministratorsfeltbetrayedbytheirerstwhile
protégés.”15Theviolencecontinuedsporadicallyfordecades,andbecameoneofthe
firstconcernsofUSAIDinindependentRwanda.
InJanuary1961,followingthetrendacrossAfrica,“theBelgiansconveneda
meetingofRwanda’snewHutuleaders,atwhichthemonarchywasofficially
abolishedandRwandawasdeclaredarepublic.”16OnJuly1,1962Rwandabecame
anindependentnation.Thisseminaleventstartedanewjourneyofdevelopment
thatincludedinteractionsandpartnershipswithUSAID.Belgiancolonialpolicyhad
employeddevelopmentpracticesandprograms,butasanewlyindependentnation,
Rwandawasabletoplayalargerroleintheirdevelopmentandpromotetheirown
developmentobjectives.GrégoireKayibandawasinauguratedasPresidentandthe
newHutudictatorship“masqueradedaspopulardemocracy,andRwanda’spower
13Gourevitch,58.14MahmoodMamdani,WhenVictimsBecomeKillers:Colonialism,Nativism,andtheGenocide
inRwanda,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),116.15GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,
1995),50.16Gourevitch,61.
18
strugglesbecameaninternalaffairoftheHutuelite.”17TheHutusinpower
reproducedabusesthathadbeencommittedagainstthemduringtheTutsi
monarchy,whilepretendingtosupporttheirnewsystemofdemocracy.Kayibanda
hidbehindaveilofdemocracywiththesupportfromHutuelitesandtheWestashe
continuedterrorizinghisopponents.RwandareceivedWesternsupportbecauseits
proximitytoZaire,whichwasofcriticalstrategicimportanceduringtheColdWar.
Ethnicviolenceincreasedandbecame“acentralfeatureofRwanda’spolitics.”18In
crossborderraids,TutsirefugeesattackedtheHutupopulationandgovernment,
andtheRwandangovernmentretaliatedagainsttheTutsisremaininginRwanda.
Thissituationcontinuedandworsenedinthefollowingdecades.
Theearly1960salsosawthecreationofUSAID.Asdecolonizationspread
acrossAfricaandthethreatofcommunismexpanded,U.S.supportforforeignaid
grewbecauseit“wasseenasatooltoreducediscontentgeneratedbypovertyand
theconsequenttemptationsofcommunismbyspurringeconomicprogressand
addressingthesocialandpoliticaltensionscreatedbyrapideconomicchange.”19
AfterWorldWarII,theUnitedStatesgovernmentlaunchedeconomicdevelopment
andassistanceprograms,suchastheMarshallPlan.WhenEisenhowertookoffice,
hereducedtheamountoffundingavailabletotheprogramsstartedbyTruman’s
administration.Eisenhower’saidwastiedtomutualsecurityassistance,until1957
17Gourevitch,61.18MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(NewYork:
CornellUniversityPress,2002),52‐53.19CarolLancasterandAnnVanDusen,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:Confrontingthe
ChallengesoftheTwentyFirstCentury,(WashingtonD.C.:theBrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),10.
19
whenhereversedthispolicyandcreatedseveraldevelopmentorganizationsand
projects.20Thismovesolidifieddevelopmentaid’spositioninU.S.foreignpolicy.As
asenator,KennedycriticizedEisenhower’sfailuretoappreciatethetrueimportance
offoreignaid.AddingtotherecentadvancesmadebyEisenhower,theelectionof
PresidentJohnF.Kennedyin1960madedevelopmentaidacrucialaspectofU.S.
foreignrelations.
WhenKennedytookoffice,hedeclaredthe1960sa“decadeofdevelopment.”
Duringhispresidentialcampaign,KennedyconstantlyemphasizedthatAmerica
wouldhaveto“demonstratetothe‘emergingcountries’thatdevelopmentalong
liberal,capitalistlinescouldalleviatepovertyandraiselivingstandardsatleastas
fastasrevolutionaryandMarxistalternatives.”21Followingthroughonthese
campaignpromises,KennedyestablishedtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternational
Development(USAID)in1961bymergingtwoexistingaidagencies,the
DevelopmentLoanFundandtheInternationalCooperationAgency22intoasingle
entitythatwouldbesemi‐autonomouswithintheDepartmentofState.23USAIDwas
intendedtofurtherinternationaldevelopmentandU.S.diplomacyinthenewly
emergingnationsofAfricaandAsia.WhileUSAIDwasconnectedtodiplomatic
goals,itwaskeptsemi‐autonomoustoseparateitfromEisenhower’spreferencefor
20SamuelButterfield,U.S.DevelopmentAid:AnHistoricFirst:AchievementsandFailuresin
theTwentiethCentury,(Westport:PraegerPublishers,2004),59.TheseorganizationsincludedtheDevelopmentLoanFund,Inter‐AmericanDevelopmentBankandsupporttheSocialProgressTrustFundthroughtheDevelopmentBank.
21MichaelLatham,ModernizationasIdeology:AmericanSocialScienceand“NationBuilding”intheKennedyEra,(ChapelHill:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2000),28.
22TheInternationalCooperationAgency(ICA)waspartoftheDepartmentofStateresponsiblefortechnicalassistance.
23CarolLancaster,ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2007),71‐72.
20
linkingaidwithsecurityinterests.PresidentKennedywantedtodistinguish
developmentfromdiplomacyinstitutionally.
Beginninginthe1960s,USAIDbecameresponsible,inconsultationwiththe
DepartmentofState,for
thepolicies,countryallocations,andusesofdevelopmentassistance(usedtopromoteeconomicgrowth,education,andagriculturaldevelopment,healthandfamilyplanninganddemocracy,conflictpreventionandhumanitarianassistance,andchildsurvival)anddisasterreliefandrecovery.24
WithinthefirstfewyearsUSAIDprogramshadexpandedacrosstheglobe,andwere
providingassistancetotheinhabitantsofdevelopingcountriesonfourcontinents.
By1963,therewereUSAIDprogramsinalmost30Africannations.25Duringthe
1960s,USAIDprogramswerefoundedinmodernizationtheory,anditsprimary
goalsweretoprovideassistanceinhealth,educationandagriculture,bringingthe
standardsofthesedomainsclosertothoseofmodernnations.
USAIDbeganworkinginRwandaduringitsfirstyearofindependencein
1962.Foreignaid“promisedtobeausefultoolinpromotingdemocracy,especially
insub‐SaharanAfrica–bothasanincentiveforgovernmentstoimplementpolitical
reformsandasourceoffinancingforactivitiesrelatedtodemocratization.”26The
UnitedStatesgovernmentwasconcernedthatnewlyindependentcountrieswould
turntocommunistregimes,especiallyifrequestsforAmericanaidweredenied.On
24CarolLancaster,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwentyFirst
Century,(WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),14‐15.
25CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtodo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999),84.
26Lancaster,ForeignAid,47.
21
thesurface,RwandawasaprimecandidateforUSAIDassistance,promotingitsfirst
democraticgovernmentastheUnitedStateshelpedtofostergrowthtoconsolidate
strategicinterestsintheregion.RwandawasatacticalpositionbetweenZaireand
Tanzania,seenbothasapotentialallyandthreatduringtheColdWar.Tohelp
democracytakehold,USAIDpromotedsectorscrucialtosurvivalandeducation;
securityandinfrastructure(primarilyinthecapital,Kigali)becamethedonor’sfirst
projectareas.USAID’sstrategyinthesefirstyearswasto“demonstrateinterestin
theeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry,supportadoptionofafundamentalfiscal
andmonetaryreform,andassisttheGovernmentofRwandainmaintaininginternal
security.”27TheseoriginaleconomicreforminitiativesinRwandahelpedthenew
countrybecomeestablishedandstablewithoutthedirectionoftheiroldcolonial
leader.Modernizationtheoristsofthe1960sdrovetheseinitialprogramsand
policyobjectives,assumingthatwithassistance“traditional”Rwandacoulddevelop
inthesamemannerastheWest.USAIDdocumentsdemonstratedthegoals
employedinRwanda,specificallytheimportanceofcreatingstrongtiesbetweenthe
newcountryandneworganization.
USAIDapproachededucationassistancefromvariousangles.Ambassador
CharlesD.WitherspresentedthefirstforeignaidprogramtoRwandaasan
independencegift:scholarshipfundsforRwandanstostudyatuniversitiesinthe
UnitedStates.USAIDalsoestablishedregionalscholarshipprogramsforstudents
attendinglocaluniversities.EventuallyUSAIDalsoprovidedsupportforAmerican
professorstoteachatRwandanuniversitiesandpurchasednecessaryschool
27LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,3.
22
equipment.28SupervisedbyUSAIDLiaisonOfficerattheU.S.EmbassyGeneMoore,
USAIDsupportalsoincludedseveralshort‐termtrainingcoursesandtwo
undergraduatedegreecourses,agrantfortwentyregionalscholarshipsforstudents
alreadyenrolledinRwandanuniversityclasses,andanequipmentgranttothe
UniversityinButare.Anotherindependencegiftofthirtytraininggrantsforcivil
servicefieldswasalsoadministered.29From1962through1968,“theUnitedStates
Governmentprovided$20,000forscholarshipstoAmericanUniversities.”30Inthe
followingdecadesUSAIDbecamemoreinvolvedandprovidedmoremoneyfor
youtheducation,fromprimaryschooltohighschoolequivalencyandvocational
trainingcourses.
AsKennedyreshapedtheobjectivesandinfluencesofforeignassistance,the
UnitedStatesmovedawayfrominfluencingpeopleprimarilythroughmilitary
meansandstartedpersuadingthemwith‘softer’means.Rostow’s1961
commencementaddressatFortBraggexemplifiedthisnewideologybychargingthe
graduatingclasstofight“notmerelywithweaponsbut…inthemindsofmenin
villagesandhills;[fight]bythespiritandpolicyofthosewhorunthelocal
government,tointervenedirectlyandengagethemselvesinthewholecreative
processofmodernization.”31TheseUSAIDeducationprojectsofthe1960s
representedtheneedsofnewlyindependentRwandaandtheshiftfromthefirst
stageofmodernizationtheorytothesecond.AsexplainedbyRostow,inorderto
28Grosz,3.29Grosz,5.30Grosz,3.31Latham,1‐2.
23
advancefromatraditionalsocietytoasocietywiththepreconditionstotake‐off,a
commitmenttoseculareducationwasnecessary.
Educationprogramsworkedtopreventthespreadofcommunism,helpedfill
vacantadministrativepositionspreviouslyfilledbyBelgianofficials,andinsureda
continuedalliancewiththeUnitedStates.Controllingtheproductionofknowledge,
educationwastheeasiestwaytoindoctrinatepeople.Asaneffectivewayof
influencingpoliticalbeliefs,theeducationprojectshelpedensureRwandanswould
steerclearofcommunism.AddressingtheneedsofRwanda,USAIDhelpedtofill
positionsleftbyBelgians.TheuniversityandtechnicaltrainingprovidedRwandans
withthecapabilitiestofillthemanyhighlevelpositionsavailableintheRwandan
government.Finally,theeducationprojectsthattaughtboththehorrorsof
communismandtheskillsneededtoruntheircountryalsoinstructedRwandansto
remainloyaltotheUnitedStates.TheemergingeducatedleadersofRwandawere
taughttoallythemselvesandtheircountrywiththeU.S.
USAID’shelpregardinginfrastructurewaslimitedduringthe1960s,and
focusedprimarilyonKigali,Rwanda’scapital.Smallprojectsincludedfurnishing
nursingschoolsinKigaliwithtransistorradios,andothersmallcashgrantsforlocal
commodities.In1966,theUnitedStatesincreasedaidlevelstoRwandaandseveral
moreprogramswereactivated.Onereasonforthe“increasedactivitywasan
agreementbetweenRwandaandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)signedin
April1966.”32TheagreementrequiredthegovernmentofRwandatodevaluethe
32Grosz,4.
24
RwandanfrancinexchangeforstandbycreditfromtheIMF.Theincreasedaidfrom
USAIDprovidedcommodityimportprograms,providingtrucks,vehicleequipment
andrawplasticaswellasstaplessuchasflour,oilandmilk.Thesecommodities
weresoldtoandbenefittedimporters.Thisfoodwasmonetizedandsoldtoraise
funds,insteadofbeingconsumedbyRwandans.ThegovernmentofRwandawas
“assuredasupplyofbasiccommoditieswasavailablewithoutspendingitsforeign
exchange,thefundsfinancedprojectsplannedbybothgovernments,andconsumers
wereabletobuybasicitems.”33Whentheseprojectswerecompletedanddeemed
successfulbyUSAID,theallottedsupportamountwasincreased.
Beginninginlate1966andcontinuingthrough1968,USAIDprovidedfunds
andtechnicalsupportforpavingstreetsinKigaliandconstructingawater
purificationplantforthecapital.Thesebasicinfrastructureprojectscontributedto
thesecondstageofmodernization,encouragingthepreconditionstotake‐off.Along
witheducation,asocietywasthoughttoneedtoenableadegreeofcapital
mobilization,whichwouldbedifficultforRwandawithoutinfrastructureassistance
fromUSAID.Thenattheendof1968,USAIDsupportwasalmostcompletelycut
fromRwandaandthenumberofprogramswassignificantlyreducedas“the
unpopularwarinVietnamdiscreditedmanydevelopmentideasandtherewas
growingdistrustofthestatetobetheprimaryagenttopromotedevelopment.”34
Beforethesefundswereeliminated,USAIDwasabletohelpadvisethegovernment
onsecurityproblems.
33Grosz,4.34DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofan
AmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),10.
25
Theinfrastructureprogramsimplementedinthe1960sworkedtosteadya
Rwandathatwaslostwithoutitscolonialguide.Aswithmanycolonies,after
decolonizationexperts,leaders,andadministratorslefttheircolonialpositionsand
returnedhometoEurope.Theeducationprojectsdiscussedearlieraddressedhow
USAIDhelpedtrainRwandanstofillthesevacantpositions.Theinfrastructure
programsworkedwiththesecoursestokeepRwandaprogressingforward.The
constructionofroads,waterplants,andfurnishingnursingschoolsandproviding
commoditieskeptdevelopmentgoingandallowedRwandatogainstabilityforthe
future.
