Transcript
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 1/44
Page 1
PLATO, HEGEL, AND DEMOCRACY
Thom Brooks©
University of Newcastle
All Rights Reserved
Abstract
Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is
an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy
working today—whether in an analytic or postmodern tradition—endorses democracy in one
variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping
us theorize about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals
of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, each is
rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have beenrepresented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian)
democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a
new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian
tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually
provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival
theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic
thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a
positive, not negative, manner.
I. Introduction
Democracy presents an interesting dilemma for contemporary political philosophers. Many of
the most historically important political philosophers were either dismissive, if not outright
hostile, to democracy as a superior form of governance. For example, neither Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, nor any number of other
major figures defended democracy as the superior form of government, often preferring various
incarnations of monarchical governments instead.
The anti-democratic position held by these canonical writers is clearly at odds with the
position of contemporary political philosophers. Today, seemingly everyone everywhere makes
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 2/44
For example, Ian Shapiro writes: ‘Authoritarian rulers seldom reject democracy1
outright. Instead they argue that their people are not ready for democracy “yet,” that their
systems are more democratic than they appear, or that the opposition is corrupt and
antidemocratic—perhaps the stooge of a foreign power’ and ‘[t]he democratic idea is close to
nonnegotiable in today’s world’. (Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 1.)
Page 2
some claim to popular legitimacy. Elected politicians claim that their election gives them a1
political mandate, as well as legitimacy. Authoritarian politicians claim that they make decisions
in the people’s best interest, only maintaining their rule until the people can take over for
themselves. Thus, at least in popular discourse, even authoritarians espouse that their legitimacy
rests on some form of popular mandate too. Indeed, hardly any leader claims he acts contrary to
popular legitimacy.
The dilemma posed here is a simple one: if much of our philosophical canon is anti-
democratic, how can these major figures have gotten it all so terribly wrong? Of what use are
these figures in helping us formulate a theory of good governance today? The standard reply by
democratic theorists is that these figures help support the case for democracy in a negative way.
That is, figures like Plato and Hegel are thought to get democracy wrong, wrong in such a way
that it helps to highlight the case for democracy, rather than against it. They tell us useful lies.
In this article, I will adopt a very different approach to this issue. I will focus on two
major figures in the history of political philosophy often discussed together: Plato and Hegel.
Both are either dismissive, if not hostile, to democracy on similar grounds. First, I will look at
what their arguments were against democracy, as well as their substantive claims in support of
what they took to be superior alternative forms of governance. Second, I will examine how both
understood the public as a check on the political power of elites in their mature philosophical
writings. The article will then end with a consideration of whether the outlines of their mature
political visions sketched here are defensible against some possible objections. My view is that
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 4/44
See T. M. Knox, ‘Hegel and Prussianism’, in ed. Walter Kaufmann, Hegel’s5
Political Philosophy (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 13-29. See also Shlomo Avineri,
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.
185-89.
See Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 187; Michael O. Hardimon,6
Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), p. 215; Steven V. Hicks, International Law and the Possibility of a Just World
Order: An Essay on Hegel’s Universalism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 173; Sidney Hook,
‘Hegel and His Apologists’, in ed. Walter Kaufmann, Hegel’s Political Philosophy, p. 90;
Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 327;
Michael Levin and Howard Williams, ‘Inherited Power and Popular Representation: A
Tension in Hegel’s Political Theory’, Political Studies 35 (1987), p. 114; Z. A. Pelczynski,
‘The Hegelian Conception of the State’, in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., Hegel’s Political
Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.
25; Leo Rauch, ‘Hegel, Spirit, and Politics’, in Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins,eds., The Age of German Idealism (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 285; Hugh A Reyburn, The
Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1921), p.
252; Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Contexts (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 152; and Mark Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justification of
Hereditary Monarchy’, History of Political Thought 12 (1991), p. 482.
On the ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ city, see Plato, Republic 369c-373a and my ‘Knowledge7
and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14
(2006), pp. 51-77. All Plato quotations come from Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M.
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
Page 4
this has not prevented any number of commentators from taking strong issue with their visions.5
These visions have been called ‘arbitrary’, ‘beset with contradictions’, ‘bizarre’, ‘comical’,
‘implausible’, ‘obscure’, ‘troubling’, ‘unconvincing’, ‘unusual’, ‘wide of the mark’, and much
worse.6
Not only then do Plato and Hegel seem unlikely allies of democratic theorists, but their
political visions have been subjected to severe criticisms themselves, primarily because each
vision is not democratic, at least in any obvious sense. For example, while Plato first claims that
a self-sufficient, moderate city with a constant population is the ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ city, most
of his Republic defends a city ruled by philosopher-kings, instead. These philosopher-kings rule7
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 5/44
See Plato, Euthydemus 291c-292c; Plato, Republic 426d, 477d-e; Plato,8
Statesman 292c, e, 308e, 311c.
George Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought (New York:9
Methuen, 1986), p. 172.
On the difference between Plato’s Republic and his Laws, see Luc Brisson, ‘Ethics10
and Politics in Plato’s Laws’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2005), pp. 93-121.
Plato, Laws 693d-e; see Plato, Eighth Letter 353d-e. Emphasis added.11
Page 5
because they possess ‘the expert knowledge of kingship’ which others lack. Thus, according to8
George Klosko, ‘the central motif of the political theory of the Republic is putting philosophical
intelligence in control of the state’.9
In his later work the Laws, Plato’s views change and he comes to endorse a government
fusing democracy and monarchy. He says:10
Listen to me then. There are two-mother constitutions, so to speak, which you could
fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and
democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians,
the latter by my country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two. It is
absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and this is of course the point
of our advice, when we insist that no state formed without these two elements can be
constituted properly)—if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good
judgement.11
The government Plato defends is composed of a legislator with an elected body, the Guardians
of the Laws. The legislator is unelected and properly educated for his office, responsible for
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 6/44
See Plato, Laws 823a.12
See Plato, Laws 755c-d, 756a-b.13
See Plato, Laws 752d-754e, 755a-c.14
Plato, Laws 751b.15
See G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right , ed. Allen W. Wood, trans.16
H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §273, R [hereafter, PR]. I will
put to the side whether or not the monarch is the dominant partner here as my argument does
not depend on it. That said, I do argue elsewhere that the monarch is more powerful than his
ministers. (See my Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of
Right (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).)
Page 6
making all laws, and persuading the public that these laws are just. The Guardians of the Laws12
are common citizens who are democratically elected to enforce the laws of the city, laws created
by the legislator.
Whilst it is true that this later political vision does give elected persons important
powers—‘generals’ and ‘calvary-commanders’ are also elected too —candidates are vetted in13
a scrutiny process prior to running for election to ensure they will perform well if elected. For 14
Plato, putting ‘incompetent officials in charge of administering the [legal] code is a waste of
good laws ... doing damage and injury on a gigantic scale’ to the political community. Thus,15
even when Plato does try to incorporate some notion of democracy and elections into a defensible
political vision, it seems quite far removed from anything we might consider to be a democracy,
at least in any obvious sense.
Likewise, Hegel does not endorse a system of governance that is recognizably democratic
either. Instead, he defends a hereditary monarch who proposes laws with the consent of his
cabinet to an elected assembly, the Estates. Whilst Hegel also allows elections to political16
office, the majority share of power is invested with the monarch and his cabinet ministers. Hegel
then, too, defends a system of government that both tries to incorporate elections for important
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 7/44
See Hegel, PR, §273R.17
This is a point missed surprisingly often, but noted well by Ilting. (See K.-H. Ilting,18
‘The Structure of the Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ’, in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., Hegel’s Political
Philosophy, pp. 103-4.)
