The logic of aid: American foreign policy and USAID in Rwanda

James Madison UniversityJMU Scholarly Commons

Masters Theses The Graduate School

Spring 2011

The logic of aid: American foreign policy andUSAID in RwandaAriel F. HendricksonJames Madison University

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Recommended CitationHendrickson, Ariel F., "The logic of aid: American foreign policy and USAID in Rwanda" (2011). Masters Theses. 233.https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/233

TheLogicofAid:AmericanForeignPolicyandUSAIDinRwanda

ArielF.Hendrickson

AthesissubmittedtotheGraduateFacultyof

JAMESMADISONUNIVERSITYIn

PartialFulfillmentoftheRequirements

forthedegreeof

MasterofArts

History

May2011

ii

Acknowledgements

IwouldliketothankmembersoftheJamesMadisonUniversityfacultywho

workeddirectlytomakethisthesispossible.Theguidance,critiques,and

encouragementfrommythesisdirector,Dr.MichaelGubser,ensuredthatthisisthe

bestproductIwascapableofcreating.Dr.DavidOwusu‐AnsahandDr.LamontKing

providedusefulfeedbackandsupportthroughoutmygraduatecareerandthesis

writingprocess.

Iwouldalsoliketothankmyfamilyandfriendsfortheirmoralsupport,

editorialassistanceandneededdistractionsthroughoutthelasttwoyears.

iii

TableofContents

Acknowledgements…………………………………..…………………………………………………ii

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………..…iv

I.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………..1

II.Chapter1:TheDecadeofDevelopment…………………………………………………….12

III.Chapter2:“NewDirections”forRwanda…………………………………………...........30

IV.Chapter3:EconomicInstabilityandtheReaganEra…………………………………54

V.Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………77

VI.Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………..83

iv

Abstract

SincetheendofWorldWarII,developmentaidhasbecomeapermanent

fixtureofU.S.foreignpolicy.TheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternational

Development(USAID)hasbeentheprimaryorganizationforimplementingthe

Americangovernment’sdevelopmentpolicies.Becauseofthis,USAIDprovidesan

excellentlensforviewingthehistoricaltrajectoryofAmericandevelopmentaid.

USAID’sexperienceinRwandademonstratesthebroadpolicyshiftsthatdefinethis

historicaltrajectory.Duringthe1960s,modernizationtheorydirecteddevelopment

projects.Inthe1970sthisshiftedtoaneeds‐basedmandate,andduringthe1980s

marketliberalizationprogramsdefinedUSAID’sobjectives.Therichrelationship

betweenUSAIDandRwandaexemplifiesthegapexistingindevelopmentaid

betweenideologyandpracticality.Developmentaid’svalueindeterminingforeign

policyhasalsobeenunderappreciatedbyscholars,andthecomprehensivereview

ofUSAIDprojectsprovidedaimstocontributetoresolvingtheseshortcomings.

Introduction

Rwandareceivedtremendousinternationalattentionduringthe1990sasa

resultofitscivilwarandgenocide.Themedia,politicians,andscholarshighlighted

manydifferentaspectsofthegenocide,includingtheroleplayedbydevelopment

andforeignaidintheintensificationofethnicanimosities.Internationalrelations

scholarMichaelBarnetthaslamentedthat“post‐1995historiesofRwandahavetwo

definingcharacteristics.One,they’rewrittenfromthevantagepointofthe

genocide.Second,they’rewrittenwithaneyetocorrectwhatareseenas

misconceptionsofthecountry’shistory.”1Bycriticizingscholarsfornarrowing

theirunderstandingtoonecrucialevent,Barnetthasidentifiedamajorshortcoming

inthegrowingliteratureonRwanda.Whileanalysisofthegenocideisnecessary,

Rwanda’shistoryisnotteleological;itdoesnotleadonlytothegenocide.

ByexaminingthehistoryofU.S.aidtoRwanda,adiscussionofRwanda’s

historycanbeginwithoutthegenocideloomingintheforeground.Byfocusingon

USAID’srolefrom1962throughthe1980s,theshiftsinforeignaidcanbeidentified

asmovingfrommodernizationpracticestoaddressingbasichumanneedsand

endingwithmarketreformpolicies.Thisapproachrevealsontheonehandthe

generalideologicalmovementofU.S.foreignaidpolicy,butitcanalsobeseenthat

Rwandaprogramsreflectedthelocalrealitiesofimplementingaidanddidnot

simplytoetheWashingtonline.AsRwandawasremoteandratherunimportant

strategically,aidmanagershadsomelatitudeforcreativeprogrammingspecificto

Rwandanneeds.Theeffectsofthisdistancecanmostclearlyberecognizedinthe

1MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:CornellUniversity,2002),49.

2

programsofthe1980swhenoldprogrammingpoliciesaddressingbasichuman

needslingeredinRwandaaftertheideologicalwindshadchangedinWashington.

ThisthesisfocusesonUnitedStates’involvementinRwandandevelopment

andexamineswhatchangesaffectedUSAID’spositionandobjectivesduringthe

1960s,1970s,and1980s.Althoughtheemergenceofdevelopmentassistanceis

quiterecent,aidhasalreadybecomeapermanentfixtureinforeignpolicyprograms

acrosstheglobe.AscountriesliketheUnitedStatescontinuetofundaidprojectsit

isimportanttounderstandtheirorigins,influencesandrecipients.Byanalyzing

pastprojects,scholarsareabletodetermineifaidhasbeeneffectiveandmake

recommendationsaboutworthwhileassistance.Finally,conclusionsonthevalueof

aidwillleadtoeducatedpolicyrecommendationstoimproveassistanceprograms

ofthefuture.AnthropologistJamesFergusoncriticallyexplainstheimportanceof

developmentasacentralvalueofourtimesaying“warsarefoughtandcoupsare

launchedinitsname.Entiresystemsofgovernmentandphilosophyareevaluated

accordingtotheirabilitytopromoteit.”2Beyondstudyingtheroleofaidindonor

countries,thehistoryofdevelopmentassistancealsoilluminateschangesin

recipientcountries.Manycountries,includingRwanda,arestillrecently

independentandrecognizingtheroleWesternnationsplayedsincecolonialismis

crucialinunderstandinghowthesenationsfunctiontoday.

Threesub‐questionswillbeconsideredtohelpexaminetheroleUSAID

playedinRwanda’sdevelopment.First,whatwerethespecificprojectsundertaken

byUSAIDinRwandaduringthesedecades?Second,howdidthegoalsand

2JamesFerguson,TheAnti­PoliticsMachine:“Development,”DepoliticizationandBureaucraticPowerinLesotho,(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1994),xiii.

3

characteristicsoftheseprojectschangeovertime?Lastly,dideventsinRwanda

leadtochangesinUSAIDprojectsorwerechangesdrivenbydevelopmentsinU.S.

foreignpolicy?ResearchonRwandanhistory,U.S.policy,andtheUSAIDarchives

revealmajoreconomic,political,andsocialeventsgloballyandwithinboth

countriesthatinfluencedUSAID’sevolvingobjectivesineachdecade.

Duringthe1960s,PresidentKennedycreatedUSAIDinaccordancewithhis

missiontopromotedevelopmentasameansofwinningColdWarallies.

Modernizationtheoristsbelievedthatlesserdevelopedregionscouldbemore

susceptibletocommunism,3providingtheU.S.reasontosupplyaidtothirdworld

countries.Anothermotivationforsupplyingaidtothedevelopingworldwas

humanitarian,suchasresponsestonaturaldisastersandfamine.Kennedyworked

todistanceaidprogramsfromU.S.diplomacy,ashesawEisenhower’spast

programsasshortsightedandtoonarrowlyfocusedonstrategicpurposes.

Kennedy’sworkcombiningtheacquisitionofalliesandfocusingonhumanitarian

developmentprojects,includingeducationandhealth,allowedUSAIDtomoveaway

fromdevelopmentmissionsofthepast.

Atthesametime,RwandafollowedthetidesweepingacrossAfricaand

declaredindependencefromBelgium.Beginninginthelate1950s,Africannations

rejectedtheircolonialtiesanddeclaredindependence.ThemajorityofAfrican

countriesgainedindependenceduringthe1960s.BoththecreationofUSAIDand

3Worksonmodernizationtheoryinclude:W.WRostow,TheStagesofEconomicGrowth:A

Non­CommunistManifesto,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1960);NilsGilman,MandarinsoftheFuture:ModernizationTheoryinColdWarAmerica,(Baltimore:theJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2003);andMichaelLatham,Modernizationasideology:AmericanSocialScienceand“NationBuilding”intheKennedyEra,(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2000).

4

Rwandanindependencesetupthelong‐standingdevelopmentrelationshipbetween

theUnitedStatesandRwanda.ThisalsosetinplacethetrajectoryofU.S.foreignaid

beginningwithmodernizationpractices.

Twokeyeventsdistinguishedaidpolicyinthe1970sfromthatofthe1960s.

In1973theUnitedStatesCongressenactedtheNewDirectionsMandatetorefocus

foreignaidonthepoorestofthepoor.NewinternalpressureswithinAmerica,

includinglobbiesoriginatingfromthecivilrightsmovementandtheendofthe

VietnamWar,forcedCongresstorethinkandrefocusforeignaid.This

CongressionalmandateoccurredthesameyearthatamilitarycoupmadeJuvenal

HabyarimanaRwanda’spresident.HabyarimanareplacedGrégoireKayibanda,the

presidentsinceRwandagainedindependence.Thesetwochangesexpandedthe

establishedrelationshipofforeignassistancebetweentheUnitedStatesand

RwandaandshiftedU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesfrommodernizationtoaneeds

mandate.

Finally,duringthe1980s,theU.S.witnessedapoliticalshifttotherightwith

theelectionofPresidentRonaldReaganandanothershiftinthetrajectoryofU.S.

foreignaidfromthe1970sneedsmandatetoaliberalizationfocus.Witha

Republicaninoffice,theU.S.putanewemphasisonfreemarketforces.Thisfocus

oneconomicreformprograms,specificallymarketliberalization,workedto

complementPresidentReagan’splatformofincreasedsecurityandtargetinglesser‐

developedregionstobooststabilityanddemocracy.Thoughprogramsinthe1960s

workedtoestablishbasiceconomicpolicesforthenewlyindependentnations,the

projectsofthe1980sreflectedanunderstandingbasedonadifferentideologyofthe

5

specificeconomicneedsofindividualcountries.Modernizationpracticesofthe

1960sinvolvedstatedirectionwhile1980sliberalizationstressedstateretraction.

Thesenewprogramsworkedonprivatizationanddiversificationofproducts.Even

thoughReaganshiftedUSAID’semphasisinRwandatomarketreform,Rwanda’s

economybeganrapidlydecliningandeventuallycollapsed.Theglobaleconomic

downturnalongwithinternalproblemsduringthe1980sledtoadeclineinprices

forRwanda’stopcommoditiesandseverelydamagedthecountry’seconomy.The

tumblingmarketforcoffeeandtea,Rwanda’smajorexports,anddisastrousweather

conditionsdestroyedthesecashcrops.

ThroughanexaminationofUSAIDdocuments,itbecomesclearthatideology

setsthedecadesapartalongwithmajoreconomic,political,andsocialeventsthat

shiftedUSAID’sdevelopmentobjectivesinRwandaduringeachofthethreedecades

studied.The“developmentconceptcanbelocatedinhistoricalconjuncturesand

canbeunderstoodinrelationtointellectualtrends,shiftsinglobaleconomic

structures,politicalexigencies,andinstitutionaldynamics.”4Analyzingthefull

rangeofUSAID’sworkinRwandaisbeyondthescopeofthisthesis.But,theUSAID

documentsthatcomprisetheprimarysourcebaseforthisresearch–including

interviewswithUSAIDemployees,andregularreportssuchasbudgetsubmissions,

countrydevelopmentstrategies,actionplans,projectupdatesandspecial

evaluationsavailableatUSAID’sonlinearchive,theDevelopmentExperience

Clearinghouse(DEC)–dorevealthemotivationsandinfluencesbehindthe

organization’sworkinRwanda.Itistheseinfluences,andnottheproject’sresults,

4FrederickCooperandRandallPackard,InternationalDevelopmentandtheSocialSciences,(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997),29.

6

thataretheprimaryfocusofthisthesis.Supportingmaterialsincludeworksonthe

UnitedStatesforeignpolicy,Rwandanhistory,andthehistoryofdevelopmentaid.

AlongwithanexaminationofUSAID’sworkinRwanda,anoverviewofthe

historiographyofdevelopmentaidisneededtounderstandthehistorical

interpretationsofaidsincethe1960s.

Asmorecountriesincludedevelopmentaidpermanentlyintheirforeignaid

policyportfolios,thehistoryofdevelopmentbecomesmorepertinent.Thehistory

ofinternationaldevelopmentisstillanemergingtopic,andwhilepoliticalscientists

andeconomistshavelongwrittenanalysesofaid,historicalworksarestillrelatively

few.Scholarsfromdifferentfieldsgenerallyagreethataidisthe

voluntarytransferofpublicresourcesfromonegovernmenttoanothergovernment,internationalorganization,ornon‐governmentalorganization(includingnot‐for‐profitorganizationsworkingonspecificissues,publicinterestorganizations,churchesandtheirassociatedorganizations,universities,foundations,evenprivate,for‐profitbusinessenterprises)toimprovethelivesandlivelihoodsinthecountryreceivingtheaid,amongothergoals.5

USAIDhascommissionedhistoricalreviewsforitsowninternalpurposes,butthe

organizationhasattractedtheattentionoffewotherhistorians.

Historicalliteratureondevelopmentaidhaslargelyemergedonlyinthelast

twodecades.Onehistoricalexaminationofforeignaidcanbefoundinthe2003

specialissueofContemporaryEuropeanHistorydedicatedtoEurope’s“first

developmentdecade”duringthe1960s.Theissueincludeshistoricalcasestudies

5CarolLancaster,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwenty­First

Century,(WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),6.

7

ontheaidportfoliosoftheUnitedKingdom,France,Norway,andtheNetherlands.

Thesearticlesexpandthehistoriographyofofficialaidprogramsandprovidea

complementaryviewtotheoriginsoftheUnitedStates’developmentprogram.

AccordingtoHeide‐IreneSchmidtandHelgePharo,“historicalanalysismayhelpto

uncoverthecontinuitiesanddiscontinuitiesintheevolutionandimplementationof

developmentstrategies.”6ThiscasestudyofUSAIDinRwandasimilarlyfocuseson

continuitiesanddiscontinuitiesinaidtypeandimplementationoverthreedecades.

Examiningthefactorsandinfluencesthatcreatedandshapedothergovernments’

aidprogramselucidatetheuniqueandspecificeventsthatledtotheformationand

developmentoftheUnitedStates’aidprogram.FortheU.S.,domesticand

internationalfactorsdeterminedthetypeofaidprovided,distinguishingthemfrom

otherdonornations.

Modernizationhasattractedparticularhistoricalattention.NilsGilman’s

MandarinsoftheFutureexaminestheintellectualhistoryofmodernizationtheory,

includingW.W.Rostow’sTheStagesofEconomicGrowth.Gilmanarguesthatwhile

thetheoryfocusedontheplightofthethirdworld,italsolookedattheunfolding

sentimentsinAmericaabouttheconditionofmodernityathome.Gilman

contextualizedmodernizationtheorywhileexamining“theimageofpostcoloniality

thatundergirdedthetheory,”andcomparedworksbymodernizationtheoriststhat

debatedthedefinitionofmodernity.7Gilman’sworksisimportantinidentifying

contributorstothecreationofAmerica’sdevelopmentpolicies.MichaelLatham’s

6Heide‐IreneSchmidtandHelgePharo,“Introduction,”ContemporaryEuropeanHistory12

(2003),393‐394.7Gilman,4.

8

ModernizationasIdeologyarguesthatmodernization“wasalsoameansof

understandingtheprocessofglobalchangeandidentifyingwaystheU.S.could

accelerate,channel,anddirect[development].”8Byexaminingtheideological

backgroundandeffectsofmodernizationtheory,Latham’sworkopensnewareas

forinquiryaboutnationalidentity,specificallyAmericanidentity,andtheimpactof

theColdWaronforeignpolicies.9

DavidEkbladh’sTheGreatAmericanMissiondescribeshowU.S.“perceptions

motivatedandthenshapedactualmodernizationpolicyandactivity.”10Focusingon

projectsimplementedinAsia,Ekbladharguesthat“understandinghow

developmentwasbroughttobearintheinternationalarenabytheU.S.”allowsfor

“indispensableinsightintothehistoryofapowerfulinternationalthemeand

providescriticalperspectiveonhowitrelatestotheworldtoday.”11Ekbladhwas

particularlyconcernedwithhowmodernizationfitintothewidersenseofAmerica’s

developmentmission.Ekbladh’sworkprovidesusefulbackgroundinformationand

supportstheargumentthatthereweremanyfactorsthatinfluencedU.S.

developmentpolicy.AndthoughNickCullather’sTheHungryWorldbeganasa

8Latham,2.9OtherworksconsiderdevelopmentoutsidetheU.S.policyframework.AmyStaples’The

BirthofDevelopmentexaminesthecreationoftheWorldBank,theFoodandAgricultureOrganizationandtheWorldHealthOrganization.WhilenotspecificallyfocusingontheUnitedStates,thisworkadvancesthehistoriographyofdevelopmentstudiesusefulincontextualizingU.S.foreignaidprograms.Similarly,thevolumeInternationalDevelopmentandtheSocialScienceseditedbyhistorianFrederickCooperandRandallPackard,workstounderstandtheproduction,transmission,andimplementationofdevelopmentthoughtwithinhistoricalandpoliticalcontexts.

10DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofanAmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),11.

11Ekbladh,13.

9

studyonfoodandagriculture,specificallythe1960sGreenRevolution,12itgrew

intoanexaminationofU.S.development,suchasnationbuilding,humanitarian

relief,andforeignaidthatalsoaddsmuchtothediscussionofU.S.developmentaid.