Asdiscussedpreviously,thesecuritysituationwithinRwandawastenuous
withsporadicfightingbetweenthegovernmentandrebelrefugeeTutsisinUganda,
Zaire,andBurundi.InJuly1963thegovernmentofRwandarequestedequipment
andconstructionassistancefromUSAIDtohelpitsinternalsecurityforces,
includingbothmilitaryandpoliceforces.Thisinitialrequestwasdenied.Thenin
December1963,TutsiexileslaunchedadesperateattackfromBurundi.Invading
Bugesera,amedium‐sizedvillageinsouthernRwanda,andalmostreachingKigali,
theexilesweredisorganizedandthegovernmentwasabletobeatthembacktothe
border.TheRwandangovernment“usedtheoccasiontolaunchamassivewaveof
repressioninwhichanestimated10,000TutsiwereslaughteredbetweenDecember
1963andJanuary1964.”35
Therebelattackinlate1963forcedtheUnitedStatestoreconsiderRwanda’s
requestforsecurityassistance.Unfortunately,theU.S.apparentlydidnotconsider
35Prunier,56.
26
itsroleinthegrowingethnicviolencebyprovidingsecurityassistance.Inthe
springof1964,aUnitedStatespolicesurveyteamarrivedandafterinspection
proposedappropriateandneededchangestoimproveRwanda’ssecuritysituation.
WhileignoringitsroleintheincreasingethnicviolenceinRwanda,theU.S.alsodid
notcriticizetheRwandangovernmentfortheretaliationcommittedagainstTutsis
residingwithinthecountry.Thesurveyteamreportnotedthatuntilitsinitial
requestwasdenied,Rwandawaspro‐western.But“sincetheirfirstrequestfor
militaryandpolicecommodityassistancehadbeenrejected,Rwandahadbecome
criticalandsuspiciousofallcurrenteffortstoassisttheminthefield.”36Worried
aboutloosingacriticallylocatedally,thesurveyteamrecommendedtheUnited
StatesprovidetechnicalandcommodityassistancetokeepRwandafrompossible
communistleanings.WhileRwandahadgrowndistrustful,finallyreceivingthe
assistancetheyrequestedapparentlymitigatedtheirfearsaboutU.S.security
assistance.
TheUnitedStatesperceivedtheretobecommunistthreatssurrounding
Rwanda,includingTanzania.JuliusNyerere,thepresidentofTanzania,
implementedasocialistgovernment,andfearsarosethatsocialismwouldspillout
fromTanzaniaintoRwandaandbeyond.Thefearofcommunismspreadinginto
EastandCentralAfricaledtoapublicsafetyprojectlaunchedin1964.Overfive
yearsUSAIDprovided$70,000totheRwandangovernmentforboththemilitary
andpolicyforceforcommunicationandtransportationequipment,alongwithtwo
advisorsprovidingtechnicaltrainingforuseandmaintenanceoftheequipment.
36Grosz,3.
27
Therewerealsoshort‐termtrainingprogramsthattookplaceintheUnitedStatesto
helptheRwandangovernmentbetterhandletherefugeeandrebelsituation.37
USAIDdocumentsclearlydemonstratethatU.S.aidstrategyfocusedonthe
“adoptionoffundamentalfiscalandmonetaryreform,assist[ed]maintaining
internalsecurity,andsupport[ed]small,viabledevelopmentprojects.”38These
fiscalreformpoliciesweregearedtowardshelpingthenewlyindependentnation
becomefinanciallystableandproductiveonitsown.Whiletheseprojectswere
underway,monetarysupportfromtheUnitedStatesCongresstoUSAIDprograms
wasalmostcompletelycut,signifyingconcernsaboutmoneyspentabroadinstead
ofdomestically.Attheendoffiscalyear(FY)1968,thePublic
Safety/CommunicationsAdvisorandtheUSAIDLiaisonOfficerleftRwandaand
from1969to1973,USAIDactivitiesinRwandawerelimitedtoPL480TitleIIand
theEmbassyadministeredSelfHelpProgram.USAIDfundsforRwandaweretoo
lowtocontinuesupportfortheseaidworkersastheirprojectswereslowly
wrappeduporcancelled.
ThePL480TitleIIprogram,39alsoknownasFoodforPeace,receivedalmost
threemilliondollarsduringthefirstsevenyearsthatUSAIDwasactiveinRwanda
andfocusedassistancetomaternalandchildhealthandschoolfeedingprograms.
TheCatholicReliefServicedistributedmostofthefood,whichcontinuedafter
37Grosz,4.38Grosz,5.39PLstandsforPublicLaw,shortenfromthe1954AgriculturalTradeDevelopment
AssistanceAct.Therearefourpartstotheact,TitleIismanagedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture,whileTitlesII,IIIandVarerunbyUSAID.FormoreinformationonthePL480TitleprogramsseeNickCullather’sTheHungryWorld.
28
USAIDfundswerecut.40TheSelfHelpProgramsprovidedsmallamountsoffunds
toRwandanswithpromisingdevelopmentideas.Bothprogramswereimportantto
Rwanda,buttheFoodforPeaceprogramswerecrucialand,infact,havecontinued
intothetwenty‐firstcentury.
Initially,in1963theU.S.Congresscomplainedaboutthelargeamountofaid
programsinAfrica,arguingthatmoneyshouldbedirectedtowardproblemsat
home.WhilePresidentKennedyfieldedCongress’complaintsandreceivedadvice
fromreportsrecommendingreductionsofprojectsinAfrica,aidprograms
continued.Yearslater,PresidentJohnsonheededtotherequestsandsuggestionsto
reduceaidprogramsand“bytheearly1970s,therewereonly10operatinginthe
region.”41ThemainreasonsforthecriticismsandattacksonaidprogramsinAfrica
stemmedfrommisunderstandingsanddiscontentovercurrentevents.As
developmentaidwasstillanewphenomenon,itwasdifficultfortheAmerican
publicandCongresstorecognizethesuccessesandchallengesUSAIDexperienced.
Americanswerealsofrustratedanddisenchantedwithdevelopmentafterthe
amountoffundsspentontheVietnamWar,arguingthatmoneyshouldnowbe
refocusedondomesticissues.TheU.S.governmentwasdisappointedwiththe
numberofmilitarycoupstakingholdinAfrica,whichmadethemquestionthevalue
ofdevelopmentaidandtheeffectivenessoftheirdemocratizationprograms.
Additionally,“criticismsoftooextensiveU.S.engagementsworldwideledthe
administrationtocloseanumberofitsaidmissionsabroad(especiallyinsub‐
40Grosz,6.41Lancaster,AidtoAfrica,85.
29
SaharanAfrica)duringthesecondhalfofthe1960s.”42Allthesefrustrationsledthe
U.S.CongresstoreducetheamountofmoneyavailabletoUSAID.WhileUSAIDlost
mostofitsfundingforprojectsinRwanda,in1973,U.S.foreignpolicyideology
shiftedagainaseventsinbothcountriessetthestagefornewfundingandbroader
objectives.
42Lancaster,ForeignAid,75.
Chapter2:“NewDirections”forRwanda
The1960sbeganwithtwosignificantevents:thecreationofUSAIDinthe
UnitedStatesandRwanda’sdeclarationofindependence.Whiletherelationship
betweenRwandaandtheU.S.wascurtailedwiththedramaticcutsof1968,the
eventsofthe1970srecoveredlostground.Asmodernizationtheorywasphased
outofU.S.practice,anewbasicneedsmandaterosetoreplaceit.Intheearly1970s
severaleventsaffectedtherelationshipbetweenAmericaandRwanda.During
1973,inRwandafirst,thenintheUnitedStates,politicalactionschangedthe
outlookandreceptionofdevelopmentaid.InRwanda,MajorGeneralJuvénal
Habyarimanastagedacoup,anddeclaredhimselfPresident.MonthslatertheU.S.
Congress,alongwithmanyotherdevelopmentorganizations,initiatednew
mandatestofocusonthepoorestofthepoorintheworld.Theyearsfollowing1973
sawmajorincreasesinaidprovidedfromUSAIDandamorereceptiveand
progressiveatmosphereinRwandaacceptingthissurgeofassistance.Changesin
theperiodfromthelate1960sto1973,setthestagefornewUSAIDprogramsand
projectsinRwanda.
PresidentGrégoireKayibandaassumedpowerinRwandaafter
independencein1962andrealizedthedesireofmanyHutustobeledbyaHutu
government.TheKayibandaregimecontinuedthehostilitiesoftheHutuRevolution
and“chasedorkilledmostformerTutsipowerholdersandpoliticians,eventhe
mostmoderateones,aswellasmanyoppositionHutupoliticianswhodidn’tjoin
31
Parmehutu.”1WhileKayibandaachievedthesegoalsmostRwandans,bothHutus
andTutsis,livedinfearofthegovernment’ssporadiccampaignsofviolence.In
1972ethnicviolencebrokeoutinBurundiandpoliticaldisturbancesleftaround
200,000dead;hundredsofthousandsmoreHutussoughtrefugeinRwanda.In
May‐June1972,“BurundihadbeenravagedbyamassivemassacreofHutucarried
outbytheTutsiminorityinordertokeepitsholdonpoliticalpower.”2
BurundihasanalmostidenticalethnicmakeupasRwanda,butwhenthe
HutuRevolutiontookpowerfromtheTutsisinRwanda,theminorityTutsigroupin
BurundiheldontotheirrulewhiledeclaringBurundianindependence.Ashundreds
ofthousandsofBurundianHutusspilledintoRwandain1972,PresidentKayibanda
triedtoexploitthesituationforpoliticalgainandbegantoattacktheRwandanTutsi
minorityagain.Over40,000Tutsiswerevictimsofattacksencouragedby
KayibandabetweenMarch1962andlate1964,andthissporadicviolencecontinued
until1972.3PresidentKayibandaaskedhisseniorarmycommanderMajor‐General
JuvénalHabyarimanatoleadthe1972attackontheRwandanTutsis.
HabyarimanarecognizedthenewstrainsfeltinRwandaandtheincreased
tensionsbetweentheHutusandTutsisandmadehisgrabforpower.Whilethe
overflowofrefugeesexacerbatedexistingethnictensions,bothgroupsresentedthe
continuallyirregularattacksthatdisruptedtheirdailylives.Habyarimanareliedon
supportfromhisregioninthenorthandfromRwandanspersecutedandexhausted
1PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian
Press,1998),23.ParmehutuwasKayibanda’spoliticalpartyorganizedduringtheHutuRevolution.2GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,
1995),60.Formoreinformationonthe1972eventsinBurundipleaseseeReneLemarchand,Burundi:EthnocideastheoryandPractice,CambridgeUniversityPress:1994.
3Uvin,20.
32
byKayibanda’sregime.OnJuly5,1973Habyarimanatookpowerinabloodless
coup,startingtheSecondRepublicasHutusandTutsisexpressedwidespreadrelief.
Thischangedidnoteliminatedecadesofethnichatred,butHutusandTutsisdid
hopetoleadlivesuninterruptedbycampaignsofviolence.
Habyarimanaorganizedamilitarydictatorshipandofferedacompromiseto
theTutsistohelpstabilizethecountry;iftheystayedoutofpoliticstheycouldlead
reasonablynormallives.Habyarimana’sironfistrulecreatedstabilityand
improveddevelopmentprospects.However,
themainstrengthofRwanda’sregimeslaynotintheiroppressionbutintheircapacitytolegitimizethemselvestointernalandexternalforces.Toachievethis…a‘development’legitimization[was]aimedatboththeinternationalBazunguaudienceandthedomesticone.4
WhenHabyarimanatookpower,Rwandawaspoorerthanitsneighbors.This
povertycombinedwithHabyarimana’sskillatattractingWesterndevelopment
agenciesledtoasurgeofassistance.DevelopmentwasHabyarimana’sfavorite
politicalword,“appealingtoEuropeanandAmericanaiddonorswhomhemilked
withgreatskill.”5Westerndevelopmentorganizations,includingUSAID,favored
HabyarimanabecausehebroughtanendtoKayibanda’sviolentcampaigns,and
madedeclarationsofcommitmenttodevelopingRwandathatpreferredWestern
capitalismtocommunism.ConditionswithinRwandachangeddrasticallyinthe
followingyears.
Startingin1974,theyearafterHabyarimana’scoupd’état,thegovernment
madeseveralsignificantchangesregardingdevelopment.Oneofitsactsincluded
4Uvin,23.5PhilipGourevitch,WeWishToInformYouthatTomorrowWeWillBeKilledWithOur
Families:StoriesFromRwanda,(NewYork:Picador,1998),69.
33
the“pronouncementthatattributedRwanda’s143communestheroleof‘motorof
development.’Fromnowon,thecommuneswouldbethebasicunitof
development.”6Thiswasasignificantchangebecausemostpreviousdevelopment
projectshadbeencenteredonthecapitalorotherlargecities,insteadofrural
communes.Habyarimanadeclared1974theyearofagricultureandmanuallabor,
changedthenameofthesinglepartytoMouvementRevolutionaireNationalpourle
Developpment(MRND)and,later,renamedtheparliamenttheNational
DevelopmentCouncil.7ThesechangesappealedtoWesterngovernmentsand
donors.
AllthesetransformationsturnedRwandaintowhatGermanPastorHerbert
Keinerdescribedas‘einEntwicklungsdiktatur,’adevelopmentdictatorship.This
ideologywassimilartocolonialtheoriesof“benevolentdespotism,asPresident
Habyarimanadecidedtotakeuponhisshoulderstheheavyburdenofthestateso
hissubjectscoulddevotethemselvesentirelytoagriculture.”8Thisideology
legitimizedthegovernment’sintrusionintoallaspectsofsociallife.Becausethe
Rwandangovernment’sdevelopmentideologyfocusedheavilyoneconomic
development,aidagenciesabroadfeltcompelledtoimplementtheirprojects
throughthegovernment.ThisarrangementallowedtheRwandangovernmentto
funnelthemajorityofassistancetothegroupsconsistingofHutus.
