Labor Market Institutions and Wage and Inflation Dynamics
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Economic AnAlysis & Policy, Vol. 40 no. 3, DEcEmBER 2010
Labor Market Institutions and Wage and Inflation Dynamics
Fatih Macit*
Department of Economics Beykent University
Istanbul, Turkey 34396 (Email: fatihmacit@beykent.edu.tr)
Abstract: ThispaperdevelopsaNewKeynesian(NK)modelthatincorporatesstandardsearchandmatchingstructurewithfiringcosts.Ianalyzehowlabormarketinstitutionsaffectthemacroeconomicdynamics,inparticular,wageandinflationdynamics.Iparticularlylookattwoimportantlabormarketinstitutionsnamelyunemploymentbenefitsandfiringcosts.Ifindthatincountrieswhereunemploymentbenefitsarehigherandtherearemorestrictemploymentprotectionlegislations,inflationandwagesbecomelessvolatileandmorepersistent.Ialsofindthattheleveloftheselabormarketinstitutionsaffecthowwagesandinflationrespondtoexogenousshocks, inparticular, toproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks.Ifirstpresentsomeempiricalevidencethatshowsacross-countrylinkbetweenlabormarketinstitutionsandwagesandinflation.ThenIbuildadynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelwhichprovidestheoreticalsupportforthisempiricalevidence.
I.INTroducTIoN
TherecentdevelopmentofmodelsthatcombinethetraditionalNewKeynesianmodelsandstandardsearchandmatchingmodelshavebeenquitesuccessfulinreplicatingthemainbusinesscycledynamicsthatstandardmodelsfailtoachieve.Forinstance,thesemodelsareabletoobtainlargeandpersistentresponsesofoutputtoexogenousshocksandrelativelysmoothbehaviorofwagesoverthecycle.Gertler,Sala,andTrigari(2008)findthatthesemodelsaccompaniedbystaggeredwagecontractingfitthedataroughlywell.InarelatedpaperMacit(2010)showsthatincorporatingon-the-jobsearchdoesthejobofstaggeredwagecontractingandachievesthesameresultswithfullyflexiblewages.Trigari(2006),KrauseandLubik(2006),andchristoffel,Kuester,andLinzert(2006)aresomerecentexamplesofthismodellingliteratureandtheyhavebeenquitesuccessfulinmatchingimportantbusinesscyclefacts.Besidesmatchingthebusinesscycledynamicstherehavealsobeenpapersthatattempttolookatoptimalmonetarypolicyinthesemodels.Faia(2006),Thomas(2008),andArseneauandchugh(2007)aresome
1 IwouldliketothankmyadvisorProfessorBehzaddibaforhisguidanceandsupportinthepreparationofthispaper.IwouldalsoliketothankProfessorJamesAlbrechtandProfessorSusanVromanfortheirveryvaluablesuggestionsandcomments.Allerrorsaremyown.
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recentexamplesthatlookatoptimalmonetarypolicywithsearchandmatchingfrictionsinthelabormarketinanotherwisestandardNKmodel.
Theaimofthispaperisdifferentfromtheoneslistedaboveasitdoesnotaimtomatchbusiness cycle dynamics or look at optimalmonetary policy. I investigatewhether labormarketinstitutionsaffectbusinesscycledynamics,inparticular,wageandinflationdynamics.Iparticularlyfocusontwoimportantlabormarketinstitutionsnamely,thebenefitreplacementrateandfiringcosts.Ichoosethesetwoinstitutionsastheysubstantiallyinfluencetheworker’sincentivetokeepajobandthefirm’sincentivetopreserveanexistingmatchwithaworker,respectively.Figure 1showstherelationshipbetweenthevolatilityofinflationandemploymentprotectionlegislationindexfortheoEcdeconomies.Figure 2showsthesamerelationshipforthevolatilityofrealwagesandFigure 3forthevolatilityofmarginalcost.1Thevolatilitiesofinflation,realwages,andmarginalcostarecalculatedfortheHPfiltereddata.ThedataforemploymentprotectionlegislationindexistakenfromNickell(2006)andthedataforinflation,realwages,andmarginalcostisobtainedfromoEcddatabase.Themarginalcostismeasuredastheunitlaborcost.Asonecanconsidertheemploymentprotectionlegislationasaproxyforthefiringcoststhegraphsshowthatthereisanegativerelationshipbetweenvolatilitiesofthesevariablesandtheleveloffiringcosts.TheseresultsareonlysuggestiveandinordertobeabletounderstandtheeffectoffiringcostsoninflationandwagedynamicsIbuildatheoreticalmodeltoisolatetheeffectoffiringcosts.ForthispurposeIdevelopadynamicstochastocgeneralequilibriummodelinwhichthefirmpaysafixedfiringcostwhenanexistingemploymentrelationshipbreaksup.Ifindthathigherlevelsoffiringcostsgeneratelessvolatileandmorepersistentmovementsininflationandwagesinresponsetomonetarypolicyandproductivityshocks.Theresultsalsoshowthatwhenfiringcostsarelowerinflationandwagesshowalargerresponseonimpactbuttheyadjustmorequickly.
