Government S-1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2006 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement.
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Government S-1740INTERNATIONAL LAW
Summer 2006
Individual Human Rights:
The Problem of Enforcement
OUTLINEI. Sources of International Human Rights LawII. Multilateral “enforcement”
A. International human rights monitoring bodiesB. HR Committee: Individual complaints processC. HR Commission: 1503 proceduresD. UN General Assembly resolutions
III. Legal means of enforcementA. Domestic courtsB. Foreign courts
IV. Political mechanismsA. Hegemonic pressureB. Domestic political pressuresC. Transnational pressure: The role of NGOs
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
THE UNITED NATIONS
• The UN Charter (Article 55)• The Universal Declaration on Human Rights
– personal rights (Articles 2-6)– legal rights (Articles 8-12)– civil liberties (Articles 13, 18-20)– subsistence/economic rights (Articles 22-25)– social and cultural rights (Articles 26-27)– political rights (Article 21)
International Human Rights Instruments in Force
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Year
Num
ber
of in
stru
men
ts
Treaty Declaration Other
SIX “CORE” HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights• International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights• Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination• Convention against Torture• Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women• Convention on the Rights of the Child
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)
ICCPR OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS
• I: State parties agree to recognize the competence of the Human Rights Committee to monitor and review practices
• II: State parties agree not to use the death penalty
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINA- TION(CERD) Steven Biko
CONVENTION AGAINST
CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATIO
N AGAINST WOMEN
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
(CRC)
0
200
400
600
800
1000To
tal R
atifi
catio
ns
year 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Year
Human Rights Treaty Ratifications
Civil&Political Economic&SocialRacial Discrimination WomenChildren Torture
II. MULTILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING
BODIES•Charter based bodies:
•Commission on Human Rights
•Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
•Treaty-based bodies:
•Committee against Torture Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights•Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women•Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination•Committee on the Rights of the Child •Human Rights Committee*
DUTIES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE
• receives reports
• receives individuals complaints
• issues general comments
THE INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT PROCESS
• First Optional Protocol
• Patterns of individual complaints
• Findings
Jamaica
Finland
0
5
10
15
20
25
Leastdemocratic
moderatelydemocratic
mostdemocratic
degree of democracy
Average number of individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee
Closed cases Active cases
UN Human Rights Commission
The Torture ScaleType of activity:
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5
Psychological mistreatment
Frequent, often
Used without reference to frequency
Sometimes, occasional
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
Rough handling, other abuse
Frequent, routine
Regular brutality, sever maltreatment of prisoners
Sometimes, occasional
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
Beatings Frequent, routine
Common (or not uncommon), numerous reports
Allegations or indications (any reported – regardless of redress)
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
torture Prevalent, widespread, repeated, methodical
Common, several reports, numerous allegations
Some, occasional (unless redressed)
Unsubstantiated; unlikely true; isolated, with redress
None
Abused to death
Common, frequent, many, widespread
Some, occasional incidents, several reports
Isolated reports
None None
Source: Oona Hathaway, 2002
Torture trends of the UNHR Commission
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
To
rtu
re s
cale
UNCHR members UNCHR nonmembers
The UNHR Commission and the Practice of Political Terror
0
1
2
3
4
5
Polit
ic T
erro
r Sca
e
UNCHR member UNCHR nonmember
1503 PROCEDURES
• ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970)
• Consistent pattern of gross violations
• Investigations can be initiated by the UN Human Rights Commission
1503 PROCEDURESStates Investigated Under the 1503 Procedure
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Inv
es
tig
ati
on
s
Number of Countriesinvestigated
1503 Subjects: Practice of Political Terror
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
44.5
Po
litic
al T
erro
r S
cale
UNCHR member 1503 subjects
STATES EXAMINED UNDER THE 1503 PROCEDURE BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (THROUGH 2003)
• Afghanistan, 1981 - 1984
• Albania, 1984 – 1988, 1995
• Antigua & Barbuda, 1997
• Argentina, 1980-1984
• Armenia, 1994-1996
• Azerbaijan, 1994 - 1996
• Bahrain, 1991-1993
• Benin, 1984-1985, 1988
• Bolivia, 1977-1981