WhileHabyarimanafavoredtheHutusblatantly,hedidbringpolitical
stabilitytoRwandaanddeliverassistancetofailingregions,regardlessoftheir
6Uvin,24.7Uvin,24.MRNDstandsforNationalRevolutionaryDevelopmentMovement.8Prunier,77.
34
ethniccomposition.Despiteremainingdesperatelypoor,Rwanda’sinternational
reputationsoared,
inpartbecauseitwasfinallydemonstratingsomeeconomicdevelopmentinaregionlackinganygoodnews.One‐partystability,thedampeningofethnicconflict,modesteconomicprogressinvestedRwandawithareputationforstabilityandhope.OutsidersroutinelytoutedRwandaasamodelofefficiencyandreferredtoitastheSwitzerlandofCentralAfrica.9
ThesechangeshelpedtoreinvigorateUSAIDassistancetoRwandainthe1970s.
1973alsosawasignificantchangeinU.S.foreignpolicythataffected
Americanassistanceglobally.TheVietnamWarandthegrowingdomestic
oppositiontothewarhadnegativelyaffectedAmerica’sperceptionsofinternational
affairs.ThewarincreasedtheCongress’roleinforeigneconomicassistancepolicy.
Intheearly1970s,theDemocraticCongress“refusedtopassaforeignaid
authorizationbilltoprotesttheNixonadministration’spoliciesinVietnam.”10
ContinuingtheCongress’stanceagainstusingdevelopmentaidforthewarin
Vietnam,1973’stheNewDirectionsbillwaspassed.Duringthe1960s,U.S.aidwas
oftenusedtomodernizesocietiesandpromotegrowth,butwiththeNewDirections
Mandate,foreignaidemphasizedthegoalofpovertyalleviation.
AgroupofCongressmenwereabletodrivetheirlegislationthroughthe
HouseofInternationalAffairsandtheSenateForeignRelationscommittees,
authorizingtheNewDirectionsMandate.Thelegislationbroughtabout“amajor
reformofU.S.aidthatinvolvedpolicyratherthanorganizationalchange:aidwas
9MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:CornellUniversity,2002),53.
10CarolLancaster,TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwentyFirstCentury,(WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000),46.
35
reorientedtowardprovidingforthebasichumanneedsofthoseinpoor
countries.”11Basichumanneedsincludedprimaryhealthcare,basiceducation,
shelter,andagriculturalassistance.ThesemembersofCongresswereabletopush
thismandatethroughbecauseithadsupportthroughoutthegovernmentandthe
developmentcommunity.Thesegroupsbelieveditwastimetorefocuson
developmentafter“itsuseinthewarinIndochinatopropupgovernments.”12
Otherdomesticandinternationaleventsalsoinfluencedthischange.In
1974,thePortuguesecoloniesofMozambiqueandAngoladeclaredindependence,
escalatingColdWartensions.Domestically,theincreasednumberofAfrican
AmericansinpoliticsledtoariseinsupportforAfricanaid.13Thesechangeshelped
spurincreasedactivityandlevelsofaidtoAfricannations,includingRwanda.The
increasedlevelsofsupportfocusedoncountryallocations,emphasizedpoorer
countries,andhighlightedgoalstoimproveeducation,healthcareandrural
agriculturaldevelopment.14TheNewDirectionsMandate,oftenreferredtoasthe
BasicHumanNeedsmandateinpopularandprofessionaldiscussions,wasadistinct
shiftawayfrommodernizationpracticesofthepreviousdecade.
Duringthe1960s,USAIDfocusedongeneralresourcetransfersthathelped
stabilizethenewlyemergingAfricannationsbutwiththeNewDirectionsMandate
USAID’sreentryintoRwandawouldbedrasticallydifferent.Themostdistinctive
11CarolLancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?(WashingtonD.C.:
CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008),13.12Lancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid,14.13CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtoDo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress,1999),86.14CarolLancaster,ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics,(Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress,2007),76.
36
featureofthenewmandate“wasthatitproposedtoconcentrateeconomic
assistanceintofivefunctionalbudgetcategories:FoodandNutrition,Population
PlanningandHealth,EducationandHumanResourceDevelopment,Selected
DevelopmentProblems,andSelectedCountriesandOrganizations.”15
Habyarimana’srebrandingofRwandaasadevelopmentstateappealedtoaid
organizationsandfitwiththeNewDirectionsMandatedforUSAID.
HabyarimanashiftedthecenterofdevelopmentinRwandafromthemajor
citiestotheruralcommunes,embracingtheNewDirectionsMandate.USAID
“involv[ed][theruralpoor]directlyinthedevelopmentprocess.”16Anothermajor
differencefromthe1960swastheremovalofsecurityprojectsfromthe
developmentsector.A1973CongressionalResearchServicesummaryconcluded
“securityassistanceshouldbeadministeredseparatelyfromdevelopment
assistance.”17DespitepreviousprojectsassistingRwandawithsecurity,all
assistanceinthe1970swasdirectedatimprovingbasichumanneeds.The1970s
sawrapidincreasesinaid,particularlyduringthelaterhalf,beginningwitha
CongressionalinitiativeandcontinuedbyPresidentCarter.
ThisfocuswasreinforcedwiththeelectionofPresidentJimmyCarterin
1976.TheCarterAdministration“enteredofficecommittedtotheobjectivesofthe
basichumanneedsmandate.”18Overthecourseofthe1970s,theinternational
humanrightsmovementgainedmomentumand“politicians,mostnotablyPresident
15VernonRuttan,UnitedStatesDevelopmentAssistancePolicy:TheDomesticPoliticsof
ForeignEconomicAid,(Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1996),94.16Ruttan,94.17Ruttan,107.18Ruttan,119.
37
JimmyCarter,startedtoinvokehumanrightsastheguidingrationaleoftheforeign
policyofstates.”19Expandinghissupportforhumanrightsinthe1980s,President
Carteraddedemphasisonwomen’sneedsandadvancementsinU.S.foreignaid.
USAIDannualreportsdemonstratethewidevarietyofprojectsimplementedto
improvebasichumanneedsintheruralsectorofRwanda.
USAIDrelationswiththeGovernmentofRwandaimprovedwith
Habyarimana’sregime.Startingin1973,“theGovernmentofRwanda’s
developmentprioritieswereinstepwithUSAIDgoalsandstrategies.”20Overa
periodof18months,fourdifferentUSAIDteamscametoRwandatodiscussprojects
thatwouldsignificantlycontributetothecountry’sdevelopmentplan.Startingin
1974theGovernmentofRwandapresented23projectproposalstoUSAID.While
notall23wereapproved,eventuallyUSAIDprogramsincreasedfromthreein1975
totwelvein1980.TheUnitedStatesusedtobeaminordonortoRwanda,butinthe
lasthalfofthe1970s,“theU.S.governmentbegantoputconsiderableeffortinto
developingandexpandingitsprograminRwanda.”21
TheUSAIDRwandaAnnualBudgetSubmissionforFY1977,writtenin
August1975outlinedsomeofthefirstprojectsimplementedundertheNew
DirectionsMandate.AninitialprojectincludedCooperativeDevelopment,
improvingtheaccessofthepopulationlivingincooperativestodevelopmentinputs,
19SamuelMoyn,TheLastUtopia:HumanRightsinHistory,(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,2010),5.20LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,
Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,6.21Grosz,8.
38
suchastechnicaltrainingsessions.Thisproject“providednecessaryunderpinnings
totheGovernmentofRwandaprogramofdevelopinglocal,specialized
cooperatives.”22Emphasiswasplacedonproductioncooperatives,includingboth
agriculturalandnon‐agriculturalcooperatives.CooperativeDevelopmentaimedto
organizepeopleintogroupsinorderto“allowotherscarceresourcestobeutilized
moreeffectively[to]resultinasynergisticeffect.”23Thecomponentsofthisproject
includedcooperativetraining,providingmaterialsandequipment,andconsultants.
ThebenefitshelpedtheGovernmentofRwanda’scooperativeprogramsand
indirectlyhelpedthousandsofsmallruralfarmersparticipatingincooperatives.
Theshort‐livedCooperativeDevelopmentproject,workingtoreinforcethe
newcommunalreorganizationofRwanda,representedthenewgoalswithUSAID’s
NewDirectionsinitiativebyworkingdirectlywiththeruralpopulationand
improvingtheirstandardoflivingeconomically,politicallyandsocially.Byhelping
thesecommunesrecognizetheirhumanresourcepotential,identifystrengthsand
methodsofbettercommunicationandteamworktheseruralcommunitieswere
givenpossibilitiestochangetheirsituation.Thisprojectdidnotcontinueformore
thanayearbecausetheRwandangovernmentwasunabletoidentifyspecific
projectswithincooperativesrequiringfurtherUSAIDassistance.ButUSAIDwas
abletohelpguidelocalparticipantsandleadersincontinuingtostrengthen
cooperativesacrossthecountry.
AnotherprojectoutlinedintheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1977included
theFarmHandTools–Blacksmithsproject.Theprojectranfrom1975through
22USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1977,”July1975,16.23USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”17.
39
1978andattemptedtosupportruralvocationaltrainingbyhelping“Rwanda[n]
blacksmithstothedegreeofskillnecessarytomanufactureandrepairhandtools
commonlyusedoressentialtothefarmsystemandprovidethesewiththe
minimumnecessarytoolkit.”24Atthetime,therewereinadequatenumbersof
blacksmithsavailabletoprovideandfixfarmtoolsacrossRwanda.Thisprogram
continuedanotherprojectoriginallystartedbyaSwissdevelopmentorganization
andevenusedtheoriginalSwisstrainingsite.TheSwissprojectwasterminated
duetoinstabilityinRwandain1972,andUSAIDmadeafewalternationswhenit
resumedtheprojectin1975.Afterreview,theUSAIDFarmToolsProjected
providedconsultantstocreatecoursematerialstoproducecapableblacksmiths,
tuitionassistancefor120studentsannuallyforthreeyears,basictoolkitfor
graduates,andequipmentforthetrainingcenter.25
Thisprojectalsohelpedcreatebettereconomicconditionsforfarmersand
blacksmiths.Rwandaimportedapproximately100,000hoesannually.By
increasingthenumberofblacksmithsavailablewithinRwanda,hoescouldbe
producedandsoldlocally,andmaterialsrepaired.Farmtoolswerepredictedtolast
threeyearswithannualrepairsnecessary,withthecalculationof2,750,00hand‐
toolsexistingand900,000needingrepairsorreplacementannually.26Thisproject
expandedadomesticmarketinsteadofrelyingonforeignimports.Rwandahad
beenbuyinghoesfromGreatBritain,butwithcontinuedblacksmithtrainingthis
importcouldbeeliminated,improvingRwanda’seconomicpossibilities.
24USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”9.25USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”11.26USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”14.
40
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionforFY1979,writteninJune1977,provided
anupdateandthelastinformationavailableontheproject.USAIDcontinuedto
assistreestablishingtheblacksmith‐trainingcenterandprovidedtechnical
assistanceandequipment.27Theprojectwasterminatedaftertheoriginalthree‐
yearplanlikelybecauseUSAIDconsideredthenumberofproficientblacksmithsin
Rwandasufficient.USAIDassumedtheRwandangovernmentwouldcontinue
supportforvocationaltrainings,includingtheblacksmithproject.
SimilartotheassistanceprovidedtocommunesthroughtheCooperative
Developmentproject,theBlacksmithtrainingprogramhelpedprovidealternative
optionstoruralinhabitants.ThemajorityofRwandanswerefarmersand
increasingfarmingcontinuallyaddedmorepressuretooverusedplots.This
problemwascounteredbytheBlacksmithprogramasitincreasededucational
optionswithvocationaltraining,relievedlandpressuresbyreducingthenumberof
farmers,offereddifferenteconomicoptionsfortheruralpopulationandimproved
theoveralleconomicconditionofRwandabyeliminatingalargeimportand
creatinganemergingdomesticmarketforfarmtoolscreationandmaintenance.
ThisprojectreflectedthepoliticalchangeswithinRwandaandthechangesin
USAIDobjectivesduringthe1970s.Byfocusingonruralemploymentoptionsand
helpingtoreducethenumberoffarmers,theBlacksmithprojectfollowedthe
Rwandangovernment’scommandtodirectforeignassistancetotherural
communes.AfterHabyarimanatookpower,hededicatedmoreattentionand
assistancetodevelopingRwanda,emphasizingtheruralsectorofthecountry.It
27USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”15.
41
alsoreflectedthechangedpoliticaldynamicfeltafterHabyarimana’scoup.The
originalSwissprojectendedsuddenlyin1972withtheoutbreakofviolence
originatinginBurundi.BecauseHabyarimanacalmedtheon‐goingethnic
hostilities,theblacksmithprojectwasabletoresumeandbecompletedbyUSAID.
TheRwandangovernmentwasn’ttheonlyentityrefocusingassistanceontherural
sector.WiththeNewDirectionsMandate,USAIDworkedtocreatenewprojects
specifictoproblemsinthecountryside.Theblacksmithprojectdirectlyaffectedthe
opportunitiesavailabletoruralinhabitants,relievedpressuresfeltbyruralfarmers,
andimprovedtheoveralleconomicconditionofthecountrybyeliminatingaregular
importfromEurope.
AthirdprojectdiscussedintheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1977wasthe
FoodStorageandMarketingproject.Thisprojectbeganin1975andwas
consideredoneofthemostsignificantprojectstoRwandabecause“whilethere
werearelativelywiderangeofcrops,inadequatetransportation,limitedmarkets,
lowincomes,poorcommunication,andotherfactorscombinedtokeepagricultural
cropsfromthemarkets.”28ThemainoutputsfortheFoodStorageandMarketing
projectincludedeightwarehouses,tenRwandantraineesintheareasoffood
storageandmarketing,anoperationalfoodmarketingoffice,proceduresfor
financialcontrolandwarehousemanagement,andaworkingcapitalfundforthe
foodmarketingoffice.29Thisproject’smostimportantgoalwastobuildadequate
storagefacilitiestohelpprotectfarmers’crops.Rwandanssufferedfrom
28Grosz,8.29USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1979,”June1977,18.
42
malnutritionpartlybecauseamajorityoftheircropswerelosttoinsects,animals,
andmold.Byhelpingprotectcrops,theproject’sgoalwastoincreasetoamountof
foodforfamiliestoeatandsellinmarkets.
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1979providedanupdateontheprogress
ofthisproject.Withintwoyearsofimplementation,almost4,000tonsofbeanshad
beenstored.RwandasentaprojectmanagertotheUnitedStatestoreceivetraining
forprojectadministrationandanalysis.Theprojectwasunderrevision,callingfor
anexpansionofthestoragecapacityinspecificareasandconstructionofmore
warehousesinothers.30Theprojectremainedfullystaffedandcontinuedtoexpand
duetoitsrapidsuccess.Examinationandexpansionsonthisprojectcontinuedinto
the1980s.
IntheBudgetSubmissionFY1980,writteninMay1978,theFoodStorage
andMarketingprojectwasupdatedagain.Theproject’spurposewasto“createan
efficientfoodstorageandmarketingsystemforstaplefoodsandreduceseasonal
andregionalpricefluctuationsofstaplefoods.”31USAIDconstructedfoodstorage
warehouses,providedtechnicalassistanceandtrainingthatledtoaprice
stabilizationprogram.Thisprogram’saimwastoincreasefoodproductionwhile
reducingregionalpricesallowingproducerstoreceivehigherprices.Ifproducers
couldreceivehigherpricestheywouldbeencouragedtoproducemoreforthe
market.Since1975,theFoodStorageandMarketingprogramhadexpandedto
increasewarehousecapacityandtrainedadditionalstaff.Mostimportantly,since
1975,“4,450MTofbeans,Rwanda’sstaplecrop,ha[d]beenstoredand1,550MT
30USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”13.31USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1980,”May1978,4.
43
sold.”32ThisprogressbenefitedtheentirepopulationofRwanda.Asthebean
pricesstabilized,morebeanswerecultivatedandsold,benefitingallRwandans
economicallyandnutritionally.Whilethefirststageofthisprojectendedin
December1980,intheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1982,theFoodStorageand
MarketIIprojectwasoutlined.
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1982,writteninJune1980,explainedand
detailedtheextendedFoodStorageandMarketingIIprogram.Thisextension
plannedto“increasetheimpactandeffectivenessoftheRwandangovernment’s
grainandfoodpulsestorageandpricestabilizationprogram,andtodevelopa
strategicstorageprogram.”33USAIDestimatedthataboutfortypercentofRwanda’s
agriculturalproductionwasmonetized,callingforcontinuedassistancewiththe
FoodStorageandMarketingproject.TheFoodStorageandMarketingproject
workedtoincreasetheamountofcropsavailabletobeconsumedandsold.With
theincreasingmonetizationofcrops,theprojecthelpedtocontinuethatgrowth.
Theplanextension
outlinedprogramstostrengthenruralcooperativestoassembleandstoremarketablefarmsurplusesandtoexpandtheinterregionaltransportandmarketingsystemforthetransferofsurplusestodeficitareas.Amoreefficientmarketwillencourageincreasedproduction.34
Thefirststageoftheprojectwaseffectiveinservinginterregionalmarkets,andthe
secondphaseaimedtocontinuetoexpandthemarketsuccesses.Ultimatelythe
successofthisprojectledtoexpandedagriculturalprojectsbyUSAIDinRwanda.
32USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”4.33USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1982,”June1980,15.34USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”15.
44
Whilethereweremanymoreprojectsfocusingonagriculturalassistance,
thereweretwothatmostspecificallyhelpedtheFoodStorageandMarketing
project.TheCooperativeGrainStorageandLocalCropStorageprograms,initiated
in1978and1979,helpedaddressstorageandmarketingneedsatlocallevels.
Theseprogramsprovided“farmersthetoolsforincreasedcontrolovertimingof
salesandawiderrangeofmarketingoptions,thusgivingthemaroletoplayin
establishingbeanandsorghumprices.”35ThecontinuationoftheFoodStorageand
MarketingIIprojectdependedonregularexaminationsandwillbediscussed
furtherinthenextchapter.
Theseagriculturalassistanceprogramsdifferedfromprojectsduringthe
1960sinafewmajorways.Underthemodernizationmandateofthe1960s,food
storageprojectswouldhavebeengearedtowarddevelopingmodernindustryfor
trade.Incontrast,undertheneedsmandateofthe1970s,theseprojectsfocusedon
stabilizingfoodavailabilityandpricesforthelocalpopulation.TheFoodStorage
andMarketingprojectsandthesupportingagriculturalprogramsworkedto
increasefarmers’cropsforlocalmarketsandpersonalconsumption.Increasingthe
amountofcropsthatsurvivedeachseasonledtoincreasedavailabilityandvariety
forlocalfarmerstosellandbuy,improvingruraleconomicandhealthconditions.
Advancingfarmers’financialsituationsandnutritionfellunderRwanda’snewfocus
onruralcommunesandUSAID’sNewDirectionsMandate.Theamountoftimeand
resourcesmadeavailabletotheFoodStorageandMarketingprojectsdemonstrated
anothershiftfromthe1960s.InUSAID’sfirstdecadeassistingRwanda,therewere
35USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”15.
45
fewerfundsavailableandprojectsimplemented.WiththeNewDirectionsMandate
therewereincreasedlevelsoffinancialassistanceandattentionmadeavailableto
thesenewprojects.TheneedsmandateemployedbyUSAIDduringthe1970s
justifiedtheshiftfromthemodernizationpracticesofthe1960s,emphasizingthe
basichumanneedsofRwanda’sruralinhabitants.
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1979detailedanotherimportantproject,
theKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolprogramthatassistedtheGovernmentofRwandain
meetingitsagriculturalneeds.TheKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolwasamajor
institutionthattrainedlowerlevelagriculturalstaff.36BecauseRwandawasamong
thesixpoorestcountriesintheworld,hadthehighestpopulationdensityinAfrica,
andhadoverninetypercentofthepopulationrelyingonagriculturefortheir
livelihood,theKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolwascrucialtoimprovingRwanda’s
situation.
Thepurposeofthisprojectwasto“expandaninstitutionthatcouldprovidea
greaternumberofpracticallytrainedagriculturaltechnicians:extensionagents,
schoolteachersandruralvocationaleducationschoolsstaff.”37Withbetter‐trained
agriculturalistsandspecialists,agriculturalproductioninRwandacouldincrease.
Overathree‐yearperiod,USAIDassistedtheschoolinimprovingeducationby
providingconsultants,trainings,logisticalsupport,andmaterials.TheKibuye
SchoolwasuniqueinRwandaandwastheonlyschooltotrainyoungmenbetween
18and20yearsoldonadvancedscientificagriculturalpractices.
36USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”19.37USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”20.
46
Thetwo‐yearprogramemphasizedgeneralagriculture,forestry,botany,
ecology,soilscience,statistics,zoology,andvegetableproduction.USAIDassistance
increasedthenumberofgraduatesfrom25to50andprovidedmorepractical
instructionalcourses.ThecourseswereimprovedwithAmericanteachersworking
inKibuyeprovidingguidancefortheRwandanteachers.38Thisassistancebeganin
FY1979andcontinuedthroughFY1981,assumingthegovernmentofRwanda
wouldcarryonsupportafter1981.Fromthemid‐1970sthroughthe1980sUSAID
assistedandcreatedseveralagriculturalprojectsbeyondtheonesoutlinedabove.
Theseotherprojectsincludedsupportingthewomen’sagriculturalschoolandarea
agriculturalproduction.
ThemanyagriculturaldevelopmentprogramsimplementedbyUSAIDhelped
Rwandainmorewaysthanjustfoodproduction.TheKibuyeAgriculturalSchool
providedincreasededucationaloptions,similartotheBlacksmithsproject,tothe
ruralpopulation.WhilemanycouldnotaffordtoattendaRwandanuniversity,they
couldbenefitfromthevocationaltrainingprogramsfromUSAID.TheAgricultural
schooltaughtRwandansmethodstoimproveandincreaseagriculturalproduction,
whichhadobviouspositiveimpacts.Malnutritionandstarvationwereaddressed
withmorefoodavailableforconsumptionandfarmersimprovedeconomicallywith
moretosellindomesticmarkets.Despiteimprovedgrowingtechniques,without
appropriatestoragefacilitiestheincreasecropswouldbelost.TheFoodStorage
andMarketingprojectsweresupportedbysmallerscale,localizedprojects,
includingtheCooperativeGrainStorageandLocalCropStorageprojects.These
38USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”24.
47
agriculturalprojectssupportedtheNewDirectionsMandateandRwandan
governmentdevelopmentgoalsinawidevarietyofways,betteringthelivesand
healthofruralRwandansleadingtopotentialeconomicandsocialprosperity.
TheNewDirectionsMandatedidn’tsolelyemphasizeimprovingrural
agriculture,butrurallivingconditionsingeneral.Otherprojectsoriginatinginthe
mid‐1970sandcontinuingthroughthenextdecadeworkedwithinfrastructure,
ruralhealth,andfamilyplanning.Rwandahadnorailroadsandlimitedair
transport,makingroadstheprimarymodeoftransportation.Theroadsystem
consistedofbituminous‐surfacedroads,re‐graveledroads,veryoldgraveledroads
andlateriteroads.Since1971,trafficinRwandahadgrownatanannualrateoften
percentandthenumberofregisteredvehiclesinRwandain1976wasalmost
13,000.Byimprovingtheroadsystemcommunications,ruraldevelopmentwould
subsequentlyprogress.39Onemajorprojectundertakenduringthe1970sto
improveRwanda’slimitedtransportationnetworkwastomodernizetheKibuye‐
Gitaramaroad.FormallyknownastheRuralRoadproject,thismajorproject
includedtechnicalassistance,equipment,on‐the‐job‐trainingandfinancialsupport
toimprovetheentirelengthofroad.
TheKibuye‐GitaramaRoadisthemainconnectiontotheNileCrestarea,one
ofthepoorestandmostdenselypopulatedareasofRwanda.Whileinfrastructure
wasoneoftheprimaryfocusesforUSAIDduringthe1960s,thisprojectdiffered
fromthoseofoldmodernizationmandateinsignificantways.Themostobvious
waysitvariedfrominfrastructureprojectsofthepastwerethegoalsandintent
39USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”17.
48
behindtheproject.Duringthe1960s,projectswereprimarilyinKigaliorother
urbancenters;theseroadswereinthecountry,connectingrural,desperatelypoor
sectionsofRwanda.Thegoalwasnolongertohelpthegovernmentstabilizeand
expandafterindependence,buttoreachdisconnectedregionsofRwanda.Beyond
theobjectivetoexpandRwanda’sroadways,theRuralRoadprojectbuiltthisroad
specificallytoimprovetheconnectionbetweenmodernizedRwandaandthis
extremelypoorsectionofthecountry.Theintenttoallowassistancetoreachthis
regionwasmoreimportantthantheactualconstructionoftheroadbecausethe
NewDirectionsMandateputmoreemphasisonimprovingstandardsoflivingthan
ontheinfrastructureprojectsofthepast.
TheRuralRoadprojectwouldrepairthe93kmroadbetweenKibuyeand
Gitaramaoverthreeyears.ThepopulationalongtheZaire‐NileCrestbenefitedfrom
increasedcommunications,decreasedtransportationcosts,andwideraccessto
marketsforbothsellingandbuying.TheMinistryofPublicWorksalsobenefited
withthepossibilityofallocatingmorefundstootherroadrepairsandtheguidance
offoreigntechniciansinvolvedinthisproject.
TheAnnualBudgetReportFY1981,writteninJune1979,providedamidway
reportontheRuralRoadsproject.Therepairstothisstretchofroadpositively
impactedthe600,000inhabitantsoftheregionsociallyandeconomically.40The
RwandangovernmentprovidedsupervisionandskilledlaborfromthePublicWorks
ministryandunskilledlaborfromtheregion.DuringFY1980,testsanddesigns
werecompleted,identifyingproblemareas,andthenecessaryequipmentwas
40USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1981,”May1979,8.
49
delivered.ForFY1981,constructionoftheroadsurface,culvertsandbridges
began.Withtherateofprogresscontinuinguninterrupted,theRuralRoadproject
wascompletedinthethree‐yeartimelineandimprovedlivingconditionstoan
enormouslyimportantanddisconnectedsectionoftheRwandanpopulation.
TheRuralRoadprojectconnectingKibuyeandGitaramaworkedto
implementUSAID’sNewDirectionsMandateandRwandangovernment’sgoalsof
bringingdevelopmentassistancetotheruralpopulation.ThisRoadprojectallowed
thepoorestsectionofRwandaaccesstodevelopmentaid.Bymakingtheregion
moreaccessiblenotonlywouldUSAIDbeabletoexpandprojectsfocusedonthese
communities,butotherdonorscouldalsobecomeinvolved.Beforeaddressingthe
basichumanneedsoftheregions,donorsneededtoaccessthepopulationfor
assessment.
