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PLATO, HEGEL, AND DEMOCRACY

Thom Brooks©

University of Newcastle

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is

an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy

working today—whether in an analytic or postmodern tradition—endorses democracy in one

variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping

us theorize about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals

of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, each is

rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have beenrepresented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian)

democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a

new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian

tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually

provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival

theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic

thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a

positive, not negative, manner.

I. Introduction

Democracy presents an interesting dilemma for contemporary political philosophers. Many of

the most historically important political philosophers were either dismissive, if not outright

hostile, to democracy as a superior form of governance. For example, neither Plato, Aristotle,

Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, nor any number of other

major figures defended democracy as the superior form of government, often preferring various

incarnations of monarchical governments instead.

The anti-democratic position held by these canonical writers is clearly at odds with the

position of contemporary political philosophers. Today, seemingly everyone everywhere makes



For example, Ian Shapiro writes: ‘Authoritarian rulers seldom reject democracy1

outright. Instead they argue that their people are not ready for democracy “yet,” that their

systems are more democratic than they appear, or that the opposition is corrupt and

antidemocratic—perhaps the stooge of a foreign power’ and ‘[t]he democratic idea is close to

nonnegotiable in today’s world’. (Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 1.)

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some claim to popular legitimacy. Elected politicians claim that their election gives them a1

political mandate, as well as legitimacy. Authoritarian politicians claim that they make decisions

in the people’s best interest, only maintaining their rule until the people can take over for

themselves. Thus, at least in popular discourse, even authoritarians espouse that their legitimacy

rests on some form of popular mandate too. Indeed, hardly any leader claims he acts contrary to

popular legitimacy.

The dilemma posed here is a simple one: if much of our philosophical canon is anti-

democratic, how can these major figures have gotten it all so terribly wrong? Of what use are

these figures in helping us formulate a theory of good governance today? The standard reply by

democratic theorists is that these figures help support the case for democracy in a negative way.

That is, figures like Plato and Hegel are thought to get democracy wrong, wrong in such a way

that it helps to highlight the case for democracy, rather than against it. They tell us useful lies.

In this article, I will adopt a very different approach to this issue. I will focus on two

major figures in the history of political philosophy often discussed together: Plato and Hegel.

Both are either dismissive, if not hostile, to democracy on similar grounds. First, I will look at

what their arguments were against democracy, as well as their substantive claims in support of

what they took to be superior alternative forms of governance. Second, I will examine how both

understood the public as a check on the political power of elites in their mature philosophical

writings. The article will then end with a consideration of whether the outlines of their mature

political visions sketched here are defensible against some possible objections. My view is that





See T. M. Knox, ‘Hegel and Prussianism’, in ed. Walter Kaufmann, Hegel’s5

Political Philosophy (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 13-29. See also Shlomo Avineri,

Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.

185-89.

See Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 187; Michael O. Hardimon,6

Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1994), p. 215; Steven V. Hicks, International Law and the Possibility of a Just World

Order: An Essay on Hegel’s Universalism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 173; Sidney Hook,

‘Hegel and His Apologists’, in ed. Walter Kaufmann, Hegel’s Political Philosophy, p. 90;

Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 327;

Michael Levin and Howard Williams, ‘Inherited Power and Popular Representation: A

Tension in Hegel’s Political Theory’, Political Studies 35 (1987), p. 114; Z. A. Pelczynski,

‘The Hegelian Conception of the State’, in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., Hegel’s Political

Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.

25; Leo Rauch, ‘Hegel, Spirit, and Politics’, in Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins,eds., The Age of German Idealism (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 285; Hugh A Reyburn, The

Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1921), p.

252; Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Contexts (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 152; and Mark Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justification of

Hereditary Monarchy’, History of Political Thought 12 (1991), p. 482.

On the ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ city, see Plato, Republic 369c-373a and my ‘Knowledge7

and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14

(2006), pp. 51-77. All Plato quotations come from Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M.

Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

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this has not prevented any number of commentators from taking strong issue with their visions.5

These visions have been called ‘arbitrary’, ‘beset with contradictions’, ‘bizarre’, ‘comical’,

‘implausible’, ‘obscure’, ‘troubling’, ‘unconvincing’, ‘unusual’, ‘wide of the mark’, and much

worse.6

Not only then do Plato and Hegel seem unlikely allies of democratic theorists, but their

political visions have been subjected to severe criticisms themselves, primarily because each

vision is not democratic, at least in any obvious sense. For example, while Plato first claims that

a self-sufficient, moderate city with a constant population is the ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ city, most

of his Republic defends a city ruled by philosopher-kings, instead. These philosopher-kings rule7



See Plato, Euthydemus 291c-292c; Plato, Republic 426d, 477d-e; Plato,8

Statesman 292c, e, 308e, 311c.

George Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought (New York:9

Methuen, 1986), p. 172.

On the difference between Plato’s Republic and his Laws, see Luc Brisson, ‘Ethics10

and Politics in Plato’s Laws’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2005), pp. 93-121.

Plato, Laws 693d-e; see Plato, Eighth Letter 353d-e. Emphasis added.11

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because they possess ‘the expert knowledge of kingship’ which others lack. Thus, according to8

George Klosko, ‘the central motif of the political theory of the Republic is putting philosophical

intelligence in control of the state’.9

In his later work the Laws, Plato’s views change and he comes to endorse a government

fusing democracy and monarchy. He says:10

Listen to me then. There are two-mother constitutions, so to speak, which you could

fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and

democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians,

the latter by my country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two. It is

absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and this is of course the point

of our advice, when we insist that no state formed without these two elements can be

constituted properly)—if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good

judgement.11

The government Plato defends is composed of a legislator with an elected body, the Guardians

of the Laws. The legislator is unelected and properly educated for his office, responsible for



See Plato, Laws 823a.12

See Plato, Laws 755c-d, 756a-b.13

See Plato, Laws 752d-754e, 755a-c.14

Plato, Laws 751b.15

See G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right , ed. Allen W. Wood, trans.16

H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §273, R [hereafter, PR]. I will

put to the side whether or not the monarch is the dominant partner here as my argument does

not depend on it. That said, I do argue elsewhere that the monarch is more powerful than his

ministers. (See my Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of

Right (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).)

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making all laws, and persuading the public that these laws are just. The Guardians of the Laws12

are common citizens who are democratically elected to enforce the laws of the city, laws created

by the legislator.

Whilst it is true that this later political vision does give elected persons important

powers—‘generals’ and ‘calvary-commanders’ are also elected too —candidates are vetted in13

a scrutiny process prior to running for election to ensure they will perform well if elected. For 14

Plato, putting ‘incompetent officials in charge of administering the [legal] code is a waste of

good laws ... doing damage and injury on a gigantic scale’ to the political community. Thus,15

even when Plato does try to incorporate some notion of democracy and elections into a defensible

political vision, it seems quite far removed from anything we might consider to be a democracy,

at least in any obvious sense.

Likewise, Hegel does not endorse a system of governance that is recognizably democratic

either. Instead, he defends a hereditary monarch who proposes laws with the consent of his

cabinet to an elected assembly, the Estates. Whilst Hegel also allows elections to political16

office, the majority share of power is invested with the monarch and his cabinet ministers. Hegel

then, too, defends a system of government that both tries to incorporate elections for important



See Hegel, PR, §273R.17

This is a point missed surprisingly often, but noted well by Ilting. (See K.-H. Ilting,18

‘The Structure of the Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ’, in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., Hegel’s Political

Philosophy, pp. 103-4.)