Thereisalsoawiderangeofworksbyeconomistsandpoliticalscientistson

thetopicofdevelopmentaid.Oneoftheleadingdevelopmenttheoristsonthe

historyofAmerica’saidprogramisCarolLancaster,theDeanandProfessorof

PoliticsintheSchoolofForeignServiceatGeorgetownUniversity.Shehaswritten

extensivelyonU.S.aid,usingherbackgroundintheStateDepartmentandUSAIDto

helpexplainpastdevelopmentpoliciesandmakerecommendationsforthefuture.13

AccordingtoLancaster,“booksthatcomeoutregularlyaboutaidrarelylookatU.S.

aid,”makingherextensivelistofcontributionsinvaluabletothefieldofboth

developmentalhistoryandhistoryofU.S.foreignaid.14

AnotherscholarcontributingtothehistoriographyofU.S.aidisSamuelHale

Butterfield,adevelopmentofficerfrom1958to1980,wholatertaughttheoryand

practiceofinternationaldevelopment.Hiswork,U.S.DevelopmentAid,anHistoric

First,isanextensivelookattheachievementsandfailuresofU.S.aidinthe

twentiethcenturyandservesasacontinuationofU.S.DevelopmentAssistancePolicy,

a1996bookbyVernonRuttan,anagriculturaleconomistwhoworkedwithUSAID

12AccordingtoCullather,theGreenRevolutionwasthewaveofdevelopmentactivitythatpeakedinthe1950sand1960s.

13WorksonforeignaidbyCarolLancasterincludeAidtoAfrica:SoMuchtoDo,SoLittleDone,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999;TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwenty­FirstCentury,WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000;OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwenty­FirstCentury,withAnnVanDuson,WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,2005;ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2007;GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?WashingtonD.C.:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008;“RedesigningForeignAid,”ForeignAffairs79(2000),74‐88.

14Lancaster,TransformingForeignAid,vii.

10

andtaughtinternationaldevelopment.ButterfieldandRuttanprovidemodelsfor

examiningAmerica’sforeignaidhistoryinspecificcases,suchasRwanda.

WhiletherearesomeworthwhilegeneralstudiesofU.S.foreignassistance,

thehistoricalliteraturelacksspecificcasesstudies.Anthropologistshavetherefore

influencedourunderstandingofthelocaleffectsofdevelopment.JamesFerguson’s

workisaprimeexample,ashechosetoplacehisstudyinLesotho,takinghis

primaryfocusasthedevelopmentapparatus.Hearguesthatdevelopment

institutionscreatetheirownformofdiscourse,constructingcountries“asa

particularkindofobjectofknowledgeandastructureofknowledgearoundthat

object.”15Thesearguments,byFergusonandotheranthropologistscontributeto

thestudyofdevelopment:itshistory,purposeandscholarship.

TherearenoworksbyhistoriansonUSAID’shistoryinRwanda,thoughthe

UnitedStateshasalongrelationshipofprovidingassistancetothecountry.The

mostpertinentvolumecomesfromPeterUvin,apoliticalscientistandauthorof

AidingViolence.Uvin’sworkisveryusefulinexaminingdevelopmentaid’simpact

ontheRwandangenocide,butdoesnotfocusononespecificdonorandrelies

primarilyonevidencefromthe1980s.AworkfocusingsolelyonUSAIDinRwanda

spanningallthreedecadesfromindependencetothecivilwarislacking.Theaimof

thisthesisistofillthatgapandcontributetothegrowingbodyofworkonboth

USAIDhistoryanddevelopmentaidinRwanda.

15Ferguson,xiv.

11

Thisthesishasthreemainchapters.Thefirstexaminesthemajoreventsin

AmericaandRwandainthe1960sthataffectedUSAIDobjectives,especially

Rwanda’sdeclarationofindependence,thecreationofUSAIDintheUnitedStates

andtheestablishmentofdevelopmentassistancebetweenthetwocountries.The

secondchapterexaminesthe1970s,whichbeganinRwandawithamilitarycoup

thatputJuvenalHabyarimanainpowerandwitnessedtheNewDirectionsMandate

intheUnitedStatesreorientingaidtowardpovertyalleviationandawayfrom

modernizationandgrowth.Finally,inthe1980s,thefocusofchapterthree,the

shiftsthatimpactedUSAIDinRwandathedecadebeforeviolencebrokeoutare

examined.TheseshiftsincludedecliningeconomicconditionsinRwandathatledto

aneconomiccollapseandtheelectionofPresidentReaganintheU.S.,which

resultedinnewmarket‐friendlyaidpolicies.Theconclusionbrieflyconsiders

Rwandaduringthe1990s,especiallytheimpactofthe1990civilwarandtheendof

theColdWar.ItcontinuesontoprovideamorecompletepictureofhowUSAID

continuedtoevolveinRwanda.

Thesechapterssupporttheargumentthateconomic,socialandpolitical

shiftsintheUnitedStatesandRwandaaffectedthetypeofaidimplementedin

Rwandafrom1962throughthe1980s.ExaminingRwanda’sdevelopmenthistory

withouthighlightingthe1994genocidecontributestothedeficientbodyof

literaturewithoutadeterministperspectiveleadingtogenocide.BecauseRwanda

hasbeenusedbothasasymbolofWesternsuccessandfailure,asmodelof

developmentandawarningsign,areinterpretationofRwanda’shistoryisneeded

tounderstandtheimportanceofdevelopmentaidandtheimpactofUSAID.

Chapter1:TheDecadeofDevelopment

Rwanda,borderingtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Uganda,Tanzania,

andBurundiinCentralEastAfrica,isslightlysmallerthanthestateofMaryland,but

its2011populationofover11millionmakesitthemostdenselypopulatedAfrican

nation.TherearethreemainethnicgroupsthatcompriseRwandabutrelations

amongtheTutsi,Hutu,andTwahavenotalwaysbeenclearlydefined.

AnthropologistJohanPottierexplainedthat“fortheperiodupto1860,itwas

correcttosaythathistoriansknewnexttonothingabouthowtheterms‘Twa,’

‘Hutu,’and‘Tutsi’wereusedinsocialdiscourse.”1Thetermshavebeenexplainedas

alternatelyracial,cultural,economic,andsocialdesignations.Duringthe

reconstructionofRwandaafterthegenocide,allcitizensweretobereferredtoas

“Rwandan”tohelpovercometheviolenceanddiscriminationofthepast.Whilethis

changemayhelpforthefuture,itdoesnothelpclarifythepast.Therehavebeen

manydebatesbetweenscholarsontheoriginsanddistinctionsofthesegroups.

Revisitingthesedebatesfrompre‐independentRwandacanclarifydevelopment

objectivesduringthe1960s.

ItiswidelyacceptedthatTutsismigratedtotheregionofRwanda

supposedlywhilefleeingdroughtandfamineinEthiopiainthefifteenthand

sixteenthcenturies.TheTutsiswerepastoralist;owningcattle,acovetedresource,

madethemeconomicallysuperiortotheexistinggroupsinRwanda,includingthe

agriculturalistHutus,whohadmigratedtofertileRwandafromCentralAfrica

1JohanPottier,Re­ImaginingRwanda:Conflict,SurvivalandDisinformationintheLate

TwentiethCentury,(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),12‐13.WorkbyhistorianJanVansinahashelpedclarifymanymisconceptionsandunknownsofRwandabefore1900.

13

duringthewiderBantumigrationsbetweenthefifthandeleventhcenturies.Both

groupsintrudedupontheoriginalinhabitantsofthearea,theTwa.Thissmall

group,comprisingapproximatelyonepercentofRwanda’spopulationtoday,were

generallyartisansandhunters.2

Whilemostscholarsacceptthistimeline,itremainsuncertainwhenthe

differentgroupsenteredtheregion.HistorianJanVansinaexplained,“therenever

were[definitive]successiveimmigrationsofTwaforagers,Hutufarmers,andTutsi

herders…[T]hesettlementhistoryofRwandaisactuallyveryancientandquite

complex.”3Regardlessoforigin,thesethreegroupshadintegratedalmost

completelybythetimeEuropeanexplorersenteredtheregion.Forcenturies“they

spokethesamelanguage,believedinthesamegod,sharedthesameculture,

belongedtojointclans,andlivedsidebysidethroughoutthecountry.”4Whilethese

threegroupshadlargelyintegratedbythemid‐nineteenthcentury,theAbazungu,5

orwhitepeople,disruptedtheequilibriumandexacerbatedthepreexistingtensions

oftheseethnicandsocialgroups.

TheAbazungucolonialistsdividedandconqueredAfricaduringthe1880s.

InRwandatheoriginalGermancolonialists–andBelgiansafter1916–comprised

nomorethanonepercentofthepopulation,butheldallthewealthandpower.The

colonialpowersenforcedindirectrule,making“socialrelationshipsinRwanda

moreuniformandexploitativethanever,withaclearhierarchyfromBazunguto

2PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(WestHartford:KumarianPress,1998),14.

3JanVansina,AntecedentstoModernRwanda:TheNyiginyaKingdom,(Madison:theUniversityofWisconsinPress,2004),198.

4Uvin,14.5ThetermisKinyarwandan.BazunguistheSwahilitermforwhitepeople.

14

TutsitoHututoTwa.”AnewhierarchyfromEuropeansattoptotheTwaatbottom

restedonan“ideologyofracialsuperiority.”6

AsGermany’scolonialcontrolincreased,Rwandaexperiencedinternal

conflicts.ThetraditionalRwandandynastywitnessedaviolentsuccessionbattle

followingthedeathofthelastleader,Mwami(King)KigeliIVRwabugiri.The

combinedresultsofGermany’spresenceandtheinternalpoliticalupheavalwasa

“politicalstructure…oftendescribedasadualcolonialism,”whereTutsielites

workedtoexploitthelowerHutuclassalongsidetheGermans.7WhiletheTutsis

weretheminoritygroupinRwanda,forcenturiestheyhadruledovertheHutu.

WhentheTutsismigratedintoRwanda,theywereestablishedaseconomically

superiorherders.Owningcattleelevatedinhabitantsfinanciallyandwiththis

supremacy,theTutsistookcontrolfirstatthecommunityleveltheninthe

monarchy.TheTutsismaintainedtheirprominentpositioninthecountrywhenthe

GermansarrivedandafterWorldWarIwhenRwandawasgiventoBelgium.When

thecolonialpowersenteredRwandatheyaggravatedthissocialdivision.

Eventuallythesocialstratificationschangedandinthe1930s,Belgiumsolidifiedthe

shiftofsocio‐economicclassesintodifferentethnicities.8

BelgiumheldcolonialpowerinRwandauntil1962.FollowingtheGermans’

lead,BelgiuminitiallyacceptedtheestablishedhierarchyinRwandaandfavoredthe

rulingTutsis.AsBelgiansinfluencedtheestablishedsocialdivisionsandinstituted

6Uvin,17.7PhilipGourevitch,WeWishtoInformYouThatTomorrowWeWillBeKilledWithOur

Families:StoriesfromRwanda,(NewYork:Picador,1998),54.8JanVansina’sAntecedentstoModernRwandaisthemostaccurateandaccessiblehistoryof

pre‐colonialRwanda.

15

rigidethnicclassifications,scientifictestswereadministeredtoseparatethegroups

andsupportTutsifavoritism.Thesetestsincludedmeasuringnoseandskullsizes

andcountingthenumberofcattleownedbyindividualsorfamilies.BecauseTutsis

supposedlyhadmoreCaucasianfeaturesandgenerallymorecattle,theycontinued

tobethepreferredgroupinRwanda.

ThisfavoritismaggravatedanalreadytensesituationasBelgiansmade“this

polarizationthecornerstoneoftheircolonialpolicy”inRwanda.9Thesetense

situationswerenotoriginallylinkedtotheethnicproblemscreatedbythe

colonizers,butinsteadstemmedfromtherulingclass’abuseofthestrugglinglower

class.TheBelgiansmadecontinuallymoreinvasivechangeswithinRwanda,

startingwiththeremovalofallundesirablelocalleaders.Theseundesirables

includedthefewHutuleadersandTutsisunwillingtoactaspuppetsoftheBelgian

government.From1933to1934Belgiumimplementedthemostdamagingchange,

theintroductionofethnicidentificationcards.Thesecards,explainedjournalist

PhilipGourevitch,made“itvirtuallyimpossibleforHutustobecomeTutsis,and

permittedtheBelgianstoperfecttheadministrationofanapartheidsystemrooted

inthemythofTutsisuperiority.”10TheCatholicChurch,theleadingreligious

organizationinRwanda,supportedthisnewsystem.Thesechangesquickly

solidifiedethniclines.

Thissituationlasteduntilarevolutionin1959putHutusinpoweroverthe

minorityTutsigroup.Africancountriesbegantobreakfreefromtheircolonial

mastersintheearly1950s,andwithinadecadealmostallAfricannationsoutsideof

9Gourevitch,54.10Gourevitch,57.

16

southernAfricawereindependent.Rwandanindependencecameontheheelsof

theHutuRevolutionof1959.Asplanswerebeinglaidforindependence,Hutus

revoltedandoverthrewtheTutsimonarchy,replacingitwithapresidential

republic.ContrarytomanyotherAfricanindependencemovements,thepushfor

Rwandanindependenceinvolvedanethnicandsocialrevolutionthatintensified

interethnicanimosity.

TheHutuRevolutionentailedseveralstagesofviolence.Outbreaksbeganas

“localizedanti‐Tutsiviolenceandsmallpogromsinsomeprovinces;hundredswere

killed,andquiteafewTutsifledthecountry.”11Alongwithwidespreadviolence,

over100,000TutsisfledRwandatoneighboringcountries.Catholicpriestsand

Belgianofficialshadencouragedthisfirststageofviolenceformonthsbeforeit

climaxed.FollowingWorldWarII,RwandasawaninfluxofBelgianFlemishPriests,

whoasaminorityintheirhomecountry,identifiedwiththedisenfranchisedHutu

population.SympathizingwiththeHutus,thenewlyarrivedpriestsencouraged

themtofightforpower.12Intandemwiththisnewinfluence,theUnitedNations

appliedpressureonBelgiumtorelinquishitscolonialcontrol.Theseinfluencesled

tothecreationofaunitedHutufrontcallingforradicalchange.

InMarch1957,thesecondstageofrevolutionbeganwhenHutuintellectuals

publishedtheHutuManifesto,arguingfordemocracyandcallingfortheremovalof

Tutsisfrompower.PhilipGourevitchdescribedthesituation,“AsnewHutuparties

sprangup,rallyingthemassestouniteintheir‘Hutuness,’theenthusiasticBelgians

scheduledtheelections.ButbeforeanyRwandanssawaballotbox,hundredsof

11Uvin,19.12Gourevitch,58.

17

themwerekilled.”13StartinginNovember1957,violencebrokeoutregularly

betweenTutsisandHutusacrossthecountry.Thisviolencewasspurredby

CatholicpriestsandencouragedbyretreatingBelgiancolonialists.TheBelgians

supportedtheHutupowergrabpartlyinretaliationforTutsisresistancetocolonial

control.TheUnitedNationsalsoencouragedtheswitchtomajoritarianruleasthe

independencemovementinRwandaprogressed.14Thecolonialauthorities

eventuallyacknowledgedthesocialrevolutionoccurringwithinRwanda,and“the

breakbetweentheBelgianauthoritiesandtheirlong‐coddledTutsielite[came]

aboutonlybecausethecolonialadministratorsfeltbetrayedbytheirerstwhile

protégés.”15Theviolencecontinuedsporadicallyfordecades,andbecameoneofthe

firstconcernsofUSAIDinindependentRwanda.

InJanuary1961,followingthetrendacrossAfrica,“theBelgiansconveneda

meetingofRwanda’snewHutuleaders,atwhichthemonarchywasofficially

abolishedandRwandawasdeclaredarepublic.”16OnJuly1,1962Rwandabecame

anindependentnation.Thisseminaleventstartedanewjourneyofdevelopment

thatincludedinteractionsandpartnershipswithUSAID.Belgiancolonialpolicyhad

employeddevelopmentpracticesandprograms,butasanewlyindependentnation,

Rwandawasabletoplayalargerroleintheirdevelopmentandpromotetheirown

developmentobjectives.GrégoireKayibandawasinauguratedasPresidentandthe

newHutudictatorship“masqueradedaspopulardemocracy,andRwanda’spower

13Gourevitch,58.14MahmoodMamdani,WhenVictimsBecomeKillers:Colonialism,Nativism,andtheGenocide

inRwanda,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),116.15GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,

1995),50.16Gourevitch,61.

18

strugglesbecameaninternalaffairoftheHutuelite.”17TheHutusinpower

reproducedabusesthathadbeencommittedagainstthemduringtheTutsi

monarchy,whilepretendingtosupporttheirnewsystemofdemocracy.Kayibanda

hidbehindaveilofdemocracywiththesupportfromHutuelitesandtheWestashe

continuedterrorizinghisopponents.RwandareceivedWesternsupportbecauseits

proximitytoZaire,whichwasofcriticalstrategicimportanceduringtheColdWar.

Ethnicviolenceincreasedandbecame“acentralfeatureofRwanda’spolitics.”18In

crossborderraids,TutsirefugeesattackedtheHutupopulationandgovernment,

andtheRwandangovernmentretaliatedagainsttheTutsisremaininginRwanda.

Thissituationcontinuedandworsenedinthefollowingdecades.

Theearly1960salsosawthecreationofUSAID.Asdecolonizationspread

acrossAfricaandthethreatofcommunismexpanded,U.S.supportforforeignaid

grewbecauseit“wasseenasatooltoreducediscontentgeneratedbypovertyand

theconsequenttemptationsofcommunismbyspurringeconomicprogressand

addressingthesocialandpoliticaltensionscreatedbyrapideconomicchange.”19

AfterWorldWarII,theUnitedStatesgovernmentlaunchedeconomicdevelopment

andassistanceprograms,suchastheMarshallPlan.WhenEisenhowertookoffice,

hereducedtheamountoffundingavailabletotheprogramsstartedbyTruman’s

administration.Eisenhower’saidwastiedtomutualsecurityassistance,until1957

17Gourevitch,61.18MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(NewYork:

CornellUniversityPress,2002),52‐53.19CarolLancasterandAnnVanDusen,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:Confrontingthe

ChallengesoftheTwenty­FirstCentury,(WashingtonD.C.:theBrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),10.