Firingcostshaveespeciallybeenanimportantareaofstudyforthestandardsearchandmatchingmodels.Themain focus of these studies has been to explain thedifferences inunemploymentratesbetweenEuropeanunioncountriesandtheu.S.Therehavealsobeenpapersthattrytoestablishalinkbetweentheleveloffiringcostsandbusinesscycledynamics.Veraciarto(2004)buildsarealbusinesscyclemodelwithestablishmentleveldynamicsandfindsthatwhenfiringcostsarehigheremploymentbecomeslessvariableandmorepersistent.Thomas(2006)findsthatfiringcostsreducethevolatilityofbusinesscyclefluctuations.Healsoshowsthatintroducingfiringcostsintothestandardsearchandmatchingmodelscanbearemedyforthefailureofthestandardmodelingeneratinganegativecorrelationbetweenthecyclicalcomponentsofunemploymentandvacancies.Thispaperdiffersfromthesepapersinthatitincorporatesfiringcostsintoastickypricedynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelandtothebestofmyknowledgeitisthefirstpaperthatinvestigateshowfiringcostsaffectinflationdynamics.Asfiringcostsaffectthesurplusforanemploymentrelationshiponemayexpecttheleveloffiringcosttoinfluencewagedynamics.TheinterestforinflationcomesfromthefactthatwagesaffectthelevelofrealmarginalcostandthedeviationofrealmarginalcostsfromtheirnaturallevelsentersintoaNKPhillipscurve.Sotheeffectoffiringcostson inflation isexpected tooccur through its influenceonmarginalcosts. I find that
1 IpresenttheresultsforthemarginalcostasthelevelofmarginalcostisanimportantdeterminantofinflationinNewKeynesianPhillipscurve.
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higherfiringcostsmakeinflationlessvolatileandmorepersistent.Theleveloffiringcostalsoaffectsthepatternthatinflationshowsinresponsetoexogenousshocks,inparticular,toproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks.
BesidestheeffectoffiringcostsonwagesandinflationdynamicsIalsoinvestigatehowthesevariablesareaffectedbythelevelofunemploymentbenefits.InthisregardanimportantpreviousstudyhasbeendonebycampolmiandFaia(2010).Theybuildadynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriumopeneconomymodelforamonetaryunion.TheythenaskthequestionwhethertheinflationdifferentialsbetweenEuropeanunioncountriescanbeexplainedbythedifferencesinlabormarketinstitutions.Theyparticularlylookatthelevelofunemploymentbenefits inEuropeanunioncountriesmeasuredbybenefit replacement rateand find thathigherlevelsofunemploymentbenefitsareassociatedwithlowervolatiliesofinflation,wages,andrealmarginalcost.InthecurrentmodelIlookattheeffectofunemploymentbenefitsonwagesandinflationfromtheperspectiveofaclosedeconomyasopposedtotheopeneconomymodelofcampolmiandFaia(2007)andIalsoinvestigatehowthesevariablesrespondtoproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Inthenextsection,Ibuildacloseddynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelinordertobeabletoisolatetheeffectoffiringcostoninflationandwagedynamics.SectionIIIdealswiththecalibrationofthemodelandSectionIVpresentstheresults.SectionVconcludes.
II.ModEL
ThemodelthatIadoptisveryclosetothatdevelopedbyTrigari(2006).ThedifferencebetweenthismodelandtheoneproposedbyTrigari(2006)isthatfirmsincurfiringcostswhenanexistingemploymentrelationshipbreaksup.Therearefouragentsintheeconomy:workers,intermediategoodfirms,retailfirms,andamonetaryauthority.Ifirstcharacterizetheproblemoftherepresentativehouseholdandthenthelaborandproductmarkets.
2.1 Households
Eachhouseholdconsistsofacontinuumofmemberswithnamesontheunitinterval.Eachmemberhasthefollowingutilityfunction:
€
u(ct ,ct−1) − g(ht ) = log(ct −ξct−1) −Ψh
ht1+φ
1+φ (1)
wherectistheconsumptionofthefinalgood,htisthehoursworkedandIallowforhabitpersistence.2Therepresentativehouseholdmaximizeslifetimeutilitybychoosingconsumption,ct,andbondholdings,Bt,subjecttothebudgetconstraint.Thelifetimeutilityofthehouseholdisgivenby:
€
Et
s=0
∞
∑β s[u(c
t+s,ct+s−1) −Gt+s] (2)
whereβε(0,1)istheintertemporaldiscountfactorandthevariableGt isthefamily’sdisutility
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fromsupplyinghoursofwork.3Idonotwritethisfunctionexplicitlyashoursworkedisnotachoicevariableforthehousehold.Ineachperiodhouseholdsaresubjecttothefollowingbudgetconstraint:
€
ct +Bt
ptrt= dt +
Bt−1
pt (3)
wherept is theaggregatepricelevelandrt is thegrossnominal interestrateonthebond.FollowingMerz(1995)andAndolfatto(1996),Iassumethatthereisperfectconsumptionrisksharingbetweenemployedandunemployedfamilymembers.Thevariabledtincludeswageincomeearnedbyemployedmembers,unemploymentbenefitsearnedbyunemployedmembers,theshareofprofitsfromretailers,netofagovernmentlump-sumtaxusedtofinanceunemploymentbenefits.