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political institutions while having ‘lost [its] democratic ... character’, lacking any close

resemblance to a modern democracy, again, at least in any obvious sense.17

We might well think it a tall order to suppose that either Plato or Hegel could actually

help us theorize about democracy in a positive way. Normally, any value they offer to democratic

theorists is viewed in a negative light. For example, Plato’s arguments in favour of philosopher-

kings are seen to fail because experts should not have final say on political decision-making.

Thus, some claim that Plato helps us understand better why people without specialized

knowledge should still have a political voice, indeed, the only voice. Similarly, many other

commentators take up Hegel’s theories of freedom, recognition, and reconciliation and claim that

he sets popular political participation in a too limited role, where these theories cannot properly

develop and take hold. Hegel negatively furthers the democratic theorists’ cause as this problem

highlights the need to extend recognition and reconciliation, for instance, much further in our

political practices than his constitutional monarchy allows. In both cases, Plato and Hegel are

negative teachers, foils used by democratic theorists to show us why democracy is the best form

of government and how it can be further improved through Plato’s and Hegel’s misplaced and

incorrect criticisms of democracy.

III. Plato’s and Hegel’s shared arguments against democracy

It is important to first recognize what Plato’s and Hegel’s target is when they criticize democracy:

Athenian democracy. Neither is considering liberal democracy and, in fact, I believe that many18



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of their criticisms do not damage liberal democracy for this reason, but may help buffer

arguments for it as well. In this section, I will examine four different arguments put forward by

both Plato and Hegel against democracy. These arguments are:

(1) Democracies are actually anarchic societies that lack any kind of coherent unity.

(2) Democracies are more likely to follow their citizens’ impulses and desires, rather than

any concern for the common good.

(3) Larger democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens, offering

disincentives to citizens to participate.

(4) Democracies are essentially governments run by fools: it would be best to have those

with expertise in statecraft take command, as the citizens are unable to govern

well because they simply do not know what they are doing.

I will now examine each of these arguments in turn. My purpose will be to demonstrate both that

Plato and Hegel offer these four arguments against democracy, but also to show how modern

liberal democracy can accommodate their worries.

III. A. Democracies are actually anarchic societies

Plato’s and Hegel’s first criticism of democracies is that they are characterized by anarchy. For

example, Plato attacks democratic governments for being essentially libertarian societies, where

each citizen can ‘arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him’: ‘anarchy’ is mistaken



Plato, Republic 557b, 560e. See ibid., 572d-e and Julia Annas, An Introduction to19

Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 300.

See Frederick Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 252.20

See Plato, Republic 562b-c.21

Plato, Republic 557e-558a.22

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as ‘freedom’. The share and scope of power held and exercised by each citizen is much greater 19

than that held by democratic citizens today. But it is also not without its own problems. Hegel

notes that the rights of each citizen are insecure in democracies because not everyone might

respect the rights of others. The thought is that if people can live however they please, they may20

choose a form of life that imposes restrictions on someone else’s well being. This gives us reason

to reject democracies as an attractive form of political organization. Whilst these worries may

be well placed with regard to classical democracies, no one today would think modern

democracies function similarly.

Plato’s and Hegel’s second criticism is that democracies lack any kind of unity on account

of their being anarchic societies. Democracies lack unity in one of two ways. First, democracies

lack political structure. Democracies are more akin to a collection of individuals occupying a21

common space, rather than a form of political organization. For example, Plato says:

In this city, there is no requirement to rule, even if you’re capable of it, or again to be

ruled if you don’t want to be, or to be at war when the others are, or at peace unless you

happen to want it. And there is no requirement in the least that you not serve in public

office as a juror, if you happen to want to serve, even if there is a law forbidding you to

do so.22



Hegel, PR, §290A. See ibid., §§273R, 274, A, 276, 278R, 290A, 302 and G. W. F.23

Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right , trans.

J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995),

§167R (hereafter, ‘ LNR’).

Hegel, LNR, §148R.24

Hegel, PR, §303R.25

Of course, for Hegel, the particular shape a people’s political community ought to26

take is the rational structure of the free will in ‘the system of right’, as set out in the

Philosophy of Right . (See Hegel, PR, §4A.)

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The society lacks any rules beyond whatever it is people see fit. One democracy might differ

radically from another, depending upon the varieties of people who happen to compose it.

Similarly, Hegel refers to democracies as fragmented societies, where people form

‘merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms’. Hegel argues that ‘[t]o speak of “the23

people” is a completely empty phrase’ as a result. He explains:24

The many as single individuals—and this is a favourite interpretation of [the term] ‘the

people’—do indeed live together , but only as a crowd , i.e. a formless mass whose

movement and activity can consequently only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and

terrifying. If we hear any further talk of ‘the people’ as an unorganized whole, we know

in advance that we can expect only generalities and one-sided determinations.25

Hegel’s view is that to speak of ‘the people’ is to speak of something that has some coherent

form, that takes some identifiable shape. Democracies are not coherent political bodies, but26

literally mob rule in every sense instead.

Second, both Plato and Hegel accuse democracies of lacking leadership. If everyone rules

and everyone has equal political voice, no one can speak for anyone else and, it is thought, not



Plato, Republic 558c.27


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for the community as a whole as well. In a society where all are equal, that society, in effect,

‘lacks rulers’. Hegel adds:27

In democracy all powers merge together in immediate fashion, the people being the

supreme lawgiver and the supreme judge. An individual, e.g. a general, is still needed for

execution, but the power is not definitely transferred to him, and he does not know how

far he can go. The people lack stability, and with them no laws are firm.28

Hegel’s claim is simple: who carries out the decisions that the so-called ‘people’ decide? If a

democracy votes to end poverty in its midst, who has a mandate to carry this out? What rights

and obligations are extended to such a person? Democracy is alone in leaving such questions

open and, worse, leaving their answers arbitrary.

From these criticisms, both Plato and Hegel propose forms of government that are not

anarchical and have clear political decision-making structures in place. These structures ensure

the community avoids slipping into anarchy and helps foster a coherent political unity. For Plato,

one possible structure is a society where each person pursues tasks they are naturally suited to

perform. He believes that there exists a natural division of labour, forming a natural unity, where

some are best suited to work as cobblers, others as medical doctors, and a chosen few as

philosopher-kings. A second possible and related structure, in the Laws, holds that a lawgiver

creates laws and educates the public about their necessity, while a democratically elected

assembly has the task of enforcing these laws. In this way, political unity is fostered by pursuing



See Brooks, ‘Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’, page number.29

See Hegel, LNR, §§129R, 130R.

30


Hegel claims any state, whether a monarchy, an aristocracy, or democracy, must32

always have ‘an individual at its head ... for all actions and all actuality are initiated and

implemented by a leader as the decisive unit’. (Hegel, PR, §279R.)

Hegel, PR, §279R (emphasis given).33

On group rights, see Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, Journal of 34

Political Philosophy 7 (1999), pp. 353-77.