Page 7
political institutions while having ‘lost [its] democratic ... character’, lacking any close
resemblance to a modern democracy, again, at least in any obvious sense.17
We might well think it a tall order to suppose that either Plato or Hegel could actually
help us theorize about democracy in a positive way. Normally, any value they offer to democratic
theorists is viewed in a negative light. For example, Plato’s arguments in favour of philosopher-
kings are seen to fail because experts should not have final say on political decision-making.
Thus, some claim that Plato helps us understand better why people without specialized
knowledge should still have a political voice, indeed, the only voice. Similarly, many other
commentators take up Hegel’s theories of freedom, recognition, and reconciliation and claim that
he sets popular political participation in a too limited role, where these theories cannot properly
develop and take hold. Hegel negatively furthers the democratic theorists’ cause as this problem
highlights the need to extend recognition and reconciliation, for instance, much further in our
political practices than his constitutional monarchy allows. In both cases, Plato and Hegel are
negative teachers, foils used by democratic theorists to show us why democracy is the best form
of government and how it can be further improved through Plato’s and Hegel’s misplaced and
incorrect criticisms of democracy.
III. Plato’s and Hegel’s shared arguments against democracy
It is important to first recognize what Plato’s and Hegel’s target is when they criticize democracy:
Athenian democracy. Neither is considering liberal democracy and, in fact, I believe that many18
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 8/44
Page 8
of their criticisms do not damage liberal democracy for this reason, but may help buffer
arguments for it as well. In this section, I will examine four different arguments put forward by
both Plato and Hegel against democracy. These arguments are:
(1) Democracies are actually anarchic societies that lack any kind of coherent unity.
(2) Democracies are more likely to follow their citizens’ impulses and desires, rather than
any concern for the common good.
(3) Larger democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens, offering
disincentives to citizens to participate.
(4) Democracies are essentially governments run by fools: it would be best to have those
with expertise in statecraft take command, as the citizens are unable to govern
well because they simply do not know what they are doing.
I will now examine each of these arguments in turn. My purpose will be to demonstrate both that
Plato and Hegel offer these four arguments against democracy, but also to show how modern
liberal democracy can accommodate their worries.
III. A. Democracies are actually anarchic societies
Plato’s and Hegel’s first criticism of democracies is that they are characterized by anarchy. For
example, Plato attacks democratic governments for being essentially libertarian societies, where
each citizen can ‘arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him’: ‘anarchy’ is mistaken
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 9/44
Plato, Republic 557b, 560e. See ibid., 572d-e and Julia Annas, An Introduction to19
Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 300.
See Frederick Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 252.20
See Plato, Republic 562b-c.21
Plato, Republic 557e-558a.22
Page 9
as ‘freedom’. The share and scope of power held and exercised by each citizen is much greater 19
than that held by democratic citizens today. But it is also not without its own problems. Hegel
notes that the rights of each citizen are insecure in democracies because not everyone might
respect the rights of others. The thought is that if people can live however they please, they may20
choose a form of life that imposes restrictions on someone else’s well being. This gives us reason
to reject democracies as an attractive form of political organization. Whilst these worries may
be well placed with regard to classical democracies, no one today would think modern
democracies function similarly.
Plato’s and Hegel’s second criticism is that democracies lack any kind of unity on account
of their being anarchic societies. Democracies lack unity in one of two ways. First, democracies
lack political structure. Democracies are more akin to a collection of individuals occupying a21
common space, rather than a form of political organization. For example, Plato says:
In this city, there is no requirement to rule, even if you’re capable of it, or again to be
ruled if you don’t want to be, or to be at war when the others are, or at peace unless you
happen to want it. And there is no requirement in the least that you not serve in public
office as a juror, if you happen to want to serve, even if there is a law forbidding you to
do so.22
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 10/44
Hegel, PR, §290A. See ibid., §§273R, 274, A, 276, 278R, 290A, 302 and G. W. F.23
Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right , trans.
J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995),
§167R (hereafter, ‘ LNR’).
Hegel, LNR, §148R.24
Hegel, PR, §303R.25
Of course, for Hegel, the particular shape a people’s political community ought to26
take is the rational structure of the free will in ‘the system of right’, as set out in the
Philosophy of Right . (See Hegel, PR, §4A.)
Page 10
The society lacks any rules beyond whatever it is people see fit. One democracy might differ
radically from another, depending upon the varieties of people who happen to compose it.
Similarly, Hegel refers to democracies as fragmented societies, where people form
‘merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms’. Hegel argues that ‘[t]o speak of “the23
people” is a completely empty phrase’ as a result. He explains:24
The many as single individuals—and this is a favourite interpretation of [the term] ‘the
people’—do indeed live together , but only as a crowd , i.e. a formless mass whose
movement and activity can consequently only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and
terrifying. If we hear any further talk of ‘the people’ as an unorganized whole, we know
in advance that we can expect only generalities and one-sided determinations.25
Hegel’s view is that to speak of ‘the people’ is to speak of something that has some coherent
form, that takes some identifiable shape. Democracies are not coherent political bodies, but26
literally mob rule in every sense instead.
Second, both Plato and Hegel accuse democracies of lacking leadership. If everyone rules
and everyone has equal political voice, no one can speak for anyone else and, it is thought, not
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 11/44
Plato, Republic 558c.27
Hegel, LNR, §135R.28
Page 11
for the community as a whole as well. In a society where all are equal, that society, in effect,
‘lacks rulers’. Hegel adds:27
In democracy all powers merge together in immediate fashion, the people being the
supreme lawgiver and the supreme judge. An individual, e.g. a general, is still needed for
execution, but the power is not definitely transferred to him, and he does not know how
far he can go. The people lack stability, and with them no laws are firm.28
Hegel’s claim is simple: who carries out the decisions that the so-called ‘people’ decide? If a
democracy votes to end poverty in its midst, who has a mandate to carry this out? What rights
and obligations are extended to such a person? Democracy is alone in leaving such questions
open and, worse, leaving their answers arbitrary.
From these criticisms, both Plato and Hegel propose forms of government that are not
anarchical and have clear political decision-making structures in place. These structures ensure
the community avoids slipping into anarchy and helps foster a coherent political unity. For Plato,
one possible structure is a society where each person pursues tasks they are naturally suited to
perform. He believes that there exists a natural division of labour, forming a natural unity, where
some are best suited to work as cobblers, others as medical doctors, and a chosen few as
philosopher-kings. A second possible and related structure, in the Laws, holds that a lawgiver
creates laws and educates the public about their necessity, while a democratically elected
assembly has the task of enforcing these laws. In this way, political unity is fostered by pursuing
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 12/44
See Brooks, ‘Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’, page number.29
See Hegel, LNR, §§129R, 130R.
30
Hegel, PR, §279R.31
Hegel claims any state, whether a monarchy, an aristocracy, or democracy, must32
always have ‘an individual at its head ... for all actions and all actuality are initiated and
implemented by a leader as the decisive unit’. (Hegel, PR, §279R.)
Hegel, PR, §279R (emphasis given).33
On group rights, see Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, Journal of 34
Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp. 353-77.