19

whenhereversedthispolicyandcreatedseveraldevelopmentorganizationsand

projects.20Thismovesolidifieddevelopmentaid’spositioninU.S.foreignpolicy.As

asenator,KennedycriticizedEisenhower’sfailuretoappreciatethetrueimportance

offoreignaid.AddingtotherecentadvancesmadebyEisenhower,theelectionof

PresidentJohnF.Kennedyin1960madedevelopmentaidacrucialaspectofU.S.

foreignrelations.

WhenKennedytookoffice,hedeclaredthe1960sa“decadeofdevelopment.”

Duringhispresidentialcampaign,KennedyconstantlyemphasizedthatAmerica

wouldhaveto“demonstratetothe‘emergingcountries’thatdevelopmentalong

liberal,capitalistlinescouldalleviatepovertyandraiselivingstandardsatleastas

fastasrevolutionaryandMarxistalternatives.”21Followingthroughonthese

campaignpromises,KennedyestablishedtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternational

Development(USAID)in1961bymergingtwoexistingaidagencies,the

DevelopmentLoanFundandtheInternationalCooperationAgency22intoasingle

entitythatwouldbesemi‐autonomouswithintheDepartmentofState.23USAIDwas

intendedtofurtherinternationaldevelopmentandU.S.diplomacyinthenewly

emergingnationsofAfricaandAsia.WhileUSAIDwasconnectedtodiplomatic

goals,itwaskeptsemi‐autonomoustoseparateitfromEisenhower’spreferencefor

20SamuelButterfield,U.S.DevelopmentAid:AnHistoricFirst:AchievementsandFailuresin

theTwentiethCentury,(Westport:PraegerPublishers,2004),59.TheseorganizationsincludedtheDevelopmentLoanFund,Inter‐AmericanDevelopmentBankandsupporttheSocialProgressTrustFundthroughtheDevelopmentBank.

21MichaelLatham,ModernizationasIdeology:AmericanSocialScienceand“NationBuilding”intheKennedyEra,(ChapelHill:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2000),28.

22TheInternationalCooperationAgency(ICA)waspartoftheDepartmentofStateresponsiblefortechnicalassistance.

23CarolLancaster,ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2007),71‐72.

20

linkingaidwithsecurityinterests.PresidentKennedywantedtodistinguish

developmentfromdiplomacyinstitutionally.

Beginninginthe1960s,USAIDbecameresponsible,inconsultationwiththe

DepartmentofState,for

thepolicies,countryallocations,andusesofdevelopmentassistance(usedtopromoteeconomicgrowth,education,andagriculturaldevelopment,healthandfamilyplanninganddemocracy,conflictpreventionandhumanitarianassistance,andchildsurvival)anddisasterreliefandrecovery.24

WithinthefirstfewyearsUSAIDprogramshadexpandedacrosstheglobe,andwere

providingassistancetotheinhabitantsofdevelopingcountriesonfourcontinents.

By1963,therewereUSAIDprogramsinalmost30Africannations.25Duringthe

1960s,USAIDprogramswerefoundedinmodernizationtheory,anditsprimary

goalsweretoprovideassistanceinhealth,educationandagriculture,bringingthe

standardsofthesedomainsclosertothoseofmodernnations.

USAIDbeganworkinginRwandaduringitsfirstyearofindependencein

1962.Foreignaid“promisedtobeausefultoolinpromotingdemocracy,especially

insub‐SaharanAfrica–bothasanincentiveforgovernmentstoimplementpolitical

reformsandasourceoffinancingforactivitiesrelatedtodemocratization.”26The

UnitedStatesgovernmentwasconcernedthatnewlyindependentcountrieswould

turntocommunistregimes,especiallyifrequestsforAmericanaidweredenied.On

24CarolLancaster,OrganizingU.S.ForeignAid:ConfrontingtheChallengesoftheTwenty­First

Century,(WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute,theGlobalEconomyandDevelopment:MonographSeriesonGlobalization,2005),14‐15.

25CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtodo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999),84.

26Lancaster,ForeignAid,47.

21

thesurface,RwandawasaprimecandidateforUSAIDassistance,promotingitsfirst

democraticgovernmentastheUnitedStateshelpedtofostergrowthtoconsolidate

strategicinterestsintheregion.RwandawasatacticalpositionbetweenZaireand

Tanzania,seenbothasapotentialallyandthreatduringtheColdWar.Tohelp

democracytakehold,USAIDpromotedsectorscrucialtosurvivalandeducation;

securityandinfrastructure(primarilyinthecapital,Kigali)becamethedonor’sfirst

projectareas.USAID’sstrategyinthesefirstyearswasto“demonstrateinterestin

theeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry,supportadoptionofafundamentalfiscal

andmonetaryreform,andassisttheGovernmentofRwandainmaintaininginternal

security.”27TheseoriginaleconomicreforminitiativesinRwandahelpedthenew

countrybecomeestablishedandstablewithoutthedirectionoftheiroldcolonial

leader.Modernizationtheoristsofthe1960sdrovetheseinitialprogramsand

policyobjectives,assumingthatwithassistance“traditional”Rwandacoulddevelop

inthesamemannerastheWest.USAIDdocumentsdemonstratedthegoals

employedinRwanda,specificallytheimportanceofcreatingstrongtiesbetweenthe

newcountryandneworganization.

USAIDapproachededucationassistancefromvariousangles.Ambassador

CharlesD.WitherspresentedthefirstforeignaidprogramtoRwandaasan

independencegift:scholarshipfundsforRwandanstostudyatuniversitiesinthe

UnitedStates.USAIDalsoestablishedregionalscholarshipprogramsforstudents

attendinglocaluniversities.EventuallyUSAIDalsoprovidedsupportforAmerican

professorstoteachatRwandanuniversitiesandpurchasednecessaryschool

27LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,3.

22

equipment.28SupervisedbyUSAIDLiaisonOfficerattheU.S.EmbassyGeneMoore,

USAIDsupportalsoincludedseveralshort‐termtrainingcoursesandtwo

undergraduatedegreecourses,agrantfortwentyregionalscholarshipsforstudents

alreadyenrolledinRwandanuniversityclasses,andanequipmentgranttothe

UniversityinButare.Anotherindependencegiftofthirtytraininggrantsforcivil

servicefieldswasalsoadministered.29From1962through1968,“theUnitedStates

Governmentprovided$20,000forscholarshipstoAmericanUniversities.”30Inthe

followingdecadesUSAIDbecamemoreinvolvedandprovidedmoremoneyfor

youtheducation,fromprimaryschooltohighschoolequivalencyandvocational

trainingcourses.

AsKennedyreshapedtheobjectivesandinfluencesofforeignassistance,the

UnitedStatesmovedawayfrominfluencingpeopleprimarilythroughmilitary

meansandstartedpersuadingthemwith‘softer’means.Rostow’s1961

commencementaddressatFortBraggexemplifiedthisnewideologybychargingthe

graduatingclasstofight“notmerelywithweaponsbut…inthemindsofmenin

villagesandhills;[fight]bythespiritandpolicyofthosewhorunthelocal

government,tointervenedirectlyandengagethemselvesinthewholecreative

processofmodernization.”31TheseUSAIDeducationprojectsofthe1960s

representedtheneedsofnewlyindependentRwandaandtheshiftfromthefirst

stageofmodernizationtheorytothesecond.AsexplainedbyRostow,inorderto

28Grosz,3.29Grosz,5.30Grosz,3.31Latham,1‐2.

23

advancefromatraditionalsocietytoasocietywiththepreconditionstotake‐off,a

commitmenttoseculareducationwasnecessary.

Educationprogramsworkedtopreventthespreadofcommunism,helpedfill

vacantadministrativepositionspreviouslyfilledbyBelgianofficials,andinsureda

continuedalliancewiththeUnitedStates.Controllingtheproductionofknowledge,

educationwastheeasiestwaytoindoctrinatepeople.Asaneffectivewayof

influencingpoliticalbeliefs,theeducationprojectshelpedensureRwandanswould

steerclearofcommunism.AddressingtheneedsofRwanda,USAIDhelpedtofill

positionsleftbyBelgians.TheuniversityandtechnicaltrainingprovidedRwandans

withthecapabilitiestofillthemanyhighlevelpositionsavailableintheRwandan

government.Finally,theeducationprojectsthattaughtboththehorrorsof

communismandtheskillsneededtoruntheircountryalsoinstructedRwandansto

remainloyaltotheUnitedStates.TheemergingeducatedleadersofRwandawere

taughttoallythemselvesandtheircountrywiththeU.S.

USAID’shelpregardinginfrastructurewaslimitedduringthe1960s,and

focusedprimarilyonKigali,Rwanda’scapital.Smallprojectsincludedfurnishing

nursingschoolsinKigaliwithtransistorradios,andothersmallcashgrantsforlocal

commodities.In1966,theUnitedStatesincreasedaidlevelstoRwandaandseveral

moreprogramswereactivated.Onereasonforthe“increasedactivitywasan

agreementbetweenRwandaandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)signedin

April1966.”32TheagreementrequiredthegovernmentofRwandatodevaluethe

32Grosz,4.

24

RwandanfrancinexchangeforstandbycreditfromtheIMF.Theincreasedaidfrom

USAIDprovidedcommodityimportprograms,providingtrucks,vehicleequipment

andrawplasticaswellasstaplessuchasflour,oilandmilk.Thesecommodities

weresoldtoandbenefittedimporters.Thisfoodwasmonetizedandsoldtoraise

funds,insteadofbeingconsumedbyRwandans.ThegovernmentofRwandawas

“assuredasupplyofbasiccommoditieswasavailablewithoutspendingitsforeign

exchange,thefundsfinancedprojectsplannedbybothgovernments,andconsumers

wereabletobuybasicitems.”33Whentheseprojectswerecompletedanddeemed

successfulbyUSAID,theallottedsupportamountwasincreased.

Beginninginlate1966andcontinuingthrough1968,USAIDprovidedfunds

andtechnicalsupportforpavingstreetsinKigaliandconstructingawater

purificationplantforthecapital.Thesebasicinfrastructureprojectscontributedto

thesecondstageofmodernization,encouragingthepreconditionstotake‐off.Along

witheducation,asocietywasthoughttoneedtoenableadegreeofcapital

mobilization,whichwouldbedifficultforRwandawithoutinfrastructureassistance

fromUSAID.Thenattheendof1968,USAIDsupportwasalmostcompletelycut

fromRwandaandthenumberofprogramswassignificantlyreducedas“the

unpopularwarinVietnamdiscreditedmanydevelopmentideasandtherewas

growingdistrustofthestatetobetheprimaryagenttopromotedevelopment.”34

Beforethesefundswereeliminated,USAIDwasabletohelpadvisethegovernment

onsecurityproblems.

33Grosz,4.34DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofan

AmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),10.

25

Theinfrastructureprogramsimplementedinthe1960sworkedtosteadya

Rwandathatwaslostwithoutitscolonialguide.Aswithmanycolonies,after

decolonizationexperts,leaders,andadministratorslefttheircolonialpositionsand

returnedhometoEurope.Theeducationprojectsdiscussedearlieraddressedhow

USAIDhelpedtrainRwandanstofillthesevacantpositions.Theinfrastructure

programsworkedwiththesecoursestokeepRwandaprogressingforward.The

constructionofroads,waterplants,andfurnishingnursingschoolsandproviding

commoditieskeptdevelopmentgoingandallowedRwandatogainstabilityforthe

future.

Asdiscussedpreviously,thesecuritysituationwithinRwandawastenuous

withsporadicfightingbetweenthegovernmentandrebelrefugeeTutsisinUganda,

Zaire,andBurundi.InJuly1963thegovernmentofRwandarequestedequipment

andconstructionassistancefromUSAIDtohelpitsinternalsecurityforces,

includingbothmilitaryandpoliceforces.Thisinitialrequestwasdenied.Thenin

December1963,TutsiexileslaunchedadesperateattackfromBurundi.Invading

Bugesera,amedium‐sizedvillageinsouthernRwanda,andalmostreachingKigali,

theexilesweredisorganizedandthegovernmentwasabletobeatthembacktothe

border.TheRwandangovernment“usedtheoccasiontolaunchamassivewaveof

repressioninwhichanestimated10,000TutsiwereslaughteredbetweenDecember

1963andJanuary1964.”35

Therebelattackinlate1963forcedtheUnitedStatestoreconsiderRwanda’s

requestforsecurityassistance.Unfortunately,theU.S.apparentlydidnotconsider

35Prunier,56.

26

itsroleinthegrowingethnicviolencebyprovidingsecurityassistance.Inthe

springof1964,aUnitedStatespolicesurveyteamarrivedandafterinspection

proposedappropriateandneededchangestoimproveRwanda’ssecuritysituation.

WhileignoringitsroleintheincreasingethnicviolenceinRwanda,theU.S.alsodid

notcriticizetheRwandangovernmentfortheretaliationcommittedagainstTutsis

residingwithinthecountry.Thesurveyteamreportnotedthatuntilitsinitial

requestwasdenied,Rwandawaspro‐western.But“sincetheirfirstrequestfor

militaryandpolicecommodityassistancehadbeenrejected,Rwandahadbecome

criticalandsuspiciousofallcurrenteffortstoassisttheminthefield.”36Worried

aboutloosingacriticallylocatedally,thesurveyteamrecommendedtheUnited

StatesprovidetechnicalandcommodityassistancetokeepRwandafrompossible

communistleanings.WhileRwandahadgrowndistrustful,finallyreceivingthe

assistancetheyrequestedapparentlymitigatedtheirfearsaboutU.S.security

assistance.

TheUnitedStatesperceivedtheretobecommunistthreatssurrounding

Rwanda,includingTanzania.JuliusNyerere,thepresidentofTanzania,

implementedasocialistgovernment,andfearsarosethatsocialismwouldspillout

fromTanzaniaintoRwandaandbeyond.Thefearofcommunismspreadinginto

EastandCentralAfricaledtoapublicsafetyprojectlaunchedin1964.Overfive

yearsUSAIDprovided$70,000totheRwandangovernmentforboththemilitary

andpolicyforceforcommunicationandtransportationequipment,alongwithtwo

advisorsprovidingtechnicaltrainingforuseandmaintenanceoftheequipment.

36Grosz,3.

27

Therewerealsoshort‐termtrainingprogramsthattookplaceintheUnitedStatesto

helptheRwandangovernmentbetterhandletherefugeeandrebelsituation.37

USAIDdocumentsclearlydemonstratethatU.S.aidstrategyfocusedonthe

“adoptionoffundamentalfiscalandmonetaryreform,assist[ed]maintaining

internalsecurity,andsupport[ed]small,viabledevelopmentprojects.”38These

fiscalreformpoliciesweregearedtowardshelpingthenewlyindependentnation

becomefinanciallystableandproductiveonitsown.Whiletheseprojectswere

underway,monetarysupportfromtheUnitedStatesCongresstoUSAIDprograms

wasalmostcompletelycut,signifyingconcernsaboutmoneyspentabroadinstead

ofdomestically.Attheendoffiscalyear(FY)1968,thePublic

Safety/CommunicationsAdvisorandtheUSAIDLiaisonOfficerleftRwandaand

from1969to1973,USAIDactivitiesinRwandawerelimitedtoPL480TitleIIand

theEmbassyadministeredSelfHelpProgram.USAIDfundsforRwandaweretoo

lowtocontinuesupportfortheseaidworkersastheirprojectswereslowly

wrappeduporcancelled.

ThePL480TitleIIprogram,39alsoknownasFoodforPeace,receivedalmost

threemilliondollarsduringthefirstsevenyearsthatUSAIDwasactiveinRwanda

andfocusedassistancetomaternalandchildhealthandschoolfeedingprograms.

TheCatholicReliefServicedistributedmostofthefood,whichcontinuedafter

37Grosz,4.38Grosz,5.39PLstandsforPublicLaw,shortenfromthe1954AgriculturalTradeDevelopment

AssistanceAct.Therearefourpartstotheact,TitleIismanagedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture,whileTitlesII,IIIandVarerunbyUSAID.FormoreinformationonthePL480TitleprogramsseeNickCullather’sTheHungryWorld.

28

USAIDfundswerecut.40TheSelfHelpProgramsprovidedsmallamountsoffunds

toRwandanswithpromisingdevelopmentideas.Bothprogramswereimportantto

Rwanda,buttheFoodforPeaceprogramswerecrucialand,infact,havecontinued

intothetwenty‐firstcentury.

Initially,in1963theU.S.Congresscomplainedaboutthelargeamountofaid

programsinAfrica,arguingthatmoneyshouldbedirectedtowardproblemsat

home.WhilePresidentKennedyfieldedCongress’complaintsandreceivedadvice

fromreportsrecommendingreductionsofprojectsinAfrica,aidprograms

continued.Yearslater,PresidentJohnsonheededtotherequestsandsuggestionsto

reduceaidprogramsand“bytheearly1970s,therewereonly10operatinginthe

region.”41ThemainreasonsforthecriticismsandattacksonaidprogramsinAfrica

stemmedfrommisunderstandingsanddiscontentovercurrentevents.As

developmentaidwasstillanewphenomenon,itwasdifficultfortheAmerican

publicandCongresstorecognizethesuccessesandchallengesUSAIDexperienced.

Americanswerealsofrustratedanddisenchantedwithdevelopmentafterthe

amountoffundsspentontheVietnamWar,arguingthatmoneyshouldnowbe

refocusedondomesticissues.TheU.S.governmentwasdisappointedwiththe

numberofmilitarycoupstakingholdinAfrica,whichmadethemquestionthevalue

ofdevelopmentaidandtheeffectivenessoftheirdemocratizationprograms.

Additionally,“criticismsoftooextensiveU.S.engagementsworldwideledthe

administrationtocloseanumberofitsaidmissionsabroad(especiallyinsub‐

40Grosz,6.41Lancaster,AidtoAfrica,85.

29

SaharanAfrica)duringthesecondhalfofthe1960s.”42Allthesefrustrationsledthe

U.S.CongresstoreducetheamountofmoneyavailabletoUSAID.WhileUSAIDlost

mostofitsfundingforprojectsinRwanda,in1973,U.S.foreignpolicyideology

shiftedagainaseventsinbothcountriessetthestagefornewfundingandbroader

objectives.