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the moderation of ‘the mixed wine of freedom’.29

Hegel believes unity is best sought out by abandoning democracy’s ‘contingent character’

and differentiating itself into various internal structures, such as a government, courts of law,

public authorities, and so on. This structure must not only contain various branches of public30

institutions, but these institutions must have a coherent relationship with one another along a

clear hierarchy. The pinnacle of the state is the monarch. For Hegel, the monarch solves a31

number of important problems relating to the questions of who enacts laws that have been agreed

upon or who can speak on behalf of the state: these are some of the monarch’s varied roles.’32

Thus, anarchy is averted and unity created. We can then move beyond the troubled notion of

‘popular sovereignty ... based on a garbled notion [Vorstellung ] of the people’ given our

recognition of clear political structures and their organization.33

At first glance, Plato’s and Hegel’s claims seem off the mark. It certainly is not obvious

in which respects, if any, modern democracies are more ‘aggregates’ rather than unified societies.

Perhaps modern liberal democracies are more aggregative—that is, perhaps they give a certain

priority to individual rights above any variety of group rights —than either Plato or Hegel would34

prefer, but there is an identifiable unity present nonetheless. We have clear institutional



Hegel, PR, §§281R, 301R.35

See Plato, Republic 561b-c and Hegel, PR, §273R. Also see Terence H. Irwin,36

Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 229.

Plato, Gorgias 517b.37

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structures, as well as political leaders, such as generals, prime ministers, presidents, and the like,

in our modern democracies and, indeed, they do know their remits, duties, and obligations as set

out in public laws.

Plato’s and Hegel’s criticisms of Athenian democracy do not stick to liberal democracies

today, because liberal democracies can address their worries unlike Athenian democracies. We

satisfy Plato’s and Hegel’s general worries about democracy because, well, we’re not that kind

of democracy after all. In fact, we actually come much closer to addressing their concerns than

either they or ourselves might have imagined.

III. B. Democracies are more likely to follow their citizens’ impulses and desires, rather than any

concern for the common good

A second argument against democracies is that they are more likely to follow their citizens’

impulses and desires, rather than by any concern for the common good of all. If democracies are

essentially anarchic societies, then, on this view, each person is free to choose whatever ends for

the community and herself she wants. Not only might these choices clash, but the problem is that

all will be disposed to think of themselves ahead of others. The common good will be lost in the

wild pursuit of individual desires. Moreover, these individuals are pursuing their passions,35

rather than reason, because reason is inapplicable: the citizenry do not know how to rule and,

thus, cannot have reason as their guide. Any democratically elected officials are little more than

36

‘servants’ dedicated to the satisfaction of ‘the city’s appetites’.37



Plato, Republic 586a-b.38

Plato, Phaedo 99b. See Plato, Republic 520c-d.

39

Plato says: ‘And so he [i.e., the democrat] lives, always surrendering rule over 40

himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is

satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying them all equally’.

(Plato, Republic 561b.)

Plato, Republic 559d-561c.41

Hegel, PR, §281R (emphasis given). See Hegel, LNR, §129R.42


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For example, in a memorable passage from the Republic, we are told that the common

people:

always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner

table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate ... their desires are insatiable ... like a vessel full of

holes.38

Democratic citizens are like ‘people groping in the dark’ because they simply do not know how

to govern. The only guide the citizenry have is the pursuit of their individual passions. Worse39

still, citizens lack any means of choosing amongst competing passions, apart from whatever takes

their fancy at a given time. As a result, a democracy is ruled by the pursuit of the passions of 40

its members and not the pursuit of their common good.41

This view is shared by Hegel. He believes that democracies are governed by ‘the sense

of the caprice, opinion, and arbitrariness of the many’, often identifying ‘caprice’ as characteristic

of ‘democracies’. For this reason, he believes democratic states are characterized by ‘subjective42

opinion and the self-confidence which accompanies it’.43



Plato, Philebus 48c-49a.44

See Plato, Gorgias 457c-d.45

Hegel, PR, §279A.46

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, 1942),47

pp. 284-85.

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In addition, Plato identifies two further difficulties. First, a great number of people falsely

believe they possess sufficient political expertise, justifying their involvement. Citizens are44

untroubled with the thought that they deserve an equal political voice with one another on

account of their having political status (e.g., being a citizen). Their lack of knowledge of which

ends are best pursued by the state never enters their minds as a serious objection. Second, the

people are more keen to win arguments, rather than pursue truth, when engaged in a

philosophical investigation with one another. Thus, even if the citizens held sufficient political45

knowledge, it is thought they would be unable to manage it effectively.

Their solution to this problem is to constrain popular participation in politics, creating

room for those with some particular expertise in governance to guide political decision-making.

The thought is that those who know best how to govern are best able to detect the common good

of the community and enable its pursuit to the good of all. Thus, in Hegel’s words, the state can

‘be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph of reason which becomes manifest in

actuality’.46

It is worth pointing out that liberal democracy takes stock of Plato’s and Hegel’s worries

again here. As Joseph Schumpeter notes, democracy is not ‘rule of the people’; but, instead,

‘[d]emocracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men

who are to rule them ... this may be expressed by saying that democracy is the rule of the

politician’. The masses do not directly vote for anything nor anyone other than those who

47




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govern them, save in the occasional referenda. We limit access to participation in such a way that

all the vicariousness that exists in the greater society is put under some control. In addition, our

elected political leaders cannot work alone, but must often work amongst themselves and

compromise with one another. They cannot be moved solely by whatever whim takes their fancy

and they have the opportunity to rationally reflect upon potential policy options before deciding

on any course of action. This is not to say our politicians always make the best judgements or that

democracy today lacks a need for development. Instead, my point here is only that it can actually

accommodate this second worry of Plato’s and Hegel’s in a positive manner.

III. C. Larger democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens

Plato and Hegel each pose a third, more specific objection to democracy. This is that larger

democracies fail to permit sufficient voice for their citizens. The thought here is that in large

democracies, ‘democracy’, as such, is essentially meaningless. This is because the so-called48

‘voice’ each person has is particularly minute. That is, my vote is worth far more in decisions

involving three or maybe a dozen people, than in a polity of three hundred million people. My

share in decision-making, my ‘voice’, depreciates when the polity expands its number of citizens.

Political participation, thus, becomes relatively worthless, even if democracy could be justified

on a much smaller scale. Instead, we should opt for a form of political decision-making that takes

citizens more seriously, where the decisions of key stakeholders matter.

Hegel argues that monarchy is superior to democracy as only a hereditary monarchy is

capable of equally representing every citizen. Elections breed winners and losers on polling day.

Democratic officials come to power when sufficient numbers of citizens express a preference for



See Hegel, PR, §281.49

Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002),50

pp. 335-36.

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them. Elected leaders are therefore the products of articulated interests, where it may well be the

case that not all interests in the state will be represented equally. Only an hereditary monarchy

can respect this equality because only such a monarch can rise above factions. As a result,

monarchies help foster the unity of the state through the ‘majesty [ Majestät ]’ of their office.49

The monarch is majestic insofar as he is raised above the varied, divisive factions within his

state.