Page 12
the moderation of ‘the mixed wine of freedom’.29
Hegel believes unity is best sought out by abandoning democracy’s ‘contingent character’
and differentiating itself into various internal structures, such as a government, courts of law,
public authorities, and so on. This structure must not only contain various branches of public30
institutions, but these institutions must have a coherent relationship with one another along a
clear hierarchy. The pinnacle of the state is the monarch. For Hegel, the monarch solves a31
number of important problems relating to the questions of who enacts laws that have been agreed
upon or who can speak on behalf of the state: these are some of the monarch’s varied roles.’32
Thus, anarchy is averted and unity created. We can then move beyond the troubled notion of
‘popular sovereignty ... based on a garbled notion [Vorstellung ] of the people’ given our
recognition of clear political structures and their organization.33
At first glance, Plato’s and Hegel’s claims seem off the mark. It certainly is not obvious
in which respects, if any, modern democracies are more ‘aggregates’ rather than unified societies.
Perhaps modern liberal democracies are more aggregative—that is, perhaps they give a certain
priority to individual rights above any variety of group rights —than either Plato or Hegel would34
prefer, but there is an identifiable unity present nonetheless. We have clear institutional
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 13/44
Hegel, PR, §§281R, 301R.35
See Plato, Republic 561b-c and Hegel, PR, §273R. Also see Terence H. Irwin,36
Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 229.
Plato, Gorgias 517b.37
Page 13
structures, as well as political leaders, such as generals, prime ministers, presidents, and the like,
in our modern democracies and, indeed, they do know their remits, duties, and obligations as set
out in public laws.
Plato’s and Hegel’s criticisms of Athenian democracy do not stick to liberal democracies
today, because liberal democracies can address their worries unlike Athenian democracies. We
satisfy Plato’s and Hegel’s general worries about democracy because, well, we’re not that kind
of democracy after all. In fact, we actually come much closer to addressing their concerns than
either they or ourselves might have imagined.
III. B. Democracies are more likely to follow their citizens’ impulses and desires, rather than any
concern for the common good
A second argument against democracies is that they are more likely to follow their citizens’
impulses and desires, rather than by any concern for the common good of all. If democracies are
essentially anarchic societies, then, on this view, each person is free to choose whatever ends for
the community and herself she wants. Not only might these choices clash, but the problem is that
all will be disposed to think of themselves ahead of others. The common good will be lost in the
wild pursuit of individual desires. Moreover, these individuals are pursuing their passions,35
rather than reason, because reason is inapplicable: the citizenry do not know how to rule and,
thus, cannot have reason as their guide. Any democratically elected officials are little more than
36
‘servants’ dedicated to the satisfaction of ‘the city’s appetites’.37
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 14/44
Plato, Republic 586a-b.38
Plato, Phaedo 99b. See Plato, Republic 520c-d.
39
Plato says: ‘And so he [i.e., the democrat] lives, always surrendering rule over 40
himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is
satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying them all equally’.
(Plato, Republic 561b.)
Plato, Republic 559d-561c.41
Hegel, PR, §281R (emphasis given). See Hegel, LNR, §129R.42
See Hegel, PR, §310R.43
Page 14
For example, in a memorable passage from the Republic, we are told that the common
people:
always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner
table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate ... their desires are insatiable ... like a vessel full of
holes.38
Democratic citizens are like ‘people groping in the dark’ because they simply do not know how
to govern. The only guide the citizenry have is the pursuit of their individual passions. Worse39
still, citizens lack any means of choosing amongst competing passions, apart from whatever takes
their fancy at a given time. As a result, a democracy is ruled by the pursuit of the passions of 40
its members and not the pursuit of their common good.41
This view is shared by Hegel. He believes that democracies are governed by ‘the sense
of the caprice, opinion, and arbitrariness of the many’, often identifying ‘caprice’ as characteristic
of ‘democracies’. For this reason, he believes democratic states are characterized by ‘subjective42
opinion and the self-confidence which accompanies it’.43
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 15/44
Plato, Philebus 48c-49a.44
See Plato, Gorgias 457c-d.45
Hegel, PR, §279A.46
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, 1942),47
pp. 284-85.
Page 15
In addition, Plato identifies two further difficulties. First, a great number of people falsely
believe they possess sufficient political expertise, justifying their involvement. Citizens are44
untroubled with the thought that they deserve an equal political voice with one another on
account of their having political status (e.g., being a citizen). Their lack of knowledge of which
ends are best pursued by the state never enters their minds as a serious objection. Second, the
people are more keen to win arguments, rather than pursue truth, when engaged in a
philosophical investigation with one another. Thus, even if the citizens held sufficient political45
knowledge, it is thought they would be unable to manage it effectively.
Their solution to this problem is to constrain popular participation in politics, creating
room for those with some particular expertise in governance to guide political decision-making.
The thought is that those who know best how to govern are best able to detect the common good
of the community and enable its pursuit to the good of all. Thus, in Hegel’s words, the state can
‘be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph of reason which becomes manifest in
actuality’.46
It is worth pointing out that liberal democracy takes stock of Plato’s and Hegel’s worries
again here. As Joseph Schumpeter notes, democracy is not ‘rule of the people’; but, instead,
‘[d]emocracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men
who are to rule them ... this may be expressed by saying that democracy is the rule of the
politician’. The masses do not directly vote for anything nor anyone other than those who
47
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 16/44
Hegel, PR, §311R.48
Page 16
govern them, save in the occasional referenda. We limit access to participation in such a way that
all the vicariousness that exists in the greater society is put under some control. In addition, our
elected political leaders cannot work alone, but must often work amongst themselves and
compromise with one another. They cannot be moved solely by whatever whim takes their fancy
and they have the opportunity to rationally reflect upon potential policy options before deciding
on any course of action. This is not to say our politicians always make the best judgements or that
democracy today lacks a need for development. Instead, my point here is only that it can actually
accommodate this second worry of Plato’s and Hegel’s in a positive manner.
III. C. Larger democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens
Plato and Hegel each pose a third, more specific objection to democracy. This is that larger
democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens. The thought here is that in large
democracies, ‘democracy’, as such, is essentially meaningless. This is because the so-called48
‘voice’ each person has is particularly minute. That is, my vote is worth far more in decisions
involving three or maybe a dozen people, than in a polity of three hundred million people. My
share in decision-making, my ‘voice’, depreciates when the polity expands its number of citizens.
Political participation, thus, becomes relatively worthless, even if democracy could be justified
on a much smaller scale. Instead, we should opt for a form of political decision-making that takes
citizens more seriously, where the decisions of key stakeholders matter.
Hegel argues that monarchy is superior to democracy as only a hereditary monarchy is
capable of equally representing every citizen. Elections breed winners and losers on polling day.
Democratic officials come to power when sufficient numbers of citizens express a preference for
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 17/44
See Hegel, PR, §281.49
Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002),50
pp. 335-36.
Page 17
them. Elected leaders are therefore the products of articulated interests, where it may well be the
case that not all interests in the state will be represented equally. Only an hereditary monarchy
can respect this equality because only such a monarch can rise above factions. As a result,
monarchies help foster the unity of the state through the ‘majesty [ Majestät ]’ of their office.49
The monarch is majestic insofar as he is raised above the varied, divisive factions within his
state.