42Lancaster,ForeignAid,75.

Chapter2:“NewDirections”forRwanda

The1960sbeganwithtwosignificantevents:thecreationofUSAIDinthe

UnitedStatesandRwanda’sdeclarationofindependence.Whiletherelationship

betweenRwandaandtheU.S.wascurtailedwiththedramaticcutsof1968,the

eventsofthe1970srecoveredlostground.Asmodernizationtheorywasphased

outofU.S.practice,anewbasicneedsmandaterosetoreplaceit.Intheearly1970s

severaleventsaffectedtherelationshipbetweenAmericaandRwanda.During

1973,inRwandafirst,thenintheUnitedStates,politicalactionschangedthe

outlookandreceptionofdevelopmentaid.InRwanda,MajorGeneralJuvénal

Habyarimanastagedacoup,anddeclaredhimselfPresident.MonthslatertheU.S.

Congress,alongwithmanyotherdevelopmentorganizations,initiatednew

mandatestofocusonthepoorestofthepoorintheworld.Theyearsfollowing1973

sawmajorincreasesinaidprovidedfromUSAIDandamorereceptiveand

progressiveatmosphereinRwandaacceptingthissurgeofassistance.Changesin

theperiodfromthelate1960sto1973,setthestagefornewUSAIDprogramsand

projectsinRwanda.

PresidentGrégoireKayibandaassumedpowerinRwandaafter

independencein1962andrealizedthedesireofmanyHutustobeledbyaHutu

government.TheKayibandaregimecontinuedthehostilitiesoftheHutuRevolution

and“chasedorkilledmostformerTutsipowerholdersandpoliticians,eventhe

mostmoderateones,aswellasmanyoppositionHutupoliticianswhodidn’tjoin

31

Parmehutu.”1WhileKayibandaachievedthesegoalsmostRwandans,bothHutus

andTutsis,livedinfearofthegovernment’ssporadiccampaignsofviolence.In

1972ethnicviolencebrokeoutinBurundiandpoliticaldisturbancesleftaround

200,000dead;hundredsofthousandsmoreHutussoughtrefugeinRwanda.In

May‐June1972,“BurundihadbeenravagedbyamassivemassacreofHutucarried

outbytheTutsiminorityinordertokeepitsholdonpoliticalpower.”2

BurundihasanalmostidenticalethnicmakeupasRwanda,butwhenthe

HutuRevolutiontookpowerfromtheTutsisinRwanda,theminorityTutsigroupin

BurundiheldontotheirrulewhiledeclaringBurundianindependence.Ashundreds

ofthousandsofBurundianHutusspilledintoRwandain1972,PresidentKayibanda

triedtoexploitthesituationforpoliticalgainandbegantoattacktheRwandanTutsi

minorityagain.Over40,000Tutsiswerevictimsofattacksencouragedby

KayibandabetweenMarch1962andlate1964,andthissporadicviolencecontinued

until1972.3PresidentKayibandaaskedhisseniorarmycommanderMajor‐General

JuvénalHabyarimanatoleadthe1972attackontheRwandanTutsis.

HabyarimanarecognizedthenewstrainsfeltinRwandaandtheincreased

tensionsbetweentheHutusandTutsisandmadehisgrabforpower.Whilethe

overflowofrefugeesexacerbatedexistingethnictensions,bothgroupsresentedthe

continuallyirregularattacksthatdisruptedtheirdailylives.Habyarimanareliedon

supportfromhisregioninthenorthandfromRwandanspersecutedandexhausted

1PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian

Press,1998),23.ParmehutuwasKayibanda’spoliticalpartyorganizedduringtheHutuRevolution.2GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,

1995),60.Formoreinformationonthe1972eventsinBurundipleaseseeReneLemarchand,Burundi:EthnocideastheoryandPractice,CambridgeUniversityPress:1994.

3Uvin,20.

32

byKayibanda’sregime.OnJuly5,1973Habyarimanatookpowerinabloodless

coup,startingtheSecondRepublicasHutusandTutsisexpressedwidespreadrelief.

Thischangedidnoteliminatedecadesofethnichatred,butHutusandTutsisdid

hopetoleadlivesuninterruptedbycampaignsofviolence.

Habyarimanaorganizedamilitarydictatorshipandofferedacompromiseto

theTutsistohelpstabilizethecountry;iftheystayedoutofpoliticstheycouldlead

reasonablynormallives.Habyarimana’sironfistrulecreatedstabilityand

improveddevelopmentprospects.However,

themainstrengthofRwanda’sregimeslaynotintheiroppressionbutintheircapacitytolegitimizethemselvestointernalandexternalforces.Toachievethis…a‘development’legitimization[was]aimedatboththeinternationalBazunguaudienceandthedomesticone.4

WhenHabyarimanatookpower,Rwandawaspoorerthanitsneighbors.This

povertycombinedwithHabyarimana’sskillatattractingWesterndevelopment

agenciesledtoasurgeofassistance.DevelopmentwasHabyarimana’sfavorite

politicalword,“appealingtoEuropeanandAmericanaiddonorswhomhemilked

withgreatskill.”5Westerndevelopmentorganizations,includingUSAID,favored

HabyarimanabecausehebroughtanendtoKayibanda’sviolentcampaigns,and

madedeclarationsofcommitmenttodevelopingRwandathatpreferredWestern

capitalismtocommunism.ConditionswithinRwandachangeddrasticallyinthe

followingyears.

Startingin1974,theyearafterHabyarimana’scoupd’état,thegovernment

madeseveralsignificantchangesregardingdevelopment.Oneofitsactsincluded

4Uvin,23.5PhilipGourevitch,WeWishToInformYouthatTomorrowWeWillBeKilledWithOur

Families:StoriesFromRwanda,(NewYork:Picador,1998),69.

33

the“pronouncementthatattributedRwanda’s143communestheroleof‘motorof

development.’Fromnowon,thecommuneswouldbethebasicunitof

development.”6Thiswasasignificantchangebecausemostpreviousdevelopment

projectshadbeencenteredonthecapitalorotherlargecities,insteadofrural

communes.Habyarimanadeclared1974theyearofagricultureandmanuallabor,

changedthenameofthesinglepartytoMouvementRevolutionaireNationalpourle

Developpment(MRND)and,later,renamedtheparliamenttheNational

DevelopmentCouncil.7ThesechangesappealedtoWesterngovernmentsand

donors.

AllthesetransformationsturnedRwandaintowhatGermanPastorHerbert

Keinerdescribedas‘einEntwicklungsdiktatur,’adevelopmentdictatorship.This

ideologywassimilartocolonialtheoriesof“benevolentdespotism,asPresident

Habyarimanadecidedtotakeuponhisshoulderstheheavyburdenofthestateso

hissubjectscoulddevotethemselvesentirelytoagriculture.”8Thisideology

legitimizedthegovernment’sintrusionintoallaspectsofsociallife.Becausethe

Rwandangovernment’sdevelopmentideologyfocusedheavilyoneconomic

development,aidagenciesabroadfeltcompelledtoimplementtheirprojects

throughthegovernment.ThisarrangementallowedtheRwandangovernmentto

funnelthemajorityofassistancetothegroupsconsistingofHutus.

WhileHabyarimanafavoredtheHutusblatantly,hedidbringpolitical

stabilitytoRwandaanddeliverassistancetofailingregions,regardlessoftheir

6Uvin,24.7Uvin,24.MRNDstandsforNationalRevolutionaryDevelopmentMovement.8Prunier,77.

34

ethniccomposition.Despiteremainingdesperatelypoor,Rwanda’sinternational

reputationsoared,

inpartbecauseitwasfinallydemonstratingsomeeconomicdevelopmentinaregionlackinganygoodnews.One‐partystability,thedampeningofethnicconflict,modesteconomicprogressinvestedRwandawithareputationforstabilityandhope.OutsidersroutinelytoutedRwandaasamodelofefficiencyandreferredtoitastheSwitzerlandofCentralAfrica.9

ThesechangeshelpedtoreinvigorateUSAIDassistancetoRwandainthe1970s.

1973alsosawasignificantchangeinU.S.foreignpolicythataffected

Americanassistanceglobally.TheVietnamWarandthegrowingdomestic

oppositiontothewarhadnegativelyaffectedAmerica’sperceptionsofinternational

affairs.ThewarincreasedtheCongress’roleinforeigneconomicassistancepolicy.

Intheearly1970s,theDemocraticCongress“refusedtopassaforeignaid

authorizationbilltoprotesttheNixonadministration’spoliciesinVietnam.”10

ContinuingtheCongress’stanceagainstusingdevelopmentaidforthewarin

Vietnam,1973’stheNewDirectionsbillwaspassed.Duringthe1960s,U.S.aidwas

oftenusedtomodernizesocietiesandpromotegrowth,butwiththeNewDirections

Mandate,foreignaidemphasizedthegoalofpovertyalleviation.

AgroupofCongressmenwereabletodrivetheirlegislationthroughthe

HouseofInternationalAffairsandtheSenateForeignRelationscommittees,

authorizingtheNewDirectionsMandate.Thelegislationbroughtabout“amajor

reformofU.S.aidthatinvolvedpolicyratherthanorganizationalchange:aidwas

9MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:CornellUniversity,2002),53.

10CarolLancaster,TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwenty­FirstCentury,(WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000),46.

35

reorientedtowardprovidingforthebasichumanneedsofthoseinpoor

countries.”11Basichumanneedsincludedprimaryhealthcare,basiceducation,

shelter,andagriculturalassistance.ThesemembersofCongresswereabletopush

thismandatethroughbecauseithadsupportthroughoutthegovernmentandthe

developmentcommunity.Thesegroupsbelieveditwastimetorefocuson

developmentafter“itsuseinthewarinIndochinatopropupgovernments.”12

Otherdomesticandinternationaleventsalsoinfluencedthischange.In

1974,thePortuguesecoloniesofMozambiqueandAngoladeclaredindependence,

escalatingColdWartensions.Domestically,theincreasednumberofAfrican

AmericansinpoliticsledtoariseinsupportforAfricanaid.13Thesechangeshelped

spurincreasedactivityandlevelsofaidtoAfricannations,includingRwanda.The

increasedlevelsofsupportfocusedoncountryallocations,emphasizedpoorer

countries,andhighlightedgoalstoimproveeducation,healthcareandrural

agriculturaldevelopment.14TheNewDirectionsMandate,oftenreferredtoasthe

BasicHumanNeedsmandateinpopularandprofessionaldiscussions,wasadistinct

shiftawayfrommodernizationpracticesofthepreviousdecade.

Duringthe1960s,USAIDfocusedongeneralresourcetransfersthathelped

stabilizethenewlyemergingAfricannationsbutwiththeNewDirectionsMandate

USAID’sreentryintoRwandawouldbedrasticallydifferent.Themostdistinctive

11CarolLancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?(WashingtonD.C.:

CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008),13.12Lancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid,14.13CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtoDo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:Universityof

ChicagoPress,1999),86.14CarolLancaster,ForeignAid:Diplomacy,Development,DomesticPolitics,(Chicago:

UniversityofChicagoPress,2007),76.

36

featureofthenewmandate“wasthatitproposedtoconcentrateeconomic

assistanceintofivefunctionalbudgetcategories:FoodandNutrition,Population

PlanningandHealth,EducationandHumanResourceDevelopment,Selected

DevelopmentProblems,andSelectedCountriesandOrganizations.”15

Habyarimana’srebrandingofRwandaasadevelopmentstateappealedtoaid

organizationsandfitwiththeNewDirectionsMandatedforUSAID.

HabyarimanashiftedthecenterofdevelopmentinRwandafromthemajor

citiestotheruralcommunes,embracingtheNewDirectionsMandate.USAID

“involv[ed][theruralpoor]directlyinthedevelopmentprocess.”16Anothermajor

differencefromthe1960swastheremovalofsecurityprojectsfromthe

developmentsector.A1973CongressionalResearchServicesummaryconcluded

“securityassistanceshouldbeadministeredseparatelyfromdevelopment

assistance.”17DespitepreviousprojectsassistingRwandawithsecurity,all

assistanceinthe1970swasdirectedatimprovingbasichumanneeds.The1970s

sawrapidincreasesinaid,particularlyduringthelaterhalf,beginningwitha

CongressionalinitiativeandcontinuedbyPresidentCarter.

ThisfocuswasreinforcedwiththeelectionofPresidentJimmyCarterin

1976.TheCarterAdministration“enteredofficecommittedtotheobjectivesofthe

basichumanneedsmandate.”18Overthecourseofthe1970s,theinternational

humanrightsmovementgainedmomentumand“politicians,mostnotablyPresident

15VernonRuttan,UnitedStatesDevelopmentAssistancePolicy:TheDomesticPoliticsof

ForeignEconomicAid,(Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1996),94.16Ruttan,94.17Ruttan,107.18Ruttan,119.

37

JimmyCarter,startedtoinvokehumanrightsastheguidingrationaleoftheforeign

policyofstates.”19Expandinghissupportforhumanrightsinthe1980s,President

Carteraddedemphasisonwomen’sneedsandadvancementsinU.S.foreignaid.

USAIDannualreportsdemonstratethewidevarietyofprojectsimplementedto

improvebasichumanneedsintheruralsectorofRwanda.

USAIDrelationswiththeGovernmentofRwandaimprovedwith

Habyarimana’sregime.Startingin1973,“theGovernmentofRwanda’s

developmentprioritieswereinstepwithUSAIDgoalsandstrategies.”20Overa

periodof18months,fourdifferentUSAIDteamscametoRwandatodiscussprojects

thatwouldsignificantlycontributetothecountry’sdevelopmentplan.Startingin

1974theGovernmentofRwandapresented23projectproposalstoUSAID.While

notall23wereapproved,eventuallyUSAIDprogramsincreasedfromthreein1975

totwelvein1980.TheUnitedStatesusedtobeaminordonortoRwanda,butinthe

lasthalfofthe1970s,“theU.S.governmentbegantoputconsiderableeffortinto

developingandexpandingitsprograminRwanda.”21

TheUSAIDRwandaAnnualBudgetSubmissionforFY1977,writtenin

August1975outlinedsomeofthefirstprojectsimplementedundertheNew

DirectionsMandate.AninitialprojectincludedCooperativeDevelopment,

improvingtheaccessofthepopulationlivingincooperativestodevelopmentinputs,

19SamuelMoyn,TheLastUtopia:HumanRightsinHistory,(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity

Press,2010),5.20LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,

Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,6.21Grosz,8.

38

suchastechnicaltrainingsessions.Thisproject“providednecessaryunderpinnings

totheGovernmentofRwandaprogramofdevelopinglocal,specialized

cooperatives.”22Emphasiswasplacedonproductioncooperatives,includingboth

agriculturalandnon‐agriculturalcooperatives.CooperativeDevelopmentaimedto

organizepeopleintogroupsinorderto“allowotherscarceresourcestobeutilized

moreeffectively[to]resultinasynergisticeffect.”23Thecomponentsofthisproject

includedcooperativetraining,providingmaterialsandequipment,andconsultants.

ThebenefitshelpedtheGovernmentofRwanda’scooperativeprogramsand

indirectlyhelpedthousandsofsmallruralfarmersparticipatingincooperatives.

Theshort‐livedCooperativeDevelopmentproject,workingtoreinforcethe

newcommunalreorganizationofRwanda,representedthenewgoalswithUSAID’s

NewDirectionsinitiativebyworkingdirectlywiththeruralpopulationand

improvingtheirstandardoflivingeconomically,politicallyandsocially.Byhelping

thesecommunesrecognizetheirhumanresourcepotential,identifystrengthsand

methodsofbettercommunicationandteamworktheseruralcommunitieswere

givenpossibilitiestochangetheirsituation.Thisprojectdidnotcontinueformore

thanayearbecausetheRwandangovernmentwasunabletoidentifyspecific

projectswithincooperativesrequiringfurtherUSAIDassistance.ButUSAIDwas

abletohelpguidelocalparticipantsandleadersincontinuingtostrengthen

cooperativesacrossthecountry.

AnotherprojectoutlinedintheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1977included

theFarmHandTools–Blacksmithsproject.Theprojectranfrom1975through

22USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1977,”July1975,16.23USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”17.

39

1978andattemptedtosupportruralvocationaltrainingbyhelping“Rwanda[n]

blacksmithstothedegreeofskillnecessarytomanufactureandrepairhandtools

commonlyusedoressentialtothefarmsystemandprovidethesewiththe

minimumnecessarytoolkit.”24Atthetime,therewereinadequatenumbersof

blacksmithsavailabletoprovideandfixfarmtoolsacrossRwanda.Thisprogram

continuedanotherprojectoriginallystartedbyaSwissdevelopmentorganization

andevenusedtheoriginalSwisstrainingsite.TheSwissprojectwasterminated

duetoinstabilityinRwandain1972,andUSAIDmadeafewalternationswhenit

resumedtheprojectin1975.Afterreview,theUSAIDFarmToolsProjected

providedconsultantstocreatecoursematerialstoproducecapableblacksmiths,

tuitionassistancefor120studentsannuallyforthreeyears,basictoolkitfor

graduates,andequipmentforthetrainingcenter.25

Thisprojectalsohelpedcreatebettereconomicconditionsforfarmersand

blacksmiths.Rwandaimportedapproximately100,000hoesannually.By

increasingthenumberofblacksmithsavailablewithinRwanda,hoescouldbe

producedandsoldlocally,andmaterialsrepaired.Farmtoolswerepredictedtolast

threeyearswithannualrepairsnecessary,withthecalculationof2,750,00hand‐

toolsexistingand900,000needingrepairsorreplacementannually.26Thisproject

expandedadomesticmarketinsteadofrelyingonforeignimports.Rwandahad

beenbuyinghoesfromGreatBritain,butwithcontinuedblacksmithtrainingthis

importcouldbeeliminated,improvingRwanda’seconomicpossibilities.

24USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”9.25USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”11.26USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”14.

40

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionforFY1979,writteninJune1977,provided

anupdateandthelastinformationavailableontheproject.USAIDcontinuedto

assistreestablishingtheblacksmith‐trainingcenterandprovidedtechnical

assistanceandequipment.27Theprojectwasterminatedaftertheoriginalthree‐

yearplanlikelybecauseUSAIDconsideredthenumberofproficientblacksmithsin

Rwandasufficient.USAIDassumedtheRwandangovernmentwouldcontinue

supportforvocationaltrainings,includingtheblacksmithproject.