Of course, many commentators have criticized Hegel in particular for circumscribing the

public’s voice too narrowly. For example, Dudley Knowles says:

What is left of Hegel’s view that the organic constitution of the state precludes the

possibility of political liberalism? It amounts to this claim: that persons who are brought

up by their parents to respect the state, educated in civil society to bring skills to the

market place and apply those skills successfully to a trade, who join with colleagues in

corporate activities which elicit a common social purpose greater than the pursuit of

mutual advantage, cannot detach themselves in thought from these affiliations to ask

whether the state serves their several and joint purposes, so long as the state is organized

in such a way that it does in fact serve these ends.50

In his attempt to avoid the problem of large states and minuscule popular political voice, it could

be argued Hegel abandons opportunities for popular participation in politics. Besides, for

Knowles, whether or not the state can function in the way Hegel preposes is an empirical



Aristotle, Politics in his The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II, ed. Jonathan51

Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),1273b5-6 [Book II].

See Plato, Republic 558c.52

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question. If Hegel’s view is incorrect or, at least, there seems reasonable grounds to reject it, then

Hegel might be accused of throwing the baby out with the bath water.

The issue of the role of the public in Plato’s and Hegel’s mature visions will be

considered in part IV. Before we turn to this issue, we should consider the role of experts in these

visions so we can understand how the public can act as a restraint on their powers.

III. D. Democracies are essentially governments run by fools

Perhaps the primary and most often highlighted (and criticized) problem both Plato and Hegel

have with democracies is that democracies make decisions without any coherent notion of what

they are doing. Democracies are essentially governments run by fools. Instead of democracies,

it would be best to have those with expertise in statecraft take command, as the citizens are

unable to govern well because they simply do not know what they are doing. Thus, in Aristotle’s

words, we should endorse the view that ‘they should rule who are able to rule best’.51

As we have seen, the problem with democracies is that they allow all citizens to possess

an equal voice in political decision-making, without regard to the citizenry’s lack of knowledge

or ability. All members are treated equally despite the fact that some are more capable of good

governance than others. Therefore, the cobbler and the medical doctor each have an equal say52

regarding governance, both equal to the person with particular expertise in governance. One

result is that political judgements will be based by and large upon mere guesswork, as expert

legislators are not in full command. Democracies are generally poorly governed as a

consequence.





Plato says that justice is ‘doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t55

one’s own’ ( Republic 433a-b, 441e). On techn, see C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The

Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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Similarly, Hegel rejects the view that the people are correct to claim that they know best

their interests on account of these interests being their own. Instead, he claims that:

the reverse is in fact the case, for if the term ‘the people’ denotes a particular category of

members of the state, it refers to that category of citizens who do not know their own will .

To know what one wills, and even more, to know what the will which has being in and

for itself—i.e., reason—wills, is the fruit of profound cognition and insight, and this is

the very thing [Sache] which ‘the people’ lack..53

For Hegel, the term ‘the people’ identifies precisely those least capable of good governance.

Citizens are in error to think they have an equal claim with others on matters simply in virtue of

the fact they are interest holders. The view here seems to be that it would be a mistake to let the54

citizens have full responsibility for political decision-making because they lack sufficient

knowledge. Both Plato and Hegel offer alternatives to democracy they believe will overcome this

worry. I will discuss each alternative in turn.

Plato argues that judgements based upon true knowledge carry a certain epistemic

authority that judgements based upon right or wrong opinion lack. Every person possesses some

degree of true knowledge, or expertise, in one type of ‘craft [techn]’. The right to rule is not55



See Plato, Euthydemus 291c-92c; Plato, Republic 426d, 477d-e; and Plato,56

Statesman 292c.

Plato, Statesman 297b-c. See Plato, Republic 494a.57

Plato, Theaetetus 170a-b.58

See Plato, Statesman 266e.59

Page 20

conferred via majority approval nor material wealth, but expertise in statesmanship. Only a few56

or, perhaps, just one individual will possess this knowledge in any given state. Furthermore,57

Plato claims it is a common fact of life that people properly seek counsel solely from experts in

a particular field. For example, in the Theaetetus, Plato says:

In emergencies—if at no other time—you see this belief. When they are in distress, on

the battlefield, or in sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each

sphere as to God, and look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely

this one thing—knowledge. And wherever human life and work goes on, you find

everywhere men seeking teachers and masters, for themselves and for other living

creatures and for the direction of all human works. You find also men who believe that

they are able to teach and to take the lead. In all these cases, what else can we say but that

men do believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance among themselves?58

As a consequence, whenever we discern those who possess expert knowledge in governance, it

is right that they should rule as this is the craft they naturally pursue best—just as those with

expertise in trade skills ought to work as manual labourers. The expert statesman alone59

transforms the naturally bestowed authority from certitude all naturally have of their given craft



See Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, Political 60

Theory 11 (1983), p. 503 and Robin Wakefield, ‘Introduction’, in Plato, Republic, trans. R.

Wakefield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. xxv. This agrees with Reeve that, for Plato, ‘Proper political rule is proper psychic rule’. (Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, p. 262.)

Plato, Republic 347c-d, 412d-e.61

See my ‘Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought’.62

Plato, Republic 472e-473a.63

Plato, Republic 473c-d. See ibid., 499a-d.64

Plato, Republic 499d (emphasis given). See ibid., 502b-c, 540d.65

Page 21

to an authority that is political .60

Plato’s ideal monarchical city-state is to be ruled by philosopher-kings: men and women

who rule neither for the sake of honour nor wealth, seeking only the advantage of the citizens

they serve. Only they should rule the state as only they have the necessary expertise, given that61

ruling is their exclusive craft.

Plato’s political vision in the Republic is oft criticized, but I do not believe he was

unaware of difficulties with it and, in fact, he comes to reject parts of this vision in favour of his

more mature view in the Laws. The reasons for this change of heart are present already in the62

Republic. For example, after he suggests that much of the discussion of the Republic has been

a theoretical sketch, Plato tells us that ‘the nature of practice’ is to attain truth less well than in

theory. The way forward entails making the smallest possible change to bring this theory into63

being: philosophers must rule as kings or kings rule as philosophers.64

Indeed, Plato admits that ‘it is not impossible for this to happen’, but ‘it is difficult for it

to happen’. Furthermore, he says:65

Glaucon: You mean that [the philosopher-king] will be willing to take part in the politics




Plato, Phaedo 62b.67

Plato, Republic 500c-d.68

Plato, Republic 590c.69

Page 22

of the city we were founding and describing, the one that exists in theory, for I

don’t think it exists anywhere on earth.

Socrates: But perhaps, I said, there is a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look

at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no

difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the

practical affairs of that city and no other.66

Thus, the ideal state’s existence as an earthly, political practice may be compromised by its

heavenly and ideal nature. The philosopher-king will only come to rule the ideal model ‘in

heaven’ proposed and in ‘no other’. Plato offers some additional evidence in the Republic and

elsewhere to support the view that only a god or someone with a divine nature can actually serve

as the philosopher-king ideal type. As an example, he tells us that (a) the ‘gods are our

guardians’, (b) philosophers become ‘as divine and ordered as a human being can’, and the67 68

philosopher-king has ‘a divine ruler within himself’.69

There is, however, an additional reason to think Plato was aware of the impossibility of

implementing his Republic. For instance, we are unable to know the true nature of others with

absolute certainty. The implications then are that the Republic will fail, as we will be unable to

prevent the breeding of philosophically-natured persons with others, perhaps producing no




Plato, Republic 546a-e. See Rod Jenks, ‘The Machinery of the Collapse: On

71

Republic VIII’, History of Political Thought 23 (2002), pp. 21-29.