AnotherprojectaimedathelpingRwandanfarmersdescribedintheAnnual
BudgetReportFY1981wastheFishCultureprogram.Theprojectworkedto
“developthecapacityofRwandanfarmerstobuildandmaintainproductiveon‐farm
fishponds.”41TherewasahighdemandforfreshfishinRwandaandthematerials
necessaryforfishfarmingwerereadilyavailableinruralsectors,creatinga
possibilitytoimproveeconomicconditionsandthehealthofruralRwandans.The
USAIDFishCultureprojectinRwandawasbasedonthefishundertakenbycolonial
administratorsinZaireduringthe1950s.ThisprojectrequiredZairianstobuild
pondsandfarmfishforseveralyears.Whilethepondswereabandonedafter
41USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”20.
50
independence,theinitialresultsbenefitedthefarmersinvolved.42USAID’ssupport
forRwandanFishFarmswasconsistentwiththeNewDirectionsinitiativeto
increasefoodproductionandcombatmalnutrition.Thepredictedbenefitswere
numerousandcouldhaveaffectedtheentirecountry.Anestimated1,200fishponds
wouldproduce36MToffishon600farmsintenRwandanprefectureswithUSAID’s
support.
AnupdatedreportontheFishFarmsshowedpositivegrowth.Theproject
planningbeganin1978forFY1980,butbeforetheprojectevenbegan,theFish
CultureprojectwasextendedtoFY1984in1979.TheRwandangovernment
providedpersonnelforextensionservicesandpondconstruction,workspacefor
technicalstaffandlandfortheponds.ThisprojectaddressedseveraloftheNew
Directionsinitiatives:tocombathealthproblems,expandfoodproductionandoffer
alternativecropsforfarmerstogrow.
Similartothepositivebenefitsoftheagriculturalprojects,theFishCulture
projectdemonstratedtheNewDirectionsMandateandRwandangovernment
initiativesbyaddingeconomic,environmentalandnutritionaldiversityintherural
sectorsofRwanda.TheFishCultureprogramofferedanewoptionforfarmersin
themarket,toreducelandpressure,andimprovethehealthofthepopulace.Most
farmersgrewthesamecrops,creatingmorecompetitioninthemarket.Byadding
fishtothearrayofoptions,economicgainwaspossible.Thishelpedtoalleviatethe
overuseofRwanda’sfarmlandsandgavefarmersanewincomesourcethatwould
notdepletefieldsofvaluablenutrients.Finally,dietswereimprovedwithneeded
42USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1981,”10.
51
supplements,includingproteinandironfromfish.Thesethreeareasspecifically
demonstratedtheRwandangovernmentandNewDirectionsgoalsofaddressing
familyhealthcare,agriculturalassistanceandenvironmentaldegradation.
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1980alsodescribedthefirsthealth
servicesprojectaddressingruralhealthcareandfamilyplanning.TheRural
Health/FamilyPlanningprogramworkedto“improvethecapacityoftheRwandan
Governmenttodeliverruralhealthservicesbyup‐gradingandcreatingtheservices
atthedispensaryandhealthcenterlevels.”43Untilthisproject,USAID’sonly
involvementinRwanda’shealthsectorwasthroughPL480assistance,runbythe
CatholicReliefServicesfundingnutritioncentersandschoolfeedingprograms.The
projectdirectlyaddressedtherapidpopulationgrowthoccurringinRwanda,
stressingagriculturalproduction,amongmanyotherareas.TheRural
Health/FamilyPlanningprogramfocused“onnutrition,preventivemedicineand
familyplanningbyimprovingthenationalhealthdeliverysystemattheclinicand
dispensarylevels.”44USAIDrecognizedtheenormousundertakingsthisproject
wouldentailandcontinuedregularupdatesonitsprogressinsubsequentreports.
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1981providedthefirst‐yearupdateon
theproject.ToassisttheRwandangovernmentinmakingexistingmedicalservices
moreefficientandeffective,USAIDhelpedemphasizepreventivemedicineinthe
ruralsector.Atthesametime,USAIDfocusedontherapidpopulationgrowth
occurringinRwandaandpromotedknowledgeofchildspacingtechniques,
establishingeducationfamilyplanningactivitiesandeventuallyimplementinga
43USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”24.44USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”24.
52
nationalfamilyplanningprogram.InFY1980,theprojectbegantrainingprograms
forhealthworkersandconstructionofruralhealthcenters.45Theprojecthada
terminationdateofFY1984becausetheGovernmentofRwandademonstrated
increasedinterestandmotivationtotackletheburgeoningpopulationproblem.
Whilethisspecificprogramdidn’tcontinuepastthemid‐1980s,USAIDcontinuedto
beaprimarydonortoRwandaneffortstocopewithexcessivepopulationgrowthby
fundingeducationalfamilyhealthprograms.
TheRuralHealth/FamilyPlanningprojectwasthemostdirectproject
implementingthegoalsoftheRwandangovernmentandtheNewDirections
Mandate.Theotherprogramsdescribedaboveexecutedmanyofthesetgoalsina
varietyofways,whilethehealthprogramsdirectlybetteredthestandardofliving
forruralRwandans.Thishealthprojectworkedsolelytoimprovethehealthof
Rwandanfamilies,particularlymothersandchildren.Byofferingclasseson
nutrition,childspacing,andpreventativemedicineintheruralsector,theoverall
healthofRwandansimproved,thuspositivelyaffectingtheproduction,education
andtheoutlookofdevelopment.Withreducedlevelsofstressonfamilies,farmers
couldbestrongerandmoreproductive,childrencouldparticipatemorefullyin
school,andtheinvolvementindevelopmentprogramscouldincrease.
AlloftheprojectsdescribedworkedtowardimplementingtheNew
DirectionsgoalsinRwandabyfocusingonagriculture,health,andeducationto
improvethestandardoflivingforRwandans.IntheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY
1982,writteninJune1980,USAIDoutlineditslong‐rangegoalstocontinuehelping
45USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1981,”14.
53
ruralRwandansintothe1980s.Thesefuturegoalsincluded“achievementand
maintenanceofnormalfoodself‐sufficiency,developmentofinfrastructureto
improvedeliveryofessentialservicesandoff‐farmemploymentopportunities,
establishaviablesystemofstorageandmarketingofbasiccropsandprotectionof
naturalresources.”46BecauseUSAIDwasinvolvedinthebeginningstagesofkey
sectordevelopmentprograms,theUSAIDprograminRwandawasnotpredictedto
changedramaticallyforthenextthreetofiveyearsintothemid‐1980s.Butwith
decliningeconomicconditionsinRwandaandchangesinthepoliticalleadershipof
theUnitedStates,U.S.foreignassistancepolicywouldtakeanotherturn.
46USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”5.
Chapter3:EconomicInstabilityandtheReaganEra
While1962and1973markedyearswherechangesinbothRwandaandthe
U.S.transpirednearlysimultaneously–thecreationofUSAIDandRwandan
independence;theNewDirectionsMandateandRwanda’smilitarycoup–political
andideologicalshiftsaffectingaidduringthe1980sinthetwocountrieswere
separatedbyseveralyears.Apartfromthisdifference,allthreedecadesandshifts
didsharethemaincharacteristicthattheramificationsofthesesignaleventstook
yearstoemerge,demonstratingthelongandcomplicatedprocessofdevelopment
work.TheelectionofRonaldReaganin1980alteredthedirectionofAmerican
foreignpolicyandUSAID’smissionawayfromaneedsmandate.Likemostchanges
ofadministration,thenewfocustooktimetobecultivatedandimplementedin
Rwanda.ThisisevidentfromthenewprogramsthatemergedinRwanda
throughoutthedecade.Growingeconomicinstabilityinthe1980salsoledtoan
eventualcollapseoftheRwandanmarketin1986.Afterinvestigatingtheeventsin
theUnitedStatesandRwanda,ananalysisofUSAIDdocumentsandprojectreports
inRwandaduringthe1980swillshowhowtheseeventsinfluenceddevelopment
policyandpractice.
Duringthe1960sand1970s,U.S.“aidfordevelopmentha[d]alternated
betweenanemphasisonpromotinggrowth–througheconomicreforms,
infrastructureexpansion,businessservicecenters–andaddressingproblemsof
55
povertydirectly,forexample,byexpandingbasichealthandeducation.”1Bythe
timeRonaldReaganwaselectedPresidentin1980,theU.S.wasreturningtopolicy
reformsthatfocusedonfiscalpolicyandsupply‐sideeconomicsratherthanstate
interventionistpolicy.Thereturntoafreemarketfocusdifferedfromtheinitial
programsinthe1960sthatassistedthenewlyfoundedcountrytostabilizeafter
decolonization.Reagan’s“maininterestwastheColdWar,andheusedforeignaid
todirectlypromoteU.S.securityinterests.”2Includedwiththereemergenceof
securityissuesandeconomicgoals,USAIDbegantonarrowandreducethegoals
promotedthroughtheNewDirectionsMandate.
Theexcitementofincreasedaidinthe1970sledtoavarietyofnewprojects
inRwandaand,asthe1980sprogressed,USAIDbegantonarrowonthemore
crucialandpressingproblems,suchasagriculturalproductionanddemographics.
USAIDnotonlyfocusedinonspecificareasforprojects,butalsoworkedtocontinue
themosteffectiveandworthwhileapproaches.Thenarrowedscopeofthese
projectsdidcontinueinitiativesfromtheNewDirectionsMandate,buttheyalso
indirectly,andoccasionallydirectly,affectedtheeconomicandsecurityprograms
proposedbyReagan.Thesegoalsweremetthrough
anintegratedassistanceprogramfocusingonfreemarketprinciples,privatesectordialogues,andtechnicalassistanceprojectswhichpromoteagriculturalproduction,naturalresourcemanagement,familyplanning,smallandmediumenterprisesandhumanresourcedevelopmenttraining.3
1CarolLancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?(WashingtonD.C.:
CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008,48.2SamuelButterfield,U.S.DevelopmentAid:AnHistoricFirst:AchievementsandFailuresinthe
TwentiethCentury,(Westport:PraegerPublishers,2004),199.3USAID/Rwanda,“BriefingBook,”April1990,1.
56
ThebenefitsandendproductsofthecontinuedselectedNewDirectionsprojects
implicitlysupportedtheneweconomicgoalsofUSAID.Forexample,theincreased
agriculturaloutputfollowingnewfarmingtechniquestaughtbyUSAIDalsoledto
morecropstosellandtradeinUSAIDmarketprojects.Inthe1980s,these
continuingprojectsdidnotreceiveheadlineattention,butwereconsistently
discussedinUSAIDdocuments,asshownlaterinthechapter.
WhileU.S.foreignaidideologyshiftedtowardsliberalisminthe1980s,the
continuationofbasichumanneedsprojectsinRwandaalsodemonstratedthe
realitiesofaidontheground.Rwandaisaprimeexampleofthedualityofforeign
aid,anexamplethatdemonstratedboththeideologyandactualityofdevelopment.
Ineachdecadestudied,thebroadthemesofU.S.foreignaidcanbeseen,from
modernizationinthe1960stotheneedsmandateofthe1970s.Despitetheshift
towardsfreemarketpoliciesinthe1980s,projectsworkingtoimprovebasichuman
needsshowtherealityofaidinrecipientcountries.BecauseRwandawassmalland
strategicallyunimportant,aidworkersonthegroundusedtheirdiscretionto
continueprojectsnecessarytoRwandandevelopment,regardlessofthedirections
giveninWashington.
ThenewRepublicanplatformsetthetoneforReagan’sapproachtoU.S.
foreignassistance.Whilemanyprojectsfromthepastcontinuedintothe1980s,
programswithsimilargoalscontinuedtobecreated,includingagriculturalsupport
andfamilyplanninginitiatives.InthelastyearsoftheCarterAdministrationand
continuingduringbothofReagan’sterms,assistancepolicy“movedawayfrombasic
humanneedsandtowardmoresecuritydominationandthemoveawayfrom
57
securitytowardapolicyofgreatereconomiccooperation.”4Essentially,theReagan
administration’s“foreignassistanceobjectivesinAfrica[included]fostering
economicdevelopmentthroughfinancingprojectsorbalance‐of‐paymentssupport
conditionedonpolicyreforms,andprovidinghumanitarianrelief.”5These
objectiveswerefiscal,supply‐sideconcernsassociatedwithmarketreformsand
werepairedwithimprovingtheprivatesectorandbusinessopportunitiesinboth
AfricaandRwanda.
Thepolicyshiftrepresentedboththechangingneedsinrecipientcountries
andlong‐termU.S.goals.ThestrengtheningofColdWarrhetoricaddedtoincreased
securityconcernsandeconomicobjectivescombiningRwandanneedsandU.S.
concerns.AsRobertMcNamara,theSecretaryofDefenseforKennedyandJohnson
described,“securityisdevelopment.Withoutdevelopmenttherecanbenosecurity.
Adevelopingnationthatdoesnotinfactdevelopsimplycannotremainsecure.”6
Preventingthespreadofcommunismtothedevelopingworldwasacontinuedand
increasedsecurityinterestforReagan.WhilethiswasprimarilyaU.S.concern,
Americanpolicymakersjustifieditasdefendingdemocracyandcapitalismfor
Rwanda.Developmentaidinthe1980s“shiftedbacktosupportinggrowthand
emphasizedfundingofessentialeconomicreforms”tohelpprivateinvestmentrise
andleadtofastergrowth,“asopposedtopovertyalleviationduringthe1970s.”7
4Butterfield,145.5Butterfield,127.6DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofan
AmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),201.7CarolLancaster,TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwentyFirst
Century,(WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000),19.
58
TheshiftintheUnitedStatestowardeconomicconditionalitybeganbecause
ofthegrowinginternationaldebtcrisis.Inthelate1970s,theRwandaneconomy
improvedbecausetea,coffee,andcocoapricestripledbetween1975and1977.