Therepresentativehouseholdmaximizes(2)subjecttotheperiodbudgetconstraintbychoosingconsumptionandbondholdings.Thefirstorderconditionsforaninteriorsolutionareasfollows:
€
λt=
1
ct−ξc
t−1
−Etβξ
1
ct+1 −ξct
(4)
€
λt= E
t[βr
t
λt+1
πt+1
] (5)
whereλtistheLagrangemultiplierassociatedwiththebudgetconstraintandπt+1isthegrossinflationrate.
2.2 Firms and the Labor Market
Therearetwotypesoffirmsinthemodel:intermediategoodsfirmsandretailfirms.Intermediategoodsfirmscarryouttheactualproductionusinglaborastheonlyfactorofproduction.Thesefirmsaresubjecttosearchandmatchingfrictionsinthelabormarketandselltheiroutputinaperfectlycompetitivemarket.retailfirmsfacemonopolisticcompetitionandaresubjecttonominalrigiditiesinthepricesettingdecision.
2.2.1TheLaborMarket
Thematchingprocessbetweentheworkersandthefirmsischaracterizedbyamatchingfunctionwhichgivesthenumberofmatchesinagivenperiodbetweenjobseekersandvacancies.Thetotalnumberofperperiodnewmatchesisgivenbythefollowingfunction:
€
mt=Mu
t
µvt
1−µ (6)
wherevtisthemeasureofvacanciespostedbyfirmsandutisthemeasureofunemployedworkerssearchingforajob.Iassumeaconstantreturntoscalematchingfunctionwhichischaracterizedby
€
mt = Mutµvt
1−µ .TheconstantMreflectstheefficiencyofthematchingprocess.
3 Assumingthatthereisperfectconsumptionrisksharingbetweenemployedandunemployedfamilymembersallowsonetoaggregatetheutilityfunctionforthefamily.
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Icanderivetheprobabilitiesofmakingamatchforfirmsandsearchingworkersusingthematchingfunction.Idefine
€
θt = vt /ut asthemeasureoflabormarkettightnessinthematchingmarket.Afirmfillsavacancywithprobabilityqt ≡ mt /vt andaworkersearchingforajobmakesamatchwithprobabilityst ≡ mt/ut.Theseprobabilitiesaregivenby:
€
qt =Mθt−µ (7)
€
st=Mθ
t
1−µ (8)
Iassumethatmatchesbreakupexogenouslywithprobabilityρ.Giventhistheevolutionofemploymentisasfollows:
€
nt+1 = (1− ρ)(nt +m
t) (9)
wherent isthenumberofpeopleemployedinperiodt.Thisequationimpliesthatnewmatchedcannotenter into theproductionfunctionif therelationshipisbrokenuprightafterbeingnegotiated.Asthemeasureoflaborisequaltoone,thenumberofunemployedpeople,ut,isgivenby:
ut =1– nt (10)
2.2.2ValueFunctions
TheproblemoftheworkersandthefirmsischaracterizedbyBellmanequations.Ifirststartwiththevaluefunctionsforthefirms.ThevalueofacontinuingemploymentrelationshipforafirmisdenotedasJt andthethevalueofanewemplomentrelationshipdenotedas
€
Jtn
andaregivenby:
€
Jt = xtat f (ht ) −wtht +Etβt,t+1[(1− ρ)Jt+1 + ρ(Vt −F)] (11)
€
Jtn = xtat f (ht ) − wt
nht + Etβt,t +1[(1− ρ)Jt +1 + ρ(Vt − F)] (12)
wherewt isthewagepaidforanexistingemploymentrelationshipand
€
wtn istheonefora
newemploymentrelationship,xt isthepriceoftheintermediategoodandatistheproductivityshock.Thevalueof a continuingmatch is equal to the current profitswhich is givenby
€
xtat f (ht ) − wtht plusthecontinuationvalue.4Withprobabilityl–ρthematchcontinuesandthefirmenjoystheexpectedvalueofthejob.Withprobabilityρ thematchbreaksupnextperiod.InthiscasethefirmenjoysthevalueofavacancybutatthesametimeincursthefixedfiringcostgivenbyF.5Thefuturevalueofthejobisdiscountedbythediscountfactorβt+1whichisgivenbyβλt + 1 / λt.
Thevalueofavacancy,Vt,isasfollows:
€
Vt =−κ +Etβt,t+1[qt (1− ρ)Jt+1 + (1− qt )Vt+1] (13)
4 Theproductionfunctionf(h)isassumedtobeadecreasingreturnstoscaleproductionfunction.5 Firingcostsarenotmodelledintheformofseverancepayment.
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whereκistheflowcostofpostingavacancy.Withprobability
€
qt (1− ρ) avacancywillbefillednextperiodandwillactuallybeproducing.Assumingfreeentryofvacancieswilldrivethevalueofavacancytozeroinordertoeliminateanyarbitrageopportunity.Thiswillgivethefollowingequilibriumcondition:
€
κ
qt= Etβt,t+1[(1− ρ)Jt+1]
(14)
Themeaningofthisequilibriumconditionisthattheexpectedcostofavacancyisequaltotheexpectedbenefitreceivedfromfillingthatvacancy.