Of course, many commentators have criticized Hegel in particular for circumscribing the
public’s voice too narrowly. For example, Dudley Knowles says:
What is left of Hegel’s view that the organic constitution of the state precludes the
possibility of political liberalism? It amounts to this claim: that persons who are brought
up by their parents to respect the state, educated in civil society to bring skills to the
market place and apply those skills successfully to a trade, who join with colleagues in
corporate activities which elicit a common social purpose greater than the pursuit of
mutual advantage, cannot detach themselves in thought from these affiliations to ask
whether the state serves their several and joint purposes, so long as the state is organized
in such a way that it does in fact serve these ends.50
In his attempt to avoid the problem of large states and minuscule popular political voice, it could
be argued Hegel abandons opportunities for popular participation in politics. Besides, for
Knowles, whether or not the state can function in the way Hegel preposes is an empirical
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 18/44
Aristotle, Politics in his The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II, ed. Jonathan51
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),1273b5-6 [Book II].
See Plato, Republic 558c.52
Page 18
question. If Hegel’s view is incorrect or, at least, there seems reasonable grounds to reject it, then
Hegel might be accused of throwing the baby out with the bath water.
The issue of the role of the public in Plato’s and Hegel’s mature visions will be
considered in part IV. Before we turn to this issue, we should consider the role of experts in these
visions so we can understand how the public can act as a restraint on their powers.
III. D. Democracies are essentially governments run by fools
Perhaps the primary and most often highlighted (and criticized) problem both Plato and Hegel
have with democracies is that democracies make decisions without any coherent notion of what
they are doing. Democracies are essentially governments run by fools. Instead of democracies,
it would be best to have those with expertise in statecraft take command, as the citizens are
unable to govern well because they simply do not know what they are doing. Thus, in Aristotle’s
words, we should endorse the view that ‘they should rule who are able to rule best’.51
As we have seen, the problem with democracies is that they allow all citizens to possess
an equal voice in political decision-making, without regard to the citizenry’s lack of knowledge
or ability. All members are treated equally despite the fact that some are more capable of good
governance than others. Therefore, the cobbler and the medical doctor each have an equal say52
regarding governance, both equal to the person with particular expertise in governance. One
result is that political judgements will be based by and large upon mere guesswork, as expert
legislators are not in full command. Democracies are generally poorly governed as a
consequence.
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 19/44
Hegel, PR, §301R.53
See Hegel, PR, §308R.54
Plato says that justice is ‘doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t55
one’s own’ ( Republic 433a-b, 441e). On techn, see C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The
Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Page 19
Similarly, Hegel rejects the view that the people are correct to claim that they know best
their interests on account of these interests being their own. Instead, he claims that:
the reverse is in fact the case, for if the term ‘the people’ denotes a particular category of
members of the state, it refers to that category of citizens who do not know their own will .
To know what one wills, and even more, to know what the will which has being in and
for itself—i.e., reason—wills, is the fruit of profound cognition and insight, and this is
the very thing [Sache] which ‘the people’ lack..53
For Hegel, the term ‘the people’ identifies precisely those least capable of good governance.
Citizens are in error to think they have an equal claim with others on matters simply in virtue of
the fact they are interest holders. The view here seems to be that it would be a mistake to let the54
citizens have full responsibility for political decision-making because they lack sufficient
knowledge. Both Plato and Hegel offer alternatives to democracy they believe will overcome this
worry. I will discuss each alternative in turn.
Plato argues that judgements based upon true knowledge carry a certain epistemic
authority that judgements based upon right or wrong opinion lack. Every person possesses some
degree of true knowledge, or expertise, in one type of ‘craft [techn]’. The right to rule is not55
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 20/44
See Plato, Euthydemus 291c-92c; Plato, Republic 426d, 477d-e; and Plato,56
Statesman 292c.
Plato, Statesman 297b-c. See Plato, Republic 494a.57
Plato, Theaetetus 170a-b.58
See Plato, Statesman 266e.59
Page 20
conferred via majority approval nor material wealth, but expertise in statesmanship. Only a few56
or, perhaps, just one individual will possess this knowledge in any given state. Furthermore,57
Plato claims it is a common fact of life that people properly seek counsel solely from experts in
a particular field. For example, in the Theaetetus, Plato says:
In emergencies—if at no other time—you see this belief. When they are in distress, on
the battlefield, or in sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each
sphere as to God, and look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely
this one thing—knowledge. And wherever human life and work goes on, you find
everywhere men seeking teachers and masters, for themselves and for other living
creatures and for the direction of all human works. You find also men who believe that
they are able to teach and to take the lead. In all these cases, what else can we say but that
men do believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance among themselves?58
As a consequence, whenever we discern those who possess expert knowledge in governance, it
is right that they should rule as this is the craft they naturally pursue best—just as those with
expertise in trade skills ought to work as manual labourers. The expert statesman alone59
transforms the naturally bestowed authority from certitude all naturally have of their given craft
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 21/44
See Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, Political 60
Theory 11 (1983), p. 503 and Robin Wakefield, ‘Introduction’, in Plato, Republic, trans. R.
Wakefield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. xxv. This agrees with Reeve that, for Plato, ‘Proper political rule is proper psychic rule’. (Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, p. 262.)
Plato, Republic 347c-d, 412d-e.61
See my ‘Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’.62
Plato, Republic 472e-473a.63
Plato, Republic 473c-d. See ibid., 499a-d.64
Plato, Republic 499d (emphasis given). See ibid., 502b-c, 540d.65
Page 21
to an authority that is political .60
Plato’s ideal monarchical city-state is to be ruled by philosopher-kings: men and women
who rule neither for the sake of honour nor wealth, seeking only the advantage of the citizens
they serve. Only they should rule the state as only they have the necessary expertise, given that61
ruling is their exclusive craft.
Plato’s political vision in the Republic is oft criticized, but I do not believe he was
unaware of difficulties with it and, in fact, he comes to reject parts of this vision in favour of his
more mature view in the Laws. The reasons for this change of heart are present already in the62
Republic. For example, after he suggests that much of the discussion of the Republic has been
a theoretical sketch, Plato tells us that ‘the nature of practice’ is to attain truth less well than in
theory. The way forward entails making the smallest possible change to bring this theory into63
being: philosophers must rule as kings or kings rule as philosophers.64
Indeed, Plato admits that ‘it is not impossible for this to happen’, but ‘it is difficult for it
to happen’. Furthermore, he says:65
Glaucon: You mean that [the philosopher-king] will be willing to take part in the politics
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 22/44
Plato, Republic 592a-b.66
Plato, Phaedo 62b.67
Plato, Republic 500c-d.68
Plato, Republic 590c.69
Page 22
of the city we were founding and describing, the one that exists in theory, for I
don’t think it exists anywhere on earth.
Socrates: But perhaps, I said, there is a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look
at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no
difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the
practical affairs of that city and no other.66
Thus, the ideal state’s existence as an earthly, political practice may be compromised by its
heavenly and ideal nature. The philosopher-king will only come to rule the ideal model ‘in
heaven’ proposed and in ‘no other’. Plato offers some additional evidence in the Republic and
elsewhere to support the view that only a god or someone with a divine nature can actually serve
as the philosopher-king ideal type. As an example, he tells us that (a) the ‘gods are our
guardians’, (b) philosophers become ‘as divine and ordered as a human being can’, and the67 68
philosopher-king has ‘a divine ruler within himself’.69
There is, however, an additional reason to think Plato was aware of the impossibility of
implementing his Republic. For instance, we are unable to know the true nature of others with
absolute certainty. The implications then are that the Republic will fail, as we will be unable to
prevent the breeding of philosophically-natured persons with others, perhaps producing no
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 23/44
Plato, Republic 546a-b.70
Plato, Republic 546a-e. See Rod Jenks, ‘The Machinery of the Collapse: On
71
Republic VIII’, History of Political Thought 23 (2002), pp. 21-29.