DroughtinIndiaandfrostsinBrazilbenefittedAfricanexportersincludingKenya,
Uganda,Burundi,andRwanda.8Bytheearly1980s,however,growthwasslowing
asAsianandAmericancropsrecoveredand“exportrevenuesdeclined,importcosts
rose,andbudgetsincreased,andgovernmentsfoundthemselvesseriouslystrapped
forcash.”9Facingsevereeconomiccrises,manyAfricangovernments,includingthe
Rwandangovernment,soughtincreasedaidanddebtrelief.Thegeneralpattern
wasalsothatpoorcountries,suchasRwanda,tookoutloanstocontinueinvesting
inbasicneedsprojects,whichledtofurtherindebtedness.Following
Habyarimana’s1970scampaigntoincreaseRwandandevelopment,thegovernment
wasforcedtoborrowmoremoneytocontinuetheirownprojects,fundnewoffices,
andcreatenewdepartments.ThesepleasweremetwiththelatestshiftinU.S.
foreignpolicydirectedspecificallyateconomicconcerns.
WhilerecognizingtheimportantshifttowardmarketliberalisminAmerican
foreignpolicyobjectives,anexaminationofthesituationleadingtotheeconomic
downfallsofthe1980sinRwandaisalsonecessary.Duringthe1970s,Rwandahad
asmaller,morereasonablerelianceonaid,butbythe1980sthisdependencehad
grownenormously.Theeconomiccollapseresultingfrommanycropandmarket
failuresinRwandaledtoadecadeofuncertaintyandhardships.Asexportmonies
8CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtodo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:UniversityofChicago
Press,1999),24.9Lancaster,AidtoAfrica,26.
59
driedup,Rwandabeganborrowingheavily.TheRwandangovernmenthadstarted
multipledevelopmentprojectsduringthe1970sfollowingPresidentHabyarimana’s
declarationtoimprovelivingconditionsacrossthecountry.Withmanylargenew
programsbeginningintheearly1980s,thegovernmentwasforcedtoborrow
moneytocontinuedomesticdevelopment,specificallyintheruralsectorsof
Rwanda.
TherewereconsistentincreasesinfoodproductioninRwandafromthe
1960sthroughtheearly1980s,butby1985productionbegantostagnate.Although
growthremainedatareasonablerate,“betweenthemid‐1970sandthe1980sthe
combinationofadroughtandadecreaseininternationaldemandleftRwandawith
aheavydebtburden.”10Thepriceofcoffee,Rwanda’smainexportcrop,hadfallen
since1977,“thenroseagainafter1980beforefinallycollapsingin1986.”11This
inconsistencywastheprimarycauseofRwanda’seconomiccollapse,despite
increasedUSAIDeconomicprojectsinthecountry.Theeconomiccriseswerefirst
agriculturalbeforebecomingfinancial.
ThereweremorefactorsaffectingRwanda’sfinancialproblemsthansimply
plummetingcoffeeprices.WhilecoffeewasRwanda’schiefexport,thecountryalso
sufferedfromfailingteaandfoodstuffsprices,alongwithtroublesinthetinand
aluminumminingsectors.By1985,teaexportslostuptofortypercentoftheir
value,whichcompoundedthedecliningpricesofcoffee.Thedecreaseinfood
10MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:
CornellUniversity,2002),53.11GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,
1995),84.
60
productionappearedevenmoredrasticthanthesituationwithteaandcoffeein
globalmarkets.PeterUvinaptlydescribesthedecliningproduction,
Maizeproductionfellfrom110,00tonsin1983to90,000by1986andsubsequentlystagnated[atthe]90,000to100,000[ton]range.Similarly,sorghumproduction,whichwasat213,000tonsin1982,sliderraticallydownwardtoapproximately140,00tonsin1988and1989.Overtheperiod1984to1991,kilocaloriesproducedbyRwandanfarmersdroppedfrom2,055perpersonperdayto1,509.12
Thesechangesdecreasedfromanalreadylowlevelofproductiontoanintolerably
minimalamount.AsmostRwandanswerefarmers,theirpersonalincomeswere
affectedbythedecreaseinagriculturalproduction.Theslumpalsoaffected
Rwandanswhowerenotfarmersbutfacedinflation,poormarketpricesforother
tradeitems,andincreasedunemployment.Thisconjunctioncontributedtoan
agriculturalemergency.
TheagriculturalandeconomiccollapsethataffectedRwandawasasmuch
tiedtonaturalforcesasitwastomarketdeclines.A1984droughtwasfollowedby
excessiverainin1987andplantdiseasein1988.Pairedwiththesenaturalchanges,
increasedlandpressure,soilerosionandpovertycompoundedthesituation.13
IncreasingpopulationratesinRwanda,alreadythemostdenselypopulatedcountry
inAfrica,didnothelp.Buttheagriculturalcalamitieslisteddon’tprovidethefull
explanationforRwanda’seconomicproblems,asthe“collapseoftheminingsector,
togetherwiththefallincoffeeprices,broughtaboutanew,moreseverecrisis.”14
12PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian
Press,1998),54.13Uvin,57.14Uvin,57.
61
Followingthecollapseofcoffeeprices,worldtinpricesfellandledtothe
closingofRwanda’smines.ThecompaniesinchargeofRwanda’sothermineral
exports,includingcassiteriteandbauxite,15closedtheirproductionandfurther
deprivedRwandansofrevenue.Thecollapseofthesecropsandmarketsledtotens
ofthousandsofunemployedyoungmenwithoutfuturejobprospects.Itwasthis
situationthatUSAIDattemptedtocombat.WhileRwandaultimatelysufferedan
economicmeltdown,theeffortsofUSAIDmayhavealleviatedsomesuffering.The
collapsedemonstratedhowdesperatelyRwandaneededhelpfromorganizations
likeUSAID.
Alongwithdemonstratingwhatcrucialsocialdevelopmentprograms
continuedfromthe1970sintothe1980s,USAIDdocumentsalsoshowtheshifting
goalstowardmarketinitiativesofthe1980s.AsoutlinedbytheUSAIDreporton
thehistoryofitsinvolvementinRwanda,during1980theoverallmission
developmentgoalswereto“increasepercapitafoodproductionandeffectageneral
improvementinthehealthstatusoftheRwandanfamily,whilebringingthe
demographicprobleminbalancewithdevelopmentpotential.”16USAIDcouldmore
easilyrolloverprojectsstartedinthe1970s,butprojectsfocusingspecificallyon
theevolvingeconomicdownturntooklongertobecreatedandimplemented.Along
withtheeaseofcontinuingbasicneedsprograms,USAIDworkersinRwanda
recognizedtheneedtomaintainprojectsfromthe1970sdespitethechanged
15Cassiteriteisareddish,brownishoryellowingmineralcontainingtindioxide.Itisthemainoreoftin.Bauxiteisaclayeyrockthatisthechiefcommercialoreofaluminum.
16LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,17.
62
ideologyinWashington.MultipleprojectsdemonstratedhowUSAIDcontinuedto
tackletheareasofincreasedinterestfromthe1970s.
Beginningwithprojectstoimprovefamilyhealth,USAIDteamedwith
organizationssuchastheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)andUnitedNations
InternationalChildren’sEmergencyFund(UNICEF)toaddressdiseasesafflicting
childrenworldwide.Rwandawasoneofthefirstcountriestobeincludedinthe
programCombatting(sic)CommunicableChildhoodDiseases(CCCD)thatbeganin
1979tofightseveralbasicillnessesfacedbychildren.Bythefirstmonthsof1980,
theCentersforDiseaseControlincoordinationwithUSAIDbegantheExpanded
ProgramforImmunizations.Thisprogram,withsupportandfundingfromCCCD,
workedto“immunizechildrenunderfiveagainstmeasles,diphtheria,tetanus,
pertussis,tuberculosisandpolio.”17Providingcrucialservicesandmaterials,USAID
wasanintegralpartofthisprogram’ssuccess.Thevaccineswereadministered
throughlocaldispensariesbutneededtoremaincolduntilinjection.USAID
providedthecoldchainmaterialsthatkeptthemedicinerefrigeratedfromthe
manufactureruntiltheywerelocallydispensed.18
InMay1988,anexternalevaluationteamproducedthe“RwandaCCCDEnd
ofProjectEvaluation.”Thisextensivedocumentoutlinedthekeygoals,projects
implemented,andtheirsuccessandfailureratesfortheeightyearstheprojectran.
Thisprojectwasintended
tostrengtheninstitutionalsupportfortheseinterventionsbydevelopinganeffective,simplifiedhealthinformationsystem,strengthenestablishedtrainingandhealthinformationefforts,reinforcesystemsofsupervision,
17Grosz,18.18Grosz,18.
63
supportoperationsresearchandotherstudies,andencouragethedevelopmentofself‐financingmechanisms.19
Thesegoalswereclearlyseenthroughoutmanyoftheprogramsimplemented,most
specificallyintheExpandedProgramforImmunizationinRwanda.
ThereportexplainstheendresultsfortheExpandedProgramfor
Immunizations,withthesuccessratesforeachdiseasetargeted.Thetuberculosis
vaccineprovidedincreasedcoveragefrom49percentin1983to90percentin
1987;thediphtheria‐pertussis‐tetanusvaccinecoverageincreasedfrom36percent
to79percent;trivalentoralpoliovaccinewentfrom25percenttoalmost80
percent;andmeaslespreventionwentfrom53percentcoverageto75.20These
increasesinthenumberofimmunizationsgiven,thoughtheyunfortunatelydidnot
eliminatethediseasesentirely,didhaveamajorimpactondevelopmentinRwanda.
Bysignificantlyreducingthenumberofpeoplesusceptibletotheseailments,
Rwandaandotherhealthorganizationswereabletofocusonothermorepersistent
afflictions,suchasmalariaandnewlyemergingdiseaseslikeHIV/AIDS.21
TheresultsabovewerepresentedinUSAIDdocumentsandmaycontaina
certainamountofbias,buttheCCCDprogramoperatedaroundtheglobeandhad
significantsuccessoutsideofRwandaaswell.AccordingtotheWorldHealth
Organization,by1988“poliocasesworldwidedecreasedbyover99percentand
onlyfourcountriesretainpolio,”notincludingRwanda.22Whilethisisonedisease,
19ThomasBossert,“RwandaCCCDEndofProjectEvaluation,”May1988,7.20Bossert,“RwandaCCCD,”9.21Bossert,“RwandaCCCD,”9.22SamOkiror,“WorldHealthOrganization,Africa:Polioeradication,”
http://www.afro.who.int/en/rwanda/rwanda‐publications/bulletins/1932‐polio‐eradication.html(accessedMarch10,2011).
64
itsupportsthefactthatratesofdiseasesweredecliningwithhealthcampaigns,
includingtheExpandedProgramforImmunizationsinRwanda.Relatedtohealth
concerns,USAIDalsocontinuedtoworkondemographicproblemsinRwanda.
Whileitmayappearparadoxicaltoreducediseaseratesinthemostdensely
populatedcountryinAfrica,ultimatelytheendresultofbothhealthprogramsand
demographicprojectswerecomplimentary.Intheshortrun,diminishedinfection
ratesdidincreasepressureonscarceresources,however,improvingthehealthof
Rwandanseventuallyledtolowerbirthrates,positivelyaffectingdemographics.By
implementinghealthanddemographicprogramsatthesametime,retentionof
populationgrowthimproved.
PopulationgrowthratesbecameamajorconcernfortheUnitedStates
duringthe1960sand1970s,butwerenotacknowledgedbydevelopingregions
untilthe1980s.In1981,USAIDbeganamajorlong‐termbilateralprojectwiththe
GovernmentofRwandatoestablishaNationalOfficeofPopulation.Thedecreewas
approvedinSeptember1980,afteryearsofRwandandenialofagrowing
populationissue,andtheNationalPopulationOfficewascreatedinthefollowing
year.Theprojecthelpedcreatemethodstocollectpopulationdataand
subsequentlyanalyzeandevaluatetheresearch.TheOfficebegan“carryingout
studiesoftheproblemsaffectingthegrowthofthepopulation,evaluat[ing]the
importanceoftheseproblemsandpropos[ing]solutions.”23Thedatacollectedby
thenewofficehelpedRwandadevelopmethodstocurtailgrowthrateswith
guidanceandsupportfromUSAID.USAIDbroughtdemographicsissuestothe
23USAID/Rwanda,“CountryDevelopmentStrategyStatement:FY1983,”January1981,40.
65
government’sattention,providedevidence,supportedRwanda’sownPopulation
Office,andeventuallymadeRwandacapableofaddressingandsolvingtheirown
demographicproblems.
Practicestocurbpopulationgrowthandimprovematernalandchildhealth
carecontinuedinseveralprojectsthroughtothestartofthe1990s.Plans
establishedduringthefinalyearsofthe1980slayouttheFamilyPlanningIIproject.
Themaingoalofthisprojectwastoreducefertilityrates,butalsoworkedto
improvethehealthandsurvivalratesofchildrenandtherebyencourageparentsto
havefewerchildren.Byteachingpreventativehealthcareandencouraging
Rwandanstohavemorewantedandplannedpregnancies,thisprojectfellinline
withReagan’senforcementoftheMexicoCitypolicy.WhiletheMexicoCitypolicy
requiredallorganizations(stateandnon‐governmental)thatreceivedfederal
fundingtorefrainfromperformingorpromotingabortionservices,theFamily
PlanningIIprojectworkedtoreducefertilityratesbypreventingunwanted
pregnancies,notabortingthem.Workingfromandexpandingonevidenceand
materialsprovidedinpreviousmaternalandchildhealthcareprogramsand
demographicprojects,theFamilyPlanningIIprogram’sbase“forpolicymakingwas
improvedbecauseofbetterquality,timelinessandutilizationoffamilyplanning
statistics.”24ThevarietyintheseapproachesallowedUSAIDtoteachbetterhealth
practicesandsupportRwandainestablishingtheirownstrategyfortackling
populationpressures.
24USAID/Rwanda,“ActionPlan:FY1990‐1991,”May1989,7.