NowletWt andUt bethevalueofemploymentandunemploymentrespectivelyfromtheperspectiveofaworker.Valueofemploymentforaworkerisgivenby:
€
Wt = wtht −g(ht )
λt+Etβt,t+1[(1− ρ)Wt+1 + ρUt+1]
(15)
Theterm
€
g(ht )λt
isthedisutilityfromsupplyinghoursofworkanditisexpressedintermsof current consumption inorder topreserveconsistencybetween the terms.Thevalueofunemploymentisgivenbythefollowingvaluefunction:
€
Ut= b+E
tβt,t+1[st (1− ρ)Wt+1 + (1− s
t(1− ρ))U
t+1] (16)
whereb isthevalueofunemploymentbenefitsreceivedbytheworkerwhichisfinancedbyalump-sumgovernmenttax.
2.2.3WageBargaining
Iassumethatwagesaredeterminedbysurplussplittingassumption.However,thepresenceoffiringcostscreatesdifferencebetweenthesurplusforanewemploymentrelationshipandthesurplusforanexistingemploymentrelationshipfromtheperspectiveofafirm.Whenaworkerandafirmmeetforthefirsttimeforawagebargainthefirmdoesnotneedtopayafiringcostifthematchisnotsuccessful.ontheotherhand,foranexistingemploymentrelationshipifthematchbreaksupthefirmincursafixedfiringcost.Sowhencalculatingthesurplusforafirmthathasanexistingmatchoneneedstotakeintoaccountthefiringcoststhatareavoidedifthematchcontinues.Foranewmatchtheoutcomeofthesurplussplittingassumptionmaximizestheproduct:
€
(Wt−U
t)η(J
t
n −Vt)1−η (17)
wherethefirsttermisthesurplusfortheworkerandthesecondtermisthesurplusforthefirm.Theparameterη reflectsthebargainingpoweroftheworker.Firmsandworkersmaximizethejointsurplusofthematch.Thewagethatmaximizesthejointsurplusgivesthefollowingfirstordercondition:
€
ηJt
n= (1−η)(W
t−U
t) (18)
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AsImentionedabovethesurplusforafirmfromanexistingemploymentrelationshipwilldifferfromtheoneforanewmatchduetothefiringcostthatthefirmincurswhenthematchbreaks up. For an existing employment relationship the outcome of the surplus splittingassumptionmaximizesthefollowingproduct:
€
(Wt−U
t)η(J
t− (V
t−F))1−η (19)
ThesecondtermreflectsthefactthatwhenthematchendsupthefirmendsupwiththevalueofvacancyandpaysthefixedfiringcostsF.Thewagethatmaximizesthejointsurplusgivesthefollowingoptimalitycondition:
€
η(Jt+F) = (1−η)(W
t−U
t) (20)
usingthesebargainingequationsandthejobcreationconditiongivesusthewageforanewmatchandthewageforanexistingemploymentrelationship:
€
wt =ηxtat f (ht )
ht+κθtht
+(1− βρ)F
ht]+ (1−η)[
g(ht )
htλt+b
ht] (21)
€
wtn=η
xtat f (ht )
ht+κθtht
−βρF
ht]+ (1−η)[
g(ht )
htλt+b
ht] (22)
where
€
wtn referstothewageforaworkerthathasmadeanewmatchwiththefirm.Thewage
equationsshowthatworkersthatalreadyhaveajobbenefitfromahigherfiringcostwhereasworkersthatdonothaveajobareharmed.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththeempiricalevidencereportedbyoEcdmentioningthatworkersthatalreadyhaveajobarefavoredbyhigherfiringcostswhereasthehigherfiringcostsmakeitmoredifficultforoutsiderstofindajobandreducestheirwages.
ForthedeterminationofhoursworkedIassumethatworkersandfirmsjointlydeterminehours.Trigari(2006)definesthisbargainingprocedureasefficientbargaining.Theoptimalityconditionforthedeterminationofhoursworkedisgivenby:
€
xtat fh (ht ) =g'(ht )
λt (23)
where
€
at fh (ht ) referstomarginalproductofhoursworkedand
€
g' (ht )λ
denotesmarginalrateofsubstitution.