See Plato, Laws 693d-e.72
Plato, Laws 756e, 701e, 693d-e. Plato’s ‘moderate authoritarianism’ has much in73
common with the notion of ‘sceptical authoritarianism’ I have defended elsewhere. (See my
‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’, Politics 22 (2002), pp. 152-62.)
See Plato, Republic 462c.74
Plato, Republic 557e-558a, 560b.75
Page 23
offspring who might grow into philosopher-kings. This problem is compounded by the fact that70
Plato believes persons who are perfectly matched for breeding will naturally produce a given
number of children with a lesser nature anyway. As a result, centralized restriction of sexual71
relationships is doomed to fail from the very start, aspiring to little more than a staving off of the
inevitable.
Ultimately, Plato endorses some mixture of expert rule with popular consent. This form72
of government is a compromise ‘between a monarchical and a democratic constitution’ fusing
a ‘moderate authoritarianism’ with ‘moderate freedom’, enjoying both ‘freedom and friendship
applied with good judgement’. As we have seen, Plato believes democracies resemble73
anarchical societies. The main problem with democratic governance is that the citizenry are74
completely unscrupulous as to whom should make political judgements, allowing all citizens to
participate equally at a task where some people perform much better than others. If we are to75
incorporate popular participation into a just form of government, then it becomes necessary to
ensure we will be governed by responsible leadership. Plato says:
I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 24/44
Plato, Republic 562c-d (emphasis added).76
Plato, Laws 693d-e.77
Page 24
for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed wine
of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom,
they are punished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs.76
Democracies pursue freedom for its own sake, without any regard for corresponding
responsibilities nor the common good. Keeping in mind the common ancient Greek practice of
always mixing wine with water prior to consumption, Plato opposes an ‘unmixed wine of
freedom’—a freedom to do whatever one pleases—perhaps for the reason that freedom is
intoxicating: the citizens are more liable to become drunk and irresponsible. Plato does not forbid
the consumption of wine—in this case synonymous with freedom—but he does forbid excessive
consumption of it. Freedom is a good to be cultivated within one’s own state, so long as it is
constrained by ‘good judgement’. With leaders capable of good judgement, a state is in77
possession of good cupbearers and will be ruled with principled moderation, but yet enjoy
widespread, popular freedoms.
Plato’s mature political vision is one where popular participation meets responsible
leadership. A lawgiver creates laws, makes them publicly known, and convinces the public they
are justified. He is educated for this task and knowledgeable about governance. The people elect
members to a representative body whose task is to enforce the community’s laws. In this way,
Plato believes he can account for democratic representation without falling prey to democracy’s
many pitfalls.
Hegel puts forward a vision fusing popular participation with expert rule as well. In this
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 25/44
See Hegel, LNR, §138 and Hegel, PR, §§275, 279-80, 283. ‘ Die fürstliche Gewalt ’78
may also be translated as ‘the princely power’.
See Hegel, LNR, §144R and Hegel, PR, §296.79
See Hegel, PR, §296.80
Hegel, LNR, §144R.
81
For example, see G. W. F. Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften82
Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817-1818) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818-1819), ed. K.-H. Ilting
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1983), pp. 166-67 (reprinted in Wood’s editorial note to §283
in Hegel, PR, p. 466).
See Hegel, LNR, §140 and Hegel, PR, §283.83
See Hegel, PR, §292.84
See Hegel, PR, §329.85
Page 25
vision, a constitutional monarch arrives at political decisions with the aid of his cabinet
[ Ministerium]. Hegel refers to the monarch with his cabinet as ‘the power of the sovereign [die
fürstliche Gewalt ]’. Potential ministers are formally educated on state affairs, as well as ethics,78
and are rigorously tested. This education is thought to best allow for their ‘dispassionateness,79
integrity [ Rechtlichkeit ], and polite behaviour’. A pool of qualified candidates are drawn up80
based upon proof of their abilities. The monarch then selects appropriate ministers for cabinet81
positions from this pool. He may fire ministers at will. While the monarch’s decision to82 83
employ or discharge ministers is subjective, this is not seen as problematic as it is thought that
all potential cabinet ministers would offer the same general advice, at least in principle.84
The role of ministers is only to advise the monarch on matters of state, grant consent to
his decisions when appropriate, and debate proposals in the legislature. They cannot make any
executive decisions on their own, although they can make decisions on foreign affairs with the
monarch without the consent of the Estates, including decisions to go to war. Ministers play an85
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 26/44
Hegel, LNR, §140, R.86
Hegel, LNR, §140R. Elsewhere, Hegel adds that in addition to ‘the executive civil87
servants’ there are also ‘higher consultative bodies’ which ‘necessarily work together in
groups, and they converge in their supreme heads who are in touch with the monarch
himself’. (Hegel, PR, §289.) Hegel suggests that these ‘higher consultative bodies’ are
‘corporations’. (See Hegel, PR, §289R.)
See Hegel, PR, §294R.88
See Hegel, PR, §§263A, 278R.89
Page 26
important role in best enabling the monarch to make proper decisions for the state. The86
monarch is advised on all political matters by his cabinet: Hegel believes this advice will help
prevent the monarch from making mistaken judgements based upon his own personal assessment
of what rationality demands.87
It is important to get this balance right for several reasons. As Hegel notes, when a civil
servant makes an error it can lead to more damaging consequences than if the person were only
a private citizen. A poor business decision may affect its employees, customers, and possibly88
even its local community. Poor decisions by those in and around government affect everyone in
the state. It is right that standards are higher for those who will have a greater disproportionate
share of political power than common citizens because the stakes are much higher.
Thus, both Plato and Hegel put forward four criticisms of democracy, as well as solutions to
these worries. Both Plato’s mixed government and Hegel’s constitutional monarchy are
governments where reason predominates and the arbitrariness of popular decision-making is
tempered, although I will discuss popular participation in the following section. Importantly,89
liberal democracy can accommodate these criticisms as well.
Before considering whether the arguments behind expert rule are defensible, it is first
necessary to consider an important feature of both Plato’s mixed government, as found in the
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 27/44
Page 27
Laws, and Hegel’s constitutional monarchy that is oft overlooked by commentators. That feature
is the fact that the public acts as the supreme restraint on the exercise of political power. I will
now move to a consideration of how this works for each before turning to a defence of their
general views and a consideration of two major objections before concluding.
IV. The public as the supreme restraint on political power
This is not the end of the story, for Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions. Neither Plato nor
Hegel were entirely antagonistic to the masses. Indeed, neither argues that experts can simply act
however they please. In fact, both Plato and Hegel assign to the masses two interesting
arguments. These are:
(1) Any just government must be responsive to the public.
(2) Experts should not have the final word on political decisions.
I will examine these two arguments in turn.
IV. A. Government should be responsive to the public
Both Plato and Hegel argue that any just government must be responsive to the public. This fact
is often overlooked. For example, Michael Hardimon says of Hegel:
What stands out about this account of the modern political state is precisely the restricted
character of the ordinary citizen’s participation. Unlike the citizen of ancient Athens or
republican Rome, the ordinary citizen in the modern social world does not participate
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 29/44
Hegel, PR, §265A.95
See Hegel, PR, §268A and T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 96
Obligation and Other Writings, eds. Paul Harris and John Morrow (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1986), pp. 89-106 [§§113-36].