See Plato, Laws 693d-e.72

Plato, Laws 756e, 701e, 693d-e. Plato’s ‘moderate authoritarianism’ has much in73

common with the notion of ‘sceptical authoritarianism’ I have defended elsewhere. (See my

‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’, Politics 22 (2002), pp. 152-62.)

See Plato, Republic 462c.74

Plato, Republic 557e-558a, 560b.75

Page 23

offspring who might grow into philosopher-kings. This problem is compounded by the fact that70

Plato believes persons who are perfectly matched for breeding will naturally produce a given

number of children with a lesser nature anyway. As a result, centralized restriction of sexual71

relationships is doomed to fail from the very start, aspiring to little more than a staving off of the

inevitable.

Ultimately, Plato endorses some mixture of expert rule with popular consent. This form72

of government is a compromise ‘between a monarchical and a democratic constitution’ fusing

a ‘moderate authoritarianism’ with ‘moderate freedom’, enjoying both ‘freedom and friendship

applied with good judgement’. As we have seen, Plato believes democracies resemble73

anarchical societies. The main problem with democratic governance is that the citizenry are74

completely unscrupulous as to whom should make political judgements, allowing all citizens to

participate equally at a task where some people perform much better than others. If we are to75

incorporate popular participation into a just form of government, then it becomes necessary to

ensure we will be governed by responsible leadership. Plato says:

I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers



Plato, Republic 562c-d (emphasis added).76

Plato, Laws 693d-e.77

Page 24

for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed wine

of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom,

they are punished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs.76

Democracies pursue freedom for its own sake, without any regard for corresponding

responsibilities nor the common good. Keeping in mind the common ancient Greek practice of

always mixing wine with water prior to consumption, Plato opposes an ‘unmixed wine of

freedom’—a freedom to do whatever one pleases—perhaps for the reason that freedom is

intoxicating: the citizens are more liable to become drunk and irresponsible. Plato does not forbid

the consumption of wine—in this case synonymous with freedom—but he does forbid excessive

consumption of it. Freedom is a good to be cultivated within one’s own state, so long as it is

constrained by ‘good judgement’. With leaders capable of good judgement, a state is in77

possession of good cupbearers and will be ruled with principled moderation, but yet enjoy

widespread, popular freedoms.

Plato’s mature political vision is one where popular participation meets responsible

leadership. A lawgiver creates laws, makes them publicly known, and convinces the public they

are justified. He is educated for this task and knowledgeable about governance. The people elect

members to a representative body whose task is to enforce the community’s laws. In this way,

Plato believes he can account for democratic representation without falling prey to democracy’s

many pitfalls.

Hegel puts forward a vision fusing popular participation with expert rule as well. In this



See Hegel, LNR, §138 and Hegel, PR, §§275, 279-80, 283. ‘ Die fürstliche Gewalt ’78

may also be translated as ‘the princely power’.

See Hegel, LNR, §144R and Hegel, PR, §296.79


Hegel, LNR, §144R.

81

For example, see G. W. F. Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften82

Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817-1818) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818-1819), ed. K.-H. Ilting

(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1983), pp. 166-67 (reprinted in Wood’s editorial note to §283

in Hegel, PR, p. 466).

See Hegel, LNR, §140 and Hegel, PR, §283.83



Page 25

vision, a constitutional monarch arrives at political decisions with the aid of his cabinet

[ Ministerium]. Hegel refers to the monarch with his cabinet as ‘the power of the sovereign [die

fürstliche Gewalt ]’. Potential ministers are formally educated on state affairs, as well as ethics,78

and are rigorously tested. This education is thought to best allow for their ‘dispassionateness,79

integrity [ Rechtlichkeit ], and polite behaviour’. A pool of qualified candidates are drawn up80

based upon proof of their abilities. The monarch then selects appropriate ministers for cabinet81

positions from this pool. He may fire ministers at will. While the monarch’s decision to82 83

employ or discharge ministers is subjective, this is not seen as problematic as it is thought that

all potential cabinet ministers would offer the same general advice, at least in principle.84

The role of ministers is only to advise the monarch on matters of state, grant consent to

his decisions when appropriate, and debate proposals in the legislature. They cannot make any

executive decisions on their own, although they can make decisions on foreign affairs with the

monarch without the consent of the Estates, including decisions to go to war. Ministers play an85



Hegel, LNR, §140, R.86

Hegel, LNR, §140R. Elsewhere, Hegel adds that in addition to ‘the executive civil87

servants’ there are also ‘higher consultative bodies’ which ‘necessarily work together in

groups, and they converge in their supreme heads who are in touch with the monarch

himself’. (Hegel, PR, §289.) Hegel suggests that these ‘higher consultative bodies’ are

‘corporations’. (See Hegel, PR, §289R.)


See Hegel, PR, §§263A, 278R.89

Page 26

important role in best enabling the monarch to make proper decisions for the state. The86

monarch is advised on all political matters by his cabinet: Hegel believes this advice will help

prevent the monarch from making mistaken judgements based upon his own personal assessment

of what rationality demands.87

It is important to get this balance right for several reasons. As Hegel notes, when a civil

servant makes an error it can lead to more damaging consequences than if the person were only

a private citizen. A poor business decision may affect its employees, customers, and possibly88

even its local community. Poor decisions by those in and around government affect everyone in

the state. It is right that standards are higher for those who will have a greater disproportionate

share of political power than common citizens because the stakes are much higher.

Thus, both Plato and Hegel put forward four criticisms of democracy, as well as solutions to

these worries. Both Plato’s mixed government and Hegel’s constitutional monarchy are

governments where reason predominates and the arbitrariness of popular decision-making is

tempered, although I will discuss popular participation in the following section. Importantly,89

liberal democracy can accommodate these criticisms as well.

Before considering whether the arguments behind expert rule are defensible, it is first

necessary to consider an important feature of both Plato’s mixed government, as found in the



Page 27

Laws, and Hegel’s constitutional monarchy that is oft overlooked by commentators. That feature

is the fact that the public acts as the supreme restraint on the exercise of political power. I will

now move to a consideration of how this works for each before turning to a defence of their

general views and a consideration of two major objections before concluding.

IV. The public as the supreme restraint on political power

This is not the end of the story, for Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions. Neither Plato nor

Hegel were entirely antagonistic to the masses. Indeed, neither argues that experts can simply act

however they please. In fact, both Plato and Hegel assign to the masses two interesting

arguments. These are:

(1) Any just government must be responsive to the public.

(2) Experts should not have the final word on political decisions.

I will examine these two arguments in turn.

IV. A. Government should be responsive to the public

Both Plato and Hegel argue that any just government must be responsive to the public. This fact

is often overlooked. For example, Michael Hardimon says of Hegel:

What stands out about this account of the modern political state is precisely the restricted

character of the ordinary citizen’s participation. Unlike the citizen of ancient Athens or

republican Rome, the ordinary citizen in the modern social world does not participate






See Hegel, PR, §268A and T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 96

Obligation and Other Writings, eds. Paul Harris and John Morrow (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press,1986), pp. 89-106 [§§113-36].