2.3 Retail Firms
There is a continuum of retails firms on the unit interval indexed by j operating in amonopolisticallycompetitivemarket.retailfirmstransformtheintermediategoodswithatechnologyandresellthemtothehouseholdsasafinalconsumptiongood.definingyjt astheoutputproducedbyretailfirmj,finalgoods,denotedbyyt, aregivenbythefollowingcombinationofindividualretailgoods:
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€
yt = 0
1
∫ y jtε−1
ε dj
ε
ε−1
(24)
whereεistheelasticityofsubstitutionacrossthedifferentiatedretailgoods.usingthisconditioneachretailfirmhasthefollowingdemandfunctiongivenby:
€
y jt = (p jt
pt)−εyt (25)
wherepjt isthepricechargedbyretailfirmj andpt istheaggregatepriceindexgivenby:
€
pt = 0
1
∫ p jt1−εdj[ ]
1
1−ε (26)
retailfirmsaresubjecttocalvo(1983)typenominalpricerigidity.Eachperiodaretailfirmisallowedtoadjustitspricewithprobability1–ϕ andthisprobabilityisindependentofhistoryofpriceadjustments.Theretailfirmsthathavethechancetosettheirpricewillchoosetheirpriceinordertomaximizetheirexpectedfuturediscountedprofitssubjecttothedemandfortheirgoodandtotheconditionthatthepricethattheysetatdatet prevailsatdatet + k withprobabilityϕt + k.Thefirstorderconditionfortheretailfirm’sprofitmaximizationproblemisgivenby:
€
p jt = ςEtk=0
∞
∑ψ t,t +kmct +kn (27)
where
€
ς = εε −1istheflexiblepricemarkupandtheterm
€
mctn = ptmct isthenominalmarginal
costatdatet. Therelevantweights
€
ψ t,t +k arewrittenas:
€
ψ t,t+k =ϕ kβt,t+kRjt,t+k
Etk=0
∞
∑ϕ kβt,t+kRjt,t+k
(28)
whereRjt, t + k istherevenueattimet + k giventhatthelastpriceadjustmentisdoneinperiodt
2.4 Monetary Authority
Iassumethattheshort-terminterestrateisthepolicyinstrumentofthemonetarypolicyandthemoneysupplyisadjustedaccordingly.IsetaTaylortyperuleforthenominalinterestratergivenby:
€
rt = β−(1−τ )
(rt−1)τEt (π t+1)
απ(1−τ )
(yt − y)αy(1−τ )
eεtr
(29)
wheretheparameterτmeasuresthedegreeofinterestratesmoothing.Thenominalinterestraterespondstoinflationandthedeviationofoutputfromitssteadystatevalue.Theresponsecoefficientsare
€
απ and
€
αy respectively.Thelastterminthepolicyfunction,
€
εtr ,isthei.i.d
monetarypolicyshock.
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Iclosethemodelbywritinganaggregateresourceconstraint.Thatisgivenby:
€
yt = ct +κvt + ρFnt−1 (30)
Thisshowsthatoutputgoestoconsumptionorvacancypostingcostorfiringcost.
III.cALIBrATIoN
InordertoinvestigatethebusinesscyclepropertiesofthetheoreticalmodelIassignnumericalvaluestothestructuralparameters.Isetthediscountfactor,β,to0.99whichimpliesa4%annualinterestrate.Thevalueofthehabitpersistenceparameterissetas0.6.Isetthelaborsupplyelasticityas1/3whichisconsistentwiththemicroeconomicstudiesthatestimatethelaborsupplyelasticitycloseto0andnothigherthan0.5.
FollowingtheliteratureIchooseacobb-douglasformforthematchingfunction.Thematchingfunctionisgivenby
€
m = Mv1−µuµ .FollowingKrauseandLubik(2006)Isetthelevelparameter,M, as0.6.InaccordancewithTrigari(2006)Isettheelasticityparameter,μ, equalto0.5.6Theparameterfortheseparationrateissetas0.1.Therearesomeempiricalestimatesintheliteraturefortheu.S.separationrate.Hall(1995)reportsthisratetobebetween8to10percent.davis,Haltiwanger,andSchuh(1996)estimatestheu.S.separationrateas8%.ThevaluethatIsetisconsistentwiththeempiricalestimates.Forthevacancypostingcost,followingKrauseandLubik(2006)Icalibrateitas0.16.Thatimpliesthatatthesteadystateabout4%oftheoutputgoestovacancypostingcost.FollowingKrauseandLubik(2006)thevaluefromunemploymentgivenbyz issetas0.4andtherelativebargainingpoweroftheworkerissetas0.5.ThisvalueisthesameastheelasticityparameterofthematchingfunctionandsosatisfiestheHosios(1990)condition.
Inowcalibratethestructuralparametersfortheretailsector.Isettheprobabilitythatafirmisnotallowedtochangeitspriceinagivenperiodequalto0.67whichimpliespricesonaveragearefixedbythreequarters.Isettheflexiblepricemarkupas10%whichimplies�
Lastly,Icalibratetheparametersfortheexogenousshocksandthemonetarypolicyrule.IassumethatthelogarithmoftheaggregateproductivityshockfollowsanAr(1)processwithacoefficient0.923whichisusedbycanzoneri,cumby,anddiba(2007).Againfollowingcanzoneri,cumby,anddiba(2007)theinterestratesmoothingparameterissetas0.824andthecoefficientsoninflationandoutputaresetequalto2.02and0.184respectively.
IV.rESuLTS
InthissectionIpresentthemodelresultsintermsofinvestigatinghowthelevelofthebenefitreplacementrateandfiringcostsaffectthewageandinflationdynamics.
6 Fortheestimationofthematchingfunction,PetrongoloandPissarides(2001)reportthisparametertobebetween0.5and0.7intheirsurveyoftheliterature.