Hegel, PR, §274A.97
Page 29
says:
It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is
certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and
if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself
stands on an insecure footing.95
For Hegel, we might say, to borrow a phrase from T. H. Green, that ‘will and not force is the
basis of the state’. That is, a secure state is one where the people are satisfied with their 96
government, their ways of life. The state must embody its citizens’ ‘feeling for its rights and
[present] condition’. A satisfied people are easier to govern because they accept their political97
system, unlike dissatisfied people where lawbreaking would become far more common.
Finally, Hegel believes monarchy is a system which has brought satisfaction to people
more often than not. He says:
Monarchs are not exactly distinguished by their physical powers or intellect [Geist ], yet
millions accept them as their rulers. But it is absurd to say that people allow themselves
to be ruled in defiance of their own interests, ends, and intentions, for they are not as
stupid as that; it is their need, the inner power of the Idea, which compels them to accept
such rule and keeps them in this situation, even if they appear to be consciously opposed
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 30/44
Hegel, PR, §281A.98
See Plato, Laws 823a.99
Plato, Alcibiades 114b.100
Plato, Gorgias 513e.101
Page 30
to it.98
This view, of course, seems somewhat at odds with Hegel’s earlier statements about citizens.
Earlier he claimed that the people were unfit to rule because they were unable to identify their
interests and the means of attaining them. Yet, in this example, Hegel claims that the common
citizenry are capable, albeit capable to recognize that a monarchy can achieve these ends better
than if left to themselves in a democracy.
Likewise, Plato argues that any just government must be responsive to its citizens. For
example, he argues that it is most sensible to advise citizens on the best course of political action,
rather than to decide such matters in secret or force their compliance. Government should be99
transparent, if still limiting the extent of popular electoral measures.
That said, it is unclear how much accountability Plato ultimately demands of rulers. In
the Alcibiades, Plato claims that the person with expertise in governance should persuade each
member of an assembly individually, one at a time, rather than force their acceptance. The100
reason for this may be because the governance of any city ought to work towards the good of the
citizens, not the interests of those in power. For example, Plato says: ‘Shouldn’t we then attempt
to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as
possible?’ Often he uses the analogies of the steersman, acting for the benefit of both his ship101
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 31/44
See Plato, Alcibiades 117c-e, 135a-b; Plato, Republic 341c, 488a-489b; Plato,102
Seventh Letter 351d; Plato, Statesman 296e-297b, e, 299a-e. See also Plato, Laws 639b;Plato, Phaedrus 246a-247c.
Plato, Republic 489a.103
For a different viewpoint, see Irwin on ‘Platonic Love and Platonic Justice’ in104
Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 311-13.
The ‘present situation’ is that Socrates has been condemned to die by the newly105
installed Athenian democracy. (See Plato, Apology 38c and Plato, Crito 43a-44d.)
Plato, Crito 44c-d.106
Page 31
and the sailors. In these analogies, the ‘ships resemble cities to their attitude to the true102
philosophers’. Throughout, he seems to take for granted that political leaders will steer their 103
cities to prosperity, although it is clear he demands these leaders make an effort to keep the
citizens on board and in support of them.
Plato’s chosen tool was persuasion to convince the people to accept some form of expert
rule, as he came to realize later in his life the importance of popular approval and participation
in governance. One of the earliest pieces of evidence for this is found in the Crito. Plato says:104
Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? ...
Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority.
Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but
pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered among them.105
Socrates: ... They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things
haphazardly.106
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 32/44
Plato, Second Letter 312. See Plato, Seventh Letter 325d-e.107
See Plato, Republic 498d-499a.108
Page 32
Whilst public opinion may be fickle, Plato would still weigh heavily the significance of paying
attention to the public mood along with Crito. In the Second Letter attributed to Plato and
addressed to Dionysius II, Plato tells us that he travelled to Syracuse in part so ‘philosophy might
gain favour with the multitude’. This view is not confined only to the various letters attributed107
to him, but also in the Republic: part of the necessity of making the transition to philosopher rule
in any state is to convince the majority of the people elsewhere that this project is a practical
possibility.108
For these reasons, both Plato and Hegel held that any just government must be responsive
to the public. However, we may well feel that the degree of responsiveness they make room for
is still insufficient. In the following section, we will see a second way in which the public matters
for Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions.
IV. B. Experts should not have the final say on political decision-making
Both Plato and Hegel have been accused of giving insufficient popular representation in their
political visions. The worry is that in both cases experts rule without any satisfactory check on
their powers. For example, Hardimon says:
if one’s concern is with the distribution of power in Hegel’s political state, as well it
might be, the proper source of worry is not the monarchy, whose powers are rather
restricted, but rather the bureaucracy, the real seat of power in the modern political state
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 33/44
Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, p. 215 (emphasis added). Whilst Hegel is109
quite clear that the monarch is meant to act as a clear restraint on the powers of the
bureaucracy, it is unclear how effective the monarch can be (see Hegel, PR, §§295A, 297).
After all, the bureaucrats seem to have sole control over the education of future members,
who form the pool of potential ministers. There is no check on their education nor suitability
for office beyond the monarch’s decision to appoint or remove members of this pool of
potential ministers.
Allen W. Wood, ‘Introduction’, in Hegel, PR, p. xxiv.110
See Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford111
University Press, 1996), pp. 75, 77.
Page 33
as Hegel represents it.109
Hardimon does not share his worry alone. Allen Wood says: ‘Hegel plainly intends real political
power to be in the hands neither of the prince nor of the people, but of an educated class of
professional civil servants’.110
Similarly, Plato’s political vision is supposed to succumb to what Robert Dahl calls the
Guardianship argument. This argument says that experts make the final decision in all political111
matters. Dahl argues this view is unacceptable and we should reject Plato’s political vision as a
result. Dahl says:
almost all of us do rely on experts to make crucial decisions that bear strongly and
directly on our well-being, happiness, health, future, even our survival, not just
physicians, surgeons, and pilots but in our increasingly complex society a myriad of
others. So if we let experts make decisions on important matters like these, why shouldn’t
we turn government over to experts?
Attractive as it may seem at times, the argument for Guardianship rather than
democracy fails to take sufficient account of some crucial defects ... To delegate certain
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 34/44
Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 70-112
71 (emphasis given).
See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p?????????113
On jury nullification, see my ‘A Defence of Jury Nullification’, Res Publica 10114
(2004), pp. 401-23; my ‘On Jury Nullification’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 97
(2005), pp. 169-75; and, more generally, my ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 197-212 and my ‘The Future of the Right to Trial by Jury’,
Page 34
subordinate decisions to experts is not equivalent to ceding final control over major
decisions ... The fundamental issue ... is not whether as individuals we must sometimes
put our trust in experts. The issue is who or what group should have the final say in
decisions made by the government of a state.112
Dahl concedes that we regularly and quite rightly place our trust in experts of all kinds everyday.
He does not deny that experts can be useful in our lives. What Dahl disputes is that experts
should have final control. For one thing, experts often disagree amongst themselves. Does this113
objection lead us to reject Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions?