Page 29

says:

It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is

certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and

if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself

stands on an insecure footing.95

For Hegel, we might say, to borrow a phrase from T. H. Green, that ‘will and not force is the

basis of the state’. That is, a secure state is one where the people are satisfied with their 96

government, their ways of life. The state must embody its citizens’ ‘feeling for its rights and

[present] condition’. A satisfied people are easier to govern because they accept their political97

system, unlike dissatisfied people where lawbreaking would become far more common.

Finally, Hegel believes monarchy is a system which has brought satisfaction to people

more often than not. He says:

Monarchs are not exactly distinguished by their physical powers or intellect [Geist ], yet

millions accept them as their rulers. But it is absurd to say that people allow themselves

to be ruled in defiance of their own interests, ends, and intentions, for they are not as

stupid as that; it is their need, the inner power of the Idea, which compels them to accept

such rule and keeps them in this situation, even if they appear to be consciously opposed




See Plato, Laws 823a.99

Plato, Alcibiades 114b.100

Plato, Gorgias 513e.101

Page 30

to it.98

This view, of course, seems somewhat at odds with Hegel’s earlier statements about citizens.

Earlier he claimed that the people were unfit to rule because they were unable to identify their

interests and the means of attaining them. Yet, in this example, Hegel claims that the common

citizenry are capable, albeit capable to recognize that a monarchy can achieve these ends better

than if left to themselves in a democracy.

Likewise, Plato argues that any just government must be responsive to its citizens. For

example, he argues that it is most sensible to advise citizens on the best course of political action,

rather than to decide such matters in secret or force their compliance. Government should be99

transparent, if still limiting the extent of popular electoral measures.

That said, it is unclear how much accountability Plato ultimately demands of rulers. In

the Alcibiades, Plato claims that the person with expertise in governance should persuade each

member of an assembly individually, one at a time, rather than force their acceptance. The100

reason for this may be because the governance of any city ought to work towards the good of the

citizens, not the interests of those in power. For example, Plato says: ‘Shouldn’t we then attempt

to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as

possible?’ Often he uses the analogies of the steersman, acting for the benefit of both his ship101



See Plato, Alcibiades 117c-e, 135a-b; Plato, Republic 341c, 488a-489b; Plato,102

Seventh Letter 351d; Plato, Statesman 296e-297b, e, 299a-e. See also Plato, Laws 639b;Plato, Phaedrus 246a-247c.

Plato, Republic 489a.103

For a different viewpoint, see Irwin on ‘Platonic Love and Platonic Justice’ in104

Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 311-13.

The ‘present situation’ is that Socrates has been condemned to die by the newly105

installed Athenian democracy. (See Plato, Apology 38c and Plato, Crito 43a-44d.)

Plato, Crito 44c-d.106

Page 31

and the sailors. In these analogies, the ‘ships resemble cities to their attitude to the true102

philosophers’. Throughout, he seems to take for granted that political leaders will steer their 103

cities to prosperity, although it is clear he demands these leaders make an effort to keep the

citizens on board and in support of them.

Plato’s chosen tool was persuasion to convince the people to accept some form of expert

rule, as he came to realize later in his life the importance of popular approval and participation

in governance. One of the earliest pieces of evidence for this is found in the Crito. Plato says:104

Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? ...

Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority.

Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but

pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered among them.105

Socrates: ... They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things

haphazardly.106



Plato, Second Letter 312. See Plato, Seventh Letter 325d-e.107

See Plato, Republic 498d-499a.108

Page 32

Whilst public opinion may be fickle, Plato would still weigh heavily the significance of paying

attention to the public mood along with Crito. In the Second Letter attributed to Plato and

addressed to Dionysius II, Plato tells us that he travelled to Syracuse in part so ‘philosophy might

gain favour with the multitude’. This view is not confined only to the various letters attributed107

to him, but also in the Republic: part of the necessity of making the transition to philosopher rule

in any state is to convince the majority of the people elsewhere that this project is a practical

possibility.108

For these reasons, both Plato and Hegel held that any just government must be responsive

to the public. However, we may well feel that the degree of responsiveness they make room for

is still insufficient. In the following section, we will see a second way in which the public matters

for Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions.

IV. B. Experts should not have the final say on political decision-making

Both Plato and Hegel have been accused of giving insufficient popular representation in their

political visions. The worry is that in both cases experts rule without any satisfactory check on

their powers. For example, Hardimon says:

if one’s concern is with the distribution of power in Hegel’s political state, as well it

might be, the proper source of worry is not the monarchy, whose powers are rather

restricted, but rather the bureaucracy, the real seat of power in the modern political state



Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, p. 215 (emphasis added). Whilst Hegel is109

quite clear that the monarch is meant to act as a clear restraint on the powers of the

bureaucracy, it is unclear how effective the monarch can be (see Hegel, PR, §§295A, 297).

After all, the bureaucrats seem to have sole control over the education of future members,

who form the pool of potential ministers. There is no check on their education nor suitability

for office beyond the monarch’s decision to appoint or remove members of this pool of

potential ministers.

Allen W. Wood, ‘Introduction’, in Hegel, PR, p. xxiv.110

See Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford111

University Press, 1996), pp. 75, 77.

Page 33

as Hegel represents it.109

Hardimon does not share his worry alone. Allen Wood says: ‘Hegel plainly intends real political

power to be in the hands neither of the prince nor of the people, but of an educated class of

professional civil servants’.110

Similarly, Plato’s political vision is supposed to succumb to what Robert Dahl calls the

Guardianship argument. This argument says that experts make the final decision in all political111

matters. Dahl argues this view is unacceptable and we should reject Plato’s political vision as a

result. Dahl says:

almost all of us do rely on experts to make crucial decisions that bear strongly and

directly on our well-being, happiness, health, future, even our survival, not just

physicians, surgeons, and pilots but in our increasingly complex society a myriad of

others. So if we let experts make decisions on important matters like these, why shouldn’t

we turn government over to experts?

Attractive as it may seem at times, the argument for Guardianship rather than

democracy fails to take sufficient account of some crucial defects ... To delegate certain



Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 70-112

71 (emphasis given).

See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p?????????113

On jury nullification, see my ‘A Defence of Jury Nullification’, Res Publica 10114

(2004), pp. 401-23; my ‘On Jury Nullification’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 97

(2005), pp. 169-75; and, more generally, my ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’, Journal of Applied

Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 197-212 and my ‘The Future of the Right to Trial by Jury’,

Page 34

subordinate decisions to experts is not equivalent to ceding final control over major

decisions ... The fundamental issue ... is not whether as individuals we must sometimes

put our trust in experts. The issue is who or what group should have the final say in

decisions made by the government of a state.112

Dahl concedes that we regularly and quite rightly place our trust in experts of all kinds everyday.

He does not deny that experts can be useful in our lives. What Dahl disputes is that experts

should have final control. For one thing, experts often disagree amongst themselves. Does this113

objection lead us to reject Plato’s and Hegel’s mature political visions?