66
Developmentofagriculturalproductioncomplimenteddemographic
concernsandtheaimtoimproveRwandanshealth.InMarch1979,thepossibility
ofadministeringasurveyandanalysisofagricultureinRwandawasfirstproposed,
andresultedintheUSAIDAgriculturalEducationProject.TheRwandanMinistryof
AgricultureassistedUSAIDwithinvestigatingtheyearlyfooddataandproduction
rates.InJuly1979,ateamofU.S.consultantsworkedwiththeMinistryinRwanda
topreparean‘OutlineofaPossibleCollaborativeSurveyandAnalysisofAgriculture
inRwanda.’Basedonthesuggestionsfromtheresearchteam,aseriesofsmall
projectsweredesignedtohelpimproveandincreaseproduction,training,anddata
collection.25Thereweremanyotherprojectsbasedinagriculturalproductionthat
coincidedwiththeearly1980s.
InJune1981,theBudgetSubmissionReportforFY1983outlinedanother
agriculturalprojectsettostartbytheendof1983.Thepurposeofthisproject
transferred“theresultsofrelevantagriculturalresearchtothefarmlevelinselected
regions,andtest[ed]thefeasibilityofvalleylandagriculturalproduction.”26During
the1970s,foodproductioninRwandahadstagnatedduetoincreasedpopulation
pressures.WiththeassistanceoftheRwandangovernment,whichprovided
personnelandoperationalsupport,smallfarmerswerethefocusfordirectbenefits
withnewagriculturaltechnologies.TheaimwasforRwandanfamiliestohavemore
foodavailableandimprovethehealthofthepopulation(includingfertilityrates)by
improvingsmallfarmproduction.
25Grosz,19‐20.26USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1983,”June1981,7‐8.
67
OtherprojectsworkedtoimprovetheamountoffoodavailabletoRwandan
farmersandincreasetheirdailyfoodintake.Theseprojectsbeganinthe1970sand
continuedintothe1980s.TheFoodStorageandMarketingprogram,discussedin
depthinchaptertwo,hadalargeimpactonfarmproduction.Stemmingfromthe
FoodStorageandMarketingprogram,theLocalCropStorageProgramalso
supportedtheeffortstoprotectcropsandhelpsmallfarmersprotecttheirproduce
fromrodentsandrot.Lastly,theFishCultureProgramworkedtoreducethe
amountoffarmersplowingoverusedland,andprovidedneedednutritionalbenefits
ofproteinandothervitaminsintothedietsofRwandans.Withthehealthprograms
discussedabove,USAIDagriculturalprogramshelpedaddresshealthissuesandthe
growingpopulationproblemsinRwanda.
Thefamilyhealthandagriculturalprogramsdiscussedaboveindirectly
demonstratethenewdevelopmentgoalsofthe1980s.Supportingthegovernment
ofRwanda’sthirdfive‐yeardevelopmentplanwiththenewinitiativesfromthe
Reaganadministration,thesehealth‐relatedprojectsaimedtoimproveboththe
socialandeconomicconditionsofRwanda.Thefourprojectsthataddressed
immunizations,populationcontrol,andfamilyhealthpracticescontinuedintothe
1980sandrepresentedReagan’sinitiatives.Rwanda’seconomicconditionswould
havenochanceofsurvivalifthepopulationgrowthratewasnotaddressed.
Immunizingmorechildren,promotinghealthierrearingpracticesandteaching
improvedagriculturalmethodsledtobettereconomicpossibilities.Accompanying
thebasicneedsprogramsthatindirectlycontributedtotheneweconomicgoalsof
the1980swereprogramsthatdirectlyaffectedthemarketreformpolicies.The
68
MaternalChildHealth/FamilyPlanningIIProject,forexample,provided“fundsfor
privatesectorfamilyplanningdeliveryservices.”27Bycontinuingbasicneeds
programsthroughprivatesectororganizations,thegoalsofthe1970salsodirectly
supportedthenewinitiativesofthe1980s.
TheinitiativesbehindtheseprojectsdemonstratethechangedUSAID
directivesofthe1980sfromthe1970s.WiththeNewDirectionsMandateinthe
1970s,thesehealthpracticeswerehavebeengearedtowardimprovingtheliving
conditionsinRwanda.Whiletheprojectsinthe1980sstillachievedthesame
outcome,improvingthebasicneedsoftheruralpoor,themotivationbehindthese
projectsdiffered.Inthe1980s,USAIDworkedtoachieveeconomicreforms;and
withoutaddressingtheproblemsofasicklypopulaceanduncontrollablepopulation
growth,theeconomicconditionsinRwandawouldnothavebeenabletoimprove.
Althoughagriculturecontinuedtobeimportant,USAID’smainfocusin
Rwandaduringthe1980sturnedtomarketreforms.Whiletheprojectsdiscussed
abovedidnotdirectlyaffecttheeconomicconditionsinRwanda,theyhadalarge
indirectimpact.ThecapabilityofRwandanstoincreaseagriculturaloutputsand
improveeconomicpossibilitieswasencouragedbycontrollingthepopulation
growthratesandimprovingruralhealth.Theprincipalcausesofpovertyand
constraintstodevelopmentofanykindinclude“populationpressures,lowlevel
agriculturalproduction,andlimitedtrainedmanpower.”28USAIDbeganmore
directlyaddressingthematerialimprovementsofRwandans’livesandworkedto
increaseeconomicactivitythroughoutthe1980s.
27USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1991,”May1989,20.28USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1984,”June1982,2.
69
In1983,USAIDreadjusteditsmaindevelopmentgoalsinaccordancewith
changesinthesituationwithinRwanda.Theyearbefore,in1982Rwandareleased
itsthirdfiveyearplanfordevelopment,workingto“satisfythefoodneedsofthe
population;promotebetteruseofthecountry’shumanresources;improvethe
livingconditionsofthepopulation;andimproveRwanda’spositionvisàvisthe
exterior.”29ThenewUSAIDstrategiesexpandeduponandworkedwiththelatest
Rwandandevelopmentplanfor1982‐1986.By1985,USAID’sstrategieswerefine‐
tunedtoaddressfourprimaryU.S.concerns:“policyreformsthatdecentralize
administrativestructures,relyonfreemarketforcesandlimitedpopulationgrowth
rates;privateenterprisedevelopment;technologytransferandresearch;and
institutionaldevelopment.”30BycombiningthenewUSAIDgoalsandRwandan
initiatives,projectsworkingtoimprovethedailylivesofRwandanscontinuedwhile
newlydevelopedeconomicprogramswereimplemented.
USAIDenactedseveraleconomicpolicyprogramsthroughoutthe1980s,but
therewasoneprimaryprojectthatbeganin1985.USAIDandRwandasignedthe
PolicyReformInitiativesinManufacturingandEmployment(PRIME)agreementto
“supportRwandaneffortstomakenecessarystructuraladjustmentsandpolicy
changesinordertostimulateproductionandemploymentinthemanufacturing
sector.”31Essentially,PRIMEwasapolicyreformprojectthatsoughttochange
Rwanda’spolicyinfavorofprivatesectordevelopment.Thisprojectcombinedthe
neweconomicinitiativesofUSAIDandcontinuedthesocialdevelopmentsoutlined
29Grosz,23.30Grosz,23.31Grosz,38.
70
bytheRwandangovernment.BecauseofasmalleconomiccrisisinRwandaduring
1983to1984,PRIMEworkedtohelpthecountryrecoverandmakeimprovements
forthefuture.32
Theprojectconsistedofdifferentparts,includingfinancialsupportfor
technicalassistanceandadministeringspecificstudies.Thesestudiesincluded
lookingatindustrialincentivesandanalysesofhouseholdbudgets.Otherobjectives
includedimprovingagriculturaltechnologiesandservicestomaternalandchild
health,includingfamilyplanning,andencouragingeconomicgrowthandon‐farm
employmentopportunities.Alltheseobjectivesshaped“incentivesforagricultural
producers,…thedemographicproblem,and…theroleoftheprivatesectorinthe
economy.”33USAIDandtheRwandangovernmentcontinuedtoworktogether
throughthePRIMEprojecttoimproveoveralleconomicconditionsforthecountry.
AnupdateonPRIME’sprogresswasprovidedinthe“ActionPlanforFY
1990‐1991,”writteninMay1989.Theprivatesectorwasusedtoincreaseruralper
capitaincomes,andhadbeenmakingrealprogress.Throughtheobjectiveto
increasegeneralruralemployment,USAIDandtheRwandangovernmentmade
severalpolicychangesallowingforconditionsmorefavorablefortheprivatesector.
Oneexampleincludeda“redirectionfromprivatizationofstate‐ownedenterprises
toemphasizingsmallandmediumenterprises.”34Withyearlychecks,PRIME
remainedontarget,andmadesmalladjustmentsalongthewaythatcontinuedinto
the1990s.
32USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1988,”May1986,iii.33Grosz,39.34USAID/Rwanda,“ActonPlan:FY1990‐1991,”3.
71
PRIMEwasaperfectexampleofamarketreformprojectthatalsoconsidered
howsocialdevelopmentconcernscouldaffecttheireconomicgoals.Manyofthe
otherprogramsemployedduringthe1980sdidnottakeasmanyissuesinto
account;negativemarketpredictionsforthefuturethatinfluencedothereconomic
programsmoreheavily.Forexample,inJanuary1981whenthe“Country
DevelopmentStrategyStatementforFY1983”wasbeingwritten,USAIDworkers
wereworriedforRwanda’seconomicfuture.Rwanda’seconomywasalmost
completelydependentontheagriculturalsectorthatprovidedalmostninety
percentofthepopulationwithitslivelihood.Agriculture’s“shareofthegross
domesticproduct(GDP)hadfallenfrom76percentin1964to49percentin1976
andwasexpectedtofallfurtherto40percentin1980.”35Thismadeprospectsfor
1980unfavorable.
PredictionsfortheotherareasofproductioninRwandawerealso
pessimistic.ThegrowthpredictedinGDPwasnotexpectedtocoverthepopulation
growthratefortheproceedingyearsaswellasdeclineinagriculturalproduction
resultingfrompoorweatherconditions.Thedevelopmentoftheagriculturesector
“hasreceivedparamountconsiderationintheeconomicdevelopmentstrategy,with
thegovernment’soverridingobjectivesbeingtoattainrelativeself‐sufficiencyin
foodstuffs.”36USAIDrecognizedfallingteaandcoffeepricesasapotentialfor
economicdisaster.Coffeeproductionin1980wasprojectedtofall21percentto
21,400tonsfromthepreviousyear.Othercropshadalsobeenfalling,including
35USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”1.36USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”1.
72
pyrethrumandcinchona(quinine).37Thedebt‐serviceratio38wasalsoincreasingin
1980,from1.3percentin1970to3.8percentin1980andaforecastof4.0percent
in1981.39Rwandahadborrowedmoneytofunditsdevelopmentprojectsandkeep
thecountryrunningastheGDPfell.Allofthesefactorswerecreatingaworsening
pictureforRwanda.
USAIDcreatednewfinancialaidprogramstoaddressissueswiththe
worseningeconomicrealitiesinRwanda.InMay1986,the“AnnualBudget
SubmissionforFY1988”listedtherevisedobjectivesforRwanda.Buildingoff
increasingpercapitafoodproductionandimprovingRwandanfamilieshealth
statuses,USAIDadded“increasingemploymentandincomeespeciallyoftherural
populationthroughthepromotionofprivateenterpriseandincreaseagricultural
productionbyraisingtheproductivityandprofitabilityoffarming,”40tothelistof
goals.USAIDcreateddozensofprojectsinRwandabythemid‐1980sandthe
organizationlearnedthatbydedicatingmoretimetoresearchingand
understandingthesituationinRwanda,projectsweremorelikelytosucceedby
USAIDterms.SincetheUnitedStateswas“viewedasoneoftheleadersin
promotinginstitutionalreformsneededtoimplementeconomicpolicychange,”the
projectsaimedtohelpRwandarecoverhadtobewellplanned.41
37USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”3.38Ineconomicsandgovernmentfinance,debtserviceratioreferstotheratioofdebtservice
payments(principalplusinterest)ofacountrytotheirexportearnings.Acountry’sfinancesarehealthierwhentheratioislower.
39USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1984,”3.40USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1988,”iii.41USAID/Rwanda,“CountryDevelopmentStrategyStatement:FY1989,”March1987,35.
73
Beginninginthelate1980s,USAIDbegantwoprogramsfocusedon
enterprisedevelopment,oneprivateandtheotherrural,bothquintessential
interestsofmarketreform–promotingentrepreneurship,privateenterprise,and
policyreformsfavorabletomarkets.ThePrivateEnterpriseDevelopmentproject
hadtwotargets.Thefirsttargetwastoprovidereinforcedmanagement,financial
andmarketingskillstosmallandmediumenterprises.Thisentailedhiringtrained
employeesintheprivatesectorandofferingtwentyseminarsforon‐the‐job
training.Thesecondtargetwastoidentifyappropriatetechnologiesfortherural
area.While‘appropriatetechnologies’wasa1970sbasicneedsbuzzword,theidea
behindfindingtechnologybestsuitedfordevelopingregionscontinuedwithnew
developmenttrends.Anexampleprovidedofappropriatetechnologyincluded
installingsunflowermillsindifferentcooperatives.TheRuralEnterprise
Developmentprogramidentifiednewopportunitiesforruralinvestments.This
projectincreasedtheinvolvementofnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGO)in
privateenterprisedevelopmentandofferedcoursesinaccountingandfeasibility
studiestohelpmakeruralemployeesmoredesirable.42NGOswerepromoted
duringboththe1970sand1980s,butfordifferentreasons.Thebasicneeds
mandateofthe1970ssawNGOsasmorelocal,closertothepoor,andsmaller;but
the1980sreformersviewedthemasnon‐state,privateorganizations.
Outlinedin1989,USAIDbeganaLocalCurrencyprogramthatworkedto
increaseprivatesectoreconomicgrowthintheruralprovincesofRwanda.Support
42USAID/Rwanda,“ActonPlan:FY1990‐1991,”17.