I do not believe this objection succeeds. It is true in Plato’s Republic that the philosopher-
kings do have this final control, but it is not the case in his Laws written toward the end of his
life. Here Plato argues that laws are created and disseminated by an expert in governance he calls
the lawgiver. However, the lawgiver does not enforce the laws. Whether or not these laws are
enforced is a challenge taken up by a popularly elected body. It is true that a highly capable
lawgiver creates new laws and that these laws should be enforced. Indeed, a great many of these
laws demand that anyone transgressing them be executed. Furthermore, perhaps as with jury
nullification, if the elected body chose not to enforce a certain law in a particular instance, this
would never mean that the law, as such, does not exist, but, only that the full weight of the law
does not come to bear in that one specific instance. Plato is able to overcome the Guardianship
114
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 35/44
Philosophy Today 17 (2003), pp. 2-4.
See Hegel, LNR, §140 and Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, p. 317.115
See Hegel, LNR, §149R: ‘Legislative proposals must therefore emanate from the116
sovereign ... the initiative for laws rests essentially with the power of the sovereign’.
See Hegel, LNR, §140.117
See Hegel, PR, §284. It is important to note that this does not suggest that the118
relevant minister is responsible for getting the monarch to agree with him on what should
become law, as this passage is equally suggestive that ministers may be held accountable if
they fail to convince the monarch to avoid moving forward with a bill proposal.
Hegel, LNR, §149R.119
Page 35
argument.
So too can Hegel. In his constitutional monarchy, members of his cabinet must be
responsive to both the monarch and the elected Estates assembly. The monarch is able to sack 115
ministers at will. The monarch with his ministers propose all pieces of legislation to be approved
or disapproved by the Estates. The Estates do not propose legislative bills themselves. It is116
important to note that neither the monarch nor any member of his cabinet can propose legislation
on their own either. Instead, whatever legislation the monarch chooses to endorse can only be
brought to the legislature for consideration if, and only if, ‘the competent minister’ in the cabinet
consents to his doing so. Laws can only be created and take effect if ministers can convince117
the elected body they should approve of these laws.
In addition, it is thought that cabinet ministers can be best held accountable for the advice
they offer to the monarch if they openly debate proposals approved by the monarch with
themselves in the estates. Hegel believes that debating proposals in the estates will guarantee118
the competency of ministers, as ministers will have to spend much of their time preparing
arguments that might convince them.119
This public grilling prevents the worry that ministers might come to use their ‘knowledge
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 36/44
Hegel, PR, §§297, R, 315A. See Hegel, LNR, §154R.120
Hegel, LNR, §145R.121
Page 36
of the legal process hid behind complicated formalities’ as ‘an instrument of profit and
domination’, providing the public with ‘a great spectacle of outstanding educational value’ in
state matters. Ministers are forced to make a case for political decisions that non-experts can120
understand and comprehend. For example, Hegel says:
The educated middle class constitutes the people’s consciousness of freedom and right;
the developed consciousness of right is to be found in the middle class. But if this class
does not have the interests of the citizens at heart, it is like a net thrown over the citizens
in order to oppress them ... Officials must therefore accustom themselves to a popular
approach, to popular language, and seek to overcome the difficulties this occasions
them.121
If ministers cannot win the favour of the people for their proposals, government will come to a
halt and the state will fail. Thus, Hegel can overcome the Guardianship objection as well as Plato.
Thus, popular sentiment matters to both Plato and Hegel. Not only do their views of just
government endorse public responsiveness, but the mature political visions of neither has experts
exerting any kind of stranglehold on power. Whilst experts have a distinct and powerful presence
in political decision-making, they may not always get what they want. The people must always
be in agreement with experts in a free and fair manner without compulsion nor duress.
To be clear, I am not arguing that each and every consideration Plato and Hegel claimed
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 37/44
Although many Hegel scholars believe Hegel was mistaken on this point, such as122
Andrew Chitty in a personal correspondence. I disagree with this view. (See my Hegel’s
Page 37
was central for conceiving a just state are useful for thinking about how their political philosophy
can engage and develop democratic theory. Instead, I am only claiming that several factors of
their political philosophies are worth highlighting, factors that I believe are most defensible
today: the state should exist as a unity, popular desires must be held under some constraint to
prevent abuses, the need for expertise in government, respect for popular opinion, and that in all
matters the public has the final word on policies.
V. Is this political vision defensible?
I will now briefly provide some argument in favour of the criticisms that Plato and Hegel direct
to democratic theory, as well as the general principles behind their alternative visions. I will then
consider two possible objections.
V. A. In favour of ‘moderate democracy’
Throughout this article, I have avoided any attempt at defining ‘democracy’, apart from the fact
that—whatever it is—it is a form of government that Plato and Hegel each attribute a number of
deficiencies to, each giving us reason to reject democracy in favour of a different form of
government. For one thing, it is quite obvious that the form of so-called democratic government
each attacks bears little resemblance to modern democratic governments. This fact, which I take
to be obvious, cannot be highlighted enough.
Yet, it would remain far from obvious that even if all of this were the case, that we then
should take Plato and Hegel to be democrats. One reason why we should not take them to be
democrats might be the simple fact that neither ultimately justifies a democratic government.122
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 38/44
Political Philosophy.)
See Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996)123
and Thomas Christiano, ‘An Argument for Egalitarian Justice and Against the Levelling
Down Objection’, in Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry Silverstein, eds., Social
Justice and the Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 41-65.
Page 38
Nevertheless, when we look below the surface, I think we find something rather
illuminating. With Plato, knowledge of good governance is key. The fact that philosopher-kings
have it is reason enough for all political power to be divested into their hands. Even in the Laws,
knowledge continues to play an important role. The legislator is not a monarch who makes laws
based on whatever takes his fancy. Instead, he is properly educated for that role. He may well
make the law, but whether or not the laws take effect and are properly enforced is something
beyond his control. This task is reserved for the Guardians of the Laws, an elected body
representing the common citizens.
Similarly, Hegel’s monarch and cabinet may well propose laws and policies, but they
alone do not determine whether or not these laws and policies are actually implemented . This task
is reserved for the Estates, an elected body representing the common citizens.
At least in their mature thought, both Plato and Hegel fuse together expertise with popular
institutions where two things occur. First, unelected experts have a legitimate role to play in
government and hold real influence. Second, unelected experts do not have a final say in what
the political community does—the final say rests with elected institutions.
The relevance of Plato’s and Hegel’s views here for contemporary democratic theory is
perhaps surprisingly significant. Most democratic theorists today become exercised about access
to voting and political equality amongst citizens. For example, Thomas Christiano’s work centres
on equality and democratic participation. David Estlund’s work looks into the ways in which
123
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 39/44
See David Estlund, ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension124
of Democratic Authority’, in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative
Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For an opposing view, see Henry S. Richardson,
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
I owe this choice phrase to Fabian Freyenhagen.125
See Hegel, PR, §272A.126
I readily grant that the justifications offered for this position differ between Hegel127
and Schumpeter and thank Andrew Chitty for this point.
Page 39
elections yield good results. Against these views, perhaps we might think of the position of 124
Plato and Hegel as endorsing a kind of ‘moderate democracy’. We would not want to call it125
‘limited government’ because that phrase refers to the separation of powers, where government
is thought to be divided between executive, legislative, and judicial branches and each is more
or less equally powerful as each other. (And, of course, neither Plato nor Hegel endorse this
traditional division of power between three branches. In addition, a non-democracy may well126
enjoy a separation of powers.)