I do not believe this objection succeeds. It is true in Plato’s Republic that the philosopher-

kings do have this final control, but it is not the case in his Laws written toward the end of his

life. Here Plato argues that laws are created and disseminated by an expert in governance he calls

the lawgiver. However, the lawgiver does not enforce the laws. Whether or not these laws are

enforced is a challenge taken up by a popularly elected body. It is true that a highly capable

lawgiver creates new laws and that these laws should be enforced. Indeed, a great many of these

laws demand that anyone transgressing them be executed. Furthermore, perhaps as with jury

nullification, if the elected body chose not to enforce a certain law in a particular instance, this

would never mean that the law, as such, does not exist, but, only that the full weight of the law

does not come to bear in that one specific instance. Plato is able to overcome the Guardianship

114



Philosophy Today 17 (2003), pp. 2-4.

See Hegel, LNR, §140 and Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, p. 317.115

See Hegel, LNR, §149R: ‘Legislative proposals must therefore emanate from the116

sovereign ... the initiative for laws rests essentially with the power of the sovereign’.

See Hegel, LNR, §140.117

See Hegel, PR, §284. It is important to note that this does not suggest that the118

relevant minister is responsible for getting the monarch to agree with him on what should

become law, as this passage is equally suggestive that ministers may be held accountable if

they fail to convince the monarch to avoid moving forward with a bill proposal.


Page 35

argument.

So too can Hegel. In his constitutional monarchy, members of his cabinet must be

responsive to both the monarch and the elected Estates assembly. The monarch is able to sack 115

ministers at will. The monarch with his ministers propose all pieces of legislation to be approved

or disapproved by the Estates. The Estates do not propose legislative bills themselves. It is116

important to note that neither the monarch nor any member of his cabinet can propose legislation

on their own either. Instead, whatever legislation the monarch chooses to endorse can only be

brought to the legislature for consideration if, and only if, ‘the competent minister’ in the cabinet

consents to his doing so. Laws can only be created and take effect if ministers can convince117

the elected body they should approve of these laws.

In addition, it is thought that cabinet ministers can be best held accountable for the advice

they offer to the monarch if they openly debate proposals approved by the monarch with

themselves in the estates. Hegel believes that debating proposals in the estates will guarantee118

the competency of ministers, as ministers will have to spend much of their time preparing

arguments that might convince them.119

This public grilling prevents the worry that ministers might come to use their ‘knowledge



Hegel, PR, §§297, R, 315A. See Hegel, LNR, §154R.120


Page 36

of the legal process hid behind complicated formalities’ as ‘an instrument of profit and

domination’, providing the public with ‘a great spectacle of outstanding educational value’ in

state matters. Ministers are forced to make a case for political decisions that non-experts can120

understand and comprehend. For example, Hegel says:

The educated middle class constitutes the people’s consciousness of freedom and right;

the developed consciousness of right is to be found in the middle class. But if this class

does not have the interests of the citizens at heart, it is like a net thrown over the citizens

in order to oppress them ... Officials must therefore accustom themselves to a popular

approach, to popular language, and seek to overcome the difficulties this occasions

them.121

If ministers cannot win the favour of the people for their proposals, government will come to a

halt and the state will fail. Thus, Hegel can overcome the Guardianship objection as well as Plato.

Thus, popular sentiment matters to both Plato and Hegel. Not only do their views of just

government endorse public responsiveness, but the mature political visions of neither has experts

exerting any kind of stranglehold on power. Whilst experts have a distinct and powerful presence

in political decision-making, they may not always get what they want. The people must always

be in agreement with experts in a free and fair manner without compulsion nor duress.

To be clear, I am not arguing that each and every consideration Plato and Hegel claimed



Although many Hegel scholars believe Hegel was mistaken on this point, such as122

Andrew Chitty in a personal correspondence. I disagree with this view. (See my Hegel’s

Page 37

was central for conceiving a just state are useful for thinking about how their political philosophy

can engage and develop democratic theory. Instead, I am only claiming that several factors of

their political philosophies are worth highlighting, factors that I believe are most defensible

today: the state should exist as a unity, popular desires must be held under some constraint to

prevent abuses, the need for expertise in government, respect for popular opinion, and that in all

matters the public has the final word on policies.

V. Is this political vision defensible?

I will now briefly provide some argument in favour of the criticisms that Plato and Hegel direct

to democratic theory, as well as the general principles behind their alternative visions. I will then

consider two possible objections.

V. A. In favour of ‘moderate democracy’

Throughout this article, I have avoided any attempt at defining ‘democracy’, apart from the fact

that—whatever it is—it is a form of government that Plato and Hegel each attribute a number of

deficiencies to, each giving us reason to reject democracy in favour of a different form of

government. For one thing, it is quite obvious that the form of so-called democratic government

each attacks bears little resemblance to modern democratic governments. This fact, which I take

to be obvious, cannot be highlighted enough.

Yet, it would remain far from obvious that even if all of this were the case, that we then

should take Plato and Hegel to be democrats. One reason why we should not take them to be

democrats might be the simple fact that neither ultimately justifies a democratic government.122



Political Philosophy.)

See Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996)123

and Thomas Christiano, ‘An Argument for Egalitarian Justice and Against the Levelling

Down Objection’, in Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry Silverstein, eds., Social

Justice and the Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 41-65.

Page 38

Nevertheless, when we look below the surface, I think we find something rather

illuminating. With Plato, knowledge of good governance is key. The fact that philosopher-kings

have it is reason enough for all political power to be divested into their hands. Even in the Laws,

knowledge continues to play an important role. The legislator is not a monarch who makes laws

based on whatever takes his fancy. Instead, he is properly educated for that role. He may well

make the law, but whether or not the laws take effect and are properly enforced is something

beyond his control. This task is reserved for the Guardians of the Laws, an elected body

representing the common citizens.

Similarly, Hegel’s monarch and cabinet may well propose laws and policies, but they

alone do not determine whether or not these laws and policies are actually implemented . This task

is reserved for the Estates, an elected body representing the common citizens.

At least in their mature thought, both Plato and Hegel fuse together expertise with popular

institutions where two things occur. First, unelected experts have a legitimate role to play in

government and hold real influence. Second, unelected experts do not have a final say in what

the political community does—the final say rests with elected institutions.

The relevance of Plato’s and Hegel’s views here for contemporary democratic theory is

perhaps surprisingly significant. Most democratic theorists today become exercised about access

to voting and political equality amongst citizens. For example, Thomas Christiano’s work centres

on equality and democratic participation. David Estlund’s work looks into the ways in which

123



See David Estlund, ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension124

of Democratic Authority’, in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative

Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For an opposing view, see Henry S. Richardson,

Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002).

I owe this choice phrase to Fabian Freyenhagen.125

See Hegel, PR, §272A.126

I readily grant that the justifications offered for this position differ between Hegel127

and Schumpeter and thank Andrew Chitty for this point.

Page 39

elections yield good results. Against these views, perhaps we might think of the position of 124

Plato and Hegel as endorsing a kind of ‘moderate democracy’. We would not want to call it125

‘limited government’ because that phrase refers to the separation of powers, where government

is thought to be divided between executive, legislative, and judicial branches and each is more

or less equally powerful as each other. (And, of course, neither Plato nor Hegel endorse this

traditional division of power between three branches. In addition, a non-democracy may well126

enjoy a separation of powers.)