SimilartotheassistanceprovidedtocommunesthroughtheCooperative

Developmentproject,theBlacksmithtrainingprogramhelpedprovidealternative

optionstoruralinhabitants.ThemajorityofRwandanswerefarmersand

increasingfarmingcontinuallyaddedmorepressuretooverusedplots.This

problemwascounteredbytheBlacksmithprogramasitincreasededucational

optionswithvocationaltraining,relievedlandpressuresbyreducingthenumberof

farmers,offereddifferenteconomicoptionsfortheruralpopulationandimproved

theoveralleconomicconditionofRwandabyeliminatingalargeimportand

creatinganemergingdomesticmarketforfarmtoolscreationandmaintenance.

ThisprojectreflectedthepoliticalchangeswithinRwandaandthechangesin

USAIDobjectivesduringthe1970s.Byfocusingonruralemploymentoptionsand

helpingtoreducethenumberoffarmers,theBlacksmithprojectfollowedthe

Rwandangovernment’scommandtodirectforeignassistancetotherural

communes.AfterHabyarimanatookpower,hededicatedmoreattentionand

assistancetodevelopingRwanda,emphasizingtheruralsectorofthecountry.It

27USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1977,”15.

41

alsoreflectedthechangedpoliticaldynamicfeltafterHabyarimana’scoup.The

originalSwissprojectendedsuddenlyin1972withtheoutbreakofviolence

originatinginBurundi.BecauseHabyarimanacalmedtheon‐goingethnic

hostilities,theblacksmithprojectwasabletoresumeandbecompletedbyUSAID.

TheRwandangovernmentwasn’ttheonlyentityrefocusingassistanceontherural

sector.WiththeNewDirectionsMandate,USAIDworkedtocreatenewprojects

specifictoproblemsinthecountryside.Theblacksmithprojectdirectlyaffectedthe

opportunitiesavailabletoruralinhabitants,relievedpressuresfeltbyruralfarmers,

andimprovedtheoveralleconomicconditionofthecountrybyeliminatingaregular

importfromEurope.

AthirdprojectdiscussedintheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1977wasthe

FoodStorageandMarketingproject.Thisprojectbeganin1975andwas

consideredoneofthemostsignificantprojectstoRwandabecause“whilethere

werearelativelywiderangeofcrops,inadequatetransportation,limitedmarkets,

lowincomes,poorcommunication,andotherfactorscombinedtokeepagricultural

cropsfromthemarkets.”28ThemainoutputsfortheFoodStorageandMarketing

projectincludedeightwarehouses,tenRwandantraineesintheareasoffood

storageandmarketing,anoperationalfoodmarketingoffice,proceduresfor

financialcontrolandwarehousemanagement,andaworkingcapitalfundforthe

foodmarketingoffice.29Thisproject’smostimportantgoalwastobuildadequate

storagefacilitiestohelpprotectfarmers’crops.Rwandanssufferedfrom

28Grosz,8.29USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1979,”June1977,18.

42

malnutritionpartlybecauseamajorityoftheircropswerelosttoinsects,animals,

andmold.Byhelpingprotectcrops,theproject’sgoalwastoincreasetoamountof

foodforfamiliestoeatandsellinmarkets.

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1979providedanupdateontheprogress

ofthisproject.Withintwoyearsofimplementation,almost4,000tonsofbeanshad

beenstored.RwandasentaprojectmanagertotheUnitedStatestoreceivetraining

forprojectadministrationandanalysis.Theprojectwasunderrevision,callingfor

anexpansionofthestoragecapacityinspecificareasandconstructionofmore

warehousesinothers.30Theprojectremainedfullystaffedandcontinuedtoexpand

duetoitsrapidsuccess.Examinationandexpansionsonthisprojectcontinuedinto

the1980s.

IntheBudgetSubmissionFY1980,writteninMay1978,theFoodStorage

andMarketingprojectwasupdatedagain.Theproject’spurposewasto“createan

efficientfoodstorageandmarketingsystemforstaplefoodsandreduceseasonal

andregionalpricefluctuationsofstaplefoods.”31USAIDconstructedfoodstorage

warehouses,providedtechnicalassistanceandtrainingthatledtoaprice

stabilizationprogram.Thisprogram’saimwastoincreasefoodproductionwhile

reducingregionalpricesallowingproducerstoreceivehigherprices.Ifproducers

couldreceivehigherpricestheywouldbeencouragedtoproducemoreforthe

market.Since1975,theFoodStorageandMarketingprogramhadexpandedto

increasewarehousecapacityandtrainedadditionalstaff.Mostimportantly,since

1975,“4,450MTofbeans,Rwanda’sstaplecrop,ha[d]beenstoredand1,550MT

30USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”13.31USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1980,”May1978,4.

43

sold.”32ThisprogressbenefitedtheentirepopulationofRwanda.Asthebean

pricesstabilized,morebeanswerecultivatedandsold,benefitingallRwandans

economicallyandnutritionally.Whilethefirststageofthisprojectendedin

December1980,intheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1982,theFoodStorageand

MarketIIprojectwasoutlined.

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1982,writteninJune1980,explainedand

detailedtheextendedFoodStorageandMarketingIIprogram.Thisextension

plannedto“increasetheimpactandeffectivenessoftheRwandangovernment’s

grainandfoodpulsestorageandpricestabilizationprogram,andtodevelopa

strategicstorageprogram.”33USAIDestimatedthataboutfortypercentofRwanda’s

agriculturalproductionwasmonetized,callingforcontinuedassistancewiththe

FoodStorageandMarketingproject.TheFoodStorageandMarketingproject

workedtoincreasetheamountofcropsavailabletobeconsumedandsold.With

theincreasingmonetizationofcrops,theprojecthelpedtocontinuethatgrowth.

Theplanextension

outlinedprogramstostrengthenruralcooperativestoassembleandstoremarketablefarmsurplusesandtoexpandtheinterregionaltransportandmarketingsystemforthetransferofsurplusestodeficitareas.Amoreefficientmarketwillencourageincreasedproduction.34

Thefirststageoftheprojectwaseffectiveinservinginterregionalmarkets,andthe

secondphaseaimedtocontinuetoexpandthemarketsuccesses.Ultimatelythe

successofthisprojectledtoexpandedagriculturalprojectsbyUSAIDinRwanda.

32USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”4.33USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1982,”June1980,15.34USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”15.

44

Whilethereweremanymoreprojectsfocusingonagriculturalassistance,

thereweretwothatmostspecificallyhelpedtheFoodStorageandMarketing

project.TheCooperativeGrainStorageandLocalCropStorageprograms,initiated

in1978and1979,helpedaddressstorageandmarketingneedsatlocallevels.

Theseprogramsprovided“farmersthetoolsforincreasedcontrolovertimingof

salesandawiderrangeofmarketingoptions,thusgivingthemaroletoplayin

establishingbeanandsorghumprices.”35ThecontinuationoftheFoodStorageand

MarketingIIprojectdependedonregularexaminationsandwillbediscussed

furtherinthenextchapter.

Theseagriculturalassistanceprogramsdifferedfromprojectsduringthe

1960sinafewmajorways.Underthemodernizationmandateofthe1960s,food

storageprojectswouldhavebeengearedtowarddevelopingmodernindustryfor

trade.Incontrast,undertheneedsmandateofthe1970s,theseprojectsfocusedon

stabilizingfoodavailabilityandpricesforthelocalpopulation.TheFoodStorage

andMarketingprojectsandthesupportingagriculturalprogramsworkedto

increasefarmers’cropsforlocalmarketsandpersonalconsumption.Increasingthe

amountofcropsthatsurvivedeachseasonledtoincreasedavailabilityandvariety

forlocalfarmerstosellandbuy,improvingruraleconomicandhealthconditions.

Advancingfarmers’financialsituationsandnutritionfellunderRwanda’snewfocus

onruralcommunesandUSAID’sNewDirectionsMandate.Theamountoftimeand

resourcesmadeavailabletotheFoodStorageandMarketingprojectsdemonstrated

anothershiftfromthe1960s.InUSAID’sfirstdecadeassistingRwanda,therewere

35USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”15.

45

fewerfundsavailableandprojectsimplemented.WiththeNewDirectionsMandate

therewereincreasedlevelsoffinancialassistanceandattentionmadeavailableto

thesenewprojects.TheneedsmandateemployedbyUSAIDduringthe1970s

justifiedtheshiftfromthemodernizationpracticesofthe1960s,emphasizingthe

basichumanneedsofRwanda’sruralinhabitants.

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1979detailedanotherimportantproject,

theKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolprogramthatassistedtheGovernmentofRwandain

meetingitsagriculturalneeds.TheKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolwasamajor

institutionthattrainedlowerlevelagriculturalstaff.36BecauseRwandawasamong

thesixpoorestcountriesintheworld,hadthehighestpopulationdensityinAfrica,

andhadoverninetypercentofthepopulationrelyingonagriculturefortheir

livelihood,theKibuyeAgriculturalSchoolwascrucialtoimprovingRwanda’s

situation.

Thepurposeofthisprojectwasto“expandaninstitutionthatcouldprovidea

greaternumberofpracticallytrainedagriculturaltechnicians:extensionagents,

schoolteachersandruralvocationaleducationschoolsstaff.”37Withbetter‐trained

agriculturalistsandspecialists,agriculturalproductioninRwandacouldincrease.

Overathree‐yearperiod,USAIDassistedtheschoolinimprovingeducationby

providingconsultants,trainings,logisticalsupport,andmaterials.TheKibuye

SchoolwasuniqueinRwandaandwastheonlyschooltotrainyoungmenbetween

18and20yearsoldonadvancedscientificagriculturalpractices.

36USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”19.37USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”20.

46

Thetwo‐yearprogramemphasizedgeneralagriculture,forestry,botany,

ecology,soilscience,statistics,zoology,andvegetableproduction.USAIDassistance

increasedthenumberofgraduatesfrom25to50andprovidedmorepractical

instructionalcourses.ThecourseswereimprovedwithAmericanteachersworking

inKibuyeprovidingguidancefortheRwandanteachers.38Thisassistancebeganin

FY1979andcontinuedthroughFY1981,assumingthegovernmentofRwanda

wouldcarryonsupportafter1981.Fromthemid‐1970sthroughthe1980sUSAID

assistedandcreatedseveralagriculturalprojectsbeyondtheonesoutlinedabove.

Theseotherprojectsincludedsupportingthewomen’sagriculturalschoolandarea

agriculturalproduction.

ThemanyagriculturaldevelopmentprogramsimplementedbyUSAIDhelped

Rwandainmorewaysthanjustfoodproduction.TheKibuyeAgriculturalSchool

providedincreasededucationaloptions,similartotheBlacksmithsproject,tothe

ruralpopulation.WhilemanycouldnotaffordtoattendaRwandanuniversity,they

couldbenefitfromthevocationaltrainingprogramsfromUSAID.TheAgricultural

schooltaughtRwandansmethodstoimproveandincreaseagriculturalproduction,

whichhadobviouspositiveimpacts.Malnutritionandstarvationwereaddressed

withmorefoodavailableforconsumptionandfarmersimprovedeconomicallywith

moretosellindomesticmarkets.Despiteimprovedgrowingtechniques,without

appropriatestoragefacilitiestheincreasecropswouldbelost.TheFoodStorage

andMarketingprojectsweresupportedbysmallerscale,localizedprojects,

includingtheCooperativeGrainStorageandLocalCropStorageprojects.These

38USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1979,”24.

47

agriculturalprojectssupportedtheNewDirectionsMandateandRwandan

governmentdevelopmentgoalsinawidevarietyofways,betteringthelivesand

healthofruralRwandansleadingtopotentialeconomicandsocialprosperity.

TheNewDirectionsMandatedidn’tsolelyemphasizeimprovingrural

agriculture,butrurallivingconditionsingeneral.Otherprojectsoriginatinginthe

mid‐1970sandcontinuingthroughthenextdecadeworkedwithinfrastructure,

ruralhealth,andfamilyplanning.Rwandahadnorailroadsandlimitedair

transport,makingroadstheprimarymodeoftransportation.Theroadsystem

consistedofbituminous‐surfacedroads,re‐graveledroads,veryoldgraveledroads

andlateriteroads.Since1971,trafficinRwandahadgrownatanannualrateoften

percentandthenumberofregisteredvehiclesinRwandain1976wasalmost

13,000.Byimprovingtheroadsystemcommunications,ruraldevelopmentwould

subsequentlyprogress.39Onemajorprojectundertakenduringthe1970sto

improveRwanda’slimitedtransportationnetworkwastomodernizetheKibuye‐

Gitaramaroad.FormallyknownastheRuralRoadproject,thismajorproject

includedtechnicalassistance,equipment,on‐the‐job‐trainingandfinancialsupport

toimprovetheentirelengthofroad.

TheKibuye‐GitaramaRoadisthemainconnectiontotheNileCrestarea,one

ofthepoorestandmostdenselypopulatedareasofRwanda.Whileinfrastructure

wasoneoftheprimaryfocusesforUSAIDduringthe1960s,thisprojectdiffered

fromthoseofoldmodernizationmandateinsignificantways.Themostobvious

waysitvariedfrominfrastructureprojectsofthepastwerethegoalsandintent

39USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”17.

48

behindtheproject.Duringthe1960s,projectswereprimarilyinKigaliorother

urbancenters;theseroadswereinthecountry,connectingrural,desperatelypoor

sectionsofRwanda.Thegoalwasnolongertohelpthegovernmentstabilizeand

expandafterindependence,buttoreachdisconnectedregionsofRwanda.Beyond

theobjectivetoexpandRwanda’sroadways,theRuralRoadprojectbuiltthisroad

specificallytoimprovetheconnectionbetweenmodernizedRwandaandthis

extremelypoorsectionofthecountry.Theintenttoallowassistancetoreachthis

regionwasmoreimportantthantheactualconstructionoftheroadbecausethe

NewDirectionsMandateputmoreemphasisonimprovingstandardsoflivingthan

ontheinfrastructureprojectsofthepast.

TheRuralRoadprojectwouldrepairthe93kmroadbetweenKibuyeand

Gitaramaoverthreeyears.ThepopulationalongtheZaire‐NileCrestbenefitedfrom

increasedcommunications,decreasedtransportationcosts,andwideraccessto

marketsforbothsellingandbuying.TheMinistryofPublicWorksalsobenefited

withthepossibilityofallocatingmorefundstootherroadrepairsandtheguidance

offoreigntechniciansinvolvedinthisproject.

TheAnnualBudgetReportFY1981,writteninJune1979,providedamidway

reportontheRuralRoadsproject.Therepairstothisstretchofroadpositively

impactedthe600,000inhabitantsoftheregionsociallyandeconomically.40The

RwandangovernmentprovidedsupervisionandskilledlaborfromthePublicWorks

ministryandunskilledlaborfromtheregion.DuringFY1980,testsanddesigns

werecompleted,identifyingproblemareas,andthenecessaryequipmentwas

40USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1981,”May1979,8.

49

delivered.ForFY1981,constructionoftheroadsurface,culvertsandbridges

began.Withtherateofprogresscontinuinguninterrupted,theRuralRoadproject

wascompletedinthethree‐yeartimelineandimprovedlivingconditionstoan

enormouslyimportantanddisconnectedsectionoftheRwandanpopulation.

TheRuralRoadprojectconnectingKibuyeandGitaramaworkedto

implementUSAID’sNewDirectionsMandateandRwandangovernment’sgoalsof

bringingdevelopmentassistancetotheruralpopulation.ThisRoadprojectallowed

thepoorestsectionofRwandaaccesstodevelopmentaid.Bymakingtheregion

moreaccessiblenotonlywouldUSAIDbeabletoexpandprojectsfocusedonthese

communities,butotherdonorscouldalsobecomeinvolved.Beforeaddressingthe

basichumanneedsoftheregions,donorsneededtoaccessthepopulationfor

assessment.

AnotherprojectaimedathelpingRwandanfarmersdescribedintheAnnual

BudgetReportFY1981wastheFishCultureprogram.Theprojectworkedto

“developthecapacityofRwandanfarmerstobuildandmaintainproductiveon‐farm

fishponds.”41TherewasahighdemandforfreshfishinRwandaandthematerials

necessaryforfishfarmingwerereadilyavailableinruralsectors,creatinga

possibilitytoimproveeconomicconditionsandthehealthofruralRwandans.The

USAIDFishCultureprojectinRwandawasbasedonthefishundertakenbycolonial

administratorsinZaireduringthe1950s.ThisprojectrequiredZairianstobuild

pondsandfarmfishforseveralyears.Whilethepondswereabandonedafter

41USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”20.

50

independence,theinitialresultsbenefitedthefarmersinvolved.42USAID’ssupport

forRwandanFishFarmswasconsistentwiththeNewDirectionsinitiativeto

increasefoodproductionandcombatmalnutrition.Thepredictedbenefitswere

numerousandcouldhaveaffectedtheentirecountry.Anestimated1,200fishponds

wouldproduce36MToffishon600farmsintenRwandanprefectureswithUSAID’s

support.

AnupdatedreportontheFishFarmsshowedpositivegrowth.Theproject

planningbeganin1978forFY1980,butbeforetheprojectevenbegan,theFish

CultureprojectwasextendedtoFY1984in1979.TheRwandangovernment

providedpersonnelforextensionservicesandpondconstruction,workspacefor

technicalstaffandlandfortheponds.ThisprojectaddressedseveraloftheNew

Directionsinitiatives:tocombathealthproblems,expandfoodproductionandoffer

alternativecropsforfarmerstogrow.

Similartothepositivebenefitsoftheagriculturalprojects,theFishCulture

projectdemonstratedtheNewDirectionsMandateandRwandangovernment

initiativesbyaddingeconomic,environmentalandnutritionaldiversityintherural

sectorsofRwanda.TheFishCultureprogramofferedanewoptionforfarmersin

themarket,toreducelandpressure,andimprovethehealthofthepopulace.Most

farmersgrewthesamecrops,creatingmorecompetitioninthemarket.Byadding

fishtothearrayofoptions,economicgainwaspossible.Thishelpedtoalleviatethe

overuseofRwanda’sfarmlandsandgavefarmersanewincomesourcethatwould

notdepletefieldsofvaluablenutrients.Finally,dietswereimprovedwithneeded

42USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1981,”10.