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4.1 Volatility and Persistence
Ifirstpresentthemodelresultsforthevolatilityofinflationandwagesfordifferentlevelsoffiringcost.Table 1showsthestandarddeviationsofthesevariablesforthreedifferentfiringcost levels.Thefirstcolumnisfor thecasewheretherearenofiringcosts.InthesecondcolumntheF parameterissettogenerateafiringcostthatisequaltoonewageatthesteadystateandinthethirdcolumnitissettogenerateafiringcostequaltotwowagesatthesteadystate.Thestandarddeviationsaremeasuredrelativetothatofoutput.Asthetableshowsasfiringcostsgoupthevolatilityofinflationandwagesgodown.Thisisconsistentwiththeempiricalresults thatarepresentedabove.Itwouldalsobenice tocompare theordersofmagnitudeonFigures 1and2toTable 1bygivingasenseoftwocountriesinthedata.InthisregardIchooseGermanyandNetherlands.IntermsoftheemploymentprotectionlegislationindexthevalueforNetherlandsishigherthanthatofGermany.InthedataonecanseethatthevolatilityofinflationforNetherlandsisabout30%lowerthanthatofGermany.IntermsofthevolatilityofwagesthenumberforNetherlandsisagainlowerthanthevolatilityofwagesinGermany.Animportantpointtonotehereisthatthevolatilityofwagesishigherthanwhatmightbeobservedinactualdata.Thereasonforthisisthatthemodelabstractsfrommanyrealrigiditiesincludingstaggeredwagecontractingoron-the-jobsearchmechanism.
Next,Iwilllookatcoefficientsofautocorrelationforinflationandrealwagesfordifferentlevelsoffiringcostsandthebenefitreplacementrateinordertoassesshowtheselabormarketinstitutionsaffectthepersistenceinthesevariables.Table 2showstheresultsfordifferentlevelsoffiringcosts.Ilookatcoefficientsofautocorrelationuptofivelagsfortwodifferentfiringcostlevels.Theresultsshowthatwhenfiringcostsgoupbothinflationandrealwagesbecomemorepersistent.Intermsofeconomicinterpretationthisresultisnotsurprising.Iffiringcostsarehigherthaninresponsetoexogenousshocksfirmshaveverylittleroomtomoveintermsofadjustingtheirpricesandinturntheirwages.Thismakesbothvariablesmorepersistentandlessvolatile.Atthispointitwillbeillustrativetogiveanexamplefromacoupleofcountriesinthedatathatmaysupportthemodelresultsintermsofautocorrelation.TobeconsistentwiththemodeltheautocorrelationsarecalculatedfortheH-Pfiltereddata.IpresenttheresultsuptofivelagsandforfourdifferentcountriesnamelyNetherlands,Germany,France,anddenmark.Table 3showstheresultsforrealwagesandTable 4showstheresultsforinflation.Itisseenfromtheresultsthatcountriesthataresubjecttomorerigidemploymentprotectionlegislationtendtohavemorepersistentinflationandwages.Animportantthingtonotehereisthattheobservedautocorrelationsaremuchhigherthantheonesobtainedfromthemodel.Thereasonforthisisthat,asImentionedbefore,themodelabstractsfrommanyrealrigiditiesthatmayhelpinobtainingtheobservedpatterninwages.Incorporatingstaggeredwagecontractingoron-the-jobsearchmechanismmaybearemedyinthisregard.
BesidesthefiringcostsIalsoinvestigatethepersistenceininflationandwagesfordifferentlevelsofthebenefitreplacementrate.Ilookfortwodiffferentlevelsofthebenefitreplacementrate.In thefirstoneIset theb parameterwhichgivesmeat thesteadystate thevalueofunemploymentbenefitstothewageis0.56.Inthesecondonetheparameterissetalowervaluethatatthesteadystatethisratiois0.19.BothofthesearewithintherangeofbenefitreplacementrateobservedinoEcdcountriesreportedbyNickell(2006).Table 5showstheresultsforinflationandwages.Itisseenthatespeciallyforinflationthepersistencebecomes
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moreobviouswhenthebenefitreplacementrategoesup.Whenthebenefitreplacementrateishigherworkersarenotwillingtotakelargewagecutsinresponsetoexogenousshocks.Thismakesbothwagesandinflationmorepersistentinresponsetotheseshocks.