A moderate democracy is a government where popular political participation is limited

in order to make some room for unelected experts into the political decision-making process.

These experts assist elected representatives with the task of governing across all three branches

of government. Whilst they have influence proportionally greater than common citizens, these

experts do not have final say in what the political decisions will be. This task is reserved for

elected representatives.

No one, as I can see since Joseph Schumpeter and perhaps Max Weber, argues that

democracy is more than representative government and elections, entailing a widespread reliance

on unelected experts, experts who make the task of governing possible for elected politicians.127

Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a well organized government today without them. These



See my ‘A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism’.128

See Stacy B. Gordon, ‘All Votes Are Not Created Equal: Campaign Contributions129

and Critical Votes’, Journal of Politics 63 (2001), pp. 249-69.

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experts are the bureaucrats, the law clerks, the civil servants. Through their help, ministers gain

valuable advice on which policies are best to implement, which reforms are most necessary, and

the knowledge to help bring this about. Moderate democracy, thus, helps transform the theory

of democracy from government by ignorance to government with moderation. Furthermore, the

main arguments behind Plato’s and Hegel’s criticisms of democracy seem satisfied by just this

kind of a democratic theory. If this theory has something to be gained from it, then Plato and

Hegel offer something positive to democratic theorists and should not longer be viewed as in

perpetual conflict with them.

V. B. Possible objections to ‘moderate democracy’

Someone might object to this political vision on the grounds that the people’s autonomy is not

properly respected. We might think about this worry in at least two ways.

First, we might think that people should ultimately share in equality when political

decisions must be made. Plato’s and Hegel’s arguments seem to run counter to this view, as

neither suggests that you and I must share an equal political voice. For this reason, we might

think that their views should be jettisoned.

A first reply to this objection might run something like this. Do we each really have equal

voice? I doubt it. For one thing, all votes are not equal under current campaign contribution128

laws: studies show that contributors have a stronger effect on votes in close elections.

129

Furthermore, even if we do each have an equal say when we vote for representatives, each

individual person does not have the same political voice. Obviously, those who are entrusted as



Cite Christiano’s AJP paper.130

See my ‘Can We Justify Political Inequality?’ Archiv für Rechts- und 131

Sozialphilosophie 89 (2003), pp. 426-38.

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our elected representatives exert more political influence than normal citizens by quite a margin.

In addition, there is Schumpeter’s simple point that the people do not in general share in any

decisions beyond choosing politicians to make political choices on their behalf.

A second reply might be this: do we really assign people an equal voice? We don’t.

Children and madmen are excluded from full political participation. So too are often felons and

non-citizens. Why is this? Well, perhaps the least controversial case is children: every society

excludes them from full democratic participation. Yet, it is unclear why they are excluded as of

right in all instances other than simple ageism. Christiano employs what he calls ‘minimal

standards of competence’ which citizens must satisfy to enjoy full political rights. In his view,130

only the insane and children will fail this condition. If our argument was that on average children

were less politically competent than adults, we may think about possibly extending this standard

to exclude adults who likewise fail to satisfy this standard. The difference seems to consist in the

fact that we just assume some groups pass the test (e.g., normal adults) and some groups always

fail, although this is surely empirically untrue: it is not unreasonable to suppose there is a 17 year

old more political astute than someone 18 or indeed 81 years of age. This first objection to

limited democracy then fails.131

A second objection to limited democracy might well be that deliberative democracy

seems incompatible with it. If those with some expertise deserve a special place in our collective

political life, then that is a space that deliberative democrats cannot claim for the citizenry.

Limited democracy should be rejected.

However, there are two replies to this objection as well. First, deliberative democrats



On Cass Sunstein’s law of group polarity. See also Bob Talisse’s paper in The132

Legacy of John Rawls.

John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’ 133

Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2002)), p. 227.

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assume deliberation yields positive effects, that it works. Yet, some work has put this article of

faith into doubt, namely, experiments by Cass Sunstein that demonstrate that in many instances

people’s views actually become more polarized through deliberation than less so.132

A second reply might look something like this. Deliberative democrats assume that

people would welcome greater opportunity for deliberative politics, if only those opportunities

could get off the ground. However, there has been a mountain of evidence to the contrary. For

example, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse claim:

The people do not care at all about most public policies and do not want to be more

involved in the political process ... The people prefer a process that allows them to keep

politics at arm’s length. People seek this kind of system; they have not been forced into

it by others ... their ideal system is one in which they themselves are not involved, but

where they can be confident that decision makers will be motivated by a desire to serve

the people.133

If their empirical research is correct, the deliberative democracy challenge fails because it

assumes that people want greater involvement in politics. Instead, people prefer to keep politics

at a manageable distance. Far enough away that they can get on with their particular ways of life,

but close enough that irresponsible persons in government (whether elected or unelected) can be

held to account. Limited democracy, in fact, is congruent with just such an account.



By looking at their criticisms of democracy, we can bracket more controversial134

issues pertaining to the many nuances of their full, considered alternatives and, thus, avoid

getting bogged down in questions over the usefulness or applicability of Hegel’s conception

of the will or worries pertaining to the metaphysics of Plato and Hegel.

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Conclusion

Thus, Plato and Hegel present us with both criticisms of democracy and positive proposals for

alternatives to democracy. We need not accept their alternatives in order to admire their

criticisms and positive proposals. These are not only defensible, but they provide new routes134

for the continued development of democratic theory. In particular, they help us focus greater

attention to the significant and necessary role played by properly trained and uncorrupt civil

servants in any modern government. Without them, modern government seems impossible. Yet,

these experts are not placed in a privileged position entirely beyond public scrutiny. It is right that

government not only lead, but lead through persuasion, bringing the public onboard with its

proposals. Furthermore, it is right that these experts who help elected officials wade through

proposed legislation, executive documents, and even potential judicial decisions of the highest

order have the vitally important space to help the legislative, executive, and judicial branches,

while at the same time these experts, these unelected government officials, do not have in any

way a final say on what the political outcomes will be while enjoying their privileged place. It

is true that ‘the people’, if we can call them that, do not simply get whatever they want either.

Their choices for elected officials, proposed legislation, etc. are determinate choices: they are

neither infinite in number nor in reality. The people choose amongst choices offered to them, not

amongst all potential theoretical possibilities. But, yet, the people rule. Experts do not have the

final say. They must always be responsive to public opinion no matter how misguided or ill-

informed that opinion may be. The citizenry will get the government it deserves at the end of the

day. Both Plato’s and Hegel’s political visions are helpful in understanding what a justification



This article was presented at annual meetings of the Hegel Society of Great Britain135

in Oxford, the Global Studies Association in Newcastle, and of the Classical Association in

Newcastle, as well as the Department of Politics at the University of Newcastle. The article

has benefited significantly by these audiences, including most especially Karin de Boer, Sarah

Francis, Tim Kelsall, Graham Long, Ali Mandipour, David Merrill, Vicky Roupa, Heather

Widdows, Kathryn Wilkinson, and not least extensive comments by Andrew Chitty, Fabian

of this system, the system we have in place today, looks like. And, for this reason, both have

something to offer the democratic theorist on positive, not negative, grounds. We should neglect

them no longer.135

Plato Hegel Democracy

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