A moderate democracy is a government where popular political participation is limited
in order to make some room for unelected experts into the political decision-making process.
These experts assist elected representatives with the task of governing across all three branches
of government. Whilst they have influence proportionally greater than common citizens, these
experts do not have final say in what the political decisions will be. This task is reserved for
elected representatives.
No one, as I can see since Joseph Schumpeter and perhaps Max Weber, argues that
democracy is more than representative government and elections, entailing a widespread reliance
on unelected experts, experts who make the task of governing possible for elected politicians.127
Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a well organized government today without them. These
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 40/44
See my ‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’.128
See Stacy B. Gordon, ‘All Votes Are Not Created Equal: Campaign Contributions129
and Critical Votes’, Journal of Politics 63 (2001), pp. 249-69.
Page 40
experts are the bureaucrats, the law clerks, the civil servants. Through their help, ministers gain
valuable advice on which policies are best to implement, which reforms are most necessary, and
the knowledge to help bring this about. Moderate democracy, thus, helps transform the theory
of democracy from government by ignorance to government with moderation. Furthermore, the
main arguments behind Plato’s and Hegel’s criticisms of democracy seem satisfied by just this
kind of a democratic theory. If this theory has something to be gained from it, then Plato and
Hegel offer something positive to democratic theorists and should not longer be viewed as in
perpetual conflict with them.
V. B. Possible objections to ‘moderate democracy’
Someone might object to this political vision on the grounds that the people’s autonomy is not
properly respected. We might think about this worry in at least two ways.
First, we might think that people should ultimately share in equality when political
decisions must be made. Plato’s and Hegel’s arguments seem to run counter to this view, as
neither suggests that you and I must share an equal political voice. For this reason, we might
think that their views should be jettisoned.
A first reply to this objection might run something like this. Do we each really have equal
voice? I doubt it. For one thing, all votes are not equal under current campaign contribution128
laws: studies show that contributors have a stronger effect on votes in close elections.
129
Furthermore, even if we do each have an equal say when we vote for representatives, each
individual person does not have the same political voice. Obviously, those who are entrusted as
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 41/44
Cite Christiano’s AJP paper.130
See my ‘Can We Justify Political Inequality?’ Archiv für Rechts- und 131
Sozialphilosophie 89 (2003), pp. 426-38.
Page 41
our elected representatives exert more political influence than normal citizens by quite a margin.
In addition, there is Schumpeter’s simple point that the people do not in general share in any
decisions beyond choosing politicians to make political choices on their behalf.
A second reply might be this: do we really assign people an equal voice? We don’t.
Children and madmen are excluded from full political participation. So too are often felons and
non-citizens. Why is this? Well, perhaps the least controversial case is children: every society
excludes them from full democratic participation. Yet, it is unclear why they are excluded as of
right in all instances other than simple ageism. Christiano employs what he calls ‘minimal
standards of competence’ which citizens must satisfy to enjoy full political rights. In his view,130
only the insane and children will fail this condition. If our argument was that on average children
were less politically competent than adults, we may think about possibly extending this standard
to exclude adults who likewise fail to satisfy this standard. The difference seems to consist in the
fact that we just assume some groups pass the test (e.g., normal adults) and some groups always
fail, although this is surely empirically untrue: it is not unreasonable to suppose there is a 17 year
old more political astute than someone 18 or indeed 81 years of age. This first objection to
limited democracy then fails.131
A second objection to limited democracy might well be that deliberative democracy
seems incompatible with it. If those with some expertise deserve a special place in our collective
political life, then that is a space that deliberative democrats cannot claim for the citizenry.
Limited democracy should be rejected.
However, there are two replies to this objection as well. First, deliberative democrats
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 42/44
On Cass Sunstein’s law of group polarity. See also Bob Talisse’s paper in The132
Legacy of John Rawls.
John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’ 133
Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002)), p. 227.
Page 42
assume deliberation yields positive effects, that it works. Yet, some work has put this article of
faith into doubt, namely, experiments by Cass Sunstein that demonstrate that in many instances
people’s views actually become more polarized through deliberation than less so.132
A second reply might look something like this. Deliberative democrats assume that
people would welcome greater opportunity for deliberative politics, if only those opportunities
could get off the ground. However, there has been a mountain of evidence to the contrary. For
example, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse claim:
The people do not care at all about most public policies and do not want to be more
involved in the political process ... The people prefer a process that allows them to keep
politics at arm’s length. People seek this kind of system; they have not been forced into
it by others ... their ideal system is one in which they themselves are not involved, but
where they can be confident that decision makers will be motivated by a desire to serve
the people.133
If their empirical research is correct, the deliberative democracy challenge fails because it
assumes that people want greater involvement in politics. Instead, people prefer to keep politics
at a manageable distance. Far enough away that they can get on with their particular ways of life,
but close enough that irresponsible persons in government (whether elected or unelected) can be
held to account. Limited democracy, in fact, is congruent with just such an account.
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 43/44
By looking at their criticisms of democracy, we can bracket more controversial134
issues pertaining to the many nuances of their full, considered alternatives and, thus, avoid
getting bogged down in questions over the usefulness or applicability of Hegel’s conception
of the will or worries pertaining to the metaphysics of Plato and Hegel.
Page 43
Conclusion
Thus, Plato and Hegel present us with both criticisms of democracy and positive proposals for
alternatives to democracy. We need not accept their alternatives in order to admire their
criticisms and positive proposals. These are not only defensible, but they provide new routes134
for the continued development of democratic theory. In particular, they help us focus greater
attention to the significant and necessary role played by properly trained and uncorrupt civil
servants in any modern government. Without them, modern government seems impossible. Yet,
these experts are not placed in a privileged position entirely beyond public scrutiny. It is right that
government not only lead, but lead through persuasion, bringing the public onboard with its
proposals. Furthermore, it is right that these experts who help elected officials wade through
proposed legislation, executive documents, and even potential judicial decisions of the highest
order have the vitally important space to help the legislative, executive, and judicial branches,
while at the same time these experts, these unelected government officials, do not have in any
way a final say on what the political outcomes will be while enjoying their privileged place. It
is true that ‘the people’, if we can call them that, do not simply get whatever they want either.
Their choices for elected officials, proposed legislation, etc. are determinate choices: they are
neither infinite in number nor in reality. The people choose amongst choices offered to them, not
amongst all potential theoretical possibilities. But, yet, the people rule. Experts do not have the
final say. They must always be responsive to public opinion no matter how misguided or ill-
informed that opinion may be. The citizenry will get the government it deserves at the end of the
day. Both Plato’s and Hegel’s political visions are helpful in understanding what a justification
8/13/2019 Plato Hegel Democracy
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/plato-hegel-democracy 44/44
This article was presented at annual meetings of the Hegel Society of Great Britain135
in Oxford, the Global Studies Association in Newcastle, and of the Classical Association in
Newcastle, as well as the Department of Politics at the University of Newcastle. The article
has benefited significantly by these audiences, including most especially Karin de Boer, Sarah
Francis, Tim Kelsall, Graham Long, Ali Mandipour, David Merrill, Vicky Roupa, Heather
Widdows, Kathryn Wilkinson, and not least extensive comments by Andrew Chitty, Fabian
of this system, the system we have in place today, looks like. And, for this reason, both have
something to offer the democratic theorist on positive, not negative, grounds. We should neglect
them no longer.135
top related