74
fromthisprojectprovidedover850,000U.S.dollars43forruralinfrastructure.Rural
infrastructureincludedcentersforartisans,smallproducersandcooperative
members.Almost700,000dollarsweregiventosupportruralartisansandyouth
groups.Thissupportcameintheformoftrainingonmanagementprinciples,
entrepreneurship,andcooperativedevelopment.440,000dollarsweregivenfor
Rwandansworkinginsmallindustriestoreceivetrainingandstudytours.Finally,
almost100,000dollarswereprovidedtofinancetrainingactivitiesforwomen,with
another65,000forcreditavailabletoparticipatingwomen.44
ForFY1990,theRwandangovernmentredirectedemphasisfrom
privatizationtosupportforsmallandmediumenterprises.Thisredirection
supportedUSAIDstrategiestoincreaseproductiveoff‐farmemployment
opportunities.TheUSAIDstrategycontinuedtosupport“theprivatesectorthrough
providingsupportdirectlytothegovernmentofRwandathrough[their]private
sectorprojectsorbyfinancingstudiesthroughPRIME.”45USAID’sprivatesector
strategywasdesignedtocomplementRwanda’sprivatizationplans,soasto
increasethepossibilitiesforsuccess.
Rwandainitiallylaunchedtheirprivatizationeffortsinthemid‐1980s,but
littleprogresshadbeenmadebyOctober1986whenthegovernmentdevelopeda
draftprivatizationstrategy.Privatizationhadbeenfocusedtoward“improving
parastatalefficiency,”butfollowingtheeconomiccrisesattentionwasfocusedon
immediatebudgetandbalanceofpaymentproblems.Withthegovernmentof
43AllsubsequentdiscussionsoffundswillbeinU.S.dollars.44USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”15‐16.45USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”20.
75
Rwanda’sattentiondiverted,USAIDworkedtobeginprivatizingsmallsectors
includingnurseries,bakeriesandfisheries.Fortunately,progresswasmadeunder
PRIME,“wherethegovernmentofRwandashow[ed]strongerinterestsin
promotingtheprivatesectorinkeyareassuchastourism,transport,educationand
trade.”FollowingUSAID’slead,Rwandaplannedtoimprovethe“business
investmentclimatebyeasingrestrictionsandadministrativeproceduresfornew
firms.”46
Onefinaleconomicprojectdesignedinthelate1980sincludedanotherRural
EnterpriseDevelopmentProject(whilethisprojecthadthesamenameasa
previousproject,itwasadistinctprogram).Fivemilliondollarsweredesignated
fordispersalbyFY1992tohelpcreateproductiveruralemployment.Accordingto
thereport,“theCooperativeTrainingandthePrivateEnterpriseprojectsha[d]
shownthatsmallandmediumenterprises,whengivenassistance,trainingand
credit,canincreaseproductivityandmember’spercapitaincomeandstimulate
ruralinvestment.”47TheRuralEnterpriseDevelopmentprojectbuiltonthesuccess
ofthesetwopastprojectswithtechnicalassistanceandtrainingforbothruralmen
andwomen.
Theeconomicdevelopmentprojectsdescribedrepresentthedirectmethods
USAIDemployedinthe1980s.Whilethesocialprojectscontinuedfromthe1970s
indirectlyhelpedeconomicconditions,theprogramsofthe1980sactivelyworked
tohelpprivate,public,andruraldevelopment.IttookyearsfortheRwandan
46USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1990,”26.47USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”47.
76
economytocollapse,andyearsforUSAIDtocreatemoreappropriateprogramsto
addressthesefailingconditions.ButwiththenewdirectionsfromReagan,the
economicmindsetwasreadyinUSAIDtohelpRwandarecover.
WhileUSAIDcontinuedthemostimportantbasicneedsprogramsinRwanda
fromthe1970s,theseprojectsalsocontributedtothenewfocusonmarketreform.
USAID’sincreasedfocusonRwandaneconomicgrowthduringthe1980sbeganwith
theelectionofPresidentReaganprovidingtheAmericanstimulusandinconsistent
commoditypricesonRwanda’sexports,thusprovidingtheRwandanstimulus.With
arefocusoneconomicandmarketissuesfromUSAIDandanewcrucialneedfor
financialassistanceinRwanda,thesetwoshiftsworkedintandemtoaddressthe
problemsofthe1980s.
Conclusion
In1990,afterthecountry’seconomiccollapse,theRwandangovernment
signedastructuraladjustmentprogram(SAP)withtheWorldBanktoaddressthe
country’scontinuedfinancialdecline.InitiallyRwandaresistedsigningtheSAP
becauseofthestipulationsattachedtotheagreement,butwithyearsofpressure
fromtheWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)toadjustitseconomic
positionfinally,theRwandangovernmentagreedin1990.Theseprovisions
includedmanyfundamentalstructuralchangestotheRwandangovernment.
Rwandareceived$90millioninSAPloanstopromotefiscalandmonetary
discipline.ThegoalsoftheSAPincludedboostingcoffeeexports,reducingimports,
anddevaluingtheRwandesefranc.1WhiletheIMFandWorldBankbeganhandling
Rwanda’seconomicrecovery,theUnitedStatesrefocusedUSAIDprojectstoreflect
thelatestshifts.
Threemajoreventsintheearly1990sdramaticallyaffectedUSAID’spolicies
inRwanda.First,astipulationthataccompaniedthestructuraladjustmentprogram
requiredthatRwandawouldbecomeamultipartydemocracyin1990.Second,
almostimmediatelyfollowingthischange,theRwandesePatrioticFront(RPF),
comprisedofTutsirefugeesfromUganda,invadedRwandaonOctober1,1990.
Thismarkedthebeginningofafour‐yearcivilwar,eventuallyleadingtogenocide.
Third,theendoftheColdWarin1991significantlytransformedU.S.foreignpolicy.
TheseshiftsguidedUSAIDprojectstoexpanddemocracyinRwanda.
1PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian
Press,1998),58.
78
TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1993,writtenJune1991,explainedthe
changingsituationinRwandaandthenewUSAIDgoalsfordemocratization.The
USAIDteam“decidedthatthetime[was]rightforincreasedU.S.activitiesin
supportofthedemocratizationprocess.”2Theobjectivesforthesenewprojects
includedsupportforimprovedgovernanceandstrengtheninglocaladministrative
structures.Whilethereareotherexamples,thefollowingprojectshowsageneral
approachofUSAID’ssupportforRwanda’stransition.
TheDemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceProjectIdentificationDocument
OutlinefromApril1992describestheprogressingdemocratizationofRwandawith
USAID’sassistance.ThenewDemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceprojectworked
to“produceanewsocialcontractinRwandathroughwhichalltheRwandanpeople
shareequitablyintheprocessesofdemocraticself‐governance,peacefullyenjoy
basicfreedomandjustice.”3ThisprojectreflectedanewtypeofUSAIDprograms
designedtopromoteRwandandemocratizationbeforethe1994genocide.
USAID’sobjectivesinRwandaduringthe1960s,1970s,and1980swere
impactedbyclear,discernablepolitical,social,andeconomicchanges.These
changesrepresenttheevolvingdevelopmentideologyofU.S.foreignpolicyfrom
modernizationtheory,toaneedsmandate,andlater,marketliberalization.During
1962,PresidentKennedycreatedUSAIDandRwandaformallydeclared
independence.1973sawtheadoptionoftheNewDirectionsMandatemonthsafter
2USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1993,”June1991,52.3HarlanHobgoodandThomasKelly,“DemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceProject
IdentificationDocumentOutline(USAID/RwandaProjectNo.696‐0130),”April1992,4‐5.
79
JuvenalHabyarimanaledamilitarycoupinRwandaandtookpower.Duringthe
1980s,PresidentReaganplacedanewemphasisonthefreemarketandsecurity
intereststhatcoincidedwithfinancialcrisesinRwanda.Shiftscontinuedintothe
1990s.
Tounderstandwhytheseshiftsoccurred,onemustexaminetrendsand
eventsinRwandaandtheUnitedStatesbetweenthe1960sandthe1990s.Glenn
Slocum,aformerUSAIDemployee,summarizedthechanginginterestsofU.S.
foreignaidpolicies:
Thesixtieswerethetimeofindustrialdevelopment,withtherushfortechnicalassistancedevelopmentprojects.The‘70s,wewerecalledtohelpthedevelopingworldtomeetbasichumanneeds.Theeightiesbroughtarecognitionthatwehadtopaymoreattentiontotheprivatesectorastheengineofdevelopmentinmostcountries.ThiscoincidedwithaconservativeRepublicanadministration.4
Slocum’soutlinedemonstratesthereactionaryqualityofdevelopmentassistancein
thepast,explainingthatmanyofthepoliciesenactedaddressedconsequencesof
earlierprograms.Continuallycorrectingunforeseenproblemsassociatedwithpast
policieslendstoanappearanceofineffectiveness.Becausedonorcountriesfixated
onproblemscreatedbytheirpoliciesinsteadoftheinherentproblemswithin
recipientcountries,aid’seffectivenesswaslimited.Bystudyingthehistoryof
developmentassistance,policymakerscanlearnfromsomeofthesesuccessesand
failures.
Despitetheappearanceofinefficientprograms,foreignassistancehasmade
somepositiveimpactsondevelopment.AsHariadeneJohnson,aformerUSAID
4AmbassadorGlennSlocum,oralhistoryinterview,GeorgetownUniversityLibrary,18
November1998,121.
80
employeeexplained,USAIDprograms“reallyworkedinRwandaandhadinmany
waysanimpactuponthecountry;apromisingfuture.”5Whilethisperspectiveis
useful,itonlyprovidesonesideofthestory.Historicalanalysisisneededfromboth
theAmericanandRwandanperspectivestofullyassessthesuccessesandfailuresof
developmentaid.
EquallyimportanttoamorecompletestudyofdevelopmentaidinRwandais
scholarshipindependentofthe1994genocide.AcademicsthatapproachRwandan
historyfromalinearperspectiveculminatinginthegenocidefundamentally
simplifythecountry’sdiversepast.Scholarstakingthisapproach,includingJan
Vansina,MahmoodMamdani,andPeterUvin,presentadeterministicviewof
Rwandanhistory.Thepurposeoftheseacademicworksistotracetheoriginsofthe
genocidenotunderstandthefullbreadthofRwanda’spast.Asaresult,theyoften
missbroaderimplicationsoftheirtopics.AfricanhistorianJanVansinawrotehis
bookAntecedentstoModernRwandainanefforttocorrecttermsoftribalviolence
toutedbythemedia.WhilehisworklooksatancientRwandanhistoryendingin
1900,hisintentioncentersonbetterunderstandingthegenocide.Anthropologist
MahmoodMamdani’sWhenVictimsBecomeKillersexplainshowtheeffectsof
colonialismcontributedtothegrowingethnicviolencethatledtothegenocide.And
politicalscientistPeterUvin’sAidingViolencetraceshowinternationaldevelopment
aidwasafactorintheincreasingstructuralviolencewithinRwanda,eventually
contributingtothegenocide.Whileunderstandingtherolesthatthesetopicsplayed
inthegenocide’sformationiscrucialandtheanalysisoftheRwandangenocideis
5AmbassadorHariadeneJohnson,oralhistoryinterview,GeorgetownUniversityLibrary,8September1998,165.
81
important,thesolefocusonviolencesimplifiesthecomplexityofRwanda’shistory.
ThisthesiscontributestotheformationofabroaderunderstandingofRwandan
history.
Thoughasmall,seeminglyinsignificantcountry,Rwanda’shistoryis
importantinmanyrights.Newscholarshipaddingtotheincompleteliteratureon
thehistoryofRwanda,independentofthegenocide,workstoreinterpretitsimage.
RwandaneedstoreclaimitsimageasadiversecountrysincetheWesthasuseditas
anexample,symbol,andwarningoftheopposite.Initiallythe“posterchild”of
development,Rwandawastoutedasthe“SwitzerlandofAfrica”bydonornations,
butinthewakeofthegenocideRwandawasusedasanexampleofthebarbaric
natureofAfricans.Othercountriesarewarnedtoavoidbecoming“thenext
Rwanda.”ThisstereotypeisperpetuatedinthecoverageofAfricanconflictstoday.
AustralianJournalistDanMcDougall’sarticle“EchoesofRwandainIvoryCoast
KillingFields,”drawsconnectionsbetweentheRwandangenocideandtheviolence
occurringintheIvoryCoast.6NewYorkTimescolumnistNicholasKristof,reporting
ontheLibyancivilwarcommentedthat“iftheLibyaoperationissuccessful,itmay
helptheemergingdoctrineofthe‘responsibilitytoprotect’–alandmarknotionin
internationallaw…thatmighthelpavertthenextRwanda.”7Thisthesisworksto
disruptthissimplifyingdiscoursebyreinterpretingRwandanhistoryindependent
ofthegenocide.
6DanMcCougall,“EchoesofRwandainIvoryCoastKillingFields,”TheAustralianSunday
Times,April11,2011.7NicholasKristof,“LearningfromPerviousMistakes,”NorthAdamsTranscript(MA),April4,
2011.
82
Asdemonstrated,U.S.foreignpolicychangedduringeachdecadebetween
1962andthe1990s,reflectingpolitical,economic,andsocialshiftswithinRwanda
andAmerica.USAID/RwandaprogramsillustratetheUnitedStates’changing
developmentideology,butalsothedissonantrealitiesofimplementingaid‘onthe
ground.’WhiledevelopmentphilosophyshiftedintheU.S.,USAIDcontinuedto
implementprogramsnecessaryforRwandandevelopment.Theseshiftscanbe
identifiedandexaminedthroughUSAIDprojectreportsthatrevealthereasons
behindnewgoalsandprograms.Thehistoricalstudyofdevelopmentaidisneeded
tohelpcontextualizepastprograms,butalsomakeforeignpolicyaidmoreeffective
forthefuture.Withtoomanygeneralities,developmentpoliciesbecomeless
efficient.Bycreatingmorespecificprogramswithtailoredpoliciestoeachrecipient
country,developmentaidcanbecomemoreeffective.
83
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