51

supplements,includingproteinandironfromfish.Thesethreeareasspecifically

demonstratedtheRwandangovernmentandNewDirectionsgoalsofaddressing

familyhealthcare,agriculturalassistanceandenvironmentaldegradation.

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1980alsodescribedthefirsthealth

servicesprojectaddressingruralhealthcareandfamilyplanning.TheRural

Health/FamilyPlanningprogramworkedto“improvethecapacityoftheRwandan

Governmenttodeliverruralhealthservicesbyup‐gradingandcreatingtheservices

atthedispensaryandhealthcenterlevels.”43Untilthisproject,USAID’sonly

involvementinRwanda’shealthsectorwasthroughPL480assistance,runbythe

CatholicReliefServicesfundingnutritioncentersandschoolfeedingprograms.The

projectdirectlyaddressedtherapidpopulationgrowthoccurringinRwanda,

stressingagriculturalproduction,amongmanyotherareas.TheRural

Health/FamilyPlanningprogramfocused“onnutrition,preventivemedicineand

familyplanningbyimprovingthenationalhealthdeliverysystemattheclinicand

dispensarylevels.”44USAIDrecognizedtheenormousundertakingsthisproject

wouldentailandcontinuedregularupdatesonitsprogressinsubsequentreports.

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1981providedthefirst‐yearupdateon

theproject.ToassisttheRwandangovernmentinmakingexistingmedicalservices

moreefficientandeffective,USAIDhelpedemphasizepreventivemedicineinthe

ruralsector.Atthesametime,USAIDfocusedontherapidpopulationgrowth

occurringinRwandaandpromotedknowledgeofchildspacingtechniques,

establishingeducationfamilyplanningactivitiesandeventuallyimplementinga

43USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”24.44USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1980,”24.

52

nationalfamilyplanningprogram.InFY1980,theprojectbegantrainingprograms

forhealthworkersandconstructionofruralhealthcenters.45Theprojecthada

terminationdateofFY1984becausetheGovernmentofRwandademonstrated

increasedinterestandmotivationtotackletheburgeoningpopulationproblem.

Whilethisspecificprogramdidn’tcontinuepastthemid‐1980s,USAIDcontinuedto

beaprimarydonortoRwandaneffortstocopewithexcessivepopulationgrowthby

fundingeducationalfamilyhealthprograms.

TheRuralHealth/FamilyPlanningprojectwasthemostdirectproject

implementingthegoalsoftheRwandangovernmentandtheNewDirections

Mandate.Theotherprogramsdescribedaboveexecutedmanyofthesetgoalsina

varietyofways,whilethehealthprogramsdirectlybetteredthestandardofliving

forruralRwandans.Thishealthprojectworkedsolelytoimprovethehealthof

Rwandanfamilies,particularlymothersandchildren.Byofferingclasseson

nutrition,childspacing,andpreventativemedicineintheruralsector,theoverall

healthofRwandansimproved,thuspositivelyaffectingtheproduction,education

andtheoutlookofdevelopment.Withreducedlevelsofstressonfamilies,farmers

couldbestrongerandmoreproductive,childrencouldparticipatemorefullyin

school,andtheinvolvementindevelopmentprogramscouldincrease.

AlloftheprojectsdescribedworkedtowardimplementingtheNew

DirectionsgoalsinRwandabyfocusingonagriculture,health,andeducationto

improvethestandardoflivingforRwandans.IntheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY

1982,writteninJune1980,USAIDoutlineditslong‐rangegoalstocontinuehelping

45USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1981,”14.

53

ruralRwandansintothe1980s.Thesefuturegoalsincluded“achievementand

maintenanceofnormalfoodself‐sufficiency,developmentofinfrastructureto

improvedeliveryofessentialservicesandoff‐farmemploymentopportunities,

establishaviablesystemofstorageandmarketingofbasiccropsandprotectionof

naturalresources.”46BecauseUSAIDwasinvolvedinthebeginningstagesofkey

sectordevelopmentprograms,theUSAIDprograminRwandawasnotpredictedto

changedramaticallyforthenextthreetofiveyearsintothemid‐1980s.Butwith

decliningeconomicconditionsinRwandaandchangesinthepoliticalleadershipof

theUnitedStates,U.S.foreignassistancepolicywouldtakeanotherturn.

46USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1982,”5.

Chapter3:EconomicInstabilityandtheReaganEra

While1962and1973markedyearswherechangesinbothRwandaandthe

U.S.transpirednearlysimultaneously–thecreationofUSAIDandRwandan

independence;theNewDirectionsMandateandRwanda’smilitarycoup–political

andideologicalshiftsaffectingaidduringthe1980sinthetwocountrieswere

separatedbyseveralyears.Apartfromthisdifference,allthreedecadesandshifts

didsharethemaincharacteristicthattheramificationsofthesesignaleventstook

yearstoemerge,demonstratingthelongandcomplicatedprocessofdevelopment

work.TheelectionofRonaldReaganin1980alteredthedirectionofAmerican

foreignpolicyandUSAID’smissionawayfromaneedsmandate.Likemostchanges

ofadministration,thenewfocustooktimetobecultivatedandimplementedin

Rwanda.ThisisevidentfromthenewprogramsthatemergedinRwanda

throughoutthedecade.Growingeconomicinstabilityinthe1980salsoledtoan

eventualcollapseoftheRwandanmarketin1986.Afterinvestigatingtheeventsin

theUnitedStatesandRwanda,ananalysisofUSAIDdocumentsandprojectreports

inRwandaduringthe1980swillshowhowtheseeventsinfluenceddevelopment

policyandpractice.

Duringthe1960sand1970s,U.S.“aidfordevelopmentha[d]alternated

betweenanemphasisonpromotinggrowth–througheconomicreforms,

infrastructureexpansion,businessservicecenters–andaddressingproblemsof

55

povertydirectly,forexample,byexpandingbasichealthandeducation.”1Bythe

timeRonaldReaganwaselectedPresidentin1980,theU.S.wasreturningtopolicy

reformsthatfocusedonfiscalpolicyandsupply‐sideeconomicsratherthanstate

interventionistpolicy.Thereturntoafreemarketfocusdifferedfromtheinitial

programsinthe1960sthatassistedthenewlyfoundedcountrytostabilizeafter

decolonization.Reagan’s“maininterestwastheColdWar,andheusedforeignaid

todirectlypromoteU.S.securityinterests.”2Includedwiththereemergenceof

securityissuesandeconomicgoals,USAIDbegantonarrowandreducethegoals

promotedthroughtheNewDirectionsMandate.

Theexcitementofincreasedaidinthe1970sledtoavarietyofnewprojects

inRwandaand,asthe1980sprogressed,USAIDbegantonarrowonthemore

crucialandpressingproblems,suchasagriculturalproductionanddemographics.

USAIDnotonlyfocusedinonspecificareasforprojects,butalsoworkedtocontinue

themosteffectiveandworthwhileapproaches.Thenarrowedscopeofthese

projectsdidcontinueinitiativesfromtheNewDirectionsMandate,buttheyalso

indirectly,andoccasionallydirectly,affectedtheeconomicandsecurityprograms

proposedbyReagan.Thesegoalsweremetthrough

anintegratedassistanceprogramfocusingonfreemarketprinciples,privatesectordialogues,andtechnicalassistanceprojectswhichpromoteagriculturalproduction,naturalresourcemanagement,familyplanning,smallandmediumenterprisesandhumanresourcedevelopmenttraining.3

1CarolLancaster,GeorgeBush’sForeignAid:TransformationorChaos?(WashingtonD.C.:

CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2008,48.2SamuelButterfield,U.S.DevelopmentAid:AnHistoricFirst:AchievementsandFailuresinthe

TwentiethCentury,(Westport:PraegerPublishers,2004),199.3USAID/Rwanda,“BriefingBook,”April1990,1.

56

ThebenefitsandendproductsofthecontinuedselectedNewDirectionsprojects

implicitlysupportedtheneweconomicgoalsofUSAID.Forexample,theincreased

agriculturaloutputfollowingnewfarmingtechniquestaughtbyUSAIDalsoledto

morecropstosellandtradeinUSAIDmarketprojects.Inthe1980s,these

continuingprojectsdidnotreceiveheadlineattention,butwereconsistently

discussedinUSAIDdocuments,asshownlaterinthechapter.

WhileU.S.foreignaidideologyshiftedtowardsliberalisminthe1980s,the

continuationofbasichumanneedsprojectsinRwandaalsodemonstratedthe

realitiesofaidontheground.Rwandaisaprimeexampleofthedualityofforeign

aid,anexamplethatdemonstratedboththeideologyandactualityofdevelopment.

Ineachdecadestudied,thebroadthemesofU.S.foreignaidcanbeseen,from

modernizationinthe1960stotheneedsmandateofthe1970s.Despitetheshift

towardsfreemarketpoliciesinthe1980s,projectsworkingtoimprovebasichuman

needsshowtherealityofaidinrecipientcountries.BecauseRwandawassmalland

strategicallyunimportant,aidworkersonthegroundusedtheirdiscretionto

continueprojectsnecessarytoRwandandevelopment,regardlessofthedirections

giveninWashington.

ThenewRepublicanplatformsetthetoneforReagan’sapproachtoU.S.

foreignassistance.Whilemanyprojectsfromthepastcontinuedintothe1980s,

programswithsimilargoalscontinuedtobecreated,includingagriculturalsupport

andfamilyplanninginitiatives.InthelastyearsoftheCarterAdministrationand

continuingduringbothofReagan’sterms,assistancepolicy“movedawayfrombasic

humanneedsandtowardmoresecuritydominationandthemoveawayfrom

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securitytowardapolicyofgreatereconomiccooperation.”4Essentially,theReagan

administration’s“foreignassistanceobjectivesinAfrica[included]fostering

economicdevelopmentthroughfinancingprojectsorbalance‐of‐paymentssupport

conditionedonpolicyreforms,andprovidinghumanitarianrelief.”5These

objectiveswerefiscal,supply‐sideconcernsassociatedwithmarketreformsand

werepairedwithimprovingtheprivatesectorandbusinessopportunitiesinboth

AfricaandRwanda.

Thepolicyshiftrepresentedboththechangingneedsinrecipientcountries

andlong‐termU.S.goals.ThestrengtheningofColdWarrhetoricaddedtoincreased

securityconcernsandeconomicobjectivescombiningRwandanneedsandU.S.

concerns.AsRobertMcNamara,theSecretaryofDefenseforKennedyandJohnson

described,“securityisdevelopment.Withoutdevelopmenttherecanbenosecurity.

Adevelopingnationthatdoesnotinfactdevelopsimplycannotremainsecure.”6

Preventingthespreadofcommunismtothedevelopingworldwasacontinuedand

increasedsecurityinterestforReagan.WhilethiswasprimarilyaU.S.concern,

Americanpolicymakersjustifieditasdefendingdemocracyandcapitalismfor

Rwanda.Developmentaidinthe1980s“shiftedbacktosupportinggrowthand

emphasizedfundingofessentialeconomicreforms”tohelpprivateinvestmentrise

andleadtofastergrowth,“asopposedtopovertyalleviationduringthe1970s.”7

4Butterfield,145.5Butterfield,127.6DavidEkbladh,TheGreatAmericanMission:ModernizationandtheConstructionofan

AmericanWorldOrder,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),201.7CarolLancaster,TransformingForeignAid:UnitedStatesAssistanceintheTwenty­First

Century,(WashingtonD.C.:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000),19.

58

TheshiftintheUnitedStatestowardeconomicconditionalitybeganbecause

ofthegrowinginternationaldebtcrisis.Inthelate1970s,theRwandaneconomy

improvedbecausetea,coffee,andcocoapricestripledbetween1975and1977.

DroughtinIndiaandfrostsinBrazilbenefittedAfricanexportersincludingKenya,

Uganda,Burundi,andRwanda.8Bytheearly1980s,however,growthwasslowing

asAsianandAmericancropsrecoveredand“exportrevenuesdeclined,importcosts

rose,andbudgetsincreased,andgovernmentsfoundthemselvesseriouslystrapped

forcash.”9Facingsevereeconomiccrises,manyAfricangovernments,includingthe

Rwandangovernment,soughtincreasedaidanddebtrelief.Thegeneralpattern

wasalsothatpoorcountries,suchasRwanda,tookoutloanstocontinueinvesting

inbasicneedsprojects,whichledtofurtherindebtedness.Following

Habyarimana’s1970scampaigntoincreaseRwandandevelopment,thegovernment

wasforcedtoborrowmoremoneytocontinuetheirownprojects,fundnewoffices,

andcreatenewdepartments.ThesepleasweremetwiththelatestshiftinU.S.

foreignpolicydirectedspecificallyateconomicconcerns.

WhilerecognizingtheimportantshifttowardmarketliberalisminAmerican

foreignpolicyobjectives,anexaminationofthesituationleadingtotheeconomic

downfallsofthe1980sinRwandaisalsonecessary.Duringthe1970s,Rwandahad

asmaller,morereasonablerelianceonaid,butbythe1980sthisdependencehad

grownenormously.Theeconomiccollapseresultingfrommanycropandmarket

failuresinRwandaledtoadecadeofuncertaintyandhardships.Asexportmonies

8CarolLancaster,AidtoAfrica:SoMuchtodo,SoLittleDone,(Chicago:UniversityofChicago

Press,1999),24.9Lancaster,AidtoAfrica,26.

59

driedup,Rwandabeganborrowingheavily.TheRwandangovernmenthadstarted

multipledevelopmentprojectsduringthe1970sfollowingPresidentHabyarimana’s

declarationtoimprovelivingconditionsacrossthecountry.Withmanylargenew

programsbeginningintheearly1980s,thegovernmentwasforcedtoborrow

moneytocontinuedomesticdevelopment,specificallyintheruralsectorsof

Rwanda.

TherewereconsistentincreasesinfoodproductioninRwandafromthe

1960sthroughtheearly1980s,butby1985productionbegantostagnate.Although

growthremainedatareasonablerate,“betweenthemid‐1970sandthe1980sthe

combinationofadroughtandadecreaseininternationaldemandleftRwandawith

aheavydebtburden.”10Thepriceofcoffee,Rwanda’smainexportcrop,hadfallen

since1977,“thenroseagainafter1980beforefinallycollapsingin1986.”11This

inconsistencywastheprimarycauseofRwanda’seconomiccollapse,despite

increasedUSAIDeconomicprojectsinthecountry.Theeconomiccriseswerefirst

agriculturalbeforebecomingfinancial.

ThereweremorefactorsaffectingRwanda’sfinancialproblemsthansimply

plummetingcoffeeprices.WhilecoffeewasRwanda’schiefexport,thecountryalso

sufferedfromfailingteaandfoodstuffsprices,alongwithtroublesinthetinand

aluminumminingsectors.By1985,teaexportslostuptofortypercentoftheir

value,whichcompoundedthedecliningpricesofcoffee.Thedecreaseinfood

10MichaelBarnett,EyewitnesstoaGenocide:TheUnitedNationsandRwanda,(Ithaca:

CornellUniversity,2002),53.11GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide,(NewYork:ColumbiaPress,

1995),84.

60

productionappearedevenmoredrasticthanthesituationwithteaandcoffeein

globalmarkets.PeterUvinaptlydescribesthedecliningproduction,

Maizeproductionfellfrom110,00tonsin1983to90,000by1986andsubsequentlystagnated[atthe]90,000to100,000[ton]range.Similarly,sorghumproduction,whichwasat213,000tonsin1982,sliderraticallydownwardtoapproximately140,00tonsin1988and1989.Overtheperiod1984to1991,kilocaloriesproducedbyRwandanfarmersdroppedfrom2,055perpersonperdayto1,509.12

Thesechangesdecreasedfromanalreadylowlevelofproductiontoanintolerably

minimalamount.AsmostRwandanswerefarmers,theirpersonalincomeswere

affectedbythedecreaseinagriculturalproduction.Theslumpalsoaffected

Rwandanswhowerenotfarmersbutfacedinflation,poormarketpricesforother

tradeitems,andincreasedunemployment.Thisconjunctioncontributedtoan

agriculturalemergency.

TheagriculturalandeconomiccollapsethataffectedRwandawasasmuch

tiedtonaturalforcesasitwastomarketdeclines.A1984droughtwasfollowedby

excessiverainin1987andplantdiseasein1988.Pairedwiththesenaturalchanges,

increasedlandpressure,soilerosionandpovertycompoundedthesituation.13

IncreasingpopulationratesinRwanda,alreadythemostdenselypopulatedcountry

inAfrica,didnothelp.Buttheagriculturalcalamitieslisteddon’tprovidethefull

explanationforRwanda’seconomicproblems,asthe“collapseoftheminingsector,

togetherwiththefallincoffeeprices,broughtaboutanew,moreseverecrisis.”14

12PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian

Press,1998),54.13Uvin,57.14Uvin,57.

61

Followingthecollapseofcoffeeprices,worldtinpricesfellandledtothe

closingofRwanda’smines.ThecompaniesinchargeofRwanda’sothermineral

exports,includingcassiteriteandbauxite,15closedtheirproductionandfurther

deprivedRwandansofrevenue.Thecollapseofthesecropsandmarketsledtotens

ofthousandsofunemployedyoungmenwithoutfuturejobprospects.Itwasthis

situationthatUSAIDattemptedtocombat.WhileRwandaultimatelysufferedan

economicmeltdown,theeffortsofUSAIDmayhavealleviatedsomesuffering.The

collapsedemonstratedhowdesperatelyRwandaneededhelpfromorganizations

likeUSAID.