4.2 Impulse Responses
Anotherimportantissueaboutthelabormarketinstitutionsiswhetherdifferencesintheseaffecthowmacrovariablesrespondtoexogenousshocks.InthissectionIinvestigatehowtheleveloffiringcostsandthebenefitreplacementrateaffectthepatternthatinflationandwages show in response toexogenous shocks inparticular toproductivityandmonetarypolicyshock.Figure 4showstheresponseofinflationtoapositiveproductivityshockfortwodifferentfiringcostlevels.onecanseethatwhenfiringcostsarelower,onimpactinflationshowsalargerresponse.Inthiscaseonimpactinflationgoesdownby0.55%whereasinthecasewherefiringcostsarehigherinflationgoesdownbyabout0.45%.However,itisseenthatwhenfiringcostsarelowerinflationadjustsmorequicklyinresponsetotheproductivityshock.Thisisactuallyconsistentwiththepreviousresultsthatarepresented.Thatiswhenfiringcostsarehigher,inresponsetotheexogenousshocksinflationbecomesmorepersistent.Figure 5showsthesameresultsforamonetarypolicyshockthatraisestheinterestrates.onecanseethesamepatternintheresponseofinflationthatisseeninproductivityshock.oncetheeconomyishitbyamonetarypolicyshockonimpactinflationgoesdownbyabout0.4%whenthefiringcostsareloweranditgoesdownby0.25%whenfiringcostsarehigher.However,again,inflationdoesnotshowapersistentresponsewhenfiringcostsareloweranditadjustsmorequicklycomparedtothecasewherefiringcostsarehigher.
Thepatternthatisseenininflationcanalsobeseenintheresponseofwages.Figure 6shows the response ofwages in response to a positive productivity shock.one can seethatonimpactlowerfiringcostscreatealargerresponse.However,thispatterndoesnotpersistandadjustveryquickly.Lowerfiringcostsgeneratemoreflexibilityforthefirmsinadjustingtheirwagesandcreateslargerandquickeradjustmentsinwagesinresponsetotheproductivityshock.
Besidestheleveloffiringcostthelevelofbenefitreplacementrateisalsoeffectivefortheresponseofinflationandwagestoproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks.Figure 7showstheresponseofinflationtoapositiveproductivityshockfortwodifferentbenefitreplacementratesthathavebeenusedinprevioussection.Thesamepatternisobservedthathasbeenseenforfiringcosts.Whentherearelessgenerousunemploymentbenefitsonimpact,inflationshowsa larger response to thepositiveproductivityshockbut itadjusts faster than is thecasewhentherearemoregenerousunemploymentbenefits.Figure 8showsthesameresultsnowforamonetarypolicyshockandexactlythesamepatternisobserved.Lowerbenefitreplacementratesmakeinflationlesspersistentandthiscanbeobservedintheresponseofinflationtoaproductivityandmonetarypolicyshock.Figure 9showstheresponseofwagestoamonetarypolicyshockagainfortwodifferentbenefitreplacementratelevels.Whenthebenefitreplacementrateislower,wagesshowaslightlylargerresponseatthebeginningbutthenadjustveryquickly.Itisimportanttonotethattheleveloffiringcostsseemstoberelativelymoreinfluentialonimpulseresponsescomparedtotheeffectofthebenefitreplacementrate.
lABoR mARkEt institutions AnD WAgE AnD inflAtion DynAmic
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V.coNcLuSIoN
InthispaperIdevelopadynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelinanotherwisestandardNKmodel.Thispaperdiffersfromthepreviousliteraturethatusesthesamemodellingstrategywiththerespecttotheincorporationoffiringcosts.Thatiswhenanexistingemploymentrelationshipbreaksupthefirmincursafixedfiringcost.InthiscontextIinvestigatehowtheleveloffiringcostandunemploymentbenefitaffectthebusinesscycledynamics,particularly,wageandinflationdynamics.
Ibuildadynamicstochasticgeneralequilibriummodelforaclosedeconomyandinvestigatehowinflationandwagesreactfordifferentlevelsoffiringcostsandbenefitreplacementrate.Ifindthathigherlevelsoffiringcostgeneratelessvolatileandmorepersistentpatterninwagesandinflationinresponsetoproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks.Thesamepatternholdsaswellforbenefitreplacementrates.Ialsofindthatwhenfiringcostsarelower,inresponsetotheproductivityandmonetarypolicyshocks,inflationandwagesshowlargerresponsesonimpactbuttheyadjustquickly.
Animportantextensionofthisworkmaybetoinvestigatetheroleofotherimportantlabormarketinstitutionsforbusinesscycledynamics.Amongthesedurationofbenefits,uniondensityandcoverage,andbargainingcoordinationandcentralizationcanbelisted.Theroleoftheseandotherlabormarketinstitutionscanbeempiricallyinvestigatedintermsoftheireffectonbusinesscycledynamics.developingtheoreticalmodelsthatmayprovidesupportfortheempiricalevidencemayalsobeanimportantfutureworkinthisdirection.
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Kai, c and T. Linzert (2005). The role of realWage rigidity and Labor Market Frictions forunemploymentandInflationdynamics,EcBWorkingPaperNo.556.
Steven,d.,J.Haltivanger,andS.Schuh(1996).Job Creation and Destruction.cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.