•Botswana, 1977•Brazil, 1974-1976•Brunei, 1988-1990•Burma, 1979-1980, 1990-1992•Burundi, 1974-1975•Central African Rep., 1980-81•Chad, 2002-2003•Chile, 1975-76, 1978-79, 1981,
2000
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Czech Republic, 1997• Djibouti, 2003• El Salvador, 1981• Equatorial Guinea, 1976-79• Estonia, 1994, 1997• Ethiopia, 1978-1981• Gabon, 1986• Gambia, 1997-1999• German Dem. Rep., 1981-83• Germany, 1994• Grenada, 1988• Guatemala, 1981• Guyana, 1974-1975• Haiti, 1981-1987
•Honduras, 1988-1989•Indonesia (and East Timor),
1978-81, 1983-85•Iran, 1974-1975, 1983•Iraq, 1988, 1989•Israel, 1975-1977•Japan, 1981, 1998•Cambodia, 1979•Kenya, 1993, 2000•Korea, Rep. of, 1977-1982•Kuwait, 1994•Kyrgyzstan, 1997-1998•Laos, 1995
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Latvia, 1995, 1997, 2000
• Lebanon, 1997
• Liberia, 2002-2003
• Lithuania, 1997
• Malawi, 1977-1980
• Malaysia, 1984
• Maldives, 2001
• Mali, 1996
• Moldova, 1995
• Mozambique, 1981
• Nepal, 1996, 1999
• Nigeria, 2002
• Pakistan, 1984, 1985, 1988
•Paraguay, 1978-90, 1998
•Peru, 1998
•Philippines, 1984-1986
•Portugal, 1974-1975
•Republic of the Congo, 2000, 2001
•Rwanda, 1993-1995
•Saudi Arabia, 1995-1999
•Sierra Leone , 1996-1999
•Slovenia, 1995, 1996
•Somalia, 1989-1994
•Sudan, 1991-1993
•Syria, 1989, 1992, 1997
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Tanzania, 1974-1975, 1997
• Thailand, 1995, 1996
• Togo, 2001-2002
• Turkey, 1983-1986
• Uganda, 1975-81, 1995, 2000-01
• United Arab Emirates, 2000
• United Kingdom, 1974-1975
• United States of America, 1997
• Uruguay, 1978-1985
•Uzbekistan, 1996-97, 2003•Venezuela, 1982•Viet Nam, 1994, 2000•Yemen, 1998-1999, 2000•Zaire (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)
1985-89, 1991-93•Zimbabwe, 2000
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat1.htm
MULTILATERAL PRESSURE
• Efforts to manipulate multilateral aid
• United Nations multilateral pressure
UNGA State-Specific Human Rights Resolutions by Year
02468
1012141618
1946
1952
1958
1964
1970
1976
1982
1988
1994
2000
Year
Nub
er o
f Res
olut
ions
P
asse
d
Number of Resolutions
Political Terror Practices of UNGA Members and Their Resolution Targets
0
1
2
3
4
5
Po
litic
al T
erro
r S
cale
named in UNGA Resolution UNGA average
III. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
DOMESTIC COURTS
• Example: Israeli Supreme Court decision, 1999.
USE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL
SYSTEMS
The Alien Tort Statute:FILARTIGA V. PENA-
IRALA• Background: foreign nationals, incident of
torture on foreign soil
• Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
• Torture is a breach of customary international law, enforceable in US courts
THE CASE OF THE BURMA GAS PIPELINE
IV. POLITICAL MECHANISMS
•Hegemonic
•Domestic
•Transnational
HEGEMONIC PRESSURE
• Bilateral political pressure
• Multilateral pressure
What is the Likelihood of Rights Mobilization?
Stable autocracy
Stable democracy
Volatile/transitionalregimes
Likelihood of succeeding
Value ofsuccess
high
low
The Expected Value of Mobilization:
Expected Value of Mobilization=(value of succeeding) x (probability of success)
Stable autocracy
Volatile/transitionalregimes
Stable democracy
Expected Value of Mobilization
How can Treaties Influence Domestic Politics?
• Raise and focus domestic expectations
• Increase the political power of pro-rights groups
• Attract pro-compliance allies
Expectation
• Treaties should have their greatest positive impact in more fluid, transitional, only partially democratic regimes.
Freedom from Torture
The Effect of the CAT on Torture Practices
Model type:
Conditional effects:
Ordered probit, one-stage estimation:
Simultaneous estimation. I.V., probit:
CAT in stable democracies and stable autocracies
-.212* -.288***
Transitional countries w/o the CAT -.797** -.207**
Transitional countries with the CAT .044* .033*
Note: Compare lines 3 and 4
This analysis controls for:
• Regional torture practices
• Civil War• Interstate war• Log of GDP• Log of GDP/capita
• Free Press• National Truth
Commissions• Torture in previous period• Year (trend)
TRANSNATIONAL PRESSURES
• Norm emergence
• Norm cascade
• internalization
Number of States with Amnesty International Sections
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Year
Num
ber o
f Sta
tes
Sections
HUMAN RIGHTS NGO GROWTH
Human Rights Watch Sections and Offices
0
2
4
6
8
10
1219
78
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Year
Numb
er of
Se
ction
s/Offic
es
Watch
Office
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of Internet Users (Millions)
US and Canada Western Europe Rest of the World
NGOs: BOOMERANG EFFECT
REPRESSIVE STATE
XXXXXXXXXXdomestic human rights demands
Coalition with transnational NGOs
Intergov.Organ.
Foreign gov’t
Multilateral or bilateral pressure
SUMMARY• The international human rights regime is characterized by weak
enforcement• Multilateral fora to hear individual complaints and render
recommendations exist, but often have no teeth.• Domestic enforcement is preferable in theory• The use of foreign courts is a theoretical possibility, but has been only
rarely used• Bilateral political pressure usually takes a back seat to foreign policy goals• Treaty commitments can change domestic politics and empower demands
of locals for rights realization.• NGOs are a crucial form of external vigilance; especially important in
extremely repressive political regimes.
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