Alongwithdemonstratingwhatcrucialsocialdevelopmentprograms

continuedfromthe1970sintothe1980s,USAIDdocumentsalsoshowtheshifting

goalstowardmarketinitiativesofthe1980s.AsoutlinedbytheUSAIDreporton

thehistoryofitsinvolvementinRwanda,during1980theoverallmission

developmentgoalswereto“increasepercapitafoodproductionandeffectageneral

improvementinthehealthstatusoftheRwandanfamily,whilebringingthe

demographicprobleminbalancewithdevelopmentpotential.”16USAIDcouldmore

easilyrolloverprojectsstartedinthe1970s,butprojectsfocusingspecificallyon

theevolvingeconomicdownturntooklongertobecreatedandimplemented.Along

withtheeaseofcontinuingbasicneedsprograms,USAIDworkersinRwanda

recognizedtheneedtomaintainprojectsfromthe1970sdespitethechanged

15Cassiteriteisareddish,brownishoryellowingmineralcontainingtindioxide.Itisthemainoreoftin.Bauxiteisaclayeyrockthatisthechiefcommercialoreofaluminum.

16LynnElizabethGrosz,“AHistoryoftheUSAIDPrograminRwanda1962‐1985.”(Kigali,Rwanda,1986),unpublishedreportavailableatUSAIDDEC,17.

62

ideologyinWashington.MultipleprojectsdemonstratedhowUSAIDcontinuedto

tackletheareasofincreasedinterestfromthe1970s.

Beginningwithprojectstoimprovefamilyhealth,USAIDteamedwith

organizationssuchastheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)andUnitedNations

InternationalChildren’sEmergencyFund(UNICEF)toaddressdiseasesafflicting

childrenworldwide.Rwandawasoneofthefirstcountriestobeincludedinthe

programCombatting(sic)CommunicableChildhoodDiseases(CCCD)thatbeganin

1979tofightseveralbasicillnessesfacedbychildren.Bythefirstmonthsof1980,

theCentersforDiseaseControlincoordinationwithUSAIDbegantheExpanded

ProgramforImmunizations.Thisprogram,withsupportandfundingfromCCCD,

workedto“immunizechildrenunderfiveagainstmeasles,diphtheria,tetanus,

pertussis,tuberculosisandpolio.”17Providingcrucialservicesandmaterials,USAID

wasanintegralpartofthisprogram’ssuccess.Thevaccineswereadministered

throughlocaldispensariesbutneededtoremaincolduntilinjection.USAID

providedthecoldchainmaterialsthatkeptthemedicinerefrigeratedfromthe

manufactureruntiltheywerelocallydispensed.18

InMay1988,anexternalevaluationteamproducedthe“RwandaCCCDEnd

ofProjectEvaluation.”Thisextensivedocumentoutlinedthekeygoals,projects

implemented,andtheirsuccessandfailureratesfortheeightyearstheprojectran.

Thisprojectwasintended

tostrengtheninstitutionalsupportfortheseinterventionsbydevelopinganeffective,simplifiedhealthinformationsystem,strengthenestablishedtrainingandhealthinformationefforts,reinforcesystemsofsupervision,

17Grosz,18.18Grosz,18.

63

supportoperationsresearchandotherstudies,andencouragethedevelopmentofself‐financingmechanisms.19

Thesegoalswereclearlyseenthroughoutmanyoftheprogramsimplemented,most

specificallyintheExpandedProgramforImmunizationinRwanda.

ThereportexplainstheendresultsfortheExpandedProgramfor

Immunizations,withthesuccessratesforeachdiseasetargeted.Thetuberculosis

vaccineprovidedincreasedcoveragefrom49percentin1983to90percentin

1987;thediphtheria‐pertussis‐tetanusvaccinecoverageincreasedfrom36percent

to79percent;trivalentoralpoliovaccinewentfrom25percenttoalmost80

percent;andmeaslespreventionwentfrom53percentcoverageto75.20These

increasesinthenumberofimmunizationsgiven,thoughtheyunfortunatelydidnot

eliminatethediseasesentirely,didhaveamajorimpactondevelopmentinRwanda.

Bysignificantlyreducingthenumberofpeoplesusceptibletotheseailments,

Rwandaandotherhealthorganizationswereabletofocusonothermorepersistent

afflictions,suchasmalariaandnewlyemergingdiseaseslikeHIV/AIDS.21

TheresultsabovewerepresentedinUSAIDdocumentsandmaycontaina

certainamountofbias,buttheCCCDprogramoperatedaroundtheglobeandhad

significantsuccessoutsideofRwandaaswell.AccordingtotheWorldHealth

Organization,by1988“poliocasesworldwidedecreasedbyover99percentand

onlyfourcountriesretainpolio,”notincludingRwanda.22Whilethisisonedisease,

19ThomasBossert,“RwandaCCCDEndofProjectEvaluation,”May1988,7.20Bossert,“RwandaCCCD,”9.21Bossert,“RwandaCCCD,”9.22SamOkiror,“WorldHealthOrganization,Africa:Polioeradication,”

http://www.afro.who.int/en/rwanda/rwanda‐publications/bulletins/1932‐polio‐eradication.html(accessedMarch10,2011).

64

itsupportsthefactthatratesofdiseasesweredecliningwithhealthcampaigns,

includingtheExpandedProgramforImmunizationsinRwanda.Relatedtohealth

concerns,USAIDalsocontinuedtoworkondemographicproblemsinRwanda.

Whileitmayappearparadoxicaltoreducediseaseratesinthemostdensely

populatedcountryinAfrica,ultimatelytheendresultofbothhealthprogramsand

demographicprojectswerecomplimentary.Intheshortrun,diminishedinfection

ratesdidincreasepressureonscarceresources,however,improvingthehealthof

Rwandanseventuallyledtolowerbirthrates,positivelyaffectingdemographics.By

implementinghealthanddemographicprogramsatthesametime,retentionof

populationgrowthimproved.

PopulationgrowthratesbecameamajorconcernfortheUnitedStates

duringthe1960sand1970s,butwerenotacknowledgedbydevelopingregions

untilthe1980s.In1981,USAIDbeganamajorlong‐termbilateralprojectwiththe

GovernmentofRwandatoestablishaNationalOfficeofPopulation.Thedecreewas

approvedinSeptember1980,afteryearsofRwandandenialofagrowing

populationissue,andtheNationalPopulationOfficewascreatedinthefollowing

year.Theprojecthelpedcreatemethodstocollectpopulationdataand

subsequentlyanalyzeandevaluatetheresearch.TheOfficebegan“carryingout

studiesoftheproblemsaffectingthegrowthofthepopulation,evaluat[ing]the

importanceoftheseproblemsandpropos[ing]solutions.”23Thedatacollectedby

thenewofficehelpedRwandadevelopmethodstocurtailgrowthrateswith

guidanceandsupportfromUSAID.USAIDbroughtdemographicsissuestothe

23USAID/Rwanda,“CountryDevelopmentStrategyStatement:FY1983,”January1981,40.

65

government’sattention,providedevidence,supportedRwanda’sownPopulation

Office,andeventuallymadeRwandacapableofaddressingandsolvingtheirown

demographicproblems.

Practicestocurbpopulationgrowthandimprovematernalandchildhealth

carecontinuedinseveralprojectsthroughtothestartofthe1990s.Plans

establishedduringthefinalyearsofthe1980slayouttheFamilyPlanningIIproject.

Themaingoalofthisprojectwastoreducefertilityrates,butalsoworkedto

improvethehealthandsurvivalratesofchildrenandtherebyencourageparentsto

havefewerchildren.Byteachingpreventativehealthcareandencouraging

Rwandanstohavemorewantedandplannedpregnancies,thisprojectfellinline

withReagan’senforcementoftheMexicoCitypolicy.WhiletheMexicoCitypolicy

requiredallorganizations(stateandnon‐governmental)thatreceivedfederal

fundingtorefrainfromperformingorpromotingabortionservices,theFamily

PlanningIIprojectworkedtoreducefertilityratesbypreventingunwanted

pregnancies,notabortingthem.Workingfromandexpandingonevidenceand

materialsprovidedinpreviousmaternalandchildhealthcareprogramsand

demographicprojects,theFamilyPlanningIIprogram’sbase“forpolicymakingwas

improvedbecauseofbetterquality,timelinessandutilizationoffamilyplanning

statistics.”24ThevarietyintheseapproachesallowedUSAIDtoteachbetterhealth

practicesandsupportRwandainestablishingtheirownstrategyfortackling

populationpressures.

24USAID/Rwanda,“ActionPlan:FY1990‐1991,”May1989,7.

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Developmentofagriculturalproductioncomplimenteddemographic

concernsandtheaimtoimproveRwandanshealth.InMarch1979,thepossibility

ofadministeringasurveyandanalysisofagricultureinRwandawasfirstproposed,

andresultedintheUSAIDAgriculturalEducationProject.TheRwandanMinistryof

AgricultureassistedUSAIDwithinvestigatingtheyearlyfooddataandproduction

rates.InJuly1979,ateamofU.S.consultantsworkedwiththeMinistryinRwanda

topreparean‘OutlineofaPossibleCollaborativeSurveyandAnalysisofAgriculture

inRwanda.’Basedonthesuggestionsfromtheresearchteam,aseriesofsmall

projectsweredesignedtohelpimproveandincreaseproduction,training,anddata

collection.25Thereweremanyotherprojectsbasedinagriculturalproductionthat

coincidedwiththeearly1980s.

InJune1981,theBudgetSubmissionReportforFY1983outlinedanother

agriculturalprojectsettostartbytheendof1983.Thepurposeofthisproject

transferred“theresultsofrelevantagriculturalresearchtothefarmlevelinselected

regions,andtest[ed]thefeasibilityofvalleylandagriculturalproduction.”26During

the1970s,foodproductioninRwandahadstagnatedduetoincreasedpopulation

pressures.WiththeassistanceoftheRwandangovernment,whichprovided

personnelandoperationalsupport,smallfarmerswerethefocusfordirectbenefits

withnewagriculturaltechnologies.TheaimwasforRwandanfamiliestohavemore

foodavailableandimprovethehealthofthepopulation(includingfertilityrates)by

improvingsmallfarmproduction.

25Grosz,19‐20.26USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1983,”June1981,7‐8.

67

OtherprojectsworkedtoimprovetheamountoffoodavailabletoRwandan

farmersandincreasetheirdailyfoodintake.Theseprojectsbeganinthe1970sand

continuedintothe1980s.TheFoodStorageandMarketingprogram,discussedin

depthinchaptertwo,hadalargeimpactonfarmproduction.Stemmingfromthe

FoodStorageandMarketingprogram,theLocalCropStorageProgramalso

supportedtheeffortstoprotectcropsandhelpsmallfarmersprotecttheirproduce

fromrodentsandrot.Lastly,theFishCultureProgramworkedtoreducethe

amountoffarmersplowingoverusedland,andprovidedneedednutritionalbenefits

ofproteinandothervitaminsintothedietsofRwandans.Withthehealthprograms

discussedabove,USAIDagriculturalprogramshelpedaddresshealthissuesandthe

growingpopulationproblemsinRwanda.

Thefamilyhealthandagriculturalprogramsdiscussedaboveindirectly

demonstratethenewdevelopmentgoalsofthe1980s.Supportingthegovernment

ofRwanda’sthirdfive‐yeardevelopmentplanwiththenewinitiativesfromthe

Reaganadministration,thesehealth‐relatedprojectsaimedtoimproveboththe

socialandeconomicconditionsofRwanda.Thefourprojectsthataddressed

immunizations,populationcontrol,andfamilyhealthpracticescontinuedintothe

1980sandrepresentedReagan’sinitiatives.Rwanda’seconomicconditionswould

havenochanceofsurvivalifthepopulationgrowthratewasnotaddressed.

Immunizingmorechildren,promotinghealthierrearingpracticesandteaching

improvedagriculturalmethodsledtobettereconomicpossibilities.Accompanying

thebasicneedsprogramsthatindirectlycontributedtotheneweconomicgoalsof

the1980swereprogramsthatdirectlyaffectedthemarketreformpolicies.The

68

MaternalChildHealth/FamilyPlanningIIProject,forexample,provided“fundsfor

privatesectorfamilyplanningdeliveryservices.”27Bycontinuingbasicneeds

programsthroughprivatesectororganizations,thegoalsofthe1970salsodirectly

supportedthenewinitiativesofthe1980s.

TheinitiativesbehindtheseprojectsdemonstratethechangedUSAID

directivesofthe1980sfromthe1970s.WiththeNewDirectionsMandateinthe

1970s,thesehealthpracticeswerehavebeengearedtowardimprovingtheliving

conditionsinRwanda.Whiletheprojectsinthe1980sstillachievedthesame

outcome,improvingthebasicneedsoftheruralpoor,themotivationbehindthese

projectsdiffered.Inthe1980s,USAIDworkedtoachieveeconomicreforms;and

withoutaddressingtheproblemsofasicklypopulaceanduncontrollablepopulation

growth,theeconomicconditionsinRwandawouldnothavebeenabletoimprove.

Althoughagriculturecontinuedtobeimportant,USAID’smainfocusin

Rwandaduringthe1980sturnedtomarketreforms.Whiletheprojectsdiscussed

abovedidnotdirectlyaffecttheeconomicconditionsinRwanda,theyhadalarge

indirectimpact.ThecapabilityofRwandanstoincreaseagriculturaloutputsand

improveeconomicpossibilitieswasencouragedbycontrollingthepopulation

growthratesandimprovingruralhealth.Theprincipalcausesofpovertyand

constraintstodevelopmentofanykindinclude“populationpressures,lowlevel

agriculturalproduction,andlimitedtrainedmanpower.”28USAIDbeganmore

directlyaddressingthematerialimprovementsofRwandans’livesandworkedto

increaseeconomicactivitythroughoutthe1980s.

27USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1991,”May1989,20.28USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1984,”June1982,2.

69

In1983,USAIDreadjusteditsmaindevelopmentgoalsinaccordancewith

changesinthesituationwithinRwanda.Theyearbefore,in1982Rwandareleased

itsthirdfiveyearplanfordevelopment,workingto“satisfythefoodneedsofthe

population;promotebetteruseofthecountry’shumanresources;improvethe

livingconditionsofthepopulation;andimproveRwanda’spositionvisàvisthe

exterior.”29ThenewUSAIDstrategiesexpandeduponandworkedwiththelatest

Rwandandevelopmentplanfor1982‐1986.By1985,USAID’sstrategieswerefine‐

tunedtoaddressfourprimaryU.S.concerns:“policyreformsthatdecentralize

administrativestructures,relyonfreemarketforcesandlimitedpopulationgrowth

rates;privateenterprisedevelopment;technologytransferandresearch;and

institutionaldevelopment.”30BycombiningthenewUSAIDgoalsandRwandan

initiatives,projectsworkingtoimprovethedailylivesofRwandanscontinuedwhile

newlydevelopedeconomicprogramswereimplemented.

USAIDenactedseveraleconomicpolicyprogramsthroughoutthe1980s,but

therewasoneprimaryprojectthatbeganin1985.USAIDandRwandasignedthe

PolicyReformInitiativesinManufacturingandEmployment(PRIME)agreementto

“supportRwandaneffortstomakenecessarystructuraladjustmentsandpolicy

changesinordertostimulateproductionandemploymentinthemanufacturing

sector.”31Essentially,PRIMEwasapolicyreformprojectthatsoughttochange

Rwanda’spolicyinfavorofprivatesectordevelopment.Thisprojectcombinedthe

neweconomicinitiativesofUSAIDandcontinuedthesocialdevelopmentsoutlined

29Grosz,23.30Grosz,23.31Grosz,38.

70

bytheRwandangovernment.BecauseofasmalleconomiccrisisinRwandaduring

1983to1984,PRIMEworkedtohelpthecountryrecoverandmakeimprovements

forthefuture.32

Theprojectconsistedofdifferentparts,includingfinancialsupportfor

technicalassistanceandadministeringspecificstudies.Thesestudiesincluded

lookingatindustrialincentivesandanalysesofhouseholdbudgets.Otherobjectives

includedimprovingagriculturaltechnologiesandservicestomaternalandchild

health,includingfamilyplanning,andencouragingeconomicgrowthandon‐farm

employmentopportunities.Alltheseobjectivesshaped“incentivesforagricultural

producers,…thedemographicproblem,and…theroleoftheprivatesectorinthe

economy.”33USAIDandtheRwandangovernmentcontinuedtoworktogether

throughthePRIMEprojecttoimproveoveralleconomicconditionsforthecountry.

AnupdateonPRIME’sprogresswasprovidedinthe“ActionPlanforFY

1990‐1991,”writteninMay1989.Theprivatesectorwasusedtoincreaseruralper

capitaincomes,andhadbeenmakingrealprogress.Throughtheobjectiveto

increasegeneralruralemployment,USAIDandtheRwandangovernmentmade

severalpolicychangesallowingforconditionsmorefavorablefortheprivatesector.

Oneexampleincludeda“redirectionfromprivatizationofstate‐ownedenterprises

toemphasizingsmallandmediumenterprises.”34Withyearlychecks,PRIME

remainedontarget,andmadesmalladjustmentsalongthewaythatcontinuedinto

the1990s.

32USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1988,”May1986,iii.33Grosz,39.34USAID/Rwanda,“ActonPlan:FY1990‐1991,”3.

71

PRIMEwasaperfectexampleofamarketreformprojectthatalsoconsidered

howsocialdevelopmentconcernscouldaffecttheireconomicgoals.Manyofthe

otherprogramsemployedduringthe1980sdidnottakeasmanyissuesinto

account;negativemarketpredictionsforthefuturethatinfluencedothereconomic

programsmoreheavily.Forexample,inJanuary1981whenthe“Country

DevelopmentStrategyStatementforFY1983”wasbeingwritten,USAIDworkers

wereworriedforRwanda’seconomicfuture.Rwanda’seconomywasalmost

completelydependentontheagriculturalsectorthatprovidedalmostninety

percentofthepopulationwithitslivelihood.Agriculture’s“shareofthegross

domesticproduct(GDP)hadfallenfrom76percentin1964to49percentin1976

andwasexpectedtofallfurtherto40percentin1980.”35Thismadeprospectsfor

1980unfavorable.