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andStaggeredNominalWageBargaining,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.40:1713-1764.Macit,F.(2010).MonetaryPolicyandProductivityShockswithEndogenousHoursandon-the-Job
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TABLES
Table 1:StandarddeviationofVariablesfordifferentFiringcostLevels
F=0 F=w F=2wInflation 1.11 0.55 0.45realWage 2.30 1.58 1.21
Table 2:coefficientsofAutocorrelationforInflationandrealWages
1 2 3 4 5InflationwithF=w 0.4817 0.2193 0.0626 -0.0370 -0.0997InflationwithF=2w 0.5868 0.3241 0.1418 0.0125 -0.0777realWagewithF=w 0.3979 0.1564 0.0292 -0.0482 -0.0963realWagewithF=2w 0.5135 0.2794 0.1298 0.0215 -0.0581
Table 3:coefficientsofAutocorrelationforrealWages
1 2 3 4 5 EPLNetherlands 0.7714 0.6170 0.4918 0.4297 0.2142 3.07Germany 0.5973 0.3748 0.1530 -0.0068 -0.2758 2.66France 0.7257 0.5771 0.4418 0.3208 0.1143 2.37denmark 0.4756 0.2082 0.0876 0.1188 -0.2053 1.49
Table 4:coefficientsofAutocorrelationforInflation
1 2 3 4 5 EPLNetherlands 0.7943 0.5020 0.1955 -0.0977 -0.2634 3.07Germany 0.7621 0.4930 0.2660 0.0308 -0.0667 2.66France 0.6482 0.4460 0.3452 -0.0276 -0.1141 2.37denmark 0.6305 0.2939 -0.0294 -0.2077 -0.3028 1.49
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Table 5:coefficientsofAutocorrelationforInflationandrealWages
1 2 3 4 5
Inflationwith
bw = 0.56 0.3788 0.1169 -0.0169 -0.0878 -0.1225
Inflationwith
bw = 0.19 0.3226 0.0617 -0.0727 -0.1237 -0.1350
realWagewith
bw = 0.56 0.3589 0.1158 -0.0085 -0.0785 -0.1158
realWagewith
bw = 0.19 0.3658 0.1045 -0.0480 -0.1165 -0.1404
FIGurES
Figure 1:TherelationshipBetweentheVolatilityofInflationandEmploymentProtection
Inflation with
0.56=wb
0.3788 0.1169 -0.0169 -0.0878 -0.1225
Inflation with
0.19=wb
0.3226 0.0617 -0.0727 -0.1237 -0.1350
Real Wage with
0.56=wb
0.3589 0.1158 -0.0085 -0.0785 -0.1158
Real Wage with
0.19=wb
0.3658 0.1045 -0.0480 -0.1165 -0.1404
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.50.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Employment Protection Legislation Index
The S
tandar
d Devi
ation o
f Infla
tion
data 1 linear
Figure 1: The relationship between the volatility of inflation and employment
StandarddeviationofInflation
EmploymentProtectionLegislationIndex
fAtih mAcit
407
Figure 2:TherelationshipBetweentheVolatilityrealWagesandEmploymentProtection
Figure 3:TherelationshipBetweentheVolatilityMarginalcostandEmploymentProtection
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.50.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
Employment Protection Index
Standa
rd Devia
tion of W
ages
data points linear fit
Figure 2: The relationship between the volatility real wages and
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
Employment Protection Legislation Index
Standa
rd Devi
ation o
f Marg
inal C
ost
data points linear
Figure 3: The relationship between the volatility marginal cost and employment protection
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
01 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 4: Impulse response of inflation for a positive productivity shock
StandarddeviationofWages
StandarddeviationofM
arginalc
ost
EmploymentProtectionIndex
EmploymentProtectionLegislationIndex
lABoR mARkEt institutions AnD WAgE AnD inflAtion DynAmic
408
Figure 5:ImpulseresponseofInflationforaMonetaryPolicyShock
Figure 4:ImpulseresponseofInflationforaPositiveProductivityShock
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
Employment Protection Legislation Index
Standa
rd Devi
ation o
f Marg
inal C
ost
data points linear
Figure 3: The relationship between the volatility marginal cost and employment protection
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
01 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 4: Impulse response of inflation for a positive productivity shock
-0.004
-0.0035
-0.003
-0.0025
-0.002
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 5: Impulse response of inflation for a monetary policy shock
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 6: Impulse response of wages for a positive productivity shock
fAtih mAcit
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Figure 6:ImpulseresponseofWagesforaPositiveProductivityShock
Figure 7:ImpulseresponseofInflationtoaPositiveProductivityShock
-0.004
-0.0035
-0.003
-0.0025
-0.002
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 5: Impulse response of inflation for a monetary policy shock
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23Lower firing costHigher firing cost
Figure 6: Impulse response of wages for a positive productivity shock
-0.009
-0.008
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Higer BRR
Lower BRR
Figure 7: Impulse response of inflation to a positive productivity shock
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Higher BRR
Lower BRR
Figure 8: Impulse response of inflation to a monetary policy shock
lABoR mARkEt institutions AnD WAgE AnD inflAtion DynAmic
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Figure 8:ImpulseresponseofInflationtoaMonetaryPolicyShock
Figure 9:ImpulseresponseofWagestoaMonetaryPolicyShock
-0.009
-0.008
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Higer BRR
Lower BRR
Figure 7: Impulse response of inflation to a positive productivity shock
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Higher BRR
Lower BRR
Figure 8: Impulse response of inflation to a monetary policy shock
-0.016
-0.014
-0.012
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Higher BRR
Lower BRR
Figure 9: Impulse response of wages to a monetary policy shock
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