PredictionsfortheotherareasofproductioninRwandawerealso

pessimistic.ThegrowthpredictedinGDPwasnotexpectedtocoverthepopulation

growthratefortheproceedingyearsaswellasdeclineinagriculturalproduction

resultingfrompoorweatherconditions.Thedevelopmentoftheagriculturesector

“hasreceivedparamountconsiderationintheeconomicdevelopmentstrategy,with

thegovernment’soverridingobjectivesbeingtoattainrelativeself‐sufficiencyin

foodstuffs.”36USAIDrecognizedfallingteaandcoffeepricesasapotentialfor

economicdisaster.Coffeeproductionin1980wasprojectedtofall21percentto

21,400tonsfromthepreviousyear.Othercropshadalsobeenfalling,including

35USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”1.36USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”1.

72

pyrethrumandcinchona(quinine).37Thedebt‐serviceratio38wasalsoincreasingin

1980,from1.3percentin1970to3.8percentin1980andaforecastof4.0percent

in1981.39Rwandahadborrowedmoneytofunditsdevelopmentprojectsandkeep

thecountryrunningastheGDPfell.Allofthesefactorswerecreatingaworsening

pictureforRwanda.

USAIDcreatednewfinancialaidprogramstoaddressissueswiththe

worseningeconomicrealitiesinRwanda.InMay1986,the“AnnualBudget

SubmissionforFY1988”listedtherevisedobjectivesforRwanda.Buildingoff

increasingpercapitafoodproductionandimprovingRwandanfamilieshealth

statuses,USAIDadded“increasingemploymentandincomeespeciallyoftherural

populationthroughthepromotionofprivateenterpriseandincreaseagricultural

productionbyraisingtheproductivityandprofitabilityoffarming,”40tothelistof

goals.USAIDcreateddozensofprojectsinRwandabythemid‐1980sandthe

organizationlearnedthatbydedicatingmoretimetoresearchingand

understandingthesituationinRwanda,projectsweremorelikelytosucceedby

USAIDterms.SincetheUnitedStateswas“viewedasoneoftheleadersin

promotinginstitutionalreformsneededtoimplementeconomicpolicychange,”the

projectsaimedtohelpRwandarecoverhadtobewellplanned.41

37USAID/Rwanda,“DevelopmentStrategy:FY1983,”3.38Ineconomicsandgovernmentfinance,debtserviceratioreferstotheratioofdebtservice

payments(principalplusinterest)ofacountrytotheirexportearnings.Acountry’sfinancesarehealthierwhentheratioislower.

39USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1984,”3.40USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1988,”iii.41USAID/Rwanda,“CountryDevelopmentStrategyStatement:FY1989,”March1987,35.

73

Beginninginthelate1980s,USAIDbegantwoprogramsfocusedon

enterprisedevelopment,oneprivateandtheotherrural,bothquintessential

interestsofmarketreform–promotingentrepreneurship,privateenterprise,and

policyreformsfavorabletomarkets.ThePrivateEnterpriseDevelopmentproject

hadtwotargets.Thefirsttargetwastoprovidereinforcedmanagement,financial

andmarketingskillstosmallandmediumenterprises.Thisentailedhiringtrained

employeesintheprivatesectorandofferingtwentyseminarsforon‐the‐job

training.Thesecondtargetwastoidentifyappropriatetechnologiesfortherural

area.While‘appropriatetechnologies’wasa1970sbasicneedsbuzzword,theidea

behindfindingtechnologybestsuitedfordevelopingregionscontinuedwithnew

developmenttrends.Anexampleprovidedofappropriatetechnologyincluded

installingsunflowermillsindifferentcooperatives.TheRuralEnterprise

Developmentprogramidentifiednewopportunitiesforruralinvestments.This

projectincreasedtheinvolvementofnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGO)in

privateenterprisedevelopmentandofferedcoursesinaccountingandfeasibility

studiestohelpmakeruralemployeesmoredesirable.42NGOswerepromoted

duringboththe1970sand1980s,butfordifferentreasons.Thebasicneeds

mandateofthe1970ssawNGOsasmorelocal,closertothepoor,andsmaller;but

the1980sreformersviewedthemasnon‐state,privateorganizations.

Outlinedin1989,USAIDbeganaLocalCurrencyprogramthatworkedto

increaseprivatesectoreconomicgrowthintheruralprovincesofRwanda.Support

42USAID/Rwanda,“ActonPlan:FY1990‐1991,”17.

74

fromthisprojectprovidedover850,000U.S.dollars43forruralinfrastructure.Rural

infrastructureincludedcentersforartisans,smallproducersandcooperative

members.Almost700,000dollarsweregiventosupportruralartisansandyouth

groups.Thissupportcameintheformoftrainingonmanagementprinciples,

entrepreneurship,andcooperativedevelopment.440,000dollarsweregivenfor

Rwandansworkinginsmallindustriestoreceivetrainingandstudytours.Finally,

almost100,000dollarswereprovidedtofinancetrainingactivitiesforwomen,with

another65,000forcreditavailabletoparticipatingwomen.44

ForFY1990,theRwandangovernmentredirectedemphasisfrom

privatizationtosupportforsmallandmediumenterprises.Thisredirection

supportedUSAIDstrategiestoincreaseproductiveoff‐farmemployment

opportunities.TheUSAIDstrategycontinuedtosupport“theprivatesectorthrough

providingsupportdirectlytothegovernmentofRwandathrough[their]private

sectorprojectsorbyfinancingstudiesthroughPRIME.”45USAID’sprivatesector

strategywasdesignedtocomplementRwanda’sprivatizationplans,soasto

increasethepossibilitiesforsuccess.

Rwandainitiallylaunchedtheirprivatizationeffortsinthemid‐1980s,but

littleprogresshadbeenmadebyOctober1986whenthegovernmentdevelopeda

draftprivatizationstrategy.Privatizationhadbeenfocusedtoward“improving

parastatalefficiency,”butfollowingtheeconomiccrisesattentionwasfocusedon

immediatebudgetandbalanceofpaymentproblems.Withthegovernmentof

43AllsubsequentdiscussionsoffundswillbeinU.S.dollars.44USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”15‐16.45USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”20.

75

Rwanda’sattentiondiverted,USAIDworkedtobeginprivatizingsmallsectors

includingnurseries,bakeriesandfisheries.Fortunately,progresswasmadeunder

PRIME,“wherethegovernmentofRwandashow[ed]strongerinterestsin

promotingtheprivatesectorinkeyareassuchastourism,transport,educationand

trade.”FollowingUSAID’slead,Rwandaplannedtoimprovethe“business

investmentclimatebyeasingrestrictionsandadministrativeproceduresfornew

firms.”46

Onefinaleconomicprojectdesignedinthelate1980sincludedanotherRural

EnterpriseDevelopmentProject(whilethisprojecthadthesamenameasa

previousproject,itwasadistinctprogram).Fivemilliondollarsweredesignated

fordispersalbyFY1992tohelpcreateproductiveruralemployment.Accordingto

thereport,“theCooperativeTrainingandthePrivateEnterpriseprojectsha[d]

shownthatsmallandmediumenterprises,whengivenassistance,trainingand

credit,canincreaseproductivityandmember’spercapitaincomeandstimulate

ruralinvestment.”47TheRuralEnterpriseDevelopmentprojectbuiltonthesuccess

ofthesetwopastprojectswithtechnicalassistanceandtrainingforbothruralmen

andwomen.

Theeconomicdevelopmentprojectsdescribedrepresentthedirectmethods

USAIDemployedinthe1980s.Whilethesocialprojectscontinuedfromthe1970s

indirectlyhelpedeconomicconditions,theprogramsofthe1980sactivelyworked

tohelpprivate,public,andruraldevelopment.IttookyearsfortheRwandan

46USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1990,”26.47USAID/Rwanda,“Annual…FY1991,”47.

76

economytocollapse,andyearsforUSAIDtocreatemoreappropriateprogramsto

addressthesefailingconditions.ButwiththenewdirectionsfromReagan,the

economicmindsetwasreadyinUSAIDtohelpRwandarecover.

WhileUSAIDcontinuedthemostimportantbasicneedsprogramsinRwanda

fromthe1970s,theseprojectsalsocontributedtothenewfocusonmarketreform.

USAID’sincreasedfocusonRwandaneconomicgrowthduringthe1980sbeganwith

theelectionofPresidentReaganprovidingtheAmericanstimulusandinconsistent

commoditypricesonRwanda’sexports,thusprovidingtheRwandanstimulus.With

arefocusoneconomicandmarketissuesfromUSAIDandanewcrucialneedfor

financialassistanceinRwanda,thesetwoshiftsworkedintandemtoaddressthe

problemsofthe1980s.

Conclusion

In1990,afterthecountry’seconomiccollapse,theRwandangovernment

signedastructuraladjustmentprogram(SAP)withtheWorldBanktoaddressthe

country’scontinuedfinancialdecline.InitiallyRwandaresistedsigningtheSAP

becauseofthestipulationsattachedtotheagreement,butwithyearsofpressure

fromtheWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)toadjustitseconomic

positionfinally,theRwandangovernmentagreedin1990.Theseprovisions

includedmanyfundamentalstructuralchangestotheRwandangovernment.

Rwandareceived$90millioninSAPloanstopromotefiscalandmonetary

discipline.ThegoalsoftheSAPincludedboostingcoffeeexports,reducingimports,

anddevaluingtheRwandesefranc.1WhiletheIMFandWorldBankbeganhandling

Rwanda’seconomicrecovery,theUnitedStatesrefocusedUSAIDprojectstoreflect

thelatestshifts.

Threemajoreventsintheearly1990sdramaticallyaffectedUSAID’spolicies

inRwanda.First,astipulationthataccompaniedthestructuraladjustmentprogram

requiredthatRwandawouldbecomeamultipartydemocracyin1990.Second,

almostimmediatelyfollowingthischange,theRwandesePatrioticFront(RPF),

comprisedofTutsirefugeesfromUganda,invadedRwandaonOctober1,1990.

Thismarkedthebeginningofafour‐yearcivilwar,eventuallyleadingtogenocide.

Third,theendoftheColdWarin1991significantlytransformedU.S.foreignpolicy.

TheseshiftsguidedUSAIDprojectstoexpanddemocracyinRwanda.

1PeterUvin,AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda,(Hartford:Kumarian

Press,1998),58.

78

TheAnnualBudgetSubmissionFY1993,writtenJune1991,explainedthe

changingsituationinRwandaandthenewUSAIDgoalsfordemocratization.The

USAIDteam“decidedthatthetime[was]rightforincreasedU.S.activitiesin

supportofthedemocratizationprocess.”2Theobjectivesforthesenewprojects

includedsupportforimprovedgovernanceandstrengtheninglocaladministrative

structures.Whilethereareotherexamples,thefollowingprojectshowsageneral

approachofUSAID’ssupportforRwanda’stransition.

TheDemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceProjectIdentificationDocument

OutlinefromApril1992describestheprogressingdemocratizationofRwandawith

USAID’sassistance.ThenewDemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceprojectworked

to“produceanewsocialcontractinRwandathroughwhichalltheRwandanpeople

shareequitablyintheprocessesofdemocraticself‐governance,peacefullyenjoy

basicfreedomandjustice.”3ThisprojectreflectedanewtypeofUSAIDprograms

designedtopromoteRwandandemocratizationbeforethe1994genocide.

USAID’sobjectivesinRwandaduringthe1960s,1970s,and1980swere

impactedbyclear,discernablepolitical,social,andeconomicchanges.These

changesrepresenttheevolvingdevelopmentideologyofU.S.foreignpolicyfrom

modernizationtheory,toaneedsmandate,andlater,marketliberalization.During

1962,PresidentKennedycreatedUSAIDandRwandaformallydeclared

independence.1973sawtheadoptionoftheNewDirectionsMandatemonthsafter

2USAID/Rwanda,“AnnualBudgetSubmission:FY1993,”June1991,52.3HarlanHobgoodandThomasKelly,“DemocraticInitiativesandGovernanceProject

IdentificationDocumentOutline(USAID/RwandaProjectNo.696‐0130),”April1992,4‐5.

79

JuvenalHabyarimanaledamilitarycoupinRwandaandtookpower.Duringthe

1980s,PresidentReaganplacedanewemphasisonthefreemarketandsecurity

intereststhatcoincidedwithfinancialcrisesinRwanda.Shiftscontinuedintothe

1990s.

Tounderstandwhytheseshiftsoccurred,onemustexaminetrendsand

eventsinRwandaandtheUnitedStatesbetweenthe1960sandthe1990s.Glenn

Slocum,aformerUSAIDemployee,summarizedthechanginginterestsofU.S.

foreignaidpolicies:

Thesixtieswerethetimeofindustrialdevelopment,withtherushfortechnicalassistancedevelopmentprojects.The‘70s,wewerecalledtohelpthedevelopingworldtomeetbasichumanneeds.Theeightiesbroughtarecognitionthatwehadtopaymoreattentiontotheprivatesectorastheengineofdevelopmentinmostcountries.ThiscoincidedwithaconservativeRepublicanadministration.4

Slocum’soutlinedemonstratesthereactionaryqualityofdevelopmentassistancein

thepast,explainingthatmanyofthepoliciesenactedaddressedconsequencesof

earlierprograms.Continuallycorrectingunforeseenproblemsassociatedwithpast

policieslendstoanappearanceofineffectiveness.Becausedonorcountriesfixated

onproblemscreatedbytheirpoliciesinsteadoftheinherentproblemswithin

recipientcountries,aid’seffectivenesswaslimited.Bystudyingthehistoryof

developmentassistance,policymakerscanlearnfromsomeofthesesuccessesand

failures.

Despitetheappearanceofinefficientprograms,foreignassistancehasmade

somepositiveimpactsondevelopment.AsHariadeneJohnson,aformerUSAID

4AmbassadorGlennSlocum,oralhistoryinterview,GeorgetownUniversityLibrary,18

November1998,121.

80

employeeexplained,USAIDprograms“reallyworkedinRwandaandhadinmany

waysanimpactuponthecountry;apromisingfuture.”5Whilethisperspectiveis

useful,itonlyprovidesonesideofthestory.Historicalanalysisisneededfromboth

theAmericanandRwandanperspectivestofullyassessthesuccessesandfailuresof

developmentaid.

EquallyimportanttoamorecompletestudyofdevelopmentaidinRwandais

scholarshipindependentofthe1994genocide.AcademicsthatapproachRwandan

historyfromalinearperspectiveculminatinginthegenocidefundamentally

simplifythecountry’sdiversepast.Scholarstakingthisapproach,includingJan

Vansina,MahmoodMamdani,andPeterUvin,presentadeterministicviewof

Rwandanhistory.Thepurposeoftheseacademicworksistotracetheoriginsofthe

genocidenotunderstandthefullbreadthofRwanda’spast.Asaresult,theyoften

missbroaderimplicationsoftheirtopics.AfricanhistorianJanVansinawrotehis

bookAntecedentstoModernRwandainanefforttocorrecttermsoftribalviolence

toutedbythemedia.WhilehisworklooksatancientRwandanhistoryendingin

1900,hisintentioncentersonbetterunderstandingthegenocide.Anthropologist

MahmoodMamdani’sWhenVictimsBecomeKillersexplainshowtheeffectsof

colonialismcontributedtothegrowingethnicviolencethatledtothegenocide.And

politicalscientistPeterUvin’sAidingViolencetraceshowinternationaldevelopment

aidwasafactorintheincreasingstructuralviolencewithinRwanda,eventually

contributingtothegenocide.Whileunderstandingtherolesthatthesetopicsplayed

inthegenocide’sformationiscrucialandtheanalysisoftheRwandangenocideis

5AmbassadorHariadeneJohnson,oralhistoryinterview,GeorgetownUniversityLibrary,8September1998,165.

81

important,thesolefocusonviolencesimplifiesthecomplexityofRwanda’shistory.

ThisthesiscontributestotheformationofabroaderunderstandingofRwandan

history.

Thoughasmall,seeminglyinsignificantcountry,Rwanda’shistoryis

importantinmanyrights.Newscholarshipaddingtotheincompleteliteratureon

thehistoryofRwanda,independentofthegenocide,workstoreinterpretitsimage.

RwandaneedstoreclaimitsimageasadiversecountrysincetheWesthasuseditas

anexample,symbol,andwarningoftheopposite.Initiallythe“posterchild”of

development,Rwandawastoutedasthe“SwitzerlandofAfrica”bydonornations,

butinthewakeofthegenocideRwandawasusedasanexampleofthebarbaric

natureofAfricans.Othercountriesarewarnedtoavoidbecoming“thenext

Rwanda.”ThisstereotypeisperpetuatedinthecoverageofAfricanconflictstoday.

AustralianJournalistDanMcDougall’sarticle“EchoesofRwandainIvoryCoast

KillingFields,”drawsconnectionsbetweentheRwandangenocideandtheviolence

occurringintheIvoryCoast.6NewYorkTimescolumnistNicholasKristof,reporting

ontheLibyancivilwarcommentedthat“iftheLibyaoperationissuccessful,itmay

helptheemergingdoctrineofthe‘responsibilitytoprotect’–alandmarknotionin

internationallaw…thatmighthelpavertthenextRwanda.”7Thisthesisworksto

disruptthissimplifyingdiscoursebyreinterpretingRwandanhistoryindependent

ofthegenocide.

6DanMcCougall,“EchoesofRwandainIvoryCoastKillingFields,”TheAustralianSunday

Times,April11,2011.7NicholasKristof,“LearningfromPerviousMistakes,”NorthAdamsTranscript(MA),April4,

2011.

82

Asdemonstrated,U.S.foreignpolicychangedduringeachdecadebetween

1962andthe1990s,reflectingpolitical,economic,andsocialshiftswithinRwanda

andAmerica.USAID/RwandaprogramsillustratetheUnitedStates’changing

developmentideology,butalsothedissonantrealitiesofimplementingaid‘onthe

ground.’WhiledevelopmentphilosophyshiftedintheU.S.,USAIDcontinuedto

implementprogramsnecessaryforRwandandevelopment.Theseshiftscanbe

identifiedandexaminedthroughUSAIDprojectreportsthatrevealthereasons

behindnewgoalsandprograms.Thehistoricalstudyofdevelopmentaidisneeded

tohelpcontextualizepastprograms,butalsomakeforeignpolicyaidmoreeffective

forthefuture.Withtoomanygeneralities,developmentpoliciesbecomeless

efficient.Bycreatingmorespecificprogramswithtailoredpoliciestoeachrecipient

country,developmentaidcanbecomemoreeffective